]> andersk Git - openssh.git/blame - auth.c
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/11/16 12:46:13
[openssh.git] / auth.c
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7368a6c8 1/*
f3c7c613 2 * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
bcbf86ec 3 *
4 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
5 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
6 * are met:
7 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
8 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
9 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
10 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
11 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
12 *
13 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
14 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
15 * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
16 * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
17 * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
18 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
19 * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
20 * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
21 * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
22 * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
7368a6c8 23 */
24
25#include "includes.h"
fad3754c 26RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.29 2001/11/08 20:02:24 markus Exp $");
7368a6c8 27
c1ef8333 28#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_H
29#include <login.h>
30#endif
4cb5ffa0 31#if defined(HAVE_SHADOW_H) && !defined(DISABLE_SHADOW)
32#include <shadow.h>
33#endif /* defined(HAVE_SHADOW_H) && !defined(DISABLE_SHADOW) */
7368a6c8 34
b4d02860 35#ifdef HAVE_LIBGEN_H
c8445989 36#include <libgen.h>
b4d02860 37#endif
c8445989 38
42f11eb2 39#include "xmalloc.h"
40#include "match.h"
41#include "groupaccess.h"
42#include "log.h"
43#include "servconf.h"
e78a59f5 44#include "auth.h"
59c97189 45#include "auth-options.h"
42f11eb2 46#include "canohost.h"
c8445989 47#include "buffer.h"
48#include "bufaux.h"
d0c8ca5c 49#include "uidswap.h"
50#include "tildexpand.h"
e78a59f5 51
7368a6c8 52/* import */
53extern ServerOptions options;
7368a6c8 54
55/*
c6a69271 56 * Check if the user is allowed to log in via ssh. If user is listed
57 * in DenyUsers or one of user's groups is listed in DenyGroups, false
58 * will be returned. If AllowUsers isn't empty and user isn't listed
59 * there, or if AllowGroups isn't empty and one of user's groups isn't
60 * listed there, false will be returned.
7368a6c8 61 * If the user's shell is not executable, false will be returned.
6ae2364d 62 * Otherwise true is returned.
7368a6c8 63 */
a306f2dd 64int
7368a6c8 65allowed_user(struct passwd * pw)
66{
67 struct stat st;
80f8f24f 68 const char *hostname = NULL, *ipaddr = NULL;
614dee3a 69 char *shell;
7368a6c8 70 int i;
71#ifdef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE
72 char *loginmsg;
73#endif /* WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE */
75b90ced 74#if !defined(USE_PAM) && defined(HAVE_SHADOW_H) && \
37c1c46d 75 !defined(DISABLE_SHADOW) && defined(HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE)
c6a69271 76 struct spwd *spw;
7368a6c8 77
78 /* Shouldn't be called if pw is NULL, but better safe than sorry... */
c6a69271 79 if (!pw || !pw->pw_name)
7368a6c8 80 return 0;
81
4cb5ffa0 82 spw = getspnam(pw->pw_name);
27494968 83 if (spw != NULL) {
84 int days = time(NULL) / 86400;
4cb5ffa0 85
27494968 86 /* Check account expiry */
37c1c46d 87 if ((spw->sp_expire >= 0) && (days > spw->sp_expire))
27494968 88 return 0;
89
90 /* Check password expiry */
2b87da3b 91 if ((spw->sp_lstchg >= 0) && (spw->sp_max >= 0) &&
7f8f5e00 92 (days > (spw->sp_lstchg + spw->sp_max)))
27494968 93 return 0;
94 }
4cb5ffa0 95#else
96 /* Shouldn't be called if pw is NULL, but better safe than sorry... */
c6a69271 97 if (!pw || !pw->pw_name)
4cb5ffa0 98 return 0;
99#endif
100
301e9b01 101 /*
102 * Get the shell from the password data. An empty shell field is
103 * legal, and means /bin/sh.
104 */
105 shell = (pw->pw_shell[0] == '\0') ? _PATH_BSHELL : pw->pw_shell;
106
107 /* deny if shell does not exists or is not executable */
108 if (stat(shell, &st) != 0)
7368a6c8 109 return 0;
110 if (!((st.st_mode & S_IFREG) && (st.st_mode & (S_IXOTH|S_IXUSR|S_IXGRP))))
111 return 0;
112
80f8f24f 113 if (options.num_deny_users > 0 || options.num_allow_users > 0) {
114 hostname = get_canonical_hostname(options.reverse_mapping_check);
115 ipaddr = get_remote_ipaddr();
116 }
117
7368a6c8 118 /* Return false if user is listed in DenyUsers */
119 if (options.num_deny_users > 0) {
7368a6c8 120 for (i = 0; i < options.num_deny_users; i++)
80f8f24f 121 if (match_user(pw->pw_name, hostname, ipaddr,
122 options.deny_users[i]))
7368a6c8 123 return 0;
124 }
125 /* Return false if AllowUsers isn't empty and user isn't listed there */
126 if (options.num_allow_users > 0) {
7368a6c8 127 for (i = 0; i < options.num_allow_users; i++)
80f8f24f 128 if (match_user(pw->pw_name, hostname, ipaddr,
129 options.allow_users[i]))
7368a6c8 130 break;
131 /* i < options.num_allow_users iff we break for loop */
132 if (i >= options.num_allow_users)
133 return 0;
134 }
7368a6c8 135 if (options.num_deny_groups > 0 || options.num_allow_groups > 0) {
c6a69271 136 /* Get the user's group access list (primary and supplementary) */
137 if (ga_init(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) == 0)
7368a6c8 138 return 0;
139
c6a69271 140 /* Return false if one of user's groups is listed in DenyGroups */
141 if (options.num_deny_groups > 0)
142 if (ga_match(options.deny_groups,
143 options.num_deny_groups)) {
144 ga_free();
7368a6c8 145 return 0;
c6a69271 146 }
7368a6c8 147 /*
c6a69271 148 * Return false if AllowGroups isn't empty and one of user's groups
7368a6c8 149 * isn't listed there
150 */
c6a69271 151 if (options.num_allow_groups > 0)
152 if (!ga_match(options.allow_groups,
153 options.num_allow_groups)) {
154 ga_free();
7368a6c8 155 return 0;
c6a69271 156 }
157 ga_free();
7368a6c8 158 }
159
160#ifdef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE
5daf7064 161 if (loginrestrictions(pw->pw_name, S_RLOGIN, NULL, &loginmsg) != 0) {
c1ef8333 162 if (loginmsg && *loginmsg) {
163 /* Remove embedded newlines (if any) */
164 char *p;
5daf7064 165 for (p = loginmsg; *p; p++) {
c1ef8333 166 if (*p == '\n')
167 *p = ' ';
5daf7064 168 }
c1ef8333 169 /* Remove trailing newline */
170 *--p = '\0';
5daf7064 171 log("Login restricted for %s: %.100s", pw->pw_name, loginmsg);
c1ef8333 172 }
7368a6c8 173 return 0;
c1ef8333 174 }
7368a6c8 175#endif /* WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE */
176
177 /* We found no reason not to let this user try to log on... */
178 return 1;
179}
59c97189 180
181Authctxt *
182authctxt_new(void)
183{
2b87da3b 184 Authctxt *authctxt = xmalloc(sizeof(*authctxt));
185 memset(authctxt, 0, sizeof(*authctxt));
186 return authctxt;
59c97189 187}
188
59c97189 189void
190auth_log(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, char *method, char *info)
191{
192 void (*authlog) (const char *fmt,...) = verbose;
193 char *authmsg;
194
195 /* Raise logging level */
196 if (authenticated == 1 ||
197 !authctxt->valid ||
198 authctxt->failures >= AUTH_FAIL_LOG ||
199 strcmp(method, "password") == 0)
200 authlog = log;
201
202 if (authctxt->postponed)
203 authmsg = "Postponed";
204 else
205 authmsg = authenticated ? "Accepted" : "Failed";
206
207 authlog("%s %s for %s%.100s from %.200s port %d%s",
208 authmsg,
209 method,
210 authctxt->valid ? "" : "illegal user ",
fad3754c 211 authctxt->user,
59c97189 212 get_remote_ipaddr(),
213 get_remote_port(),
214 info);
215}
216
217/*
15853e93 218 * Check whether root logins are disallowed.
59c97189 219 */
220int
15853e93 221auth_root_allowed(char *method)
59c97189 222{
15853e93 223 switch (options.permit_root_login) {
224 case PERMIT_YES:
59c97189 225 return 1;
15853e93 226 break;
227 case PERMIT_NO_PASSWD:
228 if (strcmp(method, "password") != 0)
229 return 1;
230 break;
231 case PERMIT_FORCED_ONLY:
232 if (forced_command) {
233 log("Root login accepted for forced command.");
234 return 1;
235 }
236 break;
59c97189 237 }
15853e93 238 log("ROOT LOGIN REFUSED FROM %.200s", get_remote_ipaddr());
239 return 0;
59c97189 240}
c8445989 241
242
243/*
244 * Given a template and a passwd structure, build a filename
245 * by substituting % tokenised options. Currently, %% becomes '%',
246 * %h becomes the home directory and %u the username.
247 *
248 * This returns a buffer allocated by xmalloc.
249 */
250char *
251expand_filename(const char *filename, struct passwd *pw)
252{
253 Buffer buffer;
254 char *file;
255 const char *cp;
256
257 /*
258 * Build the filename string in the buffer by making the appropriate
259 * substitutions to the given file name.
260 */
261 buffer_init(&buffer);
262 for (cp = filename; *cp; cp++) {
263 if (cp[0] == '%' && cp[1] == '%') {
264 buffer_append(&buffer, "%", 1);
265 cp++;
266 continue;
267 }
268 if (cp[0] == '%' && cp[1] == 'h') {
269 buffer_append(&buffer, pw->pw_dir, strlen(pw->pw_dir));
270 cp++;
271 continue;
272 }
273 if (cp[0] == '%' && cp[1] == 'u') {
274 buffer_append(&buffer, pw->pw_name,
275 strlen(pw->pw_name));
276 cp++;
277 continue;
278 }
279 buffer_append(&buffer, cp, 1);
280 }
281 buffer_append(&buffer, "\0", 1);
282
283 /*
284 * Ensure that filename starts anchored. If not, be backward
285 * compatible and prepend the '%h/'
286 */
287 file = xmalloc(MAXPATHLEN);
288 cp = buffer_ptr(&buffer);
289 if (*cp != '/')
290 snprintf(file, MAXPATHLEN, "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir, cp);
291 else
292 strlcpy(file, cp, MAXPATHLEN);
293
294 buffer_free(&buffer);
295 return file;
296}
297
298char *
299authorized_keys_file(struct passwd *pw)
300{
301 return expand_filename(options.authorized_keys_file, pw);
302}
303
304char *
305authorized_keys_file2(struct passwd *pw)
306{
307 return expand_filename(options.authorized_keys_file2, pw);
308}
309
d0c8ca5c 310/* return ok if key exists in sysfile or userfile */
311HostStatus
312check_key_in_hostfiles(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, const char *host,
313 const char *sysfile, const char *userfile)
314{
315 Key *found;
316 char *user_hostfile;
317 struct stat st;
318 int host_status;
319
320 /* Check if we know the host and its host key. */
321 found = key_new(key->type);
322 host_status = check_host_in_hostfile(sysfile, host, key, found, NULL);
323
324 if (host_status != HOST_OK && userfile != NULL) {
325 user_hostfile = tilde_expand_filename(userfile, pw->pw_uid);
326 if (options.strict_modes &&
327 (stat(user_hostfile, &st) == 0) &&
328 ((st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid) ||
329 (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)) {
330 log("Authentication refused for %.100s: "
331 "bad owner or modes for %.200s",
332 pw->pw_name, user_hostfile);
333 } else {
334 temporarily_use_uid(pw);
335 host_status = check_host_in_hostfile(user_hostfile,
336 host, key, found, NULL);
337 restore_uid();
338 }
339 xfree(user_hostfile);
340 }
341 key_free(found);
342
343 debug2("check_key_in_hostfiles: key %s for %s", host_status == HOST_OK ?
344 "ok" : "not found", host);
345 return host_status;
346}
347
348
c8445989 349/*
350 * Check a given file for security. This is defined as all components
351 * of the path to the file must either be owned by either the owner of
1ddf764b 352 * of the file or root and no directories must be group or world writable.
c8445989 353 *
354 * XXX Should any specific check be done for sym links ?
355 *
356 * Takes an open file descriptor, the file name, a uid and and
357 * error buffer plus max size as arguments.
358 *
359 * Returns 0 on success and -1 on failure
360 */
361int
6978866a 362secure_filename(FILE *f, const char *file, struct passwd *pw,
363 char *err, size_t errlen)
c8445989 364{
6978866a 365 uid_t uid = pw->pw_uid;
76fbdd47 366 char buf[MAXPATHLEN], homedir[MAXPATHLEN];
c8445989 367 char *cp;
368 struct stat st;
369
370 if (realpath(file, buf) == NULL) {
371 snprintf(err, errlen, "realpath %s failed: %s", file,
372 strerror(errno));
373 return -1;
374 }
76fbdd47 375 if (realpath(pw->pw_dir, homedir) == NULL) {
376 snprintf(err, errlen, "realpath %s failed: %s", pw->pw_dir,
377 strerror(errno));
378 return -1;
379 }
c8445989 380
381 /* check the open file to avoid races */
382 if (fstat(fileno(f), &st) < 0 ||
383 (st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != uid) ||
384 (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) {
385 snprintf(err, errlen, "bad ownership or modes for file %s",
386 buf);
387 return -1;
388 }
389
390 /* for each component of the canonical path, walking upwards */
391 for (;;) {
392 if ((cp = dirname(buf)) == NULL) {
393 snprintf(err, errlen, "dirname() failed");
394 return -1;
395 }
396 strlcpy(buf, cp, sizeof(buf));
397
398 debug3("secure_filename: checking '%s'", buf);
399 if (stat(buf, &st) < 0 ||
400 (st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != uid) ||
401 (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) {
402 snprintf(err, errlen,
403 "bad ownership or modes for directory %s", buf);
404 return -1;
405 }
406
afd501f9 407 /* If are passed the homedir then we can stop */
76fbdd47 408 if (strcmp(homedir, buf) == 0) {
afd501f9 409 debug3("secure_filename: terminating check at '%s'",
410 buf);
411 break;
412 }
c8445989 413 /*
414 * dirname should always complete with a "/" path,
415 * but we can be paranoid and check for "." too
416 */
417 if ((strcmp("/", buf) == 0) || (strcmp(".", buf) == 0))
418 break;
419 }
420 return 0;
421}
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