mucked with host table authorization checks...

[moira.git] / server / mr_util.c

diff --git a/server/mr_util.c b/server/mr_util.c
index e5d2d8e7f63696680323f8053a34a1101396fec6..47f7cc6cf17fae8e56fa1d80c4b85b23816ce1d0 100644 (file)
--- a/server/mr_util.c
+++ b/server/mr_util.c
@@ -16,7 +16,6 @@ static char *rcsid_mr_util_c = "$Header$";
 #include "mr_server.h"
 
 #include <ctype.h>
-#include <strings.h>
 #include <sys/types.h>
 
 extern char *whoami;
@@ -99,7 +98,8 @@ void mr_com_err(whoami, code, fmt, pvar)
 
 
 /* mr_trim_args: passed an argument vector, it will trim any trailing
- * spaces on the args by writing a null into the string.
+ * spaces on the args by writing a null into the string.  If an argument
+ * appears to be binary instead of ASCII, it will not be trimmed.
  */
 
 int mr_trim_args(argc, argv)
@@ -107,12 +107,22 @@ int argc;
 char **argv;
 {
     register char **arg;
-    register char *p, *lastch;
+    register unsigned char *p, *lastch;
 
     for (arg = argv; argc--; arg++) {
-       for (lastch = p = *arg; *p; p++)
-         if (!isspace(*p))
-           lastch = p;
+       for (lastch = p = (unsigned char *) *arg; *p; p++) {
+           /* If any byte in the string has the high bit set, assume
+            * that it is binary and we do not want to trim it.
+            * Setting p = lastch will cause us not to trim the string
+            * when we break out of this inner loop.
+            */
+           if (*p >= 0x80) {
+               p = lastch;
+               break;
+           }
+           if (!isspace(*p))
+             lastch = p;
+       }
        if (p != lastch) {
            if (isspace(*lastch))
              *lastch = 0;