From 3c0ef6268ff5921062694dbd2cbb80f558aa8d40 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: jbasney Date: Mon, 11 Mar 2002 15:10:35 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] Initial revision --- openssh/.cvsignore | 21 + openssh/CREDITS | 93 + openssh/ChangeLog | 6922 +++++++++++++++++++++ openssh/INSTALL | 233 + openssh/LICENCE | 174 + openssh/Makefile.in | 304 + openssh/OVERVIEW | 170 + openssh/README | 66 + openssh/README.smartcard | 72 + openssh/RFC.nroff | 1780 ++++++ openssh/TODO | 86 + openssh/WARNING.RNG | 83 + openssh/acconfig.h | 338 + openssh/aclocal.m4 | 86 + openssh/atomicio.c | 61 + openssh/atomicio.h | 31 + openssh/auth-bsdauth.c | 116 + openssh/auth-chall.c | 82 + openssh/auth-krb4.c | 373 ++ openssh/auth-krb5.c | 260 + openssh/auth-options.c | 289 + openssh/auth-options.h | 36 + openssh/auth-pam.c | 426 ++ openssh/auth-pam.h | 22 + openssh/auth-passwd.c | 222 + openssh/auth-rh-rsa.c | 89 + openssh/auth-rhosts.c | 285 + openssh/auth-rsa.c | 273 + openssh/auth-sia.c | 107 + openssh/auth-sia.h | 8 + openssh/auth-skey.c | 97 + openssh/auth.c | 421 ++ openssh/auth.h | 156 + openssh/auth1.c | 429 ++ openssh/auth2-chall.c | 307 + openssh/auth2-pam.c | 158 + openssh/auth2-pam.h | 8 + openssh/auth2.c | 804 +++ openssh/authfd.c | 595 ++ openssh/authfd.h | 80 + openssh/authfile.c | 631 ++ openssh/authfile.h | 24 + openssh/bufaux.c | 249 + openssh/bufaux.h | 44 + openssh/buffer.c | 165 + openssh/buffer.h | 43 + openssh/canohost.c | 356 ++ openssh/canohost.h | 25 + openssh/channels.c | 2978 +++++++++ openssh/channels.h | 234 + openssh/cipher.c | 548 ++ openssh/cipher.h | 119 + openssh/clientloop.c | 1292 ++++ openssh/clientloop.h | 39 + openssh/compat.c | 208 + openssh/compat.h | 64 + openssh/compress.c | 156 + openssh/compress.h | 25 + openssh/config.guess | 1371 ++++ openssh/config.sub | 1362 ++++ openssh/configure.ac | 2248 +++++++ openssh/contrib/README | 62 + openssh/contrib/caldera/openssh.spec | 227 + openssh/contrib/caldera/ssh-host-keygen | 36 + openssh/contrib/caldera/sshd.init | 125 + openssh/contrib/caldera/sshd.pam | 8 + openssh/contrib/chroot.diff | 61 + openssh/contrib/cygwin/README | 178 + openssh/contrib/cygwin/ssh-host-config | 495 ++ openssh/contrib/cygwin/ssh-user-config | 200 + openssh/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass.c | 150 + openssh/contrib/hpux/README | 45 + openssh/contrib/hpux/egd | 15 + openssh/contrib/hpux/egd.rc | 98 + openssh/contrib/hpux/sshd | 5 + openssh/contrib/hpux/sshd.rc | 90 + openssh/contrib/redhat/openssh.spec | 335 + openssh/contrib/redhat/sshd.init | 163 + openssh/contrib/redhat/sshd.pam | 8 + openssh/contrib/redhat/sshd.pam-7.x | 8 + openssh/contrib/solaris/README | 28 + openssh/contrib/solaris/buildpkg.sh | 85 + openssh/contrib/solaris/opensshd.in | 90 + openssh/contrib/ssh-copy-id | 45 + openssh/contrib/ssh-copy-id.1 | 67 + openssh/contrib/sshd.pam.freebsd | 5 + openssh/contrib/sshd.pam.generic | 8 + openssh/contrib/suse/openssh.spec | 199 + openssh/contrib/suse/rc.config.sshd | 5 + openssh/contrib/suse/rc.sshd | 80 + openssh/crc32.c | 114 + openssh/crc32.h | 21 + openssh/deattack.c | 155 + openssh/deattack.h | 30 + openssh/defines.h | 558 ++ openssh/dh.c | 290 + openssh/dh.h | 48 + openssh/dispatch.c | 77 + openssh/dispatch.h | 36 + openssh/entropy.c | 917 +++ openssh/entropy.h | 33 + openssh/fixpaths | 43 + openssh/fixprogs | 72 + openssh/getput.h | 58 + openssh/groupaccess.c | 89 + openssh/groupaccess.h | 36 + openssh/hostfile.c | 215 + openssh/hostfile.h | 26 + openssh/includes.h | 106 + openssh/install-sh | 251 + openssh/kex.c | 456 ++ openssh/kex.h | 130 + openssh/kexdh.c | 305 + openssh/kexgex.c | 409 ++ openssh/key.c | 788 +++ openssh/key.h | 80 + openssh/log.c | 389 ++ openssh/log.h | 66 + openssh/loginrec.c | 1507 +++++ openssh/loginrec.h | 140 + openssh/logintest.c | 315 + openssh/mac.c | 114 + openssh/mac.h | 28 + openssh/match.c | 255 + openssh/match.h | 23 + openssh/md5crypt.c | 159 + openssh/md5crypt.h | 32 + openssh/mdoc2man.pl | 590 ++ openssh/misc.c | 333 + openssh/misc.h | 36 + openssh/mkinstalldirs | 40 + openssh/moduli | 158 + openssh/mpaux.c | 46 + openssh/mpaux.h | 22 + openssh/myproposal.h | 52 + openssh/nchan.c | 560 ++ openssh/nchan.ms | 99 + openssh/nchan2.ms | 88 + openssh/openbsd-compat/.cvsignore | 1 + openssh/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in | 39 + openssh/openbsd-compat/base64.c | 316 + openssh/openbsd-compat/base64.h | 18 + openssh/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c | 123 + openssh/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.h | 12 + openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-arc4random.c | 77 + openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-arc4random.h | 37 + openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-cray.c | 273 + openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-cray.h | 11 + openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.c | 142 + openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h | 35 + openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.c | 101 + openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h | 76 + openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.c | 103 + openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h | 58 + openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-snprintf.c | 744 +++ openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-snprintf.h | 19 + openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.c | 52 + openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h | 49 + openssh/openbsd-compat/daemon.c | 81 + openssh/openbsd-compat/daemon.h | 11 + openssh/openbsd-compat/dirname.c | 80 + openssh/openbsd-compat/dirname.h | 5 + openssh/openbsd-compat/fake-gai-errnos.h | 14 + openssh/openbsd-compat/fake-getaddrinfo.c | 121 + openssh/openbsd-compat/fake-getaddrinfo.h | 47 + openssh/openbsd-compat/fake-getnameinfo.c | 55 + openssh/openbsd-compat/fake-getnameinfo.h | 20 + openssh/openbsd-compat/fake-queue.h | 490 ++ openssh/openbsd-compat/fake-regex.h | 106 + openssh/openbsd-compat/fake-socket.h | 47 + openssh/openbsd-compat/getcwd.c | 237 + openssh/openbsd-compat/getcwd.h | 12 + openssh/openbsd-compat/getgrouplist.c | 103 + openssh/openbsd-compat/getgrouplist.h | 16 + openssh/openbsd-compat/getopt.c | 122 + openssh/openbsd-compat/getopt.h | 14 + openssh/openbsd-compat/glob.c | 915 +++ openssh/openbsd-compat/glob.h | 101 + openssh/openbsd-compat/inet_aton.c | 193 + openssh/openbsd-compat/inet_aton.h | 12 + openssh/openbsd-compat/inet_ntoa.c | 64 + openssh/openbsd-compat/inet_ntoa.h | 12 + openssh/openbsd-compat/inet_ntop.c | 213 + openssh/openbsd-compat/inet_ntop.h | 13 + openssh/openbsd-compat/mktemp.c | 183 + openssh/openbsd-compat/mktemp.h | 13 + openssh/openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h | 44 + openssh/openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.c | 167 + openssh/openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h | 48 + openssh/openbsd-compat/realpath.c | 162 + openssh/openbsd-compat/realpath.h | 13 + openssh/openbsd-compat/rresvport.c | 106 + openssh/openbsd-compat/rresvport.h | 12 + openssh/openbsd-compat/setenv.c | 161 + openssh/openbsd-compat/setenv.h | 14 + openssh/openbsd-compat/setproctitle.c | 102 + openssh/openbsd-compat/setproctitle.h | 12 + openssh/openbsd-compat/sigact.c | 102 + openssh/openbsd-compat/sigact.h | 88 + openssh/openbsd-compat/strlcat.c | 79 + openssh/openbsd-compat/strlcat.h | 12 + openssh/openbsd-compat/strlcpy.c | 75 + openssh/openbsd-compat/strlcpy.h | 12 + openssh/openbsd-compat/strmode.c | 156 + openssh/openbsd-compat/strmode.h | 7 + openssh/openbsd-compat/strsep.c | 89 + openssh/openbsd-compat/strsep.h | 12 + openssh/packet.c | 1286 ++++ openssh/packet.h | 95 + openssh/pathnames.h | 161 + openssh/radix.c | 214 + openssh/radix.h | 28 + openssh/readconf.c | 927 +++ openssh/readconf.h | 118 + openssh/readpass.c | 127 + openssh/readpass.h | 18 + openssh/rijndael.c | 1245 ++++ openssh/rijndael.h | 51 + openssh/rsa.c | 141 + openssh/rsa.h | 26 + openssh/scard.c | 371 ++ openssh/scard.h | 40 + openssh/scard/Makefile.in | 27 + openssh/scard/Ssh.bin | Bin 0 -> 568 bytes openssh/scard/Ssh.bin.uu | 16 + openssh/scard/Ssh.java | 143 + openssh/scp.1 | 152 + openssh/scp.c | 1218 ++++ openssh/servconf.c | 881 +++ openssh/servconf.h | 139 + openssh/serverloop.c | 1009 +++ openssh/serverloop.h | 27 + openssh/session.c | 2077 +++++++ openssh/session.h | 37 + openssh/sftp-client.c | 932 +++ openssh/sftp-client.h | 103 + openssh/sftp-common.c | 149 + openssh/sftp-common.h | 46 + openssh/sftp-glob.c | 170 + openssh/sftp-glob.h | 30 + openssh/sftp-int.c | 922 +++ openssh/sftp-int.h | 27 + openssh/sftp-server.8 | 62 + openssh/sftp-server.c | 1110 ++++ openssh/sftp.1 | 256 + openssh/sftp.c | 225 + openssh/sftp.h | 91 + openssh/ssh-add.1 | 148 + openssh/ssh-add.c | 318 + openssh/ssh-agent.1 | 182 + openssh/ssh-agent.c | 1045 ++++ openssh/ssh-dss.c | 188 + openssh/ssh-dss.h | 32 + openssh/ssh-keygen.1 | 296 + openssh/ssh-keygen.c | 1085 ++++ openssh/ssh-keyscan.1 | 154 + openssh/ssh-keyscan.c | 805 +++ openssh/ssh-rsa.c | 181 + openssh/ssh-rsa.h | 32 + openssh/ssh.1 | 1513 +++++ openssh/ssh.c | 1225 ++++ openssh/ssh.h | 102 + openssh/ssh1.h | 89 + openssh/ssh2.h | 143 + openssh/ssh_config | 35 + openssh/ssh_prng_cmds.in | 75 + openssh/sshconnect.c | 905 +++ openssh/sshconnect.h | 46 + openssh/sshconnect1.c | 1276 ++++ openssh/sshconnect2.c | 1013 +++ openssh/sshd.8 | 1325 ++++ openssh/sshd.c | 1488 +++++ openssh/sshd_config | 80 + openssh/sshlogin.c | 104 + openssh/sshlogin.h | 23 + openssh/sshpty.c | 404 ++ openssh/sshpty.h | 26 + openssh/sshtty.c | 96 + openssh/sshtty.h | 48 + openssh/tildexpand.c | 72 + openssh/tildexpand.h | 15 + openssh/ttymodes.c | 462 ++ openssh/ttymodes.h | 172 + openssh/uidswap.c | 154 + openssh/uidswap.h | 22 + openssh/uuencode.c | 75 + openssh/uuencode.h | 32 + openssh/version.h | 3 + openssh/xmalloc.c | 68 + openssh/xmalloc.h | 27 + 290 files changed, 79000 insertions(+) create mode 100644 openssh/.cvsignore create mode 100644 openssh/CREDITS create mode 100644 openssh/ChangeLog create mode 100644 openssh/INSTALL create mode 100644 openssh/LICENCE create mode 100644 openssh/Makefile.in create mode 100644 openssh/OVERVIEW create mode 100644 openssh/README create mode 100644 openssh/README.smartcard create mode 100644 openssh/RFC.nroff create mode 100644 openssh/TODO create mode 100644 openssh/WARNING.RNG create mode 100644 openssh/acconfig.h create mode 100644 openssh/aclocal.m4 create mode 100644 openssh/atomicio.c create mode 100644 openssh/atomicio.h create mode 100644 openssh/auth-bsdauth.c create mode 100644 openssh/auth-chall.c create mode 100644 openssh/auth-krb4.c create mode 100644 openssh/auth-krb5.c create mode 100644 openssh/auth-options.c create mode 100644 openssh/auth-options.h create mode 100644 openssh/auth-pam.c create mode 100644 openssh/auth-pam.h create mode 100644 openssh/auth-passwd.c create mode 100644 openssh/auth-rh-rsa.c create mode 100644 openssh/auth-rhosts.c create mode 100644 openssh/auth-rsa.c create mode 100644 openssh/auth-sia.c create mode 100644 openssh/auth-sia.h create mode 100644 openssh/auth-skey.c create mode 100644 openssh/auth.c create mode 100644 openssh/auth.h create mode 100644 openssh/auth1.c create mode 100644 openssh/auth2-chall.c create mode 100644 openssh/auth2-pam.c create mode 100644 openssh/auth2-pam.h create mode 100644 openssh/auth2.c create mode 100644 openssh/authfd.c create mode 100644 openssh/authfd.h create mode 100644 openssh/authfile.c create mode 100644 openssh/authfile.h create mode 100644 openssh/bufaux.c create mode 100644 openssh/bufaux.h create mode 100644 openssh/buffer.c create mode 100644 openssh/buffer.h create mode 100644 openssh/canohost.c create mode 100644 openssh/canohost.h create mode 100644 openssh/channels.c create mode 100644 openssh/channels.h create mode 100644 openssh/cipher.c create mode 100644 openssh/cipher.h create mode 100644 openssh/clientloop.c create mode 100644 openssh/clientloop.h create mode 100644 openssh/compat.c create mode 100644 openssh/compat.h create mode 100644 openssh/compress.c create mode 100644 openssh/compress.h create mode 100755 openssh/config.guess create mode 100755 openssh/config.sub create mode 100644 openssh/configure.ac create mode 100644 openssh/contrib/README create mode 100644 openssh/contrib/caldera/openssh.spec create mode 100755 openssh/contrib/caldera/ssh-host-keygen create mode 100755 openssh/contrib/caldera/sshd.init create mode 100644 openssh/contrib/caldera/sshd.pam create mode 100644 openssh/contrib/chroot.diff create mode 100644 openssh/contrib/cygwin/README create mode 100644 openssh/contrib/cygwin/ssh-host-config create mode 100644 openssh/contrib/cygwin/ssh-user-config create mode 100644 openssh/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass.c create mode 100644 openssh/contrib/hpux/README create mode 100644 openssh/contrib/hpux/egd create mode 100755 openssh/contrib/hpux/egd.rc create mode 100644 openssh/contrib/hpux/sshd create mode 100755 openssh/contrib/hpux/sshd.rc create mode 100644 openssh/contrib/redhat/openssh.spec create mode 100755 openssh/contrib/redhat/sshd.init create mode 100644 openssh/contrib/redhat/sshd.pam create mode 100644 openssh/contrib/redhat/sshd.pam-7.x create mode 100644 openssh/contrib/solaris/README create mode 100755 openssh/contrib/solaris/buildpkg.sh create mode 100755 openssh/contrib/solaris/opensshd.in create mode 100644 openssh/contrib/ssh-copy-id create mode 100644 openssh/contrib/ssh-copy-id.1 create mode 100644 openssh/contrib/sshd.pam.freebsd create mode 100644 openssh/contrib/sshd.pam.generic create mode 100644 openssh/contrib/suse/openssh.spec create mode 100644 openssh/contrib/suse/rc.config.sshd create mode 100644 openssh/contrib/suse/rc.sshd create mode 100644 openssh/crc32.c create mode 100644 openssh/crc32.h create mode 100644 openssh/deattack.c create mode 100644 openssh/deattack.h create mode 100644 openssh/defines.h create mode 100644 openssh/dh.c create mode 100644 openssh/dh.h create mode 100644 openssh/dispatch.c create mode 100644 openssh/dispatch.h create mode 100644 openssh/entropy.c create mode 100644 openssh/entropy.h create mode 100755 openssh/fixpaths create mode 100755 openssh/fixprogs create mode 100644 openssh/getput.h create mode 100644 openssh/groupaccess.c create mode 100644 openssh/groupaccess.h create mode 100644 openssh/hostfile.c create mode 100644 openssh/hostfile.h create mode 100644 openssh/includes.h create mode 100755 openssh/install-sh create mode 100644 openssh/kex.c create mode 100644 openssh/kex.h create mode 100644 openssh/kexdh.c create mode 100644 openssh/kexgex.c create mode 100644 openssh/key.c create mode 100644 openssh/key.h create mode 100644 openssh/log.c create mode 100644 openssh/log.h create mode 100644 openssh/loginrec.c create mode 100644 openssh/loginrec.h create mode 100644 openssh/logintest.c create mode 100644 openssh/mac.c create mode 100644 openssh/mac.h create mode 100644 openssh/match.c create mode 100644 openssh/match.h create mode 100644 openssh/md5crypt.c create mode 100644 openssh/md5crypt.h create mode 100644 openssh/mdoc2man.pl create mode 100644 openssh/misc.c create mode 100644 openssh/misc.h create mode 100755 openssh/mkinstalldirs create mode 100644 openssh/moduli create mode 100644 openssh/mpaux.c create mode 100644 openssh/mpaux.h create mode 100644 openssh/myproposal.h create mode 100644 openssh/nchan.c create mode 100644 openssh/nchan.ms create mode 100644 openssh/nchan2.ms create mode 100644 openssh/openbsd-compat/.cvsignore create mode 100644 openssh/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in create mode 100644 openssh/openbsd-compat/base64.c create mode 100644 openssh/openbsd-compat/base64.h create mode 100644 openssh/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c create mode 100644 openssh/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.h create mode 100644 openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-arc4random.c create mode 100644 openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-arc4random.h create mode 100644 openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-cray.c create mode 100644 openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-cray.h create mode 100644 openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.c create mode 100644 openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h create mode 100644 openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.c create mode 100644 openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h create mode 100644 openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.c create mode 100644 openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h create mode 100644 openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-snprintf.c create mode 100644 openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-snprintf.h create mode 100644 openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.c create mode 100644 openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h create mode 100644 openssh/openbsd-compat/daemon.c create mode 100644 openssh/openbsd-compat/daemon.h create mode 100644 openssh/openbsd-compat/dirname.c create mode 100644 openssh/openbsd-compat/dirname.h create mode 100644 openssh/openbsd-compat/fake-gai-errnos.h create mode 100644 openssh/openbsd-compat/fake-getaddrinfo.c create mode 100644 openssh/openbsd-compat/fake-getaddrinfo.h create mode 100644 openssh/openbsd-compat/fake-getnameinfo.c create mode 100644 openssh/openbsd-compat/fake-getnameinfo.h create mode 100644 openssh/openbsd-compat/fake-queue.h create mode 100644 openssh/openbsd-compat/fake-regex.h create mode 100644 openssh/openbsd-compat/fake-socket.h create mode 100644 openssh/openbsd-compat/getcwd.c create mode 100644 openssh/openbsd-compat/getcwd.h create mode 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openssh/openbsd-compat/realpath.h create mode 100644 openssh/openbsd-compat/rresvport.c create mode 100644 openssh/openbsd-compat/rresvport.h create mode 100644 openssh/openbsd-compat/setenv.c create mode 100644 openssh/openbsd-compat/setenv.h create mode 100644 openssh/openbsd-compat/setproctitle.c create mode 100644 openssh/openbsd-compat/setproctitle.h create mode 100644 openssh/openbsd-compat/sigact.c create mode 100644 openssh/openbsd-compat/sigact.h create mode 100644 openssh/openbsd-compat/strlcat.c create mode 100644 openssh/openbsd-compat/strlcat.h create mode 100644 openssh/openbsd-compat/strlcpy.c create mode 100644 openssh/openbsd-compat/strlcpy.h create mode 100644 openssh/openbsd-compat/strmode.c create mode 100644 openssh/openbsd-compat/strmode.h create mode 100644 openssh/openbsd-compat/strsep.c create mode 100644 openssh/openbsd-compat/strsep.h create mode 100644 openssh/packet.c create mode 100644 openssh/packet.h create mode 100644 openssh/pathnames.h create mode 100644 openssh/radix.c create mode 100644 openssh/radix.h create mode 100644 openssh/readconf.c create mode 100644 openssh/readconf.h create mode 100644 openssh/readpass.c create mode 100644 openssh/readpass.h create mode 100644 openssh/rijndael.c create mode 100644 openssh/rijndael.h create mode 100644 openssh/rsa.c create mode 100644 openssh/rsa.h create mode 100644 openssh/scard.c create mode 100644 openssh/scard.h create mode 100644 openssh/scard/Makefile.in create mode 100644 openssh/scard/Ssh.bin create mode 100644 openssh/scard/Ssh.bin.uu create mode 100644 openssh/scard/Ssh.java create mode 100644 openssh/scp.1 create mode 100644 openssh/scp.c create mode 100644 openssh/servconf.c create mode 100644 openssh/servconf.h create mode 100644 openssh/serverloop.c create mode 100644 openssh/serverloop.h create mode 100644 openssh/session.c create mode 100644 openssh/session.h create mode 100644 openssh/sftp-client.c create mode 100644 openssh/sftp-client.h create mode 100644 openssh/sftp-common.c create mode 100644 openssh/sftp-common.h create mode 100644 openssh/sftp-glob.c create mode 100644 openssh/sftp-glob.h create mode 100644 openssh/sftp-int.c create mode 100644 openssh/sftp-int.h create mode 100644 openssh/sftp-server.8 create mode 100644 openssh/sftp-server.c create mode 100644 openssh/sftp.1 create mode 100644 openssh/sftp.c create mode 100644 openssh/sftp.h create mode 100644 openssh/ssh-add.1 create mode 100644 openssh/ssh-add.c create mode 100644 openssh/ssh-agent.1 create mode 100644 openssh/ssh-agent.c create mode 100644 openssh/ssh-dss.c create mode 100644 openssh/ssh-dss.h create mode 100644 openssh/ssh-keygen.1 create mode 100644 openssh/ssh-keygen.c create mode 100644 openssh/ssh-keyscan.1 create mode 100644 openssh/ssh-keyscan.c create mode 100644 openssh/ssh-rsa.c create mode 100644 openssh/ssh-rsa.h create mode 100644 openssh/ssh.1 create mode 100644 openssh/ssh.c create mode 100644 openssh/ssh.h create mode 100644 openssh/ssh1.h create mode 100644 openssh/ssh2.h create mode 100644 openssh/ssh_config create mode 100644 openssh/ssh_prng_cmds.in create mode 100644 openssh/sshconnect.c create mode 100644 openssh/sshconnect.h create mode 100644 openssh/sshconnect1.c create mode 100644 openssh/sshconnect2.c create mode 100644 openssh/sshd.8 create mode 100644 openssh/sshd.c create mode 100644 openssh/sshd_config create mode 100644 openssh/sshlogin.c create mode 100644 openssh/sshlogin.h create mode 100644 openssh/sshpty.c create mode 100644 openssh/sshpty.h create mode 100644 openssh/sshtty.c create mode 100644 openssh/sshtty.h create mode 100644 openssh/tildexpand.c create mode 100644 openssh/tildexpand.h create mode 100644 openssh/ttymodes.c create mode 100644 openssh/ttymodes.h create mode 100644 openssh/uidswap.c create mode 100644 openssh/uidswap.h create mode 100644 openssh/uuencode.c create mode 100644 openssh/uuencode.h create mode 100644 openssh/version.h create mode 100644 openssh/xmalloc.c create mode 100644 openssh/xmalloc.h diff --git a/openssh/.cvsignore b/openssh/.cvsignore new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a473d1f --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/.cvsignore @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ +ssh +scp +sshd +ssh-add +ssh-keygen +ssh-keyscan +ssh-agent +sftp-server +sftp +configure +config.h.in +config.h +config.status +config.cache +config.log +stamp-h.in +Makefile +ssh_prng_cmds +*.out +*.0 +buildit.sh diff --git a/openssh/CREDITS b/openssh/CREDITS new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c591e5c --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/CREDITS @@ -0,0 +1,93 @@ +Tatu Ylonen - Creator of SSH + +Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, +Theo de Raadt, and Dug Song - Creators of OpenSSH + +Alain St-Denis - Irix fix +Alexandre Oliva - AIX fixes +Andre Lucas - new login code, many fixes +Andreas Steinmetz - Shadow password expiry support +Andrew McGill - SCO fixes +Andrew Morgan - PAM bugfixes +Andrew Stribblehill - Bugfixes +Andy Sloane - bugfixes +Aran Cox - SCO bugfixes +Arkadiusz Miskiewicz - IPv6 compat fixes +Ben Lindstrom - NeXT support +Ben Taylor - Solaris debugging and fixes +Bratislav ILICH - Configure fix +Charles Levert - SunOS 4 & bug fixes +Chip Salzenberg - Assorted patches +Chris Adams - OSF SIA support +Chris Saia - SuSE packaging +Chris, the Young One - Password auth fixes +Christos Zoulas - Autoconf fixes +Chun-Chung Chen - RPM fixes +Corinna Vinschen - Cygwin support +Dan Brosemer - Autoconf support, build fixes +Darren Hall - AIX patches +David Agraz - Build fixes +David Del Piero - bug fixes +David Hesprich - Configure fixes +David Rankin - libwrap, AIX, NetBSD fixes +Ed Eden - configure fixes +Garrick James - configure fixes +Gary E. Miller - SCO support +Ged Lodder - HPUX fixes and enhancements +Gert Doering - bug and portability fixes +HARUYAMA Seigo - Translations & doc fixes +Hideaki YOSHIFUJI - IPv6 and bug fixes +Hiroshi Takekawa - Configure fixes +Holger Trapp - KRB4/AFS config patch +IWAMURO Motonori - bugfixes +Jani Hakala - Patches +Jarno Huuskonen - Bugfixes +Jim Knoble - Many patches +Jonchen (email unknown) - the original author of PAM support of SSH +Juergen Keil - scp bugfixing +KAMAHARA Junzo - Configure fixes +Kees Cook - scp fixes +Kenji Miyake - Configure fixes +Kevin O'Connor - RSAless operation +Kevin Steves - HP support, bugfixes, improvements +Kiyokazu SUTO - Bugfixes +Larry Jones - Bugfixes +Lutz Jaenicke - Bugfixes +Marc G. Fournier - Solaris patches +Mark D. Baushke - bug fixes +Martin Johansson - Linux fixes +Mark D. Roth - Features, bug fixes +Mark Miller - Bugfixes +Matt Richards - AIX patches +Michael Stone - Irix enhancements +Nakaji Hiroyuki - Sony News-OS patch +Nalin Dahyabhai - PAM environment patch +Nate Itkin - SunOS 4.1.x fixes +Niels Kristian Bech Jensen - Assorted patches +Pavel Kankovsky - Security fixes +Pavel Troller - Bugfixes +Pekka Savola - Bugfixes +Peter Kocks - Makefile fixes +Phil Hands - Debian scripts, assorted patches +Phil Karn - Autoconf fixes +Philippe WILLEM - Bugfixes +Phill Camp - login code fix +Rip Loomis - Solaris package support, fixes +SAKAI Kiyotaka - Multiple bugfixes +Simon Wilkinson - PAM fixes +Svante Signell - Bugfixes +Thomas Neumann - Shadow passwords +Tim Rice - Portability & SCO fixes +Tobias Oetiker - Bugfixes +Tom Bertelson's - AIX auth fixes +Tor-Ake Fransson - AIX support +Tudor Bosman - MD5 password support +Udo Schweigert - ReliantUNIX support +Zack Weinberg - GNOME askpass enhancement + +Apologies to anyone I have missed. + +Damien Miller + +$Id$ + diff --git a/openssh/ChangeLog b/openssh/ChangeLog new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d79e7fb --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/ChangeLog @@ -0,0 +1,6922 @@ +20011202 + - (djm) Syn with OpenBSD OpenSSH-3.0.2 + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org + [session.c sshd.8 version.h] + Don't allow authorized_keys specified environment variables when + UseLogin in active + +20011115 + - (djm) Fix IPv4 default in ssh-keyscan. Spotted by Dan Astoorian + Fix from markus@ + - (djm) Release 3.0.1p1 + +20011113 + - (djm) Fix early (and double) free of remote user when using Kerberos. + Patch from Simon Wilkinson + - (djm) AIX login{success,failed} changes. Move loginsuccess call to + do_authenticated. Call loginfailed for protocol 2 failures > MAX like + we do for protocol 1. Reports from Ralf Wenk , + K.Wolkersdorfer@fz-juelich.de and others + - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync + - dugsong@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/11/11 18:47:10 + [auth-krb5.c] + fix krb5 authorization check. found by . from + art@, deraadt@ ok + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/11/12 11:17:07 + [servconf.c] + enable authorized_keys2 again. tested by fries@ + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/11/13 02:03:57 + [version.h] + enter 3.0.1 + - (djm) Bump RPM package versions + +20011112 + - (djm) Makefile correctness fix from Mark D. Baushke + - (djm) Cygwin config patch from Corinna Vinschen + - OpenBSD CVS Sync + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/10/24 08:41:41 + [sshd.c] + mention remote port in debug message + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/10/24 08:41:20 + [ssh.c] + remove unused + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/10/24 08:51:35 + [clientloop.c ssh.c] + ignore SIGPIPE early, makes ssh work if agent dies, netbsd-pr via itojun@ + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/10/24 19:57:40 + [clientloop.c] + make ~& (backgrounding) work again for proto v1; add support ~& for v2, too + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/10/25 21:14:32 + [ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c] + better docu for fingerprinting, ok deraadt@ + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/10/29 19:27:15 + [sshconnect2.c] + hostbased: check for client hostkey before building chost + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/10/30 20:29:09 + [ssh.1] + ssh.1 + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/11/07 16:03:17 + [packet.c packet.h sshconnect2.c] + pad using the padding field from the ssh2 packet instead of sending + extra ignore messages. tested against several other ssh servers. + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/11/07 21:40:21 + [ssh-rsa.c] + ssh_rsa_sign/verify: SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB not supported + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/11/07 22:10:28 + [ssh-dss.c ssh-rsa.c] + missing free and sync dss/rsa code. + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/11/07 22:12:01 + [sshd.8] + s/Keepalive/KeepAlive/; from openbsd@davidkrause.com + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/11/07 22:41:51 + [auth2.c auth-rh-rsa.c] + unused includes + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/11/07 22:53:21 + [channels.h] + crank c->path to 256 so they can hold a full hostname; dwd@bell-labs.com + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/11/08 10:51:08 + [readpass.c] + don't strdup too much data; from gotoh@taiyo.co.jp; ok millert. + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/11/08 17:49:53 + [ssh.1] + mention setuid root requirements; noted by cnorris@csc.UVic.ca; ok stevesk@ + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/11/08 20:02:24 + [auth.c] + don't print ROOT in CAPS for the authentication messages, i.e. + Accepted publickey for ROOT from 127.0.0.1 port 42734 ssh2 + becomes + Accepted publickey for root from 127.0.0.1 port 42734 ssh2 + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/11/09 18:59:23 + [clientloop.c serverloop.c] + don't memset too much memory, ok millert@ + original patch from jlk@kamens.brookline.ma.us via nalin@redhat.com + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/11/10 13:19:45 + [sshd.c] + cleanup libwrap support (remove bogus comment, bogus close(), add + debug, etc). + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/11/10 13:22:42 + [ssh-rsa.c] + KNF (unexpand) + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/11/10 13:37:20 + [packet.c] + remove extra debug() + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/11/11 13:02:31 + [servconf.c] + make AuthorizedKeysFile2 fallback to AuthorizedKeysFile if + AuthorizedKeysFile is specified. + - (djm) Reorder portable-specific server options so that they come first. + This should help reduce diff collisions for new server options (as they + will appear at the end) + +20011109 + - (stevesk) auth-pam.c: use do_pam_authenticate(PAM_DISALLOW_NULL_AUTHTOK) + if permit_empty_passwd == 0 so null password check cannot be bypassed. + jayaraj@amritapuri.com OpenBSD bug 2168 + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/11/09 19:08:35 + [sshd.c] + remove extra trailing dot from log message; pilot@naughty.monkey.org + +20011103 + - (tim) [ contrib/caldera/openssh.spec contrib/caldera/sshd.init] Updates + from Raymund Will + [acconfig.h configure.in] Clean up login checks. + Problem reported by Jim Knoble + +20011101 + - (djm) Compat define for OpenSSL < 0.9.6 (No OPENSSL_free) + +20011031 + - (djm) Unsmoke drugs: config files should be noreplace. + +20011030 + - (djm) Redhat RPM spec: remove noreplace from config files, allow IPv6 + by default (can force IPv4 using --define "noipv6 1") + +20011029 + - (tim) [TODO defines.h loginrec.c] Change the references to configure.in + to configure.ac + +20011028 + - (djm) Avoid bug in Solaris PAM libs + - (djm) Disconnect if no tty and PAM reports password expired + - (djm) Fix for PAM password changes being echoed (from stevesk) + - (stevesk) Fix compile problem with PAM password change fix + - (stevesk) README: zlib location is http://www.gzip.org/zlib/ + +20011027 + - (tim) [configure.ac] Fixes for ReliantUNIX (don't use libucb) + Patch by Robert Dahlem + +20011026 + - (bal) Set the correct current time in login_utmp_only(). Patch by + Wayne Davison + - (tim) [scard/Makefile.in] Fix install: when building outside of source + tree and using --src=/full_path/to/openssh + Patch by Mark D. Baushke + +20011025 + - (bal) Use VDISABLE if _POSIX_VDISABLE is set in readpassphrase.c. Patch + by todd@ + - (tim) [configure.ac] Give path given in --with-xxx= for pcre,zlib, and + tcp-wrappers precedence over system libraries and includes. + Report from Dave Dykstra + +20011024 + - (bal) Should be 3.0p1 not 3.0p2. Corrected version.h already. + - (tim) configure.in -> configure.ac + +20011023 + - (bal) Updated version to 3.0p1 in preparing for release. + - (bal) Added 'PAM_TTY_KLUDGE' to Solaris platform. + - (tim) [configure.in] Fix test for broken dirname. Based on patch from + Dave Dykstra . Remove un-needed test for zlib.h. + [contrib/caldera/openssh.spec, contrib/redhat/openssh.spec, + contrib/suse/openssh.spec] Update version to match version.h + +20011022 + - (djm) Fix fd leak in loginrec.c (ro fd to lastlog was left open). + Report from Michal Zalewski + +20011021 + - (tim) [configure.in] Clean up library testing. Add optional PATH to + --with-pcre, --with-zlib, and --with-tcp-wrappers. Based on + patch by albert chin (china@thewrittenword.com) + Re-arange AC_CHECK_HEADERS and AC_CHECK_FUNCS for eaiser reading + of patches to configure.in. Replace obsolete AC_STRUCT_ST_BLKSIZE + with AC_CHECK_MEMBERS. Add test for broken dirname() on + Solaris 2.5.1 by Dan Astoorian + [acconfig.h aclocal.m4 defines.h configure.in] Better socklen_t test. + patch by albert chin (china@thewrittenword.com) + [scp.c] Replace obsolete HAVE_ST_BLKSIZE with + HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_BLKSIZE. + [Makefile.in] When running make in top level, always do make + in openbsd-compat. patch by Dave Dykstra + +20011019 + - (bal) Fixed up init.d symlink issue and piddir stuff. Patches by + Zoran Milojevic and j.petersen@msh.de + +20011012 + - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/10/10 22:18:47 + [channels.c channels.h clientloop.c nchan.c serverloop.c] + [session.c session.h] + try to keep channels open until an exit-status message is sent. + don't kill the login shells if the shells stdin/out/err is closed. + this should now work: + ssh -2n localhost 'exec > /dev/null 2>&1; sleep 10; exit 5'; echo ? + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/10/11 13:45:21 + [session.c] + delay detach of session if a channel gets closed but the child is + still alive. however, release pty, since the fd's to the child are + already closed. + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/10/11 15:24:00 + [clientloop.c] + clear select masks if we return before calling select(). + - (djm) "make veryclean" fix from Tom Holroyd + - (djm) Clean some autoconf-2.52 junk when doing "make distclean" + - (djm) Cleanup sshpty.c a little + - (bal) First wave of contrib/solaris/ package upgrades. Still more + work needs to be done, but it is a 190% better then the stuff we + had before! + - (bal) Minor bug fix in contrib/solaris/opensshd.in .. $etcdir was not + set right. + +20011010 + - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/10/04 14:34:16 + [key.c] + call OPENSSL_free() for memory allocated by openssl; from chombier@mac.com + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/10/04 15:05:40 + [channels.c serverloop.c] + comment out bogus conditions for selecting on connection_in + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/10/04 15:12:37 + [serverloop.c] + client_alive_check cleanup + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/10/06 00:14:50 + [sshconnect.c] + remove unused argument + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/10/06 00:36:42 + [session.c] + fix typo in error message, sync with do_exec_nopty + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/10/06 11:18:19 + [sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c sshconnect.c] + unify hostkey check error messages, simplify prompt. + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/10/07 10:29:52 + [authfile.c] + grammer; Matthew_Clarke@mindlink.bc.ca + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/10/07 17:49:40 + [channels.c channels.h] + avoid possible FD_ISSET overflow for channels established + during channnel_after_select() (used for dynamic channels). + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/10/08 11:48:57 + [channels.c] + better debug + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/10/08 16:15:47 + [sshconnect.c] + use correct family for -b option + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/10/08 19:05:05 + [ssh.c sshconnect.c sshconnect.h ssh-keyscan.c] + some more IPv4or6 cleanup + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/10/09 10:12:08 + [session.c] + chdir $HOME after krb_afslog(); from bbense@networking.stanford.edu + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/10/09 19:32:49 + [session.c] + stat subsystem command before calling do_exec, and return error to client. + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/10/09 19:51:18 + [serverloop.c] + close all channels if the connection to the remote host has been closed, + should fix sshd's hanging with WCHAN==wait + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/10/09 21:59:41 + [channels.c channels.h serverloop.c session.c session.h] + simplify session close: no more delayed session_close, no more + blocking wait() calls. + - (bal) removed two unsed headers in openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.c + - (bal) seed_init() and seed_rng() required in ssh-keyscan.c + +20011007 + - (bal) ssh-copy-id corrected permissions for .ssh/ and authorized_keys. + Prompted by Matthew Vernon + +20011005 + - (bal) AES works under Cray, no more hack. + +20011004 + - (bal) nchan2.ms resync. BSD License applied. + +20011003 + - (bal) CVS ID fix up in version.h + - (bal) OpenBSD CVS Sync: + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/09/27 11:58:16 + [compress.c] + mem leak; chombier@mac.com + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/09/27 11:59:37 + [packet.c] + missing called=1; chombier@mac.com + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/09/27 15:31:17 + [auth2.c auth2-chall.c sshconnect1.c] + typos; from solar + - camield@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/09/27 17:53:24 + [sshd.8] + don't talk about compile-time options + ok markus@ + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/09/28 12:07:09 + [ssh-keygen.c] + bzero private key after loading to smartcard; ok markus@ + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/09/28 15:46:29 + [ssh.c] + bug: read user config first; report kaukasoi@elektroni.ee.tut.fi + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/10/01 08:06:28 + [scp.c] + skip filenames containing \n; report jdamery@chiark.greenend.org.uk + and matthew@debian.org + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/10/01 21:38:53 + [channels.c channels.h ssh.c sshd.c] + remove ugliness; vp@drexel.edu via angelos + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/10/01 21:51:16 + [readconf.c readconf.h ssh.1 sshconnect.c] + add NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost; note that the hostkey is + now check for localhost, too. + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/10/02 08:38:50 + [ssh-add.c] + return non-zero exit code on error; ok markus@ + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/10/02 22:56:09 + [sshd.c] + #include "channels.h" for channel_set_af() + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/10/03 10:01:20 + [auth.c] + use realpath() for homedir, too. from jinmei@isl.rdc.toshiba.co.jp + +20011001 + - (stevesk) loginrec.c: fix type conversion problems exposed when using + 64-bit off_t. + +20010929 + - (bal) move reading 'config.h' up higher. Patch by albert chin + and + Redhat + - (djm) Redhat initscript config sanity checking from Pekka Savola + + - (djm) Clear supplemental groups at sshd start to prevent them from + being propogated to random PAM modules. Based on patch from Redhat via + Pekka Savola + - (djm) Make sure rijndael.c picks config.h + - (djm) Ensure that u_char gets defined + +20010914 + - (bal) OpenBSD CVS Sync + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/09/13 + [rijndael.c rijndael.h] + missing $OpenBSD + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/09/14 + [session.c] + command=xxx overwrites subsystems, too + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/09/14 + [sshd.c] + typo + +20010913 + - (bal) OpenBSD CVS Sync + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/08/23 11:31:59 + [cipher.c cipher.h] + switch to the optimised AES reference code from + http://www.esat.kuleuven.ac.be/~rijmen/rijndael/rijndael-fst-3.0.zip + +20010912 + - (bal) OpenBSD CVS Sync + - jakob@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/08/16 19:18:34 + [servconf.c servconf.h session.c sshd.8] + deprecate CheckMail. ok markus@ + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/08/16 20:14:57 + [ssh.1 sshd.8] + document case sensitivity for ssh, sshd and key file + options and arguments; ok markus@ + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/08/17 18:59:47 + [servconf.h] + typo in comment + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/08/21 21:47:42 + [ssh.1 sshd.8] + minor typos and cleanup + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/08/22 16:21:21 + [ssh.1] + hostname not optional; ok markus@ + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/08/22 16:30:02 + [sshd.8] + no rexd; ok markus@ + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/08/22 17:45:16 + [ssh.1] + document cipher des for protocol 1; ok deraadt@ + - camield@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/08/23 17:59:31 + [sshd.c] + end request with 0, not NULL + ok markus@ + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/08/23 18:02:48 + [ssh-agent.1] + fix usage; ok markus@ + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/08/23 18:08:59 + [ssh-add.1 ssh-keyscan.1] + minor cleanup + - danh@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/08/27 22:02:13 + [ssh-keyscan.c] + fix memory fault if non-existent filename is given to the -f option + ok markus@ + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/08/28 09:51:26 + [readconf.c] + don't set DynamicForward unless Host matches + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/08/28 15:39:48 + [ssh.1 ssh.c] + allow: ssh -F configfile host + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/08/29 20:44:03 + [scp.c] + clear the malloc'd buffer, otherwise source() will leak malloc'd + memory; ok theo@ + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/08/29 23:02:21 + [sshd.8] + add text about -u0 preventing DNS requests; ok markus@ + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/08/29 23:13:10 + [ssh.1 ssh.c] + document -D and DynamicForward; ok markus@ + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/08/29 23:27:23 + [ssh.c] + validate ports for -L/-R; ok markus@ + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/08/29 23:39:40 + [ssh.1 sshd.8] + additional documentation for GatewayPorts; ok markus@ + - naddy@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/08/30 15:42:36 + [ssh.1] + add -D to synopsis line; ok markus@ + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/08/30 16:04:35 + [readconf.c ssh.1] + validate ports for LocalForward/RemoteForward. + add host/port alternative syntax for IPv6 (like -L/-R). + ok markus@ + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/08/30 20:36:34 + [auth-options.c sshd.8] + validate ports for permitopen key file option. add host/port + alternative syntax for IPv6. ok markus@ + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/08/30 22:22:32 + [ssh-keyscan.c] + do not pass pointers to longjmp; fix from wayne@blorf.net + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/08/31 11:46:39 + [sshconnect2.c] + disable kbd-interactive if we don't get SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST + messages + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/09/03 20:58:33 + [readconf.c readconf.h ssh.c] + fatal() for nonexistent -Fssh_config. ok markus@ + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/09/05 06:23:07 + [scp.1 sftp.1 ssh.1 ssh-agent.1 sshd.8 ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keyscan.1] + avoid first person in manual pages + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/09/12 18:18:25 + [scp.c] + don't forward agent for non third-party copies; ok markus@ + +20010815 + - (bal) Fixed stray code in readconf.c that went in by mistake. + - OpenBSD CVS Sync + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/08/07 10:37:46 + [authfd.c authfd.h] + extended failure messages from galb@vandyke.com + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/08/08 07:16:58 + [scp.1] + when describing the -o option, give -o Protocol=1 as the specific example + since we are SICK AND TIRED of clueless people who cannot have difficulty + thinking on their own. + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/08/08 18:20:15 + [uidswap.c] + permanently_set_uid is a noop if user is not privilegued; + fixes bug on solaris; from sbi@uchicago.edu + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/08/08 21:34:19 + [uidswap.c] + undo last change; does not work for sshd + - jakob@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/08/11 22:51:27 + [ssh.c tildexpand.c] + fix more paths beginning with "//"; . + ok markus@ + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/08/13 23:38:54 + [scp.c] + don't need main prototype (also sync with rcp); ok markus@ + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/08/14 09:23:02 + [sftp.1 sftp-int.c] + "bye"; hk63a@netscape.net + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/08/14 17:54:29 + [scp.1 sftp.1 ssh.1] + consistent documentation and example of ``-o ssh_option'' for sftp and + scp; document keyword=argument for ssh. + - (bal) QNX resync. OK tim@ + +20010814 + - (stevesk) sshpty.c, cray.[ch]: whitespace, formatting and cleanup + for some #ifdef _CRAY code; ok wendyp@cray.com + - (stevesk) sshpty.c: return 0 on error in cray pty code; + ok wendyp@cray.com + - (stevesk) bsd-cray.c: utmp strings are not C strings + - (stevesk) bsd-cray.c: more cleanup; ok wendyp@cray.com + +20010812 + - (djm) Fix detection of long long int support. Based on patch from + Michael Stone . ok stevesk, tim + +20010808 + - (bal) Minor correction to inet_ntop.h. _BSD_RRESVPORT_H should be + _BSD_INET_NTOP_H. Pointed out by Mark Miller + +20010807 + - (tim) [configure.in sshconnect.c openbsd-compat/Makefile.in + openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h ] Add inet_ntop.c inet_ntop.h back + in. Needed for sshconnect.c + [sshconnect.c] fix INET6_ADDRSTRLEN for non IPv6 machines + [configure.in] make tests with missing libraries fail + patch by Wendy Palm + Added openbsd-compat/bsd-cray.h. Selective patches from + William L. Jones + +20010806 + - OpenBSD CVS Sync + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/07/22 21:32:27 + [sshpty.c] + update comment + - pvalchev@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/07/22 21:32:42 + [ssh.1] + There is no option "Compress", point to "Compression" instead; ok + markus + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/07/22 22:04:19 + [readconf.c ssh.1] + enable challenge-response auth by default; ok millert@ + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/07/22 22:24:16 + [sshd.8] + Xr login.conf + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/07/23 09:06:28 + [sshconnect2.c] + reorder default sequence of userauth methods to match ssh behaviour: + hostbased,publickey,keyboard-interactive,password + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/07/23 12:47:05 + [ssh.1] + sync PreferredAuthentications + - aaron@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/07/23 14:14:18 + [ssh-keygen.1] + Fix typo. + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/07/23 18:14:58 + [auth2.c auth-rsa.c] + use %lu; ok markus@ + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/07/23 18:21:46 + [xmalloc.c] + no zero size xstrdup() error; ok markus@ + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/07/25 11:59:35 + [scard.c] + typo in comment + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/07/25 14:35:18 + [readconf.c ssh.1 ssh.c sshconnect.c] + cleanup connect(); connection_attempts 4 -> 1; from + eivind@freebsd.org + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/07/26 17:18:22 + [sshd.8 sshd.c] + add -t option to test configuration file and keys; pekkas@netcore.fi + ok markus@ + - rees@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/07/26 20:04:27 + [scard.c ssh-keygen.c] + Inquire Cyberflex class for 0xf0 cards + change aid to conform to 7816-5 + remove gratuitous fid selects + - millert@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/07/27 14:50:45 + [ssh.c] + If smart card support is compiled in and a smart card is being used + for authentication, make it the first method used. markus@ OK + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/07/27 17:26:16 + [scp.c] + shorten lines + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/07/28 09:21:15 + [sshd.8] + cleanup some RSA vs DSA vs SSH1 vs SSH2 notes + - mouring@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/07/29 17:02:46 + [scp.1] + Clarified -o option in scp.1 OKed by Markus@ + - jakob@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/07/30 16:06:07 + [scard.c scard.h] + better errorcodes from sc_*; ok markus@ + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/07/30 16:23:30 + [rijndael.c rijndael.h] + new BSD-style license: + Brian Gladman : + >I have updated my code at: + >http://fp.gladman.plus.com/cryptography_technology/rijndael/index.htm + >with a copyright notice as follows: + >[...] + >I am not sure which version of my old code you are using but I am + >happy for the notice above to be substituted for my existing copyright + >intent if this meets your purpose. + - jakob@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/07/31 08:41:10 + [scard.c] + do not complain about missing smartcards. ok markus@ + - jakob@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/07/31 09:28:44 + [readconf.c readconf.h ssh.1 ssh.c] + add 'SmartcardDevice' client option to specify which smartcard device + is used to access a smartcard used for storing the user's private RSA + key. ok markus@. + - jakob@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/07/31 12:42:50 + [sftp-int.c sftp-server.c] + avoid paths beginning with "//"; + ok markus@ + - jakob@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/07/31 12:53:34 + [scard.c] + close smartcard connection if card is missing + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/08/01 22:03:33 + [authfd.c authfd.h readconf.c readconf.h scard.c scard.h ssh-add.c + ssh-agent.c ssh.c] + use strings instead of ints for smartcard reader ids + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/08/01 22:16:45 + [ssh.1 sshd.8] + refer to current ietf drafts for protocol v2 + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/08/01 23:33:09 + [ssh-keygen.c] + allow uploading RSA keys for non-default AUT0 (sha1 over passphrase + like sectok). + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/08/01 23:38:45 + [scard.c ssh.c] + support finish rsa keys. + free public keys after login -> call finish -> close smartcard. + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/08/02 00:10:17 + [ssh-keygen.c] + add -D readerid option (download, i.e. print public RSA key to stdout). + check for card present when uploading keys. + use strings instead of ints for smartcard reader ids, too. + - jakob@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/08/02 08:58:35 + [ssh-keygen.c] + change -u (upload smartcard key) to -U. ok markus@ + - jakob@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/08/02 15:06:52 + [ssh-keygen.c] + more verbose usage(). ok markus@ + - jakob@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/08/02 15:07:23 + [ssh-keygen.1] + document smartcard upload/download. ok markus@ + - jakob@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/08/02 15:32:10 + [ssh.c] + add smartcard to usage(). ok markus@ + - jakob@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/08/02 15:43:57 + [ssh-agent.c ssh.c ssh-keygen.c] + add /* SMARTCARD */ to #else/#endif. ok markus@ + - jakob@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/08/02 16:14:05 + [scard.c ssh-agent.c ssh.c ssh-keygen.c] + clean up some /* SMARTCARD */. ok markus@ + - mpech@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/08/02 18:37:35 + [ssh-keyscan.1] + o) .Sh AUTHOR -> .Sh AUTHORS; + o) .Sh EXAMPLE -> .Sh EXAMPLES; + o) Delete .Sh OPTIONS. Text moved to .Sh DESCRIPTION; + + millert@ ok + - jakob@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/08/03 10:31:19 + [ssh-add.1] + document smartcard options. ok markus@ + - jakob@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/08/03 10:31:30 + [ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c ssh-keyscan.c] + improve usage(). ok markus@ + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/08/05 23:18:20 + [ssh-keyscan.1 ssh-keyscan.c] + ssh 2 support; from wayned@users.sourceforge.net + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/08/05 23:29:58 + [ssh-keyscan.c] + make -t dsa work with commercial servers, too + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/08/06 19:47:05 + [scp.c] + use alarm vs. setitimer for portable; ok markus@ + - (bal) ssh-keyscan double -lssh hack due to seed_rng(). + - (bal) Second around of UNICOS patches. A few other things left. + Patches by William L. Jones + +20010803 + - (djm) Fix interrupted read in entropy gatherer. Spotted by markus@ on + a fast UltraSPARC. + +20010726 + - (stevesk) use mysignal() in protocol 1 loop now that the SIGCHLD + handler has converged. + +20010725 + - (bal) Added 'install-nokeys' to Makefile to assist package builders. + +20010724 + - (bal) 4711 not 04711 for ssh binary. + +20010722 + - (bal) Starting the Unicossmk merger. File merged TODO, configure.in, + myproposal.h, ssh_prng_cmds.in, and openbsd-compat/Makefile.in. + Added openbsd-compat/bsd-cray.c. Rest will be merged after + approval. Selective patches from William L. Jones + + - OpenBSD CVS Sync + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/07/18 21:10:43 + [sshpty.c] + pr #1946, allow sshd if /dev is readonly + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/07/18 21:40:40 + [ssh-agent.c] + chdir("/") from bbraun@synack.net; ok markus@ + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/07/19 00:41:44 + [ssh.1] + escape chars are below now + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/07/20 14:46:11 + [ssh-agent.c] + do not exit() from signal handlers; ok deraadt@ + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/07/20 18:41:51 + [ssh.1] + "the" command line + +20010719 + - (tim) [configure.in] put inet_aton back in AC_CHECK_FUNCS. + report from Mark Miller + +20010718 + - OpenBSD CVS Sync + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/07/14 15:10:17 + [readpass.c sftp-client.c sftp-common.c sftp-glob.c] + delete spurious #includes; ok deraadt@ markus@ + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/07/15 16:17:08 + [serverloop.c] + schedule client alive for ssh2 only, greg@cheers.bungi.com + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/07/15 16:57:21 + [ssh-agent.1] + -d will not fork; ok markus@ + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/07/15 16:58:29 + [ssh-agent.c] + typo in usage; ok markus@ + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/07/17 20:48:42 + [ssh-agent.c] + update maxfd if maxfd is closed; report from jmcelroy@dtgnet.com + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/07/17 21:04:58 + [channels.c channels.h clientloop.c nchan.c serverloop.c] + keep track of both maxfd and the size of the malloc'ed fdsets. + update maxfd if maxfd gets closed. + - mouring@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/07/18 16:45:52 + [scp.c] + Missing -o in scp usage() + - (bal) Cleaned up trailing spaces in ChangeLog. + - (bal) Allow sshd to switch user context without password for Cygwin. + Patch by Corinna Vinschen + - (bal) Updated cygwin README and ssh-host-config. Patch by + Corinna Vinschen + +20010715 + - (bal) Set "BROKEN_GETADDRINFO" for darwin platform. Reported by + Josh Larios + - (tim) put openssh/openbsd-compat/inet_aton.[ch] back in. + needed by openbsd-compat/fake-getaddrinfo.c + +20010714 + - (stevesk) change getopt() declaration + - (stevesk) configure.in: use ll suffix for long long constant + in snprintf() test + +20010713 + - (djm) Enable /etc/nologin check on PAM systems, as some lack the + pam_nologin module. Report from William Yodlowsky + + - (djm) Revert dirname fix, a better one is on its way. + - OpenBSD CVS Sync + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/07/04 22:47:19 + [ssh-agent.c] + ignore SIGPIPE when debugging, too + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/07/04 23:13:10 + [scard.c scard.h ssh-agent.c] + handle card removal more gracefully, add sc_close() to scard.h + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/07/04 23:39:07 + [ssh-agent.c] + for smartcards remove both RSA1/2 keys + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/07/04 23:49:27 + [ssh-agent.c] + handle mutiple adds of the same smartcard key + - espie@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/07/05 11:43:33 + [sftp-glob.c] + Directly cast to the right type. Ok markus@ + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/07/05 20:32:47 + [sshconnect1.c] + statement after label; ok dugsong@ + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/07/08 15:23:38 + [servconf.c] + fix ``MaxStartups max''; ok markus@ + - fgsch@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/07/09 05:58:47 + [ssh.c] + Use getopt(3); markus@ ok. + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/07/09 07:04:53 + [session.c sftp-int.c] + correct type on last arg to execl(); nordin@cse.ogi.edu + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/07/10 21:49:12 + [readpass.c] + don't panic if fork or pipe fail (just return an empty passwd). + - itojun@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/07/11 00:24:53 + [servconf.c] + make it compilable in all 4 combination of KRB4/KRB5 settings. + dugsong ok + XXX isn't it sensitive to the order of -I/usr/include/kerberosIV and + -I/usr/include/kerberosV? + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/07/11 16:29:59 + [ssh.c] + sort options string, fix -p, add -k + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/07/11 18:26:15 + [auth.c] + no need to call dirname(pw->pw_dir). + note that dirname(3) modifies its argument on some systems. + - (djm) Reorder Makefile.in so clean targets work a little better when + run directly from Makefile.in + - (djm) Pull in getopt(3) from OpenBSD libc for the optreset extension. + +20010711 + - (djm) dirname(3) may modify its argument on glibc and other systems. + Patch from markus@, spotted by Tom Holroyd + +20010704 + - OpenBSD CVS Sync + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/25 08:25:41 + [channels.c channels.h cipher.c clientloop.c compat.c compat.h + hostfile.c kex.c kex.h key.c key.h nchan.c packet.c serverloop.c + session.c session.h sftp-server.c ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c uuencode.h] + update copyright for 2001 + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/25 17:18:27 + [ssh-keygen.1] + sshd(8) will never read the private keys, but ssh(1) does; + hugh@mimosa.com + - provos@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/25 17:54:47 + [auth.c auth.h auth-rsa.c] + terminate secure_filename checking after checking homedir. that way + it works on AFS. okay markus@ + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/25 20:26:37 + [auth2.c sshconnect2.c] + prototype cleanup; ok markus@ + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/26 02:47:07 + [ssh-keygen.c] + allow loading a private RSA key to a cyberflex card. + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/26 04:07:06 + [ssh-agent.1 ssh-agent.c] + add debug flag + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/26 04:59:59 + [authfd.c authfd.h ssh-add.c] + initial support for smartcards in the agent + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/26 05:07:43 + [ssh-agent.c] + update usage + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/26 05:33:34 + [ssh-agent.c] + more smartcard support. + - mpech@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/26 05:48:07 + [sshd.8] + remove unnecessary .Pp between .It; + millert@ ok + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/26 05:50:11 + [auth2.c] + new interface for secure_filename() + - itojun@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/26 06:32:58 + [atomicio.h authfd.h authfile.h auth.h auth-options.h bufaux.h + buffer.h canohost.h channels.h cipher.h clientloop.h compat.h + compress.h crc32.h deattack.h dh.h dispatch.h groupaccess.h + hostfile.h kex.h key.h log.h mac.h match.h misc.h mpaux.h packet.h + radix.h readconf.h readpass.h rsa.h] + prototype pedant. not very creative... + - () -> (void) + - no variable names + - itojun@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/26 06:33:07 + [servconf.h serverloop.h session.h sftp-client.h sftp-common.h + sftp-glob.h sftp-int.h sshconnect.h ssh-dss.h sshlogin.h sshpty.h + ssh-rsa.h tildexpand.h uidswap.h uuencode.h xmalloc.h] + prototype pedant. not very creative... + - () -> (void) + - no variable names + - dugsong@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/26 16:15:25 + [auth1.c auth.h auth-krb4.c auth-passwd.c readconf.c readconf.h + servconf.c servconf.h session.c sshconnect1.c sshd.c] + Kerberos v5 support for SSH1, mostly from Assar Westerlund + and Bjorn Gronvall . markus@ ok + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/26 17:25:34 + [ssh.1] + document SSH_ASKPASS; fubob@MIT.EDU + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/26 17:27:25 + [authfd.h authfile.h auth.h auth-options.h bufaux.h buffer.h + canohost.h channels.h cipher.h clientloop.h compat.h compress.h + crc32.h deattack.h dh.h dispatch.h groupaccess.c groupaccess.h + hostfile.h kex.h key.h log.c log.h mac.h misc.c misc.h mpaux.h + packet.h radix.h readconf.h readpass.h rsa.h servconf.h serverloop.h + session.h sftp-common.c sftp-common.h sftp-glob.h sftp-int.h + sshconnect.h ssh-dss.h sshlogin.h sshpty.h ssh-rsa.h sshtty.h + tildexpand.h uidswap.h uuencode.h xmalloc.h] + remove comments from .h, since they are cut&paste from the .c files + and out of sync + - dugsong@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/26 17:41:49 + [servconf.c] + #include + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/26 20:14:11 + [key.c key.h ssh.c sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c] + add smartcard support to the client, too (now you can use both + the agent and the client). + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/27 02:12:54 + [serverloop.c serverloop.h session.c session.h] + quick hack to make ssh2 work again. + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/27 04:48:53 + [auth.c match.c sshd.8] + tridge@samba.org + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/27 05:35:42 + [ssh-keygen.c] + use cyberflex_inq_class to inquire class. + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/27 05:42:25 + [rsa.c rsa.h ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.c] + s/generate_additional_parameters/rsa_generate_additional_parameters/ + http://www.humppa.com/ + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/27 06:26:36 + [ssh-add.c] + convert to getopt(3) + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/28 19:57:35 + [ssh-keygen.c] + '\0' terminated data[] is ok; ok markus@ + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/29 07:06:34 + [ssh-keygen.c] + new error handling for cyberflex_* + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/29 07:11:01 + [ssh-keygen.c] + initialize early + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/29 18:38:44 + [clientloop.c] + sync function definition with declaration; ok markus@ + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/29 18:40:28 + [channels.c] + use socklen_t for getsockopt arg #5; ok markus@ + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/30 18:08:40 + [channels.c channels.h clientloop.c] + adress -> address; ok markus@ + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/07/02 13:59:15 + [serverloop.c session.c session.h] + wait until !session_have_children(); bugreport from + Lutz.Jaenicke@aet.TU-Cottbus.DE + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/07/02 22:29:20 + [readpass.c] + do not return NULL, use "" instead. + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/07/02 22:40:18 + [ssh-keygen.c] + update for sectok.h interface changes. + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/07/02 22:52:57 + [channels.c channels.h serverloop.c] + improve cleanup/exit logic in ssh2: + stop listening to channels, detach channel users (e.g. sessions). + wait for children (i.e. dying sessions), send exit messages, + cleanup all channels. + - (bal) forget a few new files in sync up. + - (bal) Makefile fix up requires scard.c + - (stevesk) sync misc.h + - (stevesk) more sync for session.c + - (stevesk) sync servconf.h (comments) + - (tim) [contrib/caldera/openssh.spec] sync with Caldera + - (tim) [openbsd-compat/dirname.h] Remove ^M causing some compilers to + issue warning (line 1: tokens ignored at end of directive line) + - (tim) [sshconnect1.c] give the compiler something to do for success: + if KRB5 and AFS are not defined + (ERROR: "sshconnect1.c", line 1274: Syntax error before or at: }) + +20010629 + - (bal) Removed net_aton() since we don't use it any more + - (bal) Fixed _DISABLE_VPOSIX in readpassphrase.c. + - (bal) Updated zlib's home. Thanks to David Howe . + - (stevesk) remove _REENTRANT #define + - (stevesk) session.c: use u_int for envsize + - (stevesk) remove cli.[ch] + +20010628 + - (djm) Sync openbsd-compat with -current libc + - (djm) Fix from Lutz Jaenicke for my + broken makefile + - (bal) Removed strtok_r() and inet_ntop() since they are no longer used. + - (bal) Remove getusershell() since it's no longer used. + +20010627 + - (djm) Reintroduce pam_session call for non-pty sessions. + - (djm) Remove redundant and incorrect test for max auth attempts in + PAM kbdint code. Based on fix from Matthew Melvin + + - (djm) Rename sysconfdir/primes => sysconfdir/moduli + - (djm) Oops, forgot make logic for primes=>moduli. Also try to rename + existing primes->moduli if it exists. + - (djm) Sync with -current openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.c: + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/27 13:23:30 + typo, spotted by Tom Holroyd ; ok deraadt@ + - (djm) Turn up warnings if gcc or egcs detected + - (stevesk) for HP-UX 11.X use X/Open socket interface; + pulls in modern socket prototypes and eliminates a number of compiler + warnings. see xopen_networking(7). + - (stevesk) fix x11 forwarding from _PATH_XAUTH change + - (stevesk) use X/Open socket interface for HP-UX 10.X also + +20010625 + - OpenBSD CVS Sync + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/21 21:08:25 + [session.c] + don't reset forced_command (we allow multiple login shells in + ssh2); dwd@bell-labs.com + - mpech@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/22 10:17:51 + [ssh.1 sshd.8 ssh-keyscan.1] + o) .Sh AUTHOR -> .Sh AUTHORS; + o) remove unnecessary .Pp; + o) better -mdoc style; + o) typo; + o) sort SEE ALSO; + aaron@ ok + - provos@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/22 21:27:08 + [dh.c pathnames.h] + use /etc/moduli instead of /etc/primes, okay markus@ + - provos@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/22 21:28:53 + [sshd.8] + document /etc/moduli + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/22 21:55:49 + [auth2.c auth-rsa.c pathnames.h ssh.1 sshd.8 sshd_config + ssh-keygen.1] + merge authorized_keys2 into authorized_keys. + authorized_keys2 is used for backward compat. + (just append authorized_keys2 to authorized_keys). + - provos@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/22 21:57:59 + [dh.c] + increase linebuffer to deal with larger moduli; use rewind instead of + close/open + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/22 22:21:20 + [sftp-server.c] + allow long usernames/groups in readdir + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/22 23:35:21 + [ssh.c] + don't overwrite argv (fixes ssh user@host in 'ps'), report by ericj@ + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/23 00:16:16 + [scp.c] + slightly better care + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/23 00:20:57 + [auth2.c auth.c auth.h auth-rh-rsa.c] + *known_hosts2 is obsolete for hostbased authentication and + only used for backward compat. merge ssh1/2 hostkey check + and move it to auth.c + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/23 02:33:05 + [sftp.1 sftp-server.8 ssh-keygen.1] + join .%A entries; most by bk@rt.fm + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/23 02:34:33 + [kexdh.c kexgex.c kex.h pathnames.h readconf.c servconf.h ssh.1 + sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c sshconnect.c sshconnect.h sshd.8] + get rid of known_hosts2, use it for hostkey lookup, but do not + modify. + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/23 03:03:59 + [sshd.8] + draft-ietf-secsh-dh-group-exchange-01.txt + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/23 03:04:42 + [auth2.c auth-rh-rsa.c] + restore correct ignore_user_known_hosts logic. + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/23 05:26:02 + [key.c] + handle sigature of size 0 (some broken clients send this). + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/23 05:57:09 + [sftp.1 sftp-server.8 ssh-keygen.1] + ok, tmac is now fixed + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/23 06:41:10 + [ssh-keygen.c] + try to decode ssh-3.0.0 private rsa keys + (allow migration to openssh, not vice versa), #910 + - itojun@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/23 15:12:20 + [auth1.c auth2.c auth2-chall.c authfd.c authfile.c auth-rhosts.c + canohost.c channels.c cipher.c clientloop.c deattack.c dh.c + hostfile.c kex.c kexdh.c kexgex.c key.c nchan.c packet.c radix.c + readpass.c scp.c servconf.c serverloop.c session.c sftp.c + sftp-client.c sftp-glob.c sftp-int.c sftp-server.c ssh-add.c + ssh-agent.c ssh.c sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c sshconnect.c sshd.c + ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c] + more strict prototypes. raise warning level in Makefile.inc. + markus ok'ed + TODO; cleanup headers + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/23 17:05:22 + [ssh-keygen.c] + fix import for (broken?) ssh.com/f-secure private keys + (i tested > 1000 RSA keys) + - itojun@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/23 17:48:18 + [sftp.1 ssh.1 sshd.8 ssh-keyscan.1] + kill whitespace at EOL. + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/23 19:12:43 + [sshd.c] + pidfile/sigterm race; bbraun@synack.net + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/23 22:37:46 + [sshconnect1.c] + consistent with ssh2: skip key if empty passphrase is entered, + retry num_of_passwd_prompt times if passphrase is wrong. ok fgsch@ + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/24 05:25:10 + [auth-options.c match.c match.h] + move ip+hostname check to match.c + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/24 05:35:33 + [readpass.c readpass.h ssh-add.c sshconnect2.c ssh-keygen.c] + switch to readpassphrase(3) + 2.7/8-stable needs readpassphrase.[ch] from libc + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/24 05:47:13 + [sshconnect2.c] + oops, missing format string + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/24 17:18:31 + [ttymodes.c] + passing modes works fine: debug2->3 + - (djm) -Wall fix for session.c + - (djm) Bring in readpassphrase() from OpenBSD libc. Compiles OK on Linux and + Solaris + +20010622 + - (stevesk) handle systems without pw_expire and pw_change. + +20010621 + - OpenBSD CVS Sync + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/16 08:49:38 + [misc.c] + typo; dunlap@apl.washington.edu + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/16 08:50:39 + [channels.h] + bad //-style comment; thx to stevev@darkwing.uoregon.edu + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/16 08:57:35 + [scp.c] + no stdio or exit() in signal handlers. + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/16 08:58:34 + [misc.c] + copy pw_expire and pw_change, too. + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/19 12:34:09 + [session.c] + cleanup forced command handling, from dwd@bell-labs.com + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/19 14:09:45 + [session.c sshd.8] + disable x11-fwd if use_login is enabled; from lukem@wasabisystems.com + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/19 15:40:45 + [session.c] + allocate and free at the same level. + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/20 13:56:39 + [channels.c channels.h clientloop.c packet.c serverloop.c] + move from channel_stop_listening to channel_free_all, + call channel_free_all before calling waitpid() in serverloop. + fixes the utmp handling; report from Lutz.Jaenicke@aet.TU-Cottbus.DE + +20010615 + - (stevesk) don't set SA_RESTART and set SIGCHLD to SIG_DFL + around grantpt(). + - (stevesk) update TODO: STREAMS pty systems don't call vhangup() now + +20010614 + - OpenBSD CVS Sync + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/13 09:10:31 + [session.c] + typo, use pid not s->pid, mstone@cs.loyola.edu + +20010613 + - OpenBSD CVS Sync + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/12 10:58:29 + [session.c] + merge session_free into session_close() + merge pty_cleanup_proc into session_pty_cleanup() + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/12 16:10:38 + [session.c] + merge ssh1/ssh2 tty msg parse and alloc code + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/12 16:11:26 + [packet.c] + do not log() packet_set_maxsize + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/12 21:21:29 + [session.c] + remove xauth-cookie-in-tmp handling. use default $XAUTHORITY, since + we do already trust $HOME/.ssh + you can use .ssh/sshrc and .ssh/environment if you want to customize + the location of the xauth cookies + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/12 21:30:57 + [session.c] + unused + +20010612 + - scp.c ID update (upstream synced vfsprintf() from us) + - OpenBSD CVS Sync + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/10 11:29:20 + [dispatch.c] + we support rekeying + protocol errors are fatal. + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/11 10:18:24 + [session.c] + reset pointer to NULL after xfree(); report from solar@openwall.com + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/11 16:04:38 + [sshd.8] + typo; bdubreuil@crrel.usace.army.mil + +20010611 + - (bal) NeXT/MacOS X lack libgen.h and dirname(). Patch by Mark Miller + + - (bal) Handle broken krb4 issues on Solaris with multiple defined u_*_t + types. Patch by Jan IVEN + - (bal) Fixed Makefile.in so that 'configure; make install' works. + +20010610 + - (bal) Missed two files in major resync. auth-bsdauth.c and auth-skey.c + +20010609 + - OpenBSD CVS Sync + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/05/30 12:55:13 + [auth-options.c auth2.c channels.c channels.h clientloop.c nchan.c + packet.c serverloop.c session.c ssh.c ssh1.h] + channel layer cleanup: merge header files and split .c files + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/05/30 15:20:10 + [ssh.c] + merge functions, simplify. + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/05/31 10:30:17 + [auth-options.c auth2.c channels.c channels.h clientloop.c nchan.c + packet.c serverloop.c session.c ssh.c] + undo the .c file split, just merge the header and keep the cvs + history + - (bal) Channels.c and Channels.h -- "Merge Functions, simplify" (draged + out of ssh Attic) + - (bal) Ooops.. nchan.c (and remove nchan.h) resync from OpenBSD ssh + Attic. + - OpenBSD CVS Sync + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/05/31 13:08:04 + [sshd_config] + group options and add some more comments + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/03 14:55:39 + [channels.c channels.h session.c] + use fatal_register_cleanup instead of atexit, sync with x11 authdir + handling + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/03 19:36:44 + [ssh-keygen.1] + 1-2 bits of entrophy per character (not per word), ok stevesk@ + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/03 19:38:42 + [scp.c] + pass -v to ssh; from slade@shore.net + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/03 20:06:11 + [auth2-chall.c] + the challenge response device decides how to handle non-existing + users. + -> fake challenges for skey and cryptocard + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/04 21:59:43 + [channels.c channels.h session.c] + switch uid when cleaning up tmp files and sockets; reported by + zen-parse@gmx.net on bugtraq + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/04 23:07:21 + [clientloop.c serverloop.c sshd.c] + set flags in the signal handlers, do real work in the main loop, + ok provos@ + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/04 23:16:16 + [session.c] + merge ssh1/2 x11-fwd setup, create listener after tmp-dir + - pvalchev@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/05 05:05:39 + [ssh-keyscan.1 ssh-keyscan.c] + License clarification from David Mazieres, ok deraadt@ + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/05 10:24:32 + [channels.c] + don't delete the auth socket in channel_stop_listening() + auth_sock_cleanup_proc() will take care of this. + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/05 16:46:19 + [session.c] + let session_close() delete the pty. deny x11fwd if xauthfile is set. + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/06 23:13:54 + [ssh-dss.c ssh-rsa.c] + cleanup, remove old code + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/06 23:19:35 + [ssh-add.c] + remove debug message; Darren.Moffat@eng.sun.com + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/07 19:57:53 + [auth2.c] + style is used for bsdauth. + disconnect on user/service change (ietf-drafts) + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/07 20:23:05 + [authfd.c authfile.c channels.c kexdh.c kexgex.c packet.c ssh.c + sshconnect.c sshconnect1.c] + use xxx_put_cstring() + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/07 22:25:02 + [session.c] + don't overwrite errno + delay deletion of the xauth cookie + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/08 15:25:40 + [includes.h pathnames.h readconf.c servconf.c] + move the path for xauth to pathnames.h + - (bal) configure.in fix for Tru64 (forgeting to reset $LIB) + - (bal) ANSIify strmode() + - (bal) --with-catman should be --with-mantype patch by Dave + Dykstra + +20010606 + - OpenBSD CVS Sync + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/05/17 21:34:15 + [ssh.1] + no spaces in PreferredAuthentications; + meixner@rbg.informatik.tu-darmstadt.de + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/05/18 14:13:29 + [auth-chall.c auth.h auth1.c auth2-chall.c auth2.c readconf.c + readconf.h servconf.c servconf.h sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c] + improved kbd-interactive support. work by per@appgate.com and me + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/05/19 00:36:40 + [session.c] + Disable X11 forwarding if xauth binary is not found. Patch from Nalin + Dahyabhai ; ok markus@ + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/05/19 16:05:41 + [scp.c] + ftruncate() instead of open()+O_TRUNC like rcp.c does + allows scp /path/to/file localhost:/path/to/file + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/05/19 16:08:43 + [sshd.8] + sort options; Matthew.Stier@fnc.fujitsu.com + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/05/19 16:32:16 + [ssh.1 sshconnect2.c] + change preferredauthentication order to + publickey,hostbased,password,keyboard-interactive + document that hostbased defaults to no, document order + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/05/19 16:46:19 + [ssh.1 sshd.8] + document MACs defaults with .Dq + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/05/19 19:43:57 + [misc.c misc.h servconf.c sshd.8 sshd.c] + sshd command-line arguments and configuration file options that + specify time may be expressed using a sequence of the form: + time[qualifier], where time is a positive integer value and qualifier + is one of the following: + ,s,m,h,d,w + Examples: + 600 600 seconds (10 minutes) + 10m 10 minutes + 1h30m 1 hour 30 minutes (90 minutes) + ok markus@ + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/05/19 19:57:09 + [channels.c] + typo in error message + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/05/20 17:20:36 + [auth-rsa.c auth.c auth.h auth2.c servconf.c servconf.h sshd.8 + sshd_config] + configurable authorized_keys{,2} location; originally from peter@; + ok djm@ + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/05/24 11:12:42 + [auth.c] + fix comment; from jakob@ + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/05/24 18:57:53 + [clientloop.c readconf.c ssh.c ssh.h] + don't perform escape processing when ``EscapeChar none''; ok markus@ + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/05/25 14:37:32 + [ssh-keygen.c] + use -P for -e and -y, too. + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/05/28 08:04:39 + [ssh.c] + fix usage() + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/05/28 10:08:55 + [authfile.c] + key_load_private: set comment to filename for PEM keys + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/05/28 22:51:11 + [cipher.c cipher.h] + simpler 3des for ssh1 + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/05/28 23:14:49 + [channels.c channels.h nchan.c] + undo broken channel fix and try a different one. there + should be still some select errors... + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/05/28 23:25:24 + [channels.c] + cleanup, typo + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/05/28 23:58:35 + [packet.c packet.h sshconnect.c sshd.c] + remove some lines, simplify. + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/05/29 12:31:27 + [authfile.c] + typo + +20010528 + - (tim) [conifgure.in] add setvbuf test needed for sftp-int.c + Patch by Corinna Vinschen + +20010517 + - OpenBSD CVS Sync + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/05/12 19:53:13 + [sftp-server.c] + readlink does not NULL-terminate; mhe@home.se + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/05/15 22:04:01 + [ssh.1] + X11 forwarding details improved + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/05/16 20:51:57 + [authfile.c] + return comments for private pem files, too; report from nolan@naic.edu + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/05/16 21:53:53 + [clientloop.c] + check for open sessions before we call select(); fixes the x11 client + bug reported by bowman@math.ualberta.ca + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/05/16 22:09:21 + [channels.c nchan.c] + more select() error fixes (don't set rfd/wfd to -1). + - (bal) Enabled USE_PIPES for Cygwin on Corinna Vinschen + - (bal) Corrected on_exit() emulation via atexit(). + +20010512 + - OpenBSD CVS Sync + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/05/11 14:59:56 + [clientloop.c misc.c misc.h] + add unset_nonblock for stdout/err flushing in client_loop(). + - (bal) Patch to partial sync up contrib/solaris/ packaging software. + Patch by pete + +20010511 + - OpenBSD CVS Sync + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/05/09 22:51:57 + [channels.c] + fix -R for protocol 2, noticed by greg@nest.cx. + bug was introduced with experimental dynamic forwarding. + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/05/09 23:01:31 + [rijndael.h] + fix prototype; J.S.Peatfield@damtp.cam.ac.uk + +20010509 + - OpenBSD CVS Sync + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/05/06 21:23:31 + [cli.c] + cli_read() fails to catch SIGINT + overflow; from obdb@zzlevo.net + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/05/08 19:17:31 + [channels.c serverloop.c clientloop.c] + adds correct error reporting to async connect()s + fixes the server-discards-data-before-connected-bug found by + onoe@sm.sony.co.jp + - mouring@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/05/08 19:45:25 + [misc.c misc.h scp.c sftp.c] + Use addargs() in sftp plus some clean up of addargs(). OK Markus + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/05/06 21:45:14 + [clientloop.c] + use atomicio for flushing stdout/stderr bufs. thanks to + jbw@izanami.cee.hw.ac.uk + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/05/08 22:48:07 + [atomicio.c] + no need for xmalloc.h, thanks to espie@ + - (bal) UseLogin patch for Solaris/UNICOS. Patch by Wayne Davison + + - (bal) ./configure support to disable SIA on OSF1. Patch by + Chris Adams + - (bal) Updates from the Sony NEWS-OS platform by NAKAJI Hiroyuki + + +20010508 + - (bal) Fixed configure test for USE_SIA. + +20010506 + - (djm) Update config.guess and config.sub with latest versions (from + ftp://ftp.gnu.org/gnu/config/) to allow configure on ia64-hpux. + Suggested by Jason Mader + - (bal) White Space and #ifdef sync with OpenBSD + - (bal) Add 'seed_rng()' to ssh-add.c + - (bal) CVS ID updates for readpass.c, readpass.h, cli.c, and cli.h + - OpenBSD CVS Sync + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/05/05 13:42:52 + [sftp.1 ssh-add.1 ssh-keygen.1] + typos, grammar + +20010505 + - OpenBSD CVS Sync + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/05/04 14:21:56 + [ssh.1 sshd.8] + typos + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/05/04 14:34:34 + [channels.c] + channel_new() reallocs channels[], we cannot use Channel *c after + calling channel_new(), XXX fix this in the future... + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/05/04 23:47:34 + [channels.c channels.h clientloop.c nchan.c nchan.h serverloop.c ssh.c] + move to Channel **channels (instead of Channel *channels), fixes realloc + problems. channel_new now returns a Channel *, favour Channel * over + channel id. remove old channel_allocate interface. + +20010504 + - OpenBSD CVS Sync + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/05/03 15:07:39 + [channels.c] + typo in debug() string + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/05/03 15:45:15 + [session.c] + exec shell -c /bin/sh .ssh/sshrc, from abartlet@pcug.org.au + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/05/03 21:43:01 + [servconf.c] + remove "\n" from fatal() + - mouring@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/05/03 23:09:53 + [misc.c misc.h scp.c sftp.c] + Move colon() and cleanhost() to misc.c where I should I have put it in + the first place + - (bal) Updated Cygwin README by Corinna Vinschen + - (bal) Avoid socket file security issues in ssh-agent for Cygwin. + Patch by Egor Duda + +20010503 + - OpenBSD CVS Sync + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/05/02 16:41:20 + [ssh-add.c] + fix prompt for ssh-add. + +20010502 + - OpenBSD CVS Sync + - mouring@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/05/02 01:25:39 + [readpass.c] + Put the 'const' back into ssh_askpass() function. Pointed out + by Mark Miller . OK Markus + +20010501 + - OpenBSD CVS Sync + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/30 11:18:52 + [readconf.c readconf.h ssh.1 ssh.c sshconnect.c] + implement 'ssh -b bind_address' like 'telnet -b' + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/30 15:50:46 + [compat.c compat.h kex.c] + allow interop with weaker key generation used by ssh-2.0.x, x < 10 + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/30 16:02:49 + [compat.c] + ssh-2.0.10 has the weak-key-bug, too. + - (tim) [contrib/caldera/openssh.spec] add Requires line for Caldera 3.1 + +20010430 + - OpenBSD CVS Sync + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/29 18:32:52 + [serverloop.c] + fix whitespace + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/29 19:16:52 + [channels.c clientloop.c compat.c compat.h serverloop.c] + more ssh.com-2.0.x bug-compat; from per@appgate.com + - (tim) New version of mdoc2man.pl from Mark D. Roth + - (djm) Add .cvsignore files, suggested by Wayne Davison + +20010429 + - (bal) Updated INSTALL. PCRE moved to a new place. + - (djm) Release OpenSSH-2.9p1 + +20010427 + - (bal) Fixed uidswap.c so it should work on non-posix complient systems. + patch based on 2.5.2 version by djm. + - (bal) Build manpages and config files once unless changed. Patch by + Carson Gaspar + - (bal) arpa/nameser.h does not exist on Cygwin. Patch by Corinna + Vinschen + - (bal) Add /etc/sysconfig/sshd support to redhat's sshd.init. Patch by + Pekka Savola + - (bal) Cygwin lacks setgroups() API. Patch by Corinna Vinschen + + - (bal) version.h synced, RPM specs updated for 2.9 + - (tim) update contrib/caldera files with what Caldera is using. + + +20010425 + - OpenBSD CVS Sync + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/23 21:57:07 + [ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c] + allow public key for -e, too + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/23 22:14:13 + [ssh-keygen.c] + remove debug + - (bal) Whitespace resync w/ OpenBSD for uidswap.c + - (djm) Add new server configuration directive 'PAMAuthenticationViaKbdInt' + (default: off), implies KbdInteractiveAuthentication. Suggestion from + markus@ + - (djm) Include crypt.h if available in auth-passwd.c + - tim@mindrot.org 2001/04/25 21:38:01 [configure.in] + man page detection fixes for SCO + +20010424 + - OpenBSD CVS Sync + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/22 23:58:36 + [ssh-keygen.1 ssh.1 sshd.8] + document hostbased and other cleanup + - (stevesk) start_pam() doesn't use DNS now for sshd -u0. + - (stevesk) auth-pam.c: use PERMIT_NO_PASSWD + - (bal) sys/queue.h is bogus for NCR platform. Patch by Daniel Carroll + + - (bal) Fixed contrib/postinstall.in. Patch by wsanders@wsanders.net + +20010422 + - OpenBSD CVS Sync + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/20 16:32:22 + [uidswap.c] + set non-privileged gid before uid; tholo@ and deraadt@ + - mouring@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/21 00:55:57 + [sftp.1] + Spelling + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/22 08:13:30 + [ssh.1] + typos spotted by stevesk@; ok deraadt@ + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/22 12:34:05 + [scp.c] + scp > 2GB; niles@scyld.com; ok deraadt@, djm@ + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/22 13:25:37 + [ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c] + rename arguments -x -> -e (export key), -X -> -i (import key) + xref draft-ietf-secsh-publickeyfile-01.txt + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/22 13:32:27 + [sftp-server.8 sftp.1 ssh.1 sshd.8] + xref draft-ietf-secsh-* + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/22 13:41:02 + [ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c] + style, noted by stevesk; sort flags in usage + +20010421 + - OpenBSD CVS Sync + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/20 07:17:51 + [clientloop.c ssh.1] + Split out and improve escape character documentation, mention ~R in + ~? help text; ok markus@ + - Update RPM spec files for CVS version.h + - (stevesk) set the default PAM service name to __progname instead + of the hard-coded value "sshd"; from Mark D. Roth + - (stevesk) document PAM service name change in INSTALL + - tim@mindrot.org 2001/04/21 14:25:57 [Makefile.in configure.in] + fix perl test, fix nroff test, fix Makefile to build outside source tree + +20010420 + - OpenBSD CVS Sync + - ian@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/18 16:21:05 + [ssh-keyscan.1] + Fix typo reported in PR/1779 + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/18 21:57:42 + [readpass.c ssh-add.c] + call askpass from ssh, too, based on work by roth@feep.net, ok deraadt + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/18 22:03:45 + [auth2.c sshconnect2.c] + use FDQN with trailing dot in the hostbased auth packets, ok deraadt@ + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/18 22:48:26 + [auth2.c] + no longer const + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/18 23:43:26 + [auth2.c compat.c sshconnect2.c] + more ssh v2 hostbased-auth interop: ssh.com >= 2.1.0 works now + (however the 2.1.0 server seems to work only if debug is enabled...) + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/18 23:44:51 + [authfile.c] + error->debug; noted by fries@ + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/19 00:05:11 + [auth2.c] + use local variable, no function call needed. + (btw, hostbased works now with ssh.com >= 2.0.13) + - (bal) Put scp-common.h back into scp.c (it exists in the upstream + tree) pointed out by Tom Holroyd + +20010418 + - OpenBSD CVS Sync + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/17 19:34:25 + [session.c] + move auth_approval to do_authenticated(). + do_child(): nuke hostkeys from memory + don't source .ssh/rc for subsystems. + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/18 14:15:00 + [canohost.c] + debug->debug3 + - (bal) renabled 'catman-do:' and fixed it. So now catman pages should + be working again. + - (bal) Makfile day... Cleaned up multiple mantype support (Patch by + Mark D. Roth ), and fixed PIDDIR support. + +20010417 + - (bal) Add perl5 check for HP/UX, Removed GNUness from Makefile.in + and temporary commented out 'catman-do:' since it is broken. Patches + for the first two by Lutz Jaenicke + - OpenBSD CVS Sync + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/16 08:26:04 + [key.c] + better safe than sorry in later mods; yongari@kt-is.co.kr + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/17 08:14:01 + [sshconnect1.c] + check for key!=NULL, thanks to costa + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/17 09:52:48 + [clientloop.c] + handle EINTR/EAGAIN on read; ok deraadt@ + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/17 10:53:26 + [key.c key.h readconf.c readconf.h ssh.1 sshconnect2.c] + add HostKeyAlgorithms; based on patch from res@shore.net; ok provos@ + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/17 12:55:04 + [channels.c ssh.c] + undo socks5 and https support since they are not really used and + only bloat ssh. remove -D from usage(), since '-D' is experimental. + +20010416 + - OpenBSD CVS Sync + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/15 01:35:22 + [ttymodes.c] + fix comments + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/15 08:43:47 + [dh.c sftp-glob.c sftp-glob.h sftp-int.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c] + some unused variable and typos; from tomh@po.crl.go.jp + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/15 16:58:03 + [authfile.c ssh-keygen.c sshd.c] + don't use errno for key_{load,save}_private; discussion w/ solar@openwall + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/15 17:16:00 + [clientloop.c] + set stdin/out/err to nonblocking in SSH proto 1, too. suggested by ho@ + should fix some of the blocking problems for rsync over SSH-1 + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/15 19:41:21 + [sshd.8] + some ClientAlive cleanup; ok markus@ + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/15 21:28:35 + [readconf.c servconf.c] + use fatal() or error() vs. fprintf(); ok markus@ + - (djm) Convert mandoc manpages to man automatically. Patch from Mark D. + Roth + - (bal) CVS ID fix up and slight manpage fix from OpenBSD tree. + - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync + - mouring@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/16 02:31:44 + [scp.c sftp.c] + IPv6 support for sftp (which I bungled in my last patch) which is + borrowed from scp.c. Thanks to Markus@ for pointing it out. + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/16 08:05:34 + [xmalloc.c] + xrealloc dealing with ptr == nULL; mouring + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/16 08:19:31 + [session.c] + Split motd and hushlogin checks into seperate functions, helps for + portable. From Chris Adams ; ok markus@ + - Fix OSF SIA support displaying too much information for quiet + logins and logins where access was denied by SIA. Patch from Chris Adams + + +20010415 + - OpenBSD CVS Sync + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/14 04:31:01 + [ssh-add.c] + do not double free + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/14 16:17:14 + [channels.c] + remove some channels that are not appropriate for keepalive. + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/14 16:27:57 + [ssh-add.c] + use clear_pass instead of xfree() + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/14 16:33:20 + [clientloop.c packet.h session.c ssh.c ttymodes.c ttymodes.h] + protocol 2 tty modes support; ok markus@ + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/14 17:04:42 + [scp.c] + 'T' handling rcp/scp sync; ok markus@ + - Missed sshtty.[ch] in Sync. + +20010414 + - Sync with OpenBSD glob.c, strlcat.c and vis.c changes + - Cygwin sftp/sftp-server binary mode patch from Corinna Vinschen + + - OpenBSD CVS Sync + - beck@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/13 22:46:54 + [channels.c channels.h servconf.c servconf.h serverloop.c sshd.8] + Add options ClientAliveInterval and ClientAliveCountMax to sshd. + This gives the ability to do a "keepalive" via the encrypted channel + which can't be spoofed (unlike TCP keepalives). Useful for when you want + to use ssh connections to authenticate people for something, and know + relatively quickly when they are no longer authenticated. Disabled + by default (of course). ok markus@ + +20010413 + - OpenBSD CVS Sync + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/12 14:29:09 + [ssh.c] + show debug output during option processing, report from + pekkas@netcore.fi + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/12 19:15:26 + [auth-rhosts.c auth.h auth2.c buffer.c canohost.c canohost.h + compat.c compat.h hostfile.c pathnames.h readconf.c readconf.h + servconf.c servconf.h ssh.c sshconnect.c sshconnect.h sshconnect1.c + sshconnect2.c sshd_config] + implement HostbasedAuthentication (= RhostRSAAuthentication for ssh v2) + similar to RhostRSAAuthentication unless you enable (the experimental) + HostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly option. please test. :) + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/12 19:39:27 + [readconf.c] + typo + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/12 20:09:38 + [misc.c misc.h readconf.c servconf.c ssh.c sshd.c] + robust port validation; ok markus@ jakob@ + - mouring@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/12 23:17:54 + [sftp-int.c sftp-int.h sftp.1 sftp.c] + Add support for: + sftp [user@]host[:file [file]] - Fetch remote file(s) + sftp [user@]host[:dir[/]] - Start in remote dir/ + OK deraadt@ + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/13 01:26:17 + [ssh.c] + missing \n in error message + - (bal) Added openbsd-compat/inet_ntop.[ch] since HP/UX (and others) + lack it. + +20010412 + - OpenBSD CVS Sync + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/10 07:46:58 + [channels.c] + cleanup socks4 handling + - itojun@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/10 09:13:22 + [ssh-add.1 ssh-agent.1 ssh-keygen.1 ssh.1 sshd.8] + document id_rsa{.pub,}. markus ok + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/10 12:15:23 + [channels.c] + debug cleanup + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/11 07:06:22 + [sftp-int.c] + 'mget' and 'mput' aliases; ok markus@ + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/11 10:59:01 + [ssh.c] + use strtol() for ports, thanks jakob@ + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/11 13:56:13 + [channels.c ssh.c] + https-connect and socks5 support. i feel so bad. + - lebel@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/11 16:25:30 + [sshd.8 sshd.c] + implement the -e option into sshd: + -e When this option is specified, sshd will send the output to the + standard error instead of the system log. + markus@ OK. + +20010410 + - OpenBSD CVS Sync + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/08 20:52:55 + [sftp.c] + do not modify an actual argv[] entry + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/08 23:28:27 + [sshd.8] + spelling + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/09 00:42:05 + [sftp.1] + spelling + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/09 15:12:23 + [ssh-add.c] + passphrase caching: ssh-add tries last passphrase, clears passphrase if + not successful and after last try. + based on discussions with espie@, jakob@, ... and code from jakob@ and + wolfgang@wsrcc.com + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/09 15:19:49 + [ssh-add.1] + ssh-add retries the last passphrase... + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/09 18:00:15 + [sshd.8] + ListenAddress mandoc from aaron@ + +20010409 + - (stevesk) use setresgid() for setegid() if needed + - (stevesk) configure.in: typo + - OpenBSD CVS Sync + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/08 16:01:36 + [sshd.8] + document ListenAddress addr:port + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/08 13:03:00 + [ssh-add.c] + init pointers with NULL, thanks to danimal@danimal.org + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/08 11:27:33 + [clientloop.c] + leave_raw_mode if ssh2 "session" is closed + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/06 21:00:17 + [auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rhosts.c auth-rsa.c auth2.c channels.c session.c + ssh.c sshconnect.c sshconnect.h uidswap.c uidswap.h] + do gid/groups-swap in addition to uid-swap, should help if /home/group + is chmod 750 + chgrp grp /home/group/, work be deraadt and me, thanks + to olar@openwall.com is comments. we had many requests for this. + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/07 08:55:18 + [buffer.c channels.c channels.h readconf.c ssh.c] + allow the ssh client act as a SOCKS4 proxy (dynamic local + portforwarding). work by Dan Kaminsky and me. + thanks to Dan for this great patch: use 'ssh -D 1080 host' and make + netscape use localhost:1080 as a socks proxy. + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/08 11:24:33 + [uidswap.c] + KNF + +20010408 + - OpenBSD CVS Sync + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/06 22:12:47 + [hostfile.c] + unused; typo in comment + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/06 22:25:25 + [servconf.c] + in addition to: + ListenAddress host|ipv4_addr|ipv6_addr + permit: + ListenAddress [host|ipv4_addr|ipv6_addr]:port + ListenAddress host|ipv4_addr:port + sshd.8 updates coming. ok markus@ + +20010407 + - (bal) CVS ID Resync of version.h + - OpenBSD CVS Sync + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/05 23:39:20 + [serverloop.c] + keep the ssh session even if there is no active channel. + this is more in line with the protocol spec and makes + ssh -N -L 1234:server:110 host + more useful. + based on discussion with long time ago + and recent mail from + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/06 16:46:59 + [scp.c] + remove trailing / from source paths; fixes pr#1756 + +20010406 + - (stevesk) logintest.c: fix for systems without __progname + - (stevesk) Makefile.in: log.o is in libssh.a + - OpenBSD CVS Sync + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/05 10:00:06 + [compat.c] + 2.3.x does old GEX, too; report jakob@ + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/05 10:39:03 + [compress.c compress.h packet.c] + reset compress state per direction when rekeying. + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/05 10:39:48 + [version.h] + temporary version 2.5.4 (supports rekeying). + this is not an official release. + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/05 10:42:57 + [auth-chall.c authfd.c channels.c clientloop.c kex.c kexgex.c key.c + mac.c packet.c serverloop.c sftp-client.c sftp-client.h sftp-glob.c + sftp-glob.h sftp-int.c sftp-server.c sftp.c ssh-keygen.c sshconnect.c + sshconnect2.c sshd.c] + fix whitespace: unexpand + trailing spaces. + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/05 11:09:17 + [clientloop.c compat.c compat.h] + add SSH_BUG_NOREKEY and detect broken (=all old) openssh versions. + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/05 15:45:43 + [ssh.1] + ssh defaults to protocol v2; from quisar@quisar.ambre.net + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/05 15:48:18 + [canohost.c canohost.h session.c] + move get_remote_name_or_ip() to canohost.[ch]; for portable. ok markus@ + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/05 20:01:10 + [clientloop.c] + for ~R print message if server does not support rekeying. (and fix ~R). + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/05 21:02:46 + [buffer.c] + better error message + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/05 21:05:24 + [clientloop.c ssh.c] + don't request a session for 'ssh -N', pointed out slade@shore.net + +20010405 + - OpenBSD CVS Sync + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/04 09:48:35 + [kex.c kex.h kexdh.c kexgex.c packet.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c] + don't sent multiple kexinit-requests. + send newkeys, block while waiting for newkeys. + fix comments. + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/04 14:34:58 + [clientloop.c kex.c kex.h serverloop.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c] + enable server side rekeying + some rekey related clientup. + todo: we should not send any non-KEX messages after we send KEXINIT + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/04 15:50:55 + [compat.c] + f-secure 1.3.2 does not handle IGNORE; from milliondl@ornl.gov + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/04 20:25:38 + [channels.c channels.h clientloop.c kex.c kex.h serverloop.c + sshconnect2.c sshd.c] + more robust rekeying + don't send channel data after rekeying is started. + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/04 20:32:56 + [auth2.c] + we don't care about missing bannerfiles; from tsoome@ut.ee, ok deraadt@ + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/04 22:04:35 + [kex.c kexgex.c serverloop.c] + parse full kexinit packet. + make server-side more robust, too. + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/04 23:09:18 + [dh.c kex.c packet.c] + clear+free keys,iv for rekeying. + + fix DH mem leaks. ok niels@ + - (stevesk) don't use vhangup() if defined(HAVE_DEV_PTMX); also removes + BROKEN_VHANGUP + +20010404 + - OpenBSD CVS Sync + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/02 17:32:23 + [ssh-agent.1] + grammar; slade@shore.net + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/03 13:56:11 + [sftp-glob.c ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.c] + free() -> xfree() + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/03 19:53:29 + [dh.c dh.h kex.c kex.h sshconnect2.c sshd.c] + move kex to kex*.c, used dispatch_set() callbacks for kex. should + make rekeying easier. + - todd@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/03 21:19:38 + [ssh_config] + id_rsa1/2 -> id_rsa; ok markus@ + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/03 23:32:12 + [kex.c kex.h packet.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c] + undo parts of recent my changes: main part of keyexchange does not + need dispatch-callbacks, since application data is delayed until + the keyexchange completes (if i understand the drafts correctly). + add some infrastructure for re-keying. + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/04 00:06:54 + [clientloop.c sshconnect2.c] + enable client rekeying + (1) force rekeying with ~R, or + (2) if the server requests rekeying. + works against ssh-2.0.12/2.0.13/2.1.0/2.2.0/2.3.0/2.3.1/2.4.0 + - (bal) Oops.. Missed including kexdh.c and kexgex.c in OpenBSD sync. + +20010403 + - OpenBSD CVS Sync + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/02 14:15:31 + [sshd.8] + typo; ok markus@ + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/02 14:20:23 + [readconf.c servconf.c] + correct comment; ok markus@ + - (stevesk) nchan.c: remove ostate checks and add EINVAL to + shutdown(SHUT_RD) error() bypass for HP-UX. + +20010402 + - (stevesk) log.c openbsd sync; missing newlines + - (stevesk) sshpty.h openbsd sync; PTY_H -> SSHPTY_H + +20010330 + - (djm) Another openbsd-compat/glob.c sync + - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync + - provos@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/28 21:59:41 + [kex.c kex.h sshconnect2.c sshd.c] + forgot to include min and max params in hash, okay markus@ + - provos@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/28 22:04:57 + [dh.c] + more sanity checking on primes file + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/28 22:43:31 + [auth.h auth2.c auth2-chall.c] + check auth_root_allowed for kbd-int auth, too. + - provos@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/29 14:24:59 + [sshconnect2.c] + use recommended defaults + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/29 21:06:21 + [sshconnect2.c sshd.c] + need to set both STOC and CTOS for SSH_BUG_BIGENDIANAES; ok markus@ + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/29 21:17:40 + [dh.c dh.h kex.c kex.h] + prepare for rekeying: move DH code to dh.c + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/29 23:42:01 + [sshd.c] + Protocol 1 key regeneration log => verbose, some KNF; ok markus@ + +20010329 + - OpenBSD CVS Sync + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/26 15:47:59 + [ssh.1] + document more defaults; misc. cleanup. ok markus@ + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/26 23:12:42 + [authfile.c] + KNF + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/26 23:23:24 + [rsa.c rsa.h ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.c] + try to read private f-secure ssh v2 rsa keys. + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/27 10:34:08 + [ssh-rsa.c sshd.c] + use EVP_get_digestbynid, reorder some calls and fix missing free. + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/27 10:57:00 + [compat.c compat.h ssh-rsa.c] + some older systems use NID_md5 instead of NID_sha1 for RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 + signatures in SSH protocol 2, ok djm@ + - provos@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/27 17:46:50 + [compat.c compat.h dh.c dh.h ssh2.h sshconnect2.c sshd.c version.h] + make dh group exchange more flexible, allow min and max group size, + okay markus@, deraadt@ + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/28 19:56:23 + [scp.c] + start to sync scp closer to rcp; ok markus@ + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/28 20:04:38 + [scp.c] + usage more like rcp and add missing -B to usage; ok markus@ + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/28 20:50:45 + [sshd.c] + call refuse() before close(); from olemx@ans.pl + +20010328 + - (djm) Reorder tests and library inclusion for Krb4/AFS to try to + resolve linking conflicts with libcrypto. Report and suggested fix + from Holger Trapp + - (djm) Work around Solaris' broken struct dirent. Diagnosis and suggested + fix from Philippe Levan + - (djm) Rework krbIV tests to get us closer to building on Redhat. Still + doesn't work because of conflicts between krbIV's and OpenSSL's des.h + - (djm) Sync openbsd-compat/glob.c + +20010327 + - Attempt sync with sshlogin.c w/ OpenBSD (mainly CVS ID) + - Fix pointer issues in waitpid() and wait() replaces. Patch by Lutz + Jaenicke + - OpenBSD CVS Sync + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/25 00:01:34 + [session.c] + shorten; ok markus@ + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/25 13:16:11 + [servconf.c servconf.h session.c sshd.8 sshd_config] + PrintLastLog option; from chip@valinux.com with some minor + changes by me. ok markus@ + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/26 08:07:09 + [authfile.c authfile.h ssh-add.c ssh-keygen.c ssh.c sshconnect.c + sshconnect.h sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c] + simpler key load/save interface, see authfile.h + - (djm) Reestablish PAM credentials (which can be supplemental group + memberships) after initgroups() blows them away. Report and suggested + fix from Nalin Dahyabhai + +20010324 + - Fixed permissions ssh-keyscan. Thanks to Christopher Linn . + - OpenBSD CVS Sync + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/23 11:04:07 + [compat.c compat.h sshconnect2.c sshd.c] + Compat for OpenSSH with broken Rijndael/AES. ok markus@ + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/23 12:02:49 + [auth1.c] + authctxt is now passed to do_authenticated + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/23 13:10:57 + [sftp-int.c] + fix put, upload to _absolute_ path, ok djm@ + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/23 14:28:32 + [session.c sshd.c] + ignore SIGPIPE, restore in child, fixes x11-fwd crashes; with djm@ + - (djm) Pull out our own SIGPIPE hacks + +20010323 + - OpenBSD CVS Sync + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/22 20:22:55 + [sshd.c] + do not place linefeeds in buffer + +20010322 + - (djm) Better AIX no tty fix, spotted by Gert Doering + - (bal) version.c CVS ID resync + - (bal) auth-chall.c auth-passwd.c auth.h auth1.c auth2.c session.c CVS ID + resync + - (bal) scp.c CVS ID resync + - OpenBSD CVS Sync + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/20 19:10:16 + [readconf.c] + default to SSH protocol version 2 + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/20 19:21:21 + [session.c] + remove unused arg + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/20 19:21:21 + [session.c] + remove unused arg + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/21 11:43:45 + [auth1.c auth2.c session.c session.h] + merge common ssh v1/2 code + - jakob@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/21 14:20:45 + [ssh-keygen.c] + add -B flag to usage + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/21 21:06:30 + [session.c] + missing init; from mib@unimelb.edu.au + +20010321 + - (djm) Fix ttyname breakage for AIX and Tru64. Patch from Steve + VanDevender + - (djm) Make sure pam_retval is initialised on call to pam_end. Patch + from Solar Designer + - (djm) Don't loop forever when changing password via PAM. Patch + from Solar Designer + - (djm) Generate config files before build + - (djm) Correctly handle SIA and AIX when no tty present. Spotted and + suggested fix from Mike Battersby + +20010320 + - (bal) glob.c update to added GLOB_LIMITS (OpenBSD CVS). + - (bal) glob.c update to set gl_pathv to NULL (OpenBSD CVS). + - (bal) Oops. Missed globc.h change (OpenBSD CVS). + - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/19 17:07:23 + [auth.c readconf.c] + undo /etc/shell and proto 2,1 change for openssh-2.5.2 + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/19 17:12:10 + [version.h] + version 2.5.2 + - (djm) Update RPM spec version + - (djm) Release 2.5.2p1 +- tim@mindrot.org 2001/03/19 18:33:47 [defines.h] + change S_ISLNK macro to work for UnixWare 2.03 +- tim@mindrot.org 2001/03/19 20:45:11 [openbsd-compat/glob.c] + add get_arg_max(). Use sysconf() if ARG_MAX is not defined + +20010319 + - (djm) Seed PRNG at startup, rather than waiting for arc4random calls to + do it implicitly. + - (djm) Add getusershell() functions from OpenBSD CVS + - OpenBSD CVS Sync + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/18 12:07:52 + [auth-options.c] + ignore permitopen="host:port" if AllowTcpForwarding==no + - (djm) Make scp work on systems without 64-bit ints + - tim@mindrot.org 2001/03/18 18:28:39 [defines.h] + move HAVE_LONG_LONG_INT where it works + - (bal) Use 'NGROUPS' for NeXT Since 'MAX_NGROUPS' is wrapped up in -lposix + stuff. Change suggested by Mark Miller + - (bal) Small fix to scp. %lu vs %ld + - (bal) NeXTStep lacks S_ISLNK. Plus split up S_IS* + - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/19 03:52:51 + [sftp-client.c] + Report ssh connection closing correctly; ok deraadt@ + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/18 23:30:55 + [compat.c compat.h sshd.c] + specifically version match on ssh scanners. do not log scan + information to the console + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/19 12:10:17 + [sshd.8] + Document permitopen authorized_keys option; ok markus@ + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/19 05:49:52 + [ssh.1] + document PreferredAuthentications option; ok markus@ + - (bal) Minor NeXT fixed. Forgot to #undef NGROUPS_MAX + +20010318 + - (bal) Fixed scp type casing issue which causes "scp: protocol error: + size not delimited" fatal errors when tranfering. + - OpenBSD CVS Sync + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/17 17:27:59 + [auth.c] + check /etc/shells, too + - tim@mindrot.org 2001/03/17 18:45:25 [compat.c] + openbsd-compat/fake-regex.h + +20010317 + - Support usrinfo() on AIX. Based on patch from Gert Doering + + - OpenBSD CVS Sync + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/15 15:05:59 + [scp.c] + use %lld in printf, ok millert@/deraadt@; report from ssh@client.fi + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/15 22:07:08 + [session.c] + pass Session to do_child + KNF + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/16 08:16:18 + [sftp-client.c sftp-client.h sftp-glob.c sftp-int.c] + Revise globbing for get/put to be more shell-like. In particular, + "get/put file* directory/" now works. ok markus@ + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/16 09:55:53 + [sftp-int.c] + fix memset and whitespace + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/16 13:44:24 + [sftp-int.c] + discourage strcat/strcpy + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/16 19:06:30 + [auth-options.c channels.c channels.h serverloop.c session.c] + implement "permitopen" key option, restricts -L style forwarding to + to specified host:port pairs. based on work by harlan@genua.de + - Check for gl_matchc support in glob_t and fall back to the + openbsd-compat/glob.[ch] support if it does not exist. + +20010315 + - OpenBSD CVS Sync + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/14 08:57:14 + [sftp-client.c] + Wall + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/14 15:15:58 + [sftp-int.c] + add version command + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/14 22:50:25 + [sftp-server.c] + note no getopt() + - (stevesk) ssh-keyscan.c: specify "openbsd-compat/fake-queue.h" + - (bal) Cygwin README change by Corinna Vinschen + +20010314 + - OpenBSD CVS Sync + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/13 17:34:42 + [auth-options.c] + missing xfree, deny key on parse error; ok stevesk@ + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/13 22:42:54 + [sftp-client.c sftp-client.h sftp-glob.c sftp-glob.h sftp-int.c] + sftp client filename globbing for get, put, ch{mod,grp,own}. ok markus@ + - (bal) Fix strerror() in bsd-misc.c + - (djm) Add replacement glob() from OpenBSD libc if the system glob is + missing or lacks the GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC extension + - (djm) Remove -I$(srcdir)/openbsd-compat from CFLAGS, refer to headers + relatively. Avoids conflict between glob.h and /usr/include/glob.h + +20010313 + - OpenBSD CVS Sync + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/12 22:02:02 + [key.c key.h ssh-add.c ssh-keygen.c sshconnect.c sshconnect2.c] + remove old key_fingerprint interface, s/_ex// + +20010312 + - OpenBSD CVS Sync + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/11 13:25:36 + [auth2.c key.c] + debug + - jakob@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/11 15:03:16 + [key.c key.h] + add improved fingerprint functions. based on work by Carsten + Raskgaard and modified by me. ok markus@. + - jakob@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/11 15:04:16 + [ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c] + print both md5, sha1 and bubblebabble fingerprints when using + ssh-keygen -l -v. ok markus@. + - jakob@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/11 15:13:09 + [key.c] + cleanup & shorten some var names key_fingerprint_bubblebabble. + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/11 16:39:03 + [ssh-keygen.c] + KNF, and SHA1 binary output is just creeping featurism + - tim@mindrot.org 2001/03/11 17:29:32 [configure.in] + test if snprintf() supports %ll + add /dev to search path for PRNGD/EGD socket + fix my mistake in USER_PATH test program + - OpenBSD CVS Sync + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/11 18:29:51 + [key.c] + style+cleanup + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/11 22:33:24 + [ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c] + remove -v again. use -B instead for bubblebabble. make -B consistent + with -l and make -B work with /path/to/known_hosts. ok deraadt@ + - (djm) Bump portable version number for generating test RPMs + - (djm) Add "static_openssl" RPM build option, remove rsh build dependency + - (bal) Reorder includes in Makefile. + +20010311 + - OpenBSD CVS Sync + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/10 12:48:27 + [sshconnect2.c] + ignore nonexisting private keys; report rjmooney@mediaone.net + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/10 12:53:51 + [readconf.c ssh_config] + default to SSH2, now that m68k runs fast + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/10 15:02:05 + [ttymodes.c ttymodes.h] + remove unused sgtty macros; ok markus@ + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/10 15:31:00 + [compat.c compat.h sshconnect.c] + all known netscreen ssh versions, and older versions of OSU ssh cannot + handle password padding (newer OSU is fixed) + - tim@mindrot.org 2001/03/10 16:33:42 [configure.in Makefile.in sshd_config] + make sure $bindir is in USER_PATH so scp will work + - OpenBSD CVS Sync + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/10 17:51:04 + [kex.c match.c match.h readconf.c readconf.h sshconnect2.c] + add PreferredAuthentications + +20010310 + - OpenBSD CVS Sync + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/09 03:14:39 + [ssh-keygen.c] + create *.pub files with umask 0644, so that you can mv them to + authorized_keys + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/09 12:30:29 + [sshd.c] + typo; slade@shore.net + - Removed log.o from sftp client. Not needed. + +20010309 + - OpenBSD CVS Sync + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/08 18:47:12 + [auth1.c] + unused; ok markus@ + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/08 20:44:48 + [sftp.1] + spelling, cleanup; ok deraadt@ + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/08 21:42:33 + [compat.c compat.h readconf.h ssh.c sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c] + implement client side of SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK (test public key -> + no need to do enter passphrase or do expensive sign operations if the + server does not accept key). + +20010308 + - OpenBSD CVS Sync + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/07 10:11:23 + [sftp-client.c sftp-client.h sftp-int.c sftp-server.c sftp.1 sftp.c sftp.h] + Support for new draft (draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-01). New symlink handling + functions and small protocol change. + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/08 00:15:48 + [readconf.c ssh.1] + turn off useprivilegedports by default. only rhost-auth needs + this. older sshd's may need this, too. + - (stevesk) Reliant Unix (SNI) needs HAVE_BOGUS_SYS_QUEUE_H; + Dirk Markwardt + +20010307 + - (bal) OpenBSD CVS Sync + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/06 06:11:18 + [ssh-keyscan.c] + appease gcc + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/06 06:11:44 + [sftp-int.c sftp.1 sftp.c] + sftp -b batchfile; mouring@etoh.eviladmin.org + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/06 15:10:42 + [sftp.1] + order things + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/07 01:19:06 + [ssh.1 sshd.8] + the name "secure shell" is boring, noone ever uses it + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/07 04:05:58 + [ssh.1] + removed dated comment + - Cygwin contrib improvements from Corinna Vinschen + +20010306 + - (bal) OpenBSD CVS Sync + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/05 14:28:47 + [sshd.8] + alpha order; jcs@rt.fm + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/05 15:44:51 + [servconf.c] + sync error message; ok markus@ + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/05 15:56:16 + [myproposal.h ssh.1] + switch to aes128-cbc/hmac-md5 by default in SSH2 -- faster; + provos & markus ok + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/05 16:07:15 + [sshd.8] + detail default hmac setup too + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/05 17:17:21 + [kex.c kex.h sshconnect2.c sshd.c] + generate a 2*need size (~300 instead of 1024/2048) random private + exponent during the DH key agreement. according to Niels (the great + german advisor) this is safe since /etc/primes contains strong + primes only. + + References: + P. C. van Oorschot and M. J. Wiener, On Diffie-Hellman key + agreement with short exponents, In Advances in Cryptology + - EUROCRYPT'96, LNCS 1070, Springer-Verlag, 1996, pp.332-343. + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/05 17:40:48 + [ssh.1] + more ssh_known_hosts2 documentation; ok markus@ + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/05 17:58:22 + [dh.c] + spelling + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/06 00:33:04 + [authfd.c cli.c ssh-agent.c] + EINTR/EAGAIN handling is required in more cases + - millert@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/06 01:06:03 + [ssh-keyscan.c] + Don't assume we wil get the version string all in one read(). + deraadt@ OK'd + - millert@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/06 01:08:27 + [clientloop.c] + If read() fails with EINTR deal with it the same way we treat EAGAIN + +20010305 + - (bal) CVS ID touch up on sshpty.[ch] and sshlogin.[ch] + - (bal) CVS ID touch up on sftp-int.c + - (bal) CVS ID touch up on uuencode.c + - (bal) CVS ID touch up on auth2.c, serverloop.c, session.c & sshd.c + - (bal) OpenBSD CVS Sync + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/17 23:48:48 + [sshd.8] + it's the OpenSSH one + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/21 07:37:04 + [ssh-keyscan.c] + inline -> __inline__, and some indent + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/21 09:05:54 + [authfile.c] + improve fd handling + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/21 09:12:56 + [sftp-server.c] + careful with & and &&; markus ok + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/21 21:14:04 + [ssh.c] + -i supports DSA identities now; ok markus@ + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/22 04:29:37 + [servconf.c] + grammar; slade@shore.net + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/22 06:43:55 + [ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c] + document -d, and -t defaults to rsa1 + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/22 08:03:51 + [ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c] + bye bye -d + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/22 18:09:06 + [sshd_config] + activate RSA 2 key + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/22 21:57:27 + [ssh.1 sshd.8] + typos/grammar from matt@anzen.com + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/22 21:59:44 + [auth.c auth.h auth1.c auth2.c misc.c misc.h ssh.c] + use pwcopy in ssh.c, too + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/23 15:34:53 + [serverloop.c] + debug2->3 + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/23 18:15:13 + [sshd.c] + the random session key depends now on the session_key_int + sent by the 'attacker' + dig1 = md5(cookie|session_key_int); + dig2 = md5(dig1|cookie|session_key_int); + fake_session_key = dig1|dig2; + this change is caused by a mail from anakin@pobox.com + patch based on discussions with my german advisor niels@openbsd.org + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/24 10:37:55 + [readconf.c] + look for id_rsa by default, before id_dsa + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/24 10:37:26 + [sshd_config] + ssh2 rsa key before dsa key + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/27 10:35:27 + [packet.c] + fix random padding + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/27 11:00:11 + [compat.c] + support SSH-2.0-2.1 ; from Christophe_Moret@hp.com + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/28 05:34:28 + [misc.c] + pull in protos + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/28 05:36:28 + [sftp.c] + do not kill the subprocess on termination (we will see if this helps + things or hurts things) + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/28 08:45:39 + [clientloop.c] + fix byte counts for ssh protocol v1 + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/28 08:54:55 + [channels.c nchan.c nchan.h] + make sure remote stderr does not get truncated. + remove closed fd's from the select mask. + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/28 09:57:07 + [packet.c packet.h sshconnect2.c] + in ssh protocol v2 use ignore messages for padding (instead of + trailing \0). + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/28 12:55:07 + [channels.c] + unify debug messages + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/28 17:52:54 + [misc.c] + for completeness, copy pw_gecos too + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/28 21:21:41 + [sshd.c] + generate a fake session id, too + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/28 21:27:48 + [channels.c packet.c packet.h serverloop.c] + use ignore message to simulate a SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA message + use random content in ignore messages. + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/28 21:31:32 + [channels.c] + typo + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/01 02:11:25 + [authfd.c] + split line so that p will have an easier time next time around + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/01 02:29:04 + [ssh.c] + shorten usage by a line + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/01 02:45:10 + [auth-rsa.c auth2.c deattack.c packet.c] + KNF + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/01 03:38:33 + [cli.c cli.h rijndael.h ssh-keyscan.1] + copyright notices on all source files + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/01 22:46:37 + [ssh.c] + don't truncate remote ssh-2 commands; from mkubita@securities.cz + use min, not max for logging, fixes overflow. + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/02 06:21:01 + [sshd.8] + explain SIGHUP better + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/02 09:42:49 + [sshd.8] + doc the dsa/rsa key pair files + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/02 18:54:31 + [atomicio.c atomicio.h auth-chall.c auth.c auth2-chall.c crc32.h + scp.c serverloop.c session.c sftp-server.8 sftp.1 ssh-add.1 ssh-add.c + ssh-agent.1 ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.1 ssh.1 sshd.8] + make copyright lines the same format + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/03 06:53:12 + [ssh-keyscan.c] + standard theo sweep + - millert@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/03 21:19:41 + [ssh-keyscan.c] + Dynamically allocate read_wait and its copies. Since maxfd is + based on resource limits it is often (usually?) larger than FD_SETSIZE. + - millert@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/03 21:40:30 + [sftp-server.c] + Dynamically allocate fd_set; deraadt@ OK + - millert@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/03 21:41:07 + [packet.c] + Dynamically allocate fd_set; deraadt@ OK + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/03 22:07:50 + [sftp-server.c] + KNF + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/03 23:52:22 + [sftp.c] + clean up arg processing. based on work by Christophe_Moret@hp.com + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/03 23:59:34 + [log.c ssh.c] + log*.c -> log.c + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/04 00:03:59 + [channels.c] + debug1->2 + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/04 10:57:53 + [ssh.c] + add -m to usage; ok markus@ + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/04 11:04:41 + [sshd.8] + small cleanup and clarify for PermitRootLogin; ok markus@ + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/04 11:16:06 + [servconf.c sshd.8] + kill obsolete RandomSeed; ok markus@ deraadt@ + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/04 12:54:04 + [sshd.8] + spelling + - millert@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/04 17:42:28 + [authfd.c channels.c dh.c log.c readconf.c servconf.c sftp-int.c + ssh.c sshconnect.c sshd.c] + log functions should not be passed strings that end in newline as they + get passed on to syslog() and when logging to stderr, do_log() appends + its own newline. + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/04 18:21:28 + [sshd.8] + list SSH2 ciphers + - (bal) Put HAVE_PW_CLASS_IN_PASSWD back into pwcopy() + - (bal) Fix up logging since it changed. removed log-*.c + - (djm) Fix up LOG_AUTHPRIV for systems that have it + - (stevesk) OpenBSD sync: + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/05 08:37:27 + [ssh-keyscan.c] + skip inlining, why bother + - (stevesk) sftp.c: handle __progname + +20010304 + - (bal) Remove make-ssh-known-hosts.1 since it's no longer valid. + - (bal) Updated contrib/README to remove 'make-ssh-known-hosts' and + give Mark Roth credit for mdoc2man.pl + +20010303 + - (djm) Remove make-ssh-known-hosts.pl, ssh-keyscan is better. + - (djm) Document PAM ChallengeResponseAuthentication in sshd.8 + - (djm) Disable and comment ChallengeResponseAuthentication in sshd_config + - (djm) Allow PRNGd entropy collection from localhost TCP socket. Replace + "--with-egd-pool" configure option with "--with-prngd-socket" and + "--with-prngd-port" options. Debugged and improved by Lutz Jaenicke + + +20010301 + - (djm) Properly add -lcrypt if needed. + - (djm) Force standard PAM conversation function in a few more places. + Patch from Redhat 2.5.1p1-2 RPM, probably Nalin Dahyabhai + + - (djm) Cygwin needs pw->pw_gecos copied too. Patch from Corinna Vinschen + + - (djm) Released 2.5.1p2 + +20010228 + - (djm) Detect endianness in configure and use it in rijndael.c. Fixes + "Bad packet length" bugs. + - (djm) Fully revert PAM session patch (again). All PAM session init is + now done before the final fork(). + - (djm) EGD detection patch from Tim Rice + - (djm) Remove /tmp from EGD socket search list + +20010227 + - (bal) Applied shutdown() patch for sftp.c by Corinna Vinschen + + - (bal) OpenBSD Sync + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/23 15:37:45 + [session.c] + handle SSH_PROTOFLAG_SCREEN_NUMBER for buggy clients + - (bal) sshd.init support for all Redhat release. Patch by Jim Knoble + + - (djm) Fix up POSIX saved uid support. Report from Mark Miller + + - (djm) Search for -lcrypt on FreeBSD too + - (djm) fatal() on OpenSSL version mismatch + - (djm) Move PAM init to after fork for non-Solaris derived PAMs + - (djm) Warning fix on entropy.c saved uid stuff. Patch from Mark Miller + + - (djm) Fix PAM fix + - (djm) Remove 'noreplace' flag from sshd_config in RPM spec files. This + change is being made as 2.5.x configfiles are not back-compatible with + 2.3.x. + - (djm) Avoid warnings for missing broken IP_TOS. Patch from Mark Miller + + - (djm) Open Server 5 doesn't need BROKEN_SAVED_UIDS. Patch from Tim Rice + + - (djm) Avoid multiple definition of _PATH_LS. Patch from Tim Rice + + +20010226 + - (bal) Fixed bsd-snprinf.c so it now honors 'BROKEN_SNPRINTF' again. + - (djm) Some systems (SCO3, NeXT) have weird saved uid semantics. + Based on patch from Tim Rice + +20010225 + - (djm) Use %{_libexecdir} rather than hardcoded path in RPM specfile + Patch from Adrian Ho + - (bal) Replace 'unsigned long long' to 'u_int64_t' since not every + platform defines u_int64_t as being that. + +20010224 + - (bal) Missed part of the UNIX sockets patch. Patch by Corinna + Vinschen + - (bal) Reorder where 'strftime' is detected to resolve linking + issues on SCO. Patch by Tim Rice + +20010224 + - (bal) pam_stack fix to correctly detect between RH7 and older RHs. + Patch by Pekka Savola + - (bal) Renamed sigaction.[ch] to sigact.[ch]. Causes problems with + some platforms. + - (bal) Generalize lack of UNIX sockets since this also effects Cray + not just Cygwin. Based on patch by Wendy Palm + +20010223 + - (bal) Fix --define rh7 in openssh.spec file. Patch by Steve Tell + + - (bal) Patch to force OpenSSH rpm to require the same version of OpenSSL + that it was compiled against. Patch by Pekka Savola + - (bal) Double -I for OpenSSL on SCO. Patch by Tim Rice + + +20010222 + - (bal) Corrected SCO luid patch by svaughan + - (bal) Added mdoc2man.pl from Mark Roth + - (bal) Removed reference to liblogin from contrib/README. It was + integrated into OpenSSH a long while ago. + - (stevesk) remove erroneous #ifdef sgi code. + Michael Stone + +20010221 + - (bal) Removed -L/usr/ucblib -R/usr/ucblib for Solaris platform. + - (bal) Fixed OpenSSL rework to use $saved_*. Patch by Tim Rice + + - (bal) Reverted out of 2001/02/15 patch by djm below because it + breaks Solaris. + - (djm) Move PAM session setup back to before setuid to user. + fixes problems on Solaris-drived PAMs. + - (stevesk) session.c: back out to where we were before: + - (djm) Move PAM session initialisation until after fork in sshd. Patch + from Nalin Dahyabhai + +20010220 + - (bal) Fix mixed up params to memmove() from Jan 5th in setenv.c and + getcwd.c. + - (bal) OpenBSD CVS Sync: + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/19 23:09:05 + [sshd.c] + clarify message to make it not mention "ident" + +20010219 + - (bal) Markus' blessing to rename login.[ch] -> sshlogin.[ch] and + pty.[ch] -> sshpty.[ch] + - (djm) Rework search for OpenSSL location. Skip directories which don't + exist, don't add -L$ssldir/lib if it doesn't exist. Should help SCO + with its limit of 6 -L options. + - OpenBSD CVS Sync: + - reinhard@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/17 08:24:40 + [sftp.1] + typo + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/17 16:28:58 + [ssh.c] + cleanup -V output; noted by millert + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/17 16:48:48 + [sshd.8] + it's the OpenSSH one + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/18 11:33:54 + [dispatch.c] + typo, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, from aspa@kronodoc.fi + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/19 02:53:32 + [compat.c compat.h serverloop.c] + ssh-1.2.{18-22} has broken handling of ignore messages; report from + itojun@ + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/19 03:35:23 + [version.h] + OpenSSH_2.5.1 adds bug compat with 1.2.{18-22} + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/19 03:36:25 + [scp.c] + np is changed by recursion; vinschen@redhat.com + - Update versions in RPM spec files + - Release 2.5.1p1 + +20010218 + - (bal) Patch for fix FCHMOD reference in ftp-client.c by Tim Rice + + - (Bal) Patch for lack of RA_RESTART in misc.c for mysignal by + stevesk + - (djm) Fix my breaking of cygwin builds, Patch from Corinna Vinschen + and myself. + - (djm) Close listen_sock on bind() failures. Patch from Arkadiusz + Miskiewicz + - (djm) Robustify EGD/PRNGd code in face of socket closures. Patch from + Todd C. Miller + - (djm) Use ttyname() to determine name of tty returned by openpty() + rather then risking overflow. Patch from Marek Michalkiewicz + + - (djm) Swapped tests for no_libsocket and no_libnsl in configure.in. + Patch from Marek Michalkiewicz + - (djm) Doc fixes from Pekka Savola + - (djm) Use SA_INTERRUPT along SA_RESTART if present (equivalent for + SunOS) + - (djm) SCO needs librpc for libwrap. Patch from Tim Rice + + - (stevesk) misc.c: cpp rework of SA_(INTERRUPT|RESTART) handling. + - (stevesk) scp.c: use mysignal() for updateprogressmeter() handler. + - (djm) SA_INTERRUPT is the converse of SA_RESTART, apply it only for + SIGALRM. + - (djm) Move entropy.c over to mysignal() + - (djm) SunOS 4.x also needs to define HAVE_BOGUS_SYS_QUEUE_H as it has + a that lacks the TAILQ_* macros. Patch from Todd C. + Miller + - (djm) Update RPM spec files for 2.5.0p1 + - (djm) Merge BSD_AUTH support from Markus Friedl and David J. MacKenzie + enable with --with-bsd-auth. + - (stevesk) entropy.c: typo; should be SIGPIPE + +20010217 + - (bal) OpenBSD Sync: + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/16 13:38:18 + [channel.c] + remove debug + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/16 14:03:43 + [session.c] + proper payload-length check for x11 w/o screen-number + +20010216 + - (bal) added '--with-prce' to allow overriding of system regex when + required (tested by David Dulek ) + - (bal) Added DG/UX case and set that they have a broken IPTOS. + - (djm) Mini-configure reorder patch from Tim Rice + Fixes linking on SCO. + - (djm) Make gnome-ssh-askpass handle multi-line prompts. Patch from + Nalin Dahyabhai + - (djm) BSD license for gnome-ssh-askpass (was X11) + - (djm) KNF on gnome-ssh-askpass + - (djm) USE_PIPES for a few more sysv platforms + - (djm) Cleanup configure.in a little + - (djm) Ask users to check config.log when we can't find necessary libs + - (djm) Set "login ID" on systems with setluid. Only enabled for SCO + OpenServer for now. Based on patch from svaughan + - (djm) OpenBSD CVS: + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/15 16:19:59 + [channels.c channels.h serverloop.c sshconnect.c sshconnect.h] + [sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c] + genericize password padding function for SSH1 and SSH2. + add stylized echo to 2, too. + - (djm) Add roundup() macro to defines.h + - (stevesk) set SA_RESTART flag in mysignal() for SIGCHLD; + needed on Unixware 2.x. + +20010215 + - (djm) Move PAM session setup back to before setuid to user. Fixes + problems on Solaris-derived PAMs. + - (djm) Clean up PAM namespace. Suggested by Darren Moffat + + - (bal) Sync w/ OpenSSH for new release + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/12 12:45:06 + [sshconnect1.c] + fix xmalloc(0), ok dugsong@ + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/11 12:59:25 + [Makefile.in sshd.8 sshconnect2.c readconf.h readconf.c packet.c + sshd.c ssh.c ssh.1 servconf.h servconf.c myproposal.h kex.h kex.c] + 1) clean up the MAC support for SSH-2 + 2) allow you to specify the MAC with 'ssh -m' + 3) or the 'MACs' keyword in ssh(d)_config + 4) add hmac-{md5,sha1}-96 + ok stevesk@, provos@ + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/12 16:16:23 + [auth-passwd.c auth.c auth.h auth1.c auth2.c servconf.c servconf.h + ssh-keygen.c sshd.8] + PermitRootLogin={yes,without-password,forced-commands-only,no} + (before this change, root could login even if PermitRootLogin==no) + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/12 22:56:09 + [clientloop.c packet.c ssh-keyscan.c] + deal with EAGAIN/EINTR selects which were skipped + - markus@cvs.openssh.org 2001/02/13 22:49:40 + [auth1.c auth2.c] + setproctitle(user) only if getpwnam succeeds + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/12 23:26:20 + [sshd.c] + missing memset; from solar@openwall.com + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/12 20:53:33 + [sftp-int.c] + lumask now works with 1 numeric arg; ok markus@, djm@ + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/14 9:46:03 + [sftp-client.c sftp-int.c sftp.1] + Fix and document 'preserve modes & times' option ('-p' flag in sftp); + ok markus@ + - (bal) replaced PATH_MAX in sftp-int.c w/ MAXPATHLEN. + - (djm) Move to Jim's 1.2.0 X11 askpass program + - (stevesk) OpenBSD sync: + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/15 01:38:04 + [serverloop.c] + indent + +20010214 + - (djm) Don't try to close PAM session or delete credentials if the + session has not been open or credentials not set. Based on patch from + Andrew Bartlett + - (djm) Move PAM session initialisation until after fork in sshd. Patch + from Nalin Dahyabhai + - (bal) Missing function prototype in bsd-snprintf.c patch by + Mark Miller + - (djm) Split out and improve OSF SIA auth code. Patch from Chris Adams + with a little modification and KNF. + - (stevesk) fix for SIA patch, misplaced session_setup_sia() + +20010213 + - (djm) Only test -S potential EGD sockets if they exist and are readable. + - (bal) Cleaned out bsd-snprintf.c. VARARGS have been banished and + I did a base KNF over the whe whole file to make it more acceptable. + (backed out of original patch and removed it from ChangeLog) + - (bal) Use chown() if fchown() does not exist in ftp-server.c patch by + Tim Rice + - (stevesk) auth1.c: fix PAM passwordless check. + +20010212 + - (djm) Update Redhat specfile to allow --define "skip_x11_askpass 1", + --define "skip_gnome_askpass 1", --define "rh7 1" and make the + implicit rpm-3.0.5 dependancy explicit. Patch and suggestions from + Pekka Savola + - (djm) Clean up PCRE text in INSTALL + - (djm) Fix OSF SIA auth NULL pointer deref. Report from Mike Battersby + + - (bal) NCR SVR4 compatiblity provide by Don Bragg + - (stevesk) session.c: remove debugging code. + +20010211 + - (bal) OpenBSD Sync + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/07 22:35:46 + [auth1.c auth2.c sshd.c] + move k_setpag() to a central place; ok dugsong@ + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/10 12:52:02 + [auth2.c] + offer passwd before s/key + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/8 22:37:10 + [canohost.c] + remove last call to sprintf; ok deraadt@ + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/10 1:33:32 + [canohost.c] + add debug message, since sshd blocks here if DNS is not available + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/10 12:44:02 + [cli.c] + don't call vis() for \r + - danh@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/10 0:12:43 + [scp.c] + revert a small change to allow -r option to work again; ok deraadt@ + - danh@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/10 15:14:11 + [scp.c] + fix memory leak; ok markus@ + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/10 0:45:52 + [scp.1] + Mention that you can quote pathnames with spaces in them + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/10 1:46:28 + [ssh.c] + remove mapping of argv[0] -> hostname + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/06 22:26:17 + [sshconnect2.c] + do not ask for passphrase in batch mode; report from ejb@ql.org + - itojun@cvs.opebsd.org 2001/02/08 10:47:05 + [sshconnect.c sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c] + %.30s is too short for IPv6 numeric address. use %.128s for now. + markus ok + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/09 12:28:35 + [sshconnect2.c] + do not free twice, thanks to /etc/malloc.conf + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/09 17:10:53 + [sshconnect2.c] + partial success: debug->log; "Permission denied" if no more auth methods + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/10 12:09:21 + [sshconnect2.c] + remove some lines + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/09 13:38:07 + [auth-options.c] + reset options if no option is given; from han.holl@prismant.nl + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/08 21:58:28 + [channels.c] + nuke sprintf, ok deraadt@ + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/08 21:58:28 + [channels.c] + nuke sprintf, ok deraadt@ + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/06 22:43:02 + [clientloop.h] + remove confusing callback code + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/08 14:39:36 + [readconf.c] + snprintf + - itojun@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/08 19:30:52 + sync with netbsd tree changes. + - more strict prototypes, include necessary headers + - use paths.h/pathnames.h decls + - size_t typecase to int -> u_long + - itojun@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/07 18:04:50 + [ssh-keyscan.c] + fix size_t -> int cast (use u_long). markus ok + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/07 22:43:16 + [ssh-keyscan.c] + s/getline/Linebuf_getline/; from roumen.petrov@skalasoft.com + - itojun@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/09 9:04:59 + [ssh-keyscan.c] + do not assume malloc() returns zero-filled region. found by + malloc.conf=AJ. + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/08 22:35:30 + [sshconnect.c] + don't connect if batch_mode is true and stricthostkeychecking set to + 'ask' + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/04 21:26:07 + [sshd_config] + type: ok markus@ + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/06 22:07:50 + [sshd_config] + enable sftp-server by default + - deraadt 2001/02/07 8:57:26 + [xmalloc.c] + deal with new ANSI malloc stuff + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/07 16:46:08 + [xmalloc.c] + typo in fatal() + - itojun@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/07 18:04:50 + [xmalloc.c] + fix size_t -> int cast (use u_long). markus ok + - 1.47 Thu Feb 8 23:11:42 GMT 2001 by dugsong + [serverloop.c sshconnect1.c] + mitigate SSH1 traffic analysis - from Solar Designer + , ok provos@ + - (bal) fixed sftp-client.c. Return 'status' instead of '0' + (from the OpenBSD tree) + - (bal) Synced ssh.1, ssh-add.1 and sshd.8 w/ OpenBSD + - (bal) sftp-sever.c '%8lld' to '%8llu' (OpenBSD Sync) + - (bal) uuencode.c resync w/ OpenBSD tree, plus whitespace. + - (bal) A bit more whitespace cleanup + - (djm) Set PAM_RHOST earlier, patch from Andrew Bartlett + + - (stevesk) misc.c: ssh.h not needed. + - (stevesk) compat.c: more friendly cpp error + - (stevesk) OpenBSD sync: + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/11 06:15:57 + [LICENSE] + typos and small cleanup; ok deraadt@ + +20010210 + - (djm) Sync sftp and scp stuff from OpenBSD: + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/07 03:55:13 + [sftp-client.c] + Don't free handles before we are done with them. Based on work from + Corinna Vinschen . ok markus@ + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/06 22:32:53 + [sftp.1] + Punctuation fix from Pekka Savola + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/07 04:07:29 + [sftp.1] + pretty up significantly + - itojun@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/07 06:49:42 + [sftp.1] + .Bl-.El mismatch. markus ok + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/07 06:12:30 + [sftp-int.c] + Check that target is a directory before doing ls; ok markus@ + - itojun@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/07 11:01:18 + [scp.c sftp-client.c sftp-server.c] + unsigned long long -> %llu, not %qu. markus ok + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/07 11:10:39 + [sftp.1 sftp-int.c] + more man page cleanup and sync of help text with man page; ok markus@ + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/07 14:58:34 + [sftp-client.c] + older servers reply with SSH2_FXP_NAME + count==0 instead of EOF + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/07 15:27:19 + [sftp.c] + Don't forward agent and X11 in sftp. Suggestion from Roumen Petrov + + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/07 15:36:04 + [sftp-int.c] + portable; ok markus@ + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/07 15:55:47 + [sftp-int.c] + lowercase cmds[].c also; ok markus@ + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/07 17:04:52 + [pathnames.h sftp.c] + allow sftp over ssh protocol 1; ok djm@ + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/08 07:38:55 + [scp.c] + memory leak fix, and snprintf throughout + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/08 08:02:02 + [sftp-int.c] + plug a memory leak + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/08 10:11:23 + [session.c sftp-client.c] + %i -> %d + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/08 10:57:59 + [sftp-int.c] + typo + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/08 15:28:07 + [sftp-int.c pathnames.h] + _PATH_LS; ok markus@ + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/09 04:46:25 + [sftp-int.c] + Check for NULL attribs for chown, chmod & chgrp operations, only send + relevant attribs back to server; ok markus@ + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/06 15:05:25 + [sftp.c] + Use getopt to process commandline arguments + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/06 15:06:21 + [sftp.c ] + Wait for ssh subprocess at exit + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/06 15:18:16 + [sftp-int.c] + stat target for remote chdir before doing chdir + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/06 15:32:54 + [sftp.1] + Punctuation fix from Pekka Savola + - provos@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/05 22:22:02 + [sftp-int.c] + cleanup get_pathname, fix pwd after failed cd. okay djm@ + - (djm) Update makefile.in for _PATH_SFTP_SERVER + - (bal) sftp-client.c replace NULL w/ 0 in do_ls() (pending in OpenBSD tree) + +20010209 + - (bal) patch to vis.c to deal with HAVE_VIS right by Robert Mooney + + - (bal) .c.o rule in openbsd-compat/Makefile.in did not make it to the + main tree while porting forward. Pointed out by Lutz Jaenicke + + - (bal) double entry in configure.in. Pointed out by Lutz Jaenicke + + - (stevesk) OpenBSD sync: + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/08 11:20:01 + [auth2.c] + strict checking + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/08 11:15:22 + [version.h] + update to 2.3.2 + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/08 11:12:30 + [auth2.c] + fix typo + - (djm) Update spec files + - (bal) OpenBSD sync: + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/08 14:38:54 + [scp.c] + memory leak fix, and snprintf throughout + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/06 22:43:02 + [clientloop.c] + remove confusing callback code + - (djm) Add CVS Id's to files that we have missed + - (bal) OpenBSD Sync (more): + - itojun@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/08 19:30:52 + sync with netbsd tree changes. + - more strict prototypes, include necessary headers + - use paths.h/pathnames.h decls + - size_t typecase to int -> u_long + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/06 22:07:42 + [ssh.c] + fatal() if subsystem fails + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/06 22:43:02 + [ssh.c] + remove confusing callback code + - jakob@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/06 23:03:24 + [ssh.c] + add -1 option (force protocol version 1). ok markus@ + - jakob@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/06 23:06:21 + [ssh.c] + reorder -{1,2,4,6} options. ok markus@ + - (bal) Missing 'const' in readpass.h + - (bal) OpenBSD Sync (so at least the thing compiles for 2.3.2 =) + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/06 23:30:28 + [sftp-client.c] + replace arc4random with counter for request ids; ok markus@ + - (djm) Define _PATH_TTY for systems that don't. Report from Lutz + Jaenicke + +20010208 + - (djm) Don't delete external askpass program in make uninstall target. + Report and fix from Roumen Petrov + - (djm) Fix linking of sftp, don't need arc4random any more. + - (djm) Try to use shell that supports "test -S" for EGD socket search. + Based on patch from Tim Rice + +20010207 + - (bal) Save the whole path to AR in configure. Some Solaris 2.7 installs + seem lose track of it while in openbsd-compat/ (two confirmed reports) + - (djm) Much KNF on PAM code + - (djm) Revise auth-pam.c conversation function to be a little more + readable. + - (djm) Revise kbd-int PAM conversation function to fold all text messages + to before first prompt. Fixes hangs if last pam_message did not require + a reply. + - (djm) Fix password changing when using PAM kbd-int authentication + +20010205 + - (bal) Disable groupaccess by setting NGROUPS_MAX to 0 for platforms + that don't have NGROUPS_MAX. + - (bal) AIX patch for auth1.c by William L. Jones + - (stevesk) OpenBSD sync: + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/04 08:32:27 + [many files; did this manually to our top-level source dir] + unexpand and remove end-of-line whitespace; ok markus@ + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/04 15:21:19 + [sftp-server.c] + SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID support; ok markus@ + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/04 17:02:32 + [sftp-int.c] + ? == help + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/04 16:47:46 + [sftp-int.c] + sort commands, so that abbreviations work as expected + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/04 15:17:52 + [sftp-int.c] + debugging sftp: precedence and missing break. chmod, chown, chgrp + seem to be working now. + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/04 14:41:21 + [sftp-int.c] + use base 8 for umask/chmod + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/04 11:11:54 + [sftp-int.c] + fix LCD + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/04 08:10:44 + [ssh.1] + typo; dpo@club-internet.fr + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/04 06:30:12 + [auth2.c authfd.c packet.c] + remove duplicate #include's; ok markus@ + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/04 16:56:23 + [scp.c sshd.c] + alpha happiness + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/04 15:12:17 + [sshd.c] + precedence; ok markus@ + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/04 08:14:15 + [ssh.c sshd.c] + make the alpha happy + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/31 13:37:24 + [channels.c channels.h serverloop.c ssh.c] + do not disconnect if local port forwarding fails, e.g. if port is + already in use + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/01 14:58:09 + [channels.c] + use ipaddr in channel messages, ietf-secsh wants this + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/31 12:26:20 + [channels.c] + ssh.com-2.0.1x does not send additional info in CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE + messages; bug report from edmundo@rano.org + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/31 13:48:09 + [sshconnect2.c] + unused + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/04 08:23:08 + [sftp-client.c sftp-server.c] + make gcc on the alpha even happier + +20010204 + - (bal) I think this is the last of the bsd-*.h that don't belong. + - (bal) Minor Makefile fix + - (bal) openbsd-compat/Makefile minor fix. Ensure dependancies are done + right. + - (bal) Changed order of LIB="" in -with-skey due to library resolving. + - (bal) next-posix.h changed to bsd-nextstep.h + - (djm) OpenBSD CVS sync: + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/03 03:08:38 + [auth-options.c auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rhosts.c auth.c canohost.c] + [canohost.h servconf.c servconf.h session.c sshconnect1.c sshd.8] + [sshd_config] + make ReverseMappingCheck optional in sshd_config; ok djm@,dugsong@ + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/03 03:19:51 + [ssh.1 sshd.8 sshd_config] + Skey is now called ChallengeResponse + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/03 03:43:09 + [sshd.8] + use no-pty option in .ssh/authorized_keys* if you need a 8-bit clean + channel. note from Erik.Anggard@cygate.se (pr/1659) + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/03 10:03:06 + [ssh.1] + typos; ok markus@ + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/04 04:11:56 + [scp.1 sftp-server.c ssh.1 sshd.8 sftp-client.c sftp-client.h] + [sftp-common.c sftp-common.h sftp-int.c sftp-int.h sftp.1 sftp.c] + Basic interactive sftp client; ok theo@ + - (djm) Update RPM specs for new sftp binary + - (djm) Update several bits for new optional reverse lookup stuff. I + think I got them all. + - (djm) Makefile.in fixes + - (stevesk) add mysignal() wrapper and use it for the protocol 2 + SIGCHLD handler. + - (djm) Use setvbuf() instead of setlinebuf(). Suggest from stevesk@ + +20010203 + - (bal) Cygwin clean up by Corinna Vinschen + - (bal) renamed queue.h to fake-queue.h (even if it's an OpenBSD + based file) to ensure #include space does not get confused. + - (bal) Minor Makefile.in tweak. dirname may not exist on some + platforms so builds fail. (NeXT being a well known one) + +20010202 + - (bal) Makefile fix where sourcedir != builddir by Corinna Vinschen + + - (bal) Makefile fix to use $(MAKE) instead of 'make' for platforms + that use 'gmake'. Patch by Tim Rice + +20010201 + - (bal) Minor fix to Makefile to stop rebuilding executables if no + changes have occured to any of the supporting code. Patch by + Roumen Petrov + +20010131 + - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync: + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/30 15:48:53 + [sshconnect.c] + Make warning message a little more consistent. ok markus@ + - (djm) Fix autoconf logic for --with-lastlog=no Report and diagnosis from + Philipp Buehler and Kevin Steves + respectively. + - (djm) Don't log SSH2 PAM KbdInt responses to debug, they may contain + passwords. + - (bal) Reorder. Move all bsd-*, fake-*, next-*, and cygwin* stuff to + openbsd-compat/. And resolve all ./configure and Makefile.in issues + assocated. + +20010130 + - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync: + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/29 09:55:37 + [channels.c channels.h clientloop.c serverloop.c] + fix select overflow; ok deraadt@ and stevesk@ + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/29 12:42:35 + [canohost.c canohost.h channels.c clientloop.c] + add get_peer_ipaddr(socket), x11-fwd in ssh2 requires ipaddr, not DNS + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/29 12:47:32 + [rsa.c rsa.h ssh-agent.c sshconnect1.c sshd.c] + handle rsa_private_decrypt failures; helps against the Bleichenbacher + pkcs#1 attack + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/29 05:36:11 + [ssh.1 ssh.c] + Allow invocation of sybsystem by commandline (-s); ok markus@ + - (stevesk) configure.in: remove duplicate PROG_LS + +20010129 + - (stevesk) sftp-server.c: use %lld vs. %qd + +20010128 + - (bal) Put USE_PIPES back into sco3.2v5 + - (bal) OpenBSD Sync + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/28 10:15:34 + [dispatch.c] + re-keying is not supported; ok deraadt@ + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/28 10:24:04 + [ssh-add.1 ssh-agent.1 ssh-keygen.1 ssh.1 sshd.8] + cleanup AUTHORS sections + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/28 10:37:26 + [sshd.c sshd.8] + remove -Q, no longer needed + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/28 20:36:16 + [readconf.c ssh.1] + ``StrictHostKeyChecking ask'' documentation and small cleanup. + ok markus@ + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/28 20:43:25 + [sshd.8] + spelling. ok markus@ + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/28 20:53:21 + [xmalloc.c] + use size_t for strlen() return. ok markus@ + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/28 22:27:05 + [authfile.c] + spelling. use sizeof vs. strlen(). ok markus@ + - niklas@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/29 1:59:14 + [atomicio.h canohost.h clientloop.h deattack.h dh.h dispatch.h + groupaccess.c groupaccess.h hmac.h hostfile.h includes.h kex.h + key.h log.h login.h match.h misc.h myproposal.h nchan.ms pathnames.h + radix.h readpass.h rijndael.h serverloop.h session.h sftp.h ssh-add.1 + ssh-dss.h ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keyscan.1 ssh-rsa.h ssh1.h ssh_config + sshconnect.h sshd_config tildexpand.h uidswap.h uuencode.h] + $OpenBSD$ + - (bal) Minor auth2.c resync. Whitespace and moving of an #include. + +20010126 + - (bal) SSH_PROGRAM vs _PATH_SSH_PROGRAM fix pointed out by Roumen + Petrov + - (bal) OpenBSD Sync + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/25 8:06:33 + [ssh-agent.c] + call _exit() in signal handler + +20010125 + - (djm) Sync bsd-* support files: + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/01/26 03:43:20 + [rresvport.c bindresvport.c] + new bindresvport() semantics that itojun, shin, jean-luc and i have + agreed on, which will be happy for the future. bindresvport_sa() for + sockaddr *, too. docs later.. + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/01/24 02:24:21 + [bindresvport.c] + in bindresvport(), if sin is non-NULL, example sin->sin_family for + the actual family being processed + - (djm) Mention PRNGd in documentation, it is nicer than EGD + - (djm) Automatically search for "well-known" EGD/PRNGd sockets in autoconf + - (bal) AC_FUNC_STRFTIME added to autoconf + - (bal) OpenBSD Resync + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/24 21:03:50 + [channels.c] + missing freeaddrinfo(); ok markus@ + +20010124 + - (bal) OpenBSD Resync + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/23 10:45:10 + [ssh.h] + nuke comment + - (bal) no 64bit support patch from Tim Rice + - (bal) #ifdef around S_IFSOCK if platform does not support it. + patch by Tim Rice + - (bal) fake-regex.h cleanup based on Tim Rice's patch. + - (stevesk) sftp-server.c: fix chmod() mode mask + +20010123 + - (bal) regexp.h typo in configure.in. Should have been regex.h + - (bal) SSH_USER_DIR to _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR patch by stevesk@ + - (bal) SSH_ASKPASS_DEFAULT to _PATH_SSH_ASKPASS_DEFAULT + - (bal) OpenBSD Resync + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/22 8:15:00 + [auth-krb4.c sshconnect1.c] + only AFS needs radix.[ch] + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/22 8:32:53 + [auth2.c] + no need to include; from mouring@etoh.eviladmin.org + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/22 16:55:21 + [key.c] + free() -> xfree(); ok markus@ + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/22 17:22:28 + [sshconnect2.c sshd.c] + fix memory leaks in SSH2 key exchange; ok markus@ + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/22 23:06:39 + [auth1.c auth2.c readconf.c readconf.h servconf.c servconf.h + sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c] + rename skey -> challenge response. + auto-enable kbd-interactive for ssh2 if challenge-reponse is enabled. + + +20010122 + - (bal) OpenBSD Resync + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/19 12:45:26 GMT 2001 by markus + [servconf.c ssh.h sshd.c] + only auth-chall.c needs #ifdef SKEY + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/19 15:55:10 GMT 2001 by markus + [auth-krb4.c auth-options.c auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rhosts.c auth-rsa.c + auth1.c auth2.c channels.c clientloop.c dh.c dispatch.c nchan.c + packet.c pathname.h readconf.c scp.c servconf.c serverloop.c + session.c ssh-add.c ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c ssh.c ssh.h + ssh1.h sshconnect1.c sshd.c ttymodes.c] + move ssh1 definitions to ssh1.h, pathnames to pathnames.h + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/19 16:48:14 + [sshd.8] + fix typo; from stevesk@ + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/19 16:50:58 + [ssh-dss.c] + clear and free digest, make consistent with other code (use dlen); from + stevesk@ + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/20 15:55:20 GMT 2001 by markus + [auth-options.c auth-options.h auth-rsa.c auth2.c] + pass the filename to auth_parse_options() + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/20 17:59:40 GMT 2001 + [readconf.c] + fix SIGSEGV from -o ""; problem noted by jehsom@togetherweb.com + - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/20 18:20:29 + [sshconnect2.c] + dh_new_group() does not return NULL. ok markus@ + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/20 21:33:42 + [ssh-add.c] + do not loop forever if askpass does not exist; from + andrew@pimlott.ne.mediaone.net + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/20 23:00:56 + [servconf.c] + Check for NULL return from strdelim; ok markus + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/20 23:02:07 + [readconf.c] + KNF; ok markus + - jakob@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/21 9:00:33 + [ssh-keygen.1] + remove -R flag; ok markus@ + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/21 19:05:40 + [atomicio.c automicio.h auth-chall.c auth-krb4.c auth-options.c + auth-options.h auth-passwd.c auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rhosts.c auth-rsa.c + auth.c auth.h auth1.c auth2-chall.c auth2.c authfd.c authfile.c + bufaux.c bufaux.h buffer.c canahost.c canahost.h channels.c + cipher.c cli.c clientloop.c clientloop.h compat.c compress.c + deattack.c dh.c dispatch.c groupaccess.c hmac.c hostfile.c kex.c + key.c key.h log-client.c log-server.c log.c log.h login.c login.h + match.c misc.c misc.h nchan.c packet.c pty.c radix.h readconf.c + readpass.c readpass.h rsa.c scp.c servconf.c serverloop.c serverloop.h + session.c sftp-server.c ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c ssh-dss.c ssh-keygen.c + ssh-keyscan.c ssh-rsa.c ssh.c ssh.h sshconnect.c sshconnect.h + sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c tildexpand.c tildexpand.h + ttysmodes.c uidswap.c xmalloc.c] + split ssh.h and try to cleanup the #include mess. remove unnecessary + #includes. rename util.[ch] -> misc.[ch] + - (bal) renamed 'PIDDIR' to '_PATH_SSH_PIDDIR' to match OpenBSD tree + - (bal) Moved #ifdef KRB4 in auth-krb4.c above the #include to resolve + conflict when compiling for non-kerb install + - (bal) removed the #ifdef SKEY in auth1.c to match Markus' changes + on 1/19. + +20010120 + - (bal) OpenBSD Resync + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/19 12:45:26 + [ssh-chall.c servconf.c servconf.h ssh.h sshd.c] + only auth-chall.c needs #ifdef SKEY + - (bal) Slight auth2-pam.c clean up. + - (bal) Includes a fake-regexp.h to be only used if regcomp() is found, + but no 'regexp.h' found (SCO OpenServer 3 lacks the header). + +20010119 + - (djm) Update versions in RPM specfiles + - (bal) OpenBSD Resync + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/18 16:20:21 + [log-client.c log-server.c log.c readconf.c servconf.c ssh.1 ssh.h + sshd.8 sshd.c] + log() is at pri=LOG_INFO, since LOG_NOTICE goes to /dev/console on many + systems + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/18 16:59:59 + [auth-passwd.c auth.c auth.h auth1.c auth2.c serverloop.c session.c + session.h sshconnect1.c] + 1) removes fake skey from sshd, since this will be much + harder with /usr/libexec/auth/login_XXX + 2) share/unify code used in ssh-1 and ssh-2 authentication (server side) + 3) make addition of BSD_AUTH and other challenge reponse methods + easier. + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/18 17:12:43 + [auth-chall.c auth2-chall.c] + rename *-skey.c *-chall.c since the files are not skey specific + - (djm) Merge patch from Tim Waugh (via Nalin Dahyabhai ) + to fix NULL pointer deref and fake authloop breakage in PAM code. + - (bal) Updated contrib/cygwin/ by Corinna Vinschen + - (bal) Minor cygwin patch to auth1.c. Suggested by djm. + +20010118 + - (bal) Super Sized OpenBSD Resync + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/11 22:14:20 GMT 2001 by markus + [sshd.c] + maxfd+1 + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/13 17:59:18 + [ssh-keygen.1] + small ssh-keygen manpage cleanup; stevesk@pobox.com + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/13 18:03:07 + [scp.c ssh-keygen.c sshd.c] + getopt() returns -1 not EOF; stevesk@pobox.com + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/13 18:06:54 + [ssh-keyscan.c] + use SSH_DEFAULT_PORT; from stevesk@pobox.com + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/13 18:12:47 + [ssh-keyscan.c] + free() -> xfree(); fix memory leak; from stevesk@pobox.com + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/13 18:14:13 + [ssh-add.c] + typo, from stevesk@sweden.hp.com + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/13 18:32:50 + [packet.c session.c ssh.c sshconnect.c sshd.c] + split out keepalive from packet_interactive (from dale@accentre.com) + set IPTOS_LOWDELAY TCP_NODELAY IPTOS_THROUGHPUT for ssh2, too. + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/13 18:36:45 + [packet.c packet.h] + reorder, typo + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/13 18:38:00 + [auth-options.c] + fix comment + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/13 18:43:31 + [session.c] + Wall + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/13 19:14:08 + [clientloop.h clientloop.c ssh.c] + move callback to headerfile + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/15 21:40:10 + [ssh.c] + use log() instead of stderr + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/15 21:43:51 + [dh.c] + use error() not stderr! + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/15 21:45:29 + [sftp-server.c] + rename must fail if newpath exists, debug off by default + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/15 21:46:38 + [sftp-server.c] + readable long listing for sftp-server, ok deraadt@ + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/16 19:20:06 + [key.c ssh-rsa.c] + make "ssh-rsa" key format for ssh2 confirm to the ietf-drafts; from + galb@vandyke.com. note that you have to delete older ssh2-rsa keys, + since they are in the wrong format, too. they must be removed from + .ssh/authorized_keys2 and .ssh/known_hosts2, etc. + (cd; grep -v ssh-rsa .ssh/authorized_keys2 > TMP && mv TMP + .ssh/authorized_keys2) additionally, we now check that + BN_num_bits(rsa->n) >= 768. + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/16 20:54:27 + [sftp-server.c] + remove some statics. simpler handles; idea from nisse@lysator.liu.se + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/16 23:58:08 + [bufaux.c radix.c sshconnect.h sshconnect1.c] + indent + - (bal) Added bsd-strmode.[ch] since some non-OpenBSD platforms may + be missing such feature. + + +20010117 + - (djm) Only write random seed file at exit + - (djm) Make PAM support optional, enable with --with-pam + - (djm) Try to use libcrypt on Linux, but link it after OpenSSL (which + provides a crypt() of its own) + - (djm) Avoid a warning in bsd-bindresvport.c + - (djm) Try to avoid adding -I/usr/include to CPPFLAGS during SSL tests. This + can cause weird segfaults errors on Solaris + - (djm) Avoid warning in PAM code by making read_passphrase arguments const + - (djm) Add --with-pam to RPM spec files + +20010115 + - (bal) sftp-server.c change to use chmod() if fchmod() does not exist. + - (bal) utimes() support via utime() interface on machine that lack utimes(). + +20010114 + - (stevesk) initial work for OpenBSD "support supplementary group in + {Allow,Deny}Groups" patch: + - import getgrouplist.c from OpenBSD (bsd-getgrouplist.c) + - add bsd-getgrouplist.h + - new files groupaccess.[ch] + - build but don't use yet (need to merge auth.c changes) + - (stevesk) complete: + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/13 11:56:48 + [auth.c sshd.8] + support supplementary group in {Allow,Deny}Groups + from stevesk@pobox.com + +20010112 + - (bal) OpenBSD Sync + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/10 22:56:22 + [bufaux.h bufaux.c sftp-server.c sftp.h getput.h] + cleanup sftp-server implementation: + add buffer_get_int64, buffer_put_int64, GET_64BIT, PUT_64BIT + parse SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_EXTENDED + send SSH2_FX_EOF if readdir returns no more entries + reply to SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED message + use #defines from the draft + move #definations to sftp.h + more info: + http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-00.txt + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/10 19:43:20 + [sshd.c] + XXX - generate_empheral_server_key() is not safe against races, + because it calls log() + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/09 21:19:50 + [packet.c] + allow TCP_NDELAY for ipv6; from netbsd via itojun@ + +20010110 + - (djm) SNI/Reliant Unix needs USE_PIPES and $DISPLAY hack. Report from + Bladt Norbert + +20010109 + - (bal) Resync CVS ID of cli.c + - (stevesk) auth1.c: free should be after WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE + code. + - (bal) OpenBSD Sync + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/08 22:29:05 + [auth2.c compat.c compat.h servconf.c servconf.h sshd.8 + sshd_config version.h] + implement option 'Banner /etc/issue.net' for ssh2, move version to + 2.3.1 (needed for bugcompat detection, 2.3.0 would fail if Banner + is enabled). + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/08 22:03:23 + [channels.c ssh-keyscan.c] + O_NDELAY -> O_NONBLOCK; thanks stevesk@pobox.com + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/08 21:55:41 + [sshconnect1.c] + more cleanups and fixes from stevesk@pobox.com: + 1) try_agent_authentication() for loop will overwrite key just + allocated with key_new(); don't alloc + 2) call ssh_close_authentication_connection() before exit + try_agent_authentication() + 3) free mem on bad passphrase in try_rsa_authentication() + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/08 21:48:17 + [kex.c] + missing free; thanks stevesk@pobox.com + - (bal) Detect if clock_t structure exists, if not define it. + - (bal) Detect if O_NONBLOCK exists, if not define it. + - (bal) removed news4-posix.h (now empty) + - (bal) changed bsd-bindresvport.c and bsd-rresvport.c to use 'socklen_t' + instead of 'int' + - (stevesk) sshd_config: sync + - (stevesk) defines.h: remove spurious ``;'' + +20010108 + - (bal) Fixed another typo in cli.c + - (bal) OpenBSD Sync + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/07 21:26:55 + [cli.c] + typo + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/07 21:26:55 + [cli.c] + missing free, stevesk@pobox.com + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/07 19:06:25 + [auth1.c] + missing free, stevesk@pobox.com + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/07 11:28:04 + [log-client.c log-server.c log.c readconf.c servconf.c ssh.1 + ssh.h sshd.8 sshd.c] + rename SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO->SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOTICE + syslog priority changes: + fatal() LOG_ERR -> LOG_CRIT + log() LOG_INFO -> LOG_NOTICE + - Updated TODO + +20010107 + - (bal) OpenBSD Sync + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/06 11:23:27 + [ssh-rsa.c] + remove unused + - itojun@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/05 08:23:29 + [ssh-keyscan.1] + missing .El + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/04 22:41:03 + [session.c sshconnect.c] + consistent use of _PATH_BSHELL; from stevesk@pobox.com + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/04 22:35:32 + [ssh.1 sshd.8] + Mention AES as available SSH2 Cipher; ok markus + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/04 22:25:58 + [sshd.c] + sync usage()/man with defaults; from stevesk@pobox.com + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/04 22:21:26 + [sshconnect2.c] + handle SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER; fixes bug when connecting to a server + that prints a banner (e.g. /etc/issue.net) + +20010105 + - (bal) contrib/caldera/ provided by Tim Rice + - (bal) bsd-getcwd.c and bsd-setenv.c changed from bcopy() to memmove() + +20010104 + - (djm) Fix memory leak on systems with BROKEN_GETADDRINFO. Based on + work by Chris Vaughan + +20010103 + - (bal) fixed up sshconnect.c so it was closer inline with the OpenBSD + tree (mainly positioning) + - (bal) OpenSSH CVS Update + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/02 20:41:02 + [packet.c] + log remote ip on disconnect; PR 1600 from jcs@rt.fm + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/02 20:50:56 + [sshconnect.c] + strict_host_key_checking for host_status != HOST_CHANGED && + ip_status == HOST_CHANGED + - (bal) authfile.c: Synced CVS ID tag + - (bal) UnixWare 2.0 fixes by Tim Rice + - (bal) Disable sftp-server if no 64bit int support exists. Based on + patch by Tim Rice + - (bal) Makefile.in changes to uninstall: target to remove sftp-server + and sftp-server.8 manpage. + +20010102 + - (bal) OpenBSD CVS Update + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/01 14:52:49 + [scp.c] + use shared fatal(); from stevesk@pobox.com + +20001231 + - (bal) Reverted out of MAXHOSTNAMELEN. This should be set per OS. + for multiple reasons. + - (bal) Reverted out of a partial NeXT patch. + +20001230 + - (bal) OpenBSD CVS Update + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/28 18:58:30 + [ssh-keygen.c] + enable 'ssh-keygen -l -f ~/.ssh/{authorized_keys,known_hosts}{,2} + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/29 22:19:13 + [channels.c] + missing xfree; from vaughan99@yahoo.com + - (bal) Resynced CVS ID with OpenBSD for channel.c and uidswap.c + - (bal) if no MAXHOSTNAMELEN is defined. Default to 64 character defination. + Suggested by Christian Kurz + - (bal) Add in '.c.o' section to Makefile.in to address make programs that + don't honor CPPFLAGS by default. Suggested by Lutz Jaenicke + + +20001229 + - (bal) Fixed spelling of 'authorized_keys' in ssh-copy-id.1 by Christian + Kurz + - (bal) OpenBSD CVS Update + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/28 14:25:51 + [auth.h auth2.c] + count authentication failures only + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/28 14:25:03 + [sshconnect.c] + fingerprint for MITM attacks, too. + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/28 12:03:57 + [sshd.8 sshd.c] + document -D + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/27 14:19:21 + [serverloop.c] + less chatty + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/27 12:34 + [auth1.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c] + typo + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/27 12:30:19 + [readconf.c readconf.h ssh.1 sshconnect.c] + new option: HostKeyAlias: allow the user to record the host key + under a different name. This is useful for ssh tunneling over + forwarded connections or if you run multiple sshd's on different + ports on the same machine. + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/27 11:51:53 + [ssh.1 ssh.c] + multiple -t force pty allocation, document ORIGINAL_COMMAND + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/27 11:41:31 + [sshd.8] + update for ssh-2 + - (stevesk) compress.[ch] sync with openbsd; missed in prototype + fix merge. + +20001228 + - (bal) Patch to add libutil.h to loginrec.c only if the platform has + libutil.h. Suggested by Pekka Savola + - (djm) Update to new x11-askpass in RPM spec + - (bal) SCO patch to not include since it's unrelated + header. Patch by Tim Rice + - Updated TODO w/ known HP/UX issue + - (bal) removed extra noticed by Kevin Steves and removed the + bad reference to 'NeXT including it else were' on the #ifdef version. + +20001227 + - (bal) Typo in configure.in: entut?ent should be endut?ent. Suggested by + Takumi Yamane + - (bal) Checks for getrlimit(), sysconf(), and setdtablesize(). Patch + by Corinna Vinschen + - (djm) Fix catman-do target for non-bash + - (bal) Typo in configure.in: entut?ent should be endut?ent. Suggested by + Takumi Yamane + - (bal) Checks for getrlimit(), sysconf(), and setdtablesize(). Patch + by Corinna Vinschen + - (djm) Fix catman-do target for non-bash + - (bal) Fixed NeXT's lack of CPPFLAGS honoring. + - (bal) ssh-keyscan.c: NeXT (and older BSDs) don't support getrlimit() w/ + 'RLIMIT_NOFILE' + - (djm) Remove *.Ylonen files. They are no longer in the OpenBSD tree, + the info in COPYING.Ylonen has been moved to the start of each + SSH1-derived file and README.Ylonen is well out of date. + +20001223 + - (bal) Fixed Makefile.in to support recompile of all ssh and sshd objects + if a change to config.h has occurred. Suggested by Gert Doering + + - (bal) OpenBSD CVS Update: + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/22 16:49:40 + [ssh-keygen.c] + fix ssh-keygen -x -t type > file; from Roumen.Petrov@skalasoft.com + +20001222 + - Updated RCSID for pty.c + - (bal) OpenBSD CVS Updates: + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/21 15:10:16 + [auth-rh-rsa.c hostfile.c hostfile.h sshconnect.c] + print keyfile:line for changed hostkeys, for deraadt@, ok deraadt@ + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/20 19:26:56 + [authfile.c] + allow ssh -i userkey for root + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/20 19:37:21 + [authfd.c authfd.h kex.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c uidswap.c uidswap.h] + fix prototypes; from stevesk@pobox.com + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/20 19:32:08 + [sshd.c] + init pointer to NULL; report from Jan.Ivan@cern.ch + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/19 23:17:54 + [auth-krb4.c auth-options.c auth-options.h auth-rhosts.c auth-rsa.c + auth1.c auth2-skey.c auth2.c authfd.c authfd.h authfile.c bufaux.c + bufaux.h buffer.c canohost.c channels.c clientloop.c compress.c + crc32.c deattack.c getput.h hmac.c hmac.h hostfile.c kex.c kex.h + key.c key.h log.c login.c match.c match.h mpaux.c mpaux.h packet.c + packet.h radix.c readconf.c rsa.c scp.c servconf.c servconf.h + serverloop.c session.c sftp-server.c ssh-agent.c ssh-dss.c ssh-dss.h + ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c ssh-rsa.c ssh-rsa.h ssh.c ssh.h uuencode.c + uuencode.h sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c tildexpand.c] + replace 'unsigned bla' with 'u_bla' everywhere. also replace 'char + unsigned' with u_char. + +20001221 + - (stevesk) OpenBSD CVS updates: + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/19 15:43:45 + [authfile.c channels.c sftp-server.c ssh-agent.c] + remove() -> unlink() for consistency + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/19 15:48:09 + [ssh-keyscan.c] + replace with + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/17 02:33:40 + [uidswap.c] + typo; from wsanchez@apple.com + +20001220 + - (djm) Workaround PAM inconsistencies between Solaris derived PAM code + and Linux-PAM. Based on report and fix from Andrew Morgan + + +20001218 + - (stevesk) rsa.c: entropy.h not needed. + - (bal) split CFLAGS into CFLAGS and CPPFLAGS in configure.in and Makefile. + Suggested by Wilfredo Sanchez + +20001216 + - (stevesk) OpenBSD CVS updates: + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/16 02:53:57 + [scp.c] + allow + in usernames; request from Florian.Weimer@RUS.Uni-Stuttgart.DE + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/16 02:39:57 + [scp.c] + unused; from stevesk@pobox.com + +20001215 + - (stevesk) Old OpenBSD patch wasn't completely applied: + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/01/24 22:11:20 + [scp.c] + allow '.' in usernames; from jedgar@fxp.org + - (stevesk) OpenBSD CVS updates: + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/13 16:26:53 + [ssh-keyscan.c] + fatal already adds \n; from stevesk@pobox.com + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/13 16:25:44 + [ssh-agent.c] + remove redundant spaces; from stevesk@pobox.com + - ho@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/12 15:50:21 + [pty.c] + When failing to set tty owner and mode on a read-only filesystem, don't + abort if the tty already has correct owner and reasonably sane modes. + Example; permit 'root' to login to a firewall with read-only root fs. + (markus@ ok) + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/13 06:36:05 + [pty.c] + KNF + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/12 14:45:21 + [sshd.c] + source port < 1024 is no longer required for rhosts-rsa since it + adds no additional security. + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/12 16:11:49 + [ssh.1 ssh.c] + rhosts-rsa is no longer automagically disabled if ssh is not privileged. + UsePrivilegedPort=no disables rhosts-rsa _only_ for old servers. + these changes should not change the visible default behaviour of the ssh client. + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/11 10:27:33 + [scp.c] + when copying 0-sized files, do not re-print ETA time at completion + - provos@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/15 10:30:15 + [kex.c kex.h sshconnect2.c sshd.c] + compute diffie-hellman in parallel between server and client. okay markus@ + +20001213 + - (djm) Make sure we reset the SIGPIPE disposition after we fork. Report + from Andreas M. Kirchwitz + - (stevesk) OpenBSD CVS update: + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/12 15:30:02 + [ssh-keyscan.c ssh.c sshd.c] + consistently use __progname; from stevesk@pobox.com + +20001211 + - (bal) Applied patch to include ssh-keyscan into Redhat's package, and + patch to install ssh-keyscan manpage. Patch by Pekka Savola + + - (bal) OpenbSD CVS update + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/10 17:01:53 + [sshconnect1.c] + always request new challenge for skey/tis-auth, fixes interop with + other implementations; report from roth@feep.net + +20001210 + - (bal) OpenBSD CVS updates + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/09 13:41:51 + [cipher.c cipher.h rijndael.c rijndael.h rijndael_boxes.h] + undo rijndael changes + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/09 13:48:31 + [rijndael.c] + fix byte order bug w/o introducing new implementation + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/09 14:08:27 + [sftp-server.c] + "" -> "." for realpath; from vinschen@redhat.com + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/09 14:06:54 + [ssh-agent.c] + extern int optind; from stevesk@sweden.hp.com + - provos@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/09 23:51:11 + [compat.c] + remove unnecessary '\n' + +20001209 + - (bal) OpenBSD CVS updates: + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/07 4:24:59 + [ssh.1] + Typo fix from Wilfredo Sanchez ; ok theo + +20001207 + - (bal) OpenBSD CVS updates: + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/06 22:58:14 + [compat.c compat.h packet.c] + disable debug messages for ssh.com/f-secure 2.0.1x, 2.1.0 + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/06 23:10:39 + [rijndael.c] + unexpand(1) + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/06 23:05:43 + [cipher.c cipher.h rijndael.c rijndael.h rijndael_boxes.h] + new rijndael implementation. fixes endian bugs + +20001206 + - (bal) OpenBSD CVS updates: + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/05 20:34:09 + [channels.c channels.h clientloop.c serverloop.c] + async connects for -R/-L; ok deraadt@ + - todd@cvs.openssh.org 2000/12/05 16:47:28 + [sshd.c] + tweak comment to reflect real location of pid file; ok provos@ + - (stevesk) Import from OpenBSD for systems that don't + have it (used in ssh-keyscan). + - (stevesk) OpenBSD CVS update: + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/06 19:57:48 + [ssh-keyscan.c] + err(3) -> internal error(), from stevesk@sweden.hp.com + +20001205 + - (bal) OpenBSD CVS updates: + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/04 19:24:02 + [ssh-keyscan.c ssh-keyscan.1] + David Maziere's ssh-keyscan, ok niels@ + - (bal) Updated Makefile.in to include ssh-keyscan that was just added + to the recent OpenBSD source tree. + - (stevesk) fix typos in contrib/hpux/README + +20001204 + - (bal) More C functions defined in NeXT that are unaccessable without + defining -POSIX. + - (bal) OpenBSD CVS updates: + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/03 11:29:04 + [compat.c] + remove fallback to SSH_BUG_HMAC now that the drafts are updated + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/03 11:27:55 + [compat.c] + correctly match "2.1.0.pl2 SSH" etc; from + pekkas@netcore.fi/bugzilla.redhat + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/03 11:15:03 + [auth2.c compat.c compat.h sshconnect2.c] + support f-secure/ssh.com 2.0.12; ok niels@ + +20001203 + - (bal) OpenBSD CVS updates: + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/11/30 22:54:31 + [channels.c] + debug->warn if tried to do -R style fwd w/o client requesting this; + ok neils@ + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/11/29 20:39:17 + [cipher.c] + des_cbc_encrypt -> des_ncbc_encrypt since it already updates the IV + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/11/30 18:33:05 + [ssh-agent.c] + agents must not dump core, ok niels@ + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/11/30 07:04:02 + [ssh.1] + T is for both protocols + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/01 00:00:51 + [ssh.1] + typo; from green@FreeBSD.org + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/11/30 07:02:35 + [ssh.c] + check -T before isatty() + - provos@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/11/29 13:51:27 + [sshconnect.c] + show IP address and hostname when new key is encountered. okay markus@ + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/11/30 22:53:35 + [sshconnect.c] + disable agent/x11/port fwding if hostkey has changed; ok niels@ + - marksu@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/11/29 21:11:59 + [sshd.c] + sshd -D, startup w/o deamon(), for monitoring scripts or inittab; + from handler@sub-rosa.com and eric@urbanrange.com; ok niels@ + - (djm) Added patch from Nalin Dahyabhai to enable + PAM authentication using KbdInteractive. + - (djm) Added another TODO + +20001202 + - (bal) Backed out of part of Alain St-Denis' loginrec.c patch. + - (bal) Irix need some sort of mansubdir, patch by Michael Stone + + +20001129 + - (djm) Back out all the serverloop.c hacks. sshd will now hang again + if there are background children with open fds. + - (djm) bsd-rresvport.c bzero -> memset + - (djm) Don't fail in defines.h on absence of 64 bit types (we will + still fail during compilation of sftp-server). + - (djm) Fail if ar is not found during configure + - (djm) OpenBSD CVS updates: + - provos@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/11/22 08:38:31 + [sshd.8] + talk about /etc/primes, okay markus@ + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/11/23 14:03:48 + [ssh.c sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c] + complain about invalid ciphers for ssh1/ssh2, fall back to reasonable + defaults + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/11/25 09:42:53 + [sshconnect1.c] + reorder check for illegal ciphers, bugreport from espie@ + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/11/25 10:19:34 + [ssh-keygen.c ssh.h] + print keytype when generating a key. + reasonable defaults for RSA1/RSA/DSA keys. + - (djm) Patch from Pekka Savola to include a few + more manpage paths in fixpaths calls + - (djm) Also add xauth path at Pekka's suggestion. + - (djm) Add Redhat RPM patch for AUTHPRIV SyslogFacility + +20001125 + - (djm) Give up privs when reading seed file + +20001123 + - (bal) Merge OpenBSD changes: + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/11/15 22:31:36 + [auth-options.c] + case insensitive key options; from stevesk@sweeden.hp.com + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/11/16 17:55:43 + [dh.c] + do not use perror() in sshd, after child is forked() + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/11/14 23:42:40 + [auth-rsa.c] + parse option only if key matches; fix some confusing seen by the client + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/11/14 23:44:19 + [session.c] + check no_agent_forward_flag for ssh-2, too + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/11/15 + [ssh-agent.1] + reorder SYNOPSIS; typo, use .It + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/11/14 23:48:55 + [ssh-agent.c] + do not reorder keys if a key is removed + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/11/15 19:58:08 + [ssh.c] + just ignore non existing user keys + - millert@cvs.openbsd.org 200/11/15 20:24:43 + [ssh-keygen.c] + Add missing \n at end of error message. + +20001122 + - (bal) Minor patch to ensure platforms lacking IRIX job limit supports + are compilable. + - (bal) Updated TODO as of 11/18/2000 with known things to resolve. + +20001117 + - (bal) Changed from 'primes' to 'primes.out' for consistancy sake. It + has no affect the output. Patch by Corinna Vinschen + - (stevesk) Reworked progname support. + - (bal) Misplaced #include "includes.h" in bsd-setproctitle.c. Patch by + Shinichi Maruyama + +20001116 + - (bal) Added in MAXSYMLINK test in bsd-realpath.c. Required for some SCO + releases. + - (bal) Make builds work outside of source tree. Patch by Mark D. Roth + + +20001113 + - (djm) Add pointer to http://www.imasy.or.jp/~gotoh/connect.c to + contrib/README + - (djm) Merge OpenBSD changes: + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/11/06 16:04:56 + [channels.c channels.h clientloop.c nchan.c serverloop.c] + [session.c ssh.c] + agent forwarding and -R for ssh2, based on work from + jhuuskon@messi.uku.fi + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/11/06 16:13:27 + [ssh.c sshconnect.c sshd.c] + do not disabled rhosts(rsa) if server port > 1024; from + pekkas@netcore.fi + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/11/06 16:16:35 + [sshconnect.c] + downgrade client to 1.3 if server is 1.4; help from mdb@juniper.net + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/11/09 18:04:40 + [auth1.c] + typo; from mouring@pconline.com + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/11/12 12:03:28 + [ssh-agent.c] + off-by-one when removing a key from the agent + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/11/12 12:50:39 + [auth-rh-rsa.c auth2.c authfd.c authfd.h] + [authfile.c hostfile.c kex.c kex.h key.c key.h myproposal.h] + [readconf.c readconf.h rsa.c rsa.h servconf.c servconf.h ssh-add.c] + [ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c ssh.1 ssh.c ssh_config] + [sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c sshd.8 sshd.c sshd_config ssh-dss.c] + [ssh-dss.h ssh-rsa.c ssh-rsa.h dsa.c dsa.h] + add support for RSA to SSH2. please test. + there are now 3 types of keys: RSA1 is used by ssh-1 only, + RSA and DSA are used by SSH2. + you can use 'ssh-keygen -t rsa -f ssh2_rsa_file' to generate RSA + keys for SSH2 and use the RSA keys for hostkeys or for user keys. + SSH2 RSA or DSA keys are added to .ssh/authorised_keys2 as before. + - (djm) Fix up Makefile and Redhat init script to create RSA host keys + - (djm) Change to interim version + - (djm) Fix RPM spec file stupidity + - (djm) fixpaths to DSA and RSA keys too + +20001112 + - (bal) SCO Patch to add needed libraries for configure.in. Patch by + Phillips Porch + - (bal) IRIX patch to adding Job Limits. Patch by Denis Parker + + - (stevesk) pty.c: HP-UX 10 and 11 don't define TIOCSCTTY. Add error() to + failed ioctl(TIOCSCTTY) call. + +20001111 + - (djm) Added /etc/primes for kex DH group neg, fixup Makefile.in and + packaging files + - (djm) Fix new Makefile.in warnings + - (djm) Fix vsprintf("%h") in bsd-snprintf.c, short int va_args are + promoted to type int. Report and fix from Dan Astoorian + + - (djm) Hardwire sysconfdir in RPM spec files as some RPM versions get + it wrong. Report from Bennett Todd + +20001110 + - (bal) Fixed dropped answer from skey_keyinfo() in auth1.c + - (bal) Changed from --with-skey to --with-skey=PATH in configure.in + - (bal) Added in check to verify S/Key library is being detected in + configure.in + - (bal) next-posix.h - added another prototype wrapped in POSIX ifdef/endif. + Patch by Mark Miller + - (bal) Added 'util.h' header to loginrec.c only if HAVE_UTIL_H is defined + to remove warnings under MacOS X. Patch by Mark Miller + - (bal) Fixed LDFLAG mispelling in configure.in for --with-afs + +20001107 + - (bal) acconfig.in - removed the double "USE_PIPES" entry. Patch by + Mark Miller + - (bal) sshd.init files corrected to assign $? to RETVAL. Patch by + Jarno Huuskonen + - (bal) fixpaths fixed to stop it from quitely failing. Patch by + Mark D. Roth + +20001106 + - (djm) Use Jim's new 1.0.3 askpass in Redhat RPMs + - (djm) Manually fix up missed diff hunks (mainly RCS idents) + - (djm) Remove UPGRADING document in favour of a link to the better + maintained FAQ on www.openssh.com + - (djm) Fix multiple dependancy on gnome-libs from Pekka Savola + + - (djm) Don't need X11-askpass in RPM spec file if building without it + from Pekka Savola + - (djm) Release 2.3.0p1 + - (bal) typo in configure.in in regards to --with-ldflags from Marko + Asplund + - (bal) fixed next-posix.h. Forgot prototype of getppid(). + +20001105 + - (bal) Sync with OpenBSD: + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/31 9:31:58 + [compat.c] + handle all old openssh versions + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/31 13:1853 + [deattack.c] + so that large packets do not wrap "n"; from netbsd + - (bal) rijndel.c - fix up RCSID to match OpenBSD tree + - (bal) auth2-skey.c - Checked in. Missing from portable tree. + - (bal) Reworked NEWS-OS and NeXT ports to extract waitpid() and + setsid() into more common files + - (stevesk) pty.c: use __hpux to identify HP-UX. + - (bal) Missed auth-skey.o in Makefile.in and minor correction to + bsd-waitpid.c + +20001029 + - (stevesk) Fix typo in auth.c: USE_PAM not PAM + - (stevesk) Create contrib/cygwin/ directory; patch from + Corinna Vinschen + - (bal) Resolved more $xno and $xyes issues in configure.in + - (bal) next-posix.h - spelling and forgot a prototype + +20001028 + - (djm) fix select hack in serverloop.c from Philippe WILLEM + + - (djm) Fix mangled AIXAUTHENTICATE code + - (djm) authctxt->pw may be NULL. Fix from Markus Friedl + + - (djm) Sync with OpenBSD: + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/16 15:46:32 + [ssh.1] + fixes from pekkas@netcore.fi + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/17 14:28:11 + [atomicio.c] + return number of characters processed; ok deraadt@ + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/18 12:04:02 + [atomicio.c] + undo + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/18 12:23:02 + [scp.c] + replace atomicio(read,...) with read(); ok deraadt@ + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/18 12:42:00 + [session.c] + restore old record login behaviour + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/19 10:41:13 + [auth-skey.c] + fmt string problem in unused code + - provos@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/19 10:45:16 + [sshconnect2.c] + don't reference freed memory. okay deraadt@ + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/21 11:04:23 + [canohost.c] + typo, eramore@era-t.ericsson.se; ok niels@ + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/23 13:31:55 + [cipher.c] + non-alignment dependent swap_bytes(); from + simonb@wasabisystems.com/netbsd + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/26 12:38:28 + [compat.c] + add older vandyke products + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/27 01:32:19 + [channels.c channels.h clientloop.c serverloop.c session.c] + [ssh.c util.c] + enable non-blocking IO on channels, and tty's (except for the + client ttys). + +20001027 + - (djm) Increase REKEY_BYTES to 2^24 for arc4random + +20001025 + - (djm) Added WARNING.RNG file and modified configure to ask users of the + builtin entropy code to read it. + - (djm) Prefer builtin regex to PCRE. + - (bal) Added USE_PIPS defined to NeXT configure.in since scp hangs randomly. + - (bal) Apply fixes to configure.in pointed out by Pavel Roskin + + +20001020 + - (djm) Don't define _REENTRANT for SNI/Reliant Unix + - (bal) Imported NEWS-OS waitpid() macros into NeXT. Since implementation + is more correct then current version. + +20001018 + - (stevesk) Add initial support for setproctitle(). Current + support is for the HP-UX pstat(PSTAT_SETCMD, ...) method. + - (stevesk) Add egd startup scripts to contrib/hpux/ + +20001017 + - (djm) Add -lregex to cywin libs from Corinna Vinschen + + - (djm) Don't rely on atomicio's retval to determine length of askpass + supplied passphrase. Problem report from Lutz Jaenicke + + - (bal) Changed from GNU rx to PCRE on suggestion from djm. + - (bal) Integrated Sony NEWS-OS patches from NAKAJI Hirouyuki + + +20001016 + - (djm) Sync with OpenBSD: + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/14 04:01:15 + [cipher.c] + debug3 + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/14 04:07:23 + [scp.c] + remove spaces from arguments; from djm@mindrot.org + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/14 06:09:46 + [ssh.1] + Cipher is for SSH-1 only + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/14 06:12:09 + [servconf.c servconf.h serverloop.c session.c sshd.8] + AllowTcpForwarding; from naddy@ + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/14 06:16:56 + [auth2.c compat.c compat.h sshconnect2.c version.h] + OpenSSH_2.3; note that is is not complete, but the version number + needs to be changed for interoperability reasons + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/14 06:19:45 + [auth-rsa.c] + do not send RSA challenge if key is not allowed by key-options; from + eivind@ThinkSec.com + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/15 08:14:01 + [rijndael.c session.c] + typos; from stevesk@sweden.hp.com + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/15 08:18:31 + [rijndael.c] + typo + - (djm) Copy manpages back over from OpenBSD - too tedious to wade + through diffs + - (djm) Added condrestart to Redhat init script. Patch from Pekka Savola + + - (djm) Update version in Redhat spec file + - (djm) Merge some of Nalin Dahyabhai changes from the + Redhat 7.0 spec file + - (djm) Make inability to read/write PRNG seedfile non-fatal + + +20001015 + - (djm) Fix ssh2 hang on background processes at logout. + +20001014 + - (bal) Add support for realpath and getcwd for platforms with broken + or missing realpath implementations for sftp-server. + - (bal) Corrected mistake in INSTALL in regards to GNU rx library + - (bal) Add support for GNU rx library for those lacking regexp support + - (djm) Don't accept PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON messages during initial auth + - (djm) Revert SSH2 serverloop hack, will find a better way. + - (djm) Add workaround for Linux 2.4's gratuitious errno change. Patch + from Martin Johansson + - (djm) Big OpenBSD sync: + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/30 10:27:44 + [log.c] + allow loglevel debug + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/03 11:59:57 + [packet.c] + hmac->mac + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/03 12:03:03 + [auth-krb4.c auth-passwd.c auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rhosts.c auth-rsa.c auth1.c] + move fake-auth from auth1.c to individual auth methods, disables s/key in + debug-msg + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/03 12:16:48 + ssh.c + do not resolve canonname, i have no idea why this was added oin ossh + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/09 15:30:44 + ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c + -X now reads private ssh.com DSA keys, too. + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/09 15:32:34 + auth-options.c + clear options on every call. + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/09 15:51:00 + authfd.c authfd.h + interop with ssh-agent2, from + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/10 14:20:45 + compat.c + use rexexp for version string matching + - provos@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/10 22:02:18 + [kex.c kex.h myproposal.h ssh.h ssh2.h sshconnect2.c sshd.c dh.c dh.h] + First rough implementation of the diffie-hellman group exchange. The + client can ask the server for bigger groups to perform the diffie-hellman + in, thus increasing the attack complexity when using ciphers with longer + keys. University of Windsor provided network, T the company. + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 13:59:52 + [auth-rsa.c auth2.c] + clear auth options unless auth sucessfull + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 14:00:27 + [auth-options.h] + clear auth options unless auth sucessfull + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 14:03:27 + [scp.1 scp.c] + support 'scp -o' with help from mouring@pconline.com + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 14:11:35 + [dh.c] + Wall + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 14:14:40 + [auth.h auth2.c readconf.c readconf.h readpass.c servconf.c servconf.h] + [ssh.h sshconnect2.c sshd_config auth2-skey.c cli.c cli.h] + add support for s/key (kbd-interactive) to ssh2, based on work by + mkiernan@avantgo.com and me + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 14:27:24 + [auth.c auth1.c auth2.c authfile.c cipher.c cipher.h kex.c kex.h] + [myproposal.h packet.c readconf.c session.c ssh.c ssh.h sshconnect1.c] + [sshconnect2.c sshd.c] + new cipher framework + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 14:45:21 + [cipher.c] + remove DES + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/12 03:59:20 + [cipher.c cipher.h sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c] + enable DES in SSH-1 clients only + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/12 08:21:13 + [kex.h packet.c] + remove unused + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/13 12:34:46 + [sshd.c] + Kludge for F-Secure Macintosh < 1.0.2; appro@fy.chalmers.se + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/13 12:59:15 + [cipher.c cipher.h myproposal.h rijndael.c rijndael.h] + rijndael/aes support + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/13 13:10:54 + [sshd.8] + more info about -V + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/13 13:12:02 + [myproposal.h] + prefer no compression + - (djm) Fix scp user@host handling + - (djm) Don't clobber ssh_prng_cmds on install + - (stevesk) Include config.h in rijndael.c so we define intXX_t and + u_intXX_t types on all platforms. + - (stevesk) rijndael.c: cleanup missing declaration warnings. + - (stevesk) ~/.hushlogin shouldn't cause required password change to + be bypassed. + - (stevesk) Display correct path to ssh-askpass in configure output. + Report from Lutz Jaenicke. + +20001007 + - (stevesk) Print PAM return value in PAM log messages to aid + with debugging. + - (stevesk) Fix detection of pw_class struct member in configure; + patch from KAMAHARA Junzo + +20001002 + - (djm) Fix USER_PATH, report from Kevin Steves + - (djm) Add host system and CC to end-of-configure report. Suggested by + Lutz Jaenicke + +20000931 + - (djm) Cygwin fixes from Corinna Vinschen + +20000930 + - (djm) Irix ssh_prng_cmds path fix from Pekka Savola + - (djm) Support in bsd-snprintf.c for long long conversions from + Ben Lindstrom + - (djm) Cleanup NeXT support from Ben Lindstrom + - (djm) Ignore SIGPIPEs from serverloop to child. Fixes crashes with + very short lived X connections. Bug report from Tobias Oetiker + . Fix from Markus Friedl + - (djm) Add recent InitScripts as a RPM dependancy for openssh-server + patch from Pekka Savola + - (djm) Forgot to cvs add LICENSE file + - (djm) Add LICENSE to RPM spec files + - (djm) CVS OpenBSD sync: + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/26 13:59:59 + [clientloop.c] + use debug2 + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/27 15:41:34 + [auth2.c sshconnect2.c] + use key_type() + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/28 12:03:18 + [channels.c] + debug -> debug2 cleanup + - (djm) Irix strips "/dev/tty" from [uw]tmp entries (other systems only + strip "/dev/"). Fix loginrec.c based on patch from Alain St-Denis + + - (djm) Fix 9 character passphrase failure with gnome-ssh-askpass. + Problem was caused by interrupted read in ssh-add. Report from Donald + J. Barry + +20000929 + - (djm) Fix SSH2 not terminating until all background tasks done problem. + - (djm) Another off-by-one fix from Pavel Kankovsky + + - (djm) Clean up. Strip some unnecessary differences with OpenBSD's code, + tidy necessary differences. Use Markus' new debugN() in entropy.c + - (djm) Merged big SCO portability patch from Tim Rice + + +20000926 + - (djm) Update X11-askpass to 1.0.2 in RPM spec file + - (djm) Define _REENTRANT to pickup strtok_r() on HP/UX + - (djm) Security: fix off-by-one buffer overrun in fake-getnameinfo.c. + Report and fix from Pavel Kankovsky + +20000924 + - (djm) Merged cleanup patch from Mark Miller + - (djm) A bit more cleanup - created cygwin_util.h + - (djm) Include strtok_r() from OpenBSD libc. Fixes report from Mark Miller + + +20000923 + - (djm) Fix address logging in utmp from Kevin Steves + + - (djm) Redhat spec and manpage fixes from Pekka Savola + - (djm) Seperate tests for int64_t and u_int64_t types + - (djm) Tweak password expiry checking at suggestion of Kevin Steves + + - (djm) NeXT patch from Ben Lindstrom + - (djm) Use printf %lld instead of %qd in sftp-server.c. Fix from + Michael Stone + - (djm) OpenBSD CVS sync: + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/17 09:38:59 + [sshconnect2.c sshd.c] + fix DEBUG_KEXDH + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/17 09:52:51 + [sshconnect.c] + yes no; ok niels@ + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/21 04:55:11 + [sshd.8] + typo + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/21 05:03:54 + [serverloop.c] + typo + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/21 05:11:42 + scp.c + utime() to utimes(); mouring@pconline.com + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/21 05:25:08 + sshconnect2.c + change login logic in ssh2, allows plugin of other auth methods + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/21 05:25:35 + [auth2.c channels.c channels.h clientloop.c dispatch.c dispatch.h] + [serverloop.c] + add context to dispatch_run + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/21 05:07:52 + authfd.c authfd.h ssh-agent.c + bug compat for old ssh.com software + +20000920 + - (djm) Fix bad path substitution. Report from Andrew Miner + + +20000916 + - (djm) Fix SSL search order from Lutz Jaenicke + + - (djm) New SuSE spec from Corinna Vinschen + - (djm) Update CygWin support from Corinna Vinschen + - (djm) Use a real struct sockaddr inside the fake struct sockaddr_storage. + Patch from Larry Jones + - (djm) Add Steve VanDevender's PAM + password change patch. + - (djm) Bring licenses on my stuff in line with OpenBSD's + - (djm) Cleanup auth-passwd.c and unify HP/UX authentication. Patch from + Kevin Steves + - (djm) Shadow expiry check fix from Pavel Troller + - (djm) Re-enable int64_t types - we need them for sftp + - (djm) Use libexecdir from configure , rather than libexecdir/ssh + - (djm) Update Redhat SPEC file accordingly + - (djm) Add Kevin Steves HP/UX contrib files + - (djm) Add Charles Levert getpgrp patch + - (djm) Fix password auth on HP/UX 10.20. Patch from Dirk De Wachter + + - (djm) Fixprogs and entropy list fixes from Larry Jones + + - (djm) Fix for SuSE spec file from Takashi YOSHIDA + + - (djm) Merge OpenBSD changes: + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/05 02:59:57 + [session.c] + print hostname (not hushlogin) + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/05 13:18:48 + [authfile.c ssh-add.c] + enable ssh-add -d for DSA keys + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/05 13:20:49 + [sftp-server.c] + cleanup + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/06 03:46:41 + [authfile.h] + prototype + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/07 14:27:56 + [ALL] + cleanup copyright notices on all files. I have attempted to be + accurate with the details. everything is now under Tatu's licence + (which I copied from his readme), and/or the core-sdi bsd-ish thing + for deattack, or various openbsd developers under a 2-term bsd + licence. We're not changing any rules, just being accurate. + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/07 14:40:30 + [channels.c channels.h clientloop.c serverloop.c ssh.c] + cleanup window and packet sizes for ssh2 flow control; ok niels + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/07 14:53:00 + [scp.c] + typo + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/07 15:13:37 + [auth-options.c auth-options.h auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rsa.c auth.c] + [authfile.h canohost.c channels.h compat.c hostfile.h log.c match.h] + [pty.c readconf.c] + some more Copyright fixes + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/08 03:02:51 + [README.openssh2] + bye bye + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/11 18:38:33 + [LICENCE cipher.c] + a few more comments about it being ARC4 not RC4 + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/12 14:53:11 + [log-client.c log-server.c log.c ssh.1 ssh.c ssh.h sshd.8 sshd.c] + multiple debug levels + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/14 14:25:15 + [clientloop.c] + typo + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/15 01:13:51 + [ssh-agent.c] + check return value for setenv(3) for failure, and deal appropriately + +20000913 + - (djm) Fix server not exiting with jobs in background. + +20000905 + - (djm) Import OpenBSD CVS changes + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/31 15:52:24 + [Makefile sshd.8 sshd_config sftp-server.8 sftp-server.c] + implement a SFTP server. interops with sftp2, scp2 and the windows + client from ssh.com + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/31 15:56:03 + [README.openssh2] + sync + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/31 16:05:42 + [session.c] + Wall + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/31 16:09:34 + [authfd.c ssh-agent.c] + add a flag to SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST for future extensions + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/01 09:25:13 + [scp.1 scp.c] + cleanup and fix -S support; stevesk@sweden.hp.com + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/01 16:29:32 + [sftp-server.c] + portability fixes + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/01 16:32:41 + [sftp-server.c] + fix cast; mouring@pconline.com + - itojun@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/03 09:23:28 + [ssh-add.1 ssh.1] + add missing .El against .Bl. + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/04 13:03:41 + [session.c] + missing close; ok theo + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/04 13:07:21 + [session.c] + fix get_last_login_time order; from andre@van-veen.de + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/04 13:10:09 + [sftp-server.c] + more cast fixes; from mouring@pconline.com + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/04 13:06:04 + [session.c] + set SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND; from Leakin@dfw.nostrum.com, bet@rahul.net + - (djm) Cleanup after import. Fix sftp-server compilation, Makefile + - (djm) Merge cygwin support from Corinna Vinschen + +20000903 + - (djm) Fix Redhat init script + +20000901 + - (djm) Pick up Jim's new X11-askpass + - (djm) Release 2.2.0p1 + +20000831 + - (djm) Workaround SIGPIPE problems on SCO. Fix from Aran Cox + + - (djm) Pick up new version (2.2.0) from OpenBSD CVS + +20000830 + - (djm) Compile warning fixes from Mark Miller + - (djm) Periodically rekey arc4random + - (djm) Clean up diff against OpenBSD. + - (djm) HPUX 11 needs USE_PIPES as well: Kevin Steves + + - (djm) Quieten the pam delete credentials error message + - (djm) Fix printing of $DISPLAY hack if set by system type. Report from + Kevin Steves + - (djm) NeXT patch from Ben Lindstrom + - (djm) Fix doh in bsd-arc4random.c + +20000829 + - (djm) Fix ^C ignored issue on Solaris. Diagnosis from Gert + Doering , John Horne and + Garrick James + - (djm) Check for SCO pty naming style (ptyp%d/ttyp%d). Based on fix from + Bastian Trompetter + - (djm) NeXT tweaks from Ben Lindstrom + - More OpenBSD updates: + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/24 15:46:59 + [scp.c] + off_t in sink, to fix files > 2GB, i think, test is still running ;-) + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/25 10:10:06 + [session.c] + Wall + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/26 04:33:43 + [compat.c] + ssh.com-2.3.0 + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/27 12:18:05 + [compat.c] + compatibility with future ssh.com versions + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/27 21:50:55 + [auth-krb4.c session.c ssh-add.c sshconnect.c uidswap.c] + print uid/gid as unsigned + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/28 13:51:00 + [ssh.c] + enable -n and -f for ssh2 + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/28 14:19:53 + [ssh.c] + allow combination of -N and -f + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/28 14:20:56 + [util.c] + util.c + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/28 14:22:02 + [util.c] + undo + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/28 14:23:38 + [util.c] + don't complain if setting NONBLOCK fails with ENODEV + +20000823 + - (djm) Define USE_PIPES to avoid socketpair problems on HPUX 10 and SunOS 4 + Avoids "scp never exits" problem. Reports from Lutz Jaenicke + and Tamito KAJIYAMA + + - (djm) Pick up LOGIN_PROGRAM from environment or PATH if not set by headers + - (djm) Add local version to version.h + - (djm) Don't reseed arc4random everytime it is used + - (djm) OpenBSD CVS updates: + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/18 20:07:23 + [ssh.c] + accept remsh as a valid name as well; roman@buildpoint.com + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/18 20:17:13 + [deattack.c crc32.c packet.c] + rename crc32() to ssh_crc32() to avoid zlib name clash. do not move to + libz crc32 function yet, because it has ugly "long"'s in it; + oneill@cs.sfu.ca + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/18 20:26:08 + [scp.1 scp.c] + -S prog support; tv@debian.org + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/18 20:50:07 + [scp.c] + knf + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/18 20:57:33 + [log-client.c] + shorten + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/19 12:48:11 + [channels.c channels.h clientloop.c ssh.c ssh.h] + support for ~. in ssh2 + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/19 15:29:40 + [crc32.h] + proper prototype + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/19 15:34:44 + [authfd.c authfd.h key.c key.h ssh-add.1 ssh-add.c ssh-agent.1] + [ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.c sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c Makefile] + [fingerprint.c fingerprint.h] + add SSH2/DSA support to the agent and some other DSA related cleanups. + (note that we cannot talk to ssh.com's ssh2 agents) + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/19 15:55:52 + [channels.c channels.h clientloop.c] + more ~ support for ssh2 + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/19 16:21:19 + [clientloop.c] + oops + - millert@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/20 12:25:53 + [session.c] + We have to stash the result of get_remote_name_or_ip() before we + close our socket or getpeername() will get EBADF and the process + will exit. Only a problem for "UseLogin yes". + - millert@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/20 12:30:59 + [session.c] + Only check /etc/nologin if "UseLogin no" since login(1) may have its + own policy on determining who is allowed to login when /etc/nologin + is present. Also use the _PATH_NOLOGIN define. + - millert@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/20 12:42:43 + [auth1.c auth2.c session.c ssh.c] + Add calls to setusercontext() and login_get*(). We basically call + setusercontext() in most places where previously we did a setlogin(). + Add default login.conf file and put root in the "daemon" login class. + - millert@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/21 10:23:31 + [session.c] + Fix incorrect PATH setting; noted by Markus. + +20000818 + - (djm) OpenBSD CVS changes: + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/07/22 03:14:37 + [servconf.c servconf.h sshd.8 sshd.c sshd_config] + random early drop; ok theo, niels + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/07/26 11:46:51 + [ssh.1] + typo + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/01 11:46:11 + [sshd.8] + many fixes from pepper@mail.reppep.com + - provos@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/01 13:01:42 + [Makefile.in util.c aux.c] + rename aux.c to util.c to help with cygwin port + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/02 00:23:31 + [authfd.c] + correct sun_len; Alexander@Leidinger.net + - provos@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/02 10:27:17 + [readconf.c sshd.8] + disable kerberos authentication by default + - provos@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/02 11:27:05 + [sshd.8 readconf.c auth-krb4.c] + disallow kerberos authentication if we can't verify the TGT; from + dugsong@ + kerberos authentication is on by default only if you have a srvtab. + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/04 14:30:07 + [auth.c] + unused + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/04 14:30:35 + [sshd_config] + MaxStartups + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/15 13:20:46 + [authfd.c] + cleanup; ok niels@ + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/17 14:05:10 + [session.c] + cleanup login(1)-like jobs, no duplicate utmp entries + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/17 14:06:34 + [session.c sshd.8 sshd.c] + sshd -u len, similar to telnetd + - (djm) Lastlog was not getting closed after writing login entry + - (djm) Add Solaris package support from Rip Loomis + +20000816 + - (djm) Replacement for inet_ntoa for Irix (which breaks on gcc) + - (djm) Fix strerror replacement for old SunOS. Based on patch from + Charles Levert + - (djm) Seperate arc4random into seperate file and use OpenSSL's RC4 + implementation. + - (djm) SUN_LEN macro for systems which lack it + +20000815 + - (djm) More SunOS 4.1.x fixes from Nate Itkin + - (djm) Avoid failures on Irix when ssh is not setuid. Fix from + Michael Stone + - (djm) Don't seek in directory based lastlogs + - (djm) Fix --with-ipaddr-display configure option test. Patch from + Jarno Huuskonen + - (djm) Fix AIX limits from Alexandre Oliva + +20000813 + - (djm) Add $(srcdir) to includes when compiling (for VPATH). Report from + Fabrice bacchella + +20000809 + - (djm) Define AIX hard limits if headers don't. Report from + Bill Painter + - (djm) utmp direct write & SunOS 4 patch from Charles Levert + + +20000808 + - (djm) Cleanup Redhat RPMs. Generate keys at runtime rather than install + time, spec file cleanup. + +20000807 + - (djm) Set 0755 on binaries during install. Report from Lutz Jaenicke + - (djm) Suppress error messages on channel close shutdown() failurs + works around Linux bug. Patch from Zack Weinberg + - (djm) Add some more entropy collection commands from Lutz Jaenicke + +20000725 + - (djm) Fix autoconf typo: HAVE_BINRESVPORT_AF -> HAVE_BINDRESVPORT_AF + +20000721 + - (djm) OpenBSD CVS updates: + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/07/16 02:27:22 + [authfd.c authfd.h channels.c clientloop.c ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c ssh.c] + [sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c] + make ssh-add accept dsa keys (the agent does not) + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/07/17 19:25:02 + [sshd.c] + Another closing of stdin; ok deraadt + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/07/19 18:33:12 + [dsa.c] + missing free, reorder + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/07/20 16:23:14 + [ssh-keygen.1] + document input and output files + +20000720 + - (djm) Spec file fix from Petr Novotny + +20000716 + - (djm) Release 2.1.1p4 + +20000715 + - (djm) OpenBSD CVS updates + - provos@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/07/13 16:53:22 + [aux.c readconf.c servconf.c ssh.h] + allow multiple whitespace but only one '=' between tokens, bug report from + Ralf S. Engelschall but different fix. okay deraadt@ + - provos@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/07/13 17:14:09 + [clientloop.c] + typo; todd@fries.net + - provos@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/07/13 17:19:31 + [scp.c] + close can fail on AFS, report error; from Greg Hudson + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/07/14 16:59:46 + [readconf.c servconf.c] + allow leading whitespace. ok niels + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/07/14 22:01:38 + [ssh-keygen.c ssh.c] + Always create ~/.ssh with mode 700; ok Markus + - Fixes for SunOS 4.1.4 from Gordon Atwood + - Include floatingpoint.h for entropy.c + - strerror replacement + +20000712 + - (djm) Remove -lresolve for Reliant Unix + - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Updates: + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/07/11 02:11:34 + [session.c sshd.c ] + make MaxStartups code still work with -d; djm + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/07/11 13:17:45 + [readconf.c ssh_config] + disable FallBackToRsh by default + - (djm) Replace in_addr_t with u_int32_t in bsd-inet_aton.c. Report from + Ben Lindstrom + - (djm) Make building of X11-Askpass and GNOME-Askpass optional in RPM + spec file. + - (djm) Released 2.1.1p3 + +20000711 + - (djm) Fixup for AIX getuserattr() support from Tom Bertelson + + - (djm) ReliantUNIX support from Udo Schweigert + - (djm) NeXT: dirent structures to get scp working from Ben Lindstrom + + - (djm) Fix broken inet_ntoa check and ut_user/ut_name confusion, report + from Jim Watt + - (djm) Replaced bsd-snprintf.c with one from Mutt source tree, it is known + to compile on more platforms (incl NeXT). + - (djm) Added bsd-inet_aton and configure support for NeXT + - (djm) Misc NeXT fixes from Ben Lindstrom + - (djm) OpenBSD CVS updates: + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/06/26 03:22:29 + [authfd.c] + cleanup, less cut&paste + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/06/26 15:59:19 + [servconf.c servconf.h session.c sshd.8 sshd.c] + MaxStartups: limit number of unauthenticated connections, work by + theo and me + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/07/05 14:18:07 + [session.c] + use no_x11_forwarding_flag correctly; provos ok + - provos@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/07/05 15:35:57 + [sshd.c] + typo + - aaron@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/07/05 22:06:58 + [scp.1 ssh-agent.1 ssh-keygen.1 sshd.8] + Insert more missing .El directives. Our troff really should identify + these and spit out a warning. + - todd@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/07/06 21:55:04 + [auth-rsa.c auth2.c ssh-keygen.c] + clean code is good code + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/07/07 02:14:29 + [serverloop.c] + sense of port forwarding flag test was backwards + - provos@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/07/08 17:17:31 + [compat.c readconf.c] + replace strtok with strsep; from David Young + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/07/08 19:21:15 + [auth.h] + KNF + - ho@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/07/08 19:27:33 + [compat.c readconf.c] + Better conditions for strsep() ending. + - ho@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/07/10 10:27:05 + [readconf.c] + Get the correct message on errors. (niels@ ok) + - ho@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/07/10 10:30:25 + [cipher.c kex.c servconf.c] + strtok() --> strsep(). (niels@ ok) + - (djm) Fix problem with debug mode and MaxStartups + - (djm) Don't generate host keys when $(DESTDIR) is set (e.g. during RPM + builds) + - (djm) Add strsep function from OpenBSD libc for systems that lack it + +20000709 + - (djm) Only enable PAM_TTY kludge for Linux. Problem report from + Kevin Steves + - (djm) Match prototype and function declaration for rresvport_af. + Problem report from Niklas Edmundsson + - (djm) Missing $(DESTDIR) on host-key target causing problems with RPM + builds. Problem report from Gregory Leblanc + - (djm) Replace ut_name with ut_user. Patch from Jim Watt + + - (djm) Fix pam sprintf fix + - (djm) Cleanup entropy collection code a little more. Split initialisation + from seeding, perform intialisation immediatly at start, be careful with + uids. Based on problem report from Jim Watt + - (djm) More NeXT compatibility from Ben Lindstrom + Including sigaction() et al. replacements + - (djm) AIX getuserattr() session initialisation from Tom Bertelson + + +20000708 + - (djm) Fix bad fprintf format handling in auth-pam.c. Patch from + Aaron Hopkins + - (djm) Fix incorrect configure handling of --with-rsh-path option. Fix from + Lutz Jaenicke + - (djm) Fixed undefined variables for OSF SIA. Report from + Baars, Henk + - (djm) Handle EWOULDBLOCK returns from read() and write() in atomicio.c + Fix from Marquess, Steve Mr JMLFDC + - (djm) Don't use inet_addr. + +20000702 + - (djm) Fix brace mismatch from Corinna Vinschen + - (djm) Stop shadow expiry checking from preventing logins with NIS. Based + on fix from HARUYAMA Seigo + - (djm) Use standard OpenSSL functions in auth-skey.c. Patch from + Chris, the Young One + - (djm) Fix scp progress meter on really wide terminals. Based on patch + from James H. Cloos Jr. + +20000701 + - (djm) Fix Tru64 SIA problems reported by John P Speno + - (djm) Login fixes from Tom Bertelson + - (djm) Replace "/bin/sh" with _PATH_BSHELL. Report from Corinna Vinschen + + - (djm) Replace "/usr/bin/login" with LOGIN_PROGRAM + - (djm) Added check for broken snprintf() functions which do not correctly + terminate output string and attempt to use replacement. + - (djm) Released 2.1.1p2 + +20000628 + - (djm) Fixes to lastlog code for Irix + - (djm) Use atomicio in loginrec + - (djm) Patch from Michael Stone to add support for + Irix 6.x array sessions, project id's, and system audit trail id. + - (djm) Added 'distprep' make target to simplify packaging + - (djm) Added patch from Chris Adams to add OSF SIA + support. Enable using "USE_SIA=1 ./configure [options]" + +20000627 + - (djm) Fixes to login code - not setting li->uid, cleanups + - (djm) Formatting + +20000626 + - (djm) Better fix to aclocal tests from Garrick James + - (djm) Account expiry support from Andreas Steinmetz + - (djm) Added password expiry checking (no password change support) + - (djm) Make EGD failures non-fatal if OpenSSL's entropy pool is still OK + based on patch from Lutz Jaenicke + - (djm) Fix fixed EGD code. + - OpenBSD CVS update + - provos@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/06/25 14:17:58 + [channels.c] + correct check for bad channel ids; from Wei Dai + +20000623 + - (djm) Use sa_family_t in prototype for rresvport_af. Patch from + Svante Signell + - (djm) Autoconf logic to define sa_family_t if it is missing + - OpenBSD CVS Updates: + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/06/22 10:32:27 + [sshd.c] + missing atomicio; report from Steve.Marquess@DET.AMEDD.ARMY.MIL + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/06/22 17:55:00 + [auth-krb4.c key.c radix.c uuencode.c] + Missing CVS idents; ok markus + +20000622 + - (djm) Automatically generate host key during "make install". Suggested + by Gary E. Miller + - (djm) Paranoia before kill() system call + - OpenBSD CVS Updates: + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/06/18 18:50:11 + [auth2.c compat.c compat.h sshconnect2.c] + make userauth+pubkey interop with ssh.com-2.2.0 + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/06/18 20:56:17 + [dsa.c] + mem leak + be more paranoid in dsa_verify. + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/06/18 21:29:50 + [key.c] + cleanup fingerprinting, less hardcoded sizes + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/06/19 19:39:45 + [atomicio.c auth-options.c auth-passwd.c auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rhosts.c] + [auth-rsa.c auth-skey.c authfd.c authfd.h authfile.c bufaux.c bufaux.h] + [buffer.c buffer.h canohost.c channels.c channels.h cipher.c cipher.h] + [clientloop.c compat.c compat.h compress.c compress.h crc32.c crc32.h] + [deattack.c dispatch.c dsa.c fingerprint.c fingerprint.h getput.h hmac.c] + [kex.c log-client.c log-server.c login.c match.c mpaux.c mpaux.h nchan.c] + [nchan.h packet.c packet.h pty.c pty.h readconf.c readconf.h readpass.c] + [rsa.c rsa.h scp.c servconf.c servconf.h ssh-add.c ssh-keygen.c ssh.c] + [ssh.h tildexpand.c ttymodes.c ttymodes.h uidswap.c xmalloc.c xmalloc.h] + OpenBSD tag + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/06/21 10:46:10 + sshconnect2.c missing free; nuke old comment + +20000620 + - (djm) Replace use of '-o' and '-a' logical operators in configure tests + with '||' and '&&'. As suggested by Jim Knoble + to fix SCO Unixware problem reported by Gary E. Miller + - (djm) Typo in loginrec.c + +20000618 + - (djm) Add summary of configure options to end of ./configure run + - (djm) Not all systems define RUSAGE_SELF & RUSAGE_CHILDREN. Report from + Michael Stone + - (djm) rusage is a privileged operation on some Unices (incl. + Solaris 2.5.1). Report from Paul D. Smith + - (djm) Avoid PAM failures when running without a TTY. Report from + Martin Petrak + - (djm) Include sys/types.h when including netinet/in.h in configure tests. + Patch from Jun-ichiro itojun Hagino + - (djm) Started merge of Ben Lindstrom's NeXT support + - OpenBSD CVS updates: + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/06/17 09:58:46 + [channels.c] + everyone says "nix it" (remove protocol 2 debugging message) + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/06/17 13:24:34 + [sshconnect.c] + allow extended server banners + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/06/17 14:30:10 + [sshconnect.c] + missing atomicio, typo + - jakob@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/06/17 16:52:34 + [servconf.c servconf.h session.c sshd.8 sshd_config] + add support for ssh v2 subsystems. ok markus@. + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/06/17 18:57:48 + [readconf.c servconf.c] + include = in WHITESPACE; markus ok + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/06/17 19:09:10 + [auth2.c] + implement bug compatibility with ssh-2.0.13 pubkey, server side + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/06/17 21:00:28 + [compat.c] + initial support for ssh.com's 2.2.0 + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/06/17 21:16:09 + [scp.c] + typo + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/06/17 22:05:02 + [auth-rsa.c auth2.c serverloop.c session.c auth-options.c auth-options.h] + split auth-rsa option parsing into auth-options + add options support to authorized_keys2 + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/06/17 22:42:54 + [session.c] + typo + +20000613 + - (djm) Fixes from Andrew McGill : + - Platform define for SCO 3.x which breaks on /dev/ptmx + - Detect and try to fix missing MAXPATHLEN + - (djm) Fix short copy in loginrec.c (based on patch from Phill Camp + + +20000612 + - (djm) Glob manpages in RPM spec files to catch compressed files + - (djm) Full license in auth-pam.c + - (djm) Configure fixes from SAKAI Kiyotaka + - (andre) AIX, lastlog, configure fixes from Tom Bertelson : + - Don't try to retrieve lastlog from wtmp/wtmpx if DISABLE_LASTLOG is + def'd + - Set AIX to use preformatted manpages + +20000610 + - (djm) Minor doc tweaks + - (djm) Fix for configure on bash2 from Jim Knoble + +20000609 + - (djm) Patch from Kenji Miyake to disable utmp usage + (in favour of utmpx) on Solaris 8 + +20000606 + - (djm) Cleanup of entropy.c. Reorganised code, removed second pass through + list of commands (by default). Removed verbose debugging (by default). + - (djm) Increased command entropy estimates and default entropy collection + timeout + - (djm) Remove duplicate headers from loginrec.c + - (djm) Don't add /usr/local/lib to library search path on Irix + - (djm) Fix rsh path in RPMs. Report from Jason L Tibbitts III + + - (djm) Warn user if grabs fail in GNOME askpass. Patch from Zack Weinberg + + - (djm) OpenBSD CVS updates: + - todd@cvs.openbsd.org + [sshconnect2.c] + teach protocol v2 to count login failures properly and also enable an + explanation of why the password prompt comes up again like v1; this is NOT + crypto + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org + [readconf.c readconf.h servconf.c servconf.h session.c ssh.1 ssh.c sshd.8] + xauth_location support; pr 1234 + [readconf.c sshconnect2.c] + typo, unused + [session.c] + allow use_login only for login sessions, otherwise remote commands are + execed with uid==0 + [sshd.8] + document UseLogin better + [version.h] + OpenSSH 2.1.1 + [auth-rsa.c] + fix match_hostname() logic for auth-rsa: deny access if we have a + negative match or no match at all + [channels.c hostfile.c match.c] + don't panic if mkdtemp fails for authfwd; jkb@yahoo-inc.com via + kris@FreeBSD.org + +20000606 + - (djm) Added --with-cflags, --with-ldflags and --with-libs options to + configure. + +20000604 + - Configure tweaking for new login code on Irix 5.3 + - (andre) login code changes based on djm feedback + +20000603 + - (andre) New login code + - Remove bsd-login.[ch] and all the OpenBSD-derived code in login.c + - Add loginrec.[ch], logintest.c and autoconf code + +20000531 + - Cleanup of auth.c, login.c and fake-* + - Cleanup of auth-pam.c, save and print "account expired" error messages + - Fix EGD read bug by IWAMURO Motonori + - Rewrote bsd-login to use proper utmp API if available. Major cleanup + of fallback DIY code. + +20000530 + - Define atexit for old Solaris + - Fix buffer overrun in login.c for systems which use syslen in utmpx. + patch from YOSHIFUJI Hideaki + - OpenBSD CVS updates: + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org + [session.c] + make x11-fwd work w/ localhost (xauth add host/unix:11) + [cipher.c compat.c readconf.c servconf.c] + check strtok() != NULL; ok niels@ + [key.c] + fix key_read() for uuencoded keys w/o '=' + [serverloop.c] + group ssh1 vs. ssh2 in serverloop + [kex.c kex.h myproposal.h sshconnect2.c sshd.c] + split kexinit/kexdh, factor out common code + [readconf.c ssh.1 ssh.c] + forwardagent defaults to no, add ssh -A + - theo@cvs.openbsd.org + [session.c] + just some line shortening + - Released 2.1.0p3 + +20000520 + - Xauth fix from Markus Friedl + - Don't touch utmp if USE_UTMPX defined + - SunOS 4.x support from Todd C. Miller + - SIGCHLD fix for AIX and HPUX from Tom Bertelson + - HPUX and Configure fixes from Lutz Jaenicke + + - Use mkinstalldirs script to make directories instead of non-portable + "install -d". Suggested by Lutz Jaenicke + - Doc cleanup + +20000518 + - Include Andre Lucas' fixprogs script. Forgot to "cvs add" it yesterday + - OpenBSD CVS updates: + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org + [sshconnect.c] + copy only ai_addrlen bytes; misiek@pld.org.pl + [auth.c] + accept an empty shell in authentication; bug reported by + chris@tinker.ucr.edu + [serverloop.c] + we don't have stderr for interactive terminal sessions (fcntl errors) + +20000517 + - Fix from Andre Lucas + - Fixes command line printing segfaults (spotter: Bladt Norbert) + - Fixes erroneous printing of debug messages to syslog + - Fixes utmp for MacOS X (spotter: Aristedes Maniatis) + - Gives useful error message if PRNG initialisation fails + - Reduced ssh startup delay + - Measures cumulative command time rather than the time between reads + after select() + - 'fixprogs' perl script to eliminate non-working entropy commands, and + optionally run 'ent' to measure command entropy + - Applied Tom Bertelson's AIX authentication fix + - Avoid WCOREDUMP complation errors for systems that lack it + - Avoid SIGCHLD warnings from entropy commands + - Fix HAVE_PAM_GETENVLIST setting from Simon Wilkinson + - OpenBSD CVS update: + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org + [ssh.c] + fix usage() + [ssh2.h] + draft-ietf-secsh-architecture-05.txt + [ssh.1] + document ssh -T -N (ssh2 only) + [channels.c serverloop.c ssh.h sshconnect.c sshd.c aux.c] + enable nonblocking IO for sshd w/ proto 1, too; split out common code + [aux.c] + missing include + - Several patches from SAKAI Kiyotaka + - INSTALL typo and URL fix + - Makefile fix + - Solaris fixes + - Checking for ssize_t and memmove. Based on patch from SAKAI Kiyotaka + + - RSAless operation patch from kevin_oconnor@standardandpoors.com + - Detect OpenSSL seperatly from RSA + - Better test for RSA (more compatible with RSAref). Based on work by + Ed Eden + +20000513 + - Fix for non-recognised DSA keys from Arkadiusz Miskiewicz + + +20000511 + - Fix for prng_seed permissions checking from Lutz Jaenicke + + - "make host-key" fix for Irix + +20000509 + - OpenBSD CVS update + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org + [cipher.h myproposal.h readconf.c readconf.h servconf.c ssh.1 ssh.c] + [ssh.h sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c sshd.8] + - complain about invalid ciphers in SSH1 (e.g. arcfour is SSH2 only) + - hugh@cvs.openbsd.org + [ssh.1] + - zap typo + [ssh-keygen.1] + - One last nit fix. (markus approved) + [sshd.8] + - some markus certified spelling adjustments + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org + [auth2.c channels.c clientloop.c compat compat.h dsa.c kex.c] + [sshconnect2.c ] + - bug compat w/ ssh-2.0.13 x11, split out bugs + [nchan.c] + - no drain if ibuf_empty, fixes x11fwd problems; tests by fries@ + [ssh-keygen.c] + - handle escapes in real and original key format, ok millert@ + [version.h] + - OpenSSH-2.1 + - Moved all the bsd-* and fake-* stuff into new libopenbsd-compat.a + - Doc updates + - Cleanup of bsd-base64 headers, bugfix definitions of __b64_*. Reported + by Andre Lucas + +20000508 + - Makefile and RPM spec fixes + - Generate DSA host keys during "make key" or RPM installs + - OpenBSD CVS update + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org + [clientloop.c sshconnect2.c] + - make x11-fwd interop w/ ssh-2.0.13 + [README.openssh2] + - interop w/ SecureFX + - Release 2.0.0beta2 + + - Configure caching and cleanup patch from Andre Lucas' + + +20000507 + - Remove references to SSLeay. + - Big OpenBSD CVS update + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org + [clientloop.c] + - typo + [session.c] + - update proctitle on pty alloc/dealloc, e.g. w/ windows client + [session.c] + - update proctitle for proto 1, too + [channels.h nchan.c serverloop.c session.c sshd.c] + - use c-style comments + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org + [scp.c] + - more atomicio + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org + [channels.c] + - set O_NONBLOCK + [ssh.1] + - update AUTHOR + [readconf.c ssh-keygen.c ssh.h] + - default DSA key file ~/.ssh/id_dsa + [clientloop.c] + - typo, rm verbose debug + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org + [ssh-keygen.1] + - document DSA use of ssh-keygen + [sshd.8] + - a start at describing what i understand of the DSA side + [ssh-keygen.1] + - document -X and -x + [ssh-keygen.c] + - simplify usage + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org + [sshd.8] + - there is no rhosts_dsa + [ssh-keygen.1] + - document -y, update -X,-x + [nchan.c] + - fix close for non-open ssh1 channels + [servconf.c servconf.h ssh.h sshd.8 sshd.c ] + - s/DsaKey/HostDSAKey/, document option + [sshconnect2.c] + - respect number_of_password_prompts + [channels.c channels.h servconf.c servconf.h session.c sshd.8] + - GatewayPorts for sshd, ok deraadt@ + [ssh-add.1 ssh-agent.1 ssh.1] + - more doc on: DSA, id_dsa, known_hosts2, authorized_keys2 + [ssh.1] + - more info on proto 2 + [sshd.8] + - sync AUTHOR w/ ssh.1 + [key.c key.h sshconnect.c] + - print key type when talking about host keys + [packet.c] + - clear padding in ssh2 + [dsa.c key.c radix.c ssh.h sshconnect1.c uuencode.c uuencode.h] + - replace broken uuencode w/ libc b64_ntop + [auth2.c] + - log failure before sending the reply + [key.c radix.c uuencode.c] + - remote trailing comments before calling __b64_pton + [auth2.c readconf.c readconf.h servconf.c servconf.h ssh.1] + [sshconnect2.c sshd.8] + - add DSAAuthetication option to ssh/sshd, document SSH2 in sshd.8 + - Bring in b64_ntop and b64_pton from OpenBSD libc (bsd-base64.[ch]) + +20000502 + - OpenBSD CVS update + [channels.c] + - init all fds, close all fds. + [sshconnect2.c] + - check whether file exists before asking for passphrase + [servconf.c servconf.h sshd.8 sshd.c] + - PidFile, pr 1210 + [channels.c] + - EINTR + [channels.c] + - unbreak, ok niels@ + [sshd.c] + - unlink pid file, ok niels@ + [auth2.c] + - Add missing #ifdefs; ok - markus + - Add Andre Lucas' patch to read entropy + gathering commands from a text file + - Release 2.0.0beta1 + +20000501 + - OpenBSD CVS update + [packet.c] + - send debug messages in SSH2 format + [scp.c] + - fix very rare EAGAIN/EINTR issues; based on work by djm + [packet.c] + - less debug, rm unused + [auth2.c] + - disable kerb,s/key in ssh2 + [sshd.8] + - Minor tweaks and typo fixes. + [ssh-keygen.c] + - Put -d into usage and reorder. markus ok. + - Include missing headers for OpenSSL tests. Fix from Phil Karn + + - Fixed __progname symbol collisions reported by Andre Lucas + + - Merged bsd-login ttyslot and AIX utmp patch from Gert Doering + + - Add some missing ifdefs to auth2.c + - Deprecate perl-tk askpass. + - Irix portability fixes - don't include netinet headers more than once + - Make sure we don't save PRNG seed more than once + +20000430 + - Merge HP-UX fixes and TCB support from Ged Lodder + - Integrate Andre Lucas' entropy collection + patch. + - Adds timeout to entropy collection + - Disables slow entropy sources + - Load and save seed file + - Changed entropy seed code to user per-user seeds only (server seed is + saved in root's .ssh directory) + - Use atexit() and fatal cleanups to save seed on exit + - More OpenBSD updates: + [session.c] + - don't call chan_write_failed() if we are not writing + [auth-rsa.c auth1.c authfd.c hostfile.c ssh-agent.c] + - keysize warnings error() -> log() + +20000429 + - Merge big update to OpenSSH-2.0 from OpenBSD CVS + [README.openssh2] + - interop w/ F-secure windows client + - sync documentation + - ssh_host_dsa_key not ssh_dsa_key + [auth-rsa.c] + - missing fclose + [auth.c authfile.c compat.c dsa.c dsa.h hostfile.c key.c key.h radix.c] + [readconf.c readconf.h ssh-add.c ssh-keygen.c ssh.c ssh.h sshconnect.c] + [sshd.c uuencode.c uuencode.h authfile.h] + - add DSA pubkey auth and other SSH2 fixes. use ssh-keygen -[xX] + for trading keys with the real and the original SSH, directly from the + people who invented the SSH protocol. + [auth.c auth.h authfile.c sshconnect.c auth1.c auth2.c sshconnect.h] + [sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c] + - split auth/sshconnect in one file per protocol version + [sshconnect2.c] + - remove debug + [uuencode.c] + - add trailing = + [version.h] + - OpenSSH-2.0 + [ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c] + - add -R flag: exit code indicates if RSA is alive + [sshd.c] + - remove unused + silent if -Q is specified + [ssh.h] + - host key becomes /etc/ssh_host_dsa_key + [readconf.c servconf.c ] + - ssh/sshd default to proto 1 and 2 + [uuencode.c] + - remove debug + [auth2.c ssh-keygen.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c] + - xfree DSA blobs + [auth2.c serverloop.c session.c] + - cleanup logging for sshd/2, respect PasswordAuth no + [sshconnect2.c] + - less debug, respect .ssh/config + [README.openssh2 channels.c channels.h] + - clientloop.c session.c ssh.c + - support for x11-fwding, client+server + +20000421 + - Merge fix from OpenBSD CVS + [ssh-agent.c] + - Fix memory leak per connection. Report from Andy Spiegl + via Debian bug #59926 + - Define __progname in session.c if libc doesn't + - Remove indentation on autoconf #include statements to avoid bug in + DEC Tru64 compiler. Report and fix from David Del Piero + + +20000420 + - Make fixpaths work with perl4, patch from Andre Lucas + + - Sync with OpenBSD CVS: + [clientloop.c login.c serverloop.c ssh-agent.c ssh.h sshconnect.c sshd.c] + - pid_t + [session.c] + - remove bogus chan_read_failed. this could cause data + corruption (missing data) at end of a SSH2 session. + - Merge fixes from Debian patch from Phil Hands + - Allow setting of PAM service name through CFLAGS (SSHD_PAM_SERVICE) + - Use vhangup to clean up Linux ttys + - Force posix getopt processing on GNU libc systems + - Debian bug #55910 - remove references to ssl(8) manpages + - Debian bug #58031 - ssh_config lies about default cipher + +20000419 + - OpenBSD CVS updates + [channels.c] + - fix pr 1196, listen_port and port_to_connect interchanged + [scp.c] + - after completion, replace the progress bar ETA counter with a final + elapsed time; my idea, aaron wrote the patch + [ssh_config sshd_config] + - show 'Protocol' as an example, ok markus@ + [sshd.c] + - missing xfree() + - Add missing header to bsd-misc.c + +20000416 + - Reduce diff against OpenBSD source + - All OpenSSL includes are now unconditionally referenced as + openssl/foo.h + - Pick up formatting changes + - Other minor changed (typecasts, etc) that I missed + +20000415 + - OpenBSD CVS updates. + [ssh.1 ssh.c] + - ssh -2 + [auth.c channels.c clientloop.c packet.c packet.h serverloop.c] + [session.c sshconnect.c] + - check payload for (illegal) extra data + [ALL] + whitespace cleanup + +20000413 + - INSTALL doc updates + - Merged OpenBSD updates to include paths. + +20000412 + - OpenBSD CVS updates: + - [channels.c] + repair x11-fwd + - [sshconnect.c] + fix passwd prompt for ssh2, less debugging output. + - [clientloop.c compat.c dsa.c kex.c sshd.c] + less debugging output + - [kex.c kex.h sshconnect.c sshd.c] + check for reasonable public DH values + - [README.openssh2 cipher.c cipher.h compat.c compat.h readconf.c] + [readconf.h servconf.c servconf.h ssh.c ssh.h sshconnect.c sshd.c] + add Cipher and Protocol options to ssh/sshd, e.g.: + ssh -o 'Protocol 1,2' if you prefer proto 1, ssh -o 'Ciphers + arcfour,3des-cbc' + - [sshd.c] + print 1.99 only if server supports both + +20000408 + - Avoid some compiler warnings in fake-get*.c + - Add IPTOS macros for systems which lack them + - Only set define entropy collection macros if they are found + - More large OpenBSD CVS updates: + - [auth.c auth.h servconf.c servconf.h serverloop.c session.c] + [session.h ssh.h sshd.c README.openssh2] + ssh2 server side, see README.openssh2; enable with 'sshd -2' + - [channels.c] + no adjust after close + - [sshd.c compat.c ] + interop w/ latest ssh.com windows client. + +20000406 + - OpenBSD CVS update: + - [channels.c] + close efd on eof + - [clientloop.c compat.c ssh.c sshconnect.c myproposal.h] + ssh2 client implementation, interops w/ ssh.com and lsh servers. + - [sshconnect.c] + missing free. + - [authfile.c cipher.c cipher.h packet.c sshconnect.c sshd.c] + remove unused argument, split cipher_mask() + - [clientloop.c] + re-order: group ssh1 vs. ssh2 + - Make Redhat spec require openssl >= 0.9.5a + +20000404 + - Add tests for RAND_add function when searching for OpenSSL + - OpenBSD CVS update: + - [packet.h packet.c] + ssh2 packet format + - [packet.h packet.c nchan2.ms nchan.h compat.h compat.c] + [channels.h channels.c] + channel layer support for ssh2 + - [kex.h kex.c hmac.h hmac.c dsa.c dsa.h] + DSA, keyexchange, algorithm agreement for ssh2 + - Generate manpages before make install not at the end of make all + - Don't seed the rng quite so often + - Always reseed rng when requested + +20000403 + - Wrote entropy collection routines for systems that lack /dev/random + and EGD + - Disable tests and typedefs for 64 bit types. They are currently unused. + +20000401 + - Big OpenBSD CVS update (mainly beginnings of SSH2 infrastructure) + - [auth.c session.c sshd.c auth.h] + split sshd.c -> auth.c session.c sshd.c plus cleanup and goto-removal + - [bufaux.c bufaux.h] + support ssh2 bignums + - [channels.c channels.h clientloop.c sshd.c nchan.c nchan.h packet.c] + [readconf.c ssh.c ssh.h serverloop.c] + replace big switch() with function tables (prepare for ssh2) + - [ssh2.h] + ssh2 message type codes + - [sshd.8] + reorder Xr to avoid cutting + - [serverloop.c] + close(fdin) if fdin != fdout, shutdown otherwise, ok theo@ + - [channels.c] + missing close + allow bigger packets + - [cipher.c cipher.h] + support ssh2 ciphers + - [compress.c] + cleanup, less code + - [dispatch.c dispatch.h] + function tables for different message types + - [log-server.c] + do not log() if debuggin to stderr + rename a cpp symbol, to avoid param.h collision + - [mpaux.c] + KNF + - [nchan.c] + sync w/ channels.c + +20000326 + - Better tests for OpenSSL w/ RSAref + - Added replacement setenv() function from OpenBSD libc. Suggested by + Ben Lindstrom + - OpenBSD CVS update + - [auth-krb4.c] + -Wall + - [auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rsa.c hostfile.c hostfile.h key.c key.h match.c] + [match.h ssh.c ssh.h sshconnect.c sshd.c] + initial support for DSA keys. ok deraadt@, niels@ + - [cipher.c cipher.h] + remove unused cipher_attack_detected code + - [scp.1 ssh-add.1 ssh-agent.1 ssh-keygen.1 ssh.1 sshd.8] + Fix some formatting problems I missed before. + - [ssh.1 sshd.8] + fix spelling errors, From: FreeBSD + - [ssh.c] + switch to raw mode only if he _get_ a pty (not if we _want_ a pty). + +20000324 + - Released 1.2.3 + +20000317 + - Clarified --with-default-path option. + - Added -blibpath handling for AIX to work around stupid runtime linking. + Problem elucidated by gshapiro@SENDMAIL.ORG by way of Jim Knoble + + - Checks for 64 bit int types. Problem report from Mats Fredholm + + - OpenBSD CVS updates: + - [atomicio.c auth-krb4.c bufaux.c channels.c compress.c fingerprint.c] + [packet.h radix.c rsa.c scp.c ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.c sshconnect.c] + [sshd.c] + pedantic: signed vs. unsigned, void*-arithm, etc + - [ssh.1 sshd.8] + Various cleanups and standardizations. + - Runtime error fix for HPUX from Otmar Stahl + + +20000316 + - Fixed configure not passing LDFLAGS to Solaris. Report from David G. + Hesprich + - Propogate LD through to Makefile + - Doc cleanups + - Added blurb about "scp: command not found" errors to UPGRADING + +20000315 + - Fix broken CFLAGS handling during search for OpenSSL. Fixes va_list + problems with gcc/Solaris. + - Don't free argument to putenv() after use (in setenv() replacement). + Report from Seigo Tanimura + - Created contrib/ subdirectory. Included helpers from Phil Hands' + Debian package, README file and chroot patch from Ricardo Cerqueira + + - Moved gnome-ssh-askpass.c to contrib directory and removed config + option. + - Slight cleanup to doc files + - Configure fix from Bratislav ILICH + +20000314 + - Include macro for IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED. Report from + peter@frontierflying.com + - Include /usr/local/include and /usr/local/lib for systems that don't + do it themselves + - -R/usr/local/lib for Solaris + - Fix RSAref detection + - Fix IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED macro + +20000311 + - Detect RSAref + - OpenBSD CVS change + [sshd.c] + - disallow guessing of root password + - More configure fixes + - IPv6 workarounds from Hideaki YOSHIFUJI + +20000309 + - OpenBSD CVS updates to v1.2.3 + [ssh.h atomicio.c] + - int atomicio -> ssize_t (for alpha). ok deraadt@ + [auth-rsa.c] + - delay MD5 computation until client sends response, free() early, cleanup. + [cipher.c] + - void* -> unsigned char*, ok niels@ + [hostfile.c] + - remove unused variable 'len'. fix comments. + - remove unused variable + [log-client.c log-server.c] + - rename a cpp symbol, to avoid param.h collision + [packet.c] + - missing xfree() + - getsockname() requires initialized tolen; andy@guildsoftware.com + - use getpeername() in packet_connection_is_on_socket(), fixes sshd -i; + from Holger.Trapp@Informatik.TU-Chemnitz.DE + [pty.c pty.h] + - register cleanup for pty earlier. move code for pty-owner handling to + pty.c ok provos@, dugsong@ + [readconf.c] + - turn off x11-fwd for the client, too. + [rsa.c] + - PKCS#1 padding + [scp.c] + - allow '.' in usernames; from jedgar@fxp.org + [servconf.c] + - typo: ignore_user_known_hosts int->flag; naddy@mips.rhein-neckar.de + - sync with sshd_config + [ssh-keygen.c] + - enable ssh-keygen -l -f ~/.ssh/known_hosts, ok deraadt@ + [ssh.1] + - Change invalid 'CHAT' loglevel to 'VERBOSE' + [ssh.c] + - suppress AAAA query host when '-4' is used; from shin@nd.net.fujitsu.co.jp + - turn off x11-fwd for the client, too. + [sshconnect.c] + - missing xfree() + - retry rresvport_af(), too. from sumikawa@ebina.hitachi.co.jp. + - read error vs. "Connection closed by remote host" + [sshd.8] + - ie. -> i.e., + - do not link to a commercial page.. + - sync with sshd_config + [sshd.c] + - no need for poll.h; from bright@wintelcom.net + - log with level log() not fatal() if peer behaves badly. + - don't panic if client behaves strange. ok deraadt@ + - make no-port-forwarding for RSA keys deny both -L and -R style fwding + - delay close() of pty until the pty has been chowned back to root + - oops, fix comment, too. + - missing xfree() + - move XAUTHORITY to subdir. ok dugsong@. fixes debian bug #57907, too. + (http://cgi.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?archive=no&bug=57907) + - register cleanup for pty earlier. move code for pty-owner handling to + pty.c ok provos@, dugsong@ + - create x11 cookie file + - fix pr 1113, fclose() -> pclose(), todo: remote popen() + - version 1.2.3 + - Cleaned up + - Removed warning workaround for Linux and devpts filesystems (no longer + required after OpenBSD updates) + +20000308 + - Configure fix from Hiroshi Takekawa + +20000307 + - Released 1.2.2p1 + +20000305 + - Fix DEC compile fix + - Explicitly seed OpenSSL's PRNG before checking rsa_alive() + - Check for getpagesize in libucb.a if not found in libc. Fix for old + Solaris from Andre Lucas + - Check for libwrap if --with-tcp-wrappers option specified. Suggestion + Mate Wierdl + +20000303 + - Added "make host-key" target, Suggestion from Dominik Brettnacher + + - Don't permanently fail on bind() if getaddrinfo has more choices left for + us. Needed to work around messy IPv6 on Linux. Patch from Arkadiusz + Miskiewicz + - DEC Unix compile fix from David Del Piero + - Manpage fix from David Del Piero + +20000302 + - Big cleanup of autoconf code + - Rearranged to be a little more logical + - Added -R option for Solaris + - Rewrote OpenSSL detection code. Now uses AC_TRY_RUN with a test program + to detect library and header location _and_ ensure library has proper + RSA support built in (this is a problem with OpenSSL 0.9.5). + - Applied pty cleanup patch from markus.friedl@informatik.uni-erlangen.de + - Avoid warning message with Unix98 ptys + - Warning was valid - possible race condition on PTYs. Avoided using + platform-specific code. + - Document some common problems + - Allow root access to any key. Patch from + markus.friedl@informatik.uni-erlangen.de + +20000207 + - Removed SOCKS code. Will support through a ProxyCommand. + +20000203 + - Fixed SEGVs in authloop, fix from vbzoli@hbrt.hu + - Add --with-ssl-dir option + +20000202 + - Fix lastlog code for directory based lastlogs. Fix from Josh Durham + + - Documentation fixes from HARUYAMA Seigo + - Added URLs to Japanese translations of documents by HARUYAMA Seigo + + +20000201 + - Use socket pairs by default (instead of pipes). Prevents race condition + on several (buggy) OSs. Report and fix from tridge@linuxcare.com + +20000127 + - Seed OpenSSL's random number generator before generating RSA keypairs + - Split random collector into seperate file + - Compile fix from Andre Lucas + +20000126 + - Released 1.2.2 stable + + - NeXT keeps it lastlog in /usr/adm. Report from + mouring@newton.pconline.com + - Added note in UPGRADING re interop with commercial SSH using idea. + Report from Jim Knoble + - Fix linking order for Kerberos/AFS. Fix from Holget Trapp + + +20000125 + - Fix NULL pointer dereference in login.c. Fix from Andre Lucas + + - Reorder PAM initialisation so it does not mess up lastlog. Reported + by Andre Lucas + - Use preformatted manpages on SCO, report from Gary E. Miller + + - New URL for x11-ssh-askpass. + - Fixpaths was missing /etc/ssh_known_hosts. Report from Jim Knoble + + - Added 'DESTDIR' option to Makefile to ease package building. Patch from + Jim Knoble + - Updated RPM spec files to use DESTDIR + +20000124 + - Pick up version 1.2.2 from OpenBSD CVS (no changes, just version number + increment) + +20000123 + - OpenBSD CVS: + - [packet.c] + getsockname() requires initialized tolen; andy@guildsoftware.com + - AIX patch from Matt Richards and David Rankin + + - Fix lastlog support, patch from Andre Lucas + +20000122 + - Fix compilation of bsd-snprintf.c on Solaris, fix from Ben Taylor + + - Merge preformatted manpage patch from Andre Lucas + + - Make IPv4 use the default in RPM packages + - Irix uses preformatted manpages + - Missing htons() in bsd-bindresvport.c, fix from Holger Trapp + + - OpenBSD CVS updates: + - [packet.c] + use getpeername() in packet_connection_is_on_socket(), fixes sshd -i; + from Holger.Trapp@Informatik.TU-Chemnitz.DE + - [sshd.c] + log with level log() not fatal() if peer behaves badly. + - [readpass.c] + instead of blocking SIGINT, catch it ourselves, so that we can clean + the tty modes up and kill ourselves -- instead of our process group + leader (scp, cvs, ...) going away and leaving us in noecho mode. + people with cbreak shells never even noticed.. + - [ssh-add.1 ssh-agent.1 ssh-keygen.1 ssh.1 sshd.8] + ie. -> i.e., + +20000120 + - Don't use getaddrinfo on AIX + - Update to latest OpenBSD CVS: + - [auth-rsa.c] + - fix user/1056, sshd keeps restrictions; dbt@meat.net + - [sshconnect.c] + - disable agent fwding for proto 1.3, remove abuse of auth-rsa flags. + - destroy keys earlier + - split key exchange (kex) and user authentication (user-auth), + ok: provos@ + - [sshd.c] + - no need for poll.h; from bright@wintelcom.net + - disable agent fwding for proto 1.3, remove abuse of auth-rsa flags. + - split key exchange (kex) and user authentication (user-auth), + ok: provos@ + - Big manpage and config file cleanup from Andre Lucas + + - Re-added latest (unmodified) OpenBSD manpages + - Doc updates + - NetBSD patch from David Rankin and + Christos Zoulas + +20000119 + - SCO compile fixes from Gary E. Miller + - Compile fix from Darren_Hall@progressive.com + - Linux/glibc-2.1.2 takes a *long* time to look up names for AF_UNSPEC + addresses using getaddrinfo(). Added a configure switch to make the + default lookup mode AF_INET + +20000118 + - Fixed --with-pid-dir option + - Makefile fix from Gary E. Miller + - Compile fix for HPUX and Solaris from Andre Lucas + + +20000117 + - Clean up bsd-bindresvport.c. Use arc4random() for picking initial + port, ignore EINVAL errors (Linux) when searching for free port. + - Revert __snprintf -> snprintf aliasing. Apparently Solaris + __snprintf isn't. Report from Theo de Raadt + - Document location of Redhat PAM file in INSTALL. + - Fixed X11 forwarding bug on Linux. libc advertises AF_INET6 + INADDR_ANY_INIT addresses via getaddrinfo, but may not be able to + deliver (no IPv6 kernel support) + - Released 1.2.1pre27 + + - Fix rresvport_af failure errors (logic error in bsd-bindresvport.c) + - Fix --with-ipaddr-display option test. Fix from Jarno Huuskonen + + - Fix hang on logout if processes are still using the pty. Needs + further testing. + - Patch from Christos Zoulas + - Try $prefix first when looking for OpenSSL. + - Include sys/types.h when including sys/socket.h in test programs + - Substitute PID directory in sshd.8. Suggestion from Andrew + Stribblehill + +20000116 + - Renamed --with-xauth-path to --with-xauth + - Added --with-pid-dir option + - Released 1.2.1pre26 + + - Compilation fix from Kiyokazu SUTO + - Fixed broken bugfix for /dev/ptmx on Linux systems which lack + openpty(). Report from Kiyokazu SUTO + +20000115 + - Add --with-xauth-path configure directive and explicit test for + /usr/openwin/bin/xauth for Solaris systems. Report from Anders + Nordby + - Fix incorrect detection of /dev/ptmx on Linux systems that lack + openpty. Report from John Seifarth + - Look for intXX_t and u_intXX_t in sys/bitypes.h if they are not in + sys/types.h. Fixes problems on SCO, report from Gary E. Miller + + - Use __snprintf and __vnsprintf if they are found where snprintf and + vnsprintf are lacking. Suggested by Ben Taylor + and others. + +20000114 + - Merged OpenBSD IPv6 patch: + - [sshd.c sshd.8 sshconnect.c ssh.h ssh.c servconf.h servconf.c scp.1] + [scp.c packet.h packet.c login.c log.c canohost.c channels.c] + [hostfile.c sshd_config] + ipv6 support: mostly gethostbyname->getaddrinfo/getnameinfo, new + features: sshd allows multiple ListenAddress and Port options. note + that libwrap is not IPv6-ready. (based on patches from + fujiwara@rcac.tdi.co.jp) + - [ssh.c canohost.c] + more hints (hints.ai_socktype=SOCK_STREAM) for getaddrinfo, + from itojun@ + - [channels.c] + listen on _all_ interfaces for X11-Fwd (hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE) + - [packet.h] + allow auth-kerberos for IPv4 only + - [scp.1 sshd.8 servconf.h scp.c] + document -4, -6, and 'ssh -L 2022/::1/22' + - [ssh.c] + 'ssh @host' is illegal (null user name), from + karsten@gedankenpolizei.de + - [sshconnect.c] + better error message + - [sshd.c] + allow auth-kerberos for IPv4 only + - Big IPv6 merge: + - Cleanup overrun in sockaddr copying on RHL 6.1 + - Replacements for getaddrinfo, getnameinfo, etc based on versions + from patch from KIKUCHI Takahiro + - Replacement for missing structures on systems that lack IPv6 + - record_login needed to know about AF_INET6 addresses + - Borrowed more code from OpenBSD: rresvport_af and requisites + +20000110 + - Fixes to auth-skey to enable it to use the standard OpenSSL libraries + +20000107 + - New config.sub and config.guess to fix problems on SCO. Supplied + by Gary E. Miller + - SCO build fix from Gary E. Miller + - Released 1.2.1pre25 + +20000106 + - Documentation update & cleanup + - Better KrbIV / AFS detection, based on patch from: + Holger Trapp + +20000105 + - Fixed annoying DES corruption problem. libcrypt has been + overriding symbols in libcrypto. Removed libcrypt and crypt.h + altogether (libcrypto includes its own crypt(1) replacement) + - Added platform-specific rules for Irix 6.x. Included warning that + they are untested. + +20000103 + - Add explicit make rules for files proccessed by fixpaths. + - Fix "make install" in RPM spec files. Report from Tenkou N. Hattori + + - Removed "nullok" directive from default PAM configuration files. + Added information on enabling EmptyPasswords on openssh+PAM in + UPGRADING file. + - OpenBSD CVS updates + - [ssh-agent.c] + cleanup_exit() for SIGTERM/SIGHUP, too. from fgsch@ and + dgaudet@arctic.org + - [sshconnect.c] + compare correct version for 1.3 compat mode + +20000102 + - Prevent multiple inclusion of config.h and defines.h. Suggested + by Andre Lucas + - Properly clean up on exit of ssh-agent. Patch from Dean Gaudet + + +19991231 + - Fix password support on systems with a mixture of shadowed and + non-shadowed passwords (e.g. NIS). Report and fix from + HARUYAMA Seigo + - Fix broken autoconf typedef detection. Report from Marc G. + Fournier + - Fix occasional crash on LinuxPPC. Patch from Franz Sirl + + - Prevent typedefs from being compiled more than once. Report from + Marc G. Fournier + - Fill in ut_utaddr utmp field. Report from Benjamin Charron + + - Really fix broken default path. Fix from Jim Knoble + + - Remove test for quad_t. No longer needed. + - Released 1.2.1pre24 + + - Added support for directory-based lastlogs + - Really fix typedefs, patch from Ben Taylor + +19991230 + - OpenBSD CVS updates: + - [auth-passwd.c] + check for NULL 1st + - Removed most of the pam code into its own file auth-pam.[ch]. This + cleaned up sshd.c up significantly. + - PAM authentication was incorrectly interpreting + "PermitRootLogin without-password". Report from Matthias Andree + + - Updated documentation with ./configure options + - Released 1.2.1pre23 + +19991229 + - Applied another NetBSD portability patch from David Rankin + + - Fix --with-default-path option. + - Autodetect perl, patch from David Rankin + + - Print whether OpenSSH was compiled with RSARef, patch from + Nalin Dahyabhai + - Calls to pam_setcred, patch from Nalin Dahyabhai + + - Detect missing size_t and typedef it. + - Rename helper.[ch] to (more appropriate) bsd-misc.[ch] + - Minor Makefile cleaning + +19991228 + - Replacement for getpagesize() for systems which lack it + - NetBSD login.c compile fix from David Rankin + + - Fully set ut_tv if present in utmp or utmpx + - Portability fixes for Irix 5.3 (now compiles OK!) + - autoconf and other misc cleanups + - Merged AIX patch from Darren Hall + - Cleaned up defines.h + - Released 1.2.1pre22 + +19991227 + - Automatically correct paths in manpages and configuration files. Patch + and script from Andre Lucas + - Removed credits from README to CREDITS file, updated. + - Added --with-default-path to specify custom path for server + - Removed #ifdef trickery from acconfig.h into defines.h + - PAM bugfix. PermitEmptyPassword was being ignored. + - Fixed PAM config files to allow empty passwords if server does. + - Explained spurious PAM auth warning workaround in UPGRADING + - Use last few chars of tty line as ut_id + - New SuSE RPM spec file from Chris Saia + - OpenBSD CVS updates: + - [packet.h auth-rhosts.c] + check format string for packet_disconnect and packet_send_debug, too + - [channels.c] + use packet_get_maxsize for channels. consistence. + +19991226 + - Enabled utmpx support by default for Solaris + - Cleanup sshd.c PAM a little more + - Revised RPM package to include Jim Knoble's + X11 ssh-askpass program. + - Disable logging of PAM success and failures, PAM is verbose enough. + Unfortunatly there is currently no way to disable auth failure + messages. Mention this in UPGRADING file and sent message to PAM + developers + - OpenBSD CVS update: + - [ssh-keygen.1 ssh.1] + remove ref to .ssh/random_seed, mention .ssh/environment in + .Sh FILES, too + - Released 1.2.1pre21 + - Fixed implicit '.' in default path, report from Jim Knoble + + - Redhat RPM spec fixes from Jim Knoble + +19991225 + - More fixes from Andre Lucas + - Cleanup of auth-passwd.c for shadow and MD5 passwords + - Cleanup and bugfix of PAM authentication code + - Released 1.2.1pre20 + + - Merged fixes from Ben Taylor + - Fixed configure support for PAM. Reported by Naz <96na@eng.cam.ac.uk> + - Disabled logging of PAM password authentication failures when password + is empty. (e.g start of authentication loop). Reported by Naz + <96na@eng.cam.ac.uk>) + +19991223 + - Merged later HPUX patch from Andre Lucas + + - Above patch included better utmpx support from Ben Taylor + + +19991222 + - Fix undefined fd_set type in ssh.h from Povl H. Pedersen + + - Fix login.c breakage on systems which lack ut_host in struct + utmp. Reported by Willard Dawson + +19991221 + - Integration of large HPUX patch from Andre Lucas + . Integrating it had a few other + benefits: + - Ability to disable shadow passwords at configure time + - Ability to disable lastlog support at configure time + - Support for IP address in $DISPLAY + - OpenBSD CVS update: + - [sshconnect.c] + say "REMOTE HOST IDENTIFICATION HAS CHANGED" + - Fix DISABLE_SHADOW support + - Allow MD5 passwords even if shadow passwords are disabled + - Release 1.2.1pre19 + +19991218 + - Redhat init script patch from Chun-Chung Chen + + - Avoid breakage on systems without IPv6 headers + +19991216 + - Makefile changes for Solaris from Peter Kocks + + - Minor updates to docs + - Merged OpenBSD CVS changes: + - [authfd.c ssh-agent.c] + keysize warnings talk about identity files + - [packet.c] + "Connection closed by x.x.x.x": fatal() -> log() + - Correctly handle empty passwords in shadow file. Patch from: + "Chris, the Young One" + - Released 1.2.1pre18 + +19991215 + - Integrated patchs from Juergen Keil + - Avoid void* pointer arithmatic + - Use LDFLAGS correctly + - Fix SIGIO error in scp + - Simplify status line printing in scp + - Added better test for inline functions compiler support from + Darren_Hall@progressive.com + +19991214 + - OpenBSD CVS Changes + - [canohost.c] + fix get_remote_port() and friends for sshd -i; + Holger.Trapp@Informatik.TU-Chemnitz.DE + - [mpaux.c] + make code simpler. no need for memcpy. niels@ ok + - [pty.c] + namebuflen not sizeof namebuflen; bnd@ep-ag.com via djm@mindrot.org + fix proto; markus + - [ssh.1] + typo; mark.baushke@solipsa.com + - [channels.c ssh.c ssh.h sshd.c] + type conflict for 'extern Type *options' in channels.c; dot@dotat.at + - [sshconnect.c] + move checking of hostkey into own function. + - [version.h] + OpenSSH-1.2.1 + - Clean up broken includes in pty.c + - Some older systems don't have poll.h, they use sys/poll.h instead + - Doc updates + +19991211 + - Fix compilation on systems with AFS. Reported by + aloomis@glue.umd.edu + - Fix installation on Solaris. Reported by + Gordon Rowell + - Fix gccisms (__attribute__ and inline). Report by edgy@us.ibm.com, + patch from Markus Friedl + - Auto-locate xauth. Patch from David Agraz + - Compile fix from David Agraz + - Avoid compiler warning in bsd-snprintf.c + - Added pam_limits.so to default PAM config. Suggested by + Jim Knoble + +19991209 + - Import of patch from Ben Taylor : + - Improved PAM support + - "uninstall" rule for Makefile + - utmpx support + - Should fix PAM problems on Solaris + - OpenBSD CVS updates: + - [readpass.c] + avoid stdio; based on work by markus, millert, and I + - [sshd.c] + make sure the client selects a supported cipher + - [sshd.c] + fix sighup handling. accept would just restart and daemon handled + sighup only after the next connection was accepted. use poll on + listen sock now. + - [sshd.c] + make that a fatal + - Applied patch from David Rankin + to fix libwrap support on NetBSD + - Released 1.2pre17 + +19991208 + - Compile fix for Solaris with /dev/ptmx from + David Agraz + +19991207 + - sshd Redhat init script patch from Jim Knoble + fixes compatability with 4.x and 5.x + - Fixed default SSH_ASKPASS + - Fix PAM account and session being called multiple times. Problem + reported by Adrian Baugh + - Merged more OpenBSD changes: + - [atomicio.c authfd.c scp.c serverloop.c ssh.h sshconnect.c sshd.c] + move atomicio into it's own file. wrap all socket write()s which + were doing write(sock, buf, len) != len, with atomicio() calls. + - [auth-skey.c] + fd leak + - [authfile.c] + properly name fd variable + - [channels.c] + display great hatred towards strcpy + - [pty.c pty.h sshd.c] + use openpty() if it exists (it does on BSD4_4) + - [tildexpand.c] + check for ~ expansion past MAXPATHLEN + - Modified helper.c to use new atomicio function. + - Reformat Makefile a little + - Moved RC4 routines from rc4.[ch] into helper.c + - Added autoconf code to detect /dev/ptmx (Solaris) and /dev/ptc (AIX) + - Updated SuSE spec from Chris Saia + - Tweaked Redhat spec + - Clean up bad imports of a few files (forgot -kb) + - Released 1.2pre16 + +19991204 + - Small cleanup of PAM code in sshd.c + - Merged OpenBSD CVS changes: + - [auth-krb4.c auth-passwd.c auth-skey.c ssh.h] + move skey-auth from auth-passwd.c to auth-skey.c, same for krb4 + - [auth-rsa.c] + warn only about mismatch if key is _used_ + warn about keysize-mismatch with log() not error() + channels.c readconf.c readconf.h ssh.c ssh.h sshconnect.c + ports are u_short + - [hostfile.c] + indent, shorter warning + - [nchan.c] + use error() for internal errors + - [packet.c] + set loglevel for SSH_MSG_DISCONNECT to log(), not fatal() + serverloop.c + indent + - [ssh-add.1 ssh-add.c ssh.h] + document $SSH_ASKPASS, reasonable default + - [ssh.1] + CheckHostIP is not available for connects via proxy command + - [sshconnect.c] + typo + easier to read client code for passwd and skey auth + turn of checkhostip for proxy connects, since we don't know the remote ip + +19991126 + - Add definition for __P() + - Added [v]snprintf() replacement for systems that lack it + +19991125 + - More reformatting merged from OpenBSD CVS + - Merged OpenBSD CVS changes: + - [channels.c] + fix packet_integrity_check() for !have_hostname_in_open. + report from mrwizard@psu.edu via djm@ibs.com.au + - [channels.c] + set SO_REUSEADDR and SO_LINGER for forwarded ports. + chip@valinux.com via damien@ibs.com.au + - [nchan.c] + it's not an error() if shutdown_write failes in nchan. + - [readconf.c] + remove dead #ifdef-0-code + - [readconf.c servconf.c] + strcasecmp instead of tolower + - [scp.c] + progress meter overflow fix from damien@ibs.com.au + - [ssh-add.1 ssh-add.c] + SSH_ASKPASS support + - [ssh.1 ssh.c] + postpone fork_after_authentication until command execution, + request/patch from jahakala@cc.jyu.fi via damien@ibs.com.au + plus: use daemon() for backgrounding + - Added BSD compatible install program and autoconf test, thanks to + Niels Kristian Bech Jensen + - Solaris fixing, thanks to Ben Taylor + - Merged beginnings of AIX support from Tor-Ake Fransson + - Release 1.2pre15 + +19991124 + - Merged very large OpenBSD source code reformat + - OpenBSD CVS updates + - [channels.c cipher.c compat.c log-client.c scp.c serverloop.c] + [ssh.h sshd.8 sshd.c] + syslog changes: + * Unified Logmessage for all auth-types, for success and for failed + * Standard connections get only ONE line in the LOG when level==LOG: + Auth-attempts are logged only, if authentication is: + a) successfull or + b) with passwd or + c) we had more than AUTH_FAIL_LOG failues + * many log() became verbose() + * old behaviour with level=VERBOSE + - [readconf.c readconf.h ssh.1 ssh.h sshconnect.c sshd.c] + tranfer s/key challenge/response data in SSH_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE + messages. allows use of s/key in windows (ttssh, securecrt) and + ssh-1.2.27 clients without 'ssh -v', ok: niels@ + - [sshd.8] + -V, for fallback to openssh in SSH2 compatibility mode + - [sshd.c] + fix sigchld race; cjc5@po.cwru.edu + +19991123 + - Added SuSE package files from Chris Saia + - Restructured package-related files under packages/* + - Added generic PAM config + - Numerous little Solaris fixes + - Add recommendation to use GNU make to INSTALL document + +19991122 + - Make close gnome-ssh-askpass (Debian bug #50299) + - OpenBSD CVS Changes + - [ssh-keygen.c] + don't create ~/.ssh only if the user wants to store the private + key there. show fingerprint instead of public-key after + keygeneration. ok niels@ + - Added OpenBSD bsd-strlcat.c, created bsd-strlcat.h + - Added timersub() macro + - Tidy RCSIDs of bsd-*.c + - Added autoconf test and macro to deal with old PAM libraries + pam_strerror definition (one arg vs two). + - Fix EGD problems (Thanks to Ben Taylor ) + - Retry /dev/urandom reads interrupted by signal (report from + Robert Hardy ) + - Added a setenv replacement for systems which lack it + - Only display public key comment when presenting ssh-askpass dialog + - Released 1.2pre14 + + - Configure, Make and changelog corrections from Tudor Bosman + and Niels Kristian Bech Jensen + +19991121 + - OpenBSD CVS Changes: + - [channels.c] + make this compile, bad markus + - [log.c readconf.c servconf.c ssh.h] + bugfix: loglevels are per host in clientconfig, + factor out common log-level parsing code. + - [servconf.c] + remove unused index (-Wall) + - [ssh-agent.c] + only one 'extern char *__progname' + - [sshd.8] + document SIGHUP, -Q to synopsis + - [sshconnect.c serverloop.c sshd.c packet.c packet.h] + [channels.c clientloop.c] + SSH_CMSG_MAX_PACKET_SIZE, some clients use this, some need this, niels@ + [hope this time my ISP stays alive during commit] + - [OVERVIEW README] typos; green@freebsd + - [ssh-keygen.c] + replace xstrdup+strcat with strlcat+fixed buffer, fixes OF (bad me) + exit if writing the key fails (no infinit loop) + print usage() everytime we get bad options + - [ssh-keygen.c] overflow, djm@mindrot.org + - [sshd.c] fix sigchld race; cjc5@po.cwru.edu + +19991120 + - Merged more Solaris support from Marc G. Fournier + + - Wrote autoconf tests for integer bit-types + - Fixed enabling kerberos support + - Fix segfault in ssh-keygen caused by buffer overrun in filename + handling. + +19991119 + - Merged PAM buffer overrun patch from Chip Salzenberg + - Merged OpenBSD CVS changes + - [auth-rhosts.c auth-rsa.c ssh-agent.c sshconnect.c sshd.c] + more %d vs. %s in fmt-strings + - [authfd.c] + Integers should not be printed with %s + - EGD uses a socket, not a named pipe. Duh. + - Fix includes in fingerprint.c + - Fix scp progress bar bug again. + - Move ssh-askpass from ${libdir}/ssh to ${libexecdir}/ssh at request of + David Rankin + - Added autoconf option to enable Kerberos 4 support (untested) + - Added autoconf option to enable AFS support (untested) + - Added autoconf option to enable S/Key support (untested) + - Added autoconf option to enable TCP wrappers support (compiles OK) + - Renamed BSD helper function files to bsd-* + - Added tests for login and daemon and enable OpenBSD replacements for + when they are absent. + - Added non-PAM MD5 password support patch from Tudor Bosman + +19991118 + - Merged OpenBSD CVS changes + - [scp.c] foregroundproc() in scp + - [sshconnect.h] include fingerprint.h + - [sshd.c] bugfix: the log() for passwd-auth escaped during logging + changes. + - [ssh.1] Spell my name right. + - Added openssh.com info to README + +19991117 + - Merged OpenBSD CVS changes + - [ChangeLog.Ylonen] noone needs this anymore + - [authfd.c] close-on-exec for auth-socket, ok deraadt + - [hostfile.c] + in known_hosts key lookup the entry for the bits does not need + to match, all the information is contained in n and e. This + solves the problem with buggy servers announcing the wrong + modulus length. markus and me. + - [serverloop.c] + bugfix: check for space if child has terminated, from: + iedowse@maths.tcd.ie + - [ssh-add.1 ssh-add.c ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c sshconnect.c] + [fingerprint.c fingerprint.h] + rsa key fingerprints, idea from Bjoern Groenvall + - [ssh-agent.1] typo + - [ssh.1] add OpenSSH information to AUTHOR section. okay markus@ + - [sshd.c] + force logging to stderr while loading private key file + (lost while converting to new log-levels) + +19991116 + - Fix some Linux libc5 problems reported by Miles Wilson + - Merged OpenBSD CVS changes: + - [auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rsa.c authfd.c authfd.h hostfile.c mpaux.c] + [mpaux.h ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c ssh.h ssh.c sshd.c] + the keysize of rsa-parameter 'n' is passed implizit, + a few more checks and warnings about 'pretended' keysizes. + - [cipher.c cipher.h packet.c packet.h sshd.c] + remove support for cipher RC4 + - [ssh.c] + a note for legay systems about secuity issues with permanently_set_uid(), + the private hostkey and ptrace() + - [sshconnect.c] + more detailed messages about adding and checking hostkeys + +19991115 + - Merged OpenBSD CVS changes: + - [ssh-add.c] change passphrase loop logic and remove ref to + $DISPLAY, ok niels + - Changed to ssh-add.c broke askpass support. Revised it to be a little more + modular. + - Revised autoconf support for enabling/disabling askpass support. + - Merged more OpenBSD CVS changes: + [auth-krb4.c] + - disconnect if getpeername() fails + - missing xfree(*client) + [canohost.c] + - disconnect if getpeername() fails + - fix comment: we _do_ disconnect if ip-options are set + [sshd.c] + - disconnect if getpeername() fails + - move checking of remote port to central place + [auth-rhosts.c] move checking of remote port to central place + [log-server.c] avoid extra fd per sshd, from millert@ + [readconf.c] print _all_ bad config-options in ssh(1), too + [readconf.h] print _all_ bad config-options in ssh(1), too + [ssh.c] print _all_ bad config-options in ssh(1), too + [sshconnect.c] disconnect if getpeername() fails + - OpenBSD's changes to sshd.c broke the PAM stuff, re-merged it. + - Various small cleanups to bring diff (against OpenBSD) size down. + - Merged more Solaris compability from Marc G. Fournier + + - Wrote autoconf tests for __progname symbol + - RPM spec file fixes from Jim Knoble + - Released 1.2pre12 + + - Another OpenBSD CVS update: + - [ssh-keygen.1] fix .Xr + +19991114 + - Solaris compilation fixes (still imcomplete) + +19991113 + - Build patch from Niels Kristian Bech Jensen + - Don't install config files if they already exist + - Fix inclusion of additional preprocessor directives from acconfig.h + - Removed redundant inclusions of config.h + - Added 'Obsoletes' lines to RPM spec file + - Merged OpenBSD CVS changes: + - [bufaux.c] save a view malloc/memcpy/memset/free's, ok niels + - [scp.c] fix overflow reported by damien@ibs.com.au: off_t + totalsize, ok niels,aaron + - Delay fork (-f option) in ssh until after port forwarded connections + have been initialised. Patch from Jani Hakala + - Added shadow password patch from Thomas Neumann + - Added ifdefs to auth-passwd.c to exclude it when PAM is enabled + - Tidied default config file some more + - Revised Redhat initscript to fix bug: sshd (re)start would fail + if executed from inside a ssh login. + +19991112 + - Merged changes from OpenBSD CVS + - [sshd.c] session_key_int may be zero + - [auth-rh-rsa.c servconf.c servconf.h ssh.h sshd.8 sshd.c sshd_config] + IgnoreUserKnownHosts(default=no), used for RhostRSAAuth, ok + deraadt,millert + - Brought default sshd_config more in line with OpenBSD's + - Grab server in gnome-ssh-askpass (Debian bug #49872) + - Released 1.2pre10 + + - Added INSTALL documentation + - Merged yet more changes from OpenBSD CVS + - [auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rhosts.c auth-rsa.c channels.c clientloop.c] + [ssh.c ssh.h sshconnect.c sshd.c] + make all access to options via 'extern Options options' + and 'extern ServerOptions options' respectively; + options are no longer passed as arguments: + * make options handling more consistent + * remove #include "readconf.h" from ssh.h + * readconf.h is only included if necessary + - [mpaux.c] clear temp buffer + - [servconf.c] print _all_ bad options found in configfile + - Make ssh-askpass support optional through autoconf + - Fix nasty division-by-zero error in scp.c + - Released 1.2pre11 + +19991111 + - Added (untested) Entropy Gathering Daemon (EGD) support + - Fixed /dev/urandom fd leak (Debian bug #49722) + - Merged OpenBSD CVS changes: + - [auth-rh-rsa.c] user/958: check ~/.ssh/known_hosts for rhosts-rsa, too + - [ssh.1] user/958: check ~/.ssh/known_hosts for rhosts-rsa, too + - [sshd.8] user/958: check ~/.ssh/known_hosts for rhosts-rsa, too + - Fix integer overflow which was messing up scp's progress bar for large + file transfers. Fix submitted to OpenBSD developers. Report and fix + from Kees Cook + - Merged more OpenBSD CVS changes: + - [auth-krb4.c auth-passwd.c] remove x11- and krb-cleanup from fatal() + + krb-cleanup cleanup + - [clientloop.c log-client.c log-server.c ] + [readconf.c readconf.h servconf.c servconf.h ] + [ssh.1 ssh.c ssh.h sshd.8] + add LogLevel {QUIET, FATAL, ERROR, INFO, CHAT, DEBUG} to ssh/sshd, + obsoletes QuietMode and FascistLogging in sshd. + - [sshd.c] fix fatal/assert() bug reported by damien@ibs.com.au: + allow session_key_int != sizeof(session_key) + [this should fix the pre-assert-removal-core-files] + - Updated default config file to use new LogLevel option and to improve + readability + +19991110 + - Merged several minor fixes: + - ssh-agent commandline parsing + - RPM spec file now installs ssh setuid root + - Makefile creates libdir + - Merged beginnings of Solaris compability from Marc G. Fournier + + +19991109 + - Autodetection of SSL/Crypto library location via autoconf + - Fixed location of ssh-askpass to follow autoconf + - Integrated Makefile patch from Niels Kristian Bech Jensen + - Autodetection of RSAref library for US users + - Minor doc updates + - Merged OpenBSD CVS changes: + - [rsa.c] bugfix: use correct size for memset() + - [sshconnect.c] warn if announced size of modulus 'n' != real size + - Added GNOME passphrase requestor (use --with-gnome-askpass) + - RPM build now creates subpackages + - Released 1.2pre9 + +19991108 + - Removed debian/ directory. This is now being maintained separately. + - Added symlinks for slogin in RPM spec file + - Fixed permissions on manpages in RPM spec file + - Added references to required libraries in README file + - Removed config.h.in from CVS + - Removed pwdb support (better pluggable auth is provided by glibc) + - Made PAM and requisite libdl optional + - Removed lots of unnecessary checks from autoconf + - Added support and autoconf test for openpty() function (Unix98 pty support) + - Fix for scp not finding ssh if not installed as /usr/bin/ssh + - Added TODO file + - Merged parts of Debian patch From Phil Hands : + - Added ssh-askpass program + - Added ssh-askpass support to ssh-add.c + - Create symlinks for slogin on install + - Fix "distclean" target in makefile + - Added example for ssh-agent to manpage + - Added support for PAM_TEXT_INFO messages + - Disable internal /etc/nologin support if PAM enabled + - Merged latest OpenBSD CVS changes: + - [all] replace assert() with error, fatal or packet_disconnect + - [sshd.c] don't send fail-msg but disconnect if too many authentication + failures + - [sshd.c] remove unused argument. ok dugsong + - [sshd.c] typo + - [rsa.c] clear buffers used for encryption. ok: niels + - [rsa.c] replace assert() with error, fatal or packet_disconnect + - [auth-krb4.c] remove unused argument. ok dugsong + - Fixed coredump after merge of OpenBSD rsa.c patch + - Released 1.2pre8 + +19991102 + - Merged change from OpenBSD CVS + - One-line cleanup in sshd.c + +19991030 + - Integrated debian package support from Dan Brosemer + - Merged latest updates for OpenBSD CVS: + - channels.[ch] - remove broken x11 fix and document istate/ostate + - ssh-agent.c - call setsid() regardless of argv[] + - ssh.c - save a few lines when disabling rhosts-{rsa-}auth + - Documentation cleanups + - Renamed README -> README.Ylonen + - Renamed README.openssh ->README + +19991029 + - Renamed openssh* back to ssh* at request of Theo de Raadt + - Incorporated latest changes from OpenBSD's CVS + - Integrated Makefile patch from Niels Kristian Bech Jensen + - Integrated PAM env patch from Nalin Dahyabhai + - Make distclean now removed configure script + - Improved PAM logging + - Added some debug() calls for PAM + - Removed redundant subdirectories + - Integrated part of a patch from Dan Brosemer for + building on Debian. + - Fixed off-by-one error in PAM env patch + - Released 1.2pre6 + +19991028 + - Further PAM enhancements. + - Much cleaner + - Now uses account and session modules for all logins. + - Integrated patch from Dan Brosemer + - Build fixes + - Autoconf + - Change binary names to open* + - Fixed autoconf script to detect PAM on RH6.1 + - Added tests for libpwdb, and OpenBSD functions to autoconf + - Released 1.2pre4 + + - Imported latest OpenBSD CVS code + - Updated README.openssh + - Released 1.2pre5 + +19991027 + - Adapted PAM patch. + - Released 1.0pre2 + + - Excised my buggy replacements for strlcpy and mkdtemp + - Imported correct OpenBSD strlcpy and mkdtemp routines. + - Reduced arc4random_stir entropy read to 32 bytes (256 bits) + - Picked up correct version number from OpenBSD + - Added sshd.pam PAM configuration file + - Added sshd.init Redhat init script + - Added openssh.spec RPM spec file + - Released 1.2pre3 + +19991026 + - Fixed include paths of OpenSSL functions + - Use OpenSSL MD5 routines + - Imported RC4 code from nanocrypt + - Wrote replacements for OpenBSD arc4random* functions + - Wrote replacements for strlcpy and mkdtemp + - Released 1.0pre1 + +$Id$ diff --git a/openssh/INSTALL b/openssh/INSTALL new file mode 100644 index 0000000..777bdfe --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/INSTALL @@ -0,0 +1,233 @@ +1. Prerequisites +---------------- + +You will need working installations of Zlib and OpenSSL. + +Zlib: +http://www.gzip.org/zlib/ + +OpenSSL 0.9.5a or greater: +http://www.openssl.org/ + +RPMs of OpenSSL are available at http://violet.ibs.com.au/openssh/files/support. +For Red Hat Linux 6.2, they have been released as errata. RHL7 includes +these. + +OpenSSH can utilise Pluggable Authentication Modules (PAM) if your system +supports it. PAM is standard on Redhat and Debian Linux, Solaris and +HP-UX 11. + +PAM: +http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/pam/ + +If you wish to build the GNOME passphrase requester, you will need the GNOME +libraries and headers. + +GNOME: +http://www.gnome.org/ + +Alternatively, Jim Knoble has written an excellent X11 +passphrase requester. This is maintained separately at: + +http://www.ntrnet.net/~jmknoble/software/x11-ssh-askpass/index.html + +PRNGD: + +If your system lacks Kernel based random collection, the use of Lutz +Jaenicke's PRNGd is recommended. + +http://www.aet.tu-cottbus.de/personen/jaenicke/postfix_tls/prngd.html + +EGD: + +The Entropy Gathering Daemon (EGD) is supported if you have a system which +lacks /dev/random and don't want to use OpenSSH's internal entropy collection. + +http://www.lothar.com/tech/crypto/ + +GNU Make: +ftp://ftp.gnu.org/gnu/make/ + +OpenSSH has only been tested with GNU make. It may work with other +'make' programs, but you are on your own. + +PCRE (PERL-compatible Regular Expression library): +ftp://ftp.cus.cam.ac.uk/pub/software/programing/pcre/ + +Most platforms do not require this. However older Unices may not have a +posix regex library. PCRE provides a POSIX interface. + +S/Key Libraries: +http://www.sparc.spb.su/solaris/skey/ + +If you wish to use --with-skey then you will need the above library +installed. No other current S/Key library is currently known to be +supported. + +2. Building / Installation +-------------------------- + +To install OpenSSH with default options: + +./configure +make +make install + +This will install the OpenSSH binaries in /usr/local/bin, configuration files +in /usr/local/etc, the server in /usr/local/sbin, etc. To specify a different +installation prefix, use the --prefix option to configure: + +./configure --prefix=/opt +make +make install + +Will install OpenSSH in /opt/{bin,etc,lib,sbin}. You can also override +specific paths, for example: + +./configure --prefix=/opt --sysconfdir=/etc/ssh +make +make install + +This will install the binaries in /opt/{bin,lib,sbin}, but will place the +configuration files in /etc/ssh. + +If you are using PAM, you may need to manually install a PAM control +file as "/etc/pam.d/sshd" (or wherever your system prefers to keep +them). Note that the service name used to start PAM is __progname, +which is the basename of the path of your sshd (e.g., the service name +for /usr/sbin/osshd will be osshd). If you have renamed your sshd +executable, your PAM configuration may need to be modified. + +A generic PAM configuration is included as "contrib/sshd.pam.generic", +you may need to edit it before using it on your system. If you are +using a recent version of Red Hat Linux, the config file in +contrib/redhat/sshd.pam should be more useful. Failure to install a +valid PAM file may result in an inability to use password +authentication. On HP-UX 11 and Solaris, the standard /etc/pam.conf +configuration will work with sshd (sshd will match the other service +name). + +There are a few other options to the configure script: + +--with-rsh=PATH allows you to specify the path to your rsh program. +Normally ./configure will search the current $PATH for 'rsh'. You +may need to specify this option if rsh is not in your path or has a +different name. + +--with-pam enables PAM support. + +--enable-gnome-askpass will build the GNOME passphrase dialog. You +need a working installation of GNOME, including the development +headers, for this to work. + +--with-random=/some/file allows you to specify an alternate source of +random numbers (the default is /dev/urandom). Unless you are absolutely +sure of what you are doing, it is best to leave this alone. + +--with-prngd-socket=/some/file allows you to enable EGD or PRNGD +support and to specify a PRNGd socket. Use this if your Unix lacks +/dev/random and you don't want to use OpenSSH's builtin entropy +collection support. + +--with-prngd-port=portnum allows you to enable EGD or PRNGD support +and to specify a EGD localhost TCP port. Use this if your Unix lacks +/dev/random and you don't want to use OpenSSH's builtin entropy +collection support. + +--with-lastlog=FILE will specify the location of the lastlog file. +./configure searches a few locations for lastlog, but may not find +it if lastlog is installed in a different place. + +--without-lastlog will disable lastlog support entirely. + +--with-sia, --without-sia will enable or disable OSF1's Security +Integration Architecture. The default for OSF1 machines is enable. + +--with-kerberos4=PATH will enable Kerberos IV support. You will need +to have the Kerberos libraries and header files installed for this +to work. Use the optional PATH argument to specify the root of your +Kerberos installation. + +--with-afs=PATH will enable AFS support. You will need to have the +Kerberos IV and the AFS libraries and header files installed for this +to work. Use the optional PATH argument to specify the root of your +AFS installation. AFS requires Kerberos support to be enabled. + +--with-skey=PATH will enable S/Key one time password support. You will +need the S/Key libraries and header files installed for this to work. + +--with-tcp-wrappers will enable TCP Wrappers (/etc/hosts.allow|deny) +support. You will need libwrap.a and tcpd.h installed. + +--with-md5-passwords will enable the use of MD5 passwords. Enable this +if your operating system uses MD5 passwords without using PAM. + +--with-utmpx enables utmpx support. utmpx support is automatic for +some platforms. + +--without-shadow disables shadow password support. + +--with-ipaddr-display forces the use of a numeric IP address in the +$DISPLAY environment variable. Some broken systems need this. + +--with-default-path=PATH allows you to specify a default $PATH for sessions +started by sshd. This replaces the standard path entirely. + +--with-pid-dir=PATH specifies the directory in which the ssh.pid file is +created. + +--with-xauth=PATH specifies the location of the xauth binary + +--with-ipv4-default instructs OpenSSH to use IPv4 by default for new +connections. Normally OpenSSH will try attempt to lookup both IPv6 and +IPv4 addresses. On Linux/glibc-2.1.2 this causes long delays in name +resolution. If this option is specified, you can still attempt to +connect to IPv6 addresses using the command line option '-6'. + +--with-ssl-dir=DIR allows you to specify where your OpenSSL libraries +are installed. + +--with-4in6 Check for IPv4 in IPv6 mapped addresses and convert them to +real (AF_INET) IPv4 addresses. Works around some quirks on Linux. + +If you need to pass special options to the compiler or linker, you +can specify these as environment variables before running ./configure. +For example: + +CFLAGS="-O -m486" LDFLAGS="-s" LIBS="-lrubbish" LD="/usr/foo/ld" ./configure + +3. Configuration +---------------- + +The runtime configuration files are installed by in ${prefix}/etc or +whatever you specified as your --sysconfdir (/usr/local/etc by default). + +The default configuration should be instantly usable, though you should +review it to ensure that it matches your security requirements. + +To generate a host key, run "make host-key". Alternately you can do so +manually using the following commands: + + ssh-keygen -t rsa1 -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key -N "" + ssh-keygen -t rsa -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key -N "" + ssh-keygen -t dsa -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key -N "" + +Replacing /etc/ssh with the correct path to the configuration directory. +(${prefix}/etc or whatever you specified with --sysconfdir during +configuration) + +If you have configured OpenSSH with EGD support, ensure that EGD is +running and has collected some Entropy. + +For more information on configuration, please refer to the manual pages +for sshd, ssh and ssh-agent. + +4. Problems? +------------ + +If you experience problems compiling, installing or running OpenSSH. +Please refer to the "reporting bugs" section of the webpage at +http://www.openssh.com/ + + +$Id$ diff --git a/openssh/LICENCE b/openssh/LICENCE new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b229fcd --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/LICENCE @@ -0,0 +1,174 @@ +This file is part of the OpenSSH software. + +The licences which components of this software fall under are as +follows. First, we will summarize and say that all components +are under a BSD licence, or a licence more free than that. + +OpenSSH contains no GPL code. + +1) + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + + [Tatu continues] + * However, I am not implying to give any licenses to any patents or + * copyrights held by third parties, and the software includes parts that + * are not under my direct control. As far as I know, all included + * source code is used in accordance with the relevant license agreements + * and can be used freely for any purpose (the GNU license being the most + * restrictive); see below for details. + + [However, none of that term is relevant at this point in time. All of + these restrictively licenced software components which he talks about + have been removed from OpenSSH, i.e., + + - RSA is no longer included, found in the OpenSSL library + - IDEA is no longer included, its use is deprecated + - DES is now external, in the OpenSSL library + - GMP is no longer used, and instead we call BN code from OpenSSL + - Zlib is now external, in a library + - The make-ssh-known-hosts script is no longer included + - TSS has been removed + - MD5 is now external, in the OpenSSL library + - RC4 support has been replaced with ARC4 support from OpenSSL + - Blowfish is now external, in the OpenSSL library + + [The licence continues] + + Note that any information and cryptographic algorithms used in this + software are publicly available on the Internet and at any major + bookstore, scientific library, and patent office worldwide. More + information can be found e.g. at "http://www.cs.hut.fi/crypto". + + The legal status of this program is some combination of all these + permissions and restrictions. Use only at your own responsibility. + You will be responsible for any legal consequences yourself; I am not + making any claims whether possessing or using this is legal or not in + your country, and I am not taking any responsibility on your behalf. + + + NO WARRANTY + + BECAUSE THE PROGRAM IS LICENSED FREE OF CHARGE, THERE IS NO WARRANTY + FOR THE PROGRAM, TO THE EXTENT PERMITTED BY APPLICABLE LAW. EXCEPT WHEN + OTHERWISE STATED IN WRITING THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND/OR OTHER PARTIES + PROVIDE THE PROGRAM "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESSED + OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. THE ENTIRE RISK AS + TO THE QUALITY AND PERFORMANCE OF THE PROGRAM IS WITH YOU. SHOULD THE + PROGRAM PROVE DEFECTIVE, YOU ASSUME THE COST OF ALL NECESSARY SERVICING, + REPAIR OR CORRECTION. + + IN NO EVENT UNLESS REQUIRED BY APPLICABLE LAW OR AGREED TO IN WRITING + WILL ANY COPYRIGHT HOLDER, OR ANY OTHER PARTY WHO MAY MODIFY AND/OR + REDISTRIBUTE THE PROGRAM AS PERMITTED ABOVE, BE LIABLE TO YOU FOR DAMAGES, + INCLUDING ANY GENERAL, SPECIAL, INCIDENTAL OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES ARISING + OUT OF THE USE OR INABILITY TO USE THE PROGRAM (INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED + TO LOSS OF DATA OR DATA BEING RENDERED INACCURATE OR LOSSES SUSTAINED BY + YOU OR THIRD PARTIES OR A FAILURE OF THE PROGRAM TO OPERATE WITH ANY OTHER + PROGRAMS), EVEN IF SUCH HOLDER OR OTHER PARTY HAS BEEN ADVISED OF THE + POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES. + +2) + The 32-bit CRC implementation in crc32.c is due to Gary S. Brown. + Comments in the file indicate it may be used for any purpose without + restrictions: + + * COPYRIGHT (C) 1986 Gary S. Brown. You may use this program, or + * code or tables extracted from it, as desired without restriction. + +3) + The 32-bit CRC compensation attack detector in deattack.c was + contributed by CORE SDI S.A. under a BSD-style license. + + * Cryptographic attack detector for ssh - source code + * + * Copyright (c) 1998 CORE SDI S.A., Buenos Aires, Argentina. + * + * All rights reserved. Redistribution and use in source and binary + * forms, with or without modification, are permitted provided that + * this copyright notice is retained. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL CORE SDI S.A. BE + * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY OR + * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES RESULTING FROM THE USE OR MISUSE OF THIS + * SOFTWARE. + * + * Ariel Futoransky + * + +4) + ssh-keygen was contributed by David Mazieres under a BSD-style + license. + + * Copyright 1995, 1996 by David Mazieres . + * + * Modification and redistribution in source and binary forms is + * permitted provided that due credit is given to the author and the + * OpenBSD project by leaving this copyright notice intact. + +5) + The Rijndael implementation by Vincent Rijmen, Antoon Bosselaers + and Paulo Barreto is in the public domain and distributed + with the following license: + + * @version 3.0 (December 2000) + * + * Optimised ANSI C code for the Rijndael cipher (now AES) + * + * @author Vincent Rijmen + * @author Antoon Bosselaers + * @author Paulo Barreto + * + * This code is hereby placed in the public domain. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHORS ''AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS + * OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE + * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR + * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF + * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR + * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, + * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE + * OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, + * EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + +6) + Remaining components of the software are provided under a standard + 2-term BSD licence with the following names as copyright holders: + + Markus Friedl + Theo de Raadt + Niels Provos + Dug Song + Aaron Campbell + Damien Miller + Kevin Steves + + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. diff --git a/openssh/Makefile.in b/openssh/Makefile.in new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d20bfca --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/Makefile.in @@ -0,0 +1,304 @@ +# $Id$ + +prefix=@prefix@ +exec_prefix=@exec_prefix@ +bindir=@bindir@ +sbindir=@sbindir@ +libexecdir=@libexecdir@ +datadir=@datadir@ +mandir=@mandir@ +mansubdir=@mansubdir@ +sysconfdir=@sysconfdir@ +piddir=@piddir@ +srcdir=@srcdir@ +top_srcdir=@top_srcdir@ + +DESTDIR= +VPATH=@srcdir@ +SSH_PROGRAM=@bindir@/ssh +ASKPASS_PROGRAM=$(libexecdir)/ssh-askpass +SFTP_SERVER=$(libexecdir)/sftp-server + +PATHS= -DETCDIR=\"$(sysconfdir)\" \ + -D_PATH_SSH_PROGRAM=\"$(SSH_PROGRAM)\" \ + -D_PATH_SSH_ASKPASS_DEFAULT=\"$(ASKPASS_PROGRAM)\" \ + -D_PATH_SFTP_SERVER=\"$(SFTP_SERVER)\" \ + -D_PATH_SSH_PIDDIR=\"$(piddir)\" + +CC=@CC@ +LD=@LD@ +CFLAGS=@CFLAGS@ +CPPFLAGS=-I. -I$(srcdir) @CPPFLAGS@ $(PATHS) @DEFS@ +LIBS=@LIBS@ +AR=@AR@ +RANLIB=@RANLIB@ +INSTALL=@INSTALL@ +PERL=@PERL@ +ENT=@ENT@ +XAUTH_PATH=@XAUTH_PATH@ +LDFLAGS=-L. -Lopenbsd-compat/ @LDFLAGS@ +EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@ +SSH_MODE= @SSHMODE@ + +INSTALL_SSH_PRNG_CMDS=@INSTALL_SSH_PRNG_CMDS@ + +@NO_SFTP@SFTP_PROGS=sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) + +TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) $(SFTP_PROGS) + +LIBSSH_OBJS=atomicio.o authfd.o authfile.o bufaux.o buffer.o canohost.o channels.o cipher.o compat.o compress.o crc32.o deattack.o dh.o dispatch.o mac.o hostfile.o key.o kex.o kexdh.o kexgex.o log.o match.o misc.o mpaux.o nchan.o packet.o radix.o rijndael.o entropy.o readpass.o rsa.o scard.o ssh-dss.o ssh-rsa.o tildexpand.o ttymodes.o uidswap.o uuencode.o xmalloc.o + +SSHOBJS= ssh.o sshconnect.o sshconnect1.o sshconnect2.o sshtty.o readconf.o clientloop.o + +SSHDOBJS= sshd.o auth.o auth1.o auth2.o auth-chall.o auth2-chall.o auth-rhosts.o auth-options.o auth-krb4.o auth-pam.o auth2-pam.o auth-passwd.o auth-rsa.o auth-rh-rsa.o auth-sia.o sshpty.o sshlogin.o loginrec.o servconf.o serverloop.o md5crypt.o session.o groupaccess.o auth-skey.o auth-bsdauth.o + +MANPAGES = scp.1.out ssh-add.1.out ssh-agent.1.out ssh-keygen.1.out ssh-keyscan.1.out ssh.1.out sshd.8.out sftp-server.8.out sftp.1.out +MANPAGES_IN = scp.1 ssh-add.1 ssh-agent.1 ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keyscan.1 ssh.1 sshd.8 sftp-server.8 sftp.1 +MANTYPE = @MANTYPE@ + +CONFIGFILES=sshd_config.out ssh_config.out moduli.out +CONFIGFILES_IN=sshd_config ssh_config moduli + +PATHSUBS = \ + -D/etc/ssh_config=$(sysconfdir)/ssh_config \ + -D/etc/ssh_known_hosts=$(sysconfdir)/ssh_known_hosts \ + -D/etc/sshd_config=$(sysconfdir)/sshd_config \ + -D/usr/libexec=$(libexecdir) \ + -D/etc/shosts.equiv=$(sysconfdir)/shosts.equiv \ + -D/etc/ssh_host_key=$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_key \ + -D/etc/ssh_host_dsa_key=$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_dsa_key \ + -D/etc/ssh_host_rsa_key=$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_rsa_key \ + -D/var/run/sshd.pid=$(piddir)/sshd.pid \ + -D/etc/moduli=$(sysconfdir)/moduli \ + -D/etc/sshrc=$(sysconfdir)/sshrc \ + -D/usr/X11R6/bin/xauth=$(XAUTH_PATH) \ + -D/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin=@user_path@ + +FIXPATHSCMD = $(PERL) $(srcdir)/fixpaths $(PATHSUBS) + +all: $(CONFIGFILES) $(MANPAGES) $(TARGETS) + +$(LIBSSH_OBJS): config.h +$(SSHOBJS): config.h +$(SSHDOBJS): config.h + +.c.o: + $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -c $< + +LIBCOMPAT=openbsd-compat/libopenbsd-compat.a +$(LIBCOMPAT): always + (cd openbsd-compat && $(MAKE)) +always: + +libssh.a: $(LIBSSH_OBJS) + $(AR) rv $@ $(LIBSSH_OBJS) + $(RANLIB) $@ + +ssh$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SSHOBJS) + $(LD) -o $@ $(SSHOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) + +sshd$(EXEEXT): libssh.a $(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHDOBJS) + $(LD) -o $@ $(SSHDOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) + +scp$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a scp.o + $(LD) -o $@ scp.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) + +ssh-add$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-add.o + $(LD) -o $@ ssh-add.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) + +ssh-agent$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-agent.o + $(LD) -o $@ ssh-agent.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) + +ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keygen.o + $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keygen.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) + +ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keyscan.o + $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keyscan.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS) + +sftp-server$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a sftp.o sftp-common.o sftp-server.o + $(LD) -o $@ sftp-server.o sftp-common.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) + +sftp$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a sftp.o sftp-client.o sftp-int.o sftp-common.o sftp-glob.o + $(LD) -o $@ sftp.o sftp-client.o sftp-common.o sftp-int.o sftp-glob.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) + +# test driver for the loginrec code - not built by default +logintest: logintest.o $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a loginrec.o + $(LD) -o $@ logintest.o $(LDFLAGS) loginrec.o -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS) + +$(MANPAGES): $(MANPAGES_IN) + if test "$(MANTYPE)" = "cat"; then \ + manpage=$(srcdir)/`echo $@ | sed 's/\.[1-9]\.out$$/\.0/'`; \ + else \ + manpage=$(srcdir)/`echo $@ | sed 's/\.out$$//'`; \ + fi; \ + if test "$(MANTYPE)" = "man"; then \ + $(FIXPATHSCMD) $${manpage} | $(PERL) $(srcdir)/mdoc2man.pl > $@; \ + else \ + $(FIXPATHSCMD) $${manpage} > $@; \ + fi + +$(CONFIGFILES): $(CONFIGFILES_IN) + conffile=`echo $@ | sed 's/.out$$//'`; \ + $(FIXPATHSCMD) $(srcdir)/$${conffile} > $@ + +clean: + rm -f *.o *.a $(TARGETS) logintest config.cache config.log + rm -f *.out core + (cd openbsd-compat && $(MAKE) clean) + +distclean: + rm -f *.o *.a $(TARGETS) logintest config.cache config.log + rm -f *.out core + rm -f Makefile config.h config.status ssh_prng_cmds *~ + rm -rf autom4te.cache + (cd openbsd-compat && $(MAKE) distclean) + (cd scard && $(MAKE) distclean) + +veryclean: + rm -f configure config.h.in *.0 + rm -f *.o *.a $(TARGETS) logintest config.cache config.log + rm -f *.out core + rm -f Makefile config.h config.status ssh_prng_cmds *~ + (cd openbsd-compat && $(MAKE) distclean) + (cd scard && $(MAKE) distclean) + +mrproper: distclean + +catman-do: + @for f in $(MANPAGES_IN) ; do \ + base=`echo $$f | sed 's/\..*$$//'` ; \ + echo "$$f -> $$base.0" ; \ + nroff -mandoc $$f | cat -v | sed -e 's/.\^H//g' \ + >$$base.0 ; \ + done + +distprep: catman-do + autoreconf + (cd scard && $(MAKE) -f Makefile.in distprep) + +install: $(CONFIGFILES) $(MANPAGES) $(TARGETS) install-files host-key +install-nokeys: $(CONFIGFILES) $(MANPAGES) $(TARGETS) install-files + +scard-install: + (cd scard && $(MAKE) DESTDIR=$(DESTDIR) install) + +install-files: scard-install + $(srcdir)/mkinstalldirs $(DESTDIR)$(bindir) + $(srcdir)/mkinstalldirs $(DESTDIR)$(sbindir) + $(srcdir)/mkinstalldirs $(DESTDIR)$(mandir) + $(srcdir)/mkinstalldirs $(DESTDIR)$(datadir) + $(srcdir)/mkinstalldirs $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1 + $(srcdir)/mkinstalldirs $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8 + $(srcdir)/mkinstalldirs $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir) + $(INSTALL) -m $(SSH_MODE) -s ssh $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh + $(INSTALL) -m 0755 -s scp $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/scp + $(INSTALL) -m 0755 -s ssh-add $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-add + $(INSTALL) -m 0755 -s ssh-agent $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-agent + $(INSTALL) -m 0755 -s ssh-keygen $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-keygen + $(INSTALL) -m 0755 -s ssh-keyscan $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-keyscan + $(INSTALL) -m 0755 -s sshd $(DESTDIR)$(sbindir)/sshd + @NO_SFTP@$(INSTALL) -m 0755 -s sftp $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp + @NO_SFTP@$(INSTALL) -m 0755 -s sftp-server $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER) + $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh.1 + $(INSTALL) -m 644 scp.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/scp.1 + $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-add.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-add.1 + $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-agent.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-agent.1 + $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-keygen.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-keygen.1 + $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-keyscan.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-keyscan.1 + $(INSTALL) -m 644 sshd.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/sshd.8 + @NO_SFTP@$(INSTALL) -m 644 sftp.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/sftp.1 + @NO_SFTP@$(INSTALL) -m 644 sftp-server.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/sftp-server.8 + -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/slogin + ln -s ssh$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/slogin + -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/slogin.1 + ln -s ssh.1 $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/slogin.1 + #@FILEPRIV@ -f dev,filesys,driver $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/slogin + if [ ! -d $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir) ]; then \ + $(srcdir)/mkinstalldirs $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir); \ + fi + if [ ! -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_config ]; then \ + $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh_config.out $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_config; \ + else \ + echo "$(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_config already exists, install will not overwrite"; \ + fi + if [ ! -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/sshd_config ]; then \ + $(INSTALL) -m 644 sshd_config.out $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/sshd_config; \ + else \ + echo "$(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/sshd_config already exists, install will not overwrite"; \ + fi + if [ -f ssh_prng_cmds -a ! -z "$(INSTALL_SSH_PRNG_CMDS)" ]; then \ + $(PERL) $(srcdir)/fixprogs ssh_prng_cmds $(ENT); \ + if [ ! -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_prng_cmds ] ; then \ + $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh_prng_cmds.out $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_prng_cmds; \ + else \ + echo "$(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_prng_cmds already exists, install will not overwrite"; \ + fi ; \ + fi + if [ ! -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/moduli ]; then \ + if [ -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/primes ]; then \ + echo "moving $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/primes to $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/moduli"; \ + mv "$(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/primes" "$(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/moduli"; \ + else \ + $(INSTALL) -m 644 moduli.out $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/moduli; \ + fi ; \ + else \ + echo "$(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/moduli already exists, install will not overwrite"; \ + fi + +host-key: ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) + if [ -z "$(DESTDIR)" ] ; then \ + if [ -f "$(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_key" ] ; then \ + echo "$(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_key already exists, skipping." ; \ + else \ + ./ssh-keygen -t rsa1 -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_key -N "" ; \ + fi ; \ + if [ -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_dsa_key ] ; then \ + echo "$(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_dsa_key already exists, skipping." ; \ + else \ + ./ssh-keygen -t dsa -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_dsa_key -N "" ; \ + fi ; \ + if [ -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_rsa_key ] ; then \ + echo "$(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_rsa_key already exists, skipping." ; \ + else \ + ./ssh-keygen -t rsa -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_rsa_key -N "" ; \ + fi ; \ + fi ; + +host-key-force: ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) + ./ssh-keygen -t rsa1 -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_key -N "" + ./ssh-keygen -t dsa -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_dsa_key -N "" + ./ssh-keygen -t rsa -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_rsa_key -N "" + +uninstallall: uninstall + -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_config + -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/sshd_config + -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_prng_cmds + -rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir) + -rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(bindir) + -rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(sbindir) + -rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1 + -rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8 + -rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(mandir) + -rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir) + +uninstall: + -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/slogin + -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh$(EXEEXT) + -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/scp$(EXEEXT) + -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-add$(EXEEXT) + -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) + -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) + -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT) + -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp$(EXEEXT) + -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(sbindir)/sshd$(EXEEXT) + -rm -r $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)$(EXEEXT) + -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh.1 + -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/scp.1 + -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-add.1 + -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-agent.1 + -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-keygen.1 + -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/sftp.1 + -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-keyscan.1 + -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/sshd.8 + -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/sftp-server.8 + -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/slogin.1 diff --git a/openssh/OVERVIEW b/openssh/OVERVIEW new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ff03eca --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/OVERVIEW @@ -0,0 +1,170 @@ +[Note: This file has not been updated for OpenSSH versions after +OpenSSH-1.2 and should be considered OBSOLETE. It has been left in +the distribution because some of its information may still be useful +to developers.] + +This document is intended for those who wish to read the ssh source +code. This tries to give an overview of the structure of the code. + +Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen +Updated 17 Nov 1995. +Updated 19 Oct 1999 for OpenSSH-1.2 +Updated 20 May 2001 note obsolete for > OpenSSH-1.2 + +The software consists of ssh (client), sshd (server), scp, sdist, and +the auxiliary programs ssh-keygen, ssh-agent, ssh-add, and +make-ssh-known-hosts. The main program for each of these is in a .c +file with the same name. + +There are some subsystems/abstractions that are used by a number of +these programs. + + Buffer manipulation routines + + - These provide an arbitrary size buffer, where data can be appended. + Data can be consumed from either end. The code is used heavily + throughout ssh. The basic buffer manipulation functions are in + buffer.c (header buffer.h), and additional code to manipulate specific + data types is in bufaux.c. + + Compression Library + + - Ssh uses the GNU GZIP compression library (ZLIB). + + Encryption/Decryption + + - Ssh contains several encryption algorithms. These are all + accessed through the cipher.h interface. The interface code is + in cipher.c, and the implementations are in libc. + + Multiple Precision Integer Library + + - Uses the SSLeay BIGNUM sublibrary. + - Some auxiliary functions for mp-int manipulation are in mpaux.c. + + Random Numbers + + - Uses arc4random() and such. + + RSA key generation, encryption, decryption + + - Ssh uses the RSA routines in libssl. + + RSA key files + + - RSA keys are stored in files with a special format. The code to + read/write these files is in authfile.c. The files are normally + encrypted with a passphrase. The functions to read passphrases + are in readpass.c (the same code is used to read passwords). + + Binary packet protocol + + - The ssh binary packet protocol is implemented in packet.c. The + code in packet.c does not concern itself with packet types or their + execution; it contains code to build packets, to receive them and + extract data from them, and the code to compress and/or encrypt + packets. CRC code comes from crc32.c. + + - The code in packet.c calls the buffer manipulation routines + (buffer.c, bufaux.c), compression routines (compress.c, zlib), + and the encryption routines. + + X11, TCP/IP, and Agent forwarding + + - Code for various types of channel forwarding is in channels.c. + The file defines a generic framework for arbitrary communication + channels inside the secure channel, and uses this framework to + implement X11 forwarding, TCP/IP forwarding, and authentication + agent forwarding. + The new, Protocol 1.5, channel close implementation is in nchan.c + + Authentication agent + + - Code to communicate with the authentication agent is in authfd.c. + + Authentication methods + + - Code for various authentication methods resides in auth-*.c + (auth-passwd.c, auth-rh-rsa.c, auth-rhosts.c, auth-rsa.c). This + code is linked into the server. The routines also manipulate + known hosts files using code in hostfile.c. Code in canohost.c + is used to retrieve the canonical host name of the remote host. + Code in match.c is used to match host names. + + - In the client end, authentication code is in sshconnect.c. It + reads Passwords/passphrases using code in readpass.c. It reads + RSA key files with authfile.c. It communicates the + authentication agent using authfd.c. + + The ssh client + + - The client main program is in ssh.c. It first parses arguments + and reads configuration (readconf.c), then calls ssh_connect (in + sshconnect.c) to open a connection to the server (possibly via a + proxy), and performs authentication (ssh_login in sshconnect.c). + It then makes any pty, forwarding, etc. requests. It may call + code in ttymodes.c to encode current tty modes. Finally it + calls client_loop in clientloop.c. This does the real work for + the session. + + - The client is suid root. It tries to temporarily give up this + rights while reading the configuration data. The root + privileges are only used to make the connection (from a + privileged socket). Any extra privileges are dropped before + calling ssh_login. + + Pseudo-tty manipulation and tty modes + + - Code to allocate and use a pseudo tty is in pty.c. Code to + encode and set terminal modes is in ttymodes.c. + + Logging in (updating utmp, lastlog, etc.) + + - The code to do things that are done when a user logs in are in + login.c. This includes things such as updating the utmp, wtmp, + and lastlog files. Some of the code is in sshd.c. + + Writing to the system log and terminal + + - The programs use the functions fatal(), log(), debug(), error() + in many places to write messages to system log or user's + terminal. The implementation that logs to system log is in + log-server.c; it is used in the server program. The other + programs use an implementation that sends output to stderr; it + is in log-client.c. The definitions are in ssh.h. + + The sshd server (daemon) + + - The sshd daemon starts by processing arguments and reading the + configuration file (servconf.c). It then reads the host key, + starts listening for connections, and generates the server key. + The server key will be regenerated every hour by an alarm. + + - When the server receives a connection, it forks, disables the + regeneration alarm, and starts communicating with the client. + They first perform identification string exchange, then + negotiate encryption, then perform authentication, preparatory + operations, and finally the server enters the normal session + mode by calling server_loop in serverloop.c. This does the real + work, calling functions in other modules. + + - The code for the server is in sshd.c. It contains a lot of + stuff, including: + - server main program + - waiting for connections + - processing new connection + - authentication + - preparatory operations + - building up the execution environment for the user program + - starting the user program. + + Auxiliary files + + - There are several other files in the distribution that contain + various auxiliary routines: + ssh.h the main header file for ssh (various definitions) + getput.h byte-order independent storage of integers + includes.h includes most system headers. Lots of #ifdefs. + tildexpand.c expand tilde in file names + uidswap.c uid-swapping + xmalloc.c "safe" malloc routines diff --git a/openssh/README b/openssh/README new file mode 100644 index 0000000..979d1d5 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/README @@ -0,0 +1,66 @@ +- A Japanese translation of this document and of the OpenSSH FAQ is +- available at http://www.unixuser.org/~haruyama/security/openssh/index.html +- Thanks to HARUYAMA Seigo + +This is the port of OpenBSD's excellent OpenSSH[0] to Linux and other +Unices. + +OpenSSH is based on the last free version of Tatu Ylonen's sample +implementation with all patent-encumbered algorithms removed (to +external libraries), all known security bugs fixed, new features +reintroduced and many other clean-ups. OpenSSH has been created by +Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt, +and Dug Song. It has a homepage at http://www.openssh.com/ + +This port consists of the re-introduction of autoconf support, PAM +support (for Linux and Solaris), EGD[1]/PRNGD[2] support and replacements +for OpenBSD library functions that are (regrettably) absent from other +unices. This port has been best tested on Linux, Solaris, HP-UX, NetBSD +and Irix. Support for AIX, SCO, NeXT and other Unices is underway. +This version actively tracks changes in the OpenBSD CVS repository. + +The PAM support is now more functional than the popular packages of +commercial ssh-1.2.x. It checks "account" and "session" modules for +all logins, not just when using password authentication. + +OpenSSH depends on Zlib[3], OpenSSL[4] and optionally PAM[5]. + +There is now several mailing lists for this port of OpenSSH. Please +refer to http://www.openssh.com/list.html for details on how to join. + +Please send bug reports and patches to the mailing list +openssh-unix-dev@mindrot.org. The list is open to posting by +unsubscribed users. + +If you are a citizen of an USA-embargoed country to which export of +cryptographic products is restricted, then please refrain from sending +crypto-related code or patches to the list. We cannot accept them. +Other code contribution are accepted, but please follow the OpenBSD +style guidelines[6]. + +Please refer to the INSTALL document for information on how to install +OpenSSH on your system. There are a number of differences between this +port of OpenSSH and F-Secure SSH 1.x, please refer to the OpenSSH FAQ[7] +for details and general tips. + +Damien Miller + +Miscellania - + +This version of OpenSSH is based upon code retrieved from the OpenBSD +CVS repository which in turn was based on the last free sample +implementation released by Tatu Ylonen. + +References - + +[0] http://www.openssh.com/faq.html +[1] http://www.lothar.com/tech/crypto/ +[2] http://www.aet.tu-cottbus.de/personen/jaenicke/postfix_tls/prngd.html +[3] http://www.gzip.org/zlib/ +[4] http://www.openssl.org/ +[5] http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/pam/ (PAM is standard on Solaris + and HP-UX 11) +[6] http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/man.cgi?query=style&sektion=9 +[7] http://www.openssh.com/faq.html + +$Id$ diff --git a/openssh/README.smartcard b/openssh/README.smartcard new file mode 100644 index 0000000..69dca15 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/README.smartcard @@ -0,0 +1,72 @@ +How to use smartcards with OpenSSH? + +OpenSSH contains experimental support for authentication using +Cyberflex smartcards and TODOS card readers. + +WARNING: Smartcard support is still in development. Keyfile formats, etc +are still subject to change. + +To enable this you need to: + +(1) install sectok + + Sources are instructions are available from + http://www.citi.umich.edu/projects/smartcard/sectok.html + +(2) enable SMARTCARD support in OpenSSH: + + $ ./configure --with-smartcard [options] + + You can also specify a path to libsectok: + + $ ./configure --with-smartcard=/path/to/libsectok [options] + +(3) load the Java Cardlet to the Cyberflex card: + + $ sectok + sectok> login -d + sectok> jload /usr/libdata/ssh/Ssh.bin + sectok> quit + +(4) load a RSA key to the card: + + please don't use your production RSA keys, since + with the current version of sectok/ssh-keygen + the private key file is still readable + + $ ssh-keygen -f /path/to/rsakey -U 1 + (where 1 is the reader number, you can also try 0) + + In spite of the name, this does not generate a key. + It just loads an already existing key on to the card. + +(5) optional: + + Change the card password so that only you can + read the private key: + + $ sectok + sectok> login -d + sectok> setpass + sectok> quit + + This prevents reading the key but not use of the + key by the card applet. + + Do not forget the passphrase. There is no way to + recover if you do. + + IMPORTANT WARNING: If you attempt to login with the + wrong passphrase three times in a row, you will + destroy your card. + +(6) tell the ssh client to use the card reader: + + $ ssh -I 1 otherhost + +(7) or tell the agent (don't forget to restart) to use the smartcard: + + $ ssh-add -s 1 + +-markus, +Tue Jul 17 23:54:51 CEST 2001 diff --git a/openssh/RFC.nroff b/openssh/RFC.nroff new file mode 100644 index 0000000..bf7146a --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/RFC.nroff @@ -0,0 +1,1780 @@ +.\" -*- nroff -*- +.\" +.\" $OpenBSD: RFC.nroff,v 1.2 2000/10/16 09:38:44 djm Exp $ +.\" +.pl 10.0i +.po 0 +.ll 7.2i +.lt 7.2i +.nr LL 7.2i +.nr LT 7.2i +.ds LF Ylonen +.ds RF FORMFEED[Page %] +.ds CF +.ds LH Internet-Draft +.ds RH 15 November 1995 +.ds CH SSH (Secure Shell) Remote Login Protocol +.na +.hy 0 +.in 0 +Network Working Group T. Ylonen +Internet-Draft Helsinki University of Technology +draft-ylonen-ssh-protocol-00.txt 15 November 1995 +Expires: 15 May 1996 + +.in 3 + +.ce +The SSH (Secure Shell) Remote Login Protocol + +.ti 0 +Status of This Memo + +This document is an Internet-Draft. Internet-Drafts are working +documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, +and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute +working documents as Internet-Drafts. + +Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six +months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other docu- +ments at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as +reference material or to cite them other than as ``work in pro- +gress.'' + +To learn the current status of any Internet-Draft, please check the +``1id-abstracts.txt'' listing contained in the Internet- Drafts Shadow +Directories on ftp.is.co.za (Africa), nic.nordu.net (Europe), +munnari.oz.au (Pacific Rim), ds.internic.net (US East Coast), or +ftp.isi.edu (US West Coast). + +The distribution of this memo is unlimited. + +.ti 0 +Introduction + +SSH (Secure Shell) is a program to log into another computer over a +network, to execute commands in a remote machine, and to move files +from one machine to another. It provides strong authentication and +secure communications over insecure networks. Its features include +the following: +.IP o +Closes several security holes (e.g., IP, routing, and DNS spoofing). +New authentication methods: .rhosts together with RSA [RSA] based host +authentication, and pure RSA authentication. +.IP o +All communications are automatically and transparently encrypted. +Encryption is also used to protect integrity. +.IP o +X11 connection forwarding provides secure X11 sessions. +.IP o +Arbitrary TCP/IP ports can be redirected over the encrypted channel +in both directions. +.IP o +Client RSA-authenticates the server machine in the beginning of every +connection to prevent trojan horses (by routing or DNS spoofing) and +man-in-the-middle attacks, and the server RSA-authenticates the client +machine before accepting .rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication +(to prevent DNS, routing, or IP spoofing). +.IP o +An authentication agent, running in the user's local workstation or +laptop, can be used to hold the user's RSA authentication keys. +.RT + +The goal has been to make the software as easy to use as possible for +ordinary users. The protocol has been designed to be as secure as +possible while making it possible to create implementations that +are easy to use and install. The sample implementation has a number +of convenient features that are not described in this document as they +are not relevant for the protocol. + + +.ti 0 +Overview of the Protocol + +The software consists of a server program running on a server machine, +and a client program running on a client machine (plus a few auxiliary +programs). The machines are connected by an insecure IP [RFC0791] +network (that can be monitored, tampered with, and spoofed by hostile +parties). + +A connection is always initiated by the client side. The server +listens on a specific port waiting for connections. Many clients may +connect to the same server machine. + +The client and the server are connected via a TCP/IP [RFC0793] socket +that is used for bidirectional communication. Other types of +transport can be used but are currently not defined. + +When the client connects the server, the server accepts the connection +and responds by sending back its version identification string. The +client parses the server's identification, and sends its own +identification. The purpose of the identification strings is to +validate that the connection was to the correct port, declare the +protocol version number used, and to declare the software version used +on each side (for debugging purposes). The identification strings are +human-readable. If either side fails to understand or support the +other side's version, it closes the connection. + +After the protocol identification phase, both sides switch to a packet +based binary protocol. The server starts by sending its host key +(every host has an RSA key used to authenticate the host), server key +(an RSA key regenerated every hour), and other information to the +client. The client then generates a 256 bit session key, encrypts it +using both RSA keys (see below for details), and sends the encrypted +session key and selected cipher type to the server. Both sides then +turn on encryption using the selected algorithm and key. The server +sends an encrypted confirmation message to the client. + +The client then authenticates itself using any of a number of +authentication methods. The currently supported authentication +methods are .rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication (disabled by +default), the same with RSA-based host authentication, RSA +authentication, and password authentication. + +After successful authentication, the client makes a number of requests +to prepare for the session. Typical requests include allocating a +pseudo tty, starting X11 [X11] or TCP/IP port forwarding, starting +authentication agent forwarding, and executing the shell or a command. + +When a shell or command is executed, the connection enters interactive +session mode. In this mode, data is passed in both directions, +new forwarded connections may be opened, etc. The interactive session +normally terminates when the server sends the exit status of the +program to the client. + + +The protocol makes several reservations for future extensibility. +First of all, the initial protocol identification messages include the +protocol version number. Second, the first packet by both sides +includes a protocol flags field, which can be used to agree on +extensions in a compatible manner. Third, the authentication and +session preparation phases work so that the client sends requests to +the server, and the server responds with success or failure. If the +client sends a request that the server does not support, the server +simply returns failure for it. This permits compatible addition of +new authentication methods and preparation operations. The +interactive session phase, on the other hand, works asynchronously and +does not permit the use of any extensions (because there is no easy +and reliable way to signal rejection to the other side and problems +would be hard to debug). Any compatible extensions to this phase must +be agreed upon during any of the earlier phases. + +.ti 0 +The Binary Packet Protocol + +After the protocol identification strings, both sides only send +specially formatted packets. The packet layout is as follows: +.IP o +Packet length: 32 bit unsigned integer, coded as four 8-bit bytes, msb +first. Gives the length of the packet, not including the length field +and padding. The maximum length of a packet (not including the length +field and padding) is 262144 bytes. +.IP o +Padding: 1-8 bytes of random data (or zeroes if not encrypting). The +amount of padding is (8 - (length % 8)) bytes (where % stands for the +modulo operator). The rationale for always having some random padding +at the beginning of each packet is to make known plaintext attacks +more difficult. +.IP o +Packet type: 8-bit unsigned byte. The value 255 is reserved for +future extension. +.IP o +Data: binary data bytes, depending on the packet type. The number of +data bytes is the "length" field minus 5. +.IP o +Check bytes: 32-bit crc, four 8-bit bytes, msb first. The crc is the +Cyclic Redundancy Check, with the polynomial 0xedb88320, of the +Padding, Packet type, and Data fields. The crc is computed before +any encryption. +.RT + +The packet, except for the length field, may be encrypted using any of +a number of algorithms. The length of the encrypted part (Padding + +Type + Data + Check) is always a multiple of 8 bytes. Typically the +cipher is used in a chained mode, with all packets chained together as +if it was a single data stream (the length field is never included in +the encryption process). Details of encryption are described below. + +When the session starts, encryption is turned off. Encryption is +enabled after the client has sent the session key. The encryption +algorithm to use is selected by the client. + + +.ti 0 +Packet Compression + +If compression is supported (it is an optional feature, see +SSH_CMSG_REQUEST_COMPRESSION below), the packet type and data fields +of the packet are compressed using the gzip deflate algorithm [GZIP]. +If compression is in effect, the packet length field indicates the +length of the compressed data, plus 4 for the crc. The amount of +padding is computed from the compressed data, so that the amount of +data to be encrypted becomes a multiple of 8 bytes. + +When compressing, the packets (type + data portions) in each direction +are compressed as if they formed a continuous data stream, with only the +current compression block flushed between packets. This corresponds +to the GNU ZLIB library Z_PARTIAL_FLUSH option. The compression +dictionary is not flushed between packets. The two directions are +compressed independently of each other. + + +.ti 0 +Packet Encryption + +The protocol supports several encryption methods. During session +initialization, the server sends a bitmask of all encryption methods +that it supports, and the client selects one of these methods. The +client also generates a 256-bit random session key (32 8-bit bytes) and +sends it to the server. + +The encryption methods supported by the current implementation, and +their codes are: +.TS +center; +l r l. +SSH_CIPHER_NONE 0 No encryption +SSH_CIPHER_IDEA 1 IDEA in CFB mode +SSH_CIPHER_DES 2 DES in CBC mode +SSH_CIPHER_3DES 3 Triple-DES in CBC mode +SSH_CIPHER_TSS 4 An experimental stream cipher +SSH_CIPHER_RC4 5 RC4 +.TE + +All implementations are required to support SSH_CIPHER_DES and +SSH_CIPHER_3DES. Supporting SSH_CIPHER_IDEA, SSH_CIPHER_RC4, and +SSH_CIPHER_NONE is recommended. Support for SSH_CIPHER_TSS is +optional (and it is not described in this document). Other ciphers +may be added at a later time; support for them is optional. + +For encryption, the encrypted portion of the packet is considered a +linear byte stream. The length of the stream is always a multiple of +8. The encrypted portions of consecutive packets (in the same +direction) are encrypted as if they were a continuous buffer (that is, +any initialization vectors are passed from the previous packet to the +next packet). Data in each direction is encrypted independently. +.IP SSH_CIPHER_DES +The key is taken from the first 8 bytes of the session key. The least +significant bit of each byte is ignored. This results in 56 bits of +key data. DES [DES] is used in CBC mode. The iv (initialization vector) is +initialized to all zeroes. +.IP SSH_CIPHER_3DES +The variant of triple-DES used here works as follows: there are three +independent DES-CBC ciphers, with independent initialization vectors. +The data (the whole encrypted data stream) is first encrypted with the +first cipher, then decrypted with the second cipher, and finally +encrypted with the third cipher. All these operations are performed +in CBC mode. + +The key for the first cipher is taken from the first 8 bytes of the +session key; the key for the next cipher from the next 8 bytes, and +the key for the third cipher from the following 8 bytes. All three +initialization vectors are initialized to zero. + +(Note: the variant of 3DES used here differs from some other +descriptions.) +.IP SSH_CIPHER_IDEA +The key is taken from the first 16 bytes of the session key. IDEA +[IDEA] is used in CFB mode. The initialization vector is initialized +to all zeroes. +.IP SSH_CIPHER_TSS +All 32 bytes of the session key are used as the key. + +There is no reference available for the TSS algorithm; it is currently +only documented in the sample implementation source code. The +security of this cipher is unknown (but it is quite fast). The cipher +is basically a stream cipher that uses MD5 as a random number +generator and takes feedback from the data. +.IP SSH_CIPHER_RC4 +The first 16 bytes of the session key are used as the key for the +server to client direction. The remaining 16 bytes are used as the +key for the client to server direction. This gives independent +128-bit keys for each direction. + +This algorithm is the alleged RC4 cipher posted to the Usenet in 1995. +It is widely believed to be equivalent with the original RSADSI RC4 +cipher. This is a very fast algorithm. +.RT + + +.ti 0 +Data Type Encodings + +The Data field of each packet contains data encoded as described in +this section. There may be several data items; each item is coded as +described here, and their representations are concatenated together +(without any alignment or padding). + +Each data type is stored as follows: +.IP "8-bit byte" +The byte is stored directly as a single byte. +.IP "32-bit unsigned integer" +Stored in 4 bytes, msb first. +.IP "Arbitrary length binary string" +First 4 bytes are the length of the string, msb first (not including +the length itself). The following "length" bytes are the string +value. There are no terminating null characters. +.IP "Multiple-precision integer" +First 2 bytes are the number of bits in the integer, msb first (for +example, the value 0x00012345 would have 17 bits). The value zero has +zero bits. It is permissible that the number of bits be larger than the +real number of bits. + +The number of bits is followed by (bits + 7) / 8 bytes of binary data, +msb first, giving the value of the integer. +.RT + + +.ti 0 +TCP/IP Port Number and Other Options + +The server listens for connections on TCP/IP port 22. + +The client may connect the server from any port. However, if the +client wishes to use any form of .rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv +authentication, it must connect from a privileged port (less than +1024). + +For the IP Type of Service field [RFC0791], it is recommended that +interactive sessions (those having a user terminal or forwarding X11 +connections) use the IPTOS_LOWDELAY, and non-interactive connections +use IPTOS_THROUGHPUT. + +It is recommended that keepalives are used, because otherwise programs +on the server may never notice if the other end of the connection is +rebooted. + + +.ti 0 +Protocol Version Identification + +After the socket is opened, the server sends an identification string, +which is of the form +"SSH-.-\\n", where + and are integers and specify the +protocol version number (not software distribution version). + is server side software version string (max 40 characters); +it is not interpreted by the remote side but may be useful for +debugging. + +The client parses the server's string, and sends a corresponding +string with its own information in response. If the server has lower +version number, and the client contains special code to emulate it, +the client responds with the lower number; otherwise it responds with +its own number. The server then compares the version number the +client sent with its own, and determines whether they can work +together. The server either disconnects, or sends the first packet +using the binary packet protocol and both sides start working +according to the lower of the protocol versions. + +By convention, changes which keep the protocol compatible with +previous versions keep the same major protocol version; changes that +are not compatible increment the major version (which will hopefully +never happen). The version described in this document is 1.3. + +The client will + +.ti 0 +Key Exchange and Server Host Authentication + +The first message sent by the server using the packet protocol is +SSH_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY. It declares the server's host key, server public +key, supported ciphers, supported authentication methods, and flags +for protocol extensions. It also contains a 64-bit random number +(cookie) that must be returned in the client's reply (to make IP +spoofing more difficult). No encryption is used for this message. + +Both sides compute a session id as follows. The modulus of the server +key is interpreted as a byte string (without explicit length field, +with minimum length able to hold the whole value), most significant +byte first. This string is concatenated with the server host key +interpreted the same way. Additionally, the cookie is concatenated +with this. Both sides compute MD5 of the resulting string. The +resulting 16 bytes (128 bits) are stored by both parties and are +called the session id. + +The client responds with a SSH_CMSG_SESSION_KEY message, which +contains the selected cipher type, a copy of the 64-bit cookie sent by +the server, client's protocol flags, and a session key encrypted +with both the server's host key and server key. No encryption is used +for this message. + +The session key is 32 8-bit bytes (a total of 256 random bits +generated by the client). The client first xors the 16 bytes of the +session id with the first 16 bytes of the session key. The resulting +string is then encrypted using the smaller key (one with smaller +modulus), and the result is then encrypted using the other key. The +number of bits in the public modulus of the two keys must differ by at +least 128 bits. + +At each encryption step, a multiple-precision integer is constructed +from the data to be encrypted as follows (the integer is here +interpreted as a sequence of bytes, msb first; the number of bytes is +the number of bytes needed to represent the modulus). + +The most significant byte (which is only partial as the value must be +less than the public modulus, which is never a power of two) is zero. + +The next byte contains the value 2 (which stands for public-key +encrypted data in the PKCS standard [PKCS#1]). Then, there are +non-zero random bytes to fill any unused space, a zero byte, and the +data to be encrypted in the least significant bytes, the last byte of +the data in the least significant byte. + +This algorithm is used twice. First, it is used to encrypt the 32 +random bytes generated by the client to be used as the session key +(xored by the session id). This value is converted to an integer as +described above, and encrypted with RSA using the key with the smaller +modulus. The resulting integer is converted to a byte stream, msb +first. This byte stream is padded and encrypted identically using the +key with the larger modulus. + +After the client has sent the session key, it starts to use the +selected algorithm and key for decrypting any received packets, and +for encrypting any sent packets. Separate ciphers are used for +different directions (that is, both directions have separate +initialization vectors or other state for the ciphers). + +When the server has received the session key message, and has turned +on encryption, it sends a SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS message to the client. + +The recommended size of the host key is 1024 bits, and 768 bits for +the server key. The minimum size is 512 bits for the smaller key. + + +.ti 0 +Declaring the User Name + +The client then sends a SSH_CMSG_USER message to the server. This +message specifies the user name to log in as. + +The server validates that such a user exists, checks whether +authentication is needed, and responds with either SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS or +SSH_SMSG_FAILURE. SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS indicates that no authentication +is needed for this user (no password), and authentication phase has +now been completed. SSH_SMSG_FAILURE indicates that authentication is +needed (or the user does not exist). + +If the user does not exist, it is recommended that this returns +failure, but the server keeps reading messages from the client, and +responds to any messages (except SSH_MSG_DISCONNECT, SSH_MSG_IGNORE, +and SSH_MSG_DEBUG) with SSH_SMSG_FAILURE. This way the client cannot +be certain whether the user exists. + + +.ti 0 +Authentication Phase + +Provided the server didn't immediately accept the login, an +authentication exchange begins. The client sends messages to the +server requesting different types of authentication in arbitrary order as +many times as desired (however, the server may close the connection +after a timeout). The server always responds with SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS if +it has accepted the authentication, and with SSH_SMSG_FAILURE if it has +denied authentication with the requested method or it does not +recognize the message. Some authentication methods cause an exchange +of further messages before the final result is sent. The +authentication phase ends when the server responds with success. + +The recommended value for the authentication timeout (timeout before +disconnecting if no successful authentication has been made) is 5 +minutes. + +The following authentication methods are currently supported: +.TS +center; +l r l. +SSH_AUTH_RHOSTS 1 .rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv +SSH_AUTH_RSA 2 pure RSA authentication +SSH_AUTH_PASSWORD 3 password authentication +SSH_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA 4 .rhosts with RSA host authentication +.TE +.IP SSH_AUTH_RHOSTS + +This is the authentication method used by rlogin and rsh [RFC1282]. + +The client sends SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS with the client-side user name +as an argument. + +The server checks whether to permit authentication. On UNIX systems, +this is usually done by checking /etc/hosts.equiv, and .rhosts in the +user's home directory. The connection must come from a privileged +port. + +It is recommended that the server checks that there are no IP options +(such as source routing) specified for the socket before accepting +this type of authentication. The client host name should be +reverse-mapped and then forward mapped to ensure that it has the +proper IP-address. + +This authentication method trusts the remote host (root on the remote +host can pretend to be any other user on that host), the name +services, and partially the network: anyone who can see packets coming +out from the server machine can do IP-spoofing and pretend to be any +machine; however, the protocol prevents blind IP-spoofing (which used +to be possible with rlogin). + +Many sites probably want to disable this authentication method because +of the fundamental insecurity of conventional .rhosts or +/etc/hosts.equiv authentication when faced with spoofing. It is +recommended that this method not be supported by the server by +default. +.IP SSH_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA + +In addition to conventional .rhosts and hosts.equiv authentication, +this method additionally requires that the client host be +authenticated using RSA. + +The client sends SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA specifying the client-side +user name, and the public host key of the client host. + +The server first checks if normal .rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv +authentication would be accepted, and if not, responds with +SSH_SMSG_FAILURE. Otherwise, it checks whether it knows the host key +for the client machine (using the same name for the host that was used +for checking the .rhosts and /etc/hosts.equiv files). If it does not +know the RSA key for the client, access is denied and SSH_SMSG_FAILURE +is sent. + +If the server knows the host key of the client machine, it verifies +that the given host key matches that known for the client. If not, +access is denied and SSH_SMSG_FAILURE is sent. + +The server then sends a SSH_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE message containing +an encrypted challenge for the client. The challenge is 32 8-bit +random bytes (256 bits). When encrypted, the highest (partial) byte +is left as zero, the next byte contains the value 2, the following are +non-zero random bytes, followed by a zero byte, and the challenge put +in the remaining bytes. This is then encrypted using RSA with the +client host's public key. (The padding and encryption algorithm is +the same as that used for the session key.) + +The client decrypts the challenge using its private host key, +concatenates this with the session id, and computes an MD5 checksum +of the resulting 48 bytes. The MD5 output is returned as 16 bytes in +a SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE message. (MD5 is used to deter chosen +plaintext attacks against RSA; the session id binds it to a specific +session). + +The server verifies that the MD5 of the decrypted challenge returned by +the client matches that of the original value, and sends SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS if +so. Otherwise it sends SSH_SMSG_FAILURE and refuses the +authentication attempt. + +This authentication method trusts the client side machine in that root +on that machine can pretend to be any user on that machine. +Additionally, it trusts the client host key. The name and/or IP +address of the client host is only used to select the public host key. +The same host name is used when scanning .rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv +and when selecting the host key. It would in principle be possible to +eliminate the host name entirely and substitute it directly by the +host key. IP and/or DNS [RFC1034] spoofing can only be used +to pretend to be a host for which the attacker has the private host +key. +.IP SSH_AUTH_RSA + +The idea behind RSA authentication is that the server recognizes the +public key offered by the client, generates a random challenge, and +encrypts the challenge with the public key. The client must then +prove that it has the corresponding private key by decrypting the +challenge. + +The client sends SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA with public key modulus (n) as an +argument. + +The server may respond immediately with SSH_SMSG_FAILURE if it does +not permit authentication with this key. Otherwise it generates a +challenge, encrypts it using the user's public key (stored on the +server and identified using the modulus), and sends +SSH_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE with the challenge (mp-int) as an +argument. + +The challenge is 32 8-bit random bytes (256 bits). When encrypted, +the highest (partial) byte is left as zero, the next byte contains the +value 2, the following are non-zero random bytes, followed by a zero +byte, and the challenge put in the remaining bytes. This is then +encrypted with the public key. (The padding and encryption algorithm +is the same as that used for the session key.) + +The client decrypts the challenge using its private key, concatenates +it with the session id, and computes an MD5 checksum of the resulting +48 bytes. The MD5 output is returned as 16 bytes in a +SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE message. (Note that the MD5 is necessary +to avoid chosen plaintext attacks against RSA; the session id binds it +to a specific session.) + +The server verifies that the MD5 of the decrypted challenge returned +by the client matches that of the original value, and sends +SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS if so. Otherwise it sends SSH_SMSG_FAILURE and +refuses the authentication attempt. + +This authentication method does not trust the remote host, the +network, name services, or anything else. Authentication is based +solely on the possession of the private identification keys. Anyone +in possession of the private keys can log in, but nobody else. + +The server may have additional requirements for a successful +authentiation. For example, to limit damage due to a compromised RSA +key, a server might restrict access to a limited set of hosts. +.IP SSH_AUTH_PASSWORD + +The client sends a SSH_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD message with the plain text +password. (Note that even though the password is plain text inside +the message, it is normally encrypted by the packet mechanism.) + +The server verifies the password, and sends SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS if +authentication was accepted and SSH_SMSG_FAILURE otherwise. + +Note that the password is read from the user by the client; the user +never interacts with a login program. + +This authentication method does not trust the remote host, the +network, name services or anything else. Authentication is based +solely on the possession of the password. Anyone in possession of the +password can log in, but nobody else. +.RT + +.ti 0 +Preparatory Operations + +After successful authentication, the server waits for a request from +the client, processes the request, and responds with SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS +whenever a request has been successfully processed. If it receives a +message that it does not recognize or it fails to honor a request, it +returns SSH_SMSG_FAILURE. It is expected that new message types might +be added to this phase in future. + +The following messages are currently defined for this phase. +.IP SSH_CMSG_REQUEST_COMPRESSION +Requests that compression be enabled for this session. A +gzip-compatible compression level (1-9) is passed as an argument. +.IP SSH_CMSG_REQUEST_PTY +Requests that a pseudo terminal device be allocated for this session. +The user terminal type and terminal modes are supplied as arguments. +.IP SSH_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING +Requests forwarding of X11 connections from the remote machine to the +local machine over the secure channel. Causes an internet-domain +socket to be allocated and the DISPLAY variable to be set on the server. +X11 authentication data is automatically passed to the server, and the +client may implement spoofing of authentication data for added +security. The authentication data is passed as arguments. +.IP SSH_CMSG_PORT_FORWARD_REQUEST +Requests forwarding of a TCP/IP port on the server host over the +secure channel. What happens is that whenever a connection is made to +the port on the server, a connection will be made from the client end +to the specified host/port. Any user can forward unprivileged ports; +only the root can forward privileged ports (as determined by +authentication done earlier). +.IP SSH_CMSG_AGENT_REQUEST_FORWARDING +Requests forwarding of the connection to the authentication agent. +.IP SSH_CMSG_EXEC_SHELL +Starts a shell (command interpreter) for the user, and moves into +interactive session mode. +.IP SSH_CMSG_EXEC_CMD +Executes the given command (actually " -c " or +equivalent) for the user, and moves into interactive session mode. +.RT + + +.ti 0 +Interactive Session and Exchange of Data + +During the interactive session, any data written by the shell or +command running on the server machine is forwarded to stdin or +stderr on the client machine, and any input available from stdin on +the client machine is forwarded to the program on the server machine. + +All exchange is asynchronous; either side can send at any time, and +there are no acknowledgements (TCP/IP already provides reliable +transport, and the packet protocol protects against tampering or IP +spoofing). + +When the client receives EOF from its standard input, it will send +SSH_CMSG_EOF; however, this in no way terminates the exchange. The +exchange terminates and interactive mode is left when the server sends +SSH_SMSG_EXITSTATUS to indicate that the client program has +terminated. Alternatively, either side may disconnect at any time by +sending SSH_MSG_DISCONNECT or closing the connection. + +The server may send any of the following messages: +.IP SSH_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA +Data written to stdout by the program running on the server. The data +is passed as a string argument. The client writes this data to +stdout. +.IP SSH_SMSG_STDERR_DATA +Data written to stderr by the program running on the server. The data +is passed as a string argument. The client writes this data to +stderr. (Note that if the program is running on a tty, it is not +possible to separate stdout and stderr data, and all data will be sent +as stdout data.) +.IP SSH_SMSG_EXITSTATUS +Indicates that the shell or command has exited. Exit status is passed +as an integer argument. This message causes termination of the +interactive session. +.IP SSH_SMSG_AGENT_OPEN +Indicates that someone on the server side is requesting a connection +to the authentication agent. The server-side channel number is passed +as an argument. The client must respond with either +SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION or SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE. +.IP SSH_SMSG_X11_OPEN +Indicates that a connection has been made to the X11 socket on the +server side and should be forwarded to the real X server. An integer +argument indicates the channel number allocated for this connection on +the server side. The client should send back either +SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION or SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE with +the same server side channel number. +.IP SSH_MSG_PORT_OPEN +Indicates that a connection has been made to a port on the server side +for which forwarding has been requested. Arguments are server side +channel number, host name to connect to, and port to connect to. The +client should send back either +SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION or SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE with +the same server side channel number. +.IP SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION +This is sent by the server to indicate that it has opened a connection +as requested in a previous message. The first argument indicates the +client side channel number, and the second argument is the channel number +that the server has allocated for this connection. +.IP SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE +This is sent by the server to indicate that it failed to open a +connection as requested in a previous message. The client-side +channel number is passed as an argument. The client will close the +descriptor associated with the channel and free the channel. +.IP SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA +This packet contains data for a channel from the server. The first +argument is the client-side channel number, and the second argument (a +string) is the data. +.IP SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE +This is sent by the server to indicate that whoever was in the other +end of the channel has closed it. The argument is the client side channel +number. The client will let all buffered data in the channel to +drain, and when ready, will close the socket, free the channel, and +send the server a SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION message for the +channel. +.IP SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION +This is send by the server to indicate that a channel previously +closed by the client has now been closed on the server side as well. +The argument indicates the client channel number. The client frees +the channel. +.RT + +The client may send any of the following messages: +.IP SSH_CMSG_STDIN_DATA +This is data to be sent as input to the program running on the server. +The data is passed as a string. +.IP SSH_CMSG_EOF +Indicates that the client has encountered EOF while reading standard +input. The server will allow any buffered input data to drain, and +will then close the input to the program. +.IP SSH_CMSG_WINDOW_SIZE +Indicates that window size on the client has been changed. The server +updates the window size of the tty and causes SIGWINCH to be sent to +the program. The new window size is passed as four integer arguments: +row, col, xpixel, ypixel. +.IP SSH_MSG_PORT_OPEN +Indicates that a connection has been made to a port on the client side +for which forwarding has been requested. Arguments are client side +channel number, host name to connect to, and port to connect to. The +server should send back either SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION or +SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE with the same client side channel number. +.IP SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION +This is sent by the client to indicate that it has opened a connection +as requested in a previous message. The first argument indicates the +server side channel number, and the second argument is the channel +number that the client has allocated for this connection. +.IP SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE +This is sent by the client to indicate that it failed to open a +connection as requested in a previous message. The server side +channel number is passed as an argument. The server will close the +descriptor associated with the channel and free the channel. +.IP SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA +This packet contains data for a channel from the client. The first +argument is the server side channel number, and the second argument (a +string) is the data. +.IP SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE +This is sent by the client to indicate that whoever was in the other +end of the channel has closed it. The argument is the server channel +number. The server will allow buffered data to drain, and when ready, +will close the socket, free the channel, and send the client a +SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION message for the channel. +.IP SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION +This is send by the client to indicate that a channel previously +closed by the server has now been closed on the client side as well. +The argument indicates the server channel number. The server frees +the channel. +.RT + +Any unsupported messages during interactive mode cause the connection +to be terminated with SSH_MSG_DISCONNECT and an error message. +Compatible protocol upgrades should agree about any extensions during +the preparation phase or earlier. + + +.ti 0 +Termination of the Connection + +Normal termination of the connection is always initiated by the server +by sending SSH_SMSG_EXITSTATUS after the program has exited. The +client responds to this message by sending SSH_CMSG_EXIT_CONFIRMATION +and closes the socket; the server then closes the socket. There are +two purposes for the confirmation: some systems may lose previously +sent data when the socket is closed, and closing the client side first +causes any TCP/IP TIME_WAIT [RFC0793] waits to occur on the client side, not +consuming server resources. + +If the program terminates due to a signal, the server will send +SSH_MSG_DISCONNECT with an appropriate message. If the connection is +closed, all file descriptors to the program will be closed and the +server will exit. If the program runs on a tty, the kernel sends it +the SIGHUP signal when the pty master side is closed. + +.ti 0 +Protocol Flags + +Both the server and the client pass 32 bits of protocol flags to the +other side. The flags are intended for compatible protocol extension; +the server first announces which added capabilities it supports, and +the client then sends the capabilities that it supports. + +The following flags are currently defined (the values are bit masks): +.IP "1 SSH_PROTOFLAG_SCREEN_NUMBER" +This flag can only be sent by the client. It indicates that the X11 +forwarding requests it sends will include the screen number. +.IP "2 SSH_PROTOFLAG_HOST_IN_FWD_OPEN" +If both sides specify this flag, SSH_SMSG_X11_OPEN and +SSH_MSG_PORT_OPEN messages will contain an additional field containing +a description of the host at the other end of the connection. +.RT + +.ti 0 +Detailed Description of Packet Types and Formats + +The supported packet types and the corresponding message numbers are +given in the following table. Messages with _MSG_ in their name may +be sent by either side. Messages with _CMSG_ are only sent by the +client, and messages with _SMSG_ only by the server. + +A packet may contain additional data after the arguments specified +below. Any such data should be ignored by the receiver. However, it +is recommended that no such data be stored without good reason. (This +helps build compatible extensions.) +.IP "0 SSH_MSG_NONE" +This code is reserved. This message type is never sent. +.IP "1 SSH_MSG_DISCONNECT" +.TS +; +l l. +string Cause of disconnection +.TE +This message may be sent by either party at any time. It causes the +immediate disconnection of the connection. The message is intended to +be displayed to a human, and describes the reason for disconnection. +.IP "2 SSH_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY" +.TS +; +l l. +8 bytes anti_spoofing_cookie +32-bit int server_key_bits +mp-int server_key_public_exponent +mp-int server_key_public_modulus +32-bit int host_key_bits +mp-int host_key_public_exponent +mp-int host_key_public_modulus +32-bit int protocol_flags +32-bit int supported_ciphers_mask +32-bit int supported_authentications_mask +.TE +Sent as the first message by the server. This message gives the +server's host key, server key, protocol flags (intended for compatible +protocol extension), supported_ciphers_mask (which is the +bitwise or of (1 << cipher_number), where << is the left shift +operator, for all supported ciphers), and +supported_authentications_mask (which is the bitwise or of (1 << +authentication_type) for all supported authentication types). The +anti_spoofing_cookie is 64 random bytes, and must be sent back +verbatim by the client in its reply. It is used to make IP-spoofing +more difficult (encryption and host keys are the real defense against +spoofing). +.IP "3 SSH_CMSG_SESSION_KEY" +.TS +; +l l. +1 byte cipher_type (must be one of the supported values) +8 bytes anti_spoofing_cookie (must match data sent by the server) +mp-int double-encrypted session key +32-bit int protocol_flags +.TE +Sent by the client as the first message in the session. Selects the +cipher to use, and sends the encrypted session key to the server. The +anti_spoofing_cookie must be the same bytes that were sent by the +server. Protocol_flags is intended for negotiating compatible +protocol extensions. +.IP "4 SSH_CMSG_USER" +.TS +; +l l. +string user login name on server +.TE +Sent by the client to begin authentication. Specifies the user name +on the server to log in as. The server responds with SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS +if no authentication is needed for this user, or SSH_SMSG_FAILURE if +authentication is needed (or the user does not exist). [Note to the +implementator: the user name is of arbitrary size. The implementation +must be careful not to overflow internal buffers.] +.IP "5 SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS" +.TS +; +l l. +string client-side user name +.TE +Requests authentication using /etc/hosts.equiv and .rhosts (or +equivalent mechanisms). This authentication method is normally +disabled in the server because it is not secure (but this is the +method used by rsh and rlogin). The server responds with +SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS if authentication was successful, and +SSH_SMSG_FAILURE if access was not granted. The server should check +that the client side port number is less than 1024 (a privileged +port), and immediately reject authentication if it is not. Supporting +this authentication method is optional. This method should normally +not be enabled in the server because it is not safe. (However, not +enabling this only helps if rlogind and rshd are disabled.) +.IP "6 SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA" +.TS +; +l l. +mp-int identity_public_modulus +.TE +Requests authentication using pure RSA authentication. The server +checks if the given key is permitted to log in, and if so, responds +with SSH_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE. Otherwise, it responds with +SSH_SMSG_FAILURE. The client often tries several different keys in +sequence until one supported by the server is found. Authentication +is accepted if the client gives the correct response to the challenge. +The server is free to add other criteria for authentication, such as a +requirement that the connection must come from a certain host. Such +additions are not visible at the protocol level. Supporting this +authentication method is optional but recommended. +.IP "7 SSH_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE" +.TS +; +l l. +mp-int encrypted challenge +.TE +Presents an RSA authentication challenge to the client. The challenge +is a 256-bit random value encrypted as described elsewhere in this +document. The client must decrypt the challenge using the RSA private +key, compute MD5 of the challenge plus session id, and send back the +resulting 16 bytes using SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE. +.IP "8 SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE" +.TS +; +l l. +16 bytes MD5 of decrypted challenge +.TE +This message is sent by the client in response to an RSA challenge. +The MD5 checksum is returned instead of the decrypted challenge to +deter known-plaintext attacks against the RSA key. The server +responds to this message with either SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS or +SSH_SMSG_FAILURE. +.IP "9 SSH_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD" +.TS +; +l l. +string plain text password +.TE +Requests password authentication using the given password. Note that +even though the password is plain text inside the packet, the whole +packet is normally encrypted by the packet layer. It would not be +possible for the client to perform password encryption/hashing, +because it cannot know which kind of encryption/hashing, if any, the +server uses. The server responds to this message with +SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS or SSH_SMSG_FAILURE. +.IP "10 SSH_CMSG_REQUEST_PTY" +.TS +; +l l. +string TERM environment variable value (e.g. vt100) +32-bit int terminal height, rows (e.g., 24) +32-bit int terminal width, columns (e.g., 80) +32-bit int terminal width, pixels (0 if no graphics) (e.g., 480) +32-bit int terminal height, pixels (0 if no graphics) (e.g., 640) +n bytes tty modes encoded in binary +.TE +Requests a pseudo-terminal to be allocated for this command. This +message can be used regardless of whether the session will later +execute the shell or a command. If a pty has been requested with this +message, the shell or command will run on a pty. Otherwise it will +communicate with the server using pipes, sockets or some other similar +mechanism. + +The terminal type gives the type of the user's terminal. In the UNIX +environment it is passed to the shell or command in the TERM +environment variable. + +The width and height values give the initial size of the user's +terminal or window. All values can be zero if not supported by the +operating system. The server will pass these values to the kernel if +supported. + +Terminal modes are encoded into a byte stream in a portable format. +The exact format is described later in this document. + +The server responds to the request with either SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS or +SSH_SMSG_FAILURE. If the server does not have the concept of pseudo +terminals, it should return success if it is possible to execute a +shell or a command so that it looks to the client as if it was running +on a pseudo terminal. +.IP "11 SSH_CMSG_WINDOW_SIZE" +.TS +; +l l. +32-bit int terminal height, rows +32-bit int terminal width, columns +32-bit int terminal width, pixels +32-bit int terminal height, pixels +.TE +This message can only be sent by the client during the interactive +session. This indicates that the size of the user's window has +changed, and provides the new size. The server will update the +kernel's notion of the window size, and a SIGWINCH signal or +equivalent will be sent to the shell or command (if supported by the +operating system). +.IP "12 SSH_CMSG_EXEC_SHELL" + +(no arguments) + +Starts a shell (command interpreter), and enters interactive session +mode. +.IP "13 SSH_CMSG_EXEC_CMD" +.TS +; +l l. +string command to execute +.TE +Starts executing the given command, and enters interactive session +mode. On UNIX, the command is run as " -c ", where + is the user's login shell. +.IP "14 SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS" + +(no arguments) + +This message is sent by the server in response to the session key, a +successful authentication request, and a successfully completed +preparatory operation. +.IP "15 SSH_SMSG_FAILURE" + +(no arguments) + +This message is sent by the server in response to a failed +authentication operation to indicate that the user has not yet been +successfully authenticated, and in response to a failed preparatory +operation. This is also sent in response to an authentication or +preparatory operation request that is not recognized or supported. +.IP "16 SSH_CMSG_STDIN_DATA" +.TS +; +l l. +string data +.TE +Delivers data from the client to be supplied as input to the shell or +program running on the server side. This message can only be used in +the interactive session mode. No acknowledgement is sent for this +message. +.IP "17 SSH_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA" +.TS +; +l l. +string data +.TE +Delivers data from the server that was read from the standard output of +the shell or program running on the server side. This message can +only be used in the interactive session mode. No acknowledgement is +sent for this message. +.IP "18 SSH_SMSG_STDERR_DATA" +.TS +; +l l. +string data +.TE +Delivers data from the server that was read from the standard error of +the shell or program running on the server side. This message can +only be used in the interactive session mode. No acknowledgement is +sent for this message. +.IP "19 SSH_CMSG_EOF" + +(no arguments) + +This message is sent by the client to indicate that EOF has been +reached on the input. Upon receiving this message, and after all +buffered input data has been sent to the shell or program, the server +will close the input file descriptor to the program. This message can +only be used in the interactive session mode. No acknowledgement is +sent for this message. +.IP "20 SSH_SMSG_EXITSTATUS" +.TS +; +l l. +32-bit int exit status of the command +.TE +Returns the exit status of the shell or program after it has exited. +The client should respond with SSH_CMSG_EXIT_CONFIRMATION when it has +received this message. This will be the last message sent by the +server. If the program being executed dies with a signal instead of +exiting normally, the server should terminate the session with +SSH_MSG_DISCONNECT (which can be used to pass a human-readable string +indicating that the program died due to a signal) instead of using +this message. +.IP "21 SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION" +.TS +; +l l. +32-bit int remote_channel +32-bit int local_channel +.TE +This is sent in response to any channel open request if the channel +has been successfully opened. Remote_channel is the channel number +received in the initial open request; local_channel is the channel +number the side sending this message has allocated for the channel. +Data can be transmitted on the channel after this message. +.IP "22 SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE" +.TS +; +l l. +32-bit int remote_channel +.TE +This message indicates that an earlier channel open request by the +other side has failed or has been denied. Remote_channel is the +channel number given in the original request. +.IP "23 SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA" +.TS +; +l l. +32-bit int remote_channel +string data +.TE +Data is transmitted in a channel in these messages. A channel is +bidirectional, and both sides can send these messages. There is no +acknowledgement for these messages. It is possible that either side +receives these messages after it has sent SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE for +the channel. These messages cannot be received after the party has +sent or received SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION. +.IP "24 SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE" +.TS +; +l l. +32-bit int remote_channel +.TE +When a channel is closed at one end of the connection, that side sends +this message. Upon receiving this message, the channel should be +closed. When this message is received, if the channel is already +closed (the receiving side has sent this message for the same channel +earlier), the channel is freed and no further action is taken; +otherwise the channel is freed and SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION +is sent in response. (It is possible that the channel is closed +simultaneously at both ends.) +.IP "25 SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION" +.TS +; +l l. +32-bit int remote_channel +.TE +This message is sent in response to SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE unless the +channel was already closed. When this message is sent or received, +the channel is freed. +.IP "26 (OBSOLETED; was unix-domain X11 forwarding) +.IP "27 SSH_SMSG_X11_OPEN" +.TS +; +l l. +32-bit int local_channel +string originator_string (see below) +.TE +This message can be sent by the server during the interactive session +mode to indicate that a client has connected the fake X server. +Local_channel is the channel number that the server has allocated for +the connection. The client should try to open a connection to the +real X server, and respond with SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION or +SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE. + +The field originator_string is present if both sides +specified SSH_PROTOFLAG_HOST_IN_FWD_OPEN in the protocol flags. It +contains a description of the host originating the connection. +.IP "28 SSH_CMSG_PORT_FORWARD_REQUEST" +.TS +; +l l. +32-bit int server_port +string host_to_connect +32-bit int port_to_connect +.TE +Sent by the client in the preparatory phase, this message requests +that server_port on the server machine be forwarded over the secure +channel to the client machine, and from there to the specified host +and port. The server should start listening on the port, and send +SSH_MSG_PORT_OPEN whenever a connection is made to it. Supporting +this message is optional, and the server is free to reject any forward +request. For example, it is highly recommended that unless the user +has been authenticated as root, forwarding any privileged port numbers +(below 1024) is denied. +.IP "29 SSH_MSG_PORT_OPEN" +.TS +; +l l. +32-bit int local_channel +string host_name +32-bit int port +string originator_string (see below) +.TE +Sent by either party in interactive session mode, this message +indicates that a connection has been opened to a forwarded TCP/IP +port. Local_channel is the channel number that the sending party has +allocated for the connection. Host_name is the host the connection +should be be forwarded to, and the port is the port on that host to +connect. The receiving party should open the connection, and respond +with SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION or +SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE. It is recommended that the receiving +side check the host_name and port for validity to avoid compromising +local security by compromised remote side software. Particularly, it +is recommended that the client permit connections only to those ports +for which it has requested forwarding with SSH_CMSG_PORT_FORWARD_REQUEST. + +The field originator_string is present if both sides +specified SSH_PROTOFLAG_HOST_IN_FWD_OPEN in the protocol flags. It +contains a description of the host originating the connection. +.IP "30 SSH_CMSG_AGENT_REQUEST_FORWARDING" + +(no arguments) + +Requests that the connection to the authentication agent be forwarded +over the secure channel. The method used by clients to contact the +authentication agent within each machine is implementation and machine +dependent. If the server accepts this request, it should arrange that +any clients run from this session will actually contact the server +program when they try to contact the authentication agent. The server +should then send a SSH_SMSG_AGENT_OPEN to open a channel to the agent, +and the client should forward the connection to the real +authentication agent. Supporting this message is optional. +.IP "31 SSH_SMSG_AGENT_OPEN" +.TS +; +l l. +32-bit int local_channel +.TE +Sent by the server in interactive session mode, this message requests +opening a channel to the authentication agent. The client should open +a channel, and respond with either SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION +or SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE. +.IP "32 SSH_MSG_IGNORE" +.TS +; +l l. +string data +.TE +Either party may send this message at any time. This message, and the +argument string, is silently ignored. This message might be used in +some implementations to make traffic analysis more difficult. This +message is not currently sent by the implementation, but all +implementations are required to recognize and ignore it. +.IP "33 SSH_CMSG_EXIT_CONFIRMATION" + +(no arguments) + +Sent by the client in response to SSH_SMSG_EXITSTATUS. This is the +last message sent by the client. +.IP "34 SSH_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING" +.TS +; +l l. +string x11_authentication_protocol +string x11_authentication_data +32-bit int screen number (if SSH_PROTOFLAG_SCREEN_NUMBER) +.TE +Sent by the client during the preparatory phase, this message requests +that the server create a fake X11 display and set the DISPLAY +environment variable accordingly. An internet-domain display is +preferable. The given authentication protocol and the associated data +should be recorded by the server so that it is used as authentication +on connections (e.g., in .Xauthority). The authentication protocol +must be one of the supported X11 authentication protocols, e.g., +"MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1". Authentication data must be a lowercase hex +string of even length. Its interpretation is protocol dependent. +The data is in a format that can be used with e.g. the xauth program. +Supporting this message is optional. + +The client is permitted (and recommended) to generate fake +authentication information and send fake information to the server. +This way, a corrupt server will not have access to the user's terminal +after the connection has terminated. The correct authorization codes +will also not be left hanging around in files on the server (many +users keep the same X session for months, thus protecting the +authorization data becomes important). + +X11 authentication spoofing works by initially sending fake (random) +authentication data to the server, and interpreting the first packet +sent by the X11 client after the connection has been opened. The +first packet contains the client's authentication. If the packet +contains the correct fake data, it is replaced by the client by the +correct authentication data, and then sent to the X server. +.IP "35 SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA" +.TS +; +l l. +string clint-side user name +32-bit int client_host_key_bits +mp-int client_host_key_public_exponent +mp-int client_host_key_public_modulus +.TE +Requests authentication using /etc/hosts.equiv and .rhosts (or +equivalent) together with RSA host authentication. The server should +check that the client side port number is less than 1024 (a privileged +port), and immediately reject authentication if it is not. The server +responds with SSH_SMSG_FAILURE or SSH_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE. The +client must respond to the challenge with the proper +SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE. The server then responds with success if +access was granted, or failure if the client gave a wrong response. +Supporting this authentication method is optional but recommended in +most environments. +.IP "36 SSH_MSG_DEBUG" +.TS +; +l l. +string debugging message sent to the other side +.TE +This message may be sent by either party at any time. It is used to +send debugging messages that may be informative to the user in +solving various problems. For example, if authentication fails +because of some configuration error (e.g., incorrect permissions for +some file), it can be very helpful for the user to make the cause of +failure available. On the other hand, one should not make too much +information available for security reasons. It is recommended that +the client provides an option to display the debugging information +sent by the sender (the user probably does not want to see it by default). +The server can log debugging data sent by the client (if any). Either +party is free to ignore any received debugging data. Every +implementation must be able to receive this message, but no +implementation is required to send these. +.IP "37 SSH_CMSG_REQUEST_COMPRESSION" +.TS +; +l l. +32-bit int gzip compression level (1-9) +.TE +This message can be sent by the client in the preparatory operations +phase. The server responds with SSH_SMSG_FAILURE if it does not +support compression or does not want to compress; it responds with +SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS if it accepted the compression request. In the +latter case the response to this packet will still be uncompressed, +but all further packets in either direction will be compressed by gzip. +.RT + + +.ti 0 +Encoding of Terminal Modes + +Terminal modes (as passed in SSH_CMSG_REQUEST_PTY) are encoded into a +byte stream. It is intended that the coding be portable across +different environments. + +The tty mode description is a stream of bytes. The stream consists of +opcode-argument pairs. It is terminated by opcode TTY_OP_END (0). +Opcodes 1-127 have one-byte arguments. Opcodes 128-159 have 32-bit +integer arguments (stored msb first). Opcodes 160-255 are not yet +defined, and cause parsing to stop (they should only be used after any +other data). + +The client puts in the stream any modes it knows about, and the server +ignores any modes it does not know about. This allows some degree of +machine-independence, at least between systems that use a POSIX-like +[POSIX] tty interface. The protocol can support other systems as +well, but the client may need to fill reasonable values for a number +of parameters so the server pty gets set to a reasonable mode (the +server leaves all unspecified mode bits in their default values, and +only some combinations make sense). + +The following opcodes have been defined. The naming of opcodes mostly +follows the POSIX terminal mode flags. +.IP "0 TTY_OP_END" +Indicates end of options. +.IP "1 VINTR" +Interrupt character; 255 if none. Similarly for the other characters. +Not all of these characters are supported on all systems. +.IP "2 VQUIT" +The quit character (sends SIGQUIT signal on UNIX systems). +.IP "3 VERASE" +Erase the character to left of the cursor. +.IP "4 VKILL" +Kill the current input line. +.IP "5 VEOF " +End-of-file character (sends EOF from the terminal). +.IP "6 VEOL " +End-of-line character in addition to carriage return and/or linefeed. +.IP "7 VEOL2" +Additional end-of-line character. +.IP "8 VSTART" +Continues paused output (normally ^Q). +.IP "9 VSTOP" +Pauses output (^S). +.IP "10 VSUSP" +Suspends the current program. +.IP "11 VDSUSP" +Another suspend character. +.IP "12 VREPRINT" +Reprints the current input line. +.IP "13 VWERASE" +Erases a word left of cursor. +.IP "14 VLNEXT" +More special input characters; these are probably not supported on +most systems. +.IP "15 VFLUSH" +.IP "16 VSWTCH" +.IP "17 VSTATUS" +.IP "18 VDISCARD" + +.IP "30 IGNPAR" +The ignore parity flag. The next byte should be 0 if this flag is not +set, and 1 if it is set. +.IP "31 PARMRK" +More flags. The exact definitions can be found in the POSIX standard. +.IP "32 INPCK" +.IP "33 ISTRIP" +.IP "34 INLCR" +.IP "35 IGNCR" +.IP "36 ICRNL" +.IP "37 IUCLC" +.IP "38 IXON" +.IP "39 IXANY" +.IP "40 IXOFF" +.IP "41 IMAXBEL" + +.IP "50 ISIG" +.IP "51 ICANON" +.IP "52 XCASE" +.IP "53 ECHO" +.IP "54 ECHOE" +.IP "55 ECHOK" +.IP "56 ECHONL" +.IP "57 NOFLSH" +.IP "58 TOSTOP" +.IP "59 IEXTEN" +.IP "60 ECHOCTL" +.IP "61 ECHOKE" +.IP "62 PENDIN" + +.IP "70 OPOST" +.IP "71 OLCUC" +.IP "72 ONLCR" +.IP "73 OCRNL" +.IP "74 ONOCR" +.IP "75 ONLRET" + +.IP "90 CS7" +.IP "91 CS8" +.IP "92 PARENB" +.IP "93 PARODD" + +.IP "192 TTY_OP_ISPEED" +Specifies the input baud rate in bits per second. +.IP "193 TTY_OP_OSPEED" +Specifies the output baud rate in bits per second. +.RT + + +.ti 0 +The Authentication Agent Protocol + +The authentication agent is a program that can be used to hold RSA +authentication keys for the user (in future, it might hold data for +other authentication types as well). An authorized program can send +requests to the agent to generate a proper response to an RSA +challenge. How the connection is made to the agent (or its +representative) inside a host and how access control is done inside a +host is implementation-dependent; however, how it is forwarded and how +one interacts with it is specified in this protocol. The connection +to the agent is normally automatically forwarded over the secure +channel. + +A program that wishes to use the agent first opens a connection to its +local representative (typically, the agent itself or an SSH server). +It then writes a request to the connection, and waits for response. +It is recommended that at least five minutes of timeout are provided +waiting for the agent to respond to an authentication challenge (this +gives sufficient time for the user to cut-and-paste the challenge to a +separate machine, perform the computation there, and cut-and-paste the +result back if so desired). + +Messages sent to and by the agent are in the following format: +.TS +; +l l. +4 bytes Length, msb first. Does not include length itself. +1 byte Packet type. The value 255 is reserved for future extensions. +data Any data, depending on packet type. Encoding as in the ssh packet +protocol. +.TE + +The following message types are currently defined: +.IP "1 SSH_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES" + +(no arguments) + +Requests the agent to send a list of all RSA keys for which it can +answer a challenge. +.IP "2 SSH_AGENT_RSA_IDENTITIES_ANSWER" +.TS +; +l l. +32-bit int howmany +howmany times: +32-bit int bits +mp-int public exponent +mp-int public modulus +string comment +.TE +The agent sends this message in response to the to +SSH_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES. The answer lists all RSA keys for +which the agent can answer a challenge. The comment field is intended +to help identify each key; it may be printed by an application to +indicate which key is being used. If the agent is not holding any +keys, howmany will be zero. +.IP "3 SSH_AGENTC_RSA_CHALLENGE +.TS +; +l l. +32-bit int bits +mp-int public exponent +mp-int public modulus +mp-int challenge +16 bytes session_id +32-bit int response_type +.TE +Requests RSA decryption of random challenge to authenticate the other +side. The challenge will be decrypted with the RSA private key +corresponding to the given public key. + +The decrypted challenge must contain a zero in the highest (partial) +byte, 2 in the next byte, followed by non-zero random bytes, a zero +byte, and then the real challenge value in the lowermost bytes. The +real challenge must be 32 8-bit bytes (256 bits). + +Response_type indicates the format of the response to be returned. +Currently the only supported value is 1, which means to compute MD5 of +the real challenge plus session id, and return the resulting 16 bytes +in a SSH_AGENT_RSA_RESPONSE message. +.IP "4 SSH_AGENT_RSA_RESPONSE" +.TS +; +l l. +16 bytes MD5 of decrypted challenge +.TE +Answers an RSA authentication challenge. The response is 16 bytes: +the MD5 checksum of the 32-byte challenge. +.IP "5 SSH_AGENT_FAILURE" + +(no arguments) + +This message is sent whenever the agent fails to answer a request +properly. For example, if the agent cannot answer a challenge (e.g., +no longer has the proper key), it can respond with this. The agent +also responds with this message if it receives a message it does not +recognize. +.IP "6 SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS" + +(no arguments) + +This message is sent by the agent as a response to certain requests +that do not otherwise cause a message be sent. Currently, this is +only sent in response to SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_IDENTITY and +SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_RSA_IDENTITY. +.IP "7 SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_IDENTITY" +.TS +; +l l. +32-bit int bits +mp-int public modulus +mp-int public exponent +mp-int private exponent +mp-int multiplicative inverse of p mod q +mp-int p +mp-int q +string comment +.TE +Registers an RSA key with the agent. After this request, the agent can +use this RSA key to answer requests. The agent responds with +SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS or SSH_AGENT_FAILURE. +.IP "8 SSH_AGENT_REMOVE_RSA_IDENTITY" +.TS +; +l l. +32-bit int bits +mp-int public exponent +mp-int public modulus +.TE +Removes an RSA key from the agent. The agent will no longer accept +challenges for this key and will not list it as a supported identity. +The agent responds with SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS or SSH_AGENT_FAILURE. +.RT + +If the agent receives a message that it does not understand, it +responds with SSH_AGENT_FAILURE. This permits compatible future +extensions. + +It is possible that several clients have a connection open to the +authentication agent simultaneously. Each client will use a separate +connection (thus, any SSH connection can have multiple agent +connections active simultaneously). + + +.ti 0 +References + +.IP "[DES] " +FIPS PUB 46-1: Data Encryption Standard. National Bureau of +Standards, January 1988. FIPS PUB 81: DES Modes of Operation. +National Bureau of Standards, December 1980. Bruce Schneier: Applied +Cryptography. John Wiley & Sons, 1994. J. Seberry and J. Pieprzyk: +Cryptography: An Introduction to Computer Security. Prentice-Hall, +1989. +.IP "[GZIP] " +The GNU GZIP program; available for anonymous ftp at prep.ai.mit.edu. +Please let me know if you know a paper describing the algorithm. +.IP "[IDEA] " +Xuejia Lai: On the Design and Security of Block Ciphers, ETH Series in +Information Processing, vol. 1, Hartung-Gorre Verlag, Konstanz, +Switzerland, 1992. Bruce Schneier: Applied Cryptography, John Wiley & +Sons, 1994. See also the following patents: PCT/CH91/00117, EP 0 482 +154 B1, US Pat. 5,214,703. +.IP [PKCS#1] +PKCS #1: RSA Encryption Standard. Version 1.5, RSA Laboratories, +November 1993. Available for anonymous ftp at ftp.rsa.com. +.IP [POSIX] +Portable Operating System Interface (POSIX) - Part 1: Application +Program Interface (API) [C language], ISO/IEC 9945-1, IEEE Std 1003.1, +1990. +.IP [RFC0791] +J. Postel: Internet Protocol, RFC 791, USC/ISI, September 1981. +.IP [RFC0793] +J. Postel: Transmission Control Protocol, RFC 793, USC/ISI, September +1981. +.IP [RFC1034] +P. Mockapetris: Domain Names - Concepts and Facilities, RFC 1034, +USC/ISI, November 1987. +.IP [RFC1282] +B. Kantor: BSD Rlogin, RFC 1258, UCSD, December 1991. +.IP "[RSA] " +Bruce Schneier: Applied Cryptography. John Wiley & Sons, 1994. See +also R. Rivest, A. Shamir, and L. M. Adleman: Cryptographic +Communications System and Method. US Patent 4,405,829, 1983. +.IP "[X11] " +R. Scheifler: X Window System Protocol, X Consortium Standard, Version +11, Release 6. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Laboratory of +Computer Science, 1994. +.RT + + +.ti 0 +Security Considerations + +This protocol deals with the very issue of user authentication and +security. + +First of all, as an implementation issue, the server program will have +to run as root (or equivalent) on the server machine. This is because +the server program will need be able to change to an arbitrary user +id. The server must also be able to create a privileged TCP/IP port. + +The client program will need to run as root if any variant of .rhosts +authentication is to be used. This is because the client program will +need to create a privileged port. The client host key is also usually +stored in a file which is readable by root only. The client needs the +host key in .rhosts authentication only. Root privileges can be +dropped as soon as the privileged port has been created and the host +key has been read. + +The SSH protocol offers major security advantages over existing telnet +and rlogin protocols. +.IP o +IP spoofing is restricted to closing a connection (by encryption, host +keys, and the special random cookie). If encryption is not used, IP +spoofing is possible for those who can hear packets going out from the +server. +.IP o +DNS spoofing is made ineffective (by host keys). +.IP o +Routing spoofing is made ineffective (by host keys). +.IP o +All data is encrypted with strong algorithms to make eavesdropping as +difficult as possible. This includes encrypting any authentication +information such as passwords. The information for decrypting session +keys is destroyed every hour. +.IP o +Strong authentication methods: .rhosts combined with RSA host +authentication, and pure RSA authentication. +.IP o +X11 connections and arbitrary TCP/IP ports can be forwarded securely. +.IP o +Man-in-the-middle attacks are deterred by using the server host key to +encrypt the session key. +.IP o +Trojan horses to catch a password by routing manipulation are deterred +by checking that the host key of the server machine matches that +stored on the client host. +.RT + +The security of SSH against man-in-the-middle attacks and the security +of the new form of .rhosts authentication, as well as server host +validation, depends on the integrity of the host key and the files +containing known host keys. + +The host key is normally stored in a root-readable file. If the host +key is compromised, it permits attackers to use IP, DNS and routing +spoofing as with current rlogin and rsh. It should never be any worse +than the current situation. + +The files containing known host keys are not sensitive. However, if an +attacker gets to modify the known host key files, it has the same +consequences as a compromised host key, because the attacker can then +change the recorded host key. + +The security improvements obtained by this protocol for X11 are of +particular significance. Previously, there has been no way to protect +data communicated between an X server and a client running on a remote +machine. By creating a fake display on the server, and forwarding all +X11 requests over the secure channel, SSH can be used to run any X11 +applications securely without any cooperation with the vendors of the +X server or the application. + +Finally, the security of this program relies on the strength of the +underlying cryptographic algorithms. The RSA algorithm is used for +authentication key exchange. It is widely believed to be secure. Of +the algorithms used to encrypt the session, DES has a rather small key +these days, probably permitting governments and organized criminals to +break it in very short time with specialized hardware. 3DES is +probably safe (but slower). IDEA is widely believed to be secure. +People have varying degrees of confidence in the other algorithms. +This program is not secure if used with no encryption at all. + + +.ti 0 +Additional Information + +Additional information (especially on the implementation and mailing +lists) is available via WWW at http://www.cs.hut.fi/ssh. + +Comments should be sent to Tatu Ylonen or the SSH +Mailing List . + +.ti 0 +Author's Address + +.TS +; +l. +Tatu Ylonen +Helsinki University of Technology +Otakaari 1 +FIN-02150 Espoo, Finland + +Phone: +358-0-451-3374 +Fax: +358-0-451-3293 +EMail: ylo@cs.hut.fi +.TE diff --git a/openssh/TODO b/openssh/TODO new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3c89852 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/TODO @@ -0,0 +1,86 @@ +Programming: +- Grep for 'XXX' comments and fix + +- Link order is incorrect for some systems using Kerberos 4 and AFS. Result + is multiple inclusion of DES symbols. Holger Trapp + reports that changing the configure + generated link order from: + -lresolv -lkrb -lz -lnsl -lutil -lkafs -lkrb -ldes -lcrypto + to: + -lresolv -lkrb -lz -lnsl -lutil -lcrypto -lkafs -lkrb -ldes + fixing the problem. + +- Write a test program that calls stat() to search for EGD/PRNGd socket + rather than use the (non-portable) "test -S". + +- Replacement for setproctitle() - HP-UX support only currently + +- Handle changing passwords for the non-PAM expired password case + +- Improve PAM support (a pam_lastlog module will cause sshd to exit) + and maybe support alternate forms of authenications like OPIE via + pam? + +- Rework PAM ChallengeResponseAuthentication + - Use kbdint request packet with 0 prompts for informational messages + - Use different PAM service name for kbdint vs regular auth (suggest from + Solar Designer) + - Ability to select which ChallengeResponseAuthentications may be used + and order to try them in e.g. "ChallengeResponseAuthentication skey, pam" + +- Complete Tru64 SIA support + - It looks like we could merge it into the password auth code to cut down + on diff size. Maybe PAM password auth too? + +- Finish integrating kernel-level auditing code for IRIX and SOLARIS + (Gilbert.r.loomis@saic.com) + +- sftp-server: Rework to step down to 32bit ints if the platform + lacks 'long long' == 64bit (Notable SCO w/ SCO compiler) + +- Linux hangs for 20 seconds when you do "sleep 20&exit". All current + solutions break scp or leaves processes hanging around after the ssh + connection has ended. It seems to be linked to two things. One + select() under Linux is not as nice as others, and two the children + of the shell are not killed on exiting the shell. Redhat have an excellent + description of this in their RPM package. + +- Build an automated test suite + +- 64-bit builds on HP-UX 11.X (stevesk@pobox.com): + - utmp/wtmp get corrupted (something in loginrec?) + - can't build with PAM (no 64-bit libpam yet) + +Documentation: +- More and better + +- Install FAQ? + +- General FAQ on S/Key, TIS, RSA, RSA2, DSA, etc and suggestions on when it + would be best to use them. + +- Create a Documentation/ directory? + +Clean up configure/makefiles: +- Clean up configure.ac - There are a few double #defined variables + left to do. HAVE_LOGIN is one of them. Consider NOT looking for + information in wtmpx or utmpx or any of that stuff if it's not detected + from the start + +- Fails to compile when cross compile. + (vinschen@redhat.com) + +- Replace the whole u_intXX_t evilness in acconfig.h with something better??? + +- Consider splitting the u_intXX_t test for sys/bitype.h into seperate test + to allow people to (right/wrongfully) link against Bind directly. + +Packaging: +- Solaris: Update packaging scripts and build new sysv startup scripts + Ideally the package metadata should be generated by autoconf. + (gilbert.r.loomis@saic.com) + +- HP-UX: Provide DEPOT package scripts. + (gilbert.r.loomis@saic.com) + +$Id$ diff --git a/openssh/WARNING.RNG b/openssh/WARNING.RNG new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1b9137e --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/WARNING.RNG @@ -0,0 +1,83 @@ +This document contains a description of portable OpenSSH's random +number collection code. An alternate reading of this text could +well be titled "Why I should pressure my system vendor to supply +/dev/random in their OS". + +Why is this important? OpenSSH depends on good, unpredictable numbers +for generating keys, performing digital signatures and forming +cryptographic challenges. If the random numbers that it uses are +predictable, then the strength of the whole system is compromised. + +A particularly pernicious problem arises with DSA keys (used by the +ssh2 protocol). Performing a DSA signature (which is required for +authentication), entails the use of a 160 bit random number. If an +attacker can predict this number, then they can deduce your *private* +key and impersonate you or your hosts. + +If you are using the builtin random number support (configure will +tell you if this is the case), then read this document in its entirety. +Alternately, you can use Lutz Jaenicke's PRNGd - a small daemon which +collects random numbers and makes them available by a socket. + +Please also request that your OS vendor provides a kernel-based random +number collector (/dev/random) in future versions of your operating +systems by default. + +On to the description... + +The portable OpenSSH contains random number collection support for +systems which lack a kernel entropy pool (/dev/random). + +This collector operates by executing the programs listed in +($etcdir)/ssh_prng_cmds, reading their output and adding it to the +PRNG supplied by OpenSSL (which is hash-based). It also stirs in the +output of several system calls and timings from the execution of the +programs that it runs. + +The ssh_prng_cmds file also specifies a 'rate' for each program. This +represents the number of bits of randomness per byte of output from +the specified program. + +The random number code will also read and save a seed file to +~/.ssh/prng_seed. This contents of this file are added to the random +number generator at startup. The goal here is to maintain as much +randomness between sessions as possible. + +The entropy collection code has two main problems: + +1. It is slow. + +Executing each program in the list can take a large amount of time, +especially on slower machines. Additionally some program can take a +disproportionate time to execute. + +This can be tuned by the administrator. To debug the entropy +collection is great detail, turn on full debugging ("ssh -v -v -v" or +"sshd -d -d -d"). This will list each program as it is executed, how +long it took to execute, its exit status and whether and how much data +it generated. You can the find the culprit programs which are causing +the real slow-downs. + +The entropy collector will timeout programs which take too long +to execute, the actual timeout used can be adjusted with the +--with-entropy-timeout configure option. OpenSSH will not try to +re-execute programs which have not been found, have had a non-zero +exit status or have timed out more than a couple of times. + +2. Estimating the real 'rate' of program outputs is non-trivial + +The shear volume of the task is problematic: there are currently +around 50 commands in the ssh_prng_cmds list, portable OpenSSH +supports at least 12 different OSs. That is already 600 sets of data +to be analysed, without taking into account the numerous differences +between versions of each OS. + +On top of this, the different commands can produce varying amounts of +usable data depending on how busy the machine is, how long it has been +up and various other factors. + +To make matters even more complex, some of the commands are reporting +largely the same data as other commands (eg. the various "ps" calls). + +$Id$ + diff --git a/openssh/acconfig.h b/openssh/acconfig.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..436d72e --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/acconfig.h @@ -0,0 +1,338 @@ +/* $Id$ */ + +#ifndef _CONFIG_H +#define _CONFIG_H + +/* Generated automatically from acconfig.h by autoheader. */ +/* Please make your changes there */ + +@TOP@ + +/* Define to a Set Process Title type if your system is */ +/* supported by bsd-setproctitle.c */ +#undef SPT_TYPE + +/* SCO workaround */ +#undef BROKEN_SYS_TERMIO_H +#undef HAVE_BOGUS_SYS_QUEUE_H + +/* Define if you have SCO protected password database */ +#undef HAVE_SCO_PROTECTED_PW + +/* If your header files don't define LOGIN_PROGRAM, then use this (detected) */ +/* from environment and PATH */ +#undef LOGIN_PROGRAM_FALLBACK + +/* Define if your password has a pw_class field */ +#undef HAVE_PW_CLASS_IN_PASSWD + +/* Define if your password has a pw_expire field */ +#undef HAVE_PW_EXPIRE_IN_PASSWD + +/* Define if your password has a pw_change field */ +#undef HAVE_PW_CHANGE_IN_PASSWD + +/* Define if you system's inet_ntoa is busted (e.g. Irix gcc issue) */ +#undef BROKEN_INET_NTOA + +/* Define if your system defines sys_errlist[] */ +#undef HAVE_SYS_ERRLIST + +/* Define if your system defines sys_nerr */ +#undef HAVE_SYS_NERR + +/* Define if your system choked on IP TOS setting */ +#undef IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN + +/* Define if you have the getuserattr function. */ +#undef HAVE_GETUSERATTR + +/* Work around problematic Linux PAM modules handling of PAM_TTY */ +#undef PAM_TTY_KLUDGE + +/* Use PIPES instead of a socketpair() */ +#undef USE_PIPES + +/* Define if your snprintf is busted */ +#undef BROKEN_SNPRINTF + +/* Define if you are on Cygwin */ +#undef HAVE_CYGWIN + +/* Define if you lack native POSIX regex and you are using PCRE */ +#undef HAVE_LIBPCRE + +/* Define if you have a broken realpath. */ +#undef BROKEN_REALPATH + +/* Define if you are on NeXT */ +#undef HAVE_NEXT + +/* Define if you are on NEWS-OS */ +#undef HAVE_NEWS4 + +/* Define if you want to enable PAM support */ +#undef USE_PAM + +/* Define if you want to enable AIX4's authenticate function */ +#undef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE + +/* Define if you have/want arrays (cluster-wide session managment, not C arrays) */ +#undef WITH_IRIX_ARRAY + +/* Define if you want IRIX project management */ +#undef WITH_IRIX_PROJECT + +/* Define if you want IRIX audit trails */ +#undef WITH_IRIX_AUDIT + +/* Define if you want IRIX kernel jobs */ +#undef WITH_IRIX_JOBS + +/* Location of random number pool */ +#undef RANDOM_POOL + +/* Location of PRNGD/EGD random number socket */ +#undef PRNGD_SOCKET + +/* Port number of PRNGD/EGD random number socket */ +#undef PRNGD_PORT + +/* Builtin PRNG command timeout */ +#undef ENTROPY_TIMEOUT_MSEC + +/* Define if you want to install preformatted manpages.*/ +#undef MANTYPE + +/* Define if your ssl headers are included with #include */ +#undef HAVE_OPENSSL + +/* Define if you are linking against RSAref. Used only to print the right + * message at run-time. */ +#undef RSAREF + +/* struct timeval */ +#undef HAVE_STRUCT_TIMEVAL + +/* struct utmp and struct utmpx fields */ +#undef HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMP +#undef HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMPX +#undef HAVE_ADDR_IN_UTMP +#undef HAVE_ADDR_IN_UTMPX +#undef HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMP +#undef HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMPX +#undef HAVE_SYSLEN_IN_UTMPX +#undef HAVE_PID_IN_UTMP +#undef HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMP +#undef HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMPX +#undef HAVE_TV_IN_UTMP +#undef HAVE_TV_IN_UTMPX +#undef HAVE_ID_IN_UTMP +#undef HAVE_ID_IN_UTMPX +#undef HAVE_EXIT_IN_UTMP +#undef HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMP +#undef HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMPX + +/* Define if you don't want to use your system's login() call */ +#undef DISABLE_LOGIN + +/* Define if you don't want to use pututline() etc. to write [uw]tmp */ +#undef DISABLE_PUTUTLINE + +/* Define if you don't want to use pututxline() etc. to write [uw]tmpx */ +#undef DISABLE_PUTUTXLINE + +/* Define if you don't want to use lastlog */ +#undef DISABLE_LASTLOG + +/* Define if you don't want to use utmp */ +#undef DISABLE_UTMP + +/* Define if you don't want to use utmpx */ +#undef DISABLE_UTMPX + +/* Define if you don't want to use wtmp */ +#undef DISABLE_WTMP + +/* Define if you don't want to use wtmpx */ +#undef DISABLE_WTMPX + +/* Some systems need a utmpx entry for /bin/login to work */ +#undef LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX + +/* Some versions of /bin/login need the TERM supplied on the commandline */ +#undef LOGIN_NEEDS_TERM + +/* Define if you want to specify the path to your lastlog file */ +#undef CONF_LASTLOG_FILE + +/* Define if you want to specify the path to your utmp file */ +#undef CONF_UTMP_FILE + +/* Define if you want to specify the path to your wtmp file */ +#undef CONF_WTMP_FILE + +/* Define if you want to specify the path to your utmpx file */ +#undef CONF_UTMPX_FILE + +/* Define if you want to specify the path to your wtmpx file */ +#undef CONF_WTMPX_FILE + +/* Define if you want external askpass support */ +#undef USE_EXTERNAL_ASKPASS + +/* Define if libc defines __progname */ +#undef HAVE___PROGNAME + +/* Define if you want Kerberos 4 support */ +#undef KRB4 + +/* Define if you want AFS support */ +#undef AFS + +/* Define if you want S/Key support */ +#undef SKEY + +/* Define if you want TCP Wrappers support */ +#undef LIBWRAP + +/* Define if your libraries define login() */ +#undef HAVE_LOGIN + +/* Define if your libraries define daemon() */ +#undef HAVE_DAEMON + +/* Define if your libraries define getpagesize() */ +#undef HAVE_GETPAGESIZE + +/* Define if xauth is found in your path */ +#undef XAUTH_PATH + +/* Define if rsh is found in your path */ +#undef RSH_PATH + +/* Define if you want to allow MD5 passwords */ +#undef HAVE_MD5_PASSWORDS + +/* Define if you want to disable shadow passwords */ +#undef DISABLE_SHADOW + +/* Define if you want to use shadow password expire field */ +#undef HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE + +/* Define if you have Digital Unix Security Integration Architecture */ +#undef HAVE_OSF_SIA + +/* Define if you have getpwanam(3) [SunOS 4.x] */ +#undef HAVE_GETPWANAM + +/* Defined if in_systm.h needs to be included with netinet/ip.h (HPUX - ) */ +#undef NEED_IN_SYSTM_H + +/* Define if you have an old version of PAM which takes only one argument */ +/* to pam_strerror */ +#undef HAVE_OLD_PAM + +/* Define if you are using Solaris-derived PAM which passes pam_messages */ +/* to the conversation function with an extra level of indirection */ +#undef PAM_SUN_CODEBASE + +/* Set this to your mail directory if you don't have maillock.h */ +#undef MAIL_DIRECTORY + +/* Data types */ +#undef HAVE_U_INT +#undef HAVE_INTXX_T +#undef HAVE_U_INTXX_T +#undef HAVE_UINTXX_T +#undef HAVE_INT64_T +#undef HAVE_U_INT64_T +#undef HAVE_U_CHAR +#undef HAVE_SIZE_T +#undef HAVE_SSIZE_T +#undef HAVE_CLOCK_T +#undef HAVE_MODE_T +#undef HAVE_PID_T +#undef HAVE_SA_FAMILY_T +#undef HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_STORAGE +#undef HAVE_STRUCT_ADDRINFO +#undef HAVE_STRUCT_IN6_ADDR +#undef HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN6 + +/* Fields in struct sockaddr_storage */ +#undef HAVE_SS_FAMILY_IN_SS +#undef HAVE___SS_FAMILY_IN_SS + +/* Define if you have a regcomp() function */ +#undef HAVE_REGCOMP + +/* Define if you have /dev/ptmx */ +#undef HAVE_DEV_PTMX + +/* Define if you have /dev/ptc */ +#undef HAVE_DEV_PTS_AND_PTC + +/* Define if you need to use IP address instead of hostname in $DISPLAY */ +#undef IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY + +/* Specify default $PATH */ +#undef USER_PATH + +/* Specify location of ssh.pid */ +#undef _PATH_SSH_PIDDIR + +/* Use IPv4 for connection by default, IPv6 can still if explicity asked */ +#undef IPV4_DEFAULT + +/* If you have no atexit() but xatexit(), and want to use xatexit() */ +#undef HAVE_XATEXIT + +/* getaddrinfo is broken (if present) */ +#undef BROKEN_GETADDRINFO + +/* Workaround more Linux IPv6 quirks */ +#undef DONT_TRY_OTHER_AF + +/* Detect IPv4 in IPv6 mapped addresses and treat as IPv4 */ +#undef IPV4_IN_IPV6 + +/* Define if you have BSD auth support */ +#undef BSD_AUTH + +/* Define if X11 doesn't support AF_UNIX sockets on that system */ +#undef NO_X11_UNIX_SOCKETS + +/* Needed for SCO and NeXT */ +#undef BROKEN_SAVED_UIDS + +/* Define if your system glob() function has the GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC extension */ +#undef GLOB_HAS_ALTDIRFUNC + +/* Define if your system glob() function has gl_matchc options in glob_t */ +#undef GLOB_HAS_GL_MATCHC + +/* Define in your struct dirent expects you to allocate extra space for d_name */ +#undef BROKEN_ONE_BYTE_DIRENT_D_NAME + +/* Define if your getopt(3) defines and uses optreset */ +#undef HAVE_GETOPT_OPTRESET + +/* Define on *nto-qnx systems */ +#undef MISSING_NFDBITS + +/* Define on *nto-qnx systems */ +#undef MISSING_HOWMANY + +/* Define on *nto-qnx systems */ +#undef MISSING_FD_MASK + +/* Define if you want smartcard support */ +#undef SMARTCARD + +@BOTTOM@ + +/* ******************* Shouldn't need to edit below this line ************** */ + +#include "defines.h" + +#endif /* _CONFIG_H */ diff --git a/openssh/aclocal.m4 b/openssh/aclocal.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ab9cf4e --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/aclocal.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,86 @@ +dnl $Id$ +dnl +dnl OpenSSH-specific autoconf macros +dnl + + +dnl OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD(field, header, symbol) +dnl Does AC_EGREP_HEADER on 'header' for the string 'field' +dnl If found, set 'symbol' to be defined. Cache the result. +dnl TODO: This is not foolproof, better to compile and read from there +AC_DEFUN(OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD, [ +# look for field '$1' in header '$2' + dnl This strips characters illegal to m4 from the header filename + ossh_safe=`echo "$2" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'` + dnl + ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"$1 + AC_MSG_CHECKING(for $1 field in $2) + AC_CACHE_VAL($ossh_varname, [ + AC_EGREP_HEADER($1, $2, [ dnl + eval "$ossh_varname=yes" dnl + ], [ dnl + eval "$ossh_varname=no" dnl + ]) dnl + ]) + ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"` + if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then + AC_MSG_RESULT($ossh_result) + if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then + AC_DEFINE($3) + fi + else + AC_MSG_RESULT(no) + fi +]) + +dnl OSSH_PATH_ENTROPY_PROG(variablename, command): +dnl Tidiness function, sets 'undef' if not found, and does the AC_SUBST +AC_DEFUN(OSSH_PATH_ENTROPY_PROG, [ + AC_PATH_PROG($1, $2) + if test -z "[$]$1" ; then + $1="undef" + fi + AC_SUBST($1) +]) + +dnl Check for socklen_t: historically on BSD it is an int, and in +dnl POSIX 1g it is a type of its own, but some platforms use different +dnl types for the argument to getsockopt, getpeername, etc. So we +dnl have to test to find something that will work. +AC_DEFUN([TYPE_SOCKLEN_T], +[ + AC_CHECK_TYPE([socklen_t], ,[ + AC_MSG_CHECKING([for socklen_t equivalent]) + AC_CACHE_VAL([curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv], + [ + # Systems have either "struct sockaddr *" or + # "void *" as the second argument to getpeername + curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv= + for arg2 in "struct sockaddr" void; do + for t in int size_t unsigned long "unsigned long"; do + AC_TRY_COMPILE([ + #include + #include + + int getpeername (int, $arg2 *, $t *); + ],[ + $t len; + getpeername(0,0,&len); + ],[ + curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv="$t" + break + ]) + done + done + + if test "x$curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv" = x; then + AC_MSG_ERROR([Cannot find a type to use in place of socklen_t]) + fi + ]) + AC_MSG_RESULT($curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv) + AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(socklen_t, $curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv, + [type to use in place of socklen_t if not defined])], + [#include +#include ]) +]) + diff --git a/openssh/atomicio.c b/openssh/atomicio.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..47161eb --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/atomicio.c @@ -0,0 +1,61 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995,1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" +RCSID("$OpenBSD: atomicio.c,v 1.10 2001/05/08 22:48:07 markus Exp $"); + +#include "atomicio.h" + +/* + * ensure all of data on socket comes through. f==read || f==write + */ +ssize_t +atomicio(f, fd, _s, n) + ssize_t (*f) (); + int fd; + void *_s; + size_t n; +{ + char *s = _s; + ssize_t res, pos = 0; + + while (n > pos) { + res = (f) (fd, s + pos, n - pos); + switch (res) { + case -1: +#ifdef EWOULDBLOCK + if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK) +#else + if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN) +#endif + continue; + case 0: + return (res); + default: + pos += res; + } + } + return (pos); +} diff --git a/openssh/atomicio.h b/openssh/atomicio.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e569d38 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/atomicio.h @@ -0,0 +1,31 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: atomicio.h,v 1.4 2001/06/26 06:32:46 itojun Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995,1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* + * Ensure all of data on socket comes through. f==read || f==write + */ +ssize_t atomicio(ssize_t (*)(), int, void *, size_t); diff --git a/openssh/auth-bsdauth.c b/openssh/auth-bsdauth.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3732477 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/auth-bsdauth.c @@ -0,0 +1,116 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ +#include "includes.h" +RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-bsdauth.c,v 1.1 2001/05/18 14:13:28 markus Exp $"); + +#ifdef BSD_AUTH +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "auth.h" +#include "log.h" + +static void * +bsdauth_init_ctx(Authctxt *authctxt) +{ + return authctxt; +} + +static int +bsdauth_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **infotxt, + u_int *numprompts, char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on) +{ + Authctxt *authctxt = ctx; + char *challenge = NULL; + + if (authctxt->as != NULL) { + debug2("bsdauth_query: try reuse session"); + challenge = auth_getitem(authctxt->as, AUTHV_CHALLENGE); + if (challenge == NULL) { + auth_close(authctxt->as); + authctxt->as = NULL; + } + } + + if (challenge == NULL) { + debug2("bsdauth_query: new bsd auth session"); + debug3("bsdauth_query: style %s", + authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : ""); + authctxt->as = auth_userchallenge(authctxt->user, + authctxt->style, "auth-ssh", &challenge); + if (authctxt->as == NULL) + challenge = NULL; + debug2("bsdauth_query: <%s>", challenge ? challenge : "empty"); + } + + if (challenge == NULL) + return -1; + + *name = xstrdup(""); + *infotxt = xstrdup(""); + *numprompts = 1; + *prompts = xmalloc(*numprompts * sizeof(char*)); + *echo_on = xmalloc(*numprompts * sizeof(u_int)); + (*echo_on)[0] = 0; + (*prompts)[0] = xstrdup(challenge); + + return 0; +} + +static int +bsdauth_respond(void *ctx, u_int numresponses, char **responses) +{ + Authctxt *authctxt = ctx; + int authok; + + if (authctxt->as == 0) + error("bsdauth_respond: no bsd auth session"); + + if (numresponses != 1) + return -1; + + authok = auth_userresponse(authctxt->as, responses[0], 0); + authctxt->as = NULL; + debug3("bsdauth_respond: <%s> = <%d>", responses[0], authok); + + return (authok == 0) ? -1 : 0; +} + +static void +bsdauth_free_ctx(void *ctx) +{ + Authctxt *authctxt = ctx; + + if (authctxt && authctxt->as) { + auth_close(authctxt->as); + authctxt->as = NULL; + } +} + +KbdintDevice bsdauth_device = { + "bsdauth", + bsdauth_init_ctx, + bsdauth_query, + bsdauth_respond, + bsdauth_free_ctx +}; +#endif diff --git a/openssh/auth-chall.c b/openssh/auth-chall.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..45e0c34 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/auth-chall.c @@ -0,0 +1,82 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" +RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-chall.c,v 1.8 2001/05/18 14:13:28 markus Exp $"); + +#include "auth.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "xmalloc.h" + +/* limited protocol v1 interface to kbd-interactive authentication */ + +extern KbdintDevice *devices[]; +static KbdintDevice *device; + +char * +get_challenge(Authctxt *authctxt) +{ + char *challenge, *name, *info, **prompts; + u_int i, numprompts; + u_int *echo_on; + + device = devices[0]; /* we always use the 1st device for protocol 1 */ + if (device == NULL) + return NULL; + if ((authctxt->kbdintctxt = device->init_ctx(authctxt)) == NULL) + return NULL; + if (device->query(authctxt->kbdintctxt, &name, &info, + &numprompts, &prompts, &echo_on)) { + device->free_ctx(authctxt->kbdintctxt); + authctxt->kbdintctxt = NULL; + return NULL; + } + if (numprompts < 1) + fatal("get_challenge: numprompts < 1"); + challenge = xstrdup(prompts[0]); + for (i = 0; i < numprompts; i++) + xfree(prompts[i]); + xfree(prompts); + xfree(name); + xfree(echo_on); + xfree(info); + + return (challenge); +} +int +verify_response(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *response) +{ + char *resp[1]; + int res; + + if (device == NULL) + return 0; + if (authctxt->kbdintctxt == NULL) + return 0; + resp[0] = (char *)response; + res = device->respond(authctxt->kbdintctxt, 1, resp); + device->free_ctx(authctxt->kbdintctxt); + authctxt->kbdintctxt = NULL; + return res ? 0 : 1; +} diff --git a/openssh/auth-krb4.c b/openssh/auth-krb4.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..031dcd3 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/auth-krb4.c @@ -0,0 +1,373 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999 Dug Song. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" +RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-krb4.c,v 1.24 2001/06/26 16:15:22 dugsong Exp $"); + +#include "ssh.h" +#include "ssh1.h" +#include "packet.h" +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "servconf.h" +#include "uidswap.h" +#include "auth.h" + +#ifdef AFS +#include "radix.h" +#endif + +#ifdef KRB4 +extern ServerOptions options; + +static int +krb4_init(void *context) +{ + static int cleanup_registered = 0; + Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)context; + const char *tkt_root = TKT_ROOT; + struct stat st; + int fd; + + if (!authctxt->krb4_ticket_file) { + /* Set unique ticket string manually since we're still root. */ + authctxt->krb4_ticket_file = xmalloc(MAXPATHLEN); +#ifdef AFS + if (lstat("/ticket", &st) != -1) + tkt_root = "/ticket/"; +#endif /* AFS */ + snprintf(authctxt->krb4_ticket_file, MAXPATHLEN, "%s%u_%d", + tkt_root, authctxt->pw->pw_uid, getpid()); + krb_set_tkt_string(authctxt->krb4_ticket_file); + } + /* Register ticket cleanup in case of fatal error. */ + if (!cleanup_registered) { + fatal_add_cleanup(krb4_cleanup_proc, authctxt); + cleanup_registered = 1; + } + /* Try to create our ticket file. */ + if ((fd = mkstemp(authctxt->krb4_ticket_file)) != -1) { + close(fd); + return (1); + } + /* Ticket file exists - make sure user owns it (just passed ticket). */ + if (lstat(authctxt->krb4_ticket_file, &st) != -1) { + if (st.st_mode == (S_IFREG | S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR) && + st.st_uid == authctxt->pw->pw_uid) + return (1); + } + /* Failure - cancel cleanup function, leaving ticket for inspection. */ + log("WARNING: bad ticket file %s", authctxt->krb4_ticket_file); + + fatal_remove_cleanup(krb4_cleanup_proc, authctxt); + cleanup_registered = 0; + + xfree(authctxt->krb4_ticket_file); + authctxt->krb4_ticket_file = NULL; + + return (0); +} + +/* + * try krb4 authentication, + * return 1 on success, 0 on failure, -1 if krb4 is not available + */ +int +auth_krb4_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password) +{ + AUTH_DAT adata; + KTEXT_ST tkt; + struct hostent *hp; + struct passwd *pw; + char localhost[MAXHOSTNAMELEN], phost[INST_SZ], realm[REALM_SZ]; + u_int32_t faddr; + int r; + + if ((pw = authctxt->pw) == NULL) + return (0); + + /* + * Try Kerberos password authentication only for non-root + * users and only if Kerberos is installed. + */ + if (pw->pw_uid != 0 && krb_get_lrealm(realm, 1) == KSUCCESS) { + /* Set up our ticket file. */ + if (!krb4_init(authctxt)) { + log("Couldn't initialize Kerberos ticket file for %s!", + pw->pw_name); + goto failure; + } + /* Try to get TGT using our password. */ + r = krb_get_pw_in_tkt((char *) pw->pw_name, "", realm, + "krbtgt", realm, DEFAULT_TKT_LIFE, (char *)password); + if (r != INTK_OK) { + debug("Kerberos v4 password authentication for %s " + "failed: %s", pw->pw_name, krb_err_txt[r]); + goto failure; + } + /* Successful authentication. */ + chown(tkt_string(), pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_gid); + + /* + * Now that we have a TGT, try to get a local + * "rcmd" ticket to ensure that we are not talking + * to a bogus Kerberos server. + */ + gethostname(localhost, sizeof(localhost)); + strlcpy(phost, (char *)krb_get_phost(localhost), + sizeof(phost)); + r = krb_mk_req(&tkt, KRB4_SERVICE_NAME, phost, realm, 33); + + if (r == KSUCCESS) { + if ((hp = gethostbyname(localhost)) == NULL) { + log("Couldn't get local host address!"); + goto failure; + } + memmove((void *)&faddr, (void *)hp->h_addr, + sizeof(faddr)); + + /* Verify our "rcmd" ticket. */ + r = krb_rd_req(&tkt, KRB4_SERVICE_NAME, phost, + faddr, &adata, ""); + if (r == RD_AP_UNDEC) { + /* + * Probably didn't have a srvtab on + * localhost. Disallow login. + */ + log("Kerberos v4 TGT for %s unverifiable, " + "no srvtab installed? krb_rd_req: %s", + pw->pw_name, krb_err_txt[r]); + goto failure; + } else if (r != KSUCCESS) { + log("Kerberos v4 %s ticket unverifiable: %s", + KRB4_SERVICE_NAME, krb_err_txt[r]); + goto failure; + } + } else if (r == KDC_PR_UNKNOWN) { + /* + * Disallow login if no rcmd service exists, and + * log the error. + */ + log("Kerberos v4 TGT for %s unverifiable: %s; %s.%s " + "not registered, or srvtab is wrong?", pw->pw_name, + krb_err_txt[r], KRB4_SERVICE_NAME, phost); + goto failure; + } else { + /* + * TGT is bad, forget it. Possibly spoofed! + */ + debug("WARNING: Kerberos v4 TGT possibly spoofed " + "for %s: %s", pw->pw_name, krb_err_txt[r]); + goto failure; + } + /* Authentication succeeded. */ + return (1); + } else + /* Logging in as root or no local Kerberos realm. */ + debug("Unable to authenticate to Kerberos."); + + failure: + krb4_cleanup_proc(authctxt); + + if (!options.kerberos_or_local_passwd) + return (0); + + /* Fall back to ordinary passwd authentication. */ + return (-1); +} + +void +krb4_cleanup_proc(void *context) +{ + Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)context; + debug("krb4_cleanup_proc called"); + if (authctxt->krb4_ticket_file) { + (void) dest_tkt(); + xfree(authctxt->krb4_ticket_file); + authctxt->krb4_ticket_file = NULL; + } +} + +int +auth_krb4(Authctxt *authctxt, KTEXT auth, char **client) +{ + AUTH_DAT adat = {0}; + KTEXT_ST reply; + Key_schedule schedule; + struct sockaddr_in local, foreign; + char instance[INST_SZ]; + socklen_t slen; + u_int cksum; + int r, s; + + s = packet_get_connection_in(); + + slen = sizeof(local); + memset(&local, 0, sizeof(local)); + if (getsockname(s, (struct sockaddr *) & local, &slen) < 0) + debug("getsockname failed: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + slen = sizeof(foreign); + memset(&foreign, 0, sizeof(foreign)); + if (getpeername(s, (struct sockaddr *) & foreign, &slen) < 0) { + debug("getpeername failed: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + fatal_cleanup(); + } + instance[0] = '*'; + instance[1] = 0; + + /* Get the encrypted request, challenge, and session key. */ + if ((r = krb_rd_req(auth, KRB4_SERVICE_NAME, instance, + 0, &adat, ""))) { + debug("Kerberos v4 krb_rd_req: %.100s", krb_err_txt[r]); + return (0); + } + des_key_sched((des_cblock *) adat.session, schedule); + + *client = xmalloc(MAX_K_NAME_SZ); + (void) snprintf(*client, MAX_K_NAME_SZ, "%s%s%s@%s", adat.pname, + *adat.pinst ? "." : "", adat.pinst, adat.prealm); + + /* Check ~/.klogin authorization now. */ + if (kuserok(&adat, authctxt->user) != KSUCCESS) { + log("Kerberos v4 .klogin authorization failed for %s to " + "account %s", *client, authctxt->user); + xfree(*client); + return (0); + } + /* Increment the checksum, and return it encrypted with the + session key. */ + cksum = adat.checksum + 1; + cksum = htonl(cksum); + + /* If we can't successfully encrypt the checksum, we send back an + empty message, admitting our failure. */ + if ((r = krb_mk_priv((u_char *) & cksum, reply.dat, sizeof(cksum) + 1, + schedule, &adat.session, &local, &foreign)) < 0) { + debug("Kerberos v4 mk_priv: (%d) %s", r, krb_err_txt[r]); + reply.dat[0] = 0; + reply.length = 0; + } else + reply.length = r; + + /* Clear session key. */ + memset(&adat.session, 0, sizeof(&adat.session)); + + packet_start(SSH_SMSG_AUTH_KERBEROS_RESPONSE); + packet_put_string((char *) reply.dat, reply.length); + packet_send(); + packet_write_wait(); + return (1); +} +#endif /* KRB4 */ + +#ifdef AFS +int +auth_krb4_tgt(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *string) +{ + CREDENTIALS creds; + struct passwd *pw; + + if ((pw = authctxt->pw) == NULL) + goto failure; + + temporarily_use_uid(pw); + + if (!radix_to_creds(string, &creds)) { + log("Protocol error decoding Kerberos v4 TGT"); + goto failure; + } + if (strncmp(creds.service, "", 1) == 0) /* backward compatibility */ + strlcpy(creds.service, "krbtgt", sizeof creds.service); + + if (strcmp(creds.service, "krbtgt")) { + log("Kerberos v4 TGT (%s%s%s@%s) rejected for %s", + creds.pname, creds.pinst[0] ? "." : "", creds.pinst, + creds.realm, pw->pw_name); + goto failure; + } + if (!krb4_init(authctxt)) + goto failure; + + if (in_tkt(creds.pname, creds.pinst) != KSUCCESS) + goto failure; + + if (save_credentials(creds.service, creds.instance, creds.realm, + creds.session, creds.lifetime, creds.kvno, &creds.ticket_st, + creds.issue_date) != KSUCCESS) { + debug("Kerberos v4 TGT refused: couldn't save credentials"); + goto failure; + } + /* Successful authentication, passed all checks. */ + chown(tkt_string(), pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_gid); + + debug("Kerberos v4 TGT accepted (%s%s%s@%s)", + creds.pname, creds.pinst[0] ? "." : "", creds.pinst, creds.realm); + memset(&creds, 0, sizeof(creds)); + + restore_uid(); + + return (1); + + failure: + krb4_cleanup_proc(authctxt); + memset(&creds, 0, sizeof(creds)); + restore_uid(); + + return (0); +} + +int +auth_afs_token(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *token_string) +{ + CREDENTIALS creds; + struct passwd *pw; + uid_t uid; + + if ((pw = authctxt->pw) == NULL) + return (0); + + if (!radix_to_creds(token_string, &creds)) { + log("Protocol error decoding AFS token"); + return (0); + } + if (strncmp(creds.service, "", 1) == 0) /* backward compatibility */ + strlcpy(creds.service, "afs", sizeof creds.service); + + if (strncmp(creds.pname, "AFS ID ", 7) == 0) + uid = atoi(creds.pname + 7); + else + uid = pw->pw_uid; + + if (kafs_settoken(creds.realm, uid, &creds)) { + log("AFS token (%s@%s) rejected for %s", + creds.pname, creds.realm, pw->pw_name); + memset(&creds, 0, sizeof(creds)); + return (0); + } + debug("AFS token accepted (%s@%s)", creds.pname, creds.realm); + memset(&creds, 0, sizeof(creds)); + + return (1); +} +#endif /* AFS */ diff --git a/openssh/auth-krb5.c b/openssh/auth-krb5.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b56f43a --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/auth-krb5.c @@ -0,0 +1,260 @@ +/* + * Kerberos v5 authentication and ticket-passing routines. + * + * $FreeBSD: src/crypto/openssh/auth-krb5.c,v 1.6 2001/02/13 16:58:04 assar Exp $ + * $OpenBSD: auth-krb5.c,v 1.2 2001/11/12 01:47:09 dugsong Exp $ + */ + +#include "includes.h" +#include "ssh.h" +#include "ssh1.h" +#include "packet.h" +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "servconf.h" +#include "uidswap.h" +#include "auth.h" + +#ifdef KRB5 +#include + +extern ServerOptions options; + +static int +krb5_init(void *context) +{ + Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)context; + krb5_error_code problem; + static int cleanup_registered = 0; + + if (authctxt->krb5_ctx == NULL) { + problem = krb5_init_context(&authctxt->krb5_ctx); + if (problem) + return (problem); + krb5_init_ets(authctxt->krb5_ctx); + } + if (!cleanup_registered) { + fatal_add_cleanup(krb5_cleanup_proc, authctxt); + cleanup_registered = 1; + } + return (0); +} + +/* + * Try krb5 authentication. server_user is passed for logging purposes + * only, in auth is received ticket, in client is returned principal + * from the ticket + */ +int +auth_krb5(Authctxt *authctxt, krb5_data *auth, char **client) +{ + krb5_error_code problem; + krb5_principal server; + krb5_data reply; + krb5_ticket *ticket; + int fd, ret; + + ret = 0; + server = NULL; + ticket = NULL; + reply.length = 0; + + problem = krb5_init(authctxt); + if (problem) + goto err; + + problem = krb5_auth_con_init(authctxt->krb5_ctx, + &authctxt->krb5_auth_ctx); + if (problem) + goto err; + + fd = packet_get_connection_in(); + problem = krb5_auth_con_setaddrs_from_fd(authctxt->krb5_ctx, + authctxt->krb5_auth_ctx, &fd); + if (problem) + goto err; + + problem = krb5_sname_to_principal(authctxt->krb5_ctx, NULL, NULL , + KRB5_NT_SRV_HST, &server); + if (problem) + goto err; + + problem = krb5_rd_req(authctxt->krb5_ctx, &authctxt->krb5_auth_ctx, + auth, server, NULL, NULL, &ticket); + if (problem) + goto err; + + problem = krb5_copy_principal(authctxt->krb5_ctx, ticket->client, + &authctxt->krb5_user); + if (problem) + goto err; + + /* if client wants mutual auth */ + problem = krb5_mk_rep(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_auth_ctx, + &reply); + if (problem) + goto err; + + /* Check .k5login authorization now. */ + if (!krb5_kuserok(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_user, + authctxt->pw->pw_name)) + goto err; + + if (client) + krb5_unparse_name(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_user, + client); + + packet_start(SSH_SMSG_AUTH_KERBEROS_RESPONSE); + packet_put_string((char *) reply.data, reply.length); + packet_send(); + packet_write_wait(); + + ret = 1; + err: + if (server) + krb5_free_principal(authctxt->krb5_ctx, server); + if (ticket) + krb5_free_ticket(authctxt->krb5_ctx, ticket); + if (reply.length) + xfree(reply.data); + + if (problem) + debug("Kerberos v5 authentication failed: %s", + krb5_get_err_text(authctxt->krb5_ctx, problem)); + + return (ret); +} + +int +auth_krb5_tgt(Authctxt *authctxt, krb5_data *tgt) +{ + krb5_error_code problem; + krb5_ccache ccache = NULL; + char *pname; + + if (authctxt->pw == NULL || authctxt->krb5_user == NULL) + return (0); + + temporarily_use_uid(authctxt->pw); + + problem = krb5_cc_gen_new(authctxt->krb5_ctx, &krb5_fcc_ops, &ccache); + if (problem) + goto fail; + + problem = krb5_cc_initialize(authctxt->krb5_ctx, ccache, + authctxt->krb5_user); + if (problem) + goto fail; + + problem = krb5_rd_cred2(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_auth_ctx, + ccache, tgt); + if (problem) + goto fail; + + authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache = ccache; + ccache = NULL; + + authctxt->krb5_ticket_file = (char *)krb5_cc_get_name(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache); + + problem = krb5_unparse_name(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_user, + &pname); + if (problem) + goto fail; + + debug("Kerberos v5 TGT accepted (%s)", pname); + + restore_uid(); + + return (1); + + fail: + if (problem) + debug("Kerberos v5 TGT passing failed: %s", + krb5_get_err_text(authctxt->krb5_ctx, problem)); + if (ccache) + krb5_cc_destroy(authctxt->krb5_ctx, ccache); + + restore_uid(); + + return (0); +} + +int +auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password) +{ + krb5_error_code problem; + + if (authctxt->pw == NULL) + return (0); + + temporarily_use_uid(authctxt->pw); + + problem = krb5_init(authctxt); + if (problem) + goto out; + + problem = krb5_parse_name(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->pw->pw_name, + &authctxt->krb5_user); + if (problem) + goto out; + + problem = krb5_cc_gen_new(authctxt->krb5_ctx, &krb5_mcc_ops, + &authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache); + if (problem) + goto out; + + problem = krb5_cc_initialize(authctxt->krb5_ctx, + authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache, authctxt->krb5_user); + if (problem) + goto out; + + problem = krb5_verify_user(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_user, + authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache, password, 1, NULL); + if (problem) + goto out; + + authctxt->krb5_ticket_file = (char *)krb5_cc_get_name(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache); + + out: + restore_uid(); + + if (problem) { + debug("Kerberos password authentication failed: %s", + krb5_get_err_text(authctxt->krb5_ctx, problem)); + + krb5_cleanup_proc(authctxt); + + if (options.kerberos_or_local_passwd) + return (-1); + else + return (0); + } + return (1); +} + +void +krb5_cleanup_proc(void *context) +{ + Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)context; + + debug("krb5_cleanup_proc called"); + if (authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache) { + krb5_cc_destroy(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache); + authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache = NULL; + } + if (authctxt->krb5_user) { + krb5_free_principal(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_user); + authctxt->krb5_user = NULL; + } + if (authctxt->krb5_auth_ctx) { + krb5_auth_con_free(authctxt->krb5_ctx, + authctxt->krb5_auth_ctx); + authctxt->krb5_auth_ctx = NULL; + } + if (authctxt->krb5_ctx) { + krb5_free_context(authctxt->krb5_ctx); + authctxt->krb5_ctx = NULL; + } +} + +#endif /* KRB5 */ diff --git a/openssh/auth-options.c b/openssh/auth-options.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9f90437 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/auth-options.c @@ -0,0 +1,289 @@ +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + */ + +#include "includes.h" +RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-options.c,v 1.20 2001/08/30 20:36:34 stevesk Exp $"); + +#include "packet.h" +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "match.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "canohost.h" +#include "channels.h" +#include "auth-options.h" +#include "servconf.h" +#include "misc.h" + +/* Flags set authorized_keys flags */ +int no_port_forwarding_flag = 0; +int no_agent_forwarding_flag = 0; +int no_x11_forwarding_flag = 0; +int no_pty_flag = 0; + +/* "command=" option. */ +char *forced_command = NULL; + +/* "environment=" options. */ +struct envstring *custom_environment = NULL; + +extern ServerOptions options; + +void +auth_clear_options(void) +{ + no_agent_forwarding_flag = 0; + no_port_forwarding_flag = 0; + no_pty_flag = 0; + no_x11_forwarding_flag = 0; + while (custom_environment) { + struct envstring *ce = custom_environment; + custom_environment = ce->next; + xfree(ce->s); + xfree(ce); + } + if (forced_command) { + xfree(forced_command); + forced_command = NULL; + } + channel_clear_permitted_opens(); +} + +/* + * return 1 if access is granted, 0 if not. + * side effect: sets key option flags + */ +int +auth_parse_options(struct passwd *pw, char *opts, char *file, u_long linenum) +{ + const char *cp; + int i; + + /* reset options */ + auth_clear_options(); + + if (!opts) + return 1; + + while (*opts && *opts != ' ' && *opts != '\t') { + cp = "no-port-forwarding"; + if (strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) { + packet_send_debug("Port forwarding disabled."); + no_port_forwarding_flag = 1; + opts += strlen(cp); + goto next_option; + } + cp = "no-agent-forwarding"; + if (strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) { + packet_send_debug("Agent forwarding disabled."); + no_agent_forwarding_flag = 1; + opts += strlen(cp); + goto next_option; + } + cp = "no-X11-forwarding"; + if (strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) { + packet_send_debug("X11 forwarding disabled."); + no_x11_forwarding_flag = 1; + opts += strlen(cp); + goto next_option; + } + cp = "no-pty"; + if (strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) { + packet_send_debug("Pty allocation disabled."); + no_pty_flag = 1; + opts += strlen(cp); + goto next_option; + } + cp = "command=\""; + if (strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) { + opts += strlen(cp); + forced_command = xmalloc(strlen(opts) + 1); + i = 0; + while (*opts) { + if (*opts == '"') + break; + if (*opts == '\\' && opts[1] == '"') { + opts += 2; + forced_command[i++] = '"'; + continue; + } + forced_command[i++] = *opts++; + } + if (!*opts) { + debug("%.100s, line %lu: missing end quote", + file, linenum); + packet_send_debug("%.100s, line %lu: missing end quote", + file, linenum); + xfree(forced_command); + forced_command = NULL; + goto bad_option; + } + forced_command[i] = 0; + packet_send_debug("Forced command: %.900s", forced_command); + opts++; + goto next_option; + } + cp = "environment=\""; + if (strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) { + char *s; + struct envstring *new_envstring; + + opts += strlen(cp); + s = xmalloc(strlen(opts) + 1); + i = 0; + while (*opts) { + if (*opts == '"') + break; + if (*opts == '\\' && opts[1] == '"') { + opts += 2; + s[i++] = '"'; + continue; + } + s[i++] = *opts++; + } + if (!*opts) { + debug("%.100s, line %lu: missing end quote", + file, linenum); + packet_send_debug("%.100s, line %lu: missing end quote", + file, linenum); + xfree(s); + goto bad_option; + } + s[i] = 0; + packet_send_debug("Adding to environment: %.900s", s); + debug("Adding to environment: %.900s", s); + opts++; + new_envstring = xmalloc(sizeof(struct envstring)); + new_envstring->s = s; + new_envstring->next = custom_environment; + custom_environment = new_envstring; + goto next_option; + } + cp = "from=\""; + if (strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) { + const char *remote_ip = get_remote_ipaddr(); + const char *remote_host = get_canonical_hostname( + options.reverse_mapping_check); + char *patterns = xmalloc(strlen(opts) + 1); + + opts += strlen(cp); + i = 0; + while (*opts) { + if (*opts == '"') + break; + if (*opts == '\\' && opts[1] == '"') { + opts += 2; + patterns[i++] = '"'; + continue; + } + patterns[i++] = *opts++; + } + if (!*opts) { + debug("%.100s, line %lu: missing end quote", + file, linenum); + packet_send_debug("%.100s, line %lu: missing end quote", + file, linenum); + xfree(patterns); + goto bad_option; + } + patterns[i] = 0; + opts++; + if (match_host_and_ip(remote_host, remote_ip, + patterns) != 1) { + xfree(patterns); + log("Authentication tried for %.100s with " + "correct key but not from a permitted " + "host (host=%.200s, ip=%.200s).", + pw->pw_name, remote_host, remote_ip); + packet_send_debug("Your host '%.200s' is not " + "permitted to use this key for login.", + remote_host); + /* deny access */ + return 0; + } + xfree(patterns); + /* Host name matches. */ + goto next_option; + } + cp = "permitopen=\""; + if (strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) { + char host[256], sport[6]; + u_short port; + char *patterns = xmalloc(strlen(opts) + 1); + + opts += strlen(cp); + i = 0; + while (*opts) { + if (*opts == '"') + break; + if (*opts == '\\' && opts[1] == '"') { + opts += 2; + patterns[i++] = '"'; + continue; + } + patterns[i++] = *opts++; + } + if (!*opts) { + debug("%.100s, line %lu: missing end quote", + file, linenum); + packet_send_debug("%.100s, line %lu: missing end quote", + file, linenum); + xfree(patterns); + goto bad_option; + } + patterns[i] = 0; + opts++; + if (sscanf(patterns, "%255[^:]:%5[0-9]", host, sport) != 2 && + sscanf(patterns, "%255[^/]/%5[0-9]", host, sport) != 2) { + debug("%.100s, line %lu: Bad permitopen specification " + "<%.100s>", file, linenum, patterns); + packet_send_debug("%.100s, line %lu: " + "Bad permitopen specification", file, linenum); + xfree(patterns); + goto bad_option; + } + if ((port = a2port(sport)) == 0) { + debug("%.100s, line %lu: Bad permitopen port <%.100s>", + file, linenum, sport); + packet_send_debug("%.100s, line %lu: " + "Bad permitopen port", file, linenum); + xfree(patterns); + goto bad_option; + } + if (options.allow_tcp_forwarding) + channel_add_permitted_opens(host, port); + xfree(patterns); + goto next_option; + } +next_option: + /* + * Skip the comma, and move to the next option + * (or break out if there are no more). + */ + if (!*opts) + fatal("Bugs in auth-options.c option processing."); + if (*opts == ' ' || *opts == '\t') + break; /* End of options. */ + if (*opts != ',') + goto bad_option; + opts++; + /* Process the next option. */ + } + /* grant access */ + return 1; + +bad_option: + log("Bad options in %.100s file, line %lu: %.50s", + file, linenum, opts); + packet_send_debug("Bad options in %.100s file, line %lu: %.50s", + file, linenum, opts); + /* deny access */ + return 0; +} diff --git a/openssh/auth-options.h b/openssh/auth-options.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3b2ce34 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/auth-options.h @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * Functions to interface with the SSH_AUTHENTICATION_FD socket. + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + */ + +/* $OpenBSD: auth-options.h,v 1.10 2001/06/26 17:27:22 markus Exp $ */ + +#ifndef AUTH_OPTIONS_H +#define AUTH_OPTIONS_H + +/* Linked list of custom environment strings */ +struct envstring { + struct envstring *next; + char *s; +}; + +/* Flags that may be set in authorized_keys options. */ +extern int no_port_forwarding_flag; +extern int no_agent_forwarding_flag; +extern int no_x11_forwarding_flag; +extern int no_pty_flag; +extern char *forced_command; +extern struct envstring *custom_environment; + +int auth_parse_options(struct passwd *, char *, char *, u_long); +void auth_clear_options(void); + +#endif diff --git a/openssh/auth-pam.c b/openssh/auth-pam.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..801c9eb --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/auth-pam.c @@ -0,0 +1,426 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#ifdef USE_PAM +#include "ssh.h" +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "auth-pam.h" +#include "servconf.h" +#include "canohost.h" +#include "readpass.h" + +extern char *__progname; + +RCSID("$Id$"); + +#define NEW_AUTHTOK_MSG \ + "Warning: Your password has expired, please change it now" + +static int do_pam_conversation(int num_msg, const struct pam_message **msg, + struct pam_response **resp, void *appdata_ptr); + +/* module-local variables */ +static struct pam_conv conv = { + do_pam_conversation, + NULL +}; +static char *__pam_msg = NULL; +static pam_handle_t *__pamh = NULL; +static const char *__pampasswd = NULL; + +/* states for do_pam_conversation() */ +enum { INITIAL_LOGIN, OTHER } pamstate = INITIAL_LOGIN; +/* remember whether pam_acct_mgmt() returned PAM_NEWAUTHTOK_REQD */ +static int password_change_required = 0; +/* remember whether the last pam_authenticate() succeeded or not */ +static int was_authenticated = 0; + +/* Remember what has been initialised */ +static int session_opened = 0; +static int creds_set = 0; + +/* accessor which allows us to switch conversation structs according to + * the authentication method being used */ +void do_pam_set_conv(struct pam_conv *conv) +{ + pam_set_item(__pamh, PAM_CONV, conv); +} + +/* start an authentication run */ +int do_pam_authenticate(int flags) +{ + int retval = pam_authenticate(__pamh, flags); + was_authenticated = (retval == PAM_SUCCESS); + return retval; +} + +/* + * PAM conversation function. + * There are two states this can run in. + * + * INITIAL_LOGIN mode simply feeds the password from the client into + * PAM in response to PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF, and collects output + * messages with into __pam_msg. This is used during initial + * authentication to bypass the normal PAM password prompt. + * + * OTHER mode handles PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF with read_passphrase() + * and outputs messages to stderr. This mode is used if pam_chauthtok() + * is called to update expired passwords. + */ +static int do_pam_conversation(int num_msg, const struct pam_message **msg, + struct pam_response **resp, void *appdata_ptr) +{ + struct pam_response *reply; + int count; + char buf[1024]; + + /* PAM will free this later */ + reply = malloc(num_msg * sizeof(*reply)); + if (reply == NULL) + return PAM_CONV_ERR; + + for (count = 0; count < num_msg; count++) { + if (pamstate == INITIAL_LOGIN) { + /* + * We can't use stdio yet, queue messages for + * printing later + */ + switch(PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, count, msg_style)) { + case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON: + free(reply); + return PAM_CONV_ERR; + case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF: + if (__pampasswd == NULL) { + free(reply); + return PAM_CONV_ERR; + } + reply[count].resp = xstrdup(__pampasswd); + reply[count].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS; + break; + case PAM_ERROR_MSG: + case PAM_TEXT_INFO: + if ((*msg)[count].msg != NULL) { + message_cat(&__pam_msg, + PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, count, msg)); + } + reply[count].resp = xstrdup(""); + reply[count].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS; + break; + default: + free(reply); + return PAM_CONV_ERR; + } + } else { + /* + * stdio is connected, so interact directly + */ + switch(PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, count, msg_style)) { + case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON: + fputs(PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, count, msg), stderr); + fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), stdin); + reply[count].resp = xstrdup(buf); + reply[count].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS; + break; + case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF: + reply[count].resp = + read_passphrase(PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, count, + msg), RP_ALLOW_STDIN); + reply[count].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS; + break; + case PAM_ERROR_MSG: + case PAM_TEXT_INFO: + if ((*msg)[count].msg != NULL) + fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", + PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, count, msg)); + reply[count].resp = xstrdup(""); + reply[count].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS; + break; + default: + free(reply); + return PAM_CONV_ERR; + } + } + } + + *resp = reply; + + return PAM_SUCCESS; +} + +/* Called at exit to cleanly shutdown PAM */ +void do_pam_cleanup_proc(void *context) +{ + int pam_retval = PAM_SUCCESS; + + if (__pamh && session_opened) { + pam_retval = pam_close_session(__pamh, 0); + if (pam_retval != PAM_SUCCESS) + log("Cannot close PAM session[%d]: %.200s", + pam_retval, PAM_STRERROR(__pamh, pam_retval)); + } + + if (__pamh && creds_set) { + pam_retval = pam_setcred(__pamh, PAM_DELETE_CRED); + if (pam_retval != PAM_SUCCESS) + debug("Cannot delete credentials[%d]: %.200s", + pam_retval, PAM_STRERROR(__pamh, pam_retval)); + } + + if (__pamh) { + pam_retval = pam_end(__pamh, pam_retval); + if (pam_retval != PAM_SUCCESS) + log("Cannot release PAM authentication[%d]: %.200s", + pam_retval, PAM_STRERROR(__pamh, pam_retval)); + } +} + +/* Attempt password authentation using PAM */ +int auth_pam_password(struct passwd *pw, const char *password) +{ + extern ServerOptions options; + int pam_retval; + + do_pam_set_conv(&conv); + + /* deny if no user. */ + if (pw == NULL) + return 0; + if (pw->pw_uid == 0 && options.permit_root_login == PERMIT_NO_PASSWD) + return 0; + if (*password == '\0' && options.permit_empty_passwd == 0) + return 0; + + __pampasswd = password; + + pamstate = INITIAL_LOGIN; + pam_retval = do_pam_authenticate( + options.permit_empty_passwd == 0 ? PAM_DISALLOW_NULL_AUTHTOK : 0); + if (pam_retval == PAM_SUCCESS) { + debug("PAM Password authentication accepted for " + "user \"%.100s\"", pw->pw_name); + return 1; + } else { + debug("PAM Password authentication for \"%.100s\" " + "failed[%d]: %s", pw->pw_name, pam_retval, + PAM_STRERROR(__pamh, pam_retval)); + return 0; + } +} + +/* Do account management using PAM */ +int do_pam_account(char *username, char *remote_user) +{ + int pam_retval; + + do_pam_set_conv(&conv); + + if (remote_user) { + debug("PAM setting ruser to \"%.200s\"", remote_user); + pam_retval = pam_set_item(__pamh, PAM_RUSER, remote_user); + if (pam_retval != PAM_SUCCESS) + fatal("PAM set ruser failed[%d]: %.200s", pam_retval, + PAM_STRERROR(__pamh, pam_retval)); + } + + pam_retval = pam_acct_mgmt(__pamh, 0); + switch (pam_retval) { + case PAM_SUCCESS: + /* This is what we want */ + break; + case PAM_NEW_AUTHTOK_REQD: + message_cat(&__pam_msg, NEW_AUTHTOK_MSG); + /* flag that password change is necessary */ + password_change_required = 1; + break; + default: + log("PAM rejected by account configuration[%d]: " + "%.200s", pam_retval, PAM_STRERROR(__pamh, + pam_retval)); + return(0); + } + + return(1); +} + +/* Do PAM-specific session initialisation */ +void do_pam_session(char *username, const char *ttyname) +{ + int pam_retval; + + do_pam_set_conv(&conv); + + if (ttyname != NULL) { + debug("PAM setting tty to \"%.200s\"", ttyname); + pam_retval = pam_set_item(__pamh, PAM_TTY, ttyname); + if (pam_retval != PAM_SUCCESS) + fatal("PAM set tty failed[%d]: %.200s", + pam_retval, PAM_STRERROR(__pamh, pam_retval)); + } + + pam_retval = pam_open_session(__pamh, 0); + if (pam_retval != PAM_SUCCESS) + fatal("PAM session setup failed[%d]: %.200s", + pam_retval, PAM_STRERROR(__pamh, pam_retval)); + + session_opened = 1; +} + +/* Set PAM credentials */ +void do_pam_setcred(int init) +{ + int pam_retval; + + do_pam_set_conv(&conv); + + debug("PAM establishing creds"); + pam_retval = pam_setcred(__pamh, + init ? PAM_ESTABLISH_CRED : PAM_REINITIALIZE_CRED); + if (pam_retval != PAM_SUCCESS) { + if (was_authenticated) + fatal("PAM setcred failed[%d]: %.200s", + pam_retval, PAM_STRERROR(__pamh, pam_retval)); + else + debug("PAM setcred failed[%d]: %.200s", + pam_retval, PAM_STRERROR(__pamh, pam_retval)); + } else + creds_set = 1; +} + +/* accessor function for file scope static variable */ +int is_pam_password_change_required(void) +{ + return password_change_required; +} + +/* + * Have user change authentication token if pam_acct_mgmt() indicated + * it was expired. This needs to be called after an interactive + * session is established and the user's pty is connected to + * stdin/stout/stderr. + */ +void do_pam_chauthtok(void) +{ + int pam_retval; + + do_pam_set_conv(&conv); + + if (password_change_required) { + pamstate = OTHER; + pam_retval = pam_chauthtok(__pamh, PAM_CHANGE_EXPIRED_AUTHTOK); + if (pam_retval != PAM_SUCCESS) + fatal("PAM pam_chauthtok failed[%d]: %.200s", + pam_retval, PAM_STRERROR(__pamh, pam_retval)); + } +} + +/* Cleanly shutdown PAM */ +void finish_pam(void) +{ + do_pam_cleanup_proc(NULL); + fatal_remove_cleanup(&do_pam_cleanup_proc, NULL); +} + +/* Start PAM authentication for specified account */ +void start_pam(const char *user) +{ + int pam_retval; + extern ServerOptions options; + extern u_int utmp_len; + const char *rhost; + + debug("Starting up PAM with username \"%.200s\"", user); + + pam_retval = pam_start(SSHD_PAM_SERVICE, user, &conv, &__pamh); + + if (pam_retval != PAM_SUCCESS) + fatal("PAM initialisation failed[%d]: %.200s", + pam_retval, PAM_STRERROR(__pamh, pam_retval)); + + rhost = get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.reverse_mapping_check); + debug("PAM setting rhost to \"%.200s\"", rhost); + + pam_retval = pam_set_item(__pamh, PAM_RHOST, rhost); + if (pam_retval != PAM_SUCCESS) + fatal("PAM set rhost failed[%d]: %.200s", pam_retval, + PAM_STRERROR(__pamh, pam_retval)); +#ifdef PAM_TTY_KLUDGE + /* + * Some PAM modules (e.g. pam_time) require a TTY to operate, + * and will fail in various stupid ways if they don't get one. + * sshd doesn't set the tty until too late in the auth process and may + * not even need one (for tty-less connections) + * Kludge: Set a fake PAM_TTY + */ + pam_retval = pam_set_item(__pamh, PAM_TTY, "NODEVssh"); + if (pam_retval != PAM_SUCCESS) + fatal("PAM set tty failed[%d]: %.200s", + pam_retval, PAM_STRERROR(__pamh, pam_retval)); +#endif /* PAM_TTY_KLUDGE */ + + fatal_add_cleanup(&do_pam_cleanup_proc, NULL); +} + +/* Return list of PAM enviornment strings */ +char **fetch_pam_environment(void) +{ +#ifdef HAVE_PAM_GETENVLIST + return(pam_getenvlist(__pamh)); +#else /* HAVE_PAM_GETENVLIST */ + return(NULL); +#endif /* HAVE_PAM_GETENVLIST */ +} + +/* Print any messages that have been generated during authentication */ +/* or account checking to stderr */ +void print_pam_messages(void) +{ + if (__pam_msg != NULL) + fputs(__pam_msg, stderr); +} + +/* Append a message to buffer */ +void message_cat(char **p, const char *a) +{ + char *cp; + size_t new_len; + + new_len = strlen(a); + + if (*p) { + size_t len = strlen(*p); + + *p = xrealloc(*p, new_len + len + 2); + cp = *p + len; + } else + *p = cp = xmalloc(new_len + 2); + + memcpy(cp, a, new_len); + cp[new_len] = '\n'; + cp[new_len + 1] = '\0'; +} + +#endif /* USE_PAM */ diff --git a/openssh/auth-pam.h b/openssh/auth-pam.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..30e4df5 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/auth-pam.h @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +/* $Id$ */ + +#include "includes.h" +#ifdef USE_PAM + +#include /* For struct passwd */ + +void start_pam(const char *user); +void finish_pam(void); +int auth_pam_password(struct passwd *pw, const char *password); +char **fetch_pam_environment(void); +int do_pam_authenticate(int flags); +int do_pam_account(char *username, char *remote_user); +void do_pam_session(char *username, const char *ttyname); +void do_pam_setcred(int init); +void print_pam_messages(void); +int is_pam_password_change_required(void); +void do_pam_chauthtok(void); +void do_pam_set_conv(struct pam_conv *); +void message_cat(char **p, const char *a); + +#endif /* USE_PAM */ diff --git a/openssh/auth-passwd.c b/openssh/auth-passwd.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..988297c --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/auth-passwd.c @@ -0,0 +1,222 @@ +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * Password authentication. This file contains the functions to check whether + * the password is valid for the user. + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + * + * Copyright (c) 1999 Dug Song. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" +RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-passwd.c,v 1.23 2001/06/26 16:15:23 dugsong Exp $"); + +#if !defined(USE_PAM) && !defined(HAVE_OSF_SIA) + +#include "packet.h" +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "servconf.h" +#include "auth.h" + +#ifdef HAVE_CRYPT_H +# include +#endif +#ifdef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE +# include +#endif +#ifdef __hpux +# include +# include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SCO_PROTECTED_PW +# include +# include +# include +#endif /* HAVE_SCO_PROTECTED_PW */ +#if defined(HAVE_SHADOW_H) && !defined(DISABLE_SHADOW) +# include +#endif +#if defined(HAVE_GETPWANAM) && !defined(DISABLE_SHADOW) +# include +# include +# include +#endif +#if defined(HAVE_MD5_PASSWORDS) && !defined(HAVE_MD5_CRYPT) +# include "md5crypt.h" +#endif /* defined(HAVE_MD5_PASSWORDS) && !defined(HAVE_MD5_CRYPT) */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN +#undef ERROR +#include +#include +#define is_winnt (GetVersion() < 0x80000000) +#endif + + +extern ServerOptions options; + +/* + * Tries to authenticate the user using password. Returns true if + * authentication succeeds. + */ +int +auth_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password) +{ + struct passwd * pw = authctxt->pw; + char *encrypted_password; + char *pw_password; + char *salt; +#ifdef __hpux + struct pr_passwd *spw; +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SCO_PROTECTED_PW + struct pr_passwd *spw; +#endif /* HAVE_SCO_PROTECTED_PW */ +#if defined(HAVE_SHADOW_H) && !defined(DISABLE_SHADOW) + struct spwd *spw; +#endif +#if defined(HAVE_GETPWANAM) && !defined(DISABLE_SHADOW) + struct passwd_adjunct *spw; +#endif +#ifdef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE + char *authmsg; + char *loginmsg; + int reenter = 1; +#endif + + /* deny if no user. */ + if (pw == NULL) + return 0; +#ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN + if (pw->pw_uid == 0 && options.permit_root_login != PERMIT_YES) + return 0; +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN + /* + * Empty password is only possible on NT if the user has _really_ + * an empty password and authentication is done, though. + */ + if (!is_winnt) +#endif + if (*password == '\0' && options.permit_empty_passwd == 0) + return 0; +#ifdef KRB5 + if (options.kerberos_authentication == 1) { + int ret = auth_krb5_password(authctxt, password); + if (ret == 1 || ret == 0) + return ret; + /* Fall back to ordinary passwd authentication. */ + } +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN + if (is_winnt) { + HANDLE hToken = cygwin_logon_user(pw, password); + + if (hToken == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) + return 0; + cygwin_set_impersonation_token(hToken); + return 1; + } +#endif +#ifdef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE + return (authenticate(pw->pw_name,password,&reenter,&authmsg) == 0); +#endif +#ifdef KRB4 + if (options.kerberos_authentication == 1) { + int ret = auth_krb4_password(authctxt, password); + if (ret == 1 || ret == 0) + return ret; + /* Fall back to ordinary passwd authentication. */ + } +#endif +#ifdef BSD_AUTH + if (auth_userokay(pw->pw_name, authctxt->style, "auth-ssh", + (char *)password) == 0) + return 0; + else + return 1; +#endif + pw_password = pw->pw_passwd; + + /* + * Various interfaces to shadow or protected password data + */ +#if defined(HAVE_SHADOW_H) && !defined(DISABLE_SHADOW) + spw = getspnam(pw->pw_name); + if (spw != NULL) + pw_password = spw->sp_pwdp; +#endif /* defined(HAVE_SHADOW_H) && !defined(DISABLE_SHADOW) */ + +#ifdef HAVE_SCO_PROTECTED_PW + spw = getprpwnam(pw->pw_name); + if (spw != NULL) + pw_password = spw->ufld.fd_encrypt; +#endif /* HAVE_SCO_PROTECTED_PW */ + +#if defined(HAVE_GETPWANAM) && !defined(DISABLE_SHADOW) + if (issecure() && (spw = getpwanam(pw->pw_name)) != NULL) + pw_password = spw->pwa_passwd; +#endif /* defined(HAVE_GETPWANAM) && !defined(DISABLE_SHADOW) */ + +#if defined(__hpux) + if (iscomsec() && (spw = getprpwnam(pw->pw_name)) != NULL) + pw_password = spw->ufld.fd_encrypt; +#endif /* defined(__hpux) */ + + /* Check for users with no password. */ + if ((password[0] == '\0') && (pw_password[0] == '\0')) + return 1; + + if (pw_password[0] != '\0') + salt = pw_password; + else + salt = "xx"; + +#ifdef HAVE_MD5_PASSWORDS + if (is_md5_salt(salt)) + encrypted_password = md5_crypt(password, salt); + else + encrypted_password = crypt(password, salt); +#else /* HAVE_MD5_PASSWORDS */ +# ifdef __hpux + if (iscomsec()) + encrypted_password = bigcrypt(password, salt); + else + encrypted_password = crypt(password, salt); +# else + encrypted_password = crypt(password, salt); +# endif /* __hpux */ +#endif /* HAVE_MD5_PASSWORDS */ + + /* Authentication is accepted if the encrypted passwords are identical. */ + return (strcmp(encrypted_password, pw_password) == 0); +} +#endif /* !USE_PAM && !HAVE_OSF_SIA */ diff --git a/openssh/auth-rh-rsa.c b/openssh/auth-rh-rsa.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8a486b3 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/auth-rh-rsa.c @@ -0,0 +1,89 @@ +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * Rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication combined with RSA host + * authentication. + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + */ + +#include "includes.h" +RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-rh-rsa.c,v 1.26 2001/11/07 22:41:51 markus Exp $"); + +#include "packet.h" +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "uidswap.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "servconf.h" +#include "key.h" +#include "hostfile.h" +#include "pathnames.h" +#include "auth.h" +#include "canohost.h" + +/* + * Tries to authenticate the user using the .rhosts file and the host using + * its host key. Returns true if authentication succeeds. + */ + +int +auth_rhosts_rsa(struct passwd *pw, const char *client_user, RSA *client_host_key) +{ + extern ServerOptions options; + const char *canonical_hostname; + HostStatus host_status; + Key *client_key; + + debug("Trying rhosts with RSA host authentication for client user %.100s", client_user); + + if (pw == NULL || client_host_key == NULL) + return 0; + + /* Check if we would accept it using rhosts authentication. */ + if (!auth_rhosts(pw, client_user)) + return 0; + + canonical_hostname = get_canonical_hostname( + options.reverse_mapping_check); + + debug("Rhosts RSA authentication: canonical host %.900s", canonical_hostname); + + /* wrap the RSA key into a 'generic' key */ + client_key = key_new(KEY_RSA1); + BN_copy(client_key->rsa->e, client_host_key->e); + BN_copy(client_key->rsa->n, client_host_key->n); + + host_status = check_key_in_hostfiles(pw, client_key, canonical_hostname, + _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_HOSTFILE, + options.ignore_user_known_hosts ? NULL : _PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE); + + key_free(client_key); + + if (host_status != HOST_OK) { + debug("Rhosts with RSA host authentication denied: unknown or invalid host key"); + packet_send_debug("Your host key cannot be verified: unknown or invalid host key."); + return 0; + } + /* A matching host key was found and is known. */ + + /* Perform the challenge-response dialog with the client for the host key. */ + if (!auth_rsa_challenge_dialog(client_host_key)) { + log("Client on %.800s failed to respond correctly to host authentication.", + canonical_hostname); + return 0; + } + /* + * We have authenticated the user using .rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv, + * and the host using RSA. We accept the authentication. + */ + + verbose("Rhosts with RSA host authentication accepted for %.100s, %.100s on %.700s.", + pw->pw_name, client_user, canonical_hostname); + packet_send_debug("Rhosts with RSA host authentication accepted."); + return 1; +} diff --git a/openssh/auth-rhosts.c b/openssh/auth-rhosts.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9ba64db --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/auth-rhosts.c @@ -0,0 +1,285 @@ +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * Rhosts authentication. This file contains code to check whether to admit + * the login based on rhosts authentication. This file also processes + * /etc/hosts.equiv. + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + */ + +#include "includes.h" +RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-rhosts.c,v 1.24 2001/06/23 15:12:17 itojun Exp $"); + +#include "packet.h" +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "uidswap.h" +#include "pathnames.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "servconf.h" +#include "canohost.h" +#include "auth.h" + +/* import */ +extern ServerOptions options; + +/* + * This function processes an rhosts-style file (.rhosts, .shosts, or + * /etc/hosts.equiv). This returns true if authentication can be granted + * based on the file, and returns zero otherwise. + */ + +static int +check_rhosts_file(const char *filename, const char *hostname, + const char *ipaddr, const char *client_user, + const char *server_user) +{ + FILE *f; + char buf[1024]; /* Must not be larger than host, user, dummy below. */ + + /* Open the .rhosts file, deny if unreadable */ + f = fopen(filename, "r"); + if (!f) + return 0; + + while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f)) { + /* All three must be at least as big as buf to avoid overflows. */ + char hostbuf[1024], userbuf[1024], dummy[1024], *host, *user, *cp; + int negated; + + for (cp = buf; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++) + ; + if (*cp == '#' || *cp == '\n' || !*cp) + continue; + + /* + * NO_PLUS is supported at least on OSF/1. We skip it (we + * don't ever support the plus syntax). + */ + if (strncmp(cp, "NO_PLUS", 7) == 0) + continue; + + /* + * This should be safe because each buffer is as big as the + * whole string, and thus cannot be overwritten. + */ + switch (sscanf(buf, "%s %s %s", hostbuf, userbuf, dummy)) { + case 0: + packet_send_debug("Found empty line in %.100s.", filename); + continue; + case 1: + /* Host name only. */ + strlcpy(userbuf, server_user, sizeof(userbuf)); + break; + case 2: + /* Got both host and user name. */ + break; + case 3: + packet_send_debug("Found garbage in %.100s.", filename); + continue; + default: + /* Weird... */ + continue; + } + + host = hostbuf; + user = userbuf; + negated = 0; + + /* Process negated host names, or positive netgroups. */ + if (host[0] == '-') { + negated = 1; + host++; + } else if (host[0] == '+') + host++; + + if (user[0] == '-') { + negated = 1; + user++; + } else if (user[0] == '+') + user++; + + /* Check for empty host/user names (particularly '+'). */ + if (!host[0] || !user[0]) { + /* We come here if either was '+' or '-'. */ + packet_send_debug("Ignoring wild host/user names in %.100s.", + filename); + continue; + } + /* Verify that host name matches. */ + if (host[0] == '@') { + if (!innetgr(host + 1, hostname, NULL, NULL) && + !innetgr(host + 1, ipaddr, NULL, NULL)) + continue; + } else if (strcasecmp(host, hostname) && strcmp(host, ipaddr) != 0) + continue; /* Different hostname. */ + + /* Verify that user name matches. */ + if (user[0] == '@') { + if (!innetgr(user + 1, NULL, client_user, NULL)) + continue; + } else if (strcmp(user, client_user) != 0) + continue; /* Different username. */ + + /* Found the user and host. */ + fclose(f); + + /* If the entry was negated, deny access. */ + if (negated) { + packet_send_debug("Matched negative entry in %.100s.", + filename); + return 0; + } + /* Accept authentication. */ + return 1; + } + + /* Authentication using this file denied. */ + fclose(f); + return 0; +} + +/* + * Tries to authenticate the user using the .shosts or .rhosts file. Returns + * true if authentication succeeds. If ignore_rhosts is true, only + * /etc/hosts.equiv will be considered (.rhosts and .shosts are ignored). + */ + +int +auth_rhosts(struct passwd *pw, const char *client_user) +{ + const char *hostname, *ipaddr; + int ret; + + hostname = get_canonical_hostname(options.reverse_mapping_check); + ipaddr = get_remote_ipaddr(); + ret = auth_rhosts2(pw, client_user, hostname, ipaddr); + return ret; +} + +int +auth_rhosts2(struct passwd *pw, const char *client_user, const char *hostname, + const char *ipaddr) +{ + char buf[1024]; + struct stat st; + static const char *rhosts_files[] = {".shosts", ".rhosts", NULL}; + u_int rhosts_file_index; + + debug2("auth_rhosts2: clientuser %s hostname %s ipaddr %s", + client_user, hostname, ipaddr); + + /* no user given */ + if (pw == NULL) + return 0; + + /* Switch to the user's uid. */ + temporarily_use_uid(pw); + /* + * Quick check: if the user has no .shosts or .rhosts files, return + * failure immediately without doing costly lookups from name + * servers. + */ + for (rhosts_file_index = 0; rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index]; + rhosts_file_index++) { + /* Check users .rhosts or .shosts. */ + snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.500s/%.100s", + pw->pw_dir, rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index]); + if (stat(buf, &st) >= 0) + break; + } + /* Switch back to privileged uid. */ + restore_uid(); + + /* Deny if The user has no .shosts or .rhosts file and there are no system-wide files. */ + if (!rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index] && + stat(_PATH_RHOSTS_EQUIV, &st) < 0 && + stat(_PATH_SSH_HOSTS_EQUIV, &st) < 0) + return 0; + + /* If not logging in as superuser, try /etc/hosts.equiv and shosts.equiv. */ + if (pw->pw_uid != 0) { + if (check_rhosts_file(_PATH_RHOSTS_EQUIV, hostname, ipaddr, client_user, + pw->pw_name)) { + packet_send_debug("Accepted for %.100s [%.100s] by /etc/hosts.equiv.", + hostname, ipaddr); + return 1; + } + if (check_rhosts_file(_PATH_SSH_HOSTS_EQUIV, hostname, ipaddr, client_user, + pw->pw_name)) { + packet_send_debug("Accepted for %.100s [%.100s] by %.100s.", + hostname, ipaddr, _PATH_SSH_HOSTS_EQUIV); + return 1; + } + } + /* + * Check that the home directory is owned by root or the user, and is + * not group or world writable. + */ + if (stat(pw->pw_dir, &st) < 0) { + log("Rhosts authentication refused for %.100s: no home directory %.200s", + pw->pw_name, pw->pw_dir); + packet_send_debug("Rhosts authentication refused for %.100s: no home directory %.200s", + pw->pw_name, pw->pw_dir); + return 0; + } + if (options.strict_modes && + ((st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid) || + (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)) { + log("Rhosts authentication refused for %.100s: bad ownership or modes for home directory.", + pw->pw_name); + packet_send_debug("Rhosts authentication refused for %.100s: bad ownership or modes for home directory.", + pw->pw_name); + return 0; + } + /* Temporarily use the user's uid. */ + temporarily_use_uid(pw); + + /* Check all .rhosts files (currently .shosts and .rhosts). */ + for (rhosts_file_index = 0; rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index]; + rhosts_file_index++) { + /* Check users .rhosts or .shosts. */ + snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.500s/%.100s", + pw->pw_dir, rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index]); + if (stat(buf, &st) < 0) + continue; + + /* + * Make sure that the file is either owned by the user or by + * root, and make sure it is not writable by anyone but the + * owner. This is to help avoid novices accidentally + * allowing access to their account by anyone. + */ + if (options.strict_modes && + ((st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid) || + (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)) { + log("Rhosts authentication refused for %.100s: bad modes for %.200s", + pw->pw_name, buf); + packet_send_debug("Bad file modes for %.200s", buf); + continue; + } + /* Check if we have been configured to ignore .rhosts and .shosts files. */ + if (options.ignore_rhosts) { + packet_send_debug("Server has been configured to ignore %.100s.", + rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index]); + continue; + } + /* Check if authentication is permitted by the file. */ + if (check_rhosts_file(buf, hostname, ipaddr, client_user, pw->pw_name)) { + packet_send_debug("Accepted by %.100s.", + rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index]); + /* Restore the privileged uid. */ + restore_uid(); + return 1; + } + } + + /* Restore the privileged uid. */ + restore_uid(); + return 0; +} diff --git a/openssh/auth-rsa.c b/openssh/auth-rsa.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..701d8bd --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/auth-rsa.c @@ -0,0 +1,273 @@ +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * RSA-based authentication. This code determines whether to admit a login + * based on RSA authentication. This file also contains functions to check + * validity of the host key. + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + */ + +#include "includes.h" +RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-rsa.c,v 1.44 2001/07/23 18:14:58 stevesk Exp $"); + +#include +#include + +#include "rsa.h" +#include "packet.h" +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "ssh1.h" +#include "mpaux.h" +#include "uidswap.h" +#include "match.h" +#include "auth-options.h" +#include "pathnames.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "servconf.h" +#include "auth.h" + +/* import */ +extern ServerOptions options; + +/* + * Session identifier that is used to bind key exchange and authentication + * responses to a particular session. + */ +extern u_char session_id[16]; + +/* + * The .ssh/authorized_keys file contains public keys, one per line, in the + * following format: + * options bits e n comment + * where bits, e and n are decimal numbers, + * and comment is any string of characters up to newline. The maximum + * length of a line is 8000 characters. See the documentation for a + * description of the options. + */ + +/* + * Performs the RSA authentication challenge-response dialog with the client, + * and returns true (non-zero) if the client gave the correct answer to + * our challenge; returns zero if the client gives a wrong answer. + */ + +int +auth_rsa_challenge_dialog(RSA *pk) +{ + BIGNUM *challenge, *encrypted_challenge; + BN_CTX *ctx; + u_char buf[32], mdbuf[16], response[16]; + MD5_CTX md; + u_int i; + int plen, len; + + encrypted_challenge = BN_new(); + challenge = BN_new(); + + /* Generate a random challenge. */ + BN_rand(challenge, 256, 0, 0); + ctx = BN_CTX_new(); + BN_mod(challenge, challenge, pk->n, ctx); + BN_CTX_free(ctx); + + /* Encrypt the challenge with the public key. */ + rsa_public_encrypt(encrypted_challenge, challenge, pk); + + /* Send the encrypted challenge to the client. */ + packet_start(SSH_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE); + packet_put_bignum(encrypted_challenge); + packet_send(); + BN_clear_free(encrypted_challenge); + packet_write_wait(); + + /* Wait for a response. */ + packet_read_expect(&plen, SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE); + packet_integrity_check(plen, 16, SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE); + for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) + response[i] = packet_get_char(); + + /* The response is MD5 of decrypted challenge plus session id. */ + len = BN_num_bytes(challenge); + if (len <= 0 || len > 32) + fatal("auth_rsa_challenge_dialog: bad challenge length %d", len); + memset(buf, 0, 32); + BN_bn2bin(challenge, buf + 32 - len); + MD5_Init(&md); + MD5_Update(&md, buf, 32); + MD5_Update(&md, session_id, 16); + MD5_Final(mdbuf, &md); + BN_clear_free(challenge); + + /* Verify that the response is the original challenge. */ + if (memcmp(response, mdbuf, 16) != 0) { + /* Wrong answer. */ + return 0; + } + /* Correct answer. */ + return 1; +} + +/* + * Performs the RSA authentication dialog with the client. This returns + * 0 if the client could not be authenticated, and 1 if authentication was + * successful. This may exit if there is a serious protocol violation. + */ + +int +auth_rsa(struct passwd *pw, BIGNUM *client_n) +{ + char line[8192], *file; + int authenticated; + u_int bits; + FILE *f; + u_long linenum = 0; + struct stat st; + RSA *pk; + + /* no user given */ + if (pw == NULL) + return 0; + + /* Temporarily use the user's uid. */ + temporarily_use_uid(pw); + + /* The authorized keys. */ + file = authorized_keys_file(pw); + debug("trying public RSA key file %s", file); + + /* Fail quietly if file does not exist */ + if (stat(file, &st) < 0) { + /* Restore the privileged uid. */ + restore_uid(); + xfree(file); + return 0; + } + /* Open the file containing the authorized keys. */ + f = fopen(file, "r"); + if (!f) { + /* Restore the privileged uid. */ + restore_uid(); + packet_send_debug("Could not open %.900s for reading.", file); + packet_send_debug("If your home is on an NFS volume, it may need to be world-readable."); + xfree(file); + return 0; + } + if (options.strict_modes && + secure_filename(f, file, pw, line, sizeof(line)) != 0) { + xfree(file); + fclose(f); + log("Authentication refused: %s", line); + packet_send_debug("Authentication refused: %s", line); + restore_uid(); + return 0; + } + /* Flag indicating whether authentication has succeeded. */ + authenticated = 0; + + pk = RSA_new(); + pk->e = BN_new(); + pk->n = BN_new(); + + /* + * Go though the accepted keys, looking for the current key. If + * found, perform a challenge-response dialog to verify that the + * user really has the corresponding private key. + */ + while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), f)) { + char *cp; + char *options; + + linenum++; + + /* Skip leading whitespace, empty and comment lines. */ + for (cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++) + ; + if (!*cp || *cp == '\n' || *cp == '#') + continue; + + /* + * Check if there are options for this key, and if so, + * save their starting address and skip the option part + * for now. If there are no options, set the starting + * address to NULL. + */ + if (*cp < '0' || *cp > '9') { + int quoted = 0; + options = cp; + for (; *cp && (quoted || (*cp != ' ' && *cp != '\t')); cp++) { + if (*cp == '\\' && cp[1] == '"') + cp++; /* Skip both */ + else if (*cp == '"') + quoted = !quoted; + } + } else + options = NULL; + + /* Parse the key from the line. */ + if (!auth_rsa_read_key(&cp, &bits, pk->e, pk->n)) { + debug("%.100s, line %lu: non ssh1 key syntax", + file, linenum); + continue; + } + /* cp now points to the comment part. */ + + /* Check if the we have found the desired key (identified by its modulus). */ + if (BN_cmp(pk->n, client_n) != 0) + continue; + + /* check the real bits */ + if (bits != BN_num_bits(pk->n)) + log("Warning: %s, line %lu: keysize mismatch: " + "actual %d vs. announced %d.", + file, linenum, BN_num_bits(pk->n), bits); + + /* We have found the desired key. */ + /* + * If our options do not allow this key to be used, + * do not send challenge. + */ + if (!auth_parse_options(pw, options, file, linenum)) + continue; + + /* Perform the challenge-response dialog for this key. */ + if (!auth_rsa_challenge_dialog(pk)) { + /* Wrong response. */ + verbose("Wrong response to RSA authentication challenge."); + packet_send_debug("Wrong response to RSA authentication challenge."); + continue; + } + /* + * Correct response. The client has been successfully + * authenticated. Note that we have not yet processed the + * options; this will be reset if the options cause the + * authentication to be rejected. + * Break out of the loop if authentication was successful; + * otherwise continue searching. + */ + authenticated = 1; + break; + } + + /* Restore the privileged uid. */ + restore_uid(); + + /* Close the file. */ + xfree(file); + fclose(f); + + RSA_free(pk); + + if (authenticated) + packet_send_debug("RSA authentication accepted."); + else + auth_clear_options(); + + /* Return authentication result. */ + return authenticated; +} diff --git a/openssh/auth-sia.c b/openssh/auth-sia.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4e947cd --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/auth-sia.c @@ -0,0 +1,107 @@ +#include "includes.h" + +#ifdef HAVE_OSF_SIA +#include "ssh.h" +#include "auth-sia.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "servconf.h" +#include "canohost.h" + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +extern ServerOptions options; +extern int saved_argc; +extern char **saved_argv; + +extern int errno; + +int +auth_sia_password(char *user, char *pass) +{ + int ret; + SIAENTITY *ent = NULL; + const char *host; + + host = get_canonical_hostname(options.reverse_mapping_check); + + if (!user || !pass) + return(0); + + if (sia_ses_init(&ent, saved_argc, saved_argv, host, user, NULL, 0, + NULL) != SIASUCCESS) + return(0); + + if ((ret = sia_ses_authent(NULL, pass, ent)) != SIASUCCESS) { + error("couldn't authenticate %s from %s", user, host); + if (ret & SIASTOP) + sia_ses_release(&ent); + return(0); + } + + sia_ses_release(&ent); + + return(1); +} + +void +session_setup_sia(char *user, char *tty) +{ + int ret; + struct passwd *pw; + SIAENTITY *ent = NULL; + const char *host; + + host = get_canonical_hostname (options.reverse_mapping_check); + + if (sia_ses_init(&ent, saved_argc, saved_argv, host, user, tty, 0, + NULL) != SIASUCCESS) { + error("sia_ses_init failed"); + exit(1); + } + + if ((pw = getpwnam(user)) == NULL) { + sia_ses_release(&ent); + error("getpwnam(%s) failed: %s", user, strerror(errno)); + exit(1); + } + if (sia_make_entity_pwd(pw, ent) != SIASUCCESS) { + sia_ses_release(&ent); + error("sia_make_entity_pwd failed"); + exit(1); + } + + ent->authtype = SIA_A_NONE; + if (sia_ses_estab(sia_collect_trm, ent) != SIASUCCESS) { + error("couldn't establish session for %s from %s", user, + host); + exit(1); + } + + if (setpriority(PRIO_PROCESS, 0, 0) == -1) { + sia_ses_release(&ent); + error("setpriority failed: %s", strerror (errno)); + exit(1); + } + + if (sia_ses_launch(sia_collect_trm, ent) != SIASUCCESS) { + error("couldn't launch session for %s from %s", user, host); + exit(1); + } + + sia_ses_release(&ent); + + if (setreuid(geteuid(), geteuid()) < 0) { + error("setreuid failed: %s", strerror (errno)); + exit(1); + } +} + +#endif /* HAVE_OSF_SIA */ + diff --git a/openssh/auth-sia.h b/openssh/auth-sia.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..eaa9333 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/auth-sia.h @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ +#include "includes.h" + +#ifdef HAVE_OSF_SIA + +int auth_sia_password(char *user, char *pass); +void session_setup_sia(char *user, char *tty); + +#endif /* HAVE_OSF_SIA */ diff --git a/openssh/auth-skey.c b/openssh/auth-skey.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f921fc1 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/auth-skey.c @@ -0,0 +1,97 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ +#include "includes.h" +RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-skey.c,v 1.12 2001/05/18 14:13:28 markus Exp $"); + +#ifdef SKEY + +#include + +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "auth.h" + +static void * +skey_init_ctx(Authctxt *authctxt) +{ + return authctxt; +} + +#define PROMPT "\nS/Key Password: " + +static int +skey_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **infotxt, + u_int* numprompts, char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on) +{ + Authctxt *authctxt = ctx; + char challenge[1024], *p; + int len; + struct skey skey; + + if (skeychallenge(&skey, authctxt->user, challenge) == -1) + return -1; + + *name = xstrdup(""); + *infotxt = xstrdup(""); + *numprompts = 1; + *prompts = xmalloc(*numprompts * sizeof(char*)); + *echo_on = xmalloc(*numprompts * sizeof(u_int)); + (*echo_on)[0] = 0; + + len = strlen(challenge) + strlen(PROMPT) + 1; + p = xmalloc(len); + p[0] = '\0'; + strlcat(p, challenge, len); + strlcat(p, PROMPT, len); + (*prompts)[0] = p; + + return 0; +} + +static int +skey_respond(void *ctx, u_int numresponses, char **responses) +{ + Authctxt *authctxt = ctx; + + if (authctxt->valid && + numresponses == 1 && + skey_haskey(authctxt->pw->pw_name) == 0 && + skey_passcheck(authctxt->pw->pw_name, responses[0]) != -1) + return 0; + return -1; +} + +static void +skey_free_ctx(void *ctx) +{ + /* we don't have a special context */ +} + +KbdintDevice skey_device = { + "skey", + skey_init_ctx, + skey_query, + skey_respond, + skey_free_ctx +}; +#endif /* SKEY */ diff --git a/openssh/auth.c b/openssh/auth.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2bf877d --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/auth.c @@ -0,0 +1,421 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" +RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.29 2001/11/08 20:02:24 markus Exp $"); + +#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_H +#include +#endif +#if defined(HAVE_SHADOW_H) && !defined(DISABLE_SHADOW) +#include +#endif /* defined(HAVE_SHADOW_H) && !defined(DISABLE_SHADOW) */ + +#ifdef HAVE_LIBGEN_H +#include +#endif + +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "match.h" +#include "groupaccess.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "servconf.h" +#include "auth.h" +#include "auth-options.h" +#include "canohost.h" +#include "buffer.h" +#include "bufaux.h" +#include "uidswap.h" +#include "tildexpand.h" + +/* import */ +extern ServerOptions options; + +/* + * Check if the user is allowed to log in via ssh. If user is listed + * in DenyUsers or one of user's groups is listed in DenyGroups, false + * will be returned. If AllowUsers isn't empty and user isn't listed + * there, or if AllowGroups isn't empty and one of user's groups isn't + * listed there, false will be returned. + * If the user's shell is not executable, false will be returned. + * Otherwise true is returned. + */ +int +allowed_user(struct passwd * pw) +{ + struct stat st; + const char *hostname = NULL, *ipaddr = NULL; + char *shell; + int i; +#ifdef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE + char *loginmsg; +#endif /* WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE */ +#if !defined(USE_PAM) && defined(HAVE_SHADOW_H) && \ + !defined(DISABLE_SHADOW) && defined(HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE) + struct spwd *spw; + + /* Shouldn't be called if pw is NULL, but better safe than sorry... */ + if (!pw || !pw->pw_name) + return 0; + + spw = getspnam(pw->pw_name); + if (spw != NULL) { + int days = time(NULL) / 86400; + + /* Check account expiry */ + if ((spw->sp_expire >= 0) && (days > spw->sp_expire)) + return 0; + + /* Check password expiry */ + if ((spw->sp_lstchg >= 0) && (spw->sp_max >= 0) && + (days > (spw->sp_lstchg + spw->sp_max))) + return 0; + } +#else + /* Shouldn't be called if pw is NULL, but better safe than sorry... */ + if (!pw || !pw->pw_name) + return 0; +#endif + + /* + * Get the shell from the password data. An empty shell field is + * legal, and means /bin/sh. + */ + shell = (pw->pw_shell[0] == '\0') ? _PATH_BSHELL : pw->pw_shell; + + /* deny if shell does not exists or is not executable */ + if (stat(shell, &st) != 0) + return 0; + if (!((st.st_mode & S_IFREG) && (st.st_mode & (S_IXOTH|S_IXUSR|S_IXGRP)))) + return 0; + + if (options.num_deny_users > 0 || options.num_allow_users > 0) { + hostname = get_canonical_hostname(options.reverse_mapping_check); + ipaddr = get_remote_ipaddr(); + } + + /* Return false if user is listed in DenyUsers */ + if (options.num_deny_users > 0) { + for (i = 0; i < options.num_deny_users; i++) + if (match_user(pw->pw_name, hostname, ipaddr, + options.deny_users[i])) + return 0; + } + /* Return false if AllowUsers isn't empty and user isn't listed there */ + if (options.num_allow_users > 0) { + for (i = 0; i < options.num_allow_users; i++) + if (match_user(pw->pw_name, hostname, ipaddr, + options.allow_users[i])) + break; + /* i < options.num_allow_users iff we break for loop */ + if (i >= options.num_allow_users) + return 0; + } + if (options.num_deny_groups > 0 || options.num_allow_groups > 0) { + /* Get the user's group access list (primary and supplementary) */ + if (ga_init(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) == 0) + return 0; + + /* Return false if one of user's groups is listed in DenyGroups */ + if (options.num_deny_groups > 0) + if (ga_match(options.deny_groups, + options.num_deny_groups)) { + ga_free(); + return 0; + } + /* + * Return false if AllowGroups isn't empty and one of user's groups + * isn't listed there + */ + if (options.num_allow_groups > 0) + if (!ga_match(options.allow_groups, + options.num_allow_groups)) { + ga_free(); + return 0; + } + ga_free(); + } + +#ifdef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE + if (loginrestrictions(pw->pw_name, S_RLOGIN, NULL, &loginmsg) != 0) { + if (loginmsg && *loginmsg) { + /* Remove embedded newlines (if any) */ + char *p; + for (p = loginmsg; *p; p++) { + if (*p == '\n') + *p = ' '; + } + /* Remove trailing newline */ + *--p = '\0'; + log("Login restricted for %s: %.100s", pw->pw_name, loginmsg); + } + return 0; + } +#endif /* WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE */ + + /* We found no reason not to let this user try to log on... */ + return 1; +} + +Authctxt * +authctxt_new(void) +{ + Authctxt *authctxt = xmalloc(sizeof(*authctxt)); + memset(authctxt, 0, sizeof(*authctxt)); + return authctxt; +} + +void +auth_log(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, char *method, char *info) +{ + void (*authlog) (const char *fmt,...) = verbose; + char *authmsg; + + /* Raise logging level */ + if (authenticated == 1 || + !authctxt->valid || + authctxt->failures >= AUTH_FAIL_LOG || + strcmp(method, "password") == 0) + authlog = log; + + if (authctxt->postponed) + authmsg = "Postponed"; + else + authmsg = authenticated ? "Accepted" : "Failed"; + + authlog("%s %s for %s%.100s from %.200s port %d%s", + authmsg, + method, + authctxt->valid ? "" : "illegal user ", + authctxt->user, + get_remote_ipaddr(), + get_remote_port(), + info); +} + +/* + * Check whether root logins are disallowed. + */ +int +auth_root_allowed(char *method) +{ + switch (options.permit_root_login) { + case PERMIT_YES: + return 1; + break; + case PERMIT_NO_PASSWD: + if (strcmp(method, "password") != 0) + return 1; + break; + case PERMIT_FORCED_ONLY: + if (forced_command) { + log("Root login accepted for forced command."); + return 1; + } + break; + } + log("ROOT LOGIN REFUSED FROM %.200s", get_remote_ipaddr()); + return 0; +} + + +/* + * Given a template and a passwd structure, build a filename + * by substituting % tokenised options. Currently, %% becomes '%', + * %h becomes the home directory and %u the username. + * + * This returns a buffer allocated by xmalloc. + */ +char * +expand_filename(const char *filename, struct passwd *pw) +{ + Buffer buffer; + char *file; + const char *cp; + + /* + * Build the filename string in the buffer by making the appropriate + * substitutions to the given file name. + */ + buffer_init(&buffer); + for (cp = filename; *cp; cp++) { + if (cp[0] == '%' && cp[1] == '%') { + buffer_append(&buffer, "%", 1); + cp++; + continue; + } + if (cp[0] == '%' && cp[1] == 'h') { + buffer_append(&buffer, pw->pw_dir, strlen(pw->pw_dir)); + cp++; + continue; + } + if (cp[0] == '%' && cp[1] == 'u') { + buffer_append(&buffer, pw->pw_name, + strlen(pw->pw_name)); + cp++; + continue; + } + buffer_append(&buffer, cp, 1); + } + buffer_append(&buffer, "\0", 1); + + /* + * Ensure that filename starts anchored. If not, be backward + * compatible and prepend the '%h/' + */ + file = xmalloc(MAXPATHLEN); + cp = buffer_ptr(&buffer); + if (*cp != '/') + snprintf(file, MAXPATHLEN, "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir, cp); + else + strlcpy(file, cp, MAXPATHLEN); + + buffer_free(&buffer); + return file; +} + +char * +authorized_keys_file(struct passwd *pw) +{ + return expand_filename(options.authorized_keys_file, pw); +} + +char * +authorized_keys_file2(struct passwd *pw) +{ + return expand_filename(options.authorized_keys_file2, pw); +} + +/* return ok if key exists in sysfile or userfile */ +HostStatus +check_key_in_hostfiles(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, const char *host, + const char *sysfile, const char *userfile) +{ + Key *found; + char *user_hostfile; + struct stat st; + int host_status; + + /* Check if we know the host and its host key. */ + found = key_new(key->type); + host_status = check_host_in_hostfile(sysfile, host, key, found, NULL); + + if (host_status != HOST_OK && userfile != NULL) { + user_hostfile = tilde_expand_filename(userfile, pw->pw_uid); + if (options.strict_modes && + (stat(user_hostfile, &st) == 0) && + ((st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid) || + (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)) { + log("Authentication refused for %.100s: " + "bad owner or modes for %.200s", + pw->pw_name, user_hostfile); + } else { + temporarily_use_uid(pw); + host_status = check_host_in_hostfile(user_hostfile, + host, key, found, NULL); + restore_uid(); + } + xfree(user_hostfile); + } + key_free(found); + + debug2("check_key_in_hostfiles: key %s for %s", host_status == HOST_OK ? + "ok" : "not found", host); + return host_status; +} + + +/* + * Check a given file for security. This is defined as all components + * of the path to the file must either be owned by either the owner of + * of the file or root and no directories must be group or world writable. + * + * XXX Should any specific check be done for sym links ? + * + * Takes an open file descriptor, the file name, a uid and and + * error buffer plus max size as arguments. + * + * Returns 0 on success and -1 on failure + */ +int +secure_filename(FILE *f, const char *file, struct passwd *pw, + char *err, size_t errlen) +{ + uid_t uid = pw->pw_uid; + char buf[MAXPATHLEN], homedir[MAXPATHLEN]; + char *cp; + struct stat st; + + if (realpath(file, buf) == NULL) { + snprintf(err, errlen, "realpath %s failed: %s", file, + strerror(errno)); + return -1; + } + if (realpath(pw->pw_dir, homedir) == NULL) { + snprintf(err, errlen, "realpath %s failed: %s", pw->pw_dir, + strerror(errno)); + return -1; + } + + /* check the open file to avoid races */ + if (fstat(fileno(f), &st) < 0 || + (st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != uid) || + (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) { + snprintf(err, errlen, "bad ownership or modes for file %s", + buf); + return -1; + } + + /* for each component of the canonical path, walking upwards */ + for (;;) { + if ((cp = dirname(buf)) == NULL) { + snprintf(err, errlen, "dirname() failed"); + return -1; + } + strlcpy(buf, cp, sizeof(buf)); + + debug3("secure_filename: checking '%s'", buf); + if (stat(buf, &st) < 0 || + (st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != uid) || + (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) { + snprintf(err, errlen, + "bad ownership or modes for directory %s", buf); + return -1; + } + + /* If are passed the homedir then we can stop */ + if (strcmp(homedir, buf) == 0) { + debug3("secure_filename: terminating check at '%s'", + buf); + break; + } + /* + * dirname should always complete with a "/" path, + * but we can be paranoid and check for "." too + */ + if ((strcmp("/", buf) == 0) || (strcmp(".", buf) == 0)) + break; + } + return 0; +} diff --git a/openssh/auth.h b/openssh/auth.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..edfc9fb --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/auth.h @@ -0,0 +1,156 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * $OpenBSD: auth.h,v 1.22 2001/06/26 17:27:22 markus Exp $ + */ +#ifndef AUTH_H +#define AUTH_H + +#include "key.h" +#include "hostfile.h" +#include + +#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP +#include +#endif +#ifdef BSD_AUTH +#include +#endif +#ifdef KRB5 +#include +#endif + +typedef struct Authctxt Authctxt; +typedef struct KbdintDevice KbdintDevice; + +struct Authctxt { + int success; + int postponed; + int valid; + int attempt; + int failures; + char *user; + char *service; + struct passwd *pw; + char *style; + void *kbdintctxt; +#ifdef BSD_AUTH + auth_session_t *as; +#endif +#ifdef KRB4 + char *krb4_ticket_file; +#endif +#ifdef KRB5 + krb5_context krb5_ctx; + krb5_auth_context krb5_auth_ctx; + krb5_ccache krb5_fwd_ccache; + krb5_principal krb5_user; + char *krb5_ticket_file; +#endif +}; + +/* + * Keyboard interactive device: + * init_ctx returns: non NULL upon success + * query returns: 0 - success, otherwise failure + * respond returns: 0 - success, 1 - need further interaction, + * otherwise - failure + */ +struct KbdintDevice +{ + const char *name; + void* (*init_ctx) __P((Authctxt*)); + int (*query) __P((void *ctx, char **name, char **infotxt, + u_int *numprompts, char ***prompts, + u_int **echo_on)); + int (*respond) __P((void *ctx, u_int numresp, char **responses)); + void (*free_ctx) __P((void *ctx)); +}; + +int auth_rhosts(struct passwd *, const char *); +int +auth_rhosts2(struct passwd *, const char *, const char *, const char *); + +int auth_rhosts_rsa(struct passwd *, const char *, RSA *); +int auth_password(Authctxt *, const char *); +int auth_rsa(struct passwd *, BIGNUM *); +int auth_rsa_read_key(char **, u_int *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *); +int auth_rsa_challenge_dialog(RSA *); + +#ifdef KRB4 +#include +int auth_krb4(Authctxt *, KTEXT, char **); +int auth_krb4_password(Authctxt *, const char *); +void krb4_cleanup_proc(void *); + +#ifdef AFS +#include +int auth_krb4_tgt(Authctxt *, const char *); +int auth_afs_token(Authctxt *, const char *); +#endif /* AFS */ + +#endif /* KRB4 */ + +#ifdef KRB5 +int auth_krb5(Authctxt *authctxt, krb5_data *auth, char **client); +int auth_krb5_tgt(Authctxt *authctxt, krb5_data *tgt); +int auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password); +void krb5_cleanup_proc(void *authctxt); +#endif /* KRB5 */ + +#include "auth-pam.h" +#include "auth2-pam.h" + +void do_authentication(void); +void do_authentication2(void); + +Authctxt *authctxt_new(void); +void auth_log(Authctxt *, int, char *, char *); +void userauth_finish(Authctxt *, int, char *); +int auth_root_allowed(char *); + +int auth2_challenge(Authctxt *, char *); + +int allowed_user(struct passwd *); + +char *get_challenge(Authctxt *); +int verify_response(Authctxt *, const char *); + +struct passwd * auth_get_user(void); + +char *expand_filename(const char *, struct passwd *); +char *authorized_keys_file(struct passwd *); +char *authorized_keys_file2(struct passwd *); + +int +secure_filename(FILE *, const char *, struct passwd *, char *, size_t); + +HostStatus +check_key_in_hostfiles(struct passwd *, Key *, const char *, + const char *, const char *); + +#define AUTH_FAIL_MAX 6 +#define AUTH_FAIL_LOG (AUTH_FAIL_MAX/2) +#define AUTH_FAIL_MSG "Too many authentication failures for %.100s" + +#endif diff --git a/openssh/auth1.c b/openssh/auth1.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1fbfad9 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/auth1.c @@ -0,0 +1,429 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + */ + +#include "includes.h" +RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth1.c,v 1.25 2001/06/26 16:15:23 dugsong Exp $"); + +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "rsa.h" +#include "ssh1.h" +#include "packet.h" +#include "buffer.h" +#include "mpaux.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "servconf.h" +#include "compat.h" +#include "auth.h" +#include "session.h" +#include "misc.h" +#include "uidswap.h" + +/* import */ +extern ServerOptions options; + +/* + * convert ssh auth msg type into description + */ +static char * +get_authname(int type) +{ + static char buf[1024]; + switch (type) { + case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD: + return "password"; + case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA: + return "rsa"; + case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA: + return "rhosts-rsa"; + case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS: + return "rhosts"; + case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS: + case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE: + return "challenge-response"; +#if defined(KRB4) || defined(KRB5) + case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_KERBEROS: + return "kerberos"; +#endif + } + snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "bad-auth-msg-%d", type); + return buf; +} + +/* + * read packets, try to authenticate the user and + * return only if authentication is successful + */ +static void +do_authloop(Authctxt *authctxt) +{ + int authenticated = 0; + u_int bits; + RSA *client_host_key; + BIGNUM *n; + char *client_user, *password; + char info[1024]; + u_int dlen; + int plen, nlen, elen; + u_int ulen; + int type = 0; + struct passwd *pw = authctxt->pw; + + debug("Attempting authentication for %s%.100s.", + authctxt->valid ? "" : "illegal user ", authctxt->user); + + /* If the user has no password, accept authentication immediately. */ + if (options.password_authentication && +#if defined(KRB4) || defined(KRB5) + (!options.kerberos_authentication || options.kerberos_or_local_passwd) && +#endif +#ifdef USE_PAM + auth_pam_password(pw, "")) { +#elif defined(HAVE_OSF_SIA) + 0) { +#else + auth_password(authctxt, "")) { +#endif + auth_log(authctxt, 1, "without authentication", ""); + return; + } + + /* Indicate that authentication is needed. */ + packet_start(SSH_SMSG_FAILURE); + packet_send(); + packet_write_wait(); + + client_user = NULL; + + for (;;) { + /* default to fail */ + authenticated = 0; + + info[0] = '\0'; + + /* Get a packet from the client. */ + type = packet_read(&plen); + + /* Process the packet. */ + switch (type) { + +#if defined(KRB4) || defined(KRB5) + case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_KERBEROS: + if (!options.kerberos_authentication) { + verbose("Kerberos authentication disabled."); + } else { + char *kdata = packet_get_string(&dlen); + + packet_integrity_check(plen, 4 + dlen, type); + + if (kdata[0] == 4) { /* KRB_PROT_VERSION */ +#ifdef KRB4 + KTEXT_ST tkt; + + tkt.length = dlen; + if (tkt.length < MAX_KTXT_LEN) + memcpy(tkt.dat, kdata, tkt.length); + + if (auth_krb4(authctxt, &tkt, &client_user)) { + authenticated = 1; + snprintf(info, sizeof(info), + " tktuser %.100s", + client_user); + } +#endif /* KRB4 */ + } else { +#ifdef KRB5 + krb5_data tkt; + tkt.length = dlen; + tkt.data = kdata; + + if (auth_krb5(authctxt, &tkt, &client_user)) { + authenticated = 1; + snprintf(info, sizeof(info), + " tktuser %.100s", + client_user); + } +#endif /* KRB5 */ + } + xfree(kdata); + } + break; +#endif /* KRB4 || KRB5 */ + +#if defined(AFS) || defined(KRB5) + /* XXX - punt on backward compatibility here. */ + case SSH_CMSG_HAVE_KERBEROS_TGT: + packet_send_debug("Kerberos TGT passing disabled before authentication."); + break; +#ifdef AFS + case SSH_CMSG_HAVE_AFS_TOKEN: + packet_send_debug("AFS token passing disabled before authentication."); + break; +#endif /* AFS */ +#endif /* AFS || KRB5 */ + + case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS: + if (!options.rhosts_authentication) { + verbose("Rhosts authentication disabled."); + break; + } + /* + * Get client user name. Note that we just have to + * trust the client; this is one reason why rhosts + * authentication is insecure. (Another is + * IP-spoofing on a local network.) + */ + client_user = packet_get_string(&ulen); + packet_integrity_check(plen, 4 + ulen, type); + + /* Try to authenticate using /etc/hosts.equiv and .rhosts. */ + authenticated = auth_rhosts(pw, client_user); + + snprintf(info, sizeof info, " ruser %.100s", client_user); + break; + + case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA: + if (!options.rhosts_rsa_authentication) { + verbose("Rhosts with RSA authentication disabled."); + break; + } + /* + * Get client user name. Note that we just have to + * trust the client; root on the client machine can + * claim to be any user. + */ + client_user = packet_get_string(&ulen); + + /* Get the client host key. */ + client_host_key = RSA_new(); + if (client_host_key == NULL) + fatal("RSA_new failed"); + client_host_key->e = BN_new(); + client_host_key->n = BN_new(); + if (client_host_key->e == NULL || client_host_key->n == NULL) + fatal("BN_new failed"); + bits = packet_get_int(); + packet_get_bignum(client_host_key->e, &elen); + packet_get_bignum(client_host_key->n, &nlen); + + if (bits != BN_num_bits(client_host_key->n)) + verbose("Warning: keysize mismatch for client_host_key: " + "actual %d, announced %d", BN_num_bits(client_host_key->n), bits); + packet_integrity_check(plen, (4 + ulen) + 4 + elen + nlen, type); + + authenticated = auth_rhosts_rsa(pw, client_user, client_host_key); + RSA_free(client_host_key); + + snprintf(info, sizeof info, " ruser %.100s", client_user); + break; + + case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA: + if (!options.rsa_authentication) { + verbose("RSA authentication disabled."); + break; + } + /* RSA authentication requested. */ + n = BN_new(); + packet_get_bignum(n, &nlen); + packet_integrity_check(plen, nlen, type); + authenticated = auth_rsa(pw, n); + BN_clear_free(n); + break; + + case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD: + if (!options.password_authentication) { + verbose("Password authentication disabled."); + break; + } + /* + * Read user password. It is in plain text, but was + * transmitted over the encrypted channel so it is + * not visible to an outside observer. + */ + password = packet_get_string(&dlen); + packet_integrity_check(plen, 4 + dlen, type); + +#ifdef USE_PAM + /* Do PAM auth with password */ + authenticated = auth_pam_password(pw, password); +#elif defined(HAVE_OSF_SIA) + /* Do SIA auth with password */ + authenticated = auth_sia_password(authctxt->user, + password); +#else /* !USE_PAM && !HAVE_OSF_SIA */ + /* Try authentication with the password. */ + authenticated = auth_password(authctxt, password); +#endif /* USE_PAM */ + + memset(password, 0, strlen(password)); + xfree(password); + break; + + case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS: + debug("rcvd SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS"); + if (options.challenge_response_authentication == 1) { + char *challenge = get_challenge(authctxt); + if (challenge != NULL) { + debug("sending challenge '%s'", challenge); + packet_start(SSH_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE); + packet_put_cstring(challenge); + xfree(challenge); + packet_send(); + packet_write_wait(); + continue; + } + } + break; + case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE: + debug("rcvd SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE"); + if (options.challenge_response_authentication == 1) { + char *response = packet_get_string(&dlen); + debug("got response '%s'", response); + packet_integrity_check(plen, 4 + dlen, type); + authenticated = verify_response(authctxt, response); + memset(response, 'r', dlen); + xfree(response); + } + break; + + default: + /* + * Any unknown messages will be ignored (and failure + * returned) during authentication. + */ + log("Unknown message during authentication: type %d", type); + break; + } +#ifdef BSD_AUTH + if (authctxt->as) { + auth_close(authctxt->as); + authctxt->as = NULL; + } +#endif + if (!authctxt->valid && authenticated) + fatal("INTERNAL ERROR: authenticated invalid user %s", + authctxt->user); + +#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN + if (authenticated && + !check_nt_auth(type == SSH_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD,pw->pw_uid)) { + packet_disconnect("Authentication rejected for uid %d.", + (int)pw->pw_uid); + authenticated = 0; + } +#else + /* Special handling for root */ + if (authenticated && authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 && + !auth_root_allowed(get_authname(type))) + authenticated = 0; +#endif +#ifdef USE_PAM + if (authenticated && !do_pam_account(pw->pw_name, client_user)) + authenticated = 0; +#endif + + /* Log before sending the reply */ + auth_log(authctxt, authenticated, get_authname(type), info); + + if (client_user != NULL) { + xfree(client_user); + client_user = NULL; + } + + if (authenticated) + return; + + if (authctxt->failures++ > AUTH_FAIL_MAX) { +#ifdef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE + loginfailed(authctxt->user, + get_canonical_hostname(options.reverse_mapping_check), + "ssh"); +#endif /* WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE */ + packet_disconnect(AUTH_FAIL_MSG, authctxt->user); + } + + packet_start(SSH_SMSG_FAILURE); + packet_send(); + packet_write_wait(); + } +} + +/* + * Performs authentication of an incoming connection. Session key has already + * been exchanged and encryption is enabled. + */ +void +do_authentication() +{ + Authctxt *authctxt; + struct passwd *pw; + int plen; + u_int ulen; + char *p, *user, *style = NULL; + + /* Get the name of the user that we wish to log in as. */ + packet_read_expect(&plen, SSH_CMSG_USER); + + /* Get the user name. */ + user = packet_get_string(&ulen); + packet_integrity_check(plen, (4 + ulen), SSH_CMSG_USER); + + if ((style = strchr(user, ':')) != NULL) + *style++ = '\0'; + + /* XXX - SSH.com Kerberos v5 braindeath. */ + if ((p = strchr(user, '@')) != NULL) + *p = '\0'; + + authctxt = authctxt_new(); + authctxt->user = user; + authctxt->style = style; + + /* Verify that the user is a valid user. */ + pw = getpwnam(user); + if (pw && allowed_user(pw)) { + authctxt->valid = 1; + pw = pwcopy(pw); + } else { + debug("do_authentication: illegal user %s", user); + pw = NULL; + } + authctxt->pw = pw; + + setproctitle("%s", pw ? user : "unknown"); + +#ifdef USE_PAM + if (pw) + start_pam(user); +#endif + + /* + * If we are not running as root, the user must have the same uid as + * the server. (Unless you are running Windows) + */ +#ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN + if (getuid() != 0 && pw && pw->pw_uid != getuid()) + packet_disconnect("Cannot change user when server not running as root."); +#endif + + /* + * Loop until the user has been authenticated or the connection is + * closed, do_authloop() returns only if authentication is successful + */ + do_authloop(authctxt); + + /* The user has been authenticated and accepted. */ + packet_start(SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS); + packet_send(); + packet_write_wait(); + + /* Perform session preparation. */ + do_authenticated(authctxt); +} diff --git a/openssh/auth2-chall.c b/openssh/auth2-chall.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5e6a691 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/auth2-chall.c @@ -0,0 +1,307 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2001 Per Allansson. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ +#include "includes.h" +RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth2-chall.c,v 1.8 2001/09/27 15:31:17 markus Exp $"); + +#include "ssh2.h" +#include "auth.h" +#include "packet.h" +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "dispatch.h" +#include "auth.h" +#include "log.h" + +static int auth2_challenge_start(Authctxt *); +static int send_userauth_info_request(Authctxt *); +static void input_userauth_info_response(int, int, void *); + +#ifdef BSD_AUTH +extern KbdintDevice bsdauth_device; +#else +#ifdef SKEY +extern KbdintDevice skey_device; +#endif +#endif + +KbdintDevice *devices[] = { +#ifdef BSD_AUTH + &bsdauth_device, +#else +#ifdef SKEY + &skey_device, +#endif +#endif + NULL +}; + +typedef struct KbdintAuthctxt KbdintAuthctxt; +struct KbdintAuthctxt +{ + char *devices; + void *ctxt; + KbdintDevice *device; +}; + +static KbdintAuthctxt * +kbdint_alloc(const char *devs) +{ + KbdintAuthctxt *kbdintctxt; + int i; + char buf[1024]; + + kbdintctxt = xmalloc(sizeof(KbdintAuthctxt)); + if (strcmp(devs, "") == 0) { + buf[0] = '\0'; + for (i = 0; devices[i]; i++) { + if (i != 0) + strlcat(buf, ",", sizeof(buf)); + strlcat(buf, devices[i]->name, sizeof(buf)); + } + debug("kbdint_alloc: devices '%s'", buf); + kbdintctxt->devices = xstrdup(buf); + } else { + kbdintctxt->devices = xstrdup(devs); + } + kbdintctxt->ctxt = NULL; + kbdintctxt->device = NULL; + + return kbdintctxt; +} +static void +kbdint_reset_device(KbdintAuthctxt *kbdintctxt) +{ + if (kbdintctxt->ctxt) { + kbdintctxt->device->free_ctx(kbdintctxt->ctxt); + kbdintctxt->ctxt = NULL; + } + kbdintctxt->device = NULL; +} +static void +kbdint_free(KbdintAuthctxt *kbdintctxt) +{ + if (kbdintctxt->device) + kbdint_reset_device(kbdintctxt); + if (kbdintctxt->devices) { + xfree(kbdintctxt->devices); + kbdintctxt->devices = NULL; + } + xfree(kbdintctxt); +} +/* get next device */ +static int +kbdint_next_device(KbdintAuthctxt *kbdintctxt) +{ + size_t len; + char *t; + int i; + + if (kbdintctxt->device) + kbdint_reset_device(kbdintctxt); + do { + len = kbdintctxt->devices ? + strcspn(kbdintctxt->devices, ",") : 0; + + if (len == 0) + break; + for (i = 0; devices[i]; i++) + if (strncmp(kbdintctxt->devices, devices[i]->name, len) == 0) + kbdintctxt->device = devices[i]; + t = kbdintctxt->devices; + kbdintctxt->devices = t[len] ? xstrdup(t+len+1) : NULL; + xfree(t); + debug2("kbdint_next_device: devices %s", kbdintctxt->devices ? + kbdintctxt->devices : ""); + } while (kbdintctxt->devices && !kbdintctxt->device); + + return kbdintctxt->device ? 1 : 0; +} + +/* + * try challenge-response, set authctxt->postponed if we have to + * wait for the response. + */ +int +auth2_challenge(Authctxt *authctxt, char *devs) +{ + debug("auth2_challenge: user=%s devs=%s", + authctxt->user ? authctxt->user : "", + devs ? devs : ""); + + if (authctxt->user == NULL || !devs) + return 0; + if (authctxt->kbdintctxt == NULL) + authctxt->kbdintctxt = kbdint_alloc(devs); + return auth2_challenge_start(authctxt); +} + +/* side effect: sets authctxt->postponed if a reply was sent*/ +static int +auth2_challenge_start(Authctxt *authctxt) +{ + KbdintAuthctxt *kbdintctxt = authctxt->kbdintctxt; + + debug2("auth2_challenge_start: devices %s", + kbdintctxt->devices ? kbdintctxt->devices : ""); + + if (kbdint_next_device(kbdintctxt) == 0) { + kbdint_free(kbdintctxt); + authctxt->kbdintctxt = NULL; + return 0; + } + debug("auth2_challenge_start: trying authentication method '%s'", + kbdintctxt->device->name); + + if ((kbdintctxt->ctxt = kbdintctxt->device->init_ctx(authctxt)) == NULL) { + kbdint_free(kbdintctxt); + authctxt->kbdintctxt = NULL; + return 0; + } + if (send_userauth_info_request(authctxt) == 0) { + kbdint_free(kbdintctxt); + authctxt->kbdintctxt = NULL; + return 0; + } + dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE, + &input_userauth_info_response); + + authctxt->postponed = 1; + return 0; +} + +static int +send_userauth_info_request(Authctxt *authctxt) +{ + KbdintAuthctxt *kbdintctxt; + char *name, *instr, **prompts; + int i; + u_int numprompts, *echo_on; + + kbdintctxt = authctxt->kbdintctxt; + if (kbdintctxt->device->query(kbdintctxt->ctxt, + &name, &instr, &numprompts, &prompts, &echo_on)) + return 0; + + packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST); + packet_put_cstring(name); + packet_put_cstring(instr); + packet_put_cstring(""); /* language not used */ + packet_put_int(numprompts); + for (i = 0; i < numprompts; i++) { + packet_put_cstring(prompts[i]); + packet_put_char(echo_on[i]); + } + packet_send(); + packet_write_wait(); + + for (i = 0; i < numprompts; i++) + xfree(prompts[i]); + xfree(prompts); + xfree(echo_on); + xfree(name); + xfree(instr); + return 1; +} + +static void +input_userauth_info_response(int type, int plen, void *ctxt) +{ + Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt; + KbdintAuthctxt *kbdintctxt; + int i, authenticated = 0, res, len; + u_int nresp; + char **response = NULL, *method; + + if (authctxt == NULL) + fatal("input_userauth_info_response: no authctxt"); + kbdintctxt = authctxt->kbdintctxt; + if (kbdintctxt == NULL || kbdintctxt->ctxt == NULL) + fatal("input_userauth_info_response: no kbdintctxt"); + if (kbdintctxt->device == NULL) + fatal("input_userauth_info_response: no device"); + + authctxt->postponed = 0; /* reset */ + nresp = packet_get_int(); + if (nresp > 0) { + response = xmalloc(nresp * sizeof(char*)); + for (i = 0; i < nresp; i++) + response[i] = packet_get_string(NULL); + } + packet_done(); + + if (authctxt->valid) { + res = kbdintctxt->device->respond(kbdintctxt->ctxt, + nresp, response); + } else { + res = -1; + } + + for (i = 0; i < nresp; i++) { + memset(response[i], 'r', strlen(response[i])); + xfree(response[i]); + } + if (response) + xfree(response); + + switch (res) { + case 0: + /* Success! */ + authenticated = 1; + break; + case 1: + /* Authentication needs further interaction */ + authctxt->postponed = 1; + if (send_userauth_info_request(authctxt) == 0) { + authctxt->postponed = 0; + } + break; + default: + /* Failure! */ + break; + } + + len = strlen("keyboard-interactive") + 2 + + strlen(kbdintctxt->device->name); + method = xmalloc(len); + method[0] = '\0'; + strlcat(method, "keyboard-interactive", len); + strlcat(method, "/", len); + strlcat(method, kbdintctxt->device->name, len); + + if (!authctxt->postponed) { + /* unregister callback */ + dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE, NULL); + + if (authenticated) { + kbdint_free(kbdintctxt); + authctxt->kbdintctxt = NULL; + } else { + /* start next device */ + /* may set authctxt->postponed */ + auth2_challenge_start(authctxt); + } + } + userauth_finish(authctxt, authenticated, method); + xfree(method); +} diff --git a/openssh/auth2-pam.c b/openssh/auth2-pam.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b6eaf08 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/auth2-pam.c @@ -0,0 +1,158 @@ +#include "includes.h" +RCSID("$Id$"); + +#ifdef USE_PAM +#include + +#include "ssh.h" +#include "ssh2.h" +#include "auth.h" +#include "auth-pam.h" +#include "packet.h" +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "dispatch.h" +#include "log.h" + +static int do_pam_conversation_kbd_int(int num_msg, + const struct pam_message **msg, struct pam_response **resp, + void *appdata_ptr); +void input_userauth_info_response_pam(int type, int plen, void *ctxt); + +struct { + int finished, num_received, num_expected; + int *prompts; + struct pam_response *responses; +} context_pam2 = {0, 0, 0, NULL}; + +static struct pam_conv conv2 = { + do_pam_conversation_kbd_int, + NULL, +}; + +int +auth2_pam(Authctxt *authctxt) +{ + int retval = -1; + + if (authctxt->user == NULL) + fatal("auth2_pam: internal error: no user"); + + conv2.appdata_ptr = authctxt; + do_pam_set_conv(&conv2); + + dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE, + &input_userauth_info_response_pam); + retval = (do_pam_authenticate(0) == PAM_SUCCESS); + dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE, NULL); + + return retval; +} + +static int +do_pam_conversation_kbd_int(int num_msg, const struct pam_message **msg, + struct pam_response **resp, void *appdata_ptr) +{ + int i, j, done; + char *text; + + context_pam2.finished = 0; + context_pam2.num_received = 0; + context_pam2.num_expected = 0; + context_pam2.prompts = xmalloc(sizeof(int) * num_msg); + context_pam2.responses = xmalloc(sizeof(struct pam_response) * num_msg); + memset(context_pam2.responses, 0, sizeof(struct pam_response) * num_msg); + + text = NULL; + for (i = 0, context_pam2.num_expected = 0; i < num_msg; i++) { + int style = PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg_style); + switch (style) { + case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON: + case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF: + context_pam2.num_expected++; + break; + case PAM_TEXT_INFO: + case PAM_ERROR_MSG: + default: + /* Capture all these messages to be sent at once */ + message_cat(&text, PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg)); + break; + } + } + + if (context_pam2.num_expected == 0) + return PAM_SUCCESS; + + packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST); + packet_put_cstring(""); /* Name */ + packet_put_cstring(""); /* Instructions */ + packet_put_cstring(""); /* Language */ + packet_put_int(context_pam2.num_expected); + + for (i = 0, j = 0; i < num_msg; i++) { + int style = PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg_style); + + /* Skip messages which don't need a reply */ + if (style != PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON && style != PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF) + continue; + + context_pam2.prompts[j++] = i; + if (text) { + message_cat(&text, PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg)); + packet_put_cstring(text); + text = NULL; + } else + packet_put_cstring(PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg)); + packet_put_char(style == PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON); + } + packet_send(); + packet_write_wait(); + + /* + * Grabbing control of execution and spinning until we get what + * we want is probably rude, but it seems to work properly, and + * the client *should* be in lock-step with us, so the loop should + * only be traversed once. + */ + while(context_pam2.finished == 0) { + done = 1; + dispatch_run(DISPATCH_BLOCK, &done, appdata_ptr); + if(context_pam2.finished == 0) + debug("extra packet during conversation"); + } + + if(context_pam2.num_received == context_pam2.num_expected) { + *resp = context_pam2.responses; + return PAM_SUCCESS; + } else + return PAM_CONV_ERR; +} + +void +input_userauth_info_response_pam(int type, int plen, void *ctxt) +{ + Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt; + unsigned int nresp = 0, rlen = 0, i = 0; + char *resp; + + if (authctxt == NULL) + fatal("input_userauth_info_response_pam: no authentication context"); + + nresp = packet_get_int(); /* Number of responses. */ + debug("got %d responses", nresp); + + for (i = 0; i < nresp; i++) { + int j = context_pam2.prompts[i]; + + resp = packet_get_string(&rlen); + context_pam2.responses[j].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS; + context_pam2.responses[j].resp = xstrdup(resp); + xfree(resp); + context_pam2.num_received++; + } + + context_pam2.finished = 1; + + packet_done(); +} + +#endif diff --git a/openssh/auth2-pam.h b/openssh/auth2-pam.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7992803 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/auth2-pam.h @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ +/* $Id$ */ + +#include "includes.h" +#ifdef USE_PAM + +int auth2_pam(Authctxt *authctxt); + +#endif /* USE_PAM */ diff --git a/openssh/auth2.c b/openssh/auth2.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1920eb3 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/auth2.c @@ -0,0 +1,804 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" +RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth2.c,v 1.72 2001/11/07 22:41:51 markus Exp $"); + +#include + +#include "ssh2.h" +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "rsa.h" +#include "sshpty.h" +#include "packet.h" +#include "buffer.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "servconf.h" +#include "compat.h" +#include "channels.h" +#include "bufaux.h" +#include "auth.h" +#include "session.h" +#include "dispatch.h" +#include "key.h" +#include "cipher.h" +#include "kex.h" +#include "pathnames.h" +#include "uidswap.h" +#include "auth-options.h" +#include "misc.h" +#include "hostfile.h" +#include "canohost.h" +#include "match.h" + +/* import */ +extern ServerOptions options; +extern u_char *session_id2; +extern int session_id2_len; + +static Authctxt *x_authctxt = NULL; +static int one = 1; + +typedef struct Authmethod Authmethod; +struct Authmethod { + char *name; + int (*userauth)(Authctxt *authctxt); + int *enabled; +}; + +/* protocol */ + +static void input_service_request(int, int, void *); +static void input_userauth_request(int, int, void *); +static void protocol_error(int, int, void *); + +/* helper */ +static Authmethod *authmethod_lookup(const char *); +static char *authmethods_get(void); +static int user_key_allowed(struct passwd *, Key *); +static int hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *, const char *, char *, Key *); + +/* auth */ +static void userauth_banner(void); +static int userauth_none(Authctxt *); +static int userauth_passwd(Authctxt *); +static int userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *); +static int userauth_hostbased(Authctxt *); +static int userauth_kbdint(Authctxt *); + +Authmethod authmethods[] = { + {"none", + userauth_none, + &one}, + {"publickey", + userauth_pubkey, + &options.pubkey_authentication}, + {"password", + userauth_passwd, + &options.password_authentication}, + {"keyboard-interactive", + userauth_kbdint, + &options.kbd_interactive_authentication}, + {"hostbased", + userauth_hostbased, + &options.hostbased_authentication}, + {NULL, NULL, NULL} +}; + +/* + * loop until authctxt->success == TRUE + */ + +void +do_authentication2() +{ + Authctxt *authctxt = authctxt_new(); + + x_authctxt = authctxt; /*XXX*/ + + /* challenge-response is implemented via keyboard interactive */ + if (options.challenge_response_authentication) + options.kbd_interactive_authentication = 1; + if (options.pam_authentication_via_kbd_int) + options.kbd_interactive_authentication = 1; + + dispatch_init(&protocol_error); + dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST, &input_service_request); + dispatch_run(DISPATCH_BLOCK, &authctxt->success, authctxt); + do_authenticated(authctxt); +} + +static void +protocol_error(int type, int plen, void *ctxt) +{ + log("auth: protocol error: type %d plen %d", type, plen); + packet_start(SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED); + packet_put_int(0); + packet_send(); + packet_write_wait(); +} + +static void +input_service_request(int type, int plen, void *ctxt) +{ + Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt; + u_int len; + int accept = 0; + char *service = packet_get_string(&len); + packet_done(); + + if (authctxt == NULL) + fatal("input_service_request: no authctxt"); + + if (strcmp(service, "ssh-userauth") == 0) { + if (!authctxt->success) { + accept = 1; + /* now we can handle user-auth requests */ + dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST, &input_userauth_request); + } + } + /* XXX all other service requests are denied */ + + if (accept) { + packet_start(SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT); + packet_put_cstring(service); + packet_send(); + packet_write_wait(); + } else { + debug("bad service request %s", service); + packet_disconnect("bad service request %s", service); + } + xfree(service); +} + +static void +input_userauth_request(int type, int plen, void *ctxt) +{ + Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt; + Authmethod *m = NULL; + char *user, *service, *method, *style = NULL; + int authenticated = 0; + + if (authctxt == NULL) + fatal("input_userauth_request: no authctxt"); + + user = packet_get_string(NULL); + service = packet_get_string(NULL); + method = packet_get_string(NULL); + debug("userauth-request for user %s service %s method %s", user, service, method); + debug("attempt %d failures %d", authctxt->attempt, authctxt->failures); + + if ((style = strchr(user, ':')) != NULL) + *style++ = 0; + + if (authctxt->attempt++ == 0) { + /* setup auth context */ + struct passwd *pw = NULL; + pw = getpwnam(user); + if (pw && allowed_user(pw) && strcmp(service, "ssh-connection")==0) { + authctxt->pw = pwcopy(pw); + authctxt->valid = 1; + debug2("input_userauth_request: setting up authctxt for %s", user); +#ifdef USE_PAM + start_pam(pw->pw_name); +#endif + } else { + log("input_userauth_request: illegal user %s", user); +#ifdef USE_PAM + start_pam("NOUSER"); +#endif + } + setproctitle("%s", pw ? user : "unknown"); + authctxt->user = xstrdup(user); + authctxt->service = xstrdup(service); + authctxt->style = style ? xstrdup(style) : NULL; + } else if (strcmp(user, authctxt->user) != 0 || + strcmp(service, authctxt->service) != 0) { + packet_disconnect("Change of username or service not allowed: " + "(%s,%s) -> (%s,%s)", + authctxt->user, authctxt->service, user, service); + } + /* reset state */ + dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE, &protocol_error); + authctxt->postponed = 0; +#ifdef BSD_AUTH + if (authctxt->as) { + auth_close(authctxt->as); + authctxt->as = NULL; + } +#endif + + /* try to authenticate user */ + m = authmethod_lookup(method); + if (m != NULL) { + debug2("input_userauth_request: try method %s", method); + authenticated = m->userauth(authctxt); + } + userauth_finish(authctxt, authenticated, method); + + xfree(service); + xfree(user); + xfree(method); +} + +void +userauth_finish(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, char *method) +{ + char *methods; + + if (!authctxt->valid && authenticated) + fatal("INTERNAL ERROR: authenticated invalid user %s", + authctxt->user); + + /* Special handling for root */ + if (authenticated && authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 && + !auth_root_allowed(method)) + authenticated = 0; + +#ifdef USE_PAM + if (authenticated && authctxt->user && !do_pam_account(authctxt->user, + NULL)) + authenticated = 0; +#endif /* USE_PAM */ + + /* Log before sending the reply */ + auth_log(authctxt, authenticated, method, " ssh2"); + + if (authctxt->postponed) + return; + + /* XXX todo: check if multiple auth methods are needed */ + if (authenticated == 1) { + /* turn off userauth */ + dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST, &protocol_error); + packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS); + packet_send(); + packet_write_wait(); + /* now we can break out */ + authctxt->success = 1; + } else { + if (authctxt->failures++ > AUTH_FAIL_MAX) { +#ifdef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE + loginfailed(authctxt->user, + get_canonical_hostname(options.reverse_mapping_check), + "ssh"); +#endif /* WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE */ + packet_disconnect(AUTH_FAIL_MSG, authctxt->user); + } + methods = authmethods_get(); + packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE); + packet_put_cstring(methods); + packet_put_char(0); /* XXX partial success, unused */ + packet_send(); + packet_write_wait(); + xfree(methods); + } +} + +static void +userauth_banner(void) +{ + struct stat st; + char *banner = NULL; + off_t len, n; + int fd; + + if (options.banner == NULL || (datafellows & SSH_BUG_BANNER)) + return; + if ((fd = open(options.banner, O_RDONLY)) < 0) + return; + if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0) + goto done; + len = st.st_size; + banner = xmalloc(len + 1); + if ((n = read(fd, banner, len)) < 0) + goto done; + banner[n] = '\0'; + packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER); + packet_put_cstring(banner); + packet_put_cstring(""); /* language, unused */ + packet_send(); + debug("userauth_banner: sent"); +done: + if (banner) + xfree(banner); + close(fd); + return; +} + +static int +userauth_none(Authctxt *authctxt) +{ + /* disable method "none", only allowed one time */ + Authmethod *m = authmethod_lookup("none"); + if (m != NULL) + m->enabled = NULL; + packet_done(); + userauth_banner(); + + if (authctxt->valid == 0) + return(0); + +#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN + if (check_nt_auth(1, authctxt->pw->pw_uid) == 0) + return(0); +#endif +#ifdef USE_PAM + return auth_pam_password(authctxt->pw, ""); +#elif defined(HAVE_OSF_SIA) + return 0; +#else /* !HAVE_OSF_SIA && !USE_PAM */ + return auth_password(authctxt, ""); +#endif /* USE_PAM */ +} + +static int +userauth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt) +{ + char *password; + int authenticated = 0; + int change; + u_int len; + change = packet_get_char(); + if (change) + log("password change not supported"); + password = packet_get_string(&len); + packet_done(); + if (authctxt->valid && +#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN + check_nt_auth(1, authctxt->pw->pw_uid) && +#endif +#ifdef USE_PAM + auth_pam_password(authctxt->pw, password) == 1) +#elif defined(HAVE_OSF_SIA) + auth_sia_password(authctxt->user, password) == 1) +#else /* !USE_PAM && !HAVE_OSF_SIA */ + auth_password(authctxt, password) == 1) +#endif /* USE_PAM */ + authenticated = 1; + memset(password, 0, len); + xfree(password); + return authenticated; +} + +static int +userauth_kbdint(Authctxt *authctxt) +{ + int authenticated = 0; + char *lang, *devs; + + lang = packet_get_string(NULL); + devs = packet_get_string(NULL); + packet_done(); + + debug("keyboard-interactive devs %s", devs); + + if (options.challenge_response_authentication) + authenticated = auth2_challenge(authctxt, devs); + +#ifdef USE_PAM + if (authenticated == 0 && options.pam_authentication_via_kbd_int) + authenticated = auth2_pam(authctxt); +#endif + xfree(devs); + xfree(lang); +#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN + if (check_nt_auth(0, authctxt->pw->pw_uid) == 0) + return(0); +#endif + return authenticated; +} + +static int +userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt) +{ + Buffer b; + Key *key; + char *pkalg, *pkblob, *sig; + u_int alen, blen, slen; + int have_sig, pktype; + int authenticated = 0; + + if (!authctxt->valid) { + debug2("userauth_pubkey: disabled because of invalid user"); + return 0; + } + have_sig = packet_get_char(); + if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH) { + debug2("userauth_pubkey: SSH_BUG_PKAUTH"); + /* no explicit pkalg given */ + pkblob = packet_get_string(&blen); + buffer_init(&b); + buffer_append(&b, pkblob, blen); + /* so we have to extract the pkalg from the pkblob */ + pkalg = buffer_get_string(&b, &alen); + buffer_free(&b); + } else { + pkalg = packet_get_string(&alen); + pkblob = packet_get_string(&blen); + } + pktype = key_type_from_name(pkalg); + if (pktype == KEY_UNSPEC) { + /* this is perfectly legal */ + log("userauth_pubkey: unsupported public key algorithm: %s", pkalg); + xfree(pkalg); + xfree(pkblob); + return 0; + } + key = key_from_blob(pkblob, blen); + if (key != NULL) { + if (have_sig) { + sig = packet_get_string(&slen); + packet_done(); + buffer_init(&b); + if (datafellows & SSH_OLD_SESSIONID) { + buffer_append(&b, session_id2, session_id2_len); + } else { + buffer_put_string(&b, session_id2, session_id2_len); + } + /* reconstruct packet */ + buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST); + buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->user); + buffer_put_cstring(&b, + datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKSERVICE ? + "ssh-userauth" : + authctxt->service); + if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH) { + buffer_put_char(&b, have_sig); + } else { + buffer_put_cstring(&b, "publickey"); + buffer_put_char(&b, have_sig); + buffer_put_cstring(&b, pkalg); + } + buffer_put_string(&b, pkblob, blen); +#ifdef DEBUG_PK + buffer_dump(&b); +#endif + /* test for correct signature */ + if (user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key) && + key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b)) == 1) + authenticated = 1; + buffer_clear(&b); + xfree(sig); + } else { + debug("test whether pkalg/pkblob are acceptable"); + packet_done(); + + /* XXX fake reply and always send PK_OK ? */ + /* + * XXX this allows testing whether a user is allowed + * to login: if you happen to have a valid pubkey this + * message is sent. the message is NEVER sent at all + * if a user is not allowed to login. is this an + * issue? -markus + */ + if (user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key)) { + packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK); + packet_put_string(pkalg, alen); + packet_put_string(pkblob, blen); + packet_send(); + packet_write_wait(); + authctxt->postponed = 1; + } + } + if (authenticated != 1) + auth_clear_options(); + key_free(key); + } + debug2("userauth_pubkey: authenticated %d pkalg %s", authenticated, pkalg); + xfree(pkalg); + xfree(pkblob); +#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN + if (check_nt_auth(0, authctxt->pw->pw_uid) == 0) + return(0); +#endif + return authenticated; +} + +static int +userauth_hostbased(Authctxt *authctxt) +{ + Buffer b; + Key *key; + char *pkalg, *pkblob, *sig, *cuser, *chost, *service; + u_int alen, blen, slen; + int pktype; + int authenticated = 0; + + if (!authctxt->valid) { + debug2("userauth_hostbased: disabled because of invalid user"); + return 0; + } + pkalg = packet_get_string(&alen); + pkblob = packet_get_string(&blen); + chost = packet_get_string(NULL); + cuser = packet_get_string(NULL); + sig = packet_get_string(&slen); + + debug("userauth_hostbased: cuser %s chost %s pkalg %s slen %d", + cuser, chost, pkalg, slen); +#ifdef DEBUG_PK + debug("signature:"); + buffer_init(&b); + buffer_append(&b, sig, slen); + buffer_dump(&b); + buffer_free(&b); +#endif + pktype = key_type_from_name(pkalg); + if (pktype == KEY_UNSPEC) { + /* this is perfectly legal */ + log("userauth_hostbased: unsupported " + "public key algorithm: %s", pkalg); + goto done; + } + key = key_from_blob(pkblob, blen); + if (key == NULL) { + debug("userauth_hostbased: cannot decode key: %s", pkalg); + goto done; + } + service = datafellows & SSH_BUG_HBSERVICE ? "ssh-userauth" : + authctxt->service; + buffer_init(&b); + buffer_put_string(&b, session_id2, session_id2_len); + /* reconstruct packet */ + buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST); + buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->user); + buffer_put_cstring(&b, service); + buffer_put_cstring(&b, "hostbased"); + buffer_put_string(&b, pkalg, alen); + buffer_put_string(&b, pkblob, blen); + buffer_put_cstring(&b, chost); + buffer_put_cstring(&b, cuser); +#ifdef DEBUG_PK + buffer_dump(&b); +#endif + /* test for allowed key and correct signature */ + if (hostbased_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, cuser, chost, key) && + key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b)) == 1) + authenticated = 1; + + buffer_clear(&b); + key_free(key); + +done: + debug2("userauth_hostbased: authenticated %d", authenticated); + xfree(pkalg); + xfree(pkblob); + xfree(cuser); + xfree(chost); + xfree(sig); + return authenticated; +} + +/* get current user */ + +struct passwd* +auth_get_user(void) +{ + return (x_authctxt != NULL && x_authctxt->valid) ? x_authctxt->pw : NULL; +} + +#define DELIM "," + +static char * +authmethods_get(void) +{ + Authmethod *method = NULL; + u_int size = 0; + char *list; + + for (method = authmethods; method->name != NULL; method++) { + if (strcmp(method->name, "none") == 0) + continue; + if (method->enabled != NULL && *(method->enabled) != 0) { + if (size != 0) + size += strlen(DELIM); + size += strlen(method->name); + } + } + size++; /* trailing '\0' */ + list = xmalloc(size); + list[0] = '\0'; + + for (method = authmethods; method->name != NULL; method++) { + if (strcmp(method->name, "none") == 0) + continue; + if (method->enabled != NULL && *(method->enabled) != 0) { + if (list[0] != '\0') + strlcat(list, DELIM, size); + strlcat(list, method->name, size); + } + } + return list; +} + +static Authmethod * +authmethod_lookup(const char *name) +{ + Authmethod *method = NULL; + if (name != NULL) + for (method = authmethods; method->name != NULL; method++) + if (method->enabled != NULL && + *(method->enabled) != 0 && + strcmp(name, method->name) == 0) + return method; + debug2("Unrecognized authentication method name: %s", name ? name : "NULL"); + return NULL; +} + +/* return 1 if user allows given key */ +static int +user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, char *file) +{ + char line[8192]; + int found_key = 0; + FILE *f; + u_long linenum = 0; + struct stat st; + Key *found; + + if (pw == NULL) + return 0; + + /* Temporarily use the user's uid. */ + temporarily_use_uid(pw); + + debug("trying public key file %s", file); + + /* Fail quietly if file does not exist */ + if (stat(file, &st) < 0) { + /* Restore the privileged uid. */ + restore_uid(); + return 0; + } + /* Open the file containing the authorized keys. */ + f = fopen(file, "r"); + if (!f) { + /* Restore the privileged uid. */ + restore_uid(); + return 0; + } + if (options.strict_modes && + secure_filename(f, file, pw, line, sizeof(line)) != 0) { + fclose(f); + log("Authentication refused: %s", line); + restore_uid(); + return 0; + } + + found_key = 0; + found = key_new(key->type); + + while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), f)) { + char *cp, *options = NULL; + linenum++; + /* Skip leading whitespace, empty and comment lines. */ + for (cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++) + ; + if (!*cp || *cp == '\n' || *cp == '#') + continue; + + if (key_read(found, &cp) != 1) { + /* no key? check if there are options for this key */ + int quoted = 0; + debug2("user_key_allowed: check options: '%s'", cp); + options = cp; + for (; *cp && (quoted || (*cp != ' ' && *cp != '\t')); cp++) { + if (*cp == '\\' && cp[1] == '"') + cp++; /* Skip both */ + else if (*cp == '"') + quoted = !quoted; + } + /* Skip remaining whitespace. */ + for (; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++) + ; + if (key_read(found, &cp) != 1) { + debug2("user_key_allowed: advance: '%s'", cp); + /* still no key? advance to next line*/ + continue; + } + } + if (key_equal(found, key) && + auth_parse_options(pw, options, file, linenum) == 1) { + found_key = 1; + debug("matching key found: file %s, line %lu", + file, linenum); + break; + } + } + restore_uid(); + fclose(f); + key_free(found); + if (!found_key) + debug2("key not found"); + return found_key; +} + +/* check whether given key is in .ssh/authorized_keys* */ +static int +user_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, Key *key) +{ + int success; + char *file; + + file = authorized_keys_file(pw); + success = user_key_allowed2(pw, key, file); + xfree(file); + if (success) + return success; + + /* try suffix "2" for backward compat, too */ + file = authorized_keys_file2(pw); + success = user_key_allowed2(pw, key, file); + xfree(file); + return success; +} + +/* return 1 if given hostkey is allowed */ +static int +hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, const char *cuser, char *chost, + Key *key) +{ + const char *resolvedname, *ipaddr, *lookup; + int host_status, len; + + resolvedname = get_canonical_hostname(options.reverse_mapping_check); + ipaddr = get_remote_ipaddr(); + + debug2("userauth_hostbased: chost %s resolvedname %s ipaddr %s", + chost, resolvedname, ipaddr); + + if (options.hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only) { + if (auth_rhosts2(pw, cuser, chost, chost) == 0) + return 0; + lookup = chost; + } else { + if (((len = strlen(chost)) > 0) && chost[len - 1] == '.') { + debug2("stripping trailing dot from chost %s", chost); + chost[len - 1] = '\0'; + } + if (strcasecmp(resolvedname, chost) != 0) + log("userauth_hostbased mismatch: " + "client sends %s, but we resolve %s to %s", + chost, ipaddr, resolvedname); + if (auth_rhosts2(pw, cuser, resolvedname, ipaddr) == 0) + return 0; + lookup = resolvedname; + } + debug2("userauth_hostbased: access allowed by auth_rhosts2"); + + host_status = check_key_in_hostfiles(pw, key, lookup, + _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_HOSTFILE, + options.ignore_user_known_hosts ? NULL : _PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE); + + /* backward compat if no key has been found. */ + if (host_status == HOST_NEW) + host_status = check_key_in_hostfiles(pw, key, lookup, + _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_HOSTFILE2, + options.ignore_user_known_hosts ? NULL : + _PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE2); + + return (host_status == HOST_OK); +} + diff --git a/openssh/authfd.c b/openssh/authfd.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d6366ee --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/authfd.c @@ -0,0 +1,595 @@ +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * Functions for connecting the local authentication agent. + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + * + * SSH2 implementation, + * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" +RCSID("$OpenBSD: authfd.c,v 1.45 2001/09/19 19:35:30 stevesk Exp $"); + +#include + +#include "ssh.h" +#include "rsa.h" +#include "buffer.h" +#include "bufaux.h" +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "getput.h" +#include "key.h" +#include "authfd.h" +#include "cipher.h" +#include "kex.h" +#include "compat.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "atomicio.h" + +/* helper */ +int decode_reply(int type); + +/* macro to check for "agent failure" message */ +#define agent_failed(x) \ + ((x == SSH_AGENT_FAILURE) || (x == SSH_COM_AGENT2_FAILURE) || \ + (x == SSH2_AGENT_FAILURE)) + +/* Returns the number of the authentication fd, or -1 if there is none. */ + +int +ssh_get_authentication_socket(void) +{ + const char *authsocket; + int sock; + struct sockaddr_un sunaddr; + + authsocket = getenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME); + if (!authsocket) + return -1; + + sunaddr.sun_family = AF_UNIX; + strlcpy(sunaddr.sun_path, authsocket, sizeof(sunaddr.sun_path)); + + sock = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0); + if (sock < 0) + return -1; + + /* close on exec */ + if (fcntl(sock, F_SETFD, 1) == -1) { + close(sock); + return -1; + } + if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *) &sunaddr, sizeof sunaddr) < 0) { + close(sock); + return -1; + } + return sock; +} + +static int +ssh_request_reply(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Buffer *request, Buffer *reply) +{ + int l, len; + char buf[1024]; + + /* Get the length of the message, and format it in the buffer. */ + len = buffer_len(request); + PUT_32BIT(buf, len); + + /* Send the length and then the packet to the agent. */ + if (atomicio(write, auth->fd, buf, 4) != 4 || + atomicio(write, auth->fd, buffer_ptr(request), + buffer_len(request)) != buffer_len(request)) { + error("Error writing to authentication socket."); + return 0; + } + /* + * Wait for response from the agent. First read the length of the + * response packet. + */ + len = 4; + while (len > 0) { + l = read(auth->fd, buf + 4 - len, len); + if (l == -1 && (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR)) + continue; + if (l <= 0) { + error("Error reading response length from authentication socket."); + return 0; + } + len -= l; + } + + /* Extract the length, and check it for sanity. */ + len = GET_32BIT(buf); + if (len > 256 * 1024) + fatal("Authentication response too long: %d", len); + + /* Read the rest of the response in to the buffer. */ + buffer_clear(reply); + while (len > 0) { + l = len; + if (l > sizeof(buf)) + l = sizeof(buf); + l = read(auth->fd, buf, l); + if (l == -1 && (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR)) + continue; + if (l <= 0) { + error("Error reading response from authentication socket."); + return 0; + } + buffer_append(reply, (char *) buf, l); + len -= l; + } + return 1; +} + +/* + * Closes the agent socket if it should be closed (depends on how it was + * obtained). The argument must have been returned by + * ssh_get_authentication_socket(). + */ + +void +ssh_close_authentication_socket(int sock) +{ + if (getenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME)) + close(sock); +} + +/* + * Opens and connects a private socket for communication with the + * authentication agent. Returns the file descriptor (which must be + * shut down and closed by the caller when no longer needed). + * Returns NULL if an error occurred and the connection could not be + * opened. + */ + +AuthenticationConnection * +ssh_get_authentication_connection(void) +{ + AuthenticationConnection *auth; + int sock; + + sock = ssh_get_authentication_socket(); + + /* + * Fail if we couldn't obtain a connection. This happens if we + * exited due to a timeout. + */ + if (sock < 0) + return NULL; + + auth = xmalloc(sizeof(*auth)); + auth->fd = sock; + buffer_init(&auth->identities); + auth->howmany = 0; + + return auth; +} + +/* + * Closes the connection to the authentication agent and frees any associated + * memory. + */ + +void +ssh_close_authentication_connection(AuthenticationConnection *auth) +{ + buffer_free(&auth->identities); + close(auth->fd); + xfree(auth); +} + +/* + * Returns the first authentication identity held by the agent. + */ + +int +ssh_get_num_identities(AuthenticationConnection *auth, int version) +{ + int type, code1 = 0, code2 = 0; + Buffer request; + + switch(version){ + case 1: + code1 = SSH_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES; + code2 = SSH_AGENT_RSA_IDENTITIES_ANSWER; + break; + case 2: + code1 = SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES; + code2 = SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER; + break; + default: + return 0; + } + + /* + * Send a message to the agent requesting for a list of the + * identities it can represent. + */ + buffer_init(&request); + buffer_put_char(&request, code1); + + buffer_clear(&auth->identities); + if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &request, &auth->identities) == 0) { + buffer_free(&request); + return 0; + } + buffer_free(&request); + + /* Get message type, and verify that we got a proper answer. */ + type = buffer_get_char(&auth->identities); + if (agent_failed(type)) { + return 0; + } else if (type != code2) { + fatal("Bad authentication reply message type: %d", type); + } + + /* Get the number of entries in the response and check it for sanity. */ + auth->howmany = buffer_get_int(&auth->identities); + if (auth->howmany > 1024) + fatal("Too many identities in authentication reply: %d", + auth->howmany); + + return auth->howmany; +} + +Key * +ssh_get_first_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, char **comment, int version) +{ + /* get number of identities and return the first entry (if any). */ + if (ssh_get_num_identities(auth, version) > 0) + return ssh_get_next_identity(auth, comment, version); + return NULL; +} + +Key * +ssh_get_next_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, char **comment, int version) +{ + u_int bits; + u_char *blob; + u_int blen; + Key *key = NULL; + + /* Return failure if no more entries. */ + if (auth->howmany <= 0) + return NULL; + + /* + * Get the next entry from the packet. These will abort with a fatal + * error if the packet is too short or contains corrupt data. + */ + switch(version){ + case 1: + key = key_new(KEY_RSA1); + bits = buffer_get_int(&auth->identities); + buffer_get_bignum(&auth->identities, key->rsa->e); + buffer_get_bignum(&auth->identities, key->rsa->n); + *comment = buffer_get_string(&auth->identities, NULL); + if (bits != BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n)) + log("Warning: identity keysize mismatch: actual %d, announced %u", + BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n), bits); + break; + case 2: + blob = buffer_get_string(&auth->identities, &blen); + *comment = buffer_get_string(&auth->identities, NULL); + key = key_from_blob(blob, blen); + xfree(blob); + break; + default: + return NULL; + break; + } + /* Decrement the number of remaining entries. */ + auth->howmany--; + return key; +} + +/* + * Generates a random challenge, sends it to the agent, and waits for + * response from the agent. Returns true (non-zero) if the agent gave the + * correct answer, zero otherwise. Response type selects the style of + * response desired, with 0 corresponding to protocol version 1.0 (no longer + * supported) and 1 corresponding to protocol version 1.1. + */ + +int +ssh_decrypt_challenge(AuthenticationConnection *auth, + Key* key, BIGNUM *challenge, + u_char session_id[16], + u_int response_type, + u_char response[16]) +{ + Buffer buffer; + int success = 0; + int i; + int type; + + if (key->type != KEY_RSA1) + return 0; + if (response_type == 0) { + log("Compatibility with ssh protocol version 1.0 no longer supported."); + return 0; + } + buffer_init(&buffer); + buffer_put_char(&buffer, SSH_AGENTC_RSA_CHALLENGE); + buffer_put_int(&buffer, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n)); + buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, key->rsa->e); + buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, key->rsa->n); + buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, challenge); + buffer_append(&buffer, (char *) session_id, 16); + buffer_put_int(&buffer, response_type); + + if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &buffer, &buffer) == 0) { + buffer_free(&buffer); + return 0; + } + type = buffer_get_char(&buffer); + + if (agent_failed(type)) { + log("Agent admitted failure to authenticate using the key."); + } else if (type != SSH_AGENT_RSA_RESPONSE) { + fatal("Bad authentication response: %d", type); + } else { + success = 1; + /* + * Get the response from the packet. This will abort with a + * fatal error if the packet is corrupt. + */ + for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) + response[i] = buffer_get_char(&buffer); + } + buffer_free(&buffer); + return success; +} + +/* ask agent to sign data, returns -1 on error, 0 on success */ +int +ssh_agent_sign(AuthenticationConnection *auth, + Key *key, + u_char **sigp, int *lenp, + u_char *data, int datalen) +{ + extern int datafellows; + Buffer msg; + u_char *blob; + u_int blen; + int type, flags = 0; + int ret = -1; + + if (key_to_blob(key, &blob, &blen) == 0) + return -1; + + if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB) + flags = SSH_AGENT_OLD_SIGNATURE; + + buffer_init(&msg); + buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST); + buffer_put_string(&msg, blob, blen); + buffer_put_string(&msg, data, datalen); + buffer_put_int(&msg, flags); + xfree(blob); + + if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &msg, &msg) == 0) { + buffer_free(&msg); + return -1; + } + type = buffer_get_char(&msg); + if (agent_failed(type)) { + log("Agent admitted failure to sign using the key."); + } else if (type != SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE) { + fatal("Bad authentication response: %d", type); + } else { + ret = 0; + *sigp = buffer_get_string(&msg, lenp); + } + buffer_free(&msg); + return ret; +} + +/* Encode key for a message to the agent. */ + +static void +ssh_encode_identity_rsa1(Buffer *b, RSA *key, const char *comment) +{ + buffer_clear(b); + buffer_put_char(b, SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_IDENTITY); + buffer_put_int(b, BN_num_bits(key->n)); + buffer_put_bignum(b, key->n); + buffer_put_bignum(b, key->e); + buffer_put_bignum(b, key->d); + /* To keep within the protocol: p < q for ssh. in SSL p > q */ + buffer_put_bignum(b, key->iqmp); /* ssh key->u */ + buffer_put_bignum(b, key->q); /* ssh key->p, SSL key->q */ + buffer_put_bignum(b, key->p); /* ssh key->q, SSL key->p */ + buffer_put_cstring(b, comment); +} + +static void +ssh_encode_identity_ssh2(Buffer *b, Key *key, const char *comment) +{ + buffer_clear(b); + buffer_put_char(b, SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY); + buffer_put_cstring(b, key_ssh_name(key)); + switch(key->type){ + case KEY_RSA: + buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->n); + buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->e); + buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->d); + buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->iqmp); + buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->p); + buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->q); + break; + case KEY_DSA: + buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->p); + buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->q); + buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->g); + buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->pub_key); + buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->priv_key); + break; + } + buffer_put_cstring(b, comment); +} + +/* + * Adds an identity to the authentication server. This call is not meant to + * be used by normal applications. + */ + +int +ssh_add_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Key *key, const char *comment) +{ + Buffer msg; + int type; + + buffer_init(&msg); + + switch (key->type) { + case KEY_RSA1: + ssh_encode_identity_rsa1(&msg, key->rsa, comment); + break; + case KEY_RSA: + case KEY_DSA: + ssh_encode_identity_ssh2(&msg, key, comment); + break; + default: + buffer_free(&msg); + return 0; + break; + } + if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &msg, &msg) == 0) { + buffer_free(&msg); + return 0; + } + type = buffer_get_char(&msg); + buffer_free(&msg); + return decode_reply(type); +} + +/* + * Removes an identity from the authentication server. This call is not + * meant to be used by normal applications. + */ + +int +ssh_remove_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Key *key) +{ + Buffer msg; + int type; + u_char *blob; + u_int blen; + + buffer_init(&msg); + + if (key->type == KEY_RSA1) { + buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_RSA_IDENTITY); + buffer_put_int(&msg, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n)); + buffer_put_bignum(&msg, key->rsa->e); + buffer_put_bignum(&msg, key->rsa->n); + } else if (key->type == KEY_DSA || key->type == KEY_RSA) { + key_to_blob(key, &blob, &blen); + buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_IDENTITY); + buffer_put_string(&msg, blob, blen); + xfree(blob); + } else { + buffer_free(&msg); + return 0; + } + if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &msg, &msg) == 0) { + buffer_free(&msg); + return 0; + } + type = buffer_get_char(&msg); + buffer_free(&msg); + return decode_reply(type); +} + +int +ssh_update_card(AuthenticationConnection *auth, int add, const char *reader_id) +{ + Buffer msg; + int type; + + buffer_init(&msg); + buffer_put_char(&msg, add ? SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY : + SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_SMARTCARD_KEY); + buffer_put_cstring(&msg, reader_id); + if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &msg, &msg) == 0) { + buffer_free(&msg); + return 0; + } + type = buffer_get_char(&msg); + buffer_free(&msg); + return decode_reply(type); +} + +/* + * Removes all identities from the agent. This call is not meant to be used + * by normal applications. + */ + +int +ssh_remove_all_identities(AuthenticationConnection *auth, int version) +{ + Buffer msg; + int type; + int code = (version==1) ? + SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_RSA_IDENTITIES : + SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_IDENTITIES; + + buffer_init(&msg); + buffer_put_char(&msg, code); + + if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &msg, &msg) == 0) { + buffer_free(&msg); + return 0; + } + type = buffer_get_char(&msg); + buffer_free(&msg); + return decode_reply(type); +} + +int +decode_reply(int type) +{ + switch (type) { + case SSH_AGENT_FAILURE: + case SSH_COM_AGENT2_FAILURE: + case SSH2_AGENT_FAILURE: + log("SSH_AGENT_FAILURE"); + return 0; + case SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS: + return 1; + default: + fatal("Bad response from authentication agent: %d", type); + } + /* NOTREACHED */ + return 0; +} diff --git a/openssh/authfd.h b/openssh/authfd.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8075a7e --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/authfd.h @@ -0,0 +1,80 @@ +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * Functions to interface with the SSH_AUTHENTICATION_FD socket. + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + */ + +/* RCSID("$OpenBSD: authfd.h,v 1.21 2001/08/07 10:37:46 markus Exp $"); */ + +#ifndef AUTHFD_H +#define AUTHFD_H + +#include "buffer.h" + +/* Messages for the authentication agent connection. */ +#define SSH_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES 1 +#define SSH_AGENT_RSA_IDENTITIES_ANSWER 2 +#define SSH_AGENTC_RSA_CHALLENGE 3 +#define SSH_AGENT_RSA_RESPONSE 4 +#define SSH_AGENT_FAILURE 5 +#define SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS 6 +#define SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_IDENTITY 7 +#define SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_RSA_IDENTITY 8 +#define SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_RSA_IDENTITIES 9 + +/* private OpenSSH extensions for SSH2 */ +#define SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES 11 +#define SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER 12 +#define SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST 13 +#define SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE 14 +#define SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY 17 +#define SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_IDENTITY 18 +#define SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_IDENTITIES 19 + +/* smartcard */ +#define SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY 20 +#define SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_SMARTCARD_KEY 21 + +/* extended failure messages */ +#define SSH2_AGENT_FAILURE 30 + +/* additional error code for ssh.com's ssh-agent2 */ +#define SSH_COM_AGENT2_FAILURE 102 + +#define SSH_AGENT_OLD_SIGNATURE 0x01 + +typedef struct { + int fd; + Buffer identities; + int howmany; +} AuthenticationConnection; + +int ssh_get_authentication_socket(void); +void ssh_close_authentication_socket(int); + +AuthenticationConnection *ssh_get_authentication_connection(void); +void ssh_close_authentication_connection(AuthenticationConnection *); +int ssh_get_num_identities(AuthenticationConnection *, int); +Key *ssh_get_first_identity(AuthenticationConnection *, char **, int); +Key *ssh_get_next_identity(AuthenticationConnection *, char **, int); +int ssh_add_identity(AuthenticationConnection *, Key *, const char *); +int ssh_remove_identity(AuthenticationConnection *, Key *); +int ssh_remove_all_identities(AuthenticationConnection *, int); +int ssh_update_card(AuthenticationConnection *, int, const char *); + +int +ssh_decrypt_challenge(AuthenticationConnection *, Key *, BIGNUM *, u_char[16], + u_int, u_char[16]); + +int +ssh_agent_sign(AuthenticationConnection *, Key *, u_char **, int *, u_char *, + int); + +#endif /* AUTHFD_H */ diff --git a/openssh/authfile.c b/openssh/authfile.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..135be76 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/authfile.c @@ -0,0 +1,631 @@ +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * This file contains functions for reading and writing identity files, and + * for reading the passphrase from the user. + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + * + * + * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" +RCSID("$OpenBSD: authfile.c,v 1.39 2001/10/07 10:29:52 markus Exp $"); + +#include +#include +#include + +#include "cipher.h" +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "buffer.h" +#include "bufaux.h" +#include "key.h" +#include "ssh.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "authfile.h" + +/* Version identification string for SSH v1 identity files. */ +static const char authfile_id_string[] = + "SSH PRIVATE KEY FILE FORMAT 1.1\n"; + +/* + * Saves the authentication (private) key in a file, encrypting it with + * passphrase. The identification of the file (lowest 64 bits of n) will + * precede the key to provide identification of the key without needing a + * passphrase. + */ + +static int +key_save_private_rsa1(Key *key, const char *filename, const char *passphrase, + const char *comment) +{ + Buffer buffer, encrypted; + char buf[100], *cp; + int fd, i; + CipherContext ciphercontext; + Cipher *cipher; + u_int32_t rand; + + /* + * If the passphrase is empty, use SSH_CIPHER_NONE to ease converting + * to another cipher; otherwise use SSH_AUTHFILE_CIPHER. + */ + if (strcmp(passphrase, "") == 0) + cipher = cipher_by_number(SSH_CIPHER_NONE); + else + cipher = cipher_by_number(SSH_AUTHFILE_CIPHER); + if (cipher == NULL) + fatal("save_private_key_rsa: bad cipher"); + + /* This buffer is used to built the secret part of the private key. */ + buffer_init(&buffer); + + /* Put checkbytes for checking passphrase validity. */ + rand = arc4random(); + buf[0] = rand & 0xff; + buf[1] = (rand >> 8) & 0xff; + buf[2] = buf[0]; + buf[3] = buf[1]; + buffer_append(&buffer, buf, 4); + + /* + * Store the private key (n and e will not be stored because they + * will be stored in plain text, and storing them also in encrypted + * format would just give known plaintext). + */ + buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, key->rsa->d); + buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, key->rsa->iqmp); + buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, key->rsa->q); /* reverse from SSL p */ + buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, key->rsa->p); /* reverse from SSL q */ + + /* Pad the part to be encrypted until its size is a multiple of 8. */ + while (buffer_len(&buffer) % 8 != 0) + buffer_put_char(&buffer, 0); + + /* This buffer will be used to contain the data in the file. */ + buffer_init(&encrypted); + + /* First store keyfile id string. */ + for (i = 0; authfile_id_string[i]; i++) + buffer_put_char(&encrypted, authfile_id_string[i]); + buffer_put_char(&encrypted, 0); + + /* Store cipher type. */ + buffer_put_char(&encrypted, cipher->number); + buffer_put_int(&encrypted, 0); /* For future extension */ + + /* Store public key. This will be in plain text. */ + buffer_put_int(&encrypted, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n)); + buffer_put_bignum(&encrypted, key->rsa->n); + buffer_put_bignum(&encrypted, key->rsa->e); + buffer_put_cstring(&encrypted, comment); + + /* Allocate space for the private part of the key in the buffer. */ + buffer_append_space(&encrypted, &cp, buffer_len(&buffer)); + + cipher_set_key_string(&ciphercontext, cipher, passphrase); + cipher_encrypt(&ciphercontext, (u_char *) cp, + (u_char *) buffer_ptr(&buffer), buffer_len(&buffer)); + memset(&ciphercontext, 0, sizeof(ciphercontext)); + + /* Destroy temporary data. */ + memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); + buffer_free(&buffer); + + fd = open(filename, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0600); + if (fd < 0) { + error("open %s failed: %s.", filename, strerror(errno)); + return 0; + } + if (write(fd, buffer_ptr(&encrypted), buffer_len(&encrypted)) != + buffer_len(&encrypted)) { + error("write to key file %s failed: %s", filename, + strerror(errno)); + buffer_free(&encrypted); + close(fd); + unlink(filename); + return 0; + } + close(fd); + buffer_free(&encrypted); + return 1; +} + +/* save SSH v2 key in OpenSSL PEM format */ +static int +key_save_private_pem(Key *key, const char *filename, const char *_passphrase, + const char *comment) +{ + FILE *fp; + int fd; + int success = 0; + int len = strlen(_passphrase); + char *passphrase = (len > 0) ? (char *)_passphrase : NULL; + EVP_CIPHER *cipher = (len > 0) ? EVP_des_ede3_cbc() : NULL; + + if (len > 0 && len <= 4) { + error("passphrase too short: have %d bytes, need > 4", len); + return 0; + } + fd = open(filename, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0600); + if (fd < 0) { + error("open %s failed: %s.", filename, strerror(errno)); + return 0; + } + fp = fdopen(fd, "w"); + if (fp == NULL ) { + error("fdopen %s failed: %s.", filename, strerror(errno)); + close(fd); + return 0; + } + switch (key->type) { + case KEY_DSA: + success = PEM_write_DSAPrivateKey(fp, key->dsa, + cipher, passphrase, len, NULL, NULL); + break; + case KEY_RSA: + success = PEM_write_RSAPrivateKey(fp, key->rsa, + cipher, passphrase, len, NULL, NULL); + break; + } + fclose(fp); + return success; +} + +int +key_save_private(Key *key, const char *filename, const char *passphrase, + const char *comment) +{ + switch (key->type) { + case KEY_RSA1: + return key_save_private_rsa1(key, filename, passphrase, + comment); + break; + case KEY_DSA: + case KEY_RSA: + return key_save_private_pem(key, filename, passphrase, + comment); + break; + default: + break; + } + error("key_save_private: cannot save key type %d", key->type); + return 0; +} + +/* + * Loads the public part of the ssh v1 key file. Returns NULL if an error was + * encountered (the file does not exist or is not readable), and the key + * otherwise. + */ + +static Key * +key_load_public_rsa1(int fd, const char *filename, char **commentp) +{ + Buffer buffer; + Key *pub; + char *cp; + int i; + off_t len; + + len = lseek(fd, (off_t) 0, SEEK_END); + lseek(fd, (off_t) 0, SEEK_SET); + + buffer_init(&buffer); + buffer_append_space(&buffer, &cp, len); + + if (read(fd, cp, (size_t) len) != (size_t) len) { + debug("Read from key file %.200s failed: %.100s", filename, + strerror(errno)); + buffer_free(&buffer); + return NULL; + } + + /* Check that it is at least big enough to contain the ID string. */ + if (len < sizeof(authfile_id_string)) { + debug3("Not a RSA1 key file %.200s.", filename); + buffer_free(&buffer); + return NULL; + } + /* + * Make sure it begins with the id string. Consume the id string + * from the buffer. + */ + for (i = 0; i < sizeof(authfile_id_string); i++) + if (buffer_get_char(&buffer) != authfile_id_string[i]) { + debug3("Not a RSA1 key file %.200s.", filename); + buffer_free(&buffer); + return NULL; + } + /* Skip cipher type and reserved data. */ + (void) buffer_get_char(&buffer); /* cipher type */ + (void) buffer_get_int(&buffer); /* reserved */ + + /* Read the public key from the buffer. */ + buffer_get_int(&buffer); + pub = key_new(KEY_RSA1); + buffer_get_bignum(&buffer, pub->rsa->n); + buffer_get_bignum(&buffer, pub->rsa->e); + if (commentp) + *commentp = buffer_get_string(&buffer, NULL); + /* The encrypted private part is not parsed by this function. */ + + buffer_free(&buffer); + return pub; +} + +/* load public key from private-key file, works only for SSH v1 */ +Key * +key_load_public_type(int type, const char *filename, char **commentp) +{ + Key *pub; + int fd; + + if (type == KEY_RSA1) { + fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY); + if (fd < 0) + return NULL; + pub = key_load_public_rsa1(fd, filename, commentp); + close(fd); + return pub; + } + return NULL; +} + +/* + * Loads the private key from the file. Returns 0 if an error is encountered + * (file does not exist or is not readable, or passphrase is bad). This + * initializes the private key. + * Assumes we are called under uid of the owner of the file. + */ + +static Key * +key_load_private_rsa1(int fd, const char *filename, const char *passphrase, + char **commentp) +{ + int i, check1, check2, cipher_type; + off_t len; + Buffer buffer, decrypted; + char *cp; + CipherContext ciphercontext; + Cipher *cipher; + BN_CTX *ctx; + BIGNUM *aux; + Key *prv = NULL; + + len = lseek(fd, (off_t) 0, SEEK_END); + lseek(fd, (off_t) 0, SEEK_SET); + + buffer_init(&buffer); + buffer_append_space(&buffer, &cp, len); + + if (read(fd, cp, (size_t) len) != (size_t) len) { + debug("Read from key file %.200s failed: %.100s", filename, + strerror(errno)); + buffer_free(&buffer); + close(fd); + return NULL; + } + + /* Check that it is at least big enough to contain the ID string. */ + if (len < sizeof(authfile_id_string)) { + debug3("Not a RSA1 key file %.200s.", filename); + buffer_free(&buffer); + close(fd); + return NULL; + } + /* + * Make sure it begins with the id string. Consume the id string + * from the buffer. + */ + for (i = 0; i < sizeof(authfile_id_string); i++) + if (buffer_get_char(&buffer) != authfile_id_string[i]) { + debug3("Not a RSA1 key file %.200s.", filename); + buffer_free(&buffer); + close(fd); + return NULL; + } + + /* Read cipher type. */ + cipher_type = buffer_get_char(&buffer); + (void) buffer_get_int(&buffer); /* Reserved data. */ + + /* Read the public key from the buffer. */ + buffer_get_int(&buffer); + prv = key_new_private(KEY_RSA1); + + buffer_get_bignum(&buffer, prv->rsa->n); + buffer_get_bignum(&buffer, prv->rsa->e); + if (commentp) + *commentp = buffer_get_string(&buffer, NULL); + else + xfree(buffer_get_string(&buffer, NULL)); + + /* Check that it is a supported cipher. */ + cipher = cipher_by_number(cipher_type); + if (cipher == NULL) { + debug("Unsupported cipher %d used in key file %.200s.", + cipher_type, filename); + buffer_free(&buffer); + goto fail; + } + /* Initialize space for decrypted data. */ + buffer_init(&decrypted); + buffer_append_space(&decrypted, &cp, buffer_len(&buffer)); + + /* Rest of the buffer is encrypted. Decrypt it using the passphrase. */ + cipher_set_key_string(&ciphercontext, cipher, passphrase); + cipher_decrypt(&ciphercontext, (u_char *) cp, + (u_char *) buffer_ptr(&buffer), buffer_len(&buffer)); + memset(&ciphercontext, 0, sizeof(ciphercontext)); + buffer_free(&buffer); + + check1 = buffer_get_char(&decrypted); + check2 = buffer_get_char(&decrypted); + if (check1 != buffer_get_char(&decrypted) || + check2 != buffer_get_char(&decrypted)) { + if (strcmp(passphrase, "") != 0) + debug("Bad passphrase supplied for key file %.200s.", + filename); + /* Bad passphrase. */ + buffer_free(&decrypted); + goto fail; + } + /* Read the rest of the private key. */ + buffer_get_bignum(&decrypted, prv->rsa->d); + buffer_get_bignum(&decrypted, prv->rsa->iqmp); /* u */ + /* in SSL and SSH v1 p and q are exchanged */ + buffer_get_bignum(&decrypted, prv->rsa->q); /* p */ + buffer_get_bignum(&decrypted, prv->rsa->p); /* q */ + + /* calculate p-1 and q-1 */ + ctx = BN_CTX_new(); + aux = BN_new(); + + BN_sub(aux, prv->rsa->q, BN_value_one()); + BN_mod(prv->rsa->dmq1, prv->rsa->d, aux, ctx); + + BN_sub(aux, prv->rsa->p, BN_value_one()); + BN_mod(prv->rsa->dmp1, prv->rsa->d, aux, ctx); + + BN_clear_free(aux); + BN_CTX_free(ctx); + + buffer_free(&decrypted); + close(fd); + return prv; + +fail: + if (commentp) + xfree(*commentp); + close(fd); + key_free(prv); + return NULL; +} + +static Key * +key_load_private_pem(int fd, int type, const char *passphrase, + char **commentp) +{ + FILE *fp; + EVP_PKEY *pk = NULL; + Key *prv = NULL; + char *name = ""; + + fp = fdopen(fd, "r"); + if (fp == NULL) { + error("fdopen failed: %s", strerror(errno)); + close(fd); + return NULL; + } + pk = PEM_read_PrivateKey(fp, NULL, NULL, (char *)passphrase); + if (pk == NULL) { + debug("PEM_read_PrivateKey failed"); + (void)ERR_get_error(); + } else if (pk->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && + (type == KEY_UNSPEC||type==KEY_RSA)) { + prv = key_new(KEY_UNSPEC); + prv->rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pk); + prv->type = KEY_RSA; + name = "rsa w/o comment"; +#ifdef DEBUG_PK + RSA_print_fp(stderr, prv->rsa, 8); +#endif + } else if (pk->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA && + (type == KEY_UNSPEC||type==KEY_DSA)) { + prv = key_new(KEY_UNSPEC); + prv->dsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_DSA(pk); + prv->type = KEY_DSA; + name = "dsa w/o comment"; +#ifdef DEBUG_PK + DSA_print_fp(stderr, prv->dsa, 8); +#endif + } else { + error("PEM_read_PrivateKey: mismatch or " + "unknown EVP_PKEY save_type %d", pk->save_type); + } + fclose(fp); + if (pk != NULL) + EVP_PKEY_free(pk); + if (prv != NULL && commentp) + *commentp = xstrdup(name); + debug("read PEM private key done: type %s", + prv ? key_type(prv) : ""); + return prv; +} + +static int +key_perm_ok(int fd, const char *filename) +{ + struct stat st; + + if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0) + return 0; + /* + * if a key owned by the user is accessed, then we check the + * permissions of the file. if the key owned by a different user, + * then we don't care. + */ +#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN + if (check_ntsec(filename)) +#endif + if ((st.st_uid == getuid()) && (st.st_mode & 077) != 0) { + error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@"); + error("@ WARNING: UNPROTECTED PRIVATE KEY FILE! @"); + error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@"); + error("Permissions 0%3.3o for '%s' are too open.", + st.st_mode & 0777, filename); + error("It is recommended that your private key files are NOT accessible by others."); + error("This private key will be ignored."); + return 0; + } + return 1; +} + +Key * +key_load_private_type(int type, const char *filename, const char *passphrase, + char **commentp) +{ + int fd; + + fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY); + if (fd < 0) + return NULL; + if (!key_perm_ok(fd, filename)) { + error("bad permissions: ignore key: %s", filename); + close(fd); + return NULL; + } + switch (type) { + case KEY_RSA1: + return key_load_private_rsa1(fd, filename, passphrase, + commentp); + /* closes fd */ + break; + case KEY_DSA: + case KEY_RSA: + case KEY_UNSPEC: + return key_load_private_pem(fd, type, passphrase, commentp); + /* closes fd */ + break; + default: + close(fd); + break; + } + return NULL; +} + +Key * +key_load_private(const char *filename, const char *passphrase, + char **commentp) +{ + Key *pub, *prv; + int fd; + + fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY); + if (fd < 0) + return NULL; + if (!key_perm_ok(fd, filename)) { + error("bad permissions: ignore key: %s", filename); + close(fd); + return NULL; + } + pub = key_load_public_rsa1(fd, filename, commentp); + lseek(fd, (off_t) 0, SEEK_SET); /* rewind */ + if (pub == NULL) { + /* closes fd */ + prv = key_load_private_pem(fd, KEY_UNSPEC, passphrase, NULL); + /* use the filename as a comment for PEM */ + if (commentp && prv) + *commentp = xstrdup(filename); + } else { + /* it's a SSH v1 key if the public key part is readable */ + key_free(pub); + /* closes fd */ + prv = key_load_private_rsa1(fd, filename, passphrase, NULL); + } + return prv; +} + +static int +key_try_load_public(Key *k, const char *filename, char **commentp) +{ + FILE *f; + char line[4096]; + char *cp; + + f = fopen(filename, "r"); + if (f != NULL) { + while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), f)) { + line[sizeof(line)-1] = '\0'; + cp = line; + switch(*cp){ + case '#': + case '\n': + case '\0': + continue; + } + /* Skip leading whitespace. */ + for (; *cp && (*cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'); cp++) + ; + if (*cp) { + if (key_read(k, &cp) == 1) { + if (commentp) + *commentp=xstrdup(filename); + fclose(f); + return 1; + } + } + } + fclose(f); + } + return 0; +} + +/* load public key from ssh v1 private or any pubkey file */ +Key * +key_load_public(const char *filename, char **commentp) +{ + Key *pub; + char file[MAXPATHLEN]; + + pub = key_load_public_type(KEY_RSA1, filename, commentp); + if (pub != NULL) + return pub; + pub = key_new(KEY_UNSPEC); + if (key_try_load_public(pub, filename, commentp) == 1) + return pub; + if ((strlcpy(file, filename, sizeof file) < sizeof(file)) && + (strlcat(file, ".pub", sizeof file) < sizeof(file)) && + (key_try_load_public(pub, file, commentp) == 1)) + return pub; + key_free(pub); + return NULL; +} diff --git a/openssh/authfile.h b/openssh/authfile.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c8b31fb --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/authfile.h @@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + */ + +/* $OpenBSD: authfile.h,v 1.8 2001/06/26 17:27:22 markus Exp $ */ + +#ifndef AUTHFILE_H +#define AUTHFILE_H + +int key_save_private(Key *, const char *, const char *, const char *); +Key *key_load_public(const char *, char **); +Key *key_load_public_type(int, const char *, char **); +Key *key_load_private(const char *, const char *, char **); +Key *key_load_private_type(int, const char *, const char *, char **); + +#endif diff --git a/openssh/bufaux.c b/openssh/bufaux.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b17256d --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/bufaux.c @@ -0,0 +1,249 @@ +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * Auxiliary functions for storing and retrieving various data types to/from + * Buffers. + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + * + * + * SSH2 packet format added by Markus Friedl + * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" +RCSID("$OpenBSD: bufaux.c,v 1.17 2001/01/21 19:05:45 markus Exp $"); + +#include +#include "bufaux.h" +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "getput.h" +#include "log.h" + +/* + * Stores an BIGNUM in the buffer with a 2-byte msb first bit count, followed + * by (bits+7)/8 bytes of binary data, msb first. + */ +void +buffer_put_bignum(Buffer *buffer, BIGNUM *value) +{ + int bits = BN_num_bits(value); + int bin_size = (bits + 7) / 8; + u_char *buf = xmalloc(bin_size); + int oi; + char msg[2]; + + /* Get the value of in binary */ + oi = BN_bn2bin(value, buf); + if (oi != bin_size) + fatal("buffer_put_bignum: BN_bn2bin() failed: oi %d != bin_size %d", + oi, bin_size); + + /* Store the number of bits in the buffer in two bytes, msb first. */ + PUT_16BIT(msg, bits); + buffer_append(buffer, msg, 2); + /* Store the binary data. */ + buffer_append(buffer, (char *)buf, oi); + + memset(buf, 0, bin_size); + xfree(buf); +} + +/* + * Retrieves an BIGNUM from the buffer. + */ +int +buffer_get_bignum(Buffer *buffer, BIGNUM *value) +{ + int bits, bytes; + u_char buf[2], *bin; + + /* Get the number for bits. */ + buffer_get(buffer, (char *) buf, 2); + bits = GET_16BIT(buf); + /* Compute the number of binary bytes that follow. */ + bytes = (bits + 7) / 8; + if (buffer_len(buffer) < bytes) + fatal("buffer_get_bignum: input buffer too small"); + bin = (u_char *) buffer_ptr(buffer); + BN_bin2bn(bin, bytes, value); + buffer_consume(buffer, bytes); + + return 2 + bytes; +} + +/* + * Stores an BIGNUM in the buffer in SSH2 format. + */ +void +buffer_put_bignum2(Buffer *buffer, BIGNUM *value) +{ + int bytes = BN_num_bytes(value) + 1; + u_char *buf = xmalloc(bytes); + int oi; + int hasnohigh = 0; + buf[0] = '\0'; + /* Get the value of in binary */ + oi = BN_bn2bin(value, buf+1); + if (oi != bytes-1) + fatal("buffer_put_bignum: BN_bn2bin() failed: oi %d != bin_size %d", + oi, bytes); + hasnohigh = (buf[1] & 0x80) ? 0 : 1; + if (value->neg) { + /**XXX should be two's-complement */ + int i, carry; + u_char *uc = buf; + log("negativ!"); + for(i = bytes-1, carry = 1; i>=0; i--) { + uc[i] ^= 0xff; + if(carry) + carry = !++uc[i]; + } + } + buffer_put_string(buffer, buf+hasnohigh, bytes-hasnohigh); + memset(buf, 0, bytes); + xfree(buf); +} + +int +buffer_get_bignum2(Buffer *buffer, BIGNUM *value) +{ + /**XXX should be two's-complement */ + int len; + u_char *bin = (u_char *)buffer_get_string(buffer, (u_int *)&len); + BN_bin2bn(bin, len, value); + xfree(bin); + return len; +} + +/* + * Returns an integer from the buffer (4 bytes, msb first). + */ +u_int +buffer_get_int(Buffer *buffer) +{ + u_char buf[4]; + buffer_get(buffer, (char *) buf, 4); + return GET_32BIT(buf); +} + +#ifdef HAVE_U_INT64_T +u_int64_t +buffer_get_int64(Buffer *buffer) +{ + u_char buf[8]; + buffer_get(buffer, (char *) buf, 8); + return GET_64BIT(buf); +} +#endif + +/* + * Stores an integer in the buffer in 4 bytes, msb first. + */ +void +buffer_put_int(Buffer *buffer, u_int value) +{ + char buf[4]; + PUT_32BIT(buf, value); + buffer_append(buffer, buf, 4); +} + +#ifdef HAVE_U_INT64_T +void +buffer_put_int64(Buffer *buffer, u_int64_t value) +{ + char buf[8]; + PUT_64BIT(buf, value); + buffer_append(buffer, buf, 8); +} +#endif + +/* + * Returns an arbitrary binary string from the buffer. The string cannot + * be longer than 256k. The returned value points to memory allocated + * with xmalloc; it is the responsibility of the calling function to free + * the data. If length_ptr is non-NULL, the length of the returned data + * will be stored there. A null character will be automatically appended + * to the returned string, and is not counted in length. + */ +char * +buffer_get_string(Buffer *buffer, u_int *length_ptr) +{ + u_int len; + char *value; + /* Get the length. */ + len = buffer_get_int(buffer); + if (len > 256 * 1024) + fatal("Received packet with bad string length %d", len); + /* Allocate space for the string. Add one byte for a null character. */ + value = xmalloc(len + 1); + /* Get the string. */ + buffer_get(buffer, value, len); + /* Append a null character to make processing easier. */ + value[len] = 0; + /* Optionally return the length of the string. */ + if (length_ptr) + *length_ptr = len; + return value; +} + +/* + * Stores and arbitrary binary string in the buffer. + */ +void +buffer_put_string(Buffer *buffer, const void *buf, u_int len) +{ + buffer_put_int(buffer, len); + buffer_append(buffer, buf, len); +} +void +buffer_put_cstring(Buffer *buffer, const char *s) +{ + buffer_put_string(buffer, s, strlen(s)); +} + +/* + * Returns a character from the buffer (0 - 255). + */ +int +buffer_get_char(Buffer *buffer) +{ + char ch; + buffer_get(buffer, &ch, 1); + return (u_char) ch; +} + +/* + * Stores a character in the buffer. + */ +void +buffer_put_char(Buffer *buffer, int value) +{ + char ch = value; + buffer_append(buffer, &ch, 1); +} diff --git a/openssh/bufaux.h b/openssh/bufaux.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d1af098 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/bufaux.h @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + */ + +/* RCSID("$OpenBSD: bufaux.h,v 1.13 2001/06/26 17:27:22 markus Exp $"); */ + +#ifndef BUFAUX_H +#define BUFAUX_H + +#include "buffer.h" +#include + +void buffer_put_bignum(Buffer *, BIGNUM *); +void buffer_put_bignum2(Buffer *, BIGNUM *); + +int buffer_get_bignum(Buffer *, BIGNUM *); +int buffer_get_bignum2(Buffer *, BIGNUM *); + +u_int buffer_get_int(Buffer *); +void buffer_put_int(Buffer *, u_int); + +#ifdef HAVE_U_INT64_T +u_int64_t buffer_get_int64(Buffer *); +void buffer_put_int64(Buffer *, u_int64_t); +#endif + +int buffer_get_char(Buffer *); + +void buffer_put_char(Buffer *, int); + +char *buffer_get_string(Buffer *, u_int *); + +void buffer_put_string(Buffer *, const void *, u_int); +void buffer_put_cstring(Buffer *, const char *); + +#endif /* BUFAUX_H */ diff --git a/openssh/buffer.c b/openssh/buffer.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..044caaf --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/buffer.c @@ -0,0 +1,165 @@ +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * Functions for manipulating fifo buffers (that can grow if needed). + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + */ + +#include "includes.h" +RCSID("$OpenBSD: buffer.c,v 1.13 2001/04/12 19:15:24 markus Exp $"); + +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "buffer.h" +#include "log.h" + +/* Initializes the buffer structure. */ + +void +buffer_init(Buffer *buffer) +{ + buffer->alloc = 4096; + buffer->buf = xmalloc(buffer->alloc); + buffer->offset = 0; + buffer->end = 0; +} + +/* Frees any memory used for the buffer. */ + +void +buffer_free(Buffer *buffer) +{ + memset(buffer->buf, 0, buffer->alloc); + xfree(buffer->buf); +} + +/* + * Clears any data from the buffer, making it empty. This does not actually + * zero the memory. + */ + +void +buffer_clear(Buffer *buffer) +{ + buffer->offset = 0; + buffer->end = 0; +} + +/* Appends data to the buffer, expanding it if necessary. */ + +void +buffer_append(Buffer *buffer, const char *data, u_int len) +{ + char *cp; + buffer_append_space(buffer, &cp, len); + memcpy(cp, data, len); +} + +/* + * Appends space to the buffer, expanding the buffer if necessary. This does + * not actually copy the data into the buffer, but instead returns a pointer + * to the allocated region. + */ + +void +buffer_append_space(Buffer *buffer, char **datap, u_int len) +{ + /* If the buffer is empty, start using it from the beginning. */ + if (buffer->offset == buffer->end) { + buffer->offset = 0; + buffer->end = 0; + } +restart: + /* If there is enough space to store all data, store it now. */ + if (buffer->end + len < buffer->alloc) { + *datap = buffer->buf + buffer->end; + buffer->end += len; + return; + } + /* + * If the buffer is quite empty, but all data is at the end, move the + * data to the beginning and retry. + */ + if (buffer->offset > buffer->alloc / 2) { + memmove(buffer->buf, buffer->buf + buffer->offset, + buffer->end - buffer->offset); + buffer->end -= buffer->offset; + buffer->offset = 0; + goto restart; + } + /* Increase the size of the buffer and retry. */ + buffer->alloc += len + 32768; + buffer->buf = xrealloc(buffer->buf, buffer->alloc); + goto restart; +} + +/* Returns the number of bytes of data in the buffer. */ + +u_int +buffer_len(Buffer *buffer) +{ + return buffer->end - buffer->offset; +} + +/* Gets data from the beginning of the buffer. */ + +void +buffer_get(Buffer *buffer, char *buf, u_int len) +{ + if (len > buffer->end - buffer->offset) + fatal("buffer_get: trying to get more bytes %d than in buffer %d", + len, buffer->end - buffer->offset); + memcpy(buf, buffer->buf + buffer->offset, len); + buffer->offset += len; +} + +/* Consumes the given number of bytes from the beginning of the buffer. */ + +void +buffer_consume(Buffer *buffer, u_int bytes) +{ + if (bytes > buffer->end - buffer->offset) + fatal("buffer_consume: trying to get more bytes than in buffer"); + buffer->offset += bytes; +} + +/* Consumes the given number of bytes from the end of the buffer. */ + +void +buffer_consume_end(Buffer *buffer, u_int bytes) +{ + if (bytes > buffer->end - buffer->offset) + fatal("buffer_consume_end: trying to get more bytes than in buffer"); + buffer->end -= bytes; +} + +/* Returns a pointer to the first used byte in the buffer. */ + +char * +buffer_ptr(Buffer *buffer) +{ + return buffer->buf + buffer->offset; +} + +/* Dumps the contents of the buffer to stderr. */ + +void +buffer_dump(Buffer *buffer) +{ + int i; + u_char *ucp = (u_char *) buffer->buf; + + for (i = buffer->offset; i < buffer->end; i++) { + fprintf(stderr, "%02x", ucp[i]); + if ((i-buffer->offset)%16==15) + fprintf(stderr, "\r\n"); + else if ((i-buffer->offset)%2==1) + fprintf(stderr, " "); + } + fprintf(stderr, "\r\n"); +} diff --git a/openssh/buffer.h b/openssh/buffer.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..845bfb6 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/buffer.h @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * Code for manipulating FIFO buffers. + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + */ + +/* RCSID("$OpenBSD: buffer.h,v 1.9 2001/06/26 17:27:23 markus Exp $"); */ + +#ifndef BUFFER_H +#define BUFFER_H + +typedef struct { + char *buf; /* Buffer for data. */ + u_int alloc; /* Number of bytes allocated for data. */ + u_int offset; /* Offset of first byte containing data. */ + u_int end; /* Offset of last byte containing data. */ +} Buffer; + +void buffer_init(Buffer *); +void buffer_clear(Buffer *); +void buffer_free(Buffer *); + +u_int buffer_len(Buffer *); +char *buffer_ptr(Buffer *); + +void buffer_append(Buffer *, const char *, u_int); +void buffer_append_space(Buffer *, char **, u_int); + +void buffer_get(Buffer *, char *, u_int); + +void buffer_consume(Buffer *, u_int); +void buffer_consume_end(Buffer *, u_int); + +void buffer_dump(Buffer *); + +#endif /* BUFFER_H */ diff --git a/openssh/canohost.c b/openssh/canohost.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6e6a045 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/canohost.c @@ -0,0 +1,356 @@ +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * Functions for returning the canonical host name of the remote site. + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + */ + +#include "includes.h" +RCSID("$OpenBSD: canohost.c,v 1.27 2001/06/23 15:12:17 itojun Exp $"); + +#include "packet.h" +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "canohost.h" + +static void check_ip_options(int, char *); + +/* + * Return the canonical name of the host at the other end of the socket. The + * caller should free the returned string with xfree. + */ + +static char * +get_remote_hostname(int socket, int reverse_mapping_check) +{ + struct sockaddr_storage from; + int i; + socklen_t fromlen; + struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop; + char name[NI_MAXHOST], ntop[NI_MAXHOST], ntop2[NI_MAXHOST]; + + /* Get IP address of client. */ + fromlen = sizeof(from); + memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from)); + if (getpeername(socket, (struct sockaddr *) &from, &fromlen) < 0) { + debug("getpeername failed: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + fatal_cleanup(); + } +#ifdef IPV4_IN_IPV6 + if (from.ss_family == AF_INET6) { + struct sockaddr_in6 *from6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)&from; + + /* Detect IPv4 in IPv6 mapped address and convert it to */ + /* plain (AF_INET) IPv4 address */ + if (IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(&from6->sin6_addr)) { + struct sockaddr_in *from4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)&from; + struct in_addr addr; + u_int16_t port; + + memcpy(&addr, ((char *)&from6->sin6_addr) + 12, sizeof(addr)); + port = from6->sin6_port; + + memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from)); + + from4->sin_family = AF_INET; + memcpy(&from4->sin_addr, &addr, sizeof(addr)); + from4->sin_port = port; + } + } +#endif + if (from.ss_family == AF_INET) + check_ip_options(socket, ntop); + + if (getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen, ntop, sizeof(ntop), + NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) != 0) + fatal("get_remote_hostname: getnameinfo NI_NUMERICHOST failed"); + + debug3("Trying to reverse map address %.100s.", ntop); + /* Map the IP address to a host name. */ + if (getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen, name, sizeof(name), + NULL, 0, NI_NAMEREQD) != 0) { + /* Host name not found. Use ip address. */ + log("Could not reverse map address %.100s.", ntop); + return xstrdup(ntop); + } + + /* Got host name. */ + name[sizeof(name) - 1] = '\0'; + /* + * Convert it to all lowercase (which is expected by the rest + * of this software). + */ + for (i = 0; name[i]; i++) + if (isupper(name[i])) + name[i] = tolower(name[i]); + + if (!reverse_mapping_check) + return xstrdup(name); + /* + * Map it back to an IP address and check that the given + * address actually is an address of this host. This is + * necessary because anyone with access to a name server can + * define arbitrary names for an IP address. Mapping from + * name to IP address can be trusted better (but can still be + * fooled if the intruder has access to the name server of + * the domain). + */ + memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); + hints.ai_family = from.ss_family; + hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; + if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &aitop) != 0) { + log("reverse mapping checking getaddrinfo for %.700s " + "failed - POSSIBLE BREAKIN ATTEMPT!", name); + return xstrdup(ntop); + } + /* Look for the address from the list of addresses. */ + for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) { + if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop2, + sizeof(ntop2), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) == 0 && + (strcmp(ntop, ntop2) == 0)) + break; + } + freeaddrinfo(aitop); + /* If we reached the end of the list, the address was not there. */ + if (!ai) { + /* Address not found for the host name. */ + log("Address %.100s maps to %.600s, but this does not " + "map back to the address - POSSIBLE BREAKIN ATTEMPT!", + ntop, name); + return xstrdup(ntop); + } + return xstrdup(name); +} + +/* + * If IP options are supported, make sure there are none (log and + * disconnect them if any are found). Basically we are worried about + * source routing; it can be used to pretend you are somebody + * (ip-address) you are not. That itself may be "almost acceptable" + * under certain circumstances, but rhosts autentication is useless + * if source routing is accepted. Notice also that if we just dropped + * source routing here, the other side could use IP spoofing to do + * rest of the interaction and could still bypass security. So we + * exit here if we detect any IP options. + */ +/* IPv4 only */ +static void +check_ip_options(int socket, char *ipaddr) +{ + u_char options[200]; + char text[sizeof(options) * 3 + 1]; + socklen_t option_size; + int i, ipproto; + struct protoent *ip; + + if ((ip = getprotobyname("ip")) != NULL) + ipproto = ip->p_proto; + else + ipproto = IPPROTO_IP; + option_size = sizeof(options); + if (getsockopt(socket, ipproto, IP_OPTIONS, (void *)options, + &option_size) >= 0 && option_size != 0) { + text[0] = '\0'; + for (i = 0; i < option_size; i++) + snprintf(text + i*3, sizeof(text) - i*3, + " %2.2x", options[i]); + log("Connection from %.100s with IP options:%.800s", + ipaddr, text); + packet_disconnect("Connection from %.100s with IP options:%.800s", + ipaddr, text); + } +} + +/* + * Return the canonical name of the host in the other side of the current + * connection. The host name is cached, so it is efficient to call this + * several times. + */ + +const char * +get_canonical_hostname(int reverse_mapping_check) +{ + static char *canonical_host_name = NULL; + static int reverse_mapping_checked = 0; + + /* Check if we have previously retrieved name with same option. */ + if (canonical_host_name != NULL) { + if (reverse_mapping_checked != reverse_mapping_check) + xfree(canonical_host_name); + else + return canonical_host_name; + } + + /* Get the real hostname if socket; otherwise return UNKNOWN. */ + if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) + canonical_host_name = get_remote_hostname( + packet_get_connection_in(), reverse_mapping_check); + else + canonical_host_name = xstrdup("UNKNOWN"); + + reverse_mapping_checked = reverse_mapping_check; + return canonical_host_name; +} + +/* + * Returns the remote IP-address of socket as a string. The returned + * string must be freed. + */ +static char * +get_socket_address(int socket, int remote, int flags) +{ + struct sockaddr_storage addr; + socklen_t addrlen; + char ntop[NI_MAXHOST]; + + /* Get IP address of client. */ + addrlen = sizeof(addr); + memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr)); + + if (remote) { + if (getpeername(socket, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, &addrlen) + < 0) { + debug("get_socket_ipaddr: getpeername failed: %.100s", + strerror(errno)); + return NULL; + } + } else { + if (getsockname(socket, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, &addrlen) + < 0) { + debug("get_socket_ipaddr: getsockname failed: %.100s", + strerror(errno)); + return NULL; + } + } + /* Get the address in ascii. */ + if (getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&addr, addrlen, ntop, sizeof(ntop), + NULL, 0, flags) != 0) { + error("get_socket_ipaddr: getnameinfo %d failed", flags); + return NULL; + } + return xstrdup(ntop); +} + +char * +get_peer_ipaddr(int socket) +{ + return get_socket_address(socket, 1, NI_NUMERICHOST); +} + +char * +get_local_ipaddr(int socket) +{ + return get_socket_address(socket, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST); +} + +char * +get_local_name(int socket) +{ + return get_socket_address(socket, 0, NI_NAMEREQD); +} + +/* + * Returns the IP-address of the remote host as a string. The returned + * string must not be freed. + */ + +const char * +get_remote_ipaddr() +{ + static char *canonical_host_ip = NULL; + + /* Check whether we have cached the ipaddr. */ + if (canonical_host_ip == NULL) { + if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) { + canonical_host_ip = + get_peer_ipaddr(packet_get_connection_in()); + if (canonical_host_ip == NULL) + fatal_cleanup(); + } else { + /* If not on socket, return UNKNOWN. */ + canonical_host_ip = xstrdup("UNKNOWN"); + } + } + return canonical_host_ip; +} + +const char * +get_remote_name_or_ip(u_int utmp_len, int reverse_mapping_check) +{ + static const char *remote = ""; + if (utmp_len > 0) + remote = get_canonical_hostname(reverse_mapping_check); + if (utmp_len == 0 || strlen(remote) > utmp_len) + remote = get_remote_ipaddr(); + return remote; +} + +/* Returns the local/remote port for the socket. */ + +static int +get_sock_port(int sock, int local) +{ + struct sockaddr_storage from; + socklen_t fromlen; + char strport[NI_MAXSERV]; + + /* Get IP address of client. */ + fromlen = sizeof(from); + memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from)); + if (local) { + if (getsockname(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) { + error("getsockname failed: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + return 0; + } + } else { + if (getpeername(sock, (struct sockaddr *) & from, &fromlen) < 0) { + debug("getpeername failed: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + fatal_cleanup(); + } + } + /* Return port number. */ + if (getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen, NULL, 0, + strport, sizeof(strport), NI_NUMERICSERV) != 0) + fatal("get_sock_port: getnameinfo NI_NUMERICSERV failed"); + return atoi(strport); +} + +/* Returns remote/local port number for the current connection. */ + +static int +get_port(int local) +{ + /* + * If the connection is not a socket, return 65535. This is + * intentionally chosen to be an unprivileged port number. + */ + if (!packet_connection_is_on_socket()) + return 65535; + + /* Get socket and return the port number. */ + return get_sock_port(packet_get_connection_in(), local); +} + +int +get_peer_port(int sock) +{ + return get_sock_port(sock, 0); +} + +int +get_remote_port() +{ + return get_port(0); +} + +int +get_local_port() +{ + return get_port(1); +} diff --git a/openssh/canohost.h b/openssh/canohost.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4347b48 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/canohost.h @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: canohost.h,v 1.8 2001/06/26 17:27:23 markus Exp $ */ + +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + */ + +const char *get_canonical_hostname(int); +const char *get_remote_ipaddr(void); +const char *get_remote_name_or_ip(u_int, int); + +char *get_peer_ipaddr(int); +int get_peer_port(int); +char *get_local_ipaddr(int); +char *get_local_name(int); + +int get_remote_port(void); +int get_local_port(void); diff --git a/openssh/channels.c b/openssh/channels.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..62fd73d --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/channels.c @@ -0,0 +1,2978 @@ +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * This file contains functions for generic socket connection forwarding. + * There is also code for initiating connection forwarding for X11 connections, + * arbitrary tcp/ip connections, and the authentication agent connection. + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + * + * SSH2 support added by Markus Friedl. + * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 1999 Dug Song. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" +RCSID("$OpenBSD: channels.c,v 1.140 2001/10/10 22:18:47 markus Exp $"); + +#include "ssh.h" +#include "ssh1.h" +#include "ssh2.h" +#include "packet.h" +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "uidswap.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "misc.h" +#include "channels.h" +#include "compat.h" +#include "canohost.h" +#include "key.h" +#include "authfd.h" + + +/* -- channel core */ + +/* + * Pointer to an array containing all allocated channels. The array is + * dynamically extended as needed. + */ +static Channel **channels = NULL; + +/* + * Size of the channel array. All slots of the array must always be + * initialized (at least the type field); unused slots set to NULL + */ +static int channels_alloc = 0; + +/* + * Maximum file descriptor value used in any of the channels. This is + * updated in channel_new. + */ +static int channel_max_fd = 0; + + +/* -- tcp forwarding */ + +/* + * Data structure for storing which hosts are permitted for forward requests. + * The local sides of any remote forwards are stored in this array to prevent + * a corrupt remote server from accessing arbitrary TCP/IP ports on our local + * network (which might be behind a firewall). + */ +typedef struct { + char *host_to_connect; /* Connect to 'host'. */ + u_short port_to_connect; /* Connect to 'port'. */ + u_short listen_port; /* Remote side should listen port number. */ +} ForwardPermission; + +/* List of all permitted host/port pairs to connect. */ +static ForwardPermission permitted_opens[SSH_MAX_FORWARDS_PER_DIRECTION]; + +/* Number of permitted host/port pairs in the array. */ +static int num_permitted_opens = 0; +/* + * If this is true, all opens are permitted. This is the case on the server + * on which we have to trust the client anyway, and the user could do + * anything after logging in anyway. + */ +static int all_opens_permitted = 0; + + +/* -- X11 forwarding */ + +/* Maximum number of fake X11 displays to try. */ +#define MAX_DISPLAYS 1000 + +/* Saved X11 authentication protocol name. */ +static char *x11_saved_proto = NULL; + +/* Saved X11 authentication data. This is the real data. */ +static char *x11_saved_data = NULL; +static u_int x11_saved_data_len = 0; + +/* + * Fake X11 authentication data. This is what the server will be sending us; + * we should replace any occurrences of this by the real data. + */ +static char *x11_fake_data = NULL; +static u_int x11_fake_data_len; + + +/* -- agent forwarding */ + +#define NUM_SOCKS 10 + +/* Name and directory of socket for authentication agent forwarding. */ +static char *auth_sock_name = NULL; +static char *auth_sock_dir = NULL; + +/* AF_UNSPEC or AF_INET or AF_INET6 */ +static int IPv4or6 = AF_UNSPEC; + +/* helper */ +static void port_open_helper(Channel *c, char *rtype); + +/* -- channel core */ + +Channel * +channel_lookup(int id) +{ + Channel *c; + + if (id < 0 || id > channels_alloc) { + log("channel_lookup: %d: bad id", id); + return NULL; + } + c = channels[id]; + if (c == NULL) { + log("channel_lookup: %d: bad id: channel free", id); + return NULL; + } + return c; +} + +/* + * Register filedescriptors for a channel, used when allocating a channel or + * when the channel consumer/producer is ready, e.g. shell exec'd + */ + +static void +channel_register_fds(Channel *c, int rfd, int wfd, int efd, + int extusage, int nonblock) +{ + /* Update the maximum file descriptor value. */ + channel_max_fd = MAX(channel_max_fd, rfd); + channel_max_fd = MAX(channel_max_fd, wfd); + channel_max_fd = MAX(channel_max_fd, efd); + + /* XXX set close-on-exec -markus */ + + c->rfd = rfd; + c->wfd = wfd; + c->sock = (rfd == wfd) ? rfd : -1; + c->efd = efd; + c->extended_usage = extusage; + + /* XXX ugly hack: nonblock is only set by the server */ + if (nonblock && isatty(c->rfd)) { + debug("channel %d: rfd %d isatty", c->self, c->rfd); + c->isatty = 1; + if (!isatty(c->wfd)) { + error("channel %d: wfd %d is not a tty?", + c->self, c->wfd); + } + } else { + c->isatty = 0; + } + + /* enable nonblocking mode */ + if (nonblock) { + if (rfd != -1) + set_nonblock(rfd); + if (wfd != -1) + set_nonblock(wfd); + if (efd != -1) + set_nonblock(efd); + } +} + +/* + * Allocate a new channel object and set its type and socket. This will cause + * remote_name to be freed. + */ + +Channel * +channel_new(char *ctype, int type, int rfd, int wfd, int efd, + int window, int maxpack, int extusage, char *remote_name, int nonblock) +{ + int i, found; + Channel *c; + + /* Do initial allocation if this is the first call. */ + if (channels_alloc == 0) { + chan_init(); + channels_alloc = 10; + channels = xmalloc(channels_alloc * sizeof(Channel *)); + for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) + channels[i] = NULL; + fatal_add_cleanup((void (*) (void *)) channel_free_all, NULL); + } + /* Try to find a free slot where to put the new channel. */ + for (found = -1, i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) + if (channels[i] == NULL) { + /* Found a free slot. */ + found = i; + break; + } + if (found == -1) { + /* There are no free slots. Take last+1 slot and expand the array. */ + found = channels_alloc; + channels_alloc += 10; + debug2("channel: expanding %d", channels_alloc); + channels = xrealloc(channels, channels_alloc * sizeof(Channel *)); + for (i = found; i < channels_alloc; i++) + channels[i] = NULL; + } + /* Initialize and return new channel. */ + c = channels[found] = xmalloc(sizeof(Channel)); + memset(c, 0, sizeof(Channel)); + buffer_init(&c->input); + buffer_init(&c->output); + buffer_init(&c->extended); + chan_init_iostates(c); + channel_register_fds(c, rfd, wfd, efd, extusage, nonblock); + c->self = found; + c->type = type; + c->ctype = ctype; + c->local_window = window; + c->local_window_max = window; + c->local_consumed = 0; + c->local_maxpacket = maxpack; + c->remote_id = -1; + c->remote_name = remote_name; + c->remote_window = 0; + c->remote_maxpacket = 0; + c->cb_fn = NULL; + c->cb_arg = NULL; + c->cb_event = 0; + c->force_drain = 0; + c->detach_user = NULL; + c->input_filter = NULL; + debug("channel %d: new [%s]", found, remote_name); + return c; +} + +static int +channel_find_maxfd(void) +{ + int i, max = 0; + Channel *c; + + for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) { + c = channels[i]; + if (c != NULL) { + max = MAX(max, c->rfd); + max = MAX(max, c->wfd); + max = MAX(max, c->efd); + } + } + return max; +} + +int +channel_close_fd(int *fdp) +{ + int ret = 0, fd = *fdp; + + if (fd != -1) { + ret = close(fd); + *fdp = -1; + if (fd == channel_max_fd) + channel_max_fd = channel_find_maxfd(); + } + return ret; +} + +/* Close all channel fd/socket. */ + +static void +channel_close_fds(Channel *c) +{ + debug3("channel_close_fds: channel %d: r %d w %d e %d", + c->self, c->rfd, c->wfd, c->efd); + + channel_close_fd(&c->sock); + channel_close_fd(&c->rfd); + channel_close_fd(&c->wfd); + channel_close_fd(&c->efd); +} + +/* Free the channel and close its fd/socket. */ + +void +channel_free(Channel *c) +{ + char *s; + int i, n; + + for (n = 0, i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) + if (channels[i]) + n++; + debug("channel_free: channel %d: %s, nchannels %d", c->self, + c->remote_name ? c->remote_name : "???", n); + + s = channel_open_message(); + debug3("channel_free: status: %s", s); + xfree(s); + + if (c->sock != -1) + shutdown(c->sock, SHUT_RDWR); + channel_close_fds(c); + buffer_free(&c->input); + buffer_free(&c->output); + buffer_free(&c->extended); + if (c->remote_name) { + xfree(c->remote_name); + c->remote_name = NULL; + } + channels[c->self] = NULL; + xfree(c); +} + +void +channel_free_all(void) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) + if (channels[i] != NULL) + channel_free(channels[i]); +} + +/* + * Closes the sockets/fds of all channels. This is used to close extra file + * descriptors after a fork. + */ + +void +channel_close_all() +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) + if (channels[i] != NULL) + channel_close_fds(channels[i]); +} + +/* + * Stop listening to channels. + */ + +void +channel_stop_listening(void) +{ + int i; + Channel *c; + + for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) { + c = channels[i]; + if (c != NULL) { + switch (c->type) { + case SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET: + case SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER: + case SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER: + case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER: + channel_close_fd(&c->sock); + channel_free(c); + break; + } + } + } +} + +/* + * Returns true if no channel has too much buffered data, and false if one or + * more channel is overfull. + */ + +int +channel_not_very_much_buffered_data() +{ + u_int i; + Channel *c; + + for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) { + c = channels[i]; + if (c != NULL && c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) { +#if 0 + if (!compat20 && + buffer_len(&c->input) > packet_get_maxsize()) { + debug("channel %d: big input buffer %d", + c->self, buffer_len(&c->input)); + return 0; + } +#endif + if (buffer_len(&c->output) > packet_get_maxsize()) { + debug("channel %d: big output buffer %d > %d", + c->self, buffer_len(&c->output), + packet_get_maxsize()); + return 0; + } + } + } + return 1; +} + +/* Returns true if any channel is still open. */ + +int +channel_still_open() +{ + int i; + Channel *c; + + for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) { + c = channels[i]; + if (c == NULL) + continue; + switch (c->type) { + case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER: + case SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER: + case SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER: + case SSH_CHANNEL_CLOSED: + case SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET: + case SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC: + case SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING: + case SSH_CHANNEL_ZOMBIE: + continue; + case SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL: + if (!compat20) + fatal("cannot happen: SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL"); + continue; + case SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING: + case SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN: + case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN: + return 1; + case SSH_CHANNEL_INPUT_DRAINING: + case SSH_CHANNEL_OUTPUT_DRAINING: + if (!compat13) + fatal("cannot happen: OUT_DRAIN"); + return 1; + default: + fatal("channel_still_open: bad channel type %d", c->type); + /* NOTREACHED */ + } + } + return 0; +} + +/* Returns the id of an open channel suitable for keepaliving */ + +int +channel_find_open() +{ + int i; + Channel *c; + + for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) { + c = channels[i]; + if (c == NULL) + continue; + switch (c->type) { + case SSH_CHANNEL_CLOSED: + case SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC: + case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER: + case SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER: + case SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER: + case SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING: + case SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING: + case SSH_CHANNEL_ZOMBIE: + continue; + case SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL: + case SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET: + case SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN: + case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN: + return i; + case SSH_CHANNEL_INPUT_DRAINING: + case SSH_CHANNEL_OUTPUT_DRAINING: + if (!compat13) + fatal("cannot happen: OUT_DRAIN"); + return i; + default: + fatal("channel_find_open: bad channel type %d", c->type); + /* NOTREACHED */ + } + } + return -1; +} + + +/* + * Returns a message describing the currently open forwarded connections, + * suitable for sending to the client. The message contains crlf pairs for + * newlines. + */ + +char * +channel_open_message() +{ + Buffer buffer; + Channel *c; + char buf[1024], *cp; + int i; + + buffer_init(&buffer); + snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "The following connections are open:\r\n"); + buffer_append(&buffer, buf, strlen(buf)); + for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) { + c = channels[i]; + if (c == NULL) + continue; + switch (c->type) { + case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER: + case SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER: + case SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER: + case SSH_CHANNEL_CLOSED: + case SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET: + case SSH_CHANNEL_ZOMBIE: + continue; + case SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL: + case SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING: + case SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING: + case SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC: + case SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN: + case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN: + case SSH_CHANNEL_INPUT_DRAINING: + case SSH_CHANNEL_OUTPUT_DRAINING: + snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, " #%d %.300s (t%d r%d i%d/%d o%d/%d fd %d/%d)\r\n", + c->self, c->remote_name, + c->type, c->remote_id, + c->istate, buffer_len(&c->input), + c->ostate, buffer_len(&c->output), + c->rfd, c->wfd); + buffer_append(&buffer, buf, strlen(buf)); + continue; + default: + fatal("channel_open_message: bad channel type %d", c->type); + /* NOTREACHED */ + } + } + buffer_append(&buffer, "\0", 1); + cp = xstrdup(buffer_ptr(&buffer)); + buffer_free(&buffer); + return cp; +} + +void +channel_send_open(int id) +{ + Channel *c = channel_lookup(id); + if (c == NULL) { + log("channel_send_open: %d: bad id", id); + return; + } + debug("send channel open %d", id); + packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN); + packet_put_cstring(c->ctype); + packet_put_int(c->self); + packet_put_int(c->local_window); + packet_put_int(c->local_maxpacket); + packet_send(); +} + +void +channel_request(int id, char *service, int wantconfirm) +{ + channel_request_start(id, service, wantconfirm); + packet_send(); + debug("channel request %d: %s", id, service) ; +} +void +channel_request_start(int id, char *service, int wantconfirm) +{ + Channel *c = channel_lookup(id); + if (c == NULL) { + log("channel_request: %d: bad id", id); + return; + } + packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST); + packet_put_int(c->remote_id); + packet_put_cstring(service); + packet_put_char(wantconfirm); +} +void +channel_register_callback(int id, int mtype, channel_callback_fn *fn, void *arg) +{ + Channel *c = channel_lookup(id); + if (c == NULL) { + log("channel_register_callback: %d: bad id", id); + return; + } + c->cb_event = mtype; + c->cb_fn = fn; + c->cb_arg = arg; +} +void +channel_register_cleanup(int id, channel_callback_fn *fn) +{ + Channel *c = channel_lookup(id); + if (c == NULL) { + log("channel_register_cleanup: %d: bad id", id); + return; + } + c->detach_user = fn; +} +void +channel_cancel_cleanup(int id) +{ + Channel *c = channel_lookup(id); + if (c == NULL) { + log("channel_cancel_cleanup: %d: bad id", id); + return; + } + c->detach_user = NULL; +} +void +channel_register_filter(int id, channel_filter_fn *fn) +{ + Channel *c = channel_lookup(id); + if (c == NULL) { + log("channel_register_filter: %d: bad id", id); + return; + } + c->input_filter = fn; +} + +void +channel_set_fds(int id, int rfd, int wfd, int efd, + int extusage, int nonblock) +{ + Channel *c = channel_lookup(id); + if (c == NULL || c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL) + fatal("channel_activate for non-larval channel %d.", id); + channel_register_fds(c, rfd, wfd, efd, extusage, nonblock); + c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN; + /* XXX window size? */ + c->local_window = c->local_window_max = c->local_maxpacket * 2; + packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST); + packet_put_int(c->remote_id); + packet_put_int(c->local_window); + packet_send(); +} + +/* + * 'channel_pre*' are called just before select() to add any bits relevant to + * channels in the select bitmasks. + */ +/* + * 'channel_post*': perform any appropriate operations for channels which + * have events pending. + */ +typedef void chan_fn(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset); +chan_fn *channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_MAX_TYPE]; +chan_fn *channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_MAX_TYPE]; + +static void +channel_pre_listener(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset) +{ + FD_SET(c->sock, readset); +} + +static void +channel_pre_connecting(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset) +{ + debug3("channel %d: waiting for connection", c->self); + FD_SET(c->sock, writeset); +} + +static void +channel_pre_open_13(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset) +{ + if (buffer_len(&c->input) < packet_get_maxsize()) + FD_SET(c->sock, readset); + if (buffer_len(&c->output) > 0) + FD_SET(c->sock, writeset); +} + +static void +channel_pre_open_15(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset) +{ + /* test whether sockets are 'alive' for read/write */ + if (c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_OPEN) + if (buffer_len(&c->input) < packet_get_maxsize()) + FD_SET(c->sock, readset); + if (c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN || + c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) { + if (buffer_len(&c->output) > 0) { + FD_SET(c->sock, writeset); + } else if (c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) { + chan_obuf_empty(c); + } + } +} + +static void +channel_pre_open_20(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset) +{ + if (c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_OPEN && + c->remote_window > 0 && + buffer_len(&c->input) < c->remote_window) + FD_SET(c->rfd, readset); + if (c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN || + c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) { + if (buffer_len(&c->output) > 0) { + FD_SET(c->wfd, writeset); + } else if (c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) { + chan_obuf_empty(c); + } + } + /** XXX check close conditions, too */ + if (c->efd != -1) { + if (c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE && + buffer_len(&c->extended) > 0) + FD_SET(c->efd, writeset); + else if (c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_READ && + buffer_len(&c->extended) < c->remote_window) + FD_SET(c->efd, readset); + } +} + +static void +channel_pre_input_draining(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset) +{ + if (buffer_len(&c->input) == 0) { + packet_start(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE); + packet_put_int(c->remote_id); + packet_send(); + c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_CLOSED; + debug("channel %d: closing after input drain.", c->self); + } +} + +static void +channel_pre_output_draining(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset) +{ + if (buffer_len(&c->output) == 0) + chan_mark_dead(c); + else + FD_SET(c->sock, writeset); +} + +/* + * This is a special state for X11 authentication spoofing. An opened X11 + * connection (when authentication spoofing is being done) remains in this + * state until the first packet has been completely read. The authentication + * data in that packet is then substituted by the real data if it matches the + * fake data, and the channel is put into normal mode. + * XXX All this happens at the client side. + * Returns: 0 = need more data, -1 = wrong cookie, 1 = ok + */ +static int +x11_open_helper(Buffer *b) +{ + u_char *ucp; + u_int proto_len, data_len; + + /* Check if the fixed size part of the packet is in buffer. */ + if (buffer_len(b) < 12) + return 0; + + /* Parse the lengths of variable-length fields. */ + ucp = (u_char *) buffer_ptr(b); + if (ucp[0] == 0x42) { /* Byte order MSB first. */ + proto_len = 256 * ucp[6] + ucp[7]; + data_len = 256 * ucp[8] + ucp[9]; + } else if (ucp[0] == 0x6c) { /* Byte order LSB first. */ + proto_len = ucp[6] + 256 * ucp[7]; + data_len = ucp[8] + 256 * ucp[9]; + } else { + debug("Initial X11 packet contains bad byte order byte: 0x%x", + ucp[0]); + return -1; + } + + /* Check if the whole packet is in buffer. */ + if (buffer_len(b) < + 12 + ((proto_len + 3) & ~3) + ((data_len + 3) & ~3)) + return 0; + + /* Check if authentication protocol matches. */ + if (proto_len != strlen(x11_saved_proto) || + memcmp(ucp + 12, x11_saved_proto, proto_len) != 0) { + debug("X11 connection uses different authentication protocol."); + return -1; + } + /* Check if authentication data matches our fake data. */ + if (data_len != x11_fake_data_len || + memcmp(ucp + 12 + ((proto_len + 3) & ~3), + x11_fake_data, x11_fake_data_len) != 0) { + debug("X11 auth data does not match fake data."); + return -1; + } + /* Check fake data length */ + if (x11_fake_data_len != x11_saved_data_len) { + error("X11 fake_data_len %d != saved_data_len %d", + x11_fake_data_len, x11_saved_data_len); + return -1; + } + /* + * Received authentication protocol and data match + * our fake data. Substitute the fake data with real + * data. + */ + memcpy(ucp + 12 + ((proto_len + 3) & ~3), + x11_saved_data, x11_saved_data_len); + return 1; +} + +static void +channel_pre_x11_open_13(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset) +{ + int ret = x11_open_helper(&c->output); + if (ret == 1) { + /* Start normal processing for the channel. */ + c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN; + channel_pre_open_13(c, readset, writeset); + } else if (ret == -1) { + /* + * We have received an X11 connection that has bad + * authentication information. + */ + log("X11 connection rejected because of wrong authentication."); + buffer_clear(&c->input); + buffer_clear(&c->output); + channel_close_fd(&c->sock); + c->sock = -1; + c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_CLOSED; + packet_start(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE); + packet_put_int(c->remote_id); + packet_send(); + } +} + +static void +channel_pre_x11_open(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset) +{ + int ret = x11_open_helper(&c->output); + + /* c->force_drain = 1; */ + + if (ret == 1) { + c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN; + if (compat20) + channel_pre_open_20(c, readset, writeset); + else + channel_pre_open_15(c, readset, writeset); + } else if (ret == -1) { + debug("X11 rejected %d i%d/o%d", c->self, c->istate, c->ostate); + chan_read_failed(c); /** force close? */ + chan_write_failed(c); + debug("X11 closed %d i%d/o%d", c->self, c->istate, c->ostate); + } +} + +/* try to decode a socks4 header */ +static int +channel_decode_socks4(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset) +{ + u_char *p, *host; + int len, have, i, found; + char username[256]; + struct { + u_int8_t version; + u_int8_t command; + u_int16_t dest_port; + struct in_addr dest_addr; + } s4_req, s4_rsp; + + debug2("channel %d: decode socks4", c->self); + + have = buffer_len(&c->input); + len = sizeof(s4_req); + if (have < len) + return 0; + p = buffer_ptr(&c->input); + for (found = 0, i = len; i < have; i++) { + if (p[i] == '\0') { + found = 1; + break; + } + if (i > 1024) { + /* the peer is probably sending garbage */ + debug("channel %d: decode socks4: too long", + c->self); + return -1; + } + } + if (!found) + return 0; + buffer_get(&c->input, (char *)&s4_req.version, 1); + buffer_get(&c->input, (char *)&s4_req.command, 1); + buffer_get(&c->input, (char *)&s4_req.dest_port, 2); + buffer_get(&c->input, (char *)&s4_req.dest_addr, 4); + have = buffer_len(&c->input); + p = buffer_ptr(&c->input); + len = strlen(p); + debug2("channel %d: decode socks4: user %s/%d", c->self, p, len); + if (len > have) + fatal("channel %d: decode socks4: len %d > have %d", + c->self, len, have); + strlcpy(username, p, sizeof(username)); + buffer_consume(&c->input, len); + buffer_consume(&c->input, 1); /* trailing '\0' */ + + host = inet_ntoa(s4_req.dest_addr); + strlcpy(c->path, host, sizeof(c->path)); + c->host_port = ntohs(s4_req.dest_port); + + debug("channel %d: dynamic request: socks4 host %s port %u command %u", + c->self, host, c->host_port, s4_req.command); + + if (s4_req.command != 1) { + debug("channel %d: cannot handle: socks4 cn %d", + c->self, s4_req.command); + return -1; + } + s4_rsp.version = 0; /* vn: 0 for reply */ + s4_rsp.command = 90; /* cd: req granted */ + s4_rsp.dest_port = 0; /* ignored */ + s4_rsp.dest_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY; /* ignored */ + buffer_append(&c->output, (char *)&s4_rsp, sizeof(s4_rsp)); + return 1; +} + +/* dynamic port forwarding */ +static void +channel_pre_dynamic(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset) +{ + u_char *p; + int have, ret; + + have = buffer_len(&c->input); + c->delayed = 0; + debug2("channel %d: pre_dynamic: have %d", c->self, have); + /* buffer_dump(&c->input); */ + /* check if the fixed size part of the packet is in buffer. */ + if (have < 4) { + /* need more */ + FD_SET(c->sock, readset); + return; + } + /* try to guess the protocol */ + p = buffer_ptr(&c->input); + switch (p[0]) { + case 0x04: + ret = channel_decode_socks4(c, readset, writeset); + break; + default: + ret = -1; + break; + } + if (ret < 0) { + chan_mark_dead(c); + } else if (ret == 0) { + debug2("channel %d: pre_dynamic: need more", c->self); + /* need more */ + FD_SET(c->sock, readset); + } else { + /* switch to the next state */ + c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING; + port_open_helper(c, "direct-tcpip"); + } +} + +/* This is our fake X11 server socket. */ +static void +channel_post_x11_listener(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset) +{ + Channel *nc; + struct sockaddr addr; + int newsock; + socklen_t addrlen; + char buf[16384], *remote_ipaddr; + int remote_port; + + if (FD_ISSET(c->sock, readset)) { + debug("X11 connection requested."); + addrlen = sizeof(addr); + newsock = accept(c->sock, &addr, &addrlen); + if (newsock < 0) { + error("accept: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + return; + } + remote_ipaddr = get_peer_ipaddr(newsock); + remote_port = get_peer_port(newsock); + snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "X11 connection from %.200s port %d", + remote_ipaddr, remote_port); + + nc = channel_new("accepted x11 socket", + SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, newsock, newsock, -1, + c->local_window_max, c->local_maxpacket, + 0, xstrdup(buf), 1); + if (nc == NULL) { + close(newsock); + xfree(remote_ipaddr); + return; + } + if (compat20) { + packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN); + packet_put_cstring("x11"); + packet_put_int(nc->self); + packet_put_int(c->local_window_max); + packet_put_int(c->local_maxpacket); + /* originator ipaddr and port */ + packet_put_cstring(remote_ipaddr); + if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_X11FWD) { + debug("ssh2 x11 bug compat mode"); + } else { + packet_put_int(remote_port); + } + packet_send(); + } else { + packet_start(SSH_SMSG_X11_OPEN); + packet_put_int(nc->self); + if (packet_get_protocol_flags() & + SSH_PROTOFLAG_HOST_IN_FWD_OPEN) + packet_put_cstring(buf); + packet_send(); + } + xfree(remote_ipaddr); + } +} + +static void +port_open_helper(Channel *c, char *rtype) +{ + int direct; + char buf[1024]; + char *remote_ipaddr = get_peer_ipaddr(c->sock); + u_short remote_port = get_peer_port(c->sock); + + direct = (strcmp(rtype, "direct-tcpip") == 0); + + snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, + "%s: listening port %d for %.100s port %d, " + "connect from %.200s port %d", + rtype, c->listening_port, c->path, c->host_port, + remote_ipaddr, remote_port); + + xfree(c->remote_name); + c->remote_name = xstrdup(buf); + + if (compat20) { + packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN); + packet_put_cstring(rtype); + packet_put_int(c->self); + packet_put_int(c->local_window_max); + packet_put_int(c->local_maxpacket); + if (direct) { + /* target host, port */ + packet_put_cstring(c->path); + packet_put_int(c->host_port); + } else { + /* listen address, port */ + packet_put_cstring(c->path); + packet_put_int(c->listening_port); + } + /* originator host and port */ + packet_put_cstring(remote_ipaddr); + packet_put_int(remote_port); + packet_send(); + } else { + packet_start(SSH_MSG_PORT_OPEN); + packet_put_int(c->self); + packet_put_cstring(c->path); + packet_put_int(c->host_port); + if (packet_get_protocol_flags() & + SSH_PROTOFLAG_HOST_IN_FWD_OPEN) + packet_put_cstring(c->remote_name); + packet_send(); + } + xfree(remote_ipaddr); +} + +/* + * This socket is listening for connections to a forwarded TCP/IP port. + */ +static void +channel_post_port_listener(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset) +{ + Channel *nc; + struct sockaddr addr; + int newsock, nextstate; + socklen_t addrlen; + char *rtype; + + if (FD_ISSET(c->sock, readset)) { + debug("Connection to port %d forwarding " + "to %.100s port %d requested.", + c->listening_port, c->path, c->host_port); + + if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER) { + nextstate = SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING; + rtype = "forwarded-tcpip"; + } else { + if (c->host_port == 0) { + nextstate = SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC; + rtype = "dynamic-tcpip"; + } else { + nextstate = SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING; + rtype = "direct-tcpip"; + } + } + + addrlen = sizeof(addr); + newsock = accept(c->sock, &addr, &addrlen); + if (newsock < 0) { + error("accept: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + return; + } + nc = channel_new(rtype, + nextstate, newsock, newsock, -1, + c->local_window_max, c->local_maxpacket, + 0, xstrdup(rtype), 1); + if (nc == NULL) { + error("channel_post_port_listener: no new channel:"); + close(newsock); + return; + } + nc->listening_port = c->listening_port; + nc->host_port = c->host_port; + strlcpy(nc->path, c->path, sizeof(nc->path)); + + if (nextstate == SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC) { + /* + * do not call the channel_post handler until + * this flag has been reset by a pre-handler. + * otherwise the FD_ISSET calls might overflow + */ + nc->delayed = 1; + } else { + port_open_helper(nc, rtype); + } + } +} + +/* + * This is the authentication agent socket listening for connections from + * clients. + */ +static void +channel_post_auth_listener(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset) +{ + Channel *nc; + char *name; + int newsock; + struct sockaddr addr; + socklen_t addrlen; + + if (FD_ISSET(c->sock, readset)) { + addrlen = sizeof(addr); + newsock = accept(c->sock, &addr, &addrlen); + if (newsock < 0) { + error("accept from auth socket: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + return; + } + name = xstrdup("accepted auth socket"); + nc = channel_new("accepted auth socket", + SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, newsock, newsock, -1, + c->local_window_max, c->local_maxpacket, + 0, name, 1); + if (nc == NULL) { + error("channel_post_auth_listener: channel_new failed"); + xfree(name); + close(newsock); + } + if (compat20) { + packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN); + packet_put_cstring("auth-agent@openssh.com"); + packet_put_int(nc->self); + packet_put_int(c->local_window_max); + packet_put_int(c->local_maxpacket); + } else { + packet_start(SSH_SMSG_AGENT_OPEN); + packet_put_int(nc->self); + } + packet_send(); + } +} + +static void +channel_post_connecting(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset) +{ + int err = 0; + socklen_t sz = sizeof(err); + + if (FD_ISSET(c->sock, writeset)) { + if (getsockopt(c->sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_ERROR, (char *)&err, + &sz) < 0) { + err = errno; + error("getsockopt SO_ERROR failed"); + } + if (err == 0) { + debug("channel %d: connected", c->self); + c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN; + if (compat20) { + packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION); + packet_put_int(c->remote_id); + packet_put_int(c->self); + packet_put_int(c->local_window); + packet_put_int(c->local_maxpacket); + } else { + packet_start(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION); + packet_put_int(c->remote_id); + packet_put_int(c->self); + } + } else { + debug("channel %d: not connected: %s", + c->self, strerror(err)); + if (compat20) { + packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE); + packet_put_int(c->remote_id); + packet_put_int(SSH2_OPEN_CONNECT_FAILED); + if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_OPENFAILURE)) { + packet_put_cstring(strerror(err)); + packet_put_cstring(""); + } + } else { + packet_start(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE); + packet_put_int(c->remote_id); + } + chan_mark_dead(c); + } + packet_send(); + } +} + +static int +channel_handle_rfd(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset) +{ + char buf[16*1024]; + int len; + + if (c->rfd != -1 && + FD_ISSET(c->rfd, readset)) { + len = read(c->rfd, buf, sizeof(buf)); + if (len < 0 && (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN)) + return 1; + if (len <= 0) { + debug("channel %d: read<=0 rfd %d len %d", + c->self, c->rfd, len); + if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) { + debug("channel %d: not open", c->self); + chan_mark_dead(c); + return -1; + } else if (compat13) { + buffer_consume(&c->output, buffer_len(&c->output)); + c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_INPUT_DRAINING; + debug("channel %d: input draining.", c->self); + } else { + chan_read_failed(c); + } + return -1; + } + if(c->input_filter != NULL) { + if (c->input_filter(c, buf, len) == -1) { + debug("channel %d: filter stops", c->self); + chan_read_failed(c); + } + } else { + buffer_append(&c->input, buf, len); + } + } + return 1; +} +static int +channel_handle_wfd(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset) +{ + struct termios tio; + u_char *data; + u_int dlen; + int len; + + /* Send buffered output data to the socket. */ + if (c->wfd != -1 && + FD_ISSET(c->wfd, writeset) && + buffer_len(&c->output) > 0) { + data = buffer_ptr(&c->output); + dlen = buffer_len(&c->output); + len = write(c->wfd, data, dlen); + if (len < 0 && (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN)) + return 1; + if (len <= 0) { + if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) { + debug("channel %d: not open", c->self); + chan_mark_dead(c); + return -1; + } else if (compat13) { + buffer_consume(&c->output, buffer_len(&c->output)); + debug("channel %d: input draining.", c->self); + c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_INPUT_DRAINING; + } else { + chan_write_failed(c); + } + return -1; + } + if (compat20 && c->isatty && dlen >= 1 && data[0] != '\r') { + if (tcgetattr(c->wfd, &tio) == 0 && + !(tio.c_lflag & ECHO) && (tio.c_lflag & ICANON)) { + /* + * Simulate echo to reduce the impact of + * traffic analysis. We need to match the + * size of a SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA message + * (4 byte channel id + data) + */ + packet_send_ignore(4 + len); + packet_send(); + } + } + buffer_consume(&c->output, len); + if (compat20 && len > 0) { + c->local_consumed += len; + } + } + return 1; +} +static int +channel_handle_efd(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset) +{ + char buf[16*1024]; + int len; + +/** XXX handle drain efd, too */ + if (c->efd != -1) { + if (c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE && + FD_ISSET(c->efd, writeset) && + buffer_len(&c->extended) > 0) { + len = write(c->efd, buffer_ptr(&c->extended), + buffer_len(&c->extended)); + debug2("channel %d: written %d to efd %d", + c->self, len, c->efd); + if (len < 0 && (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN)) + return 1; + if (len <= 0) { + debug2("channel %d: closing write-efd %d", + c->self, c->efd); + channel_close_fd(&c->efd); + } else { + buffer_consume(&c->extended, len); + c->local_consumed += len; + } + } else if (c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_READ && + FD_ISSET(c->efd, readset)) { + len = read(c->efd, buf, sizeof(buf)); + debug2("channel %d: read %d from efd %d", + c->self, len, c->efd); + if (len < 0 && (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN)) + return 1; + if (len <= 0) { + debug2("channel %d: closing read-efd %d", + c->self, c->efd); + channel_close_fd(&c->efd); + } else { + buffer_append(&c->extended, buf, len); + } + } + } + return 1; +} +static int +channel_check_window(Channel *c) +{ + if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN && + !(c->flags & (CHAN_CLOSE_SENT|CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD)) && + c->local_window < c->local_window_max/2 && + c->local_consumed > 0) { + packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST); + packet_put_int(c->remote_id); + packet_put_int(c->local_consumed); + packet_send(); + debug2("channel %d: window %d sent adjust %d", + c->self, c->local_window, + c->local_consumed); + c->local_window += c->local_consumed; + c->local_consumed = 0; + } + return 1; +} + +static void +channel_post_open_1(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset) +{ + if (c->delayed) + return; + channel_handle_rfd(c, readset, writeset); + channel_handle_wfd(c, readset, writeset); +} + +static void +channel_post_open_2(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset) +{ + if (c->delayed) + return; + channel_handle_rfd(c, readset, writeset); + channel_handle_wfd(c, readset, writeset); + channel_handle_efd(c, readset, writeset); + + channel_check_window(c); +} + +static void +channel_post_output_drain_13(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset) +{ + int len; + /* Send buffered output data to the socket. */ + if (FD_ISSET(c->sock, writeset) && buffer_len(&c->output) > 0) { + len = write(c->sock, buffer_ptr(&c->output), + buffer_len(&c->output)); + if (len <= 0) + buffer_consume(&c->output, buffer_len(&c->output)); + else + buffer_consume(&c->output, len); + } +} + +static void +channel_handler_init_20(void) +{ + channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN] = &channel_pre_open_20; + channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN] = &channel_pre_x11_open; + channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener; + channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener; + channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener; + channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET] = &channel_pre_listener; + channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING] = &channel_pre_connecting; + channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC] = &channel_pre_dynamic; + + channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN] = &channel_post_open_2; + channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER] = &channel_post_port_listener; + channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER] = &channel_post_port_listener; + channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER] = &channel_post_x11_listener; + channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET] = &channel_post_auth_listener; + channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING] = &channel_post_connecting; + channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC] = &channel_post_open_2; +} + +static void +channel_handler_init_13(void) +{ + channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN] = &channel_pre_open_13; + channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN] = &channel_pre_x11_open_13; + channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener; + channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener; + channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET] = &channel_pre_listener; + channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_INPUT_DRAINING] = &channel_pre_input_draining; + channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_OUTPUT_DRAINING] = &channel_pre_output_draining; + channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING] = &channel_pre_connecting; + channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC] = &channel_pre_dynamic; + + channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN] = &channel_post_open_1; + channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER] = &channel_post_x11_listener; + channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER] = &channel_post_port_listener; + channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET] = &channel_post_auth_listener; + channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_OUTPUT_DRAINING] = &channel_post_output_drain_13; + channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING] = &channel_post_connecting; + channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC] = &channel_post_open_1; +} + +static void +channel_handler_init_15(void) +{ + channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN] = &channel_pre_open_15; + channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN] = &channel_pre_x11_open; + channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener; + channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener; + channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET] = &channel_pre_listener; + channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING] = &channel_pre_connecting; + channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC] = &channel_pre_dynamic; + + channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER] = &channel_post_x11_listener; + channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER] = &channel_post_port_listener; + channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET] = &channel_post_auth_listener; + channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN] = &channel_post_open_1; + channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING] = &channel_post_connecting; + channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC] = &channel_post_open_1; +} + +static void +channel_handler_init(void) +{ + int i; + for(i = 0; i < SSH_CHANNEL_MAX_TYPE; i++) { + channel_pre[i] = NULL; + channel_post[i] = NULL; + } + if (compat20) + channel_handler_init_20(); + else if (compat13) + channel_handler_init_13(); + else + channel_handler_init_15(); +} + +/* gc dead channels */ +static void +channel_garbage_collect(Channel *c) +{ + if (c == NULL) + return; + if (c->detach_user != NULL) { + if (!chan_is_dead(c, 0)) + return; + debug("channel %d: gc: notify user", c->self); + c->detach_user(c->self, NULL); + /* if we still have a callback */ + if (c->detach_user != NULL) + return; + debug("channel %d: gc: user detached", c->self); + } + if (!chan_is_dead(c, 1)) + return; + debug("channel %d: garbage collecting", c->self); + channel_free(c); +} + +static void +channel_handler(chan_fn *ftab[], fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset) +{ + static int did_init = 0; + int i; + Channel *c; + + if (!did_init) { + channel_handler_init(); + did_init = 1; + } + for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) { + c = channels[i]; + if (c == NULL) + continue; + if (ftab[c->type] != NULL) + (*ftab[c->type])(c, readset, writeset); + channel_garbage_collect(c); + } +} + +/* + * Allocate/update select bitmasks and add any bits relevant to channels in + * select bitmasks. + */ +void +channel_prepare_select(fd_set **readsetp, fd_set **writesetp, int *maxfdp, + int *nallocp, int rekeying) +{ + int n; + u_int sz; + + n = MAX(*maxfdp, channel_max_fd); + + sz = howmany(n+1, NFDBITS) * sizeof(fd_mask); + /* perhaps check sz < nalloc/2 and shrink? */ + if (*readsetp == NULL || sz > *nallocp) { + *readsetp = xrealloc(*readsetp, sz); + *writesetp = xrealloc(*writesetp, sz); + *nallocp = sz; + } + *maxfdp = n; + memset(*readsetp, 0, sz); + memset(*writesetp, 0, sz); + + if (!rekeying) + channel_handler(channel_pre, *readsetp, *writesetp); +} + +/* + * After select, perform any appropriate operations for channels which have + * events pending. + */ +void +channel_after_select(fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset) +{ + channel_handler(channel_post, readset, writeset); +} + + +/* If there is data to send to the connection, enqueue some of it now. */ + +void +channel_output_poll() +{ + int len, i; + Channel *c; + + for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) { + c = channels[i]; + if (c == NULL) + continue; + + /* + * We are only interested in channels that can have buffered + * incoming data. + */ + if (compat13) { + if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN && + c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_INPUT_DRAINING) + continue; + } else { + if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) + continue; + } + if (compat20 && + (c->flags & (CHAN_CLOSE_SENT|CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD))) { + /* XXX is this true? */ + debug3("channel %d: will not send data after close", c->self); + continue; + } + + /* Get the amount of buffered data for this channel. */ + if ((c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_OPEN || + c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) && + (len = buffer_len(&c->input)) > 0) { + /* + * Send some data for the other side over the secure + * connection. + */ + if (compat20) { + if (len > c->remote_window) + len = c->remote_window; + if (len > c->remote_maxpacket) + len = c->remote_maxpacket; + } else { + if (packet_is_interactive()) { + if (len > 1024) + len = 512; + } else { + /* Keep the packets at reasonable size. */ + if (len > packet_get_maxsize()/2) + len = packet_get_maxsize()/2; + } + } + if (len > 0) { + packet_start(compat20 ? + SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA : SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA); + packet_put_int(c->remote_id); + packet_put_string(buffer_ptr(&c->input), len); + packet_send(); + buffer_consume(&c->input, len); + c->remote_window -= len; + } + } else if (c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) { + if (compat13) + fatal("cannot happen: istate == INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN for proto 1.3"); + /* + * input-buffer is empty and read-socket shutdown: + * tell peer, that we will not send more data: send IEOF + */ + chan_ibuf_empty(c); + } + /* Send extended data, i.e. stderr */ + if (compat20 && + c->remote_window > 0 && + (len = buffer_len(&c->extended)) > 0 && + c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_READ) { + debug2("channel %d: rwin %d elen %d euse %d", + c->self, c->remote_window, buffer_len(&c->extended), + c->extended_usage); + if (len > c->remote_window) + len = c->remote_window; + if (len > c->remote_maxpacket) + len = c->remote_maxpacket; + packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA); + packet_put_int(c->remote_id); + packet_put_int(SSH2_EXTENDED_DATA_STDERR); + packet_put_string(buffer_ptr(&c->extended), len); + packet_send(); + buffer_consume(&c->extended, len); + c->remote_window -= len; + debug2("channel %d: sent ext data %d", c->self, len); + } + } +} + + +/* -- protocol input */ + +void +channel_input_data(int type, int plen, void *ctxt) +{ + int id; + char *data; + u_int data_len; + Channel *c; + + /* Get the channel number and verify it. */ + id = packet_get_int(); + c = channel_lookup(id); + if (c == NULL) + packet_disconnect("Received data for nonexistent channel %d.", id); + + /* Ignore any data for non-open channels (might happen on close) */ + if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN && + c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN) + return; + + /* same for protocol 1.5 if output end is no longer open */ + if (!compat13 && c->ostate != CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN) + return; + + /* Get the data. */ + data = packet_get_string(&data_len); + packet_done(); + + if (compat20){ + if (data_len > c->local_maxpacket) { + log("channel %d: rcvd big packet %d, maxpack %d", + c->self, data_len, c->local_maxpacket); + } + if (data_len > c->local_window) { + log("channel %d: rcvd too much data %d, win %d", + c->self, data_len, c->local_window); + xfree(data); + return; + } + c->local_window -= data_len; + }else{ + packet_integrity_check(plen, 4 + 4 + data_len, type); + } + buffer_append(&c->output, data, data_len); + xfree(data); +} + +void +channel_input_extended_data(int type, int plen, void *ctxt) +{ + int id; + int tcode; + char *data; + u_int data_len; + Channel *c; + + /* Get the channel number and verify it. */ + id = packet_get_int(); + c = channel_lookup(id); + + if (c == NULL) + packet_disconnect("Received extended_data for bad channel %d.", id); + if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) { + log("channel %d: ext data for non open", id); + return; + } + tcode = packet_get_int(); + if (c->efd == -1 || + c->extended_usage != CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE || + tcode != SSH2_EXTENDED_DATA_STDERR) { + log("channel %d: bad ext data", c->self); + return; + } + data = packet_get_string(&data_len); + packet_done(); + if (data_len > c->local_window) { + log("channel %d: rcvd too much extended_data %d, win %d", + c->self, data_len, c->local_window); + xfree(data); + return; + } + debug2("channel %d: rcvd ext data %d", c->self, data_len); + c->local_window -= data_len; + buffer_append(&c->extended, data, data_len); + xfree(data); +} + +void +channel_input_ieof(int type, int plen, void *ctxt) +{ + int id; + Channel *c; + + packet_integrity_check(plen, 4, type); + + id = packet_get_int(); + c = channel_lookup(id); + if (c == NULL) + packet_disconnect("Received ieof for nonexistent channel %d.", id); + chan_rcvd_ieof(c); + + /* XXX force input close */ + if (c->force_drain) { + debug("channel %d: FORCE input drain", c->self); + c->istate = CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN; + } + +} + +void +channel_input_close(int type, int plen, void *ctxt) +{ + int id; + Channel *c; + + packet_integrity_check(plen, 4, type); + + id = packet_get_int(); + c = channel_lookup(id); + if (c == NULL) + packet_disconnect("Received close for nonexistent channel %d.", id); + + /* + * Send a confirmation that we have closed the channel and no more + * data is coming for it. + */ + packet_start(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION); + packet_put_int(c->remote_id); + packet_send(); + + /* + * If the channel is in closed state, we have sent a close request, + * and the other side will eventually respond with a confirmation. + * Thus, we cannot free the channel here, because then there would be + * no-one to receive the confirmation. The channel gets freed when + * the confirmation arrives. + */ + if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_CLOSED) { + /* + * Not a closed channel - mark it as draining, which will + * cause it to be freed later. + */ + buffer_consume(&c->input, buffer_len(&c->input)); + c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OUTPUT_DRAINING; + } +} + +/* proto version 1.5 overloads CLOSE_CONFIRMATION with OCLOSE */ +void +channel_input_oclose(int type, int plen, void *ctxt) +{ + int id = packet_get_int(); + Channel *c = channel_lookup(id); + packet_integrity_check(plen, 4, type); + if (c == NULL) + packet_disconnect("Received oclose for nonexistent channel %d.", id); + chan_rcvd_oclose(c); +} + +void +channel_input_close_confirmation(int type, int plen, void *ctxt) +{ + int id = packet_get_int(); + Channel *c = channel_lookup(id); + + packet_done(); + if (c == NULL) + packet_disconnect("Received close confirmation for " + "out-of-range channel %d.", id); + if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_CLOSED) + packet_disconnect("Received close confirmation for " + "non-closed channel %d (type %d).", id, c->type); + channel_free(c); +} + +void +channel_input_open_confirmation(int type, int plen, void *ctxt) +{ + int id, remote_id; + Channel *c; + + if (!compat20) + packet_integrity_check(plen, 4 + 4, type); + + id = packet_get_int(); + c = channel_lookup(id); + + if (c==NULL || c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING) + packet_disconnect("Received open confirmation for " + "non-opening channel %d.", id); + remote_id = packet_get_int(); + /* Record the remote channel number and mark that the channel is now open. */ + c->remote_id = remote_id; + c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN; + + if (compat20) { + c->remote_window = packet_get_int(); + c->remote_maxpacket = packet_get_int(); + packet_done(); + if (c->cb_fn != NULL && c->cb_event == type) { + debug2("callback start"); + c->cb_fn(c->self, c->cb_arg); + debug2("callback done"); + } + debug("channel %d: open confirm rwindow %d rmax %d", c->self, + c->remote_window, c->remote_maxpacket); + } +} + +static char * +reason2txt(int reason) +{ + switch(reason) { + case SSH2_OPEN_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED: + return "administratively prohibited"; + case SSH2_OPEN_CONNECT_FAILED: + return "connect failed"; + case SSH2_OPEN_UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_TYPE: + return "unknown channel type"; + case SSH2_OPEN_RESOURCE_SHORTAGE: + return "resource shortage"; + } + return "unknown reason"; +} + +void +channel_input_open_failure(int type, int plen, void *ctxt) +{ + int id, reason; + char *msg = NULL, *lang = NULL; + Channel *c; + + if (!compat20) + packet_integrity_check(plen, 4, type); + + id = packet_get_int(); + c = channel_lookup(id); + + if (c==NULL || c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING) + packet_disconnect("Received open failure for " + "non-opening channel %d.", id); + if (compat20) { + reason = packet_get_int(); + if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_OPENFAILURE)) { + msg = packet_get_string(NULL); + lang = packet_get_string(NULL); + } + packet_done(); + log("channel %d: open failed: %s%s%s", id, + reason2txt(reason), msg ? ": ": "", msg ? msg : ""); + if (msg != NULL) + xfree(msg); + if (lang != NULL) + xfree(lang); + } + /* Free the channel. This will also close the socket. */ + channel_free(c); +} + +void +channel_input_channel_request(int type, int plen, void *ctxt) +{ + int id; + Channel *c; + + id = packet_get_int(); + c = channel_lookup(id); + + if (c == NULL || + (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN && c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL)) + packet_disconnect("Received request for " + "non-open channel %d.", id); + if (c->cb_fn != NULL && c->cb_event == type) { + debug2("callback start"); + c->cb_fn(c->self, c->cb_arg); + debug2("callback done"); + } else { + char *service = packet_get_string(NULL); + debug("channel %d: rcvd request for %s", c->self, service); + debug("cb_fn %p cb_event %d", c->cb_fn , c->cb_event); + xfree(service); + } +} + +void +channel_input_window_adjust(int type, int plen, void *ctxt) +{ + Channel *c; + int id, adjust; + + if (!compat20) + return; + + /* Get the channel number and verify it. */ + id = packet_get_int(); + c = channel_lookup(id); + + if (c == NULL || c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) { + log("Received window adjust for " + "non-open channel %d.", id); + return; + } + adjust = packet_get_int(); + packet_done(); + debug2("channel %d: rcvd adjust %d", id, adjust); + c->remote_window += adjust; +} + +void +channel_input_port_open(int type, int plen, void *ctxt) +{ + Channel *c = NULL; + u_short host_port; + char *host, *originator_string; + int remote_id, sock = -1; + + remote_id = packet_get_int(); + host = packet_get_string(NULL); + host_port = packet_get_int(); + + if (packet_get_protocol_flags() & SSH_PROTOFLAG_HOST_IN_FWD_OPEN) { + originator_string = packet_get_string(NULL); + } else { + originator_string = xstrdup("unknown (remote did not supply name)"); + } + packet_done(); + sock = channel_connect_to(host, host_port); + if (sock != -1) { + c = channel_new("connected socket", + SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING, sock, sock, -1, 0, 0, 0, + originator_string, 1); + if (c == NULL) { + error("channel_input_port_open: channel_new failed"); + close(sock); + } else { + c->remote_id = remote_id; + } + } + if (c == NULL) { + packet_start(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE); + packet_put_int(remote_id); + packet_send(); + } + xfree(host); +} + + +/* -- tcp forwarding */ + +void +channel_set_af(int af) +{ + IPv4or6 = af; +} + +/* + * Initiate forwarding of connections to local port "port" through the secure + * channel to host:port from remote side. + */ +int +channel_request_local_forwarding(u_short listen_port, const char *host_to_connect, + u_short port_to_connect, int gateway_ports) +{ + return channel_request_forwarding( + NULL, listen_port, + host_to_connect, port_to_connect, + gateway_ports, /*remote_fwd*/ 0); +} + +/* + * If 'remote_fwd' is true we have a '-R style' listener for protocol 2 + * (SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER). + */ +int +channel_request_forwarding( + const char *listen_address, u_short listen_port, + const char *host_to_connect, u_short port_to_connect, + int gateway_ports, int remote_fwd) +{ + Channel *c; + int success, sock, on = 1, type; + struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop; + char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV]; + const char *host; + struct linger linger; + + success = 0; + + if (remote_fwd) { + host = listen_address; + type = SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER; + } else { + host = host_to_connect; + type = SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER; + } + + if (strlen(host) > SSH_CHANNEL_PATH_LEN - 1) { + error("Forward host name too long."); + return success; + } + + /* XXX listen_address is currently ignored */ + /* + * getaddrinfo returns a loopback address if the hostname is + * set to NULL and hints.ai_flags is not AI_PASSIVE + */ + memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); + hints.ai_family = IPv4or6; + hints.ai_flags = gateway_ports ? AI_PASSIVE : 0; + hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; + snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", listen_port); + if (getaddrinfo(NULL, strport, &hints, &aitop) != 0) + packet_disconnect("getaddrinfo: fatal error"); + + for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) { + if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET && ai->ai_family != AF_INET6) + continue; + if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop, sizeof(ntop), + strport, sizeof(strport), NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV) != 0) { + error("channel_request_forwarding: getnameinfo failed"); + continue; + } + /* Create a port to listen for the host. */ + sock = socket(ai->ai_family, SOCK_STREAM, 0); + if (sock < 0) { + /* this is no error since kernel may not support ipv6 */ + verbose("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + continue; + } + /* + * Set socket options. We would like the socket to disappear + * as soon as it has been closed for whatever reason. + */ + setsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, (void *)&on, sizeof(on)); + linger.l_onoff = 1; + linger.l_linger = 5; + setsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_LINGER, (void *)&linger, sizeof(linger)); + debug("Local forwarding listening on %s port %s.", ntop, strport); + + /* Bind the socket to the address. */ + if (bind(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) { + /* address can be in use ipv6 address is already bound */ + if (!ai->ai_next) + error("bind: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + else + verbose("bind: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + + close(sock); + continue; + } + /* Start listening for connections on the socket. */ + if (listen(sock, 5) < 0) { + error("listen: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + close(sock); + continue; + } + /* Allocate a channel number for the socket. */ + c = channel_new("port listener", type, sock, sock, -1, + CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, + 0, xstrdup("port listener"), 1); + if (c == NULL) { + error("channel_request_forwarding: channel_new failed"); + close(sock); + continue; + } + strlcpy(c->path, host, sizeof(c->path)); + c->host_port = port_to_connect; + c->listening_port = listen_port; + success = 1; + } + if (success == 0) + error("channel_request_forwarding: cannot listen to port: %d", + listen_port); + freeaddrinfo(aitop); + return success; +} + +/* + * Initiate forwarding of connections to port "port" on remote host through + * the secure channel to host:port from local side. + */ + +void +channel_request_remote_forwarding(u_short listen_port, + const char *host_to_connect, u_short port_to_connect) +{ + int payload_len, type, success = 0; + + /* Record locally that connection to this host/port is permitted. */ + if (num_permitted_opens >= SSH_MAX_FORWARDS_PER_DIRECTION) + fatal("channel_request_remote_forwarding: too many forwards"); + + /* Send the forward request to the remote side. */ + if (compat20) { + const char *address_to_bind = "0.0.0.0"; + packet_start(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST); + packet_put_cstring("tcpip-forward"); + packet_put_char(0); /* boolean: want reply */ + packet_put_cstring(address_to_bind); + packet_put_int(listen_port); + packet_send(); + packet_write_wait(); + /* Assume that server accepts the request */ + success = 1; + } else { + packet_start(SSH_CMSG_PORT_FORWARD_REQUEST); + packet_put_int(listen_port); + packet_put_cstring(host_to_connect); + packet_put_int(port_to_connect); + packet_send(); + packet_write_wait(); + + /* Wait for response from the remote side. */ + type = packet_read(&payload_len); + switch (type) { + case SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS: + success = 1; + break; + case SSH_SMSG_FAILURE: + log("Warning: Server denied remote port forwarding."); + break; + default: + /* Unknown packet */ + packet_disconnect("Protocol error for port forward request:" + "received packet type %d.", type); + } + } + if (success) { + permitted_opens[num_permitted_opens].host_to_connect = xstrdup(host_to_connect); + permitted_opens[num_permitted_opens].port_to_connect = port_to_connect; + permitted_opens[num_permitted_opens].listen_port = listen_port; + num_permitted_opens++; + } +} + +/* + * This is called after receiving CHANNEL_FORWARDING_REQUEST. This initates + * listening for the port, and sends back a success reply (or disconnect + * message if there was an error). This never returns if there was an error. + */ + +void +channel_input_port_forward_request(int is_root, int gateway_ports) +{ + u_short port, host_port; + char *hostname; + + /* Get arguments from the packet. */ + port = packet_get_int(); + hostname = packet_get_string(NULL); + host_port = packet_get_int(); + +#ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN + /* + * Check that an unprivileged user is not trying to forward a + * privileged port. + */ + if (port < IPPORT_RESERVED && !is_root) + packet_disconnect("Requested forwarding of port %d but user is not root.", + port); +#endif + /* Initiate forwarding */ + channel_request_local_forwarding(port, hostname, host_port, gateway_ports); + + /* Free the argument string. */ + xfree(hostname); +} + +/* + * Permits opening to any host/port if permitted_opens[] is empty. This is + * usually called by the server, because the user could connect to any port + * anyway, and the server has no way to know but to trust the client anyway. + */ +void +channel_permit_all_opens() +{ + if (num_permitted_opens == 0) + all_opens_permitted = 1; +} + +void +channel_add_permitted_opens(char *host, int port) +{ + if (num_permitted_opens >= SSH_MAX_FORWARDS_PER_DIRECTION) + fatal("channel_request_remote_forwarding: too many forwards"); + debug("allow port forwarding to host %s port %d", host, port); + + permitted_opens[num_permitted_opens].host_to_connect = xstrdup(host); + permitted_opens[num_permitted_opens].port_to_connect = port; + num_permitted_opens++; + + all_opens_permitted = 0; +} + +void +channel_clear_permitted_opens(void) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < num_permitted_opens; i++) + xfree(permitted_opens[i].host_to_connect); + num_permitted_opens = 0; + +} + + +/* return socket to remote host, port */ +static int +connect_to(const char *host, u_short port) +{ + struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop; + char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV]; + int gaierr; + int sock = -1; + + memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); + hints.ai_family = IPv4or6; + hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; + snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", port); + if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(host, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0) { + error("connect_to %.100s: unknown host (%s)", host, + gai_strerror(gaierr)); + return -1; + } + for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) { + if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET && ai->ai_family != AF_INET6) + continue; + if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop, sizeof(ntop), + strport, sizeof(strport), NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV) != 0) { + error("connect_to: getnameinfo failed"); + continue; + } + sock = socket(ai->ai_family, SOCK_STREAM, 0); + if (sock < 0) { + error("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + continue; + } + if (fcntl(sock, F_SETFL, O_NONBLOCK) < 0) + fatal("connect_to: F_SETFL: %s", strerror(errno)); + if (connect(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0 && + errno != EINPROGRESS) { + error("connect_to %.100s port %s: %.100s", ntop, strport, + strerror(errno)); + close(sock); + continue; /* fail -- try next */ + } + break; /* success */ + + } + freeaddrinfo(aitop); + if (!ai) { + error("connect_to %.100s port %d: failed.", host, port); + return -1; + } + /* success */ + return sock; +} + +int +channel_connect_by_listen_address(u_short listen_port) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < num_permitted_opens; i++) + if (permitted_opens[i].listen_port == listen_port) + return connect_to( + permitted_opens[i].host_to_connect, + permitted_opens[i].port_to_connect); + error("WARNING: Server requests forwarding for unknown listen_port %d", + listen_port); + return -1; +} + +/* Check if connecting to that port is permitted and connect. */ +int +channel_connect_to(const char *host, u_short port) +{ + int i, permit; + + permit = all_opens_permitted; + if (!permit) { + for (i = 0; i < num_permitted_opens; i++) + if (permitted_opens[i].port_to_connect == port && + strcmp(permitted_opens[i].host_to_connect, host) == 0) + permit = 1; + + } + if (!permit) { + log("Received request to connect to host %.100s port %d, " + "but the request was denied.", host, port); + return -1; + } + return connect_to(host, port); +} + +/* -- X11 forwarding */ + +/* + * Creates an internet domain socket for listening for X11 connections. + * Returns a suitable value for the DISPLAY variable, or NULL if an error + * occurs. + */ +char * +x11_create_display_inet(int screen_number, int x11_display_offset) +{ + int display_number, sock; + u_short port; + struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop; + char strport[NI_MAXSERV]; + int gaierr, n, num_socks = 0, socks[NUM_SOCKS]; + char display[512]; + char hostname[MAXHOSTNAMELEN]; + + for (display_number = x11_display_offset; + display_number < MAX_DISPLAYS; + display_number++) { + port = 6000 + display_number; + memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); + hints.ai_family = IPv4or6; + hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE; /* XXX loopback only ? */ + hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; + snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", port); + if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(NULL, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0) { + error("getaddrinfo: %.100s", gai_strerror(gaierr)); + return NULL; + } + for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) { + if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET && ai->ai_family != AF_INET6) + continue; + sock = socket(ai->ai_family, SOCK_STREAM, 0); + if (sock < 0) { + if ((errno != EINVAL) && (errno != EAFNOSUPPORT)) { + error("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + return NULL; + } else { + debug("x11_create_display_inet: Socket family %d not supported", + ai->ai_family); + continue; + } + } + if (bind(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) { + debug("bind port %d: %.100s", port, strerror(errno)); + shutdown(sock, SHUT_RDWR); + close(sock); + + if (ai->ai_next) + continue; + + for (n = 0; n < num_socks; n++) { + shutdown(socks[n], SHUT_RDWR); + close(socks[n]); + } + num_socks = 0; + break; + } + socks[num_socks++] = sock; +#ifndef DONT_TRY_OTHER_AF + if (num_socks == NUM_SOCKS) + break; +#else + break; +#endif + } + freeaddrinfo(aitop); + if (num_socks > 0) + break; + } + if (display_number >= MAX_DISPLAYS) { + error("Failed to allocate internet-domain X11 display socket."); + return NULL; + } + /* Start listening for connections on the socket. */ + for (n = 0; n < num_socks; n++) { + sock = socks[n]; + if (listen(sock, 5) < 0) { + error("listen: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + shutdown(sock, SHUT_RDWR); + close(sock); + return NULL; + } + } + + /* Set up a suitable value for the DISPLAY variable. */ + if (gethostname(hostname, sizeof(hostname)) < 0) + fatal("gethostname: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + +#ifdef IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY + /* + * HPUX detects the local hostname in the DISPLAY variable and tries + * to set up a shared memory connection to the server, which it + * incorrectly supposes to be local. + * + * The workaround - as used in later $$H and other programs - is + * is to set display to the host's IP address. + */ + { + struct hostent *he; + struct in_addr my_addr; + + he = gethostbyname(hostname); + if (he == NULL) { + error("[X11-broken-fwd-hostname-workaround] Could not get " + "IP address for hostname %s.", hostname); + + packet_send_debug("[X11-broken-fwd-hostname-workaround]" + "Could not get IP address for hostname %s.", hostname); + + shutdown(sock, SHUT_RDWR); + close(sock); + + return NULL; + } + + memcpy(&my_addr, he->h_addr_list[0], sizeof(struct in_addr)); + + /* Set DISPLAY to :screen.display */ + snprintf(display, sizeof(display), "%.50s:%d.%d", inet_ntoa(my_addr), + display_number, screen_number); + } +#else /* IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY */ + /* Just set DISPLAY to hostname:screen.display */ + snprintf(display, sizeof display, "%.400s:%d.%d", hostname, + display_number, screen_number); +#endif /* IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY */ + + /* Allocate a channel for each socket. */ + for (n = 0; n < num_socks; n++) { + sock = socks[n]; + (void) channel_new("x11 listener", + SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER, sock, sock, -1, + CHAN_X11_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT, + 0, xstrdup("X11 inet listener"), 1); + } + + /* Return a suitable value for the DISPLAY environment variable. */ + return xstrdup(display); +} + +#ifndef X_UNIX_PATH +#define X_UNIX_PATH "/tmp/.X11-unix/X" +#endif + +static int +connect_local_xsocket(u_int dnr) +{ + static const char *const x_sockets[] = { + X_UNIX_PATH "%u", + "/var/X/.X11-unix/X" "%u", + "/usr/spool/sockets/X11/" "%u", + NULL + }; + int sock; + struct sockaddr_un addr; + const char *const * path; + + for (path = x_sockets; *path; ++path) { + sock = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0); + if (sock < 0) + error("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr)); + addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX; + snprintf(addr.sun_path, sizeof addr.sun_path, *path, dnr); + if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *) & addr, sizeof(addr)) == 0) + return sock; + close(sock); + } + error("connect %.100s: %.100s", addr.sun_path, strerror(errno)); + return -1; +} + +int +x11_connect_display(void) +{ + int display_number, sock = 0; + const char *display; + char buf[1024], *cp; + struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop; + char strport[NI_MAXSERV]; + int gaierr; + + /* Try to open a socket for the local X server. */ + display = getenv("DISPLAY"); + if (!display) { + error("DISPLAY not set."); + return -1; + } + /* + * Now we decode the value of the DISPLAY variable and make a + * connection to the real X server. + */ + + /* + * Check if it is a unix domain socket. Unix domain displays are in + * one of the following formats: unix:d[.s], :d[.s], ::d[.s] + */ + if (strncmp(display, "unix:", 5) == 0 || + display[0] == ':') { + /* Connect to the unix domain socket. */ + if (sscanf(strrchr(display, ':') + 1, "%d", &display_number) != 1) { + error("Could not parse display number from DISPLAY: %.100s", + display); + return -1; + } + /* Create a socket. */ + sock = connect_local_xsocket(display_number); + if (sock < 0) + return -1; + + /* OK, we now have a connection to the display. */ + return sock; + } + /* + * Connect to an inet socket. The DISPLAY value is supposedly + * hostname:d[.s], where hostname may also be numeric IP address. + */ + strncpy(buf, display, sizeof(buf)); + buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = 0; + cp = strchr(buf, ':'); + if (!cp) { + error("Could not find ':' in DISPLAY: %.100s", display); + return -1; + } + *cp = 0; + /* buf now contains the host name. But first we parse the display number. */ + if (sscanf(cp + 1, "%d", &display_number) != 1) { + error("Could not parse display number from DISPLAY: %.100s", + display); + return -1; + } + + /* Look up the host address */ + memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); + hints.ai_family = IPv4or6; + hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; + snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", 6000 + display_number); + if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(buf, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0) { + error("%.100s: unknown host. (%s)", buf, gai_strerror(gaierr)); + return -1; + } + for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) { + /* Create a socket. */ + sock = socket(ai->ai_family, SOCK_STREAM, 0); + if (sock < 0) { + debug("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + continue; + } + /* Connect it to the display. */ + if (connect(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) { + debug("connect %.100s port %d: %.100s", buf, + 6000 + display_number, strerror(errno)); + close(sock); + continue; + } + /* Success */ + break; + } + freeaddrinfo(aitop); + if (!ai) { + error("connect %.100s port %d: %.100s", buf, 6000 + display_number, + strerror(errno)); + return -1; + } + return sock; +} + +/* + * This is called when SSH_SMSG_X11_OPEN is received. The packet contains + * the remote channel number. We should do whatever we want, and respond + * with either SSH_MSG_OPEN_CONFIRMATION or SSH_MSG_OPEN_FAILURE. + */ + +void +x11_input_open(int type, int plen, void *ctxt) +{ + Channel *c = NULL; + int remote_id, sock = 0; + char *remote_host; + + debug("Received X11 open request."); + + remote_id = packet_get_int(); + + if (packet_get_protocol_flags() & SSH_PROTOFLAG_HOST_IN_FWD_OPEN) { + remote_host = packet_get_string(NULL); + } else { + remote_host = xstrdup("unknown (remote did not supply name)"); + } + packet_done(); + + /* Obtain a connection to the real X display. */ + sock = x11_connect_display(); + if (sock != -1) { + /* Allocate a channel for this connection. */ + c = channel_new("connected x11 socket", + SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN, sock, sock, -1, 0, 0, 0, + remote_host, 1); + if (c == NULL) { + error("x11_input_open: channel_new failed"); + close(sock); + } else { + c->remote_id = remote_id; + c->force_drain = 1; + } + } + if (c == NULL) { + /* Send refusal to the remote host. */ + packet_start(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE); + packet_put_int(remote_id); + } else { + /* Send a confirmation to the remote host. */ + packet_start(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION); + packet_put_int(remote_id); + packet_put_int(c->self); + } + packet_send(); +} + +/* dummy protocol handler that denies SSH-1 requests (agent/x11) */ +void +deny_input_open(int type, int plen, void *ctxt) +{ + int rchan = packet_get_int(); + switch(type){ + case SSH_SMSG_AGENT_OPEN: + error("Warning: ssh server tried agent forwarding."); + break; + case SSH_SMSG_X11_OPEN: + error("Warning: ssh server tried X11 forwarding."); + break; + default: + error("deny_input_open: type %d plen %d", type, plen); + break; + } + error("Warning: this is probably a break in attempt by a malicious server."); + packet_start(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE); + packet_put_int(rchan); + packet_send(); +} + +/* + * Requests forwarding of X11 connections, generates fake authentication + * data, and enables authentication spoofing. + * This should be called in the client only. + */ +void +x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(int client_session_id, + const char *proto, const char *data) +{ + u_int data_len = (u_int) strlen(data) / 2; + u_int i, value, len; + char *new_data; + int screen_number; + const char *cp; + u_int32_t rand = 0; + + cp = getenv("DISPLAY"); + if (cp) + cp = strchr(cp, ':'); + if (cp) + cp = strchr(cp, '.'); + if (cp) + screen_number = atoi(cp + 1); + else + screen_number = 0; + + /* Save protocol name. */ + x11_saved_proto = xstrdup(proto); + + /* + * Extract real authentication data and generate fake data of the + * same length. + */ + x11_saved_data = xmalloc(data_len); + x11_fake_data = xmalloc(data_len); + for (i = 0; i < data_len; i++) { + if (sscanf(data + 2 * i, "%2x", &value) != 1) + fatal("x11_request_forwarding: bad authentication data: %.100s", data); + if (i % 4 == 0) + rand = arc4random(); + x11_saved_data[i] = value; + x11_fake_data[i] = rand & 0xff; + rand >>= 8; + } + x11_saved_data_len = data_len; + x11_fake_data_len = data_len; + + /* Convert the fake data into hex. */ + len = 2 * data_len + 1; + new_data = xmalloc(len); + for (i = 0; i < data_len; i++) + snprintf(new_data + 2 * i, len - 2 * i, + "%02x", (u_char) x11_fake_data[i]); + + /* Send the request packet. */ + if (compat20) { + channel_request_start(client_session_id, "x11-req", 0); + packet_put_char(0); /* XXX bool single connection */ + } else { + packet_start(SSH_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING); + } + packet_put_cstring(proto); + packet_put_cstring(new_data); + packet_put_int(screen_number); + packet_send(); + packet_write_wait(); + xfree(new_data); +} + + +/* -- agent forwarding */ + +/* Sends a message to the server to request authentication fd forwarding. */ + +void +auth_request_forwarding() +{ + packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AGENT_REQUEST_FORWARDING); + packet_send(); + packet_write_wait(); +} + +/* + * Returns the name of the forwarded authentication socket. Returns NULL if + * there is no forwarded authentication socket. The returned value points to + * a static buffer. + */ + +char * +auth_get_socket_name() +{ + return auth_sock_name; +} + +/* removes the agent forwarding socket */ + +void +auth_sock_cleanup_proc(void *_pw) +{ + struct passwd *pw = _pw; + + if (auth_sock_name) { + temporarily_use_uid(pw); + unlink(auth_sock_name); + rmdir(auth_sock_dir); + auth_sock_name = NULL; + restore_uid(); + } +} + +/* + * This is called to process SSH_CMSG_AGENT_REQUEST_FORWARDING on the server. + * This starts forwarding authentication requests. + */ + +int +auth_input_request_forwarding(struct passwd * pw) +{ + Channel *nc; + int sock; + struct sockaddr_un sunaddr; + + if (auth_get_socket_name() != NULL) { + error("authentication forwarding requested twice."); + return 0; + } + + /* Temporarily drop privileged uid for mkdir/bind. */ + temporarily_use_uid(pw); + + /* Allocate a buffer for the socket name, and format the name. */ + auth_sock_name = xmalloc(MAXPATHLEN); + auth_sock_dir = xmalloc(MAXPATHLEN); + strlcpy(auth_sock_dir, "/tmp/ssh-XXXXXXXX", MAXPATHLEN); + + /* Create private directory for socket */ + if (mkdtemp(auth_sock_dir) == NULL) { + packet_send_debug("Agent forwarding disabled: " + "mkdtemp() failed: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + restore_uid(); + xfree(auth_sock_name); + xfree(auth_sock_dir); + auth_sock_name = NULL; + auth_sock_dir = NULL; + return 0; + } + snprintf(auth_sock_name, MAXPATHLEN, "%s/agent.%d", + auth_sock_dir, (int) getpid()); + + /* delete agent socket on fatal() */ + fatal_add_cleanup(auth_sock_cleanup_proc, pw); + + /* Create the socket. */ + sock = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0); + if (sock < 0) + packet_disconnect("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + + /* Bind it to the name. */ + memset(&sunaddr, 0, sizeof(sunaddr)); + sunaddr.sun_family = AF_UNIX; + strncpy(sunaddr.sun_path, auth_sock_name, + sizeof(sunaddr.sun_path)); + + if (bind(sock, (struct sockaddr *) & sunaddr, sizeof(sunaddr)) < 0) + packet_disconnect("bind: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + + /* Restore the privileged uid. */ + restore_uid(); + + /* Start listening on the socket. */ + if (listen(sock, 5) < 0) + packet_disconnect("listen: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + + /* Allocate a channel for the authentication agent socket. */ + nc = channel_new("auth socket", + SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET, sock, sock, -1, + CHAN_X11_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT, + 0, xstrdup("auth socket"), 1); + if (nc == NULL) { + error("auth_input_request_forwarding: channel_new failed"); + auth_sock_cleanup_proc(pw); + fatal_remove_cleanup(auth_sock_cleanup_proc, pw); + close(sock); + return 0; + } + strlcpy(nc->path, auth_sock_name, sizeof(nc->path)); + return 1; +} + +/* This is called to process an SSH_SMSG_AGENT_OPEN message. */ + +void +auth_input_open_request(int type, int plen, void *ctxt) +{ + Channel *c = NULL; + int remote_id, sock; + char *name; + + packet_integrity_check(plen, 4, type); + + /* Read the remote channel number from the message. */ + remote_id = packet_get_int(); + + /* + * Get a connection to the local authentication agent (this may again + * get forwarded). + */ + sock = ssh_get_authentication_socket(); + + /* + * If we could not connect the agent, send an error message back to + * the server. This should never happen unless the agent dies, + * because authentication forwarding is only enabled if we have an + * agent. + */ + if (sock >= 0) { + name = xstrdup("authentication agent connection"); + c = channel_new("", SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN, sock, sock, + -1, 0, 0, 0, name, 1); + if (c == NULL) { + error("auth_input_open_request: channel_new failed"); + xfree(name); + close(sock); + } else { + c->remote_id = remote_id; + c->force_drain = 1; + } + } + if (c == NULL) { + packet_start(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE); + packet_put_int(remote_id); + } else { + /* Send a confirmation to the remote host. */ + debug("Forwarding authentication connection."); + packet_start(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION); + packet_put_int(remote_id); + packet_put_int(c->self); + } + packet_send(); +} diff --git a/openssh/channels.h b/openssh/channels.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..11ebb7b --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/channels.h @@ -0,0 +1,234 @@ +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ +/* RCSID("$OpenBSD: channels.h,v 1.51 2001/11/07 22:53:21 markus Exp $"); */ + +#ifndef CHANNEL_H +#define CHANNEL_H + +#include "buffer.h" + +/* Definitions for channel types. */ +#define SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER 1 /* Listening for inet X11 conn. */ +#define SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER 2 /* Listening on a port. */ +#define SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING 3 /* waiting for confirmation */ +#define SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN 4 /* normal open two-way channel */ +#define SSH_CHANNEL_CLOSED 5 /* waiting for close confirmation */ +#define SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET 6 /* authentication socket */ +#define SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN 7 /* reading first X11 packet */ +#define SSH_CHANNEL_INPUT_DRAINING 8 /* sending remaining data to conn */ +#define SSH_CHANNEL_OUTPUT_DRAINING 9 /* sending remaining data to app */ +#define SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL 10 /* larval session */ +#define SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER 11 /* Listening to a R-style port */ +#define SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING 12 +#define SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC 13 +#define SSH_CHANNEL_ZOMBIE 14 /* Almost dead. */ +#define SSH_CHANNEL_MAX_TYPE 15 + +#define SSH_CHANNEL_PATH_LEN 256 + +struct Channel; +typedef struct Channel Channel; + +typedef void channel_callback_fn(int, void *); +typedef int channel_filter_fn(struct Channel *, char *, int); + +struct Channel { + int type; /* channel type/state */ + int self; /* my own channel identifier */ + int remote_id; /* channel identifier for remote peer */ + int istate; /* input from channel (state of receive half) */ + int ostate; /* output to channel (state of transmit half) */ + int flags; /* close sent/rcvd */ + int rfd; /* read fd */ + int wfd; /* write fd */ + int efd; /* extended fd */ + int sock; /* sock fd */ + int isatty; /* rfd is a tty */ + int force_drain; /* force close on iEOF */ + int delayed; /* fdset hack */ + Buffer input; /* data read from socket, to be sent over + * encrypted connection */ + Buffer output; /* data received over encrypted connection for + * send on socket */ + Buffer extended; + char path[SSH_CHANNEL_PATH_LEN]; + /* path for unix domain sockets, or host name for forwards */ + int listening_port; /* port being listened for forwards */ + int host_port; /* remote port to connect for forwards */ + char *remote_name; /* remote hostname */ + + int remote_window; + int remote_maxpacket; + int local_window; + int local_window_max; + int local_consumed; + int local_maxpacket; + int extended_usage; + + char *ctype; /* type */ + + /* callback */ + channel_callback_fn *cb_fn; + void *cb_arg; + int cb_event; + channel_callback_fn *detach_user; + + /* filter */ + channel_filter_fn *input_filter; +}; + +#define CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE 0 +#define CHAN_EXTENDED_READ 1 +#define CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE 2 + +/* default window/packet sizes for tcp/x11-fwd-channel */ +#define CHAN_SES_WINDOW_DEFAULT (32*1024) +#define CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT (CHAN_SES_WINDOW_DEFAULT/2) +#define CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT (32*1024) +#define CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT (CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT/2) +#define CHAN_X11_WINDOW_DEFAULT (4*1024) +#define CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT (CHAN_X11_WINDOW_DEFAULT/2) + +/* possible input states */ +#define CHAN_INPUT_OPEN 0x01 +#define CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN 0x02 +#define CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_OCLOSE 0x04 +#define CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED 0x08 + +/* possible output states */ +#define CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN 0x10 +#define CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN 0x20 +#define CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_IEOF 0x40 +#define CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED 0x80 + +#define CHAN_CLOSE_SENT 0x01 +#define CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD 0x02 + +/* channel management */ + +Channel *channel_lookup(int); +Channel *channel_new(char *, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, char *, int); +void channel_set_fds(int, int, int, int, int, int); +void channel_free(Channel *); +void channel_free_all(void); +void channel_stop_listening(void); + +void channel_send_open(int); +void channel_request(int, char *, int); +void channel_request_start(int, char *, int); +void channel_register_callback(int, int mtype, channel_callback_fn *, void *); +void channel_register_cleanup(int, channel_callback_fn *); +void channel_register_filter(int, channel_filter_fn *); +void channel_cancel_cleanup(int); +int channel_close_fd(int *); + +/* protocol handler */ + +void channel_input_channel_request(int, int, void *); +void channel_input_close(int, int, void *); +void channel_input_close_confirmation(int, int, void *); +void channel_input_data(int, int, void *); +void channel_input_extended_data(int, int, void *); +void channel_input_ieof(int, int, void *); +void channel_input_oclose(int, int, void *); +void channel_input_open_confirmation(int, int, void *); +void channel_input_open_failure(int, int, void *); +void channel_input_port_open(int, int, void *); +void channel_input_window_adjust(int, int, void *); + +/* file descriptor handling (read/write) */ + +void channel_prepare_select(fd_set **, fd_set **, int *, int*, int); +void channel_after_select(fd_set *, fd_set *); +void channel_output_poll(void); + +int channel_not_very_much_buffered_data(void); +void channel_close_all(void); +int channel_still_open(void); +char *channel_open_message(void); +int channel_find_open(void); + +/* tcp forwarding */ +void channel_set_af(int af); +void channel_permit_all_opens(void); +void channel_add_permitted_opens(char *, int); +void channel_clear_permitted_opens(void); +void channel_input_port_forward_request(int, int); +int channel_connect_to(const char *, u_short); +int channel_connect_by_listen_address(u_short); +void channel_request_remote_forwarding(u_short, const char *, u_short); +int channel_request_local_forwarding(u_short, const char *, u_short, int); +int +channel_request_forwarding(const char *, u_short, const char *, u_short, int, + int); + +/* x11 forwarding */ + +int x11_connect_display(void); +char *x11_create_display(int); +char *x11_create_display_inet(int, int); +void x11_input_open(int, int, void *); +void x11_request_forwarding(void); +void x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(int, const char *, const char *); +void deny_input_open(int, int, void *); + +/* agent forwarding */ + +void auth_request_forwarding(void); +char *auth_get_socket_name(void); +void auth_sock_cleanup_proc(void *); +int auth_input_request_forwarding(struct passwd *); +void auth_input_open_request(int, int, void *); + +/* channel close */ + +int chan_is_dead(Channel *, int); +void chan_mark_dead(Channel *); +void chan_init_iostates(Channel *); +void chan_init(void); + +typedef void chan_event_fn(Channel *); + +/* for the input state */ +extern chan_event_fn *chan_rcvd_oclose; +extern chan_event_fn *chan_read_failed; +extern chan_event_fn *chan_ibuf_empty; + +/* for the output state */ +extern chan_event_fn *chan_rcvd_ieof; +extern chan_event_fn *chan_write_failed; +extern chan_event_fn *chan_obuf_empty; + +#endif diff --git a/openssh/cipher.c b/openssh/cipher.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..de25ff0 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/cipher.c @@ -0,0 +1,548 @@ +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + * + * + * Copyright (c) 1999 Niels Provos. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" +RCSID("$OpenBSD: cipher.c,v 1.47 2001/08/23 11:31:59 markus Exp $"); + +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "cipher.h" + +#include + +/* no encryption */ +static void +none_setkey(CipherContext *cc, const u_char *key, u_int keylen) +{ +} +static void +none_setiv(CipherContext *cc, const u_char *iv, u_int ivlen) +{ +} +static void +none_crypt(CipherContext *cc, u_char *dest, const u_char *src, u_int len) +{ + memcpy(dest, src, len); +} + +/* DES */ +static void +des_ssh1_setkey(CipherContext *cc, const u_char *key, u_int keylen) +{ + static int dowarn = 1; + if (dowarn) { + error("Warning: use of DES is strongly discouraged " + "due to cryptographic weaknesses"); + dowarn = 0; + } + des_set_key((void *)key, cc->u.des.key); +} +static void +des_ssh1_setiv(CipherContext *cc, const u_char *iv, u_int ivlen) +{ + memset(cc->u.des.iv, 0, sizeof(cc->u.des.iv)); +} +static void +des_ssh1_encrypt(CipherContext *cc, u_char *dest, const u_char *src, u_int len) +{ + des_ncbc_encrypt(src, dest, len, cc->u.des.key, &cc->u.des.iv, + DES_ENCRYPT); +} +static void +des_ssh1_decrypt(CipherContext *cc, u_char *dest, const u_char *src, u_int len) +{ + des_ncbc_encrypt(src, dest, len, cc->u.des.key, &cc->u.des.iv, + DES_DECRYPT); +} + +/* 3DES */ +static void +des3_setkey(CipherContext *cc, const u_char *key, u_int keylen) +{ + des_set_key((void *) key, cc->u.des3.key1); + des_set_key((void *) (key+8), cc->u.des3.key2); + des_set_key((void *) (key+16), cc->u.des3.key3); +} +static void +des3_setiv(CipherContext *cc, const u_char *iv, u_int ivlen) +{ + memset(cc->u.des3.iv1, 0, sizeof(cc->u.des3.iv1)); + memset(cc->u.des3.iv2, 0, sizeof(cc->u.des3.iv2)); + memset(cc->u.des3.iv3, 0, sizeof(cc->u.des3.iv3)); + if (iv == NULL) + return; + memcpy(cc->u.des3.iv3, (char *)iv, 8); +} +static void +des3_cbc_encrypt(CipherContext *cc, u_char *dest, const u_char *src, u_int len) +{ + des_ede3_cbc_encrypt(src, dest, len, + cc->u.des3.key1, cc->u.des3.key2, cc->u.des3.key3, + &cc->u.des3.iv3, DES_ENCRYPT); +} +static void +des3_cbc_decrypt(CipherContext *cc, u_char *dest, const u_char *src, u_int len) +{ + des_ede3_cbc_encrypt(src, dest, len, + cc->u.des3.key1, cc->u.des3.key2, cc->u.des3.key3, + &cc->u.des3.iv3, DES_DECRYPT); +} + +/* + * This is used by SSH1: + * + * What kind of triple DES are these 2 routines? + * + * Why is there a redundant initialization vector? + * + * If only iv3 was used, then, this would till effect have been + * outer-cbc. However, there is also a private iv1 == iv2 which + * perhaps makes differential analysis easier. On the other hand, the + * private iv1 probably makes the CRC-32 attack ineffective. This is a + * result of that there is no longer any known iv1 to use when + * choosing the X block. + */ +static void +des3_ssh1_setkey(CipherContext *cc, const u_char *key, u_int keylen) +{ + des_set_key((void *) key, cc->u.des3.key1); + des_set_key((void *) (key+8), cc->u.des3.key2); + if (keylen <= 16) + des_set_key((void *) key, cc->u.des3.key3); + else + des_set_key((void *) (key+16), cc->u.des3.key3); +} +static void +des3_ssh1_encrypt(CipherContext *cc, u_char *dest, const u_char *src, + u_int len) +{ + des_ncbc_encrypt(src, dest, len, cc->u.des3.key1, &cc->u.des3.iv1, + DES_ENCRYPT); + des_ncbc_encrypt(dest, dest, len, cc->u.des3.key2, &cc->u.des3.iv2, + DES_DECRYPT); + des_ncbc_encrypt(dest, dest, len, cc->u.des3.key3, &cc->u.des3.iv3, + DES_ENCRYPT); +} +static void +des3_ssh1_decrypt(CipherContext *cc, u_char *dest, const u_char *src, + u_int len) +{ + des_ncbc_encrypt(src, dest, len, cc->u.des3.key3, &cc->u.des3.iv3, + DES_DECRYPT); + des_ncbc_encrypt(dest, dest, len, cc->u.des3.key2, &cc->u.des3.iv2, + DES_ENCRYPT); + des_ncbc_encrypt(dest, dest, len, cc->u.des3.key1, &cc->u.des3.iv1, + DES_DECRYPT); +} + +/* Blowfish */ +static void +blowfish_setkey(CipherContext *cc, const u_char *key, u_int keylen) +{ + BF_set_key(&cc->u.bf.key, keylen, (u_char *)key); +} +static void +blowfish_setiv(CipherContext *cc, const u_char *iv, u_int ivlen) +{ + if (iv == NULL) + memset(cc->u.bf.iv, 0, 8); + else + memcpy(cc->u.bf.iv, (char *)iv, 8); +} +static void +blowfish_cbc_encrypt(CipherContext *cc, u_char *dest, const u_char *src, + u_int len) +{ + BF_cbc_encrypt((void *)src, dest, len, &cc->u.bf.key, cc->u.bf.iv, + BF_ENCRYPT); +} +static void +blowfish_cbc_decrypt(CipherContext *cc, u_char *dest, const u_char *src, + u_int len) +{ + BF_cbc_encrypt((void *)src, dest, len, &cc->u.bf.key, cc->u.bf.iv, + BF_DECRYPT); +} + +/* + * SSH1 uses a variation on Blowfish, all bytes must be swapped before + * and after encryption/decryption. Thus the swap_bytes stuff (yuk). + */ +static void +swap_bytes(const u_char *src, u_char *dst, int n) +{ + char c[4]; + + /* Process 4 bytes every lap. */ + for (n = n / 4; n > 0; n--) { + c[3] = *src++; + c[2] = *src++; + c[1] = *src++; + c[0] = *src++; + + *dst++ = c[0]; + *dst++ = c[1]; + *dst++ = c[2]; + *dst++ = c[3]; + } +} + +static void +blowfish_ssh1_encrypt(CipherContext *cc, u_char *dest, const u_char *src, + u_int len) +{ + swap_bytes(src, dest, len); + BF_cbc_encrypt((void *)dest, dest, len, &cc->u.bf.key, cc->u.bf.iv, + BF_ENCRYPT); + swap_bytes(dest, dest, len); +} +static void +blowfish_ssh1_decrypt(CipherContext *cc, u_char *dest, const u_char *src, + u_int len) +{ + swap_bytes(src, dest, len); + BF_cbc_encrypt((void *)dest, dest, len, &cc->u.bf.key, cc->u.bf.iv, + BF_DECRYPT); + swap_bytes(dest, dest, len); +} + +/* alleged rc4 */ +static void +arcfour_setkey(CipherContext *cc, const u_char *key, u_int keylen) +{ + RC4_set_key(&cc->u.rc4, keylen, (u_char *)key); +} +static void +arcfour_crypt(CipherContext *cc, u_char *dest, const u_char *src, u_int len) +{ + RC4(&cc->u.rc4, len, (u_char *)src, dest); +} + +/* CAST */ +static void +cast_setkey(CipherContext *cc, const u_char *key, u_int keylen) +{ + CAST_set_key(&cc->u.cast.key, keylen, (u_char *) key); +} +static void +cast_setiv(CipherContext *cc, const u_char *iv, u_int ivlen) +{ + if (iv == NULL) + fatal("no IV for %s.", cc->cipher->name); + memcpy(cc->u.cast.iv, (char *)iv, 8); +} +static void +cast_cbc_encrypt(CipherContext *cc, u_char *dest, const u_char *src, u_int len) +{ + CAST_cbc_encrypt(src, dest, len, &cc->u.cast.key, cc->u.cast.iv, + CAST_ENCRYPT); +} +static void +cast_cbc_decrypt(CipherContext *cc, u_char *dest, const u_char *src, u_int len) +{ + CAST_cbc_encrypt(src, dest, len, &cc->u.cast.key, cc->u.cast.iv, + CAST_DECRYPT); +} + +/* RIJNDAEL */ + +#define RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE 16 +static void +rijndael_setkey(CipherContext *cc, const u_char *key, u_int keylen) +{ + rijndael_set_key(&cc->u.rijndael.enc, (char *)key, 8*keylen, 1); + rijndael_set_key(&cc->u.rijndael.dec, (char *)key, 8*keylen, 0); +} +static void +rijndael_setiv(CipherContext *cc, const u_char *iv, u_int ivlen) +{ + if (iv == NULL || ivlen != RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE) + fatal("bad/no IV for %s.", cc->cipher->name); + memcpy(cc->u.rijndael.iv, iv, RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE); +} +static void +rijndael_cbc_encrypt(CipherContext *cc, u_char *dest, const u_char *src, + u_int len) +{ + rijndael_ctx *ctx = &cc->u.rijndael.enc; + u_char *iv = cc->u.rijndael.iv; + u_char in[RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE]; + u_char *cprev, *cnow, *plain; + int i, j, blocks = len / RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE; + + if (len == 0) + return; + if (len % RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE) + fatal("rijndael_cbc_encrypt: bad len %d", len); + cnow = dest; + plain = (u_char *) src; + cprev = iv; + for (i = 0; i < blocks; i++, plain+=RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE, + cnow+=RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE) { + for (j = 0; j < RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE; j++) + in[j] = plain[j] ^ cprev[j]; + rijndael_encrypt(ctx, in, cnow); + cprev = cnow; + } + memcpy(iv, cprev, RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE); +} +static void +rijndael_cbc_decrypt(CipherContext *cc, u_char *dest, const u_char *src, + u_int len) +{ + rijndael_ctx *ctx = &cc->u.rijndael.dec; + u_char *iv = cc->u.rijndael.iv; + u_char ivsaved[RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE]; + u_char *cnow = (u_char *) (src+len-RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE); + u_char *plain = dest+len-RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE; + u_char *ivp; + int i, j, blocks = len / RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE; + + if (len == 0) + return; + if (len % RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE) + fatal("rijndael_cbc_decrypt: bad len %d", len); + memcpy(ivsaved, cnow, RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE); + for (i = blocks; i > 0; i--, cnow-=RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE, + plain-=RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE) { + rijndael_decrypt(ctx, cnow, plain); + ivp = (i == 1) ? iv : cnow-RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE; + for (j = 0; j < RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE; j++) + plain[j] ^= ivp[j]; + } + memcpy(iv, ivsaved, RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE); +} + +Cipher ciphers[] = { + { "none", + SSH_CIPHER_NONE, 8, 0, + none_setkey, none_setiv, + none_crypt, none_crypt }, + { "des", + SSH_CIPHER_DES, 8, 8, + des_ssh1_setkey, des_ssh1_setiv, + des_ssh1_encrypt, des_ssh1_decrypt }, + { "3des", + SSH_CIPHER_3DES, 8, 16, + des3_ssh1_setkey, des3_setiv, + des3_ssh1_encrypt, des3_ssh1_decrypt }, + { "blowfish", + SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH, 8, 16, + blowfish_setkey, blowfish_setiv, + blowfish_ssh1_encrypt, blowfish_ssh1_decrypt }, + + { "3des-cbc", + SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 24, + des3_setkey, des3_setiv, + des3_cbc_encrypt, des3_cbc_decrypt }, + { "blowfish-cbc", + SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 16, + blowfish_setkey, blowfish_setiv, + blowfish_cbc_encrypt, blowfish_cbc_decrypt }, + { "cast128-cbc", + SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 16, + cast_setkey, cast_setiv, + cast_cbc_encrypt, cast_cbc_decrypt }, + { "arcfour", + SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 16, + arcfour_setkey, none_setiv, + arcfour_crypt, arcfour_crypt }, + { "aes128-cbc", + SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 16, + rijndael_setkey, rijndael_setiv, + rijndael_cbc_encrypt, rijndael_cbc_decrypt }, + { "aes192-cbc", + SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 24, + rijndael_setkey, rijndael_setiv, + rijndael_cbc_encrypt, rijndael_cbc_decrypt }, + { "aes256-cbc", + SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, + rijndael_setkey, rijndael_setiv, + rijndael_cbc_encrypt, rijndael_cbc_decrypt }, + { "rijndael128-cbc", + SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 16, + rijndael_setkey, rijndael_setiv, + rijndael_cbc_encrypt, rijndael_cbc_decrypt }, + { "rijndael192-cbc", + SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 24, + rijndael_setkey, rijndael_setiv, + rijndael_cbc_encrypt, rijndael_cbc_decrypt }, + { "rijndael256-cbc", + SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, + rijndael_setkey, rijndael_setiv, + rijndael_cbc_encrypt, rijndael_cbc_decrypt }, + { "rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se", + SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, + rijndael_setkey, rijndael_setiv, + rijndael_cbc_encrypt, rijndael_cbc_decrypt }, + { NULL, SSH_CIPHER_ILLEGAL, 0, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL } +}; + +/*--*/ + +u_int +cipher_mask_ssh1(int client) +{ + u_int mask = 0; + mask |= 1 << SSH_CIPHER_3DES; /* Mandatory */ + mask |= 1 << SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH; + if (client) { + mask |= 1 << SSH_CIPHER_DES; + } + return mask; +} + +Cipher * +cipher_by_name(const char *name) +{ + Cipher *c; + for (c = ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++) + if (strcasecmp(c->name, name) == 0) + return c; + return NULL; +} + +Cipher * +cipher_by_number(int id) +{ + Cipher *c; + for (c = ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++) + if (c->number == id) + return c; + return NULL; +} + +#define CIPHER_SEP "," +int +ciphers_valid(const char *names) +{ + Cipher *c; + char *ciphers, *cp; + char *p; + + if (names == NULL || strcmp(names, "") == 0) + return 0; + ciphers = cp = xstrdup(names); + for ((p = strsep(&cp, CIPHER_SEP)); p && *p != '\0'; + (p = strsep(&cp, CIPHER_SEP))) { + c = cipher_by_name(p); + if (c == NULL || c->number != SSH_CIPHER_SSH2) { + debug("bad cipher %s [%s]", p, names); + xfree(ciphers); + return 0; + } else { + debug3("cipher ok: %s [%s]", p, names); + } + } + debug3("ciphers ok: [%s]", names); + xfree(ciphers); + return 1; +} + +/* + * Parses the name of the cipher. Returns the number of the corresponding + * cipher, or -1 on error. + */ + +int +cipher_number(const char *name) +{ + Cipher *c; + if (name == NULL) + return -1; + c = cipher_by_name(name); + return (c==NULL) ? -1 : c->number; +} + +char * +cipher_name(int id) +{ + Cipher *c = cipher_by_number(id); + return (c==NULL) ? "" : c->name; +} + +void +cipher_init(CipherContext *cc, Cipher *cipher, + const u_char *key, u_int keylen, const u_char *iv, u_int ivlen) +{ + if (keylen < cipher->key_len) + fatal("cipher_init: key length %d is insufficient for %s.", + keylen, cipher->name); + if (iv != NULL && ivlen < cipher->block_size) + fatal("cipher_init: iv length %d is insufficient for %s.", + ivlen, cipher->name); + cc->cipher = cipher; + cipher->setkey(cc, key, keylen); + cipher->setiv(cc, iv, ivlen); +} + +void +cipher_encrypt(CipherContext *cc, u_char *dest, const u_char *src, u_int len) +{ + if (len % cc->cipher->block_size) + fatal("cipher_encrypt: bad plaintext length %d", len); + cc->cipher->encrypt(cc, dest, src, len); +} + +void +cipher_decrypt(CipherContext *cc, u_char *dest, const u_char *src, u_int len) +{ + if (len % cc->cipher->block_size) + fatal("cipher_decrypt: bad ciphertext length %d", len); + cc->cipher->decrypt(cc, dest, src, len); +} + +/* + * Selects the cipher, and keys if by computing the MD5 checksum of the + * passphrase and using the resulting 16 bytes as the key. + */ + +void +cipher_set_key_string(CipherContext *cc, Cipher *cipher, + const char *passphrase) +{ + MD5_CTX md; + u_char digest[16]; + + MD5_Init(&md); + MD5_Update(&md, (const u_char *)passphrase, strlen(passphrase)); + MD5_Final(digest, &md); + + cipher_init(cc, cipher, digest, 16, NULL, 0); + + memset(digest, 0, sizeof(digest)); + memset(&md, 0, sizeof(md)); +} diff --git a/openssh/cipher.h b/openssh/cipher.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4533f5e --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/cipher.h @@ -0,0 +1,119 @@ +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + * + * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* RCSID("$OpenBSD: cipher.h,v 1.29 2001/08/23 11:31:59 markus Exp $"); */ + +#ifndef CIPHER_H +#define CIPHER_H + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include "rijndael.h" +/* + * Cipher types for SSH-1. New types can be added, but old types should not + * be removed for compatibility. The maximum allowed value is 31. + */ +#define SSH_CIPHER_SSH2 -3 +#define SSH_CIPHER_ILLEGAL -2 /* No valid cipher selected. */ +#define SSH_CIPHER_NOT_SET -1 /* None selected (invalid number). */ +#define SSH_CIPHER_NONE 0 /* no encryption */ +#define SSH_CIPHER_IDEA 1 /* IDEA CFB */ +#define SSH_CIPHER_DES 2 /* DES CBC */ +#define SSH_CIPHER_3DES 3 /* 3DES CBC */ +#define SSH_CIPHER_BROKEN_TSS 4 /* TRI's Simple Stream encryption CBC */ +#define SSH_CIPHER_BROKEN_RC4 5 /* Alleged RC4 */ +#define SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH 6 +#define SSH_CIPHER_RESERVED 7 +#define SSH_CIPHER_MAX 31 + +typedef struct Cipher Cipher; +typedef struct CipherContext CipherContext; + +struct CipherContext { + union { + struct { + des_key_schedule key; + des_cblock iv; + } des; + struct { + des_key_schedule key1; + des_key_schedule key2; + des_key_schedule key3; + des_cblock iv1; + des_cblock iv2; + des_cblock iv3; + } des3; + struct { + struct bf_key_st key; + u_char iv[8]; + } bf; + struct { + CAST_KEY key; + u_char iv[8]; + } cast; + struct { + u_char iv[16]; + rijndael_ctx enc; + rijndael_ctx dec; + } rijndael; + RC4_KEY rc4; + } u; + Cipher *cipher; +}; +struct Cipher { + char *name; + int number; /* for ssh1 only */ + u_int block_size; + u_int key_len; + void (*setkey)(CipherContext *, const u_char *, u_int); + void (*setiv)(CipherContext *, const u_char *, u_int); + void (*encrypt)(CipherContext *, u_char *, const u_char *, u_int); + void (*decrypt)(CipherContext *, u_char *, const u_char *, u_int); +}; + +u_int cipher_mask_ssh1(int); +Cipher *cipher_by_name(const char *); +Cipher *cipher_by_number(int); +int cipher_number(const char *); +char *cipher_name(int); +int ciphers_valid(const char *); +void cipher_init(CipherContext *, Cipher *, const u_char *, u_int, + const u_char *, u_int); +void cipher_encrypt(CipherContext *, u_char *, const u_char *, u_int); +void cipher_decrypt(CipherContext *, u_char *, const u_char *, u_int); +void cipher_set_key_string(CipherContext *, Cipher *, const char *); + +#endif /* CIPHER_H */ diff --git a/openssh/clientloop.c b/openssh/clientloop.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..cbcb1d1 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/clientloop.c @@ -0,0 +1,1292 @@ +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * The main loop for the interactive session (client side). + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + * + * + * Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * + * SSH2 support added by Markus Friedl. + * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" +RCSID("$OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.87 2001/11/09 18:59:23 markus Exp $"); + +#include "ssh.h" +#include "ssh1.h" +#include "ssh2.h" +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "packet.h" +#include "buffer.h" +#include "compat.h" +#include "channels.h" +#include "dispatch.h" +#include "buffer.h" +#include "bufaux.h" +#include "key.h" +#include "kex.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "readconf.h" +#include "clientloop.h" +#include "authfd.h" +#include "atomicio.h" +#include "sshtty.h" +#include "misc.h" + +/* import options */ +extern Options options; + +/* Flag indicating that stdin should be redirected from /dev/null. */ +extern int stdin_null_flag; + +/* + * Name of the host we are connecting to. This is the name given on the + * command line, or the HostName specified for the user-supplied name in a + * configuration file. + */ +extern char *host; + +/* + * Flag to indicate that we have received a window change signal which has + * not yet been processed. This will cause a message indicating the new + * window size to be sent to the server a little later. This is volatile + * because this is updated in a signal handler. + */ +static volatile int received_window_change_signal = 0; +static volatile int received_signal = 0; + +/* Flag indicating whether the user\'s terminal is in non-blocking mode. */ +static int in_non_blocking_mode = 0; + +/* Common data for the client loop code. */ +static int quit_pending; /* Set to non-zero to quit the client loop. */ +static int escape_char; /* Escape character. */ +static int escape_pending; /* Last character was the escape character */ +static int last_was_cr; /* Last character was a newline. */ +static int exit_status; /* Used to store the exit status of the command. */ +static int stdin_eof; /* EOF has been encountered on standard error. */ +static Buffer stdin_buffer; /* Buffer for stdin data. */ +static Buffer stdout_buffer; /* Buffer for stdout data. */ +static Buffer stderr_buffer; /* Buffer for stderr data. */ +static u_long stdin_bytes, stdout_bytes, stderr_bytes; +static u_int buffer_high;/* Soft max buffer size. */ +static int connection_in; /* Connection to server (input). */ +static int connection_out; /* Connection to server (output). */ +static int need_rekeying; /* Set to non-zero if rekeying is requested. */ +static int session_closed = 0; /* In SSH2: login session closed. */ + +static void client_init_dispatch(void); +int session_ident = -1; + +/*XXX*/ +extern Kex *xxx_kex; + +/* Restores stdin to blocking mode. */ + +static void +leave_non_blocking(void) +{ + if (in_non_blocking_mode) { + (void) fcntl(fileno(stdin), F_SETFL, 0); + in_non_blocking_mode = 0; + fatal_remove_cleanup((void (*) (void *)) leave_non_blocking, NULL); + } +} + +/* Puts stdin terminal in non-blocking mode. */ + +static void +enter_non_blocking(void) +{ + in_non_blocking_mode = 1; + (void) fcntl(fileno(stdin), F_SETFL, O_NONBLOCK); + fatal_add_cleanup((void (*) (void *)) leave_non_blocking, NULL); +} + +/* + * Signal handler for the window change signal (SIGWINCH). This just sets a + * flag indicating that the window has changed. + */ + +static void +window_change_handler(int sig) +{ + received_window_change_signal = 1; + signal(SIGWINCH, window_change_handler); +} + +/* + * Signal handler for signals that cause the program to terminate. These + * signals must be trapped to restore terminal modes. + */ + +static void +signal_handler(int sig) +{ + received_signal = sig; + quit_pending = 1; +} + +/* + * Returns current time in seconds from Jan 1, 1970 with the maximum + * available resolution. + */ + +static double +get_current_time(void) +{ + struct timeval tv; + gettimeofday(&tv, NULL); + return (double) tv.tv_sec + (double) tv.tv_usec / 1000000.0; +} + +/* + * This is called when the interactive is entered. This checks if there is + * an EOF coming on stdin. We must check this explicitly, as select() does + * not appear to wake up when redirecting from /dev/null. + */ + +static void +client_check_initial_eof_on_stdin(void) +{ + int len; + char buf[1]; + + /* + * If standard input is to be "redirected from /dev/null", we simply + * mark that we have seen an EOF and send an EOF message to the + * server. Otherwise, we try to read a single character; it appears + * that for some files, such /dev/null, select() never wakes up for + * read for this descriptor, which means that we never get EOF. This + * way we will get the EOF if stdin comes from /dev/null or similar. + */ + if (stdin_null_flag) { + /* Fake EOF on stdin. */ + debug("Sending eof."); + stdin_eof = 1; + packet_start(SSH_CMSG_EOF); + packet_send(); + } else { + enter_non_blocking(); + + /* Check for immediate EOF on stdin. */ + len = read(fileno(stdin), buf, 1); + if (len == 0) { + /* EOF. Record that we have seen it and send EOF to server. */ + debug("Sending eof."); + stdin_eof = 1; + packet_start(SSH_CMSG_EOF); + packet_send(); + } else if (len > 0) { + /* + * Got data. We must store the data in the buffer, + * and also process it as an escape character if + * appropriate. + */ + if ((u_char) buf[0] == escape_char) + escape_pending = 1; + else + buffer_append(&stdin_buffer, buf, 1); + } + leave_non_blocking(); + } +} + + +/* + * Make packets from buffered stdin data, and buffer them for sending to the + * connection. + */ + +static void +client_make_packets_from_stdin_data(void) +{ + u_int len; + + /* Send buffered stdin data to the server. */ + while (buffer_len(&stdin_buffer) > 0 && + packet_not_very_much_data_to_write()) { + len = buffer_len(&stdin_buffer); + /* Keep the packets at reasonable size. */ + if (len > packet_get_maxsize()) + len = packet_get_maxsize(); + packet_start(SSH_CMSG_STDIN_DATA); + packet_put_string(buffer_ptr(&stdin_buffer), len); + packet_send(); + buffer_consume(&stdin_buffer, len); + stdin_bytes += len; + /* If we have a pending EOF, send it now. */ + if (stdin_eof && buffer_len(&stdin_buffer) == 0) { + packet_start(SSH_CMSG_EOF); + packet_send(); + } + } +} + +/* + * Checks if the client window has changed, and sends a packet about it to + * the server if so. The actual change is detected elsewhere (by a software + * interrupt on Unix); this just checks the flag and sends a message if + * appropriate. + */ + +static void +client_check_window_change(void) +{ + struct winsize ws; + + if (! received_window_change_signal) + return; + /** XXX race */ + received_window_change_signal = 0; + + if (ioctl(fileno(stdin), TIOCGWINSZ, &ws) < 0) + return; + + debug2("client_check_window_change: changed"); + + if (compat20) { + channel_request_start(session_ident, "window-change", 0); + packet_put_int(ws.ws_col); + packet_put_int(ws.ws_row); + packet_put_int(ws.ws_xpixel); + packet_put_int(ws.ws_ypixel); + packet_send(); + } else { + packet_start(SSH_CMSG_WINDOW_SIZE); + packet_put_int(ws.ws_row); + packet_put_int(ws.ws_col); + packet_put_int(ws.ws_xpixel); + packet_put_int(ws.ws_ypixel); + packet_send(); + } +} + +/* + * Waits until the client can do something (some data becomes available on + * one of the file descriptors). + */ + +static void +client_wait_until_can_do_something(fd_set **readsetp, fd_set **writesetp, + int *maxfdp, int *nallocp, int rekeying) +{ + /* Add any selections by the channel mechanism. */ + channel_prepare_select(readsetp, writesetp, maxfdp, nallocp, rekeying); + + if (!compat20) { + /* Read from the connection, unless our buffers are full. */ + if (buffer_len(&stdout_buffer) < buffer_high && + buffer_len(&stderr_buffer) < buffer_high && + channel_not_very_much_buffered_data()) + FD_SET(connection_in, *readsetp); + /* + * Read from stdin, unless we have seen EOF or have very much + * buffered data to send to the server. + */ + if (!stdin_eof && packet_not_very_much_data_to_write()) + FD_SET(fileno(stdin), *readsetp); + + /* Select stdout/stderr if have data in buffer. */ + if (buffer_len(&stdout_buffer) > 0) + FD_SET(fileno(stdout), *writesetp); + if (buffer_len(&stderr_buffer) > 0) + FD_SET(fileno(stderr), *writesetp); + } else { + /* channel_prepare_select could have closed the last channel */ + if (session_closed && !channel_still_open() && + !packet_have_data_to_write()) { + /* clear mask since we did not call select() */ + memset(*readsetp, 0, *nallocp); + memset(*writesetp, 0, *nallocp); + return; + } else { + FD_SET(connection_in, *readsetp); + } + } + + /* Select server connection if have data to write to the server. */ + if (packet_have_data_to_write()) + FD_SET(connection_out, *writesetp); + + /* + * Wait for something to happen. This will suspend the process until + * some selected descriptor can be read, written, or has some other + * event pending. Note: if you want to implement SSH_MSG_IGNORE + * messages to fool traffic analysis, this might be the place to do + * it: just have a random timeout for the select, and send a random + * SSH_MSG_IGNORE packet when the timeout expires. + */ + + if (select((*maxfdp)+1, *readsetp, *writesetp, NULL, NULL) < 0) { + char buf[100]; + + /* + * We have to clear the select masks, because we return. + * We have to return, because the mainloop checks for the flags + * set by the signal handlers. + */ + memset(*readsetp, 0, *nallocp); + memset(*writesetp, 0, *nallocp); + + if (errno == EINTR) + return; + /* Note: we might still have data in the buffers. */ + snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "select: %s\r\n", strerror(errno)); + buffer_append(&stderr_buffer, buf, strlen(buf)); + quit_pending = 1; + } +} + +static void +client_suspend_self(Buffer *bin, Buffer *bout, Buffer *berr) +{ + struct winsize oldws, newws; + + /* Flush stdout and stderr buffers. */ + if (buffer_len(bout) > 0) + atomicio(write, fileno(stdout), buffer_ptr(bout), buffer_len(bout)); + if (buffer_len(berr) > 0) + atomicio(write, fileno(stderr), buffer_ptr(berr), buffer_len(berr)); + + leave_raw_mode(); + + /* + * Free (and clear) the buffer to reduce the amount of data that gets + * written to swap. + */ + buffer_free(bin); + buffer_free(bout); + buffer_free(berr); + + /* Save old window size. */ + ioctl(fileno(stdin), TIOCGWINSZ, &oldws); + + /* Send the suspend signal to the program itself. */ + kill(getpid(), SIGTSTP); + + /* Check if the window size has changed. */ + if (ioctl(fileno(stdin), TIOCGWINSZ, &newws) >= 0 && + (oldws.ws_row != newws.ws_row || + oldws.ws_col != newws.ws_col || + oldws.ws_xpixel != newws.ws_xpixel || + oldws.ws_ypixel != newws.ws_ypixel)) + received_window_change_signal = 1; + + /* OK, we have been continued by the user. Reinitialize buffers. */ + buffer_init(bin); + buffer_init(bout); + buffer_init(berr); + + enter_raw_mode(); +} + +static void +client_process_net_input(fd_set * readset) +{ + int len; + char buf[8192]; + + /* + * Read input from the server, and add any such data to the buffer of + * the packet subsystem. + */ + if (FD_ISSET(connection_in, readset)) { + /* Read as much as possible. */ + len = read(connection_in, buf, sizeof(buf)); + if (len == 0) { + /* Received EOF. The remote host has closed the connection. */ + snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "Connection to %.300s closed by remote host.\r\n", + host); + buffer_append(&stderr_buffer, buf, strlen(buf)); + quit_pending = 1; + return; + } + /* + * There is a kernel bug on Solaris that causes select to + * sometimes wake up even though there is no data available. + */ + if (len < 0 && (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR)) + len = 0; + + if (len < 0) { + /* An error has encountered. Perhaps there is a network problem. */ + snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "Read from remote host %.300s: %.100s\r\n", + host, strerror(errno)); + buffer_append(&stderr_buffer, buf, strlen(buf)); + quit_pending = 1; + return; + } + packet_process_incoming(buf, len); + } +} + +/* process the characters one by one */ +static int +process_escapes(Buffer *bin, Buffer *bout, Buffer *berr, char *buf, int len) +{ + char string[1024]; + pid_t pid; + int bytes = 0; + u_int i; + u_char ch; + char *s; + + for (i = 0; i < len; i++) { + /* Get one character at a time. */ + ch = buf[i]; + + if (escape_pending) { + /* We have previously seen an escape character. */ + /* Clear the flag now. */ + escape_pending = 0; + + /* Process the escaped character. */ + switch (ch) { + case '.': + /* Terminate the connection. */ + snprintf(string, sizeof string, "%c.\r\n", escape_char); + buffer_append(berr, string, strlen(string)); + + quit_pending = 1; + return -1; + + case 'Z' - 64: + /* Suspend the program. */ + /* Print a message to that effect to the user. */ + snprintf(string, sizeof string, "%c^Z [suspend ssh]\r\n", escape_char); + buffer_append(berr, string, strlen(string)); + + /* Restore terminal modes and suspend. */ + client_suspend_self(bin, bout, berr); + + /* We have been continued. */ + continue; + + case 'R': + if (compat20) { + if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY) + log("Server does not support re-keying"); + else + need_rekeying = 1; + } + continue; + + case '&': + /* + * Detach the program (continue to serve connections, + * but put in background and no more new connections). + */ + /* Restore tty modes. */ + leave_raw_mode(); + + /* Stop listening for new connections. */ + channel_stop_listening(); + + snprintf(string, sizeof string, + "%c& [backgrounded]\n", escape_char); + buffer_append(berr, string, strlen(string)); + + /* Fork into background. */ + pid = fork(); + if (pid < 0) { + error("fork: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + continue; + } + if (pid != 0) { /* This is the parent. */ + /* The parent just exits. */ + exit(0); + } + /* The child continues serving connections. */ + if (compat20) { + buffer_append(bin, "\004", 1); + /* fake EOF on stdin */ + return -1; + } else if (!stdin_eof) { + /* + * Sending SSH_CMSG_EOF alone does not always appear + * to be enough. So we try to send an EOF character + * first. + */ + packet_start(SSH_CMSG_STDIN_DATA); + packet_put_string("\004", 1); + packet_send(); + /* Close stdin. */ + stdin_eof = 1; + if (buffer_len(bin) == 0) { + packet_start(SSH_CMSG_EOF); + packet_send(); + } + } + continue; + + case '?': + snprintf(string, sizeof string, +"%c?\r\n\ +Supported escape sequences:\r\n\ +~. - terminate connection\r\n\ +~R - Request rekey (SSH protocol 2 only)\r\n\ +~^Z - suspend ssh\r\n\ +~# - list forwarded connections\r\n\ +~& - background ssh (when waiting for connections to terminate)\r\n\ +~? - this message\r\n\ +~~ - send the escape character by typing it twice\r\n\ +(Note that escapes are only recognized immediately after newline.)\r\n", + escape_char); + buffer_append(berr, string, strlen(string)); + continue; + + case '#': + snprintf(string, sizeof string, "%c#\r\n", escape_char); + buffer_append(berr, string, strlen(string)); + s = channel_open_message(); + buffer_append(berr, s, strlen(s)); + xfree(s); + continue; + + default: + if (ch != escape_char) { + buffer_put_char(bin, escape_char); + bytes++; + } + /* Escaped characters fall through here */ + break; + } + } else { + /* + * The previous character was not an escape char. Check if this + * is an escape. + */ + if (last_was_cr && ch == escape_char) { + /* It is. Set the flag and continue to next character. */ + escape_pending = 1; + continue; + } + } + + /* + * Normal character. Record whether it was a newline, + * and append it to the buffer. + */ + last_was_cr = (ch == '\r' || ch == '\n'); + buffer_put_char(bin, ch); + bytes++; + } + return bytes; +} + +static void +client_process_input(fd_set * readset) +{ + int len; + char buf[8192]; + + /* Read input from stdin. */ + if (FD_ISSET(fileno(stdin), readset)) { + /* Read as much as possible. */ + len = read(fileno(stdin), buf, sizeof(buf)); + if (len < 0 && (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR)) + return; /* we'll try again later */ + if (len <= 0) { + /* + * Received EOF or error. They are treated + * similarly, except that an error message is printed + * if it was an error condition. + */ + if (len < 0) { + snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "read: %.100s\r\n", strerror(errno)); + buffer_append(&stderr_buffer, buf, strlen(buf)); + } + /* Mark that we have seen EOF. */ + stdin_eof = 1; + /* + * Send an EOF message to the server unless there is + * data in the buffer. If there is data in the + * buffer, no message will be sent now. Code + * elsewhere will send the EOF when the buffer + * becomes empty if stdin_eof is set. + */ + if (buffer_len(&stdin_buffer) == 0) { + packet_start(SSH_CMSG_EOF); + packet_send(); + } + } else if (escape_char == SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE) { + /* + * Normal successful read, and no escape character. + * Just append the data to buffer. + */ + buffer_append(&stdin_buffer, buf, len); + } else { + /* + * Normal, successful read. But we have an escape character + * and have to process the characters one by one. + */ + if (process_escapes(&stdin_buffer, &stdout_buffer, + &stderr_buffer, buf, len) == -1) + return; + } + } +} + +static void +client_process_output(fd_set * writeset) +{ + int len; + char buf[100]; + + /* Write buffered output to stdout. */ + if (FD_ISSET(fileno(stdout), writeset)) { + /* Write as much data as possible. */ + len = write(fileno(stdout), buffer_ptr(&stdout_buffer), + buffer_len(&stdout_buffer)); + if (len <= 0) { + if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN) + len = 0; + else { + /* + * An error or EOF was encountered. Put an + * error message to stderr buffer. + */ + snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "write stdout: %.50s\r\n", strerror(errno)); + buffer_append(&stderr_buffer, buf, strlen(buf)); + quit_pending = 1; + return; + } + } + /* Consume printed data from the buffer. */ + buffer_consume(&stdout_buffer, len); + stdout_bytes += len; + } + /* Write buffered output to stderr. */ + if (FD_ISSET(fileno(stderr), writeset)) { + /* Write as much data as possible. */ + len = write(fileno(stderr), buffer_ptr(&stderr_buffer), + buffer_len(&stderr_buffer)); + if (len <= 0) { + if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN) + len = 0; + else { + /* EOF or error, but can't even print error message. */ + quit_pending = 1; + return; + } + } + /* Consume printed characters from the buffer. */ + buffer_consume(&stderr_buffer, len); + stderr_bytes += len; + } +} + +/* + * Get packets from the connection input buffer, and process them as long as + * there are packets available. + * + * Any unknown packets received during the actual + * session cause the session to terminate. This is + * intended to make debugging easier since no + * confirmations are sent. Any compatible protocol + * extensions must be negotiated during the + * preparatory phase. + */ + +static void +client_process_buffered_input_packets(void) +{ + dispatch_run(DISPATCH_NONBLOCK, &quit_pending, compat20 ? xxx_kex : NULL); +} + +/* scan buf[] for '~' before sending data to the peer */ + +static int +simple_escape_filter(Channel *c, char *buf, int len) +{ + /* XXX we assume c->extended is writeable */ + return process_escapes(&c->input, &c->output, &c->extended, buf, len); +} + +static void +client_channel_closed(int id, void *arg) +{ + if (id != session_ident) + error("client_channel_closed: id %d != session_ident %d", + id, session_ident); + channel_cancel_cleanup(id); + session_closed = 1; + if (in_raw_mode()) + leave_raw_mode(); +} + +/* + * Implements the interactive session with the server. This is called after + * the user has been authenticated, and a command has been started on the + * remote host. If escape_char != SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE, it is the character + * used as an escape character for terminating or suspending the session. + */ + +int +client_loop(int have_pty, int escape_char_arg, int ssh2_chan_id) +{ + fd_set *readset = NULL, *writeset = NULL; + double start_time, total_time; + int max_fd = 0, max_fd2 = 0, len, rekeying = 0, nalloc = 0; + char buf[100]; + + debug("Entering interactive session."); + + start_time = get_current_time(); + + /* Initialize variables. */ + escape_pending = 0; + last_was_cr = 1; + exit_status = -1; + stdin_eof = 0; + buffer_high = 64 * 1024; + connection_in = packet_get_connection_in(); + connection_out = packet_get_connection_out(); + max_fd = MAX(connection_in, connection_out); + + if (!compat20) { + /* enable nonblocking unless tty */ + if (!isatty(fileno(stdin))) + set_nonblock(fileno(stdin)); + if (!isatty(fileno(stdout))) + set_nonblock(fileno(stdout)); + if (!isatty(fileno(stderr))) + set_nonblock(fileno(stderr)); + max_fd = MAX(max_fd, fileno(stdin)); + max_fd = MAX(max_fd, fileno(stdout)); + max_fd = MAX(max_fd, fileno(stderr)); + } + stdin_bytes = 0; + stdout_bytes = 0; + stderr_bytes = 0; + quit_pending = 0; + escape_char = escape_char_arg; + + /* Initialize buffers. */ + buffer_init(&stdin_buffer); + buffer_init(&stdout_buffer); + buffer_init(&stderr_buffer); + + client_init_dispatch(); + + /* Set signal handlers to restore non-blocking mode. */ + signal(SIGINT, signal_handler); + signal(SIGQUIT, signal_handler); + signal(SIGTERM, signal_handler); + if (have_pty) + signal(SIGWINCH, window_change_handler); + + if (have_pty) + enter_raw_mode(); + + if (compat20) { + session_ident = ssh2_chan_id; + if (escape_char != SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE) + channel_register_filter(session_ident, + simple_escape_filter); + if (session_ident != -1) + channel_register_cleanup(session_ident, + client_channel_closed); + } else { + /* Check if we should immediately send eof on stdin. */ + client_check_initial_eof_on_stdin(); + } + + /* Main loop of the client for the interactive session mode. */ + while (!quit_pending) { + + /* Process buffered packets sent by the server. */ + client_process_buffered_input_packets(); + + if (compat20 && session_closed && !channel_still_open()) + break; + + rekeying = (xxx_kex != NULL && !xxx_kex->done); + + if (rekeying) { + debug("rekeying in progress"); + } else { + /* + * Make packets of buffered stdin data, and buffer + * them for sending to the server. + */ + if (!compat20) + client_make_packets_from_stdin_data(); + + /* + * Make packets from buffered channel data, and + * enqueue them for sending to the server. + */ + if (packet_not_very_much_data_to_write()) + channel_output_poll(); + + /* + * Check if the window size has changed, and buffer a + * message about it to the server if so. + */ + client_check_window_change(); + + if (quit_pending) + break; + } + /* + * Wait until we have something to do (something becomes + * available on one of the descriptors). + */ + max_fd2 = max_fd; + client_wait_until_can_do_something(&readset, &writeset, + &max_fd2, &nalloc, rekeying); + + if (quit_pending) + break; + + /* Do channel operations unless rekeying in progress. */ + if (!rekeying) { + channel_after_select(readset, writeset); + + if (need_rekeying) { + debug("user requests rekeying"); + xxx_kex->done = 0; + kex_send_kexinit(xxx_kex); + need_rekeying = 0; + } + } + + /* Buffer input from the connection. */ + client_process_net_input(readset); + + if (quit_pending) + break; + + if (!compat20) { + /* Buffer data from stdin */ + client_process_input(readset); + /* + * Process output to stdout and stderr. Output to + * the connection is processed elsewhere (above). + */ + client_process_output(writeset); + } + + /* Send as much buffered packet data as possible to the sender. */ + if (FD_ISSET(connection_out, writeset)) + packet_write_poll(); + } + if (readset) + xfree(readset); + if (writeset) + xfree(writeset); + + /* Terminate the session. */ + + /* Stop watching for window change. */ + if (have_pty) + signal(SIGWINCH, SIG_DFL); + + channel_free_all(); + + if (have_pty) + leave_raw_mode(); + + /* restore blocking io */ + if (!isatty(fileno(stdin))) + unset_nonblock(fileno(stdin)); + if (!isatty(fileno(stdout))) + unset_nonblock(fileno(stdout)); + if (!isatty(fileno(stderr))) + unset_nonblock(fileno(stderr)); + + if (received_signal) { + if (in_non_blocking_mode) /* XXX */ + leave_non_blocking(); + fatal("Killed by signal %d.", received_signal); + } + + /* + * In interactive mode (with pseudo tty) display a message indicating + * that the connection has been closed. + */ + if (have_pty && options.log_level != SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET) { + snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "Connection to %.64s closed.\r\n", host); + buffer_append(&stderr_buffer, buf, strlen(buf)); + } + + /* Output any buffered data for stdout. */ + while (buffer_len(&stdout_buffer) > 0) { + len = write(fileno(stdout), buffer_ptr(&stdout_buffer), + buffer_len(&stdout_buffer)); + if (len <= 0) { + error("Write failed flushing stdout buffer."); + break; + } + buffer_consume(&stdout_buffer, len); + stdout_bytes += len; + } + + /* Output any buffered data for stderr. */ + while (buffer_len(&stderr_buffer) > 0) { + len = write(fileno(stderr), buffer_ptr(&stderr_buffer), + buffer_len(&stderr_buffer)); + if (len <= 0) { + error("Write failed flushing stderr buffer."); + break; + } + buffer_consume(&stderr_buffer, len); + stderr_bytes += len; + } + + /* Clear and free any buffers. */ + memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); + buffer_free(&stdin_buffer); + buffer_free(&stdout_buffer); + buffer_free(&stderr_buffer); + + /* Report bytes transferred, and transfer rates. */ + total_time = get_current_time() - start_time; + debug("Transferred: stdin %lu, stdout %lu, stderr %lu bytes in %.1f seconds", + stdin_bytes, stdout_bytes, stderr_bytes, total_time); + if (total_time > 0) + debug("Bytes per second: stdin %.1f, stdout %.1f, stderr %.1f", + stdin_bytes / total_time, stdout_bytes / total_time, + stderr_bytes / total_time); + + /* Return the exit status of the program. */ + debug("Exit status %d", exit_status); + return exit_status; +} + +/*********/ + +static void +client_input_stdout_data(int type, int plen, void *ctxt) +{ + u_int data_len; + char *data = packet_get_string(&data_len); + packet_integrity_check(plen, 4 + data_len, type); + buffer_append(&stdout_buffer, data, data_len); + memset(data, 0, data_len); + xfree(data); +} +static void +client_input_stderr_data(int type, int plen, void *ctxt) +{ + u_int data_len; + char *data = packet_get_string(&data_len); + packet_integrity_check(plen, 4 + data_len, type); + buffer_append(&stderr_buffer, data, data_len); + memset(data, 0, data_len); + xfree(data); +} +static void +client_input_exit_status(int type, int plen, void *ctxt) +{ + packet_integrity_check(plen, 4, type); + exit_status = packet_get_int(); + /* Acknowledge the exit. */ + packet_start(SSH_CMSG_EXIT_CONFIRMATION); + packet_send(); + /* + * Must wait for packet to be sent since we are + * exiting the loop. + */ + packet_write_wait(); + /* Flag that we want to exit. */ + quit_pending = 1; +} + +static Channel * +client_request_forwarded_tcpip(const char *request_type, int rchan) +{ + Channel* c = NULL; + char *listen_address, *originator_address; + int listen_port, originator_port; + int sock; + + /* Get rest of the packet */ + listen_address = packet_get_string(NULL); + listen_port = packet_get_int(); + originator_address = packet_get_string(NULL); + originator_port = packet_get_int(); + packet_done(); + + debug("client_request_forwarded_tcpip: listen %s port %d, originator %s port %d", + listen_address, listen_port, originator_address, originator_port); + + sock = channel_connect_by_listen_address(listen_port); + if (sock < 0) { + xfree(originator_address); + xfree(listen_address); + return NULL; + } + c = channel_new("forwarded-tcpip", + SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING, sock, sock, -1, + CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, 0, + xstrdup(originator_address), 1); + if (c == NULL) { + error("client_request_forwarded_tcpip: channel_new failed"); + close(sock); + } + xfree(originator_address); + xfree(listen_address); + return c; +} + +static Channel* +client_request_x11(const char *request_type, int rchan) +{ + Channel *c = NULL; + char *originator; + int originator_port; + int sock; + + if (!options.forward_x11) { + error("Warning: ssh server tried X11 forwarding."); + error("Warning: this is probably a break in attempt by a malicious server."); + return NULL; + } + originator = packet_get_string(NULL); + if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_X11FWD) { + debug2("buggy server: x11 request w/o originator_port"); + originator_port = 0; + } else { + originator_port = packet_get_int(); + } + packet_done(); + /* XXX check permission */ + debug("client_request_x11: request from %s %d", originator, + originator_port); + xfree(originator); + sock = x11_connect_display(); + if (sock < 0) + return NULL; + c = channel_new("x11", + SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN, sock, sock, -1, + CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, + xstrdup("x11"), 1); + if (c == NULL) { + error("client_request_x11: channel_new failed"); + close(sock); + } + c->force_drain = 1; + return c; +} + +static Channel* +client_request_agent(const char *request_type, int rchan) +{ + Channel *c = NULL; + int sock; + + if (!options.forward_agent) { + error("Warning: ssh server tried agent forwarding."); + error("Warning: this is probably a break in attempt by a malicious server."); + return NULL; + } + sock = ssh_get_authentication_socket(); + if (sock < 0) + return NULL; + c = channel_new("authentication agent connection", + SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN, sock, sock, -1, + CHAN_X11_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, 0, + xstrdup("authentication agent connection"), 1); + if (c == NULL) { + error("client_request_agent: channel_new failed"); + close(sock); + } + c->force_drain = 1; + return c; +} + +/* XXXX move to generic input handler */ +static void +client_input_channel_open(int type, int plen, void *ctxt) +{ + Channel *c = NULL; + char *ctype; + u_int len; + int rchan; + int rmaxpack; + int rwindow; + + ctype = packet_get_string(&len); + rchan = packet_get_int(); + rwindow = packet_get_int(); + rmaxpack = packet_get_int(); + + debug("client_input_channel_open: ctype %s rchan %d win %d max %d", + ctype, rchan, rwindow, rmaxpack); + + if (strcmp(ctype, "forwarded-tcpip") == 0) { + c = client_request_forwarded_tcpip(ctype, rchan); + } else if (strcmp(ctype, "x11") == 0) { + c = client_request_x11(ctype, rchan); + } else if (strcmp(ctype, "auth-agent@openssh.com") == 0) { + c = client_request_agent(ctype, rchan); + } +/* XXX duplicate : */ + if (c != NULL) { + debug("confirm %s", ctype); + c->remote_id = rchan; + c->remote_window = rwindow; + c->remote_maxpacket = rmaxpack; + if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING) { + packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION); + packet_put_int(c->remote_id); + packet_put_int(c->self); + packet_put_int(c->local_window); + packet_put_int(c->local_maxpacket); + packet_send(); + } + } else { + debug("failure %s", ctype); + packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE); + packet_put_int(rchan); + packet_put_int(SSH2_OPEN_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED); + if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_OPENFAILURE)) { + packet_put_cstring("open failed"); + packet_put_cstring(""); + } + packet_send(); + } + xfree(ctype); +} +static void +client_input_channel_req(int type, int plen, void *ctxt) +{ + Channel *c = NULL; + int id, reply, success = 0; + char *rtype; + + id = packet_get_int(); + rtype = packet_get_string(NULL); + reply = packet_get_char(); + + debug("client_input_channel_req: channel %d rtype %s reply %d", + id, rtype, reply); + + if (session_ident == -1) { + error("client_input_channel_req: no channel %d", session_ident); + } else if (id != session_ident) { + error("client_input_channel_req: channel %d: wrong channel: %d", + session_ident, id); + } + c = channel_lookup(id); + if (c == NULL) { + error("client_input_channel_req: channel %d: unknown channel", id); + } else if (strcmp(rtype, "exit-status") == 0) { + success = 1; + exit_status = packet_get_int(); + packet_done(); + } + if (reply) { + packet_start(success ? + SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS : SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE); + packet_put_int(c->remote_id); + packet_send(); + } + xfree(rtype); +} + +static void +client_init_dispatch_20(void) +{ + dispatch_init(&dispatch_protocol_error); + dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE, &channel_input_oclose); + dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA, &channel_input_data); + dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF, &channel_input_ieof); + dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA, &channel_input_extended_data); + dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN, &client_input_channel_open); + dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION, &channel_input_open_confirmation); + dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE, &channel_input_open_failure); + dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST, &client_input_channel_req); + dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST, &channel_input_window_adjust); + + /* rekeying */ + dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, &kex_input_kexinit); +} +static void +client_init_dispatch_13(void) +{ + dispatch_init(NULL); + dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE, &channel_input_close); + dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION, &channel_input_close_confirmation); + dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA, &channel_input_data); + dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION, &channel_input_open_confirmation); + dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE, &channel_input_open_failure); + dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_PORT_OPEN, &channel_input_port_open); + dispatch_set(SSH_SMSG_EXITSTATUS, &client_input_exit_status); + dispatch_set(SSH_SMSG_STDERR_DATA, &client_input_stderr_data); + dispatch_set(SSH_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA, &client_input_stdout_data); + + dispatch_set(SSH_SMSG_AGENT_OPEN, options.forward_agent ? + &auth_input_open_request : &deny_input_open); + dispatch_set(SSH_SMSG_X11_OPEN, options.forward_x11 ? + &x11_input_open : &deny_input_open); +} +static void +client_init_dispatch_15(void) +{ + client_init_dispatch_13(); + dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE, &channel_input_ieof); + dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION, & channel_input_oclose); +} +static void +client_init_dispatch(void) +{ + if (compat20) + client_init_dispatch_20(); + else if (compat13) + client_init_dispatch_13(); + else + client_init_dispatch_15(); +} diff --git a/openssh/clientloop.h b/openssh/clientloop.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1bc9a95 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/clientloop.h @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.h,v 1.6 2001/06/26 17:27:23 markus Exp $ */ + +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* Client side main loop for the interactive session. */ +int client_loop(int, int, int); diff --git a/openssh/compat.c b/openssh/compat.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1d3e970 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/compat.c @@ -0,0 +1,208 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" +RCSID("$OpenBSD: compat.c,v 1.53 2001/09/20 13:50:40 markus Exp $"); + +#ifdef HAVE_LIBPCRE +# include +#else /* Use native regex libraries */ +# ifdef HAVE_REGEX_H +# include +# else +# include "openbsd-compat/fake-regex.h" +# endif +#endif /* HAVE_LIBPCRE */ + +#include "packet.h" +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "compat.h" +#include "log.h" + +int compat13 = 0; +int compat20 = 0; +int datafellows = 0; + +void +enable_compat20(void) +{ + verbose("Enabling compatibility mode for protocol 2.0"); + compat20 = 1; +} +void +enable_compat13(void) +{ + verbose("Enabling compatibility mode for protocol 1.3"); + compat13 = 1; +} +/* datafellows bug compatibility */ +void +compat_datafellows(const char *version) +{ + int i, ret; + char ebuf[1024]; + regex_t reg; + static struct { + char *pat; + int bugs; + } check[] = { + { "^OpenSSH[-_]2\\.[012]", + SSH_OLD_SESSIONID|SSH_BUG_BANNER| + SSH_OLD_DHGEX|SSH_BUG_NOREKEY }, + { "^OpenSSH_2\\.3\\.0", SSH_BUG_BANNER|SSH_BUG_BIGENDIANAES| + SSH_OLD_DHGEX|SSH_BUG_NOREKEY}, + { "^OpenSSH_2\\.3\\.", SSH_BUG_BIGENDIANAES|SSH_OLD_DHGEX| + SSH_BUG_NOREKEY}, + { "^OpenSSH_2\\.5\\.[01]p1", + SSH_BUG_BIGENDIANAES|SSH_OLD_DHGEX| + SSH_BUG_NOREKEY }, + { "^OpenSSH_2\\.5\\.[012]", + SSH_OLD_DHGEX|SSH_BUG_NOREKEY }, + { "^OpenSSH_2\\.5\\.3", + SSH_BUG_NOREKEY }, + { "^OpenSSH", 0 }, + { "MindTerm", 0 }, + { "^2\\.1\\.0", SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB|SSH_BUG_HMAC| + SSH_OLD_SESSIONID|SSH_BUG_DEBUG| + SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5|SSH_BUG_HBSERVICE }, + { "^2\\.1 ", SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB|SSH_BUG_HMAC| + SSH_OLD_SESSIONID|SSH_BUG_DEBUG| + SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5|SSH_BUG_HBSERVICE }, + { "^2\\.0\\.1[3-9]", SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB|SSH_BUG_HMAC| + SSH_OLD_SESSIONID|SSH_BUG_DEBUG| + SSH_BUG_PKSERVICE|SSH_BUG_X11FWD| + SSH_BUG_PKOK|SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5| + SSH_BUG_HBSERVICE|SSH_BUG_OPENFAILURE| + SSH_BUG_DUMMYCHAN }, + { "^2\\.0\\.1[1-2]", SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB|SSH_BUG_HMAC| + SSH_OLD_SESSIONID|SSH_BUG_DEBUG| + SSH_BUG_PKSERVICE|SSH_BUG_X11FWD| + SSH_BUG_PKAUTH|SSH_BUG_PKOK| + SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5|SSH_BUG_OPENFAILURE| + SSH_BUG_DUMMYCHAN }, + { "^2\\.0\\.", SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB|SSH_BUG_HMAC| + SSH_OLD_SESSIONID|SSH_BUG_DEBUG| + SSH_BUG_PKSERVICE|SSH_BUG_X11FWD| + SSH_BUG_PKAUTH|SSH_BUG_PKOK| + SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5|SSH_BUG_OPENFAILURE| + SSH_BUG_DERIVEKEY|SSH_BUG_DUMMYCHAN }, + { "^2\\.[23]\\.0", SSH_BUG_HMAC|SSH_BUG_DEBUG| + SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5 }, + { "^2\\.3\\.", SSH_BUG_DEBUG|SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5 }, + { "^2\\.[2-9]\\.", SSH_BUG_DEBUG }, + { "^3\\.0\\.", SSH_BUG_DEBUG }, + { "^2\\.4$", SSH_OLD_SESSIONID }, /* Van Dyke */ + { "^3\\.0 SecureCRT", SSH_OLD_SESSIONID }, + { "^1\\.7 SecureFX", SSH_OLD_SESSIONID }, + { "^1\\.2\\.1[89]", SSH_BUG_IGNOREMSG }, + { "^1\\.2\\.2[012]", SSH_BUG_IGNOREMSG }, + { "^1\\.3\\.2", SSH_BUG_IGNOREMSG }, /* f-secure */ + { "^SSH Compatible Server", /* Netscreen */ + SSH_BUG_PASSWORDPAD }, + { "^OSU_0", SSH_BUG_PASSWORDPAD }, + { "^OSU_1\\.[0-4]", SSH_BUG_PASSWORDPAD }, + { "^OSU_1\\.5alpha[1-3]", + SSH_BUG_PASSWORDPAD }, + { "^SSH_Version_Mapper", + SSH_BUG_SCANNER }, + { NULL, 0 } + }; + /* process table, return first match */ + for (i = 0; check[i].pat; i++) { + ret = regcomp(®, check[i].pat, REG_EXTENDED|REG_NOSUB); + if (ret != 0) { + regerror(ret, ®, ebuf, sizeof(ebuf)); + ebuf[sizeof(ebuf)-1] = '\0'; + error("regerror: %s", ebuf); + continue; + } + ret = regexec(®, version, 0, NULL, 0); + regfree(®); + if (ret == 0) { + debug("match: %s pat %s", version, check[i].pat); + datafellows = check[i].bugs; + return; + } + } + debug("no match: %s", version); +} + +#define SEP "," +int +proto_spec(const char *spec) +{ + char *s, *p, *q; + int ret = SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN; + + if (spec == NULL) + return ret; + q = s = xstrdup(spec); + for ((p = strsep(&q, SEP)); p && *p != '\0'; (p = strsep(&q, SEP))) { + switch(atoi(p)) { + case 1: + if (ret == SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN) + ret |= SSH_PROTO_1_PREFERRED; + ret |= SSH_PROTO_1; + break; + case 2: + ret |= SSH_PROTO_2; + break; + default: + log("ignoring bad proto spec: '%s'.", p); + break; + } + } + xfree(s); + return ret; +} + +char * +compat_cipher_proposal(char *cipher_prop) +{ + char *orig_prop, *fix_ciphers; + char *cp, *tmp; + size_t len; + + if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_BIGENDIANAES)) + return(cipher_prop); + + len = strlen(cipher_prop) + 1; + fix_ciphers = xmalloc(len); + *fix_ciphers = '\0'; + tmp = orig_prop = xstrdup(cipher_prop); + while((cp = strsep(&tmp, ",")) != NULL) { + if (strncmp(cp, "aes", 3) && strncmp(cp, "rijndael", 8)) { + if (*fix_ciphers) + strlcat(fix_ciphers, ",", len); + strlcat(fix_ciphers, cp, len); + } + } + xfree(orig_prop); + debug2("Original cipher proposal: %s", cipher_prop); + debug2("Compat cipher proposal: %s", fix_ciphers); + if (!*fix_ciphers) + fatal("No available ciphers found."); + + return(fix_ciphers); +} diff --git a/openssh/compat.h b/openssh/compat.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b6609ef --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/compat.h @@ -0,0 +1,64 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ +/* RCSID("$OpenBSD: compat.h,v 1.29 2001/09/20 13:50:40 markus Exp $"); */ + +#ifndef COMPAT_H +#define COMPAT_H + +#define SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN 0x00 +#define SSH_PROTO_1 0x01 +#define SSH_PROTO_1_PREFERRED 0x02 +#define SSH_PROTO_2 0x04 + +#define SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB 0x00000001 +#define SSH_BUG_PKSERVICE 0x00000002 +#define SSH_BUG_HMAC 0x00000004 +#define SSH_BUG_X11FWD 0x00000008 +#define SSH_OLD_SESSIONID 0x00000010 +#define SSH_BUG_PKAUTH 0x00000020 +#define SSH_BUG_DEBUG 0x00000040 +#define SSH_BUG_BANNER 0x00000080 +#define SSH_BUG_IGNOREMSG 0x00000100 +#define SSH_BUG_PKOK 0x00000200 +#define SSH_BUG_PASSWORDPAD 0x00000400 +#define SSH_BUG_SCANNER 0x00000800 +#define SSH_BUG_BIGENDIANAES 0x00001000 +#define SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5 0x00002000 +#define SSH_OLD_DHGEX 0x00004000 +#define SSH_BUG_NOREKEY 0x00008000 +#define SSH_BUG_HBSERVICE 0x00010000 +#define SSH_BUG_OPENFAILURE 0x00020000 +#define SSH_BUG_DERIVEKEY 0x00040000 +#define SSH_BUG_DUMMYCHAN 0x00100000 + +void enable_compat13(void); +void enable_compat20(void); +void compat_datafellows(const char *); +int proto_spec(const char *); +char *compat_cipher_proposal(char *); + +extern int compat13; +extern int compat20; +extern int datafellows; +#endif diff --git a/openssh/compress.c b/openssh/compress.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a779af6 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/compress.c @@ -0,0 +1,156 @@ +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * Interface to packet compression for ssh. + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + */ + +#include "includes.h" +RCSID("$OpenBSD: compress.c,v 1.15 2001/09/27 11:58:16 markus Exp $"); + +#include "log.h" +#include "buffer.h" +#include "zlib.h" +#include "compress.h" + +static z_stream incoming_stream; +static z_stream outgoing_stream; +static int compress_init_send_called = 0; +static int compress_init_recv_called = 0; + +/* + * Initializes compression; level is compression level from 1 to 9 + * (as in gzip). + */ + +void +buffer_compress_init_send(int level) +{ + if (compress_init_send_called == 1) + deflateEnd(&outgoing_stream); + compress_init_send_called = 1; + debug("Enabling compression at level %d.", level); + if (level < 1 || level > 9) + fatal("Bad compression level %d.", level); + deflateInit(&outgoing_stream, level); +} +void +buffer_compress_init_recv(void) +{ + if (compress_init_recv_called == 1) + inflateEnd(&incoming_stream); + compress_init_recv_called = 1; + inflateInit(&incoming_stream); +} + +/* Frees any data structures allocated for compression. */ + +void +buffer_compress_uninit(void) +{ + debug("compress outgoing: raw data %lu, compressed %lu, factor %.2f", + outgoing_stream.total_in, outgoing_stream.total_out, + outgoing_stream.total_in == 0 ? 0.0 : + (double) outgoing_stream.total_out / outgoing_stream.total_in); + debug("compress incoming: raw data %lu, compressed %lu, factor %.2f", + incoming_stream.total_out, incoming_stream.total_in, + incoming_stream.total_out == 0 ? 0.0 : + (double) incoming_stream.total_in / incoming_stream.total_out); + if (compress_init_recv_called == 1) + inflateEnd(&incoming_stream); + if (compress_init_send_called == 1) + deflateEnd(&outgoing_stream); +} + +/* + * Compresses the contents of input_buffer into output_buffer. All packets + * compressed using this function will form a single compressed data stream; + * however, data will be flushed at the end of every call so that each + * output_buffer can be decompressed independently (but in the appropriate + * order since they together form a single compression stream) by the + * receiver. This appends the compressed data to the output buffer. + */ + +void +buffer_compress(Buffer * input_buffer, Buffer * output_buffer) +{ + char buf[4096]; + int status; + + /* This case is not handled below. */ + if (buffer_len(input_buffer) == 0) + return; + + /* Input is the contents of the input buffer. */ + outgoing_stream.next_in = (u_char *) buffer_ptr(input_buffer); + outgoing_stream.avail_in = buffer_len(input_buffer); + + /* Loop compressing until deflate() returns with avail_out != 0. */ + do { + /* Set up fixed-size output buffer. */ + outgoing_stream.next_out = (u_char *)buf; + outgoing_stream.avail_out = sizeof(buf); + + /* Compress as much data into the buffer as possible. */ + status = deflate(&outgoing_stream, Z_PARTIAL_FLUSH); + switch (status) { + case Z_OK: + /* Append compressed data to output_buffer. */ + buffer_append(output_buffer, buf, + sizeof(buf) - outgoing_stream.avail_out); + break; + default: + fatal("buffer_compress: deflate returned %d", status); + /* NOTREACHED */ + } + } while (outgoing_stream.avail_out == 0); +} + +/* + * Uncompresses the contents of input_buffer into output_buffer. All packets + * uncompressed using this function will form a single compressed data + * stream; however, data will be flushed at the end of every call so that + * each output_buffer. This must be called for the same size units that the + * buffer_compress was called, and in the same order that buffers compressed + * with that. This appends the uncompressed data to the output buffer. + */ + +void +buffer_uncompress(Buffer * input_buffer, Buffer * output_buffer) +{ + char buf[4096]; + int status; + + incoming_stream.next_in = (u_char *) buffer_ptr(input_buffer); + incoming_stream.avail_in = buffer_len(input_buffer); + + for (;;) { + /* Set up fixed-size output buffer. */ + incoming_stream.next_out = (u_char *) buf; + incoming_stream.avail_out = sizeof(buf); + + status = inflate(&incoming_stream, Z_PARTIAL_FLUSH); + switch (status) { + case Z_OK: + buffer_append(output_buffer, buf, + sizeof(buf) - incoming_stream.avail_out); + break; + case Z_BUF_ERROR: + /* + * Comments in zlib.h say that we should keep calling + * inflate() until we get an error. This appears to + * be the error that we get. + */ + return; + default: + fatal("buffer_uncompress: inflate returned %d", status); + /* NOTREACHED */ + } + } +} diff --git a/openssh/compress.h b/openssh/compress.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2721d45 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/compress.h @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * Interface to packet compression for ssh. + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + */ + +/* RCSID("$OpenBSD: compress.h,v 1.10 2001/06/26 17:27:23 markus Exp $"); */ + +#ifndef COMPRESS_H +#define COMPRESS_H + +void buffer_compress_init_send(int); +void buffer_compress_init_recv(void); +void buffer_compress_uninit(void); +void buffer_compress(Buffer *, Buffer *); +void buffer_uncompress(Buffer *, Buffer *); + +#endif /* COMPRESS_H */ diff --git a/openssh/config.guess b/openssh/config.guess new file mode 100755 index 0000000..ba66165 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/config.guess @@ -0,0 +1,1371 @@ +#! /bin/sh +# Attempt to guess a canonical system name. +# Copyright (C) 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001 +# Free Software Foundation, Inc. + +timestamp='2001-04-20' + +# This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it +# under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by +# the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or +# (at your option) any later version. +# +# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but +# WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of +# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU +# General Public License for more details. +# +# You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License +# along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software +# Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA. +# +# As a special exception to the GNU General Public License, if you +# distribute this file as part of a program that contains a +# configuration script generated by Autoconf, you may include it under +# the same distribution terms that you use for the rest of that program. + +# Written by Per Bothner . +# Please send patches to . +# +# This script attempts to guess a canonical system name similar to +# config.sub. If it succeeds, it prints the system name on stdout, and +# exits with 0. Otherwise, it exits with 1. +# +# The plan is that this can be called by configure scripts if you +# don't specify an explicit build system type. + +me=`echo "$0" | sed -e 's,.*/,,'` + +usage="\ +Usage: $0 [OPTION] + +Output the configuration name of the system \`$me' is run on. + +Operation modes: + -h, --help print this help, then exit + -t, --time-stamp print date of last modification, then exit + -v, --version print version number, then exit + +Report bugs and patches to ." + +version="\ +GNU config.guess ($timestamp) + +Originally written by Per Bothner. +Copyright (C) 1992, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 2000 +Free Software Foundation, Inc. + +This is free software; see the source for copying conditions. There is NO +warranty; not even for MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE." + +help=" +Try \`$me --help' for more information." + +# Parse command line +while test $# -gt 0 ; do + case $1 in + --time-stamp | --time* | -t ) + echo "$timestamp" ; exit 0 ;; + --version | -v ) + echo "$version" ; exit 0 ;; + --help | --h* | -h ) + echo "$usage"; exit 0 ;; + -- ) # Stop option processing + shift; break ;; + - ) # Use stdin as input. + break ;; + -* ) + echo "$me: invalid option $1$help" >&2 + exit 1 ;; + * ) + break ;; + esac +done + +if test $# != 0; then + echo "$me: too many arguments$help" >&2 + exit 1 +fi + + +dummy=dummy-$$ +trap 'rm -f $dummy.c $dummy.o $dummy.rel $dummy; exit 1' 1 2 15 + +# CC_FOR_BUILD -- compiler used by this script. +# Historically, `CC_FOR_BUILD' used to be named `HOST_CC'. We still +# use `HOST_CC' if defined, but it is deprecated. + +case $CC_FOR_BUILD,$HOST_CC,$CC in + ,,) echo "int dummy(){}" > $dummy.c + for c in cc gcc c89 ; do + ($c $dummy.c -c -o $dummy.o) >/dev/null 2>&1 + if test $? = 0 ; then + CC_FOR_BUILD="$c"; break + fi + done + rm -f $dummy.c $dummy.o $dummy.rel + if test x"$CC_FOR_BUILD" = x ; then + CC_FOR_BUILD=no_compiler_found + fi + ;; + ,,*) CC_FOR_BUILD=$CC ;; + ,*,*) CC_FOR_BUILD=$HOST_CC ;; +esac + +# This is needed to find uname on a Pyramid OSx when run in the BSD universe. +# (ghazi@noc.rutgers.edu 8/24/94.) +if (test -f /.attbin/uname) >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then + PATH=$PATH:/.attbin ; export PATH +fi + +UNAME_MACHINE=`(uname -m) 2>/dev/null` || UNAME_MACHINE=unknown +UNAME_RELEASE=`(uname -r) 2>/dev/null` || UNAME_RELEASE=unknown +UNAME_SYSTEM=`(uname -s) 2>/dev/null` || UNAME_SYSTEM=unknown +UNAME_VERSION=`(uname -v) 2>/dev/null` || UNAME_VERSION=unknown + +# Note: order is significant - the case branches are not exclusive. + +case "${UNAME_MACHINE}:${UNAME_SYSTEM}:${UNAME_RELEASE}:${UNAME_VERSION}" in + *:NetBSD:*:*) + # Netbsd (nbsd) targets should (where applicable) match one or + # more of the tupples: *-*-netbsdelf*, *-*-netbsdaout*, + # *-*-netbsdecoff* and *-*-netbsd*. For targets that recently + # switched to ELF, *-*-netbsd* would select the old + # object file format. This provides both forward + # compatibility and a consistent mechanism for selecting the + # object file format. + # Determine the machine/vendor (is the vendor relevant). + case "${UNAME_MACHINE}" in + amiga) machine=m68k-unknown ;; + arm32) machine=arm-unknown ;; + atari*) machine=m68k-atari ;; + sun3*) machine=m68k-sun ;; + mac68k) machine=m68k-apple ;; + macppc) machine=powerpc-apple ;; + hp3[0-9][05]) machine=m68k-hp ;; + ibmrt|romp-ibm) machine=romp-ibm ;; + *) machine=${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown ;; + esac + # The Operating System including object format, if it has switched + # to ELF recently, or will in the future. + case "${UNAME_MACHINE}" in + i386|sparc|amiga|arm*|hp300|mvme68k|vax|atari|luna68k|mac68k|news68k|next68k|pc532|sun3*|x68k) + if echo __ELF__ | $CC_FOR_BUILD -E - 2>/dev/null \ + | grep __ELF__ >/dev/null + then + # Once all utilities can be ECOFF (netbsdecoff) or a.out (netbsdaout). + # Return netbsd for either. FIX? + os=netbsd + else + os=netbsdelf + fi + ;; + *) + os=netbsd + ;; + esac + # The OS release + release=`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[-_].*/\./'` + # Since CPU_TYPE-MANUFACTURER-KERNEL-OPERATING_SYSTEM: + # contains redundant information, the shorter form: + # CPU_TYPE-MANUFACTURER-OPERATING_SYSTEM is used. + echo "${machine}-${os}${release}" + exit 0 ;; + alpha:OSF1:*:*) + if test $UNAME_RELEASE = "V4.0"; then + UNAME_RELEASE=`/usr/sbin/sizer -v | awk '{print $3}'` + fi + # A Vn.n version is a released version. + # A Tn.n version is a released field test version. + # A Xn.n version is an unreleased experimental baselevel. + # 1.2 uses "1.2" for uname -r. + cat <$dummy.s + .data +\$Lformat: + .byte 37,100,45,37,120,10,0 # "%d-%x\n" + + .text + .globl main + .align 4 + .ent main +main: + .frame \$30,16,\$26,0 + ldgp \$29,0(\$27) + .prologue 1 + .long 0x47e03d80 # implver \$0 + lda \$2,-1 + .long 0x47e20c21 # amask \$2,\$1 + lda \$16,\$Lformat + mov \$0,\$17 + not \$1,\$18 + jsr \$26,printf + ldgp \$29,0(\$26) + mov 0,\$16 + jsr \$26,exit + .end main +EOF + $CC_FOR_BUILD $dummy.s -o $dummy 2>/dev/null + if test "$?" = 0 ; then + case `./$dummy` in + 0-0) + UNAME_MACHINE="alpha" + ;; + 1-0) + UNAME_MACHINE="alphaev5" + ;; + 1-1) + UNAME_MACHINE="alphaev56" + ;; + 1-101) + UNAME_MACHINE="alphapca56" + ;; + 2-303) + UNAME_MACHINE="alphaev6" + ;; + 2-307) + UNAME_MACHINE="alphaev67" + ;; + esac + fi + rm -f $dummy.s $dummy + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-dec-osf`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE} | sed -e 's/^[VTX]//' | tr 'ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ' 'abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz'` + exit 0 ;; + Alpha\ *:Windows_NT*:*) + # How do we know it's Interix rather than the generic POSIX subsystem? + # Should we change UNAME_MACHINE based on the output of uname instead + # of the specific Alpha model? + echo alpha-pc-interix + exit 0 ;; + 21064:Windows_NT:50:3) + echo alpha-dec-winnt3.5 + exit 0 ;; + Amiga*:UNIX_System_V:4.0:*) + echo m68k-unknown-sysv4 + exit 0;; + amiga:OpenBSD:*:*) + echo m68k-unknown-openbsd${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + *:[Aa]miga[Oo][Ss]:*:*) + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-amigaos + exit 0 ;; + arc64:OpenBSD:*:*) + echo mips64el-unknown-openbsd${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + arc:OpenBSD:*:*) + echo mipsel-unknown-openbsd${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + hkmips:OpenBSD:*:*) + echo mips-unknown-openbsd${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + pmax:OpenBSD:*:*) + echo mipsel-unknown-openbsd${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + sgi:OpenBSD:*:*) + echo mips-unknown-openbsd${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + wgrisc:OpenBSD:*:*) + echo mipsel-unknown-openbsd${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + *:OS/390:*:*) + echo i370-ibm-openedition + exit 0 ;; + arm:RISC*:1.[012]*:*|arm:riscix:1.[012]*:*) + echo arm-acorn-riscix${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0;; + SR2?01:HI-UX/MPP:*:* | SR8000:HI-UX/MPP:*:*) + echo hppa1.1-hitachi-hiuxmpp + exit 0;; + Pyramid*:OSx*:*:* | MIS*:OSx*:*:* | MIS*:SMP_DC-OSx*:*:*) + # akee@wpdis03.wpafb.af.mil (Earle F. Ake) contributed MIS and NILE. + if test "`(/bin/universe) 2>/dev/null`" = att ; then + echo pyramid-pyramid-sysv3 + else + echo pyramid-pyramid-bsd + fi + exit 0 ;; + NILE*:*:*:dcosx) + echo pyramid-pyramid-svr4 + exit 0 ;; + sun4H:SunOS:5.*:*) + echo sparc-hal-solaris2`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[^.]*//'` + exit 0 ;; + sun4*:SunOS:5.*:* | tadpole*:SunOS:5.*:*) + echo sparc-sun-solaris2`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[^.]*//'` + exit 0 ;; + i86pc:SunOS:5.*:*) + echo i386-pc-solaris2`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[^.]*//'` + exit 0 ;; + sun4*:SunOS:6*:*) + # According to config.sub, this is the proper way to canonicalize + # SunOS6. Hard to guess exactly what SunOS6 will be like, but + # it's likely to be more like Solaris than SunOS4. + echo sparc-sun-solaris3`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[^.]*//'` + exit 0 ;; + sun4*:SunOS:*:*) + case "`/usr/bin/arch -k`" in + Series*|S4*) + UNAME_RELEASE=`uname -v` + ;; + esac + # Japanese Language versions have a version number like `4.1.3-JL'. + echo sparc-sun-sunos`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/-/_/'` + exit 0 ;; + sun3*:SunOS:*:*) + echo m68k-sun-sunos${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + sun*:*:4.2BSD:*) + UNAME_RELEASE=`(head -1 /etc/motd | awk '{print substr($5,1,3)}') 2>/dev/null` + test "x${UNAME_RELEASE}" = "x" && UNAME_RELEASE=3 + case "`/bin/arch`" in + sun3) + echo m68k-sun-sunos${UNAME_RELEASE} + ;; + sun4) + echo sparc-sun-sunos${UNAME_RELEASE} + ;; + esac + exit 0 ;; + aushp:SunOS:*:*) + echo sparc-auspex-sunos${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + atari*:OpenBSD:*:*) + echo m68k-unknown-openbsd${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + # The situation for MiNT is a little confusing. The machine name + # can be virtually everything (everything which is not + # "atarist" or "atariste" at least should have a processor + # > m68000). The system name ranges from "MiNT" over "FreeMiNT" + # to the lowercase version "mint" (or "freemint"). Finally + # the system name "TOS" denotes a system which is actually not + # MiNT. But MiNT is downward compatible to TOS, so this should + # be no problem. + atarist[e]:*MiNT:*:* | atarist[e]:*mint:*:* | atarist[e]:*TOS:*:*) + echo m68k-atari-mint${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + atari*:*MiNT:*:* | atari*:*mint:*:* | atarist[e]:*TOS:*:*) + echo m68k-atari-mint${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + *falcon*:*MiNT:*:* | *falcon*:*mint:*:* | *falcon*:*TOS:*:*) + echo m68k-atari-mint${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + milan*:*MiNT:*:* | milan*:*mint:*:* | *milan*:*TOS:*:*) + echo m68k-milan-mint${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + hades*:*MiNT:*:* | hades*:*mint:*:* | *hades*:*TOS:*:*) + echo m68k-hades-mint${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + *:*MiNT:*:* | *:*mint:*:* | *:*TOS:*:*) + echo m68k-unknown-mint${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + sun3*:OpenBSD:*:*) + echo m68k-unknown-openbsd${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + mac68k:OpenBSD:*:*) + echo m68k-unknown-openbsd${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + mvme68k:OpenBSD:*:*) + echo m68k-unknown-openbsd${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + mvme88k:OpenBSD:*:*) + echo m88k-unknown-openbsd${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + powerpc:machten:*:*) + echo powerpc-apple-machten${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + RISC*:Mach:*:*) + echo mips-dec-mach_bsd4.3 + exit 0 ;; + RISC*:ULTRIX:*:*) + echo mips-dec-ultrix${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + VAX*:ULTRIX*:*:*) + echo vax-dec-ultrix${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + 2020:CLIX:*:* | 2430:CLIX:*:*) + echo clipper-intergraph-clix${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + mips:*:*:UMIPS | mips:*:*:RISCos) + sed 's/^ //' << EOF >$dummy.c +#ifdef __cplusplus +#include /* for printf() prototype */ + int main (int argc, char *argv[]) { +#else + int main (argc, argv) int argc; char *argv[]; { +#endif + #if defined (host_mips) && defined (MIPSEB) + #if defined (SYSTYPE_SYSV) + printf ("mips-mips-riscos%ssysv\n", argv[1]); exit (0); + #endif + #if defined (SYSTYPE_SVR4) + printf ("mips-mips-riscos%ssvr4\n", argv[1]); exit (0); + #endif + #if defined (SYSTYPE_BSD43) || defined(SYSTYPE_BSD) + printf ("mips-mips-riscos%sbsd\n", argv[1]); exit (0); + #endif + #endif + exit (-1); + } +EOF + $CC_FOR_BUILD $dummy.c -o $dummy \ + && ./$dummy `echo "${UNAME_RELEASE}" | sed -n 's/\([0-9]*\).*/\1/p'` \ + && rm -f $dummy.c $dummy && exit 0 + rm -f $dummy.c $dummy + echo mips-mips-riscos${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + Motorola:PowerMAX_OS:*:*) + echo powerpc-motorola-powermax + exit 0 ;; + Night_Hawk:Power_UNIX:*:*) + echo powerpc-harris-powerunix + exit 0 ;; + m88k:CX/UX:7*:*) + echo m88k-harris-cxux7 + exit 0 ;; + m88k:*:4*:R4*) + echo m88k-motorola-sysv4 + exit 0 ;; + m88k:*:3*:R3*) + echo m88k-motorola-sysv3 + exit 0 ;; + AViiON:dgux:*:*) + # DG/UX returns AViiON for all architectures + UNAME_PROCESSOR=`/usr/bin/uname -p` + if [ $UNAME_PROCESSOR = mc88100 ] || [ $UNAME_PROCESSOR = mc88110 ] + then + if [ ${TARGET_BINARY_INTERFACE}x = m88kdguxelfx ] || \ + [ ${TARGET_BINARY_INTERFACE}x = x ] + then + echo m88k-dg-dgux${UNAME_RELEASE} + else + echo m88k-dg-dguxbcs${UNAME_RELEASE} + fi + else + echo i586-dg-dgux${UNAME_RELEASE} + fi + exit 0 ;; + M88*:DolphinOS:*:*) # DolphinOS (SVR3) + echo m88k-dolphin-sysv3 + exit 0 ;; + M88*:*:R3*:*) + # Delta 88k system running SVR3 + echo m88k-motorola-sysv3 + exit 0 ;; + XD88*:*:*:*) # Tektronix XD88 system running UTekV (SVR3) + echo m88k-tektronix-sysv3 + exit 0 ;; + Tek43[0-9][0-9]:UTek:*:*) # Tektronix 4300 system running UTek (BSD) + echo m68k-tektronix-bsd + exit 0 ;; + *:IRIX*:*:*) + echo mips-sgi-irix`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/-/_/g'` + exit 0 ;; + ????????:AIX?:[12].1:2) # AIX 2.2.1 or AIX 2.1.1 is RT/PC AIX. + echo romp-ibm-aix # uname -m gives an 8 hex-code CPU id + exit 0 ;; # Note that: echo "'`uname -s`'" gives 'AIX ' + i*86:AIX:*:*) + echo i386-ibm-aix + exit 0 ;; + ia64:AIX:*:*) + if [ -x /usr/bin/oslevel ] ; then + IBM_REV=`/usr/bin/oslevel` + else + IBM_REV=${UNAME_VERSION}.${UNAME_RELEASE} + fi + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-ibm-aix${IBM_REV} + exit 0 ;; + *:AIX:2:3) + if grep bos325 /usr/include/stdio.h >/dev/null 2>&1; then + sed 's/^ //' << EOF >$dummy.c + #include + + main() + { + if (!__power_pc()) + exit(1); + puts("powerpc-ibm-aix3.2.5"); + exit(0); + } +EOF + $CC_FOR_BUILD $dummy.c -o $dummy && ./$dummy && rm -f $dummy.c $dummy && exit 0 + rm -f $dummy.c $dummy + echo rs6000-ibm-aix3.2.5 + elif grep bos324 /usr/include/stdio.h >/dev/null 2>&1; then + echo rs6000-ibm-aix3.2.4 + else + echo rs6000-ibm-aix3.2 + fi + exit 0 ;; + *:AIX:*:[45]) + IBM_CPU_ID=`/usr/sbin/lsdev -C -c processor -S available | head -1 | awk '{ print $1 }'` + if /usr/sbin/lsattr -El ${IBM_CPU_ID} | grep ' POWER' >/dev/null 2>&1; then + IBM_ARCH=rs6000 + else + IBM_ARCH=powerpc + fi + if [ -x /usr/bin/oslevel ] ; then + IBM_REV=`/usr/bin/oslevel` + else + IBM_REV=${UNAME_VERSION}.${UNAME_RELEASE} + fi + echo ${IBM_ARCH}-ibm-aix${IBM_REV} + exit 0 ;; + *:AIX:*:*) + echo rs6000-ibm-aix + exit 0 ;; + ibmrt:4.4BSD:*|romp-ibm:BSD:*) + echo romp-ibm-bsd4.4 + exit 0 ;; + ibmrt:*BSD:*|romp-ibm:BSD:*) # covers RT/PC BSD and + echo romp-ibm-bsd${UNAME_RELEASE} # 4.3 with uname added to + exit 0 ;; # report: romp-ibm BSD 4.3 + *:BOSX:*:*) + echo rs6000-bull-bosx + exit 0 ;; + DPX/2?00:B.O.S.:*:*) + echo m68k-bull-sysv3 + exit 0 ;; + 9000/[34]??:4.3bsd:1.*:*) + echo m68k-hp-bsd + exit 0 ;; + hp300:4.4BSD:*:* | 9000/[34]??:4.3bsd:2.*:*) + echo m68k-hp-bsd4.4 + exit 0 ;; + 9000/[34678]??:HP-UX:*:*) + HPUX_REV=`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[^.]*.[0B]*//'` + case "${UNAME_MACHINE}" in + 9000/31? ) HP_ARCH=m68000 ;; + 9000/[34]?? ) HP_ARCH=m68k ;; + 9000/[678][0-9][0-9]) + case "${HPUX_REV}" in + 11.[0-9][0-9]) + if [ -x /usr/bin/getconf ]; then + sc_cpu_version=`/usr/bin/getconf SC_CPU_VERSION 2>/dev/null` + sc_kernel_bits=`/usr/bin/getconf SC_KERNEL_BITS 2>/dev/null` + case "${sc_cpu_version}" in + 523) HP_ARCH="hppa1.0" ;; # CPU_PA_RISC1_0 + 528) HP_ARCH="hppa1.1" ;; # CPU_PA_RISC1_1 + 532) # CPU_PA_RISC2_0 + case "${sc_kernel_bits}" in + 32) HP_ARCH="hppa2.0n" ;; + 64) HP_ARCH="hppa2.0w" ;; + esac ;; + esac + fi ;; + esac + if [ "${HP_ARCH}" = "" ]; then + sed 's/^ //' << EOF >$dummy.c + + #define _HPUX_SOURCE + #include + #include + + int main () + { + #if defined(_SC_KERNEL_BITS) + long bits = sysconf(_SC_KERNEL_BITS); + #endif + long cpu = sysconf (_SC_CPU_VERSION); + + switch (cpu) + { + case CPU_PA_RISC1_0: puts ("hppa1.0"); break; + case CPU_PA_RISC1_1: puts ("hppa1.1"); break; + case CPU_PA_RISC2_0: + #if defined(_SC_KERNEL_BITS) + switch (bits) + { + case 64: puts ("hppa2.0w"); break; + case 32: puts ("hppa2.0n"); break; + default: puts ("hppa2.0"); break; + } break; + #else /* !defined(_SC_KERNEL_BITS) */ + puts ("hppa2.0"); break; + #endif + default: puts ("hppa1.0"); break; + } + exit (0); + } +EOF + (CCOPTS= $CC_FOR_BUILD $dummy.c -o $dummy 2>/dev/null ) && HP_ARCH=`./$dummy` + if test -z "$HP_ARCH"; then HP_ARCH=hppa; fi + rm -f $dummy.c $dummy + fi ;; + esac + echo ${HP_ARCH}-hp-hpux${HPUX_REV} + exit 0 ;; + ia64:HP-UX:*:*) + HPUX_REV=`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[^.]*.[0B]*//'` + echo ia64-hp-hpux${HPUX_REV} + exit 0 ;; + 3050*:HI-UX:*:*) + sed 's/^ //' << EOF >$dummy.c + #include + int + main () + { + long cpu = sysconf (_SC_CPU_VERSION); + /* The order matters, because CPU_IS_HP_MC68K erroneously returns + true for CPU_PA_RISC1_0. CPU_IS_PA_RISC returns correct + results, however. */ + if (CPU_IS_PA_RISC (cpu)) + { + switch (cpu) + { + case CPU_PA_RISC1_0: puts ("hppa1.0-hitachi-hiuxwe2"); break; + case CPU_PA_RISC1_1: puts ("hppa1.1-hitachi-hiuxwe2"); break; + case CPU_PA_RISC2_0: puts ("hppa2.0-hitachi-hiuxwe2"); break; + default: puts ("hppa-hitachi-hiuxwe2"); break; + } + } + else if (CPU_IS_HP_MC68K (cpu)) + puts ("m68k-hitachi-hiuxwe2"); + else puts ("unknown-hitachi-hiuxwe2"); + exit (0); + } +EOF + $CC_FOR_BUILD $dummy.c -o $dummy && ./$dummy && rm -f $dummy.c $dummy && exit 0 + rm -f $dummy.c $dummy + echo unknown-hitachi-hiuxwe2 + exit 0 ;; + 9000/7??:4.3bsd:*:* | 9000/8?[79]:4.3bsd:*:* ) + echo hppa1.1-hp-bsd + exit 0 ;; + 9000/8??:4.3bsd:*:*) + echo hppa1.0-hp-bsd + exit 0 ;; + *9??*:MPE/iX:*:*) + echo hppa1.0-hp-mpeix + exit 0 ;; + hp7??:OSF1:*:* | hp8?[79]:OSF1:*:* ) + echo hppa1.1-hp-osf + exit 0 ;; + hp8??:OSF1:*:*) + echo hppa1.0-hp-osf + exit 0 ;; + i*86:OSF1:*:*) + if [ -x /usr/sbin/sysversion ] ; then + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-osf1mk + else + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-osf1 + fi + exit 0 ;; + parisc*:Lites*:*:*) + echo hppa1.1-hp-lites + exit 0 ;; + hppa*:OpenBSD:*:*) + echo hppa-unknown-openbsd + exit 0 ;; + C1*:ConvexOS:*:* | convex:ConvexOS:C1*:*) + echo c1-convex-bsd + exit 0 ;; + C2*:ConvexOS:*:* | convex:ConvexOS:C2*:*) + if getsysinfo -f scalar_acc + then echo c32-convex-bsd + else echo c2-convex-bsd + fi + exit 0 ;; + C34*:ConvexOS:*:* | convex:ConvexOS:C34*:*) + echo c34-convex-bsd + exit 0 ;; + C38*:ConvexOS:*:* | convex:ConvexOS:C38*:*) + echo c38-convex-bsd + exit 0 ;; + C4*:ConvexOS:*:* | convex:ConvexOS:C4*:*) + echo c4-convex-bsd + exit 0 ;; + CRAY*X-MP:*:*:*) + echo xmp-cray-unicos + exit 0 ;; + CRAY*Y-MP:*:*:*) + echo ymp-cray-unicos${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + CRAY*[A-Z]90:*:*:*) + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-cray-unicos${UNAME_RELEASE} \ + | sed -e 's/CRAY.*\([A-Z]90\)/\1/' \ + -e y/ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ/abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz/ + exit 0 ;; + CRAY*TS:*:*:*) + echo t90-cray-unicos${UNAME_RELEASE} | sed -e 's/\.[^.]*$/.X/' + exit 0 ;; + CRAY*T3D:*:*:*) + echo alpha-cray-unicosmk${UNAME_RELEASE} | sed -e 's/\.[^.]*$/.X/' + exit 0 ;; + CRAY*T3E:*:*:*) + echo alphaev5-cray-unicosmk${UNAME_RELEASE} | sed -e 's/\.[^.]*$/.X/' + exit 0 ;; + CRAY*SV1:*:*:*) + echo sv1-cray-unicos${UNAME_RELEASE} | sed -e 's/\.[^.]*$/.X/' + exit 0 ;; + CRAY-2:*:*:*) + echo cray2-cray-unicos + exit 0 ;; + F30[01]:UNIX_System_V:*:* | F700:UNIX_System_V:*:*) + FUJITSU_PROC=`uname -m | tr 'ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ' 'abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz'` + FUJITSU_SYS=`uname -p | tr 'ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ' 'abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz' | sed -e 's/\///'` + FUJITSU_REL=`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE} | sed -e 's/ /_/'` + echo "${FUJITSU_PROC}-fujitsu-${FUJITSU_SYS}${FUJITSU_REL}" + exit 0 ;; + hp300:OpenBSD:*:*) + echo m68k-unknown-openbsd${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + i*86:BSD/386:*:* | i*86:BSD/OS:*:* | *:Ascend\ Embedded/OS:*:*) + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-bsdi${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + sparc*:BSD/OS:*:*) + echo sparc-unknown-bsdi${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + *:BSD/OS:*:*) + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-bsdi${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + *:FreeBSD:*:*) + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-freebsd`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[-(].*//'` + exit 0 ;; + *:OpenBSD:*:*) + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-openbsd`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[-_].*/\./'` + exit 0 ;; + i*:CYGWIN*:*) + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-cygwin + exit 0 ;; + i*:MINGW*:*) + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-mingw32 + exit 0 ;; + i*:PW*:*) + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-pw32 + exit 0 ;; + i*:Windows_NT*:* | Pentium*:Windows_NT*:*) + # How do we know it's Interix rather than the generic POSIX subsystem? + # It also conflicts with pre-2.0 versions of AT&T UWIN. Should we + # UNAME_MACHINE based on the output of uname instead of i386? + echo i386-pc-interix + exit 0 ;; + i*:UWIN*:*) + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-uwin + exit 0 ;; + p*:CYGWIN*:*) + echo powerpcle-unknown-cygwin + exit 0 ;; + prep*:SunOS:5.*:*) + echo powerpcle-unknown-solaris2`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[^.]*//'` + exit 0 ;; + *:GNU:*:*) + echo `echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}|sed -e 's,[-/].*$,,'`-unknown-gnu`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's,/.*$,,'` + exit 0 ;; + i*86:Minix:*:*) + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-minix + exit 0 ;; + arm*:Linux:*:*) + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-gnu + exit 0 ;; + ia64:Linux:*:*) + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux + exit 0 ;; + m68*:Linux:*:*) + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-gnu + exit 0 ;; + mips:Linux:*:*) + cat >$dummy.c < /* for printf() prototype */ +int main (int argc, char *argv[]) { +#else +int main (argc, argv) int argc; char *argv[]; { +#endif +#ifdef __MIPSEB__ + printf ("%s-unknown-linux-gnu\n", argv[1]); +#endif +#ifdef __MIPSEL__ + printf ("%sel-unknown-linux-gnu\n", argv[1]); +#endif + return 0; +} +EOF + $CC_FOR_BUILD $dummy.c -o $dummy 2>/dev/null && ./$dummy "${UNAME_MACHINE}" && rm -f $dummy.c $dummy && exit 0 + rm -f $dummy.c $dummy + ;; + ppc:Linux:*:*) + # Determine Lib Version + cat >$dummy.c < +#if defined(__GLIBC__) +extern char __libc_version[]; +extern char __libc_release[]; +#endif +main(argc, argv) + int argc; + char *argv[]; +{ +#if defined(__GLIBC__) + printf("%s %s\n", __libc_version, __libc_release); +#else + printf("unknown\n"); +#endif + return 0; +} +EOF + LIBC="" + $CC_FOR_BUILD $dummy.c -o $dummy 2>/dev/null + if test "$?" = 0 ; then + ./$dummy | grep 1\.99 > /dev/null + if test "$?" = 0 ; then LIBC="libc1" ; fi + fi + rm -f $dummy.c $dummy + echo powerpc-unknown-linux-gnu${LIBC} + exit 0 ;; + alpha:Linux:*:*) + cat <$dummy.s + .data + \$Lformat: + .byte 37,100,45,37,120,10,0 # "%d-%x\n" + .text + .globl main + .align 4 + .ent main + main: + .frame \$30,16,\$26,0 + ldgp \$29,0(\$27) + .prologue 1 + .long 0x47e03d80 # implver \$0 + lda \$2,-1 + .long 0x47e20c21 # amask \$2,\$1 + lda \$16,\$Lformat + mov \$0,\$17 + not \$1,\$18 + jsr \$26,printf + ldgp \$29,0(\$26) + mov 0,\$16 + jsr \$26,exit + .end main +EOF + LIBC="" + $CC_FOR_BUILD $dummy.s -o $dummy 2>/dev/null + if test "$?" = 0 ; then + case `./$dummy` in + 0-0) UNAME_MACHINE="alpha" ;; + 1-0) UNAME_MACHINE="alphaev5" ;; + 1-1) UNAME_MACHINE="alphaev56" ;; + 1-101) UNAME_MACHINE="alphapca56" ;; + 2-303) UNAME_MACHINE="alphaev6" ;; + 2-307) UNAME_MACHINE="alphaev67" ;; + esac + objdump --private-headers $dummy | \ + grep ld.so.1 > /dev/null + if test "$?" = 0 ; then + LIBC="libc1" + fi + fi + rm -f $dummy.s $dummy + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-gnu${LIBC} + exit 0 ;; + parisc:Linux:*:* | hppa:Linux:*:*) + # Look for CPU level + case `grep '^cpu[^a-z]*:' /proc/cpuinfo 2>/dev/null | cut -d' ' -f2` in + PA7*) echo hppa1.1-unknown-linux-gnu ;; + PA8*) echo hppa2.0-unknown-linux-gnu ;; + *) echo hppa-unknown-linux-gnu ;; + esac + exit 0 ;; + parisc64:Linux:*:* | hppa64:Linux:*:*) + echo hppa64-unknown-linux-gnu + exit 0 ;; + s390:Linux:*:* | s390x:Linux:*:*) + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-ibm-linux + exit 0 ;; + sh*:Linux:*:*) + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-gnu + exit 0 ;; + sparc:Linux:*:* | sparc64:Linux:*:*) + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-gnu + exit 0 ;; + x86_64:Linux:*:*) + echo x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu + exit 0 ;; + i*86:Linux:*:*) + # The BFD linker knows what the default object file format is, so + # first see if it will tell us. cd to the root directory to prevent + # problems with other programs or directories called `ld' in the path. + ld_supported_emulations=`cd /; ld --help 2>&1 \ + | sed -ne '/supported emulations:/!d + s/[ ][ ]*/ /g + s/.*supported emulations: *// + s/ .*// + p'` + case "$ld_supported_emulations" in + i*86linux) + echo "${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-linux-gnuaout" + exit 0 + ;; + elf_i*86) + TENTATIVE="${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-linux-gnu" + ;; + i*86coff) + echo "${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-linux-gnucoff" + exit 0 + ;; + esac + # Either a pre-BFD a.out linker (linux-gnuoldld) + # or one that does not give us useful --help. + # GCC wants to distinguish between linux-gnuoldld and linux-gnuaout. + # If ld does not provide *any* "supported emulations:" + # that means it is gnuoldld. + test -z "$ld_supported_emulations" && echo "${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-linux-gnuoldld" && exit 0 + case "${UNAME_MACHINE}" in + i*86) + VENDOR=pc; + ;; + *) + VENDOR=unknown; + ;; + esac + # Determine whether the default compiler is a.out or elf + cat >$dummy.c < +#ifdef __cplusplus +#include /* for printf() prototype */ + int main (int argc, char *argv[]) { +#else + int main (argc, argv) int argc; char *argv[]; { +#endif +#ifdef __ELF__ +# ifdef __GLIBC__ +# if __GLIBC__ >= 2 + printf ("%s-${VENDOR}-linux-gnu\n", argv[1]); +# else + printf ("%s-${VENDOR}-linux-gnulibc1\n", argv[1]); +# endif +# else + printf ("%s-${VENDOR}-linux-gnulibc1\n", argv[1]); +# endif +#else + printf ("%s-${VENDOR}-linux-gnuaout\n", argv[1]); +#endif + return 0; +} +EOF + $CC_FOR_BUILD $dummy.c -o $dummy 2>/dev/null && ./$dummy "${UNAME_MACHINE}" && rm -f $dummy.c $dummy && exit 0 + rm -f $dummy.c $dummy + test x"${TENTATIVE}" != x && echo "${TENTATIVE}" && exit 0 + ;; +# ptx 4.0 does uname -s correctly, with DYNIX/ptx in there. earlier versions +# are messed up and put the nodename in both sysname and nodename. + i*86:DYNIX/ptx:4*:*) + echo i386-sequent-sysv4 + exit 0 ;; + i*86:UNIX_SV:4.2MP:2.*) + # Unixware is an offshoot of SVR4, but it has its own version + # number series starting with 2... + # I am not positive that other SVR4 systems won't match this, + # I just have to hope. -- rms. + # Use sysv4.2uw... so that sysv4* matches it. + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-sysv4.2uw${UNAME_VERSION} + exit 0 ;; + i*86:*:4.*:* | i*86:SYSTEM_V:4.*:*) + UNAME_REL=`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE} | sed 's/\/MP$//'` + if grep Novell /usr/include/link.h >/dev/null 2>/dev/null; then + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-univel-sysv${UNAME_REL} + else + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-sysv${UNAME_REL} + fi + exit 0 ;; + i*86:*:5:7*) + # Fixed at (any) Pentium or better + UNAME_MACHINE=i586 + if [ ${UNAME_SYSTEM} = "UnixWare" ] ; then + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-sco-sysv${UNAME_RELEASE}uw${UNAME_VERSION} + else + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-sysv${UNAME_RELEASE} + fi + exit 0 ;; + i*86:*:3.2:*) + if test -f /usr/options/cb.name; then + UNAME_REL=`sed -n 's/.*Version //p' /dev/null >/dev/null ; then + UNAME_REL=`(/bin/uname -X|egrep Release|sed -e 's/.*= //')` + (/bin/uname -X|egrep i80486 >/dev/null) && UNAME_MACHINE=i486 + (/bin/uname -X|egrep '^Machine.*Pentium' >/dev/null) \ + && UNAME_MACHINE=i586 + (/bin/uname -X|egrep '^Machine.*Pent ?II' >/dev/null) \ + && UNAME_MACHINE=i686 + (/bin/uname -X|egrep '^Machine.*Pentium Pro' >/dev/null) \ + && UNAME_MACHINE=i686 + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-sco$UNAME_REL + else + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-sysv32 + fi + exit 0 ;; + i*86:*DOS:*:*) + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-msdosdjgpp + exit 0 ;; + pc:*:*:*) + # Left here for compatibility: + # uname -m prints for DJGPP always 'pc', but it prints nothing about + # the processor, so we play safe by assuming i386. + echo i386-pc-msdosdjgpp + exit 0 ;; + Intel:Mach:3*:*) + echo i386-pc-mach3 + exit 0 ;; + paragon:*:*:*) + echo i860-intel-osf1 + exit 0 ;; + i860:*:4.*:*) # i860-SVR4 + if grep Stardent /usr/include/sys/uadmin.h >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then + echo i860-stardent-sysv${UNAME_RELEASE} # Stardent Vistra i860-SVR4 + else # Add other i860-SVR4 vendors below as they are discovered. + echo i860-unknown-sysv${UNAME_RELEASE} # Unknown i860-SVR4 + fi + exit 0 ;; + mini*:CTIX:SYS*5:*) + # "miniframe" + echo m68010-convergent-sysv + exit 0 ;; + M68*:*:R3V[567]*:*) + test -r /sysV68 && echo 'm68k-motorola-sysv' && exit 0 ;; + 3[34]??:*:4.0:3.0 | 3[34]??A:*:4.0:3.0 | 3[34]??,*:*:4.0:3.0 | 4850:*:4.0:3.0) + OS_REL='' + test -r /etc/.relid \ + && OS_REL=.`sed -n 's/[^ ]* [^ ]* \([0-9][0-9]\).*/\1/p' < /etc/.relid` + /bin/uname -p 2>/dev/null | grep 86 >/dev/null \ + && echo i486-ncr-sysv4.3${OS_REL} && exit 0 + /bin/uname -p 2>/dev/null | /bin/grep entium >/dev/null \ + && echo i586-ncr-sysv4.3${OS_REL} && exit 0 ;; + 3[34]??:*:4.0:* | 3[34]??,*:*:4.0:*) + /bin/uname -p 2>/dev/null | grep 86 >/dev/null \ + && echo i486-ncr-sysv4 && exit 0 ;; + m68*:LynxOS:2.*:* | m68*:LynxOS:3.0*:*) + echo m68k-unknown-lynxos${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + mc68030:UNIX_System_V:4.*:*) + echo m68k-atari-sysv4 + exit 0 ;; + i*86:LynxOS:2.*:* | i*86:LynxOS:3.[01]*:* | i*86:LynxOS:4.0*:*) + echo i386-unknown-lynxos${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + TSUNAMI:LynxOS:2.*:*) + echo sparc-unknown-lynxos${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + rs6000:LynxOS:2.*:*) + echo rs6000-unknown-lynxos${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + PowerPC:LynxOS:2.*:* | PowerPC:LynxOS:3.[01]*:* | PowerPC:LynxOS:4.0*:*) + echo powerpc-unknown-lynxos${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + SM[BE]S:UNIX_SV:*:*) + echo mips-dde-sysv${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + RM*:ReliantUNIX-*:*:*) + echo mips-sni-sysv4 + exit 0 ;; + RM*:SINIX-*:*:*) + echo mips-sni-sysv4 + exit 0 ;; + *:SINIX-*:*:*) + if uname -p 2>/dev/null >/dev/null ; then + UNAME_MACHINE=`(uname -p) 2>/dev/null` + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-sni-sysv4 + else + echo ns32k-sni-sysv + fi + exit 0 ;; + PENTIUM:CPunix:4.0*:*) # Unisys `ClearPath HMP IX 4000' SVR4/MP effort + # says + echo i586-unisys-sysv4 + exit 0 ;; + *:UNIX_System_V:4*:FTX*) + # From Gerald Hewes . + # How about differentiating between stratus architectures? -djm + echo hppa1.1-stratus-sysv4 + exit 0 ;; + *:*:*:FTX*) + # From seanf@swdc.stratus.com. + echo i860-stratus-sysv4 + exit 0 ;; + mc68*:A/UX:*:*) + echo m68k-apple-aux${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + news*:NEWS-OS:6*:*) + echo mips-sony-newsos6 + exit 0 ;; + R[34]000:*System_V*:*:* | R4000:UNIX_SYSV:*:* | R*000:UNIX_SV:*:*) + if [ -d /usr/nec ]; then + echo mips-nec-sysv${UNAME_RELEASE} + else + echo mips-unknown-sysv${UNAME_RELEASE} + fi + exit 0 ;; + BeBox:BeOS:*:*) # BeOS running on hardware made by Be, PPC only. + echo powerpc-be-beos + exit 0 ;; + BeMac:BeOS:*:*) # BeOS running on Mac or Mac clone, PPC only. + echo powerpc-apple-beos + exit 0 ;; + BePC:BeOS:*:*) # BeOS running on Intel PC compatible. + echo i586-pc-beos + exit 0 ;; + SX-4:SUPER-UX:*:*) + echo sx4-nec-superux${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + SX-5:SUPER-UX:*:*) + echo sx5-nec-superux${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + Power*:Rhapsody:*:*) + echo powerpc-apple-rhapsody${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + *:Rhapsody:*:*) + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-apple-rhapsody${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + *:Darwin:*:*) + echo `uname -p`-apple-darwin${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + *:procnto*:*:* | *:QNX:[0123456789]*:*) + if test "${UNAME_MACHINE}" = "x86pc"; then + UNAME_MACHINE=pc + fi + echo `uname -p`-${UNAME_MACHINE}-nto-qnx + exit 0 ;; + *:QNX:*:4*) + echo i386-pc-qnx + exit 0 ;; + NSR-[KW]:NONSTOP_KERNEL:*:*) + echo nsr-tandem-nsk${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + *:NonStop-UX:*:*) + echo mips-compaq-nonstopux + exit 0 ;; + BS2000:POSIX*:*:*) + echo bs2000-siemens-sysv + exit 0 ;; + DS/*:UNIX_System_V:*:*) + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-${UNAME_SYSTEM}-${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + *:Plan9:*:*) + # "uname -m" is not consistent, so use $cputype instead. 386 + # is converted to i386 for consistency with other x86 + # operating systems. + if test "$cputype" = "386"; then + UNAME_MACHINE=i386 + else + UNAME_MACHINE="$cputype" + fi + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-plan9 + exit 0 ;; + i*86:OS/2:*:*) + # If we were able to find `uname', then EMX Unix compatibility + # is probably installed. + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-os2-emx + exit 0 ;; + *:TOPS-10:*:*) + echo pdp10-unknown-tops10 + exit 0 ;; + *:TENEX:*:*) + echo pdp10-unknown-tenex + exit 0 ;; + KS10:TOPS-20:*:* | KL10:TOPS-20:*:* | TYPE4:TOPS-20:*:*) + echo pdp10-dec-tops20 + exit 0 ;; + XKL-1:TOPS-20:*:* | TYPE5:TOPS-20:*:*) + echo pdp10-xkl-tops20 + exit 0 ;; + *:TOPS-20:*:*) + echo pdp10-unknown-tops20 + exit 0 ;; + *:ITS:*:*) + echo pdp10-unknown-its + exit 0 ;; +esac + +#echo '(No uname command or uname output not recognized.)' 1>&2 +#echo "${UNAME_MACHINE}:${UNAME_SYSTEM}:${UNAME_RELEASE}:${UNAME_VERSION}" 1>&2 + +cat >$dummy.c < +# include +#endif +main () +{ +#if defined (sony) +#if defined (MIPSEB) + /* BFD wants "bsd" instead of "newsos". Perhaps BFD should be changed, + I don't know.... */ + printf ("mips-sony-bsd\n"); exit (0); +#else +#include + printf ("m68k-sony-newsos%s\n", +#ifdef NEWSOS4 + "4" +#else + "" +#endif + ); exit (0); +#endif +#endif + +#if defined (__arm) && defined (__acorn) && defined (__unix) + printf ("arm-acorn-riscix"); exit (0); +#endif + +#if defined (hp300) && !defined (hpux) + printf ("m68k-hp-bsd\n"); exit (0); +#endif + +#if defined (NeXT) +#if !defined (__ARCHITECTURE__) +#define __ARCHITECTURE__ "m68k" +#endif + int version; + version=`(hostinfo | sed -n 's/.*NeXT Mach \([0-9]*\).*/\1/p') 2>/dev/null`; + if (version < 4) + printf ("%s-next-nextstep%d\n", __ARCHITECTURE__, version); + else + printf ("%s-next-openstep%d\n", __ARCHITECTURE__, version); + exit (0); +#endif + +#if defined (MULTIMAX) || defined (n16) +#if defined (UMAXV) + printf ("ns32k-encore-sysv\n"); exit (0); +#else +#if defined (CMU) + printf ("ns32k-encore-mach\n"); exit (0); +#else + printf ("ns32k-encore-bsd\n"); exit (0); +#endif +#endif +#endif + +#if defined (__386BSD__) + printf ("i386-pc-bsd\n"); exit (0); +#endif + +#if defined (sequent) +#if defined (i386) + printf ("i386-sequent-dynix\n"); exit (0); +#endif +#if defined (ns32000) + printf ("ns32k-sequent-dynix\n"); exit (0); +#endif +#endif + +#if defined (_SEQUENT_) + struct utsname un; + + uname(&un); + + if (strncmp(un.version, "V2", 2) == 0) { + printf ("i386-sequent-ptx2\n"); exit (0); + } + if (strncmp(un.version, "V1", 2) == 0) { /* XXX is V1 correct? */ + printf ("i386-sequent-ptx1\n"); exit (0); + } + printf ("i386-sequent-ptx\n"); exit (0); + +#endif + +#if defined (vax) +# if !defined (ultrix) +# include +# if defined (BSD) +# if BSD == 43 + printf ("vax-dec-bsd4.3\n"); exit (0); +# else +# if BSD == 199006 + printf ("vax-dec-bsd4.3reno\n"); exit (0); +# else + printf ("vax-dec-bsd\n"); exit (0); +# endif +# endif +# else + printf ("vax-dec-bsd\n"); exit (0); +# endif +# else + printf ("vax-dec-ultrix\n"); exit (0); +# endif +#endif + +#if defined (alliant) && defined (i860) + printf ("i860-alliant-bsd\n"); exit (0); +#endif + + exit (1); +} +EOF + +$CC_FOR_BUILD $dummy.c -o $dummy 2>/dev/null && ./$dummy && rm -f $dummy.c $dummy && exit 0 +rm -f $dummy.c $dummy + +# Apollos put the system type in the environment. + +test -d /usr/apollo && { echo ${ISP}-apollo-${SYSTYPE}; exit 0; } + +# Convex versions that predate uname can use getsysinfo(1) + +if [ -x /usr/convex/getsysinfo ] +then + case `getsysinfo -f cpu_type` in + c1*) + echo c1-convex-bsd + exit 0 ;; + c2*) + if getsysinfo -f scalar_acc + then echo c32-convex-bsd + else echo c2-convex-bsd + fi + exit 0 ;; + c34*) + echo c34-convex-bsd + exit 0 ;; + c38*) + echo c38-convex-bsd + exit 0 ;; + c4*) + echo c4-convex-bsd + exit 0 ;; + esac +fi + +cat >&2 < in order to provide the needed +information to handle your system. + +config.guess timestamp = $timestamp + +uname -m = `(uname -m) 2>/dev/null || echo unknown` +uname -r = `(uname -r) 2>/dev/null || echo unknown` +uname -s = `(uname -s) 2>/dev/null || echo unknown` +uname -v = `(uname -v) 2>/dev/null || echo unknown` + +/usr/bin/uname -p = `(/usr/bin/uname -p) 2>/dev/null` +/bin/uname -X = `(/bin/uname -X) 2>/dev/null` + +hostinfo = `(hostinfo) 2>/dev/null` +/bin/universe = `(/bin/universe) 2>/dev/null` +/usr/bin/arch -k = `(/usr/bin/arch -k) 2>/dev/null` +/bin/arch = `(/bin/arch) 2>/dev/null` +/usr/bin/oslevel = `(/usr/bin/oslevel) 2>/dev/null` +/usr/convex/getsysinfo = `(/usr/convex/getsysinfo) 2>/dev/null` + +UNAME_MACHINE = ${UNAME_MACHINE} +UNAME_RELEASE = ${UNAME_RELEASE} +UNAME_SYSTEM = ${UNAME_SYSTEM} +UNAME_VERSION = ${UNAME_VERSION} +EOF + +exit 1 + +# Local variables: +# eval: (add-hook 'write-file-hooks 'time-stamp) +# time-stamp-start: "timestamp='" +# time-stamp-format: "%:y-%02m-%02d" +# time-stamp-end: "'" +# End: diff --git a/openssh/config.sub b/openssh/config.sub new file mode 100755 index 0000000..a06a480 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/config.sub @@ -0,0 +1,1362 @@ +#! /bin/sh +# Configuration validation subroutine script. +# Copyright (C) 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001 +# Free Software Foundation, Inc. + +timestamp='2001-04-20' + +# This file is (in principle) common to ALL GNU software. +# The presence of a machine in this file suggests that SOME GNU software +# can handle that machine. It does not imply ALL GNU software can. +# +# This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify +# it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by +# the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or +# (at your option) any later version. +# +# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of +# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the +# GNU General Public License for more details. +# +# You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License +# along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software +# Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, +# Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA. + +# As a special exception to the GNU General Public License, if you +# distribute this file as part of a program that contains a +# configuration script generated by Autoconf, you may include it under +# the same distribution terms that you use for the rest of that program. + +# Please send patches to . +# +# Configuration subroutine to validate and canonicalize a configuration type. +# Supply the specified configuration type as an argument. +# If it is invalid, we print an error message on stderr and exit with code 1. +# Otherwise, we print the canonical config type on stdout and succeed. + +# This file is supposed to be the same for all GNU packages +# and recognize all the CPU types, system types and aliases +# that are meaningful with *any* GNU software. +# Each package is responsible for reporting which valid configurations +# it does not support. The user should be able to distinguish +# a failure to support a valid configuration from a meaningless +# configuration. + +# The goal of this file is to map all the various variations of a given +# machine specification into a single specification in the form: +# CPU_TYPE-MANUFACTURER-OPERATING_SYSTEM +# or in some cases, the newer four-part form: +# CPU_TYPE-MANUFACTURER-KERNEL-OPERATING_SYSTEM +# It is wrong to echo any other type of specification. + +me=`echo "$0" | sed -e 's,.*/,,'` + +usage="\ +Usage: $0 [OPTION] CPU-MFR-OPSYS + $0 [OPTION] ALIAS + +Canonicalize a configuration name. + +Operation modes: + -h, --help print this help, then exit + -t, --time-stamp print date of last modification, then exit + -v, --version print version number, then exit + +Report bugs and patches to ." + +version="\ +GNU config.sub ($timestamp) + +Copyright (C) 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001 +Free Software Foundation, Inc. + +This is free software; see the source for copying conditions. There is NO +warranty; not even for MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE." + +help=" +Try \`$me --help' for more information." + +# Parse command line +while test $# -gt 0 ; do + case $1 in + --time-stamp | --time* | -t ) + echo "$timestamp" ; exit 0 ;; + --version | -v ) + echo "$version" ; exit 0 ;; + --help | --h* | -h ) + echo "$usage"; exit 0 ;; + -- ) # Stop option processing + shift; break ;; + - ) # Use stdin as input. + break ;; + -* ) + echo "$me: invalid option $1$help" + exit 1 ;; + + *local*) + # First pass through any local machine types. + echo $1 + exit 0;; + + * ) + break ;; + esac +done + +case $# in + 0) echo "$me: missing argument$help" >&2 + exit 1;; + 1) ;; + *) echo "$me: too many arguments$help" >&2 + exit 1;; +esac + +# Separate what the user gave into CPU-COMPANY and OS or KERNEL-OS (if any). +# Here we must recognize all the valid KERNEL-OS combinations. +maybe_os=`echo $1 | sed 's/^\(.*\)-\([^-]*-[^-]*\)$/\2/'` +case $maybe_os in + nto-qnx* | linux-gnu* | storm-chaos* | os2-emx*) + os=-$maybe_os + basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed 's/^\(.*\)-\([^-]*-[^-]*\)$/\1/'` + ;; + *) + basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed 's/-[^-]*$//'` + if [ $basic_machine != $1 ] + then os=`echo $1 | sed 's/.*-/-/'` + else os=; fi + ;; +esac + +### Let's recognize common machines as not being operating systems so +### that things like config.sub decstation-3100 work. We also +### recognize some manufacturers as not being operating systems, so we +### can provide default operating systems below. +case $os in + -sun*os*) + # Prevent following clause from handling this invalid input. + ;; + -dec* | -mips* | -sequent* | -encore* | -pc532* | -sgi* | -sony* | \ + -att* | -7300* | -3300* | -delta* | -motorola* | -sun[234]* | \ + -unicom* | -ibm* | -next | -hp | -isi* | -apollo | -altos* | \ + -convergent* | -ncr* | -news | -32* | -3600* | -3100* | -hitachi* |\ + -c[123]* | -convex* | -sun | -crds | -omron* | -dg | -ultra | -tti* | \ + -harris | -dolphin | -highlevel | -gould | -cbm | -ns | -masscomp | \ + -apple | -axis) + os= + basic_machine=$1 + ;; + -sim | -cisco | -oki | -wec | -winbond) + os= + basic_machine=$1 + ;; + -scout) + ;; + -wrs) + os=-vxworks + basic_machine=$1 + ;; + -hiux*) + os=-hiuxwe2 + ;; + -sco5) + os=-sco3.2v5 + basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed -e 's/86-.*/86-pc/'` + ;; + -sco4) + os=-sco3.2v4 + basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed -e 's/86-.*/86-pc/'` + ;; + -sco3.2.[4-9]*) + os=`echo $os | sed -e 's/sco3.2./sco3.2v/'` + basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed -e 's/86-.*/86-pc/'` + ;; + -sco3.2v[4-9]*) + # Don't forget version if it is 3.2v4 or newer. + basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed -e 's/86-.*/86-pc/'` + ;; + -sco*) + os=-sco3.2v2 + basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed -e 's/86-.*/86-pc/'` + ;; + -udk*) + basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed -e 's/86-.*/86-pc/'` + ;; + -isc) + os=-isc2.2 + basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed -e 's/86-.*/86-pc/'` + ;; + -clix*) + basic_machine=clipper-intergraph + ;; + -isc*) + basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed -e 's/86-.*/86-pc/'` + ;; + -lynx*) + os=-lynxos + ;; + -ptx*) + basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed -e 's/86-.*/86-sequent/'` + ;; + -windowsnt*) + os=`echo $os | sed -e 's/windowsnt/winnt/'` + ;; + -psos*) + os=-psos + ;; + -mint | -mint[0-9]*) + basic_machine=m68k-atari + os=-mint + ;; +esac + +# Decode aliases for certain CPU-COMPANY combinations. +case $basic_machine in + # Recognize the basic CPU types without company name. + # Some are omitted here because they have special meanings below. + tahoe | i860 | ia64 | m32r | m68k | m68000 | m88k | ns32k | arc \ + | arm | arme[lb] | arm[bl]e | armv[2345] | armv[345][lb] | strongarm | xscale \ + | pyramid | mn10200 | mn10300 | tron | a29k \ + | 580 | i960 | h8300 \ + | x86 | ppcbe | mipsbe | mipsle | shbe | shle \ + | hppa | hppa1.0 | hppa1.1 | hppa2.0 | hppa2.0w | hppa2.0n \ + | hppa64 \ + | alpha | alphaev[4-8] | alphaev56 | alphapca5[67] \ + | alphaev6[78] \ + | we32k | ns16k | clipper | i370 | sh | sh[34] \ + | powerpc | powerpcle \ + | 1750a | dsp16xx | pdp10 | pdp11 \ + | mips16 | mips64 | mipsel | mips64el \ + | mips64orion | mips64orionel | mipstx39 | mipstx39el \ + | mips64vr4300 | mips64vr4300el | mips64vr4100 | mips64vr4100el \ + | mips64vr5000 | miprs64vr5000el | mcore | s390 | s390x \ + | sparc | sparclet | sparclite | sparc64 | sparcv9 | sparcv9b \ + | v850 | c4x \ + | thumb | d10v | d30v | fr30 | avr | openrisc | tic80 \ + | pj | pjl | h8500) + basic_machine=$basic_machine-unknown + ;; + m6811 | m68hc11 | m6812 | m68hc12) + # Motorola 68HC11/12. + basic_machine=$basic_machine-unknown + os=-none + ;; + m88110 | m680[12346]0 | m683?2 | m68360 | m5200 | z8k | v70 | w65) + ;; + + # We use `pc' rather than `unknown' + # because (1) that's what they normally are, and + # (2) the word "unknown" tends to confuse beginning users. + i*86 | x86_64) + basic_machine=$basic_machine-pc + ;; + # Object if more than one company name word. + *-*-*) + echo Invalid configuration \`$1\': machine \`$basic_machine\' not recognized 1>&2 + exit 1 + ;; + # Recognize the basic CPU types with company name. + # FIXME: clean up the formatting here. + vax-* | tahoe-* | i*86-* | i860-* | ia64-* | m32r-* | m68k-* | m68000-* \ + | m88k-* | sparc-* | ns32k-* | fx80-* | arc-* | c[123]* \ + | arm-* | armbe-* | armle-* | armv*-* | strongarm-* | xscale-* \ + | mips-* | pyramid-* | tron-* | a29k-* | romp-* | rs6000-* \ + | power-* | none-* | 580-* | cray2-* | h8300-* | h8500-* | i960-* \ + | xmp-* | ymp-* \ + | x86-* | ppcbe-* | mipsbe-* | mipsle-* | shbe-* | shle-* \ + | hppa-* | hppa1.0-* | hppa1.1-* | hppa2.0-* | hppa2.0w-* \ + | hppa2.0n-* | hppa64-* \ + | alpha-* | alphaev[4-8]-* | alphaev56-* | alphapca5[67]-* \ + | alphaev6[78]-* \ + | we32k-* | cydra-* | ns16k-* | pn-* | np1-* | xps100-* \ + | clipper-* | orion-* \ + | sparclite-* | pdp10-* | pdp11-* | sh-* | powerpc-* | powerpcle-* \ + | sparc64-* | sparcv9-* | sparcv9b-* | sparc86x-* \ + | mips16-* | mips64-* | mipsel-* \ + | mips64el-* | mips64orion-* | mips64orionel-* \ + | mips64vr4100-* | mips64vr4100el-* | mips64vr4300-* | mips64vr4300el-* \ + | mipstx39-* | mipstx39el-* | mcore-* \ + | f30[01]-* | f700-* | s390-* | s390x-* | sv1-* | t3e-* \ + | [cjt]90-* \ + | m88110-* | m680[01234]0-* | m683?2-* | m68360-* | z8k-* | d10v-* \ + | thumb-* | v850-* | d30v-* | tic30-* | tic80-* | c30-* | fr30-* \ + | bs2000-* | tic54x-* | c54x-* | x86_64-* | pj-* | pjl-*) + ;; + # Recognize the various machine names and aliases which stand + # for a CPU type and a company and sometimes even an OS. + 386bsd) + basic_machine=i386-unknown + os=-bsd + ;; + 3b1 | 7300 | 7300-att | att-7300 | pc7300 | safari | unixpc) + basic_machine=m68000-att + ;; + 3b*) + basic_machine=we32k-att + ;; + a29khif) + basic_machine=a29k-amd + os=-udi + ;; + adobe68k) + basic_machine=m68010-adobe + os=-scout + ;; + alliant | fx80) + basic_machine=fx80-alliant + ;; + altos | altos3068) + basic_machine=m68k-altos + ;; + am29k) + basic_machine=a29k-none + os=-bsd + ;; + amdahl) + basic_machine=580-amdahl + os=-sysv + ;; + amiga | amiga-*) + basic_machine=m68k-unknown + ;; + amigaos | amigados) + basic_machine=m68k-unknown + os=-amigaos + ;; + amigaunix | amix) + basic_machine=m68k-unknown + os=-sysv4 + ;; + apollo68) + basic_machine=m68k-apollo + os=-sysv + ;; + apollo68bsd) + basic_machine=m68k-apollo + os=-bsd + ;; + aux) + basic_machine=m68k-apple + os=-aux + ;; + balance) + basic_machine=ns32k-sequent + os=-dynix + ;; + convex-c1) + basic_machine=c1-convex + os=-bsd + ;; + convex-c2) + basic_machine=c2-convex + os=-bsd + ;; + convex-c32) + basic_machine=c32-convex + os=-bsd + ;; + convex-c34) + basic_machine=c34-convex + os=-bsd + ;; + convex-c38) + basic_machine=c38-convex + os=-bsd + ;; + cray | ymp) + basic_machine=ymp-cray + os=-unicos + ;; + cray2) + basic_machine=cray2-cray + os=-unicos + ;; + [cjt]90) + basic_machine=${basic_machine}-cray + os=-unicos + ;; + crds | unos) + basic_machine=m68k-crds + ;; + cris | cris-* | etrax*) + basic_machine=cris-axis + ;; + da30 | da30-*) + basic_machine=m68k-da30 + ;; + decstation | decstation-3100 | pmax | pmax-* | pmin | dec3100 | decstatn) + basic_machine=mips-dec + ;; + delta | 3300 | motorola-3300 | motorola-delta \ + | 3300-motorola | delta-motorola) + basic_machine=m68k-motorola + ;; + delta88) + basic_machine=m88k-motorola + os=-sysv3 + ;; + dpx20 | dpx20-*) + basic_machine=rs6000-bull + os=-bosx + ;; + dpx2* | dpx2*-bull) + basic_machine=m68k-bull + os=-sysv3 + ;; + ebmon29k) + basic_machine=a29k-amd + os=-ebmon + ;; + elxsi) + basic_machine=elxsi-elxsi + os=-bsd + ;; + encore | umax | mmax) + basic_machine=ns32k-encore + ;; + es1800 | OSE68k | ose68k | ose | OSE) + basic_machine=m68k-ericsson + os=-ose + ;; + fx2800) + basic_machine=i860-alliant + ;; + genix) + basic_machine=ns32k-ns + ;; + gmicro) + basic_machine=tron-gmicro + os=-sysv + ;; + go32) + basic_machine=i386-pc + os=-go32 + ;; + h3050r* | hiux*) + basic_machine=hppa1.1-hitachi + os=-hiuxwe2 + ;; + h8300hms) + basic_machine=h8300-hitachi + os=-hms + ;; + h8300xray) + basic_machine=h8300-hitachi + os=-xray + ;; + h8500hms) + basic_machine=h8500-hitachi + os=-hms + ;; + harris) + basic_machine=m88k-harris + os=-sysv3 + ;; + hp300-*) + basic_machine=m68k-hp + ;; + hp300bsd) + basic_machine=m68k-hp + os=-bsd + ;; + hp300hpux) + basic_machine=m68k-hp + os=-hpux + ;; + hp3k9[0-9][0-9] | hp9[0-9][0-9]) + basic_machine=hppa1.0-hp + ;; + hp9k2[0-9][0-9] | hp9k31[0-9]) + basic_machine=m68000-hp + ;; + hp9k3[2-9][0-9]) + basic_machine=m68k-hp + ;; + hp9k6[0-9][0-9] | hp6[0-9][0-9]) + basic_machine=hppa1.0-hp + ;; + hp9k7[0-79][0-9] | hp7[0-79][0-9]) + basic_machine=hppa1.1-hp + ;; + hp9k78[0-9] | hp78[0-9]) + # FIXME: really hppa2.0-hp + basic_machine=hppa1.1-hp + ;; + hp9k8[67]1 | hp8[67]1 | hp9k80[24] | hp80[24] | hp9k8[78]9 | hp8[78]9 | hp9k893 | hp893) + # FIXME: really hppa2.0-hp + basic_machine=hppa1.1-hp + ;; + hp9k8[0-9][13679] | hp8[0-9][13679]) + basic_machine=hppa1.1-hp + ;; + hp9k8[0-9][0-9] | hp8[0-9][0-9]) + basic_machine=hppa1.0-hp + ;; + hppa-next) + os=-nextstep3 + ;; + hppaosf) + basic_machine=hppa1.1-hp + os=-osf + ;; + hppro) + basic_machine=hppa1.1-hp + os=-proelf + ;; + i370-ibm* | ibm*) + basic_machine=i370-ibm + ;; +# I'm not sure what "Sysv32" means. Should this be sysv3.2? + i*86v32) + basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed -e 's/86.*/86-pc/'` + os=-sysv32 + ;; + i*86v4*) + basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed -e 's/86.*/86-pc/'` + os=-sysv4 + ;; + i*86v) + basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed -e 's/86.*/86-pc/'` + os=-sysv + ;; + i*86sol2) + basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed -e 's/86.*/86-pc/'` + os=-solaris2 + ;; + i386mach) + basic_machine=i386-mach + os=-mach + ;; + i386-vsta | vsta) + basic_machine=i386-unknown + os=-vsta + ;; + iris | iris4d) + basic_machine=mips-sgi + case $os in + -irix*) + ;; + *) + os=-irix4 + ;; + esac + ;; + isi68 | isi) + basic_machine=m68k-isi + os=-sysv + ;; + m88k-omron*) + basic_machine=m88k-omron + ;; + magnum | m3230) + basic_machine=mips-mips + os=-sysv + ;; + merlin) + basic_machine=ns32k-utek + os=-sysv + ;; + mingw32) + basic_machine=i386-pc + os=-mingw32 + ;; + miniframe) + basic_machine=m68000-convergent + ;; + *mint | -mint[0-9]* | *MiNT | *MiNT[0-9]*) + basic_machine=m68k-atari + os=-mint + ;; + mipsel*-linux*) + basic_machine=mipsel-unknown + os=-linux-gnu + ;; + mips*-linux*) + basic_machine=mips-unknown + os=-linux-gnu + ;; + mips3*-*) + basic_machine=`echo $basic_machine | sed -e 's/mips3/mips64/'` + ;; + mips3*) + basic_machine=`echo $basic_machine | sed -e 's/mips3/mips64/'`-unknown + ;; + mmix*) + basic_machine=mmix-knuth + os=-mmixware + ;; + monitor) + basic_machine=m68k-rom68k + os=-coff + ;; + msdos) + basic_machine=i386-pc + os=-msdos + ;; + mvs) + basic_machine=i370-ibm + os=-mvs + ;; + ncr3000) + basic_machine=i486-ncr + os=-sysv4 + ;; + netbsd386) + basic_machine=i386-unknown + os=-netbsd + ;; + netwinder) + basic_machine=armv4l-rebel + os=-linux + ;; + news | news700 | news800 | news900) + basic_machine=m68k-sony + os=-newsos + ;; + news1000) + basic_machine=m68030-sony + os=-newsos + ;; + news-3600 | risc-news) + basic_machine=mips-sony + os=-newsos + ;; + necv70) + basic_machine=v70-nec + os=-sysv + ;; + next | m*-next ) + basic_machine=m68k-next + case $os in + -nextstep* ) + ;; + -ns2*) + os=-nextstep2 + ;; + *) + os=-nextstep3 + ;; + esac + ;; + nh3000) + basic_machine=m68k-harris + os=-cxux + ;; + nh[45]000) + basic_machine=m88k-harris + os=-cxux + ;; + nindy960) + basic_machine=i960-intel + os=-nindy + ;; + mon960) + basic_machine=i960-intel + os=-mon960 + ;; + nonstopux) + basic_machine=mips-compaq + os=-nonstopux + ;; + np1) + basic_machine=np1-gould + ;; + nsr-tandem) + basic_machine=nsr-tandem + ;; + op50n-* | op60c-*) + basic_machine=hppa1.1-oki + os=-proelf + ;; + OSE68000 | ose68000) + basic_machine=m68000-ericsson + os=-ose + ;; + os68k) + basic_machine=m68k-none + os=-os68k + ;; + pa-hitachi) + basic_machine=hppa1.1-hitachi + os=-hiuxwe2 + ;; + paragon) + basic_machine=i860-intel + os=-osf + ;; + pbd) + basic_machine=sparc-tti + ;; + pbb) + basic_machine=m68k-tti + ;; + pc532 | pc532-*) + basic_machine=ns32k-pc532 + ;; + pentium | p5 | k5 | k6 | nexgen) + basic_machine=i586-pc + ;; + pentiumpro | p6 | 6x86 | athlon) + basic_machine=i686-pc + ;; + pentiumii | pentium2) + basic_machine=i686-pc + ;; + pentium-* | p5-* | k5-* | k6-* | nexgen-*) + basic_machine=i586-`echo $basic_machine | sed 's/^[^-]*-//'` + ;; + pentiumpro-* | p6-* | 6x86-* | athlon-*) + basic_machine=i686-`echo $basic_machine | sed 's/^[^-]*-//'` + ;; + pentiumii-* | pentium2-*) + basic_machine=i686-`echo $basic_machine | sed 's/^[^-]*-//'` + ;; + pn) + basic_machine=pn-gould + ;; + power) basic_machine=power-ibm + ;; + ppc) basic_machine=powerpc-unknown + ;; + ppc-*) basic_machine=powerpc-`echo $basic_machine | sed 's/^[^-]*-//'` + ;; + ppcle | powerpclittle | ppc-le | powerpc-little) + basic_machine=powerpcle-unknown + ;; + ppcle-* | powerpclittle-*) + basic_machine=powerpcle-`echo $basic_machine | sed 's/^[^-]*-//'` + ;; + ps2) + basic_machine=i386-ibm + ;; + pw32) + basic_machine=i586-unknown + os=-pw32 + ;; + rom68k) + basic_machine=m68k-rom68k + os=-coff + ;; + rm[46]00) + basic_machine=mips-siemens + ;; + rtpc | rtpc-*) + basic_machine=romp-ibm + ;; + sa29200) + basic_machine=a29k-amd + os=-udi + ;; + sequent) + basic_machine=i386-sequent + ;; + sh) + basic_machine=sh-hitachi + os=-hms + ;; + sparclite-wrs) + basic_machine=sparclite-wrs + os=-vxworks + ;; + sps7) + basic_machine=m68k-bull + os=-sysv2 + ;; + spur) + basic_machine=spur-unknown + ;; + st2000) + basic_machine=m68k-tandem + ;; + stratus) + basic_machine=i860-stratus + os=-sysv4 + ;; + sun2) + basic_machine=m68000-sun + ;; + sun2os3) + basic_machine=m68000-sun + os=-sunos3 + ;; + sun2os4) + basic_machine=m68000-sun + os=-sunos4 + ;; + sun3os3) + basic_machine=m68k-sun + os=-sunos3 + ;; + sun3os4) + basic_machine=m68k-sun + os=-sunos4 + ;; + sun4os3) + basic_machine=sparc-sun + os=-sunos3 + ;; + sun4os4) + basic_machine=sparc-sun + os=-sunos4 + ;; + sun4sol2) + basic_machine=sparc-sun + os=-solaris2 + ;; + sun3 | sun3-*) + basic_machine=m68k-sun + ;; + sun4) + basic_machine=sparc-sun + ;; + sun386 | sun386i | roadrunner) + basic_machine=i386-sun + ;; + sv1) + basic_machine=sv1-cray + os=-unicos + ;; + symmetry) + basic_machine=i386-sequent + os=-dynix + ;; + t3e) + basic_machine=t3e-cray + os=-unicos + ;; + tic54x | c54x*) + basic_machine=tic54x-unknown + os=-coff + ;; + tx39) + basic_machine=mipstx39-unknown + ;; + tx39el) + basic_machine=mipstx39el-unknown + ;; + tower | tower-32) + basic_machine=m68k-ncr + ;; + udi29k) + basic_machine=a29k-amd + os=-udi + ;; + ultra3) + basic_machine=a29k-nyu + os=-sym1 + ;; + v810 | necv810) + basic_machine=v810-nec + os=-none + ;; + vaxv) + basic_machine=vax-dec + os=-sysv + ;; + vms) + basic_machine=vax-dec + os=-vms + ;; + vpp*|vx|vx-*) + basic_machine=f301-fujitsu + ;; + vxworks960) + basic_machine=i960-wrs + os=-vxworks + ;; + vxworks68) + basic_machine=m68k-wrs + os=-vxworks + ;; + vxworks29k) + basic_machine=a29k-wrs + os=-vxworks + ;; + w65*) + basic_machine=w65-wdc + os=-none + ;; + w89k-*) + basic_machine=hppa1.1-winbond + os=-proelf + ;; + xmp) + basic_machine=xmp-cray + os=-unicos + ;; + xps | xps100) + basic_machine=xps100-honeywell + ;; + z8k-*-coff) + basic_machine=z8k-unknown + os=-sim + ;; + none) + basic_machine=none-none + os=-none + ;; + +# Here we handle the default manufacturer of certain CPU types. It is in +# some cases the only manufacturer, in others, it is the most popular. + w89k) + basic_machine=hppa1.1-winbond + ;; + op50n) + basic_machine=hppa1.1-oki + ;; + op60c) + basic_machine=hppa1.1-oki + ;; + mips) + if [ x$os = x-linux-gnu ]; then + basic_machine=mips-unknown + else + basic_machine=mips-mips + fi + ;; + romp) + basic_machine=romp-ibm + ;; + rs6000) + basic_machine=rs6000-ibm + ;; + vax) + basic_machine=vax-dec + ;; + pdp10) + # there are many clones, so DEC is not a safe bet + basic_machine=pdp10-unknown + ;; + pdp11) + basic_machine=pdp11-dec + ;; + we32k) + basic_machine=we32k-att + ;; + sh3 | sh4) + basic_machine=sh-unknown + ;; + sparc | sparcv9 | sparcv9b) + basic_machine=sparc-sun + ;; + cydra) + basic_machine=cydra-cydrome + ;; + orion) + basic_machine=orion-highlevel + ;; + orion105) + basic_machine=clipper-highlevel + ;; + mac | mpw | mac-mpw) + basic_machine=m68k-apple + ;; + pmac | pmac-mpw) + basic_machine=powerpc-apple + ;; + c4x*) + basic_machine=c4x-none + os=-coff + ;; + *-unknown) + # Make sure to match an already-canonicalized machine name. + ;; + *) + echo Invalid configuration \`$1\': machine \`$basic_machine\' not recognized 1>&2 + exit 1 + ;; +esac + +# Here we canonicalize certain aliases for manufacturers. +case $basic_machine in + *-digital*) + basic_machine=`echo $basic_machine | sed 's/digital.*/dec/'` + ;; + *-commodore*) + basic_machine=`echo $basic_machine | sed 's/commodore.*/cbm/'` + ;; + *) + ;; +esac + +# Decode manufacturer-specific aliases for certain operating systems. + +if [ x"$os" != x"" ] +then +case $os in + # First match some system type aliases + # that might get confused with valid system types. + # -solaris* is a basic system type, with this one exception. + -solaris1 | -solaris1.*) + os=`echo $os | sed -e 's|solaris1|sunos4|'` + ;; + -solaris) + os=-solaris2 + ;; + -svr4*) + os=-sysv4 + ;; + -unixware*) + os=-sysv4.2uw + ;; + -gnu/linux*) + os=`echo $os | sed -e 's|gnu/linux|linux-gnu|'` + ;; + # First accept the basic system types. + # The portable systems comes first. + # Each alternative MUST END IN A *, to match a version number. + # -sysv* is not here because it comes later, after sysvr4. + -gnu* | -bsd* | -mach* | -minix* | -genix* | -ultrix* | -irix* \ + | -*vms* | -sco* | -esix* | -isc* | -aix* | -sunos | -sunos[34]*\ + | -hpux* | -unos* | -osf* | -luna* | -dgux* | -solaris* | -sym* \ + | -amigaos* | -amigados* | -msdos* | -newsos* | -unicos* | -aof* \ + | -aos* \ + | -nindy* | -vxsim* | -vxworks* | -ebmon* | -hms* | -mvs* \ + | -clix* | -riscos* | -uniplus* | -iris* | -rtu* | -xenix* \ + | -hiux* | -386bsd* | -netbsd* | -openbsd* | -freebsd* | -riscix* \ + | -lynxos* | -bosx* | -nextstep* | -cxux* | -aout* | -elf* | -oabi* \ + | -ptx* | -coff* | -ecoff* | -winnt* | -domain* | -vsta* \ + | -udi* | -eabi* | -lites* | -ieee* | -go32* | -aux* \ + | -cygwin* | -pe* | -psos* | -moss* | -proelf* | -rtems* \ + | -mingw32* | -linux-gnu* | -uxpv* | -beos* | -mpeix* | -udk* \ + | -interix* | -uwin* | -rhapsody* | -darwin* | -opened* \ + | -openstep* | -oskit* | -conix* | -pw32* | -nonstopux* \ + | -storm-chaos* | -tops10* | -tenex* | -tops20* | -its* | -os2*) + # Remember, each alternative MUST END IN *, to match a version number. + ;; + -qnx*) + case $basic_machine in + x86-* | i*86-*) + ;; + *) + os=-nto$os + ;; + esac + ;; + -nto*) + os=-nto-qnx + ;; + -sim | -es1800* | -hms* | -xray | -os68k* | -none* | -v88r* \ + | -windows* | -osx | -abug | -netware* | -os9* | -beos* \ + | -macos* | -mpw* | -magic* | -mmixware* | -mon960* | -lnews*) + ;; + -mac*) + os=`echo $os | sed -e 's|mac|macos|'` + ;; + -linux*) + os=`echo $os | sed -e 's|linux|linux-gnu|'` + ;; + -sunos5*) + os=`echo $os | sed -e 's|sunos5|solaris2|'` + ;; + -sunos6*) + os=`echo $os | sed -e 's|sunos6|solaris3|'` + ;; + -opened*) + os=-openedition + ;; + -wince*) + os=-wince + ;; + -osfrose*) + os=-osfrose + ;; + -osf*) + os=-osf + ;; + -utek*) + os=-bsd + ;; + -dynix*) + os=-bsd + ;; + -acis*) + os=-aos + ;; + -386bsd) + os=-bsd + ;; + -ctix* | -uts*) + os=-sysv + ;; + -ns2 ) + os=-nextstep2 + ;; + -nsk*) + os=-nsk + ;; + # Preserve the version number of sinix5. + -sinix5.*) + os=`echo $os | sed -e 's|sinix|sysv|'` + ;; + -sinix*) + os=-sysv4 + ;; + -triton*) + os=-sysv3 + ;; + -oss*) + os=-sysv3 + ;; + -svr4) + os=-sysv4 + ;; + -svr3) + os=-sysv3 + ;; + -sysvr4) + os=-sysv4 + ;; + # This must come after -sysvr4. + -sysv*) + ;; + -ose*) + os=-ose + ;; + -es1800*) + os=-ose + ;; + -xenix) + os=-xenix + ;; + -*mint | -mint[0-9]* | -*MiNT | -MiNT[0-9]*) + os=-mint + ;; + -none) + ;; + *) + # Get rid of the `-' at the beginning of $os. + os=`echo $os | sed 's/[^-]*-//'` + echo Invalid configuration \`$1\': system \`$os\' not recognized 1>&2 + exit 1 + ;; +esac +else + +# Here we handle the default operating systems that come with various machines. +# The value should be what the vendor currently ships out the door with their +# machine or put another way, the most popular os provided with the machine. + +# Note that if you're going to try to match "-MANUFACTURER" here (say, +# "-sun"), then you have to tell the case statement up towards the top +# that MANUFACTURER isn't an operating system. Otherwise, code above +# will signal an error saying that MANUFACTURER isn't an operating +# system, and we'll never get to this point. + +case $basic_machine in + *-acorn) + os=-riscix1.2 + ;; + arm*-rebel) + os=-linux + ;; + arm*-semi) + os=-aout + ;; + pdp10-*) + os=-tops20 + ;; + pdp11-*) + os=-none + ;; + *-dec | vax-*) + os=-ultrix4.2 + ;; + m68*-apollo) + os=-domain + ;; + i386-sun) + os=-sunos4.0.2 + ;; + m68000-sun) + os=-sunos3 + # This also exists in the configure program, but was not the + # default. + # os=-sunos4 + ;; + m68*-cisco) + os=-aout + ;; + mips*-cisco) + os=-elf + ;; + mips*-*) + os=-elf + ;; + *-tti) # must be before sparc entry or we get the wrong os. + os=-sysv3 + ;; + sparc-* | *-sun) + os=-sunos4.1.1 + ;; + *-be) + os=-beos + ;; + *-ibm) + os=-aix + ;; + *-wec) + os=-proelf + ;; + *-winbond) + os=-proelf + ;; + *-oki) + os=-proelf + ;; + *-hp) + os=-hpux + ;; + *-hitachi) + os=-hiux + ;; + i860-* | *-att | *-ncr | *-altos | *-motorola | *-convergent) + os=-sysv + ;; + *-cbm) + os=-amigaos + ;; + *-dg) + os=-dgux + ;; + *-dolphin) + os=-sysv3 + ;; + m68k-ccur) + os=-rtu + ;; + m88k-omron*) + os=-luna + ;; + *-next ) + os=-nextstep + ;; + *-sequent) + os=-ptx + ;; + *-crds) + os=-unos + ;; + *-ns) + os=-genix + ;; + i370-*) + os=-mvs + ;; + *-next) + os=-nextstep3 + ;; + *-gould) + os=-sysv + ;; + *-highlevel) + os=-bsd + ;; + *-encore) + os=-bsd + ;; + *-sgi) + os=-irix + ;; + *-siemens) + os=-sysv4 + ;; + *-masscomp) + os=-rtu + ;; + f30[01]-fujitsu | f700-fujitsu) + os=-uxpv + ;; + *-rom68k) + os=-coff + ;; + *-*bug) + os=-coff + ;; + *-apple) + os=-macos + ;; + *-atari*) + os=-mint + ;; + *) + os=-none + ;; +esac +fi + +# Here we handle the case where we know the os, and the CPU type, but not the +# manufacturer. We pick the logical manufacturer. +vendor=unknown +case $basic_machine in + *-unknown) + case $os in + -riscix*) + vendor=acorn + ;; + -sunos*) + vendor=sun + ;; + -aix*) + vendor=ibm + ;; + -beos*) + vendor=be + ;; + -hpux*) + vendor=hp + ;; + -mpeix*) + vendor=hp + ;; + -hiux*) + vendor=hitachi + ;; + -unos*) + vendor=crds + ;; + -dgux*) + vendor=dg + ;; + -luna*) + vendor=omron + ;; + -genix*) + vendor=ns + ;; + -mvs* | -opened*) + vendor=ibm + ;; + -ptx*) + vendor=sequent + ;; + -vxsim* | -vxworks*) + vendor=wrs + ;; + -aux*) + vendor=apple + ;; + -hms*) + vendor=hitachi + ;; + -mpw* | -macos*) + vendor=apple + ;; + -*mint | -mint[0-9]* | -*MiNT | -MiNT[0-9]*) + vendor=atari + ;; + esac + basic_machine=`echo $basic_machine | sed "s/unknown/$vendor/"` + ;; +esac + +echo $basic_machine$os +exit 0 + +# Local variables: +# eval: (add-hook 'write-file-hooks 'time-stamp) +# time-stamp-start: "timestamp='" +# time-stamp-format: "%:y-%02m-%02d" +# time-stamp-end: "'" +# End: diff --git a/openssh/configure.ac b/openssh/configure.ac new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3cc9365 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/configure.ac @@ -0,0 +1,2248 @@ +# $Id$ + +AC_INIT +AC_CONFIG_SRCDIR([ssh.c]) + +AC_CONFIG_HEADER(config.h) +AC_PROG_CC +AC_CANONICAL_HOST +AC_C_BIGENDIAN + +# Checks for programs. +AC_PROG_CPP +AC_PROG_RANLIB +AC_PROG_INSTALL +AC_PATH_PROG(AR, ar) +AC_PATH_PROGS(PERL, perl5 perl) +AC_SUBST(PERL) +AC_PATH_PROG(ENT, ent) +AC_SUBST(ENT) +AC_PATH_PROGS(FILEPRIV, filepriv, true, /sbin:/usr/sbin) +AC_PATH_PROG(TEST_MINUS_S_SH, bash) +AC_PATH_PROG(TEST_MINUS_S_SH, ksh) +AC_PATH_PROG(TEST_MINUS_S_SH, sh) + +# System features +AC_SYS_LARGEFILE + +if test -z "$AR" ; then + AC_MSG_ERROR([*** 'ar' missing, please install or fix your \$PATH ***]) +fi + +# Use LOGIN_PROGRAM from environment if possible +if test ! -z "$LOGIN_PROGRAM" ; then + AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(LOGIN_PROGRAM_FALLBACK, "$LOGIN_PROGRAM") +else + # Search for login + AC_PATH_PROG(LOGIN_PROGRAM_FALLBACK, login) + if test ! -z "$LOGIN_PROGRAM_FALLBACK" ; then + AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(LOGIN_PROGRAM_FALLBACK, "$LOGIN_PROGRAM_FALLBACK") + fi +fi + +if test -z "$LD" ; then + LD=$CC +fi +AC_SUBST(LD) + +AC_C_INLINE +if test "$GCC" = "yes" || test "$GCC" = "egcs"; then + CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -Wall -Wpointer-arith -Wno-uninitialized" +fi + +# Check for some target-specific stuff +case "$host" in +*-*-aix*) + AFS_LIBS="-lld" + CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I/usr/local/include" + LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -L/usr/local/lib" + if (test "$LD" != "gcc" && test -z "$blibpath"); then + blibpath="/usr/lib:/lib:/usr/local/lib" + fi + AC_CHECK_FUNC(authenticate, [AC_DEFINE(WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE)]) + AC_DEFINE(BROKEN_GETADDRINFO) + dnl AIX handles lastlog as part of its login message + AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_LASTLOG) + ;; +*-*-cygwin*) + LIBS="$LIBS -lregex /usr/lib/textmode.o" + AC_DEFINE(HAVE_CYGWIN) + AC_DEFINE(USE_PIPES) + AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_SHADOW) + AC_DEFINE(IPV4_DEFAULT) + AC_DEFINE(IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN) + AC_DEFINE(NO_X11_UNIX_SOCKETS) + ;; +*-*-dgux*) + AC_DEFINE(IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN) + ;; +*-*-darwin*) + AC_DEFINE(BROKEN_GETADDRINFO) + ;; +*-*-hpux10*) + if test -z "$GCC"; then + CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -Ae" + fi + CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -D_HPUX_SOURCE -D_XOPEN_SOURCE -D_XOPEN_SOURCE_EXTENDED=1" + IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY=yes + AC_DEFINE(USE_PIPES) + AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_SHADOW) + AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_UTMP) + AC_DEFINE(SPT_TYPE,SPT_PSTAT) + LIBS="$LIBS -lxnet -lsec" + ;; +*-*-hpux11*) + CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -D_HPUX_SOURCE -D_XOPEN_SOURCE -D_XOPEN_SOURCE_EXTENDED=1" + IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY=yes + AC_DEFINE(PAM_SUN_CODEBASE) + AC_DEFINE(USE_PIPES) + AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_SHADOW) + AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_UTMP) + AC_DEFINE(SPT_TYPE,SPT_PSTAT) + LIBS="$LIBS -lxnet -lsec" + ;; +*-*-irix5*) + CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I/usr/local/include" + LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS" + PATH="$PATH:/usr/etc" + AC_DEFINE(BROKEN_INET_NTOA) + ;; +*-*-irix6*) + CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I/usr/local/include" + LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS" + PATH="$PATH:/usr/etc" + AC_DEFINE(WITH_IRIX_ARRAY) + AC_DEFINE(WITH_IRIX_PROJECT) + AC_DEFINE(WITH_IRIX_AUDIT) + AC_CHECK_FUNC(jlimit_startjob, [AC_DEFINE(WITH_IRIX_JOBS)]) + AC_DEFINE(BROKEN_INET_NTOA) + ;; +*-*-linux*) + no_dev_ptmx=1 + check_for_libcrypt_later=1 + AC_DEFINE(DONT_TRY_OTHER_AF) + AC_DEFINE(PAM_TTY_KLUDGE) + inet6_default_4in6=yes + ;; +mips-sony-bsd|mips-sony-newsos4) + AC_DEFINE(HAVE_NEWS4) + SONY=1 + AC_CHECK_LIB(iberty, xatexit, AC_DEFINE(HAVE_XATEXIT), + AC_MSG_ERROR([*** libiberty missing - please install first or check config.log ***]) + ) + ;; +*-*-netbsd*) + need_dash_r=1 + ;; +*-*-freebsd*) + check_for_libcrypt_later=1 + ;; +*-next-*) + conf_lastlog_location="/usr/adm/lastlog" + conf_utmp_location=/etc/utmp + conf_wtmp_location=/usr/adm/wtmp + MAIL=/usr/spool/mail + AC_DEFINE(HAVE_NEXT) + AC_DEFINE(BROKEN_REALPATH) + AC_DEFINE(USE_PIPES) + AC_DEFINE(BROKEN_SAVED_UIDS) + CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I/usr/local/include" + CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" + ;; +*-*-solaris*) + CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I/usr/local/include" + LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -L/usr/local/lib -R/usr/local/lib" + need_dash_r=1 + AC_DEFINE(PAM_SUN_CODEBASE) + AC_DEFINE(LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX) + AC_DEFINE(LOGIN_NEEDS_TERM) + AC_DEFINE(PAM_TTY_KLUDGE) + # hardwire lastlog location (can't detect it on some versions) + conf_lastlog_location="/var/adm/lastlog" + AC_MSG_CHECKING(for obsolete utmp and wtmp in solaris2.x) + sol2ver=`echo "$host"| sed -e 's/.*[[0-9]]\.//'` + if test "$sol2ver" -ge 8; then + AC_MSG_RESULT(yes) + AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_UTMP) + AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_WTMP) + else + AC_MSG_RESULT(no) + fi + ;; +*-*-sunos4*) + CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -DSUNOS4" + AC_CHECK_FUNCS(getpwanam) + AC_DEFINE(PAM_SUN_CODEBASE) + AC_DEFINE(HAVE_BOGUS_SYS_QUEUE_H) + conf_utmp_location=/etc/utmp + conf_wtmp_location=/var/adm/wtmp + conf_lastlog_location=/var/adm/lastlog + AC_DEFINE(USE_PIPES) + ;; +*-ncr-sysv*) + CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I/usr/local/include" + LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -L/usr/local/lib" + LIBS="$LIBS -lc89" + AC_DEFINE(HAVE_BOGUS_SYS_QUEUE_H) + ;; +*-sni-sysv*) + CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I/usr/local/include" + # /usr/ucblib MUST NOT be searched on ReliantUNIX + LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -L/usr/local/lib" + IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY=yes + AC_DEFINE(USE_PIPES) + AC_DEFINE(IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN) + AC_DEFINE(HAVE_BOGUS_SYS_QUEUE_H) + # /usr/ucblib/libucb.a no longer needed on ReliantUNIX + # Attention: always take care to bind libsocket and libnsl before libc, + # otherwise you will find lots of "SIOCGPGRP errno 22" on syslog + ;; +*-*-sysv4.2*) + CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I/usr/local/include" + LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -L/usr/local/lib" +# enable_suid_ssh=no + AC_DEFINE(USE_PIPES) + ;; +*-*-sysv5*) + CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I/usr/local/include" + LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -L/usr/local/lib" +# enable_suid_ssh=no + AC_DEFINE(USE_PIPES) + ;; +*-*-sysv*) + CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I/usr/local/include" + LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -L/usr/local/lib" + ;; +*-*-sco3.2v4*) + CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -Dftruncate=chsize -I/usr/local/include" + LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -L/usr/local/lib" + LIBS="$LIBS -los -lprot -lx -ltinfo -lm" + rsh_path="/usr/bin/rcmd" + RANLIB=true + no_dev_ptmx=1 + AC_DEFINE(BROKEN_SYS_TERMIO_H) + AC_DEFINE(USE_PIPES) + AC_DEFINE(HAVE_SCO_PROTECTED_PW) + AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_SHADOW) + AC_DEFINE(HAVE_BOGUS_SYS_QUEUE_H) + AC_DEFINE(BROKEN_SAVED_UIDS) + AC_CHECK_FUNCS(getluid setluid) + MANTYPE=man + do_sco3_extra_lib_check=yes + ;; +*-*-sco3.2v5*) + CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I/usr/local/include" + LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -L/usr/local/lib" + LIBS="$LIBS -lprot -lx -ltinfo -lm" + no_dev_ptmx=1 + rsh_path="/usr/bin/rcmd" + AC_DEFINE(USE_PIPES) + AC_DEFINE(HAVE_SCO_PROTECTED_PW) + AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_SHADOW) + AC_DEFINE(HAVE_BOGUS_SYS_QUEUE_H) + AC_CHECK_FUNCS(getluid setluid) + MANTYPE=man + ;; +*-*-unicos*) + no_libsocket=1 + no_libnsl=1 + AC_DEFINE(USE_PIPES) + LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -Wl,-Dmsglevel=334:fatal,-L/usr/local/lib" + LIBS="$LIBS -lgen -lrsc" + ;; +*-dec-osf*) + AC_MSG_CHECKING(for Digital Unix SIA) + no_osfsia="" + AC_ARG_WITH(osfsia, + [ --with-osfsia Enable Digital Unix SIA], + [ + if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then + AC_MSG_RESULT(disabled) + no_osfsia=1 + fi + ], + ) + if test -z "$no_osfsia" ; then + if test -f /etc/sia/matrix.conf; then + AC_MSG_RESULT(yes) + AC_DEFINE(HAVE_OSF_SIA) + AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_LOGIN) + LIBS="$LIBS -lsecurity -ldb -lm -laud" + else + AC_MSG_RESULT(no) + fi + fi + ;; + +*-*-nto-qnx) + AC_DEFINE(USE_PIPES) + AC_DEFINE(NO_X11_UNIX_SOCKETS) + AC_DEFINE(MISSING_NFDBITS) + AC_DEFINE(MISSING_HOWMANY) + AC_DEFINE(MISSING_FD_MASK) + ;; +esac + +# Allow user to specify flags +AC_ARG_WITH(cflags, + [ --with-cflags Specify additional flags to pass to compiler], + [ + if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then + CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $withval" + fi + ] +) +AC_ARG_WITH(cppflags, + [ --with-cppflags Specify additional flags to pass to preprocessor] , + [ + if test "x$withval" != "xno"; then + CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS $withval" + fi + ] +) +AC_ARG_WITH(ldflags, + [ --with-ldflags Specify additional flags to pass to linker], + [ + if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then + LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $withval" + fi + ] +) +AC_ARG_WITH(libs, + [ --with-libs Specify additional libraries to link with], + [ + if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then + LIBS="$LIBS $withval" + fi + ] +) + +AC_ARG_WITH(pcre, + [ --with-pcre[[=PATH]] Override built in regex library with pcre + (optionally in PATH)], + [ + case "$withval" in + no) ;; + *) + if test "x$withval" != "xyes"; then + if test -d "$withval/lib"; then + if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then + LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib -R${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}" + else + LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}" + fi + else + if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then + LDFLAGS="-L${withval} -R${withval} ${LDFLAGS}" + else + LDFLAGS="-L${withval} ${LDFLAGS}" + fi + fi + if test -d "$withval/include"; then + CPPFLAGS="-I${withval}/include ${CPPFLAGS}" + else + CPPFLAGS="-I${withval} ${CPPFLAGS}" + fi + fi + + AC_CHECK_HEADER(pcreposix.h, + AC_CHECK_LIB(pcre, pcre_info,[ + AC_DEFINE(HAVE_LIBPCRE) + LIBS="$LIBS -lpcreposix -lpcre" + no_comp_check=yes], + AC_MSG_ERROR([*** unable to locate pcre library ***])), + AC_MSG_ERROR([*** unable to locate pcreposix.h include file ***])) + ;; + esac + ] +) + +# Checks for libraries. +AC_CHECK_FUNC(yp_match, , AC_CHECK_LIB(nsl, yp_match)) +AC_CHECK_FUNC(setsockopt, , AC_CHECK_LIB(socket, setsockopt)) + +dnl SCO OS3 needs this for libwrap +if test "x$with_tcp_wrappers" != "xno" ; then + if test "x$do_sco3_extra_lib_check" = "xyes" ; then + AC_CHECK_LIB(rpc, innetgr, LIBS="-lrpc -lyp -lrpc $LIBS" , , -lyp -lrpc) + fi +fi + +AC_CHECK_FUNC(getspnam, , + AC_CHECK_LIB(gen, getspnam, LIBS="$LIBS -lgen")) + +dnl zlib is required +AC_ARG_WITH(zlib, + [ --with-zlib=PATH Use zlib in PATH], + [ + if test -d "$withval/lib"; then + if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then + LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib -R${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}" + else + LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}" + fi + else + if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then + LDFLAGS="-L${withval} -R${withval} ${LDFLAGS}" + else + LDFLAGS="-L${withval} ${LDFLAGS}" + fi + fi + if test -d "$withval/include"; then + CPPFLAGS="-I${withval}/include ${CPPFLAGS}" + else + CPPFLAGS="-I${withval} ${CPPFLAGS}" + fi + ] +) + +AC_CHECK_LIB(z, deflate, ,AC_MSG_ERROR([*** zlib missing - please install first or check config.log ***])) + +# We don't want to check if we did an pcre override. +if test -z "$no_comp_check" ; then + AC_CHECK_FUNC(regcomp, + [ AC_DEFINE(HAVE_REGCOMP)], + [ + AC_CHECK_LIB(pcre, pcre_info, + [ + AC_DEFINE(HAVE_LIBPCRE) + LIBS="$LIBS -lpcreposix -lpcre" + ], + [ + AC_MSG_ERROR([*** No regex library found.]) + ]) + ] + ) +fi + +dnl UnixWare 2.x +AC_CHECK_FUNC(strcasecmp, + [], [ AC_CHECK_LIB(resolv, strcasecmp, LIBS="$LIBS -lresolv") ] +) +AC_CHECK_FUNC(utimes, + [], [ AC_CHECK_LIB(c89, utimes, LIBS="$LIBS -lc89") ] +) + +dnl Checks for libutil functions +AC_CHECK_HEADERS(libutil.h) +AC_SEARCH_LIBS(login, util bsd, [AC_DEFINE(HAVE_LOGIN)]) +AC_CHECK_FUNCS(logout updwtmp logwtmp) + +AC_FUNC_STRFTIME + +# Checks for header files. +AC_CHECK_HEADERS(bstring.h crypt.h endian.h floatingpoint.h \ + getopt.h glob.h lastlog.h limits.h login.h \ + login_cap.h maillock.h netdb.h netgroup.h \ + netinet/in_systm.h paths.h poll.h pty.h regex.h \ + security/pam_appl.h shadow.h stddef.h stdint.h \ + strings.h sys/bitypes.h sys/bsdtty.h sys/cdefs.h \ + sys/poll.h sys/queue.h sys/select.h sys/stat.h \ + sys/stropts.h sys/sysmacros.h sys/time.h \ + sys/ttcompat.h sys/un.h time.h ttyent.h usersec.h \ + util.h utime.h utmp.h utmpx.h) + +# Check for ALTDIRFUNC glob() extension +AC_MSG_CHECKING(for GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC support) +AC_EGREP_CPP(FOUNDIT, + [ + #include + #ifdef GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC + FOUNDIT + #endif + ], + [ + AC_DEFINE(GLOB_HAS_ALTDIRFUNC) + AC_MSG_RESULT(yes) + ], + [ + AC_MSG_RESULT(no) + ] +) + +# Check for g.gl_matchc glob() extension +AC_MSG_CHECKING(for gl_matchc field in glob_t) +AC_EGREP_CPP(FOUNDIT, + [ + #include + int main(void){glob_t g; g.gl_matchc = 1;} + ], + [ + AC_DEFINE(GLOB_HAS_GL_MATCHC) + AC_MSG_RESULT(yes) + ], + [ + AC_MSG_RESULT(no) + ] +) + +AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether struct dirent allocates space for d_name]) +AC_TRY_RUN( + [ +#include +#include +int main(void){struct dirent d;return(sizeof(d.d_name)<=sizeof(char));} + ], + [AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)], + [ + AC_MSG_RESULT(no) + AC_DEFINE(BROKEN_ONE_BYTE_DIRENT_D_NAME) + ] +) + +# Check whether user wants S/Key support +SKEY_MSG="no" +AC_ARG_WITH(skey, + [ --with-skey[[=PATH]] Enable S/Key support + (optionally in PATH)], + [ + if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then + + if test "x$withval" != "xyes" ; then + CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${withval}/include" + LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -L${withval}/lib" + fi + + AC_DEFINE(SKEY) + LIBS="-lskey $LIBS" + SKEY_MSG="yes" + + AC_CHECK_FUNC(skey_keyinfo, + [], + [ + AC_MSG_ERROR([** Incomplete or missing s/key libraries.]) + ]) + fi + ] +) + +# Check whether user wants TCP wrappers support +TCPW_MSG="no" +AC_ARG_WITH(tcp-wrappers, + [ --with-tcp-wrappers[[=PATH]] Enable tcpwrappers support + (optionally in PATH)], + [ + if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then + saved_LIBS="$LIBS" + saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS" + saved_CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS" + if test -n "${withval}" -a "${withval}" != "yes"; then + if test -d "${withval}/lib"; then + if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then + LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib -R${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}" + else + LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}" + fi + else + if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then + LDFLAGS="-L${withval} -R${withval} ${LDFLAGS}" + else + LDFLAGS="-L${withval} ${LDFLAGS}" + fi + fi + if test -d "${withval}/include"; then + CPPFLAGS="-I${withval}/include ${CPPFLAGS}" + else + CPPFLAGS="-I${withval} ${CPPFLAGS}" + fi + fi + LIBS="-lwrap $LIBS" + AC_MSG_CHECKING(for libwrap) + AC_TRY_LINK( + [ +#include + int deny_severity = 0, allow_severity = 0; + ], + [hosts_access(0);], + [ + AC_MSG_RESULT(yes) + AC_DEFINE(LIBWRAP) + TCPW_MSG="yes" + ], + [ + AC_MSG_ERROR([*** libwrap missing]) + ] + ) + fi + ] +) + +dnl Checks for library functions. +AC_CHECK_FUNCS(arc4random atexit b64_ntop bcopy bindresvport_sa \ + clock fchmod fchown freeaddrinfo futimes gai_strerror \ + getaddrinfo getcwd getgrouplist getnameinfo getopt \ + getrlimit getrusage getttyent glob inet_aton inet_ntoa \ + inet_ntop innetgr login_getcapbool md5_crypt memmove \ + mkdtemp on_exit openpty readpassphrase realpath \ + rresvport_af setdtablesize setegid setenv seteuid \ + setlogin setproctitle setresgid setreuid setrlimit \ + setsid setvbuf sigaction sigvec snprintf strerror \ + strlcat strlcpy strmode strsep sysconf tcgetpgrp utimes \ + vhangup vsnprintf waitpid __b64_ntop _getpty) + +dnl IRIX and Solaris 2.5.1 have dirname() in libgen +AC_CHECK_FUNCS(dirname, [AC_CHECK_HEADERS(libgen.h)] ,[ + AC_CHECK_LIB(gen, dirname,[ + AC_CACHE_CHECK([for broken dirname], + ac_cv_have_broken_dirname, [ + save_LIBS="$LIBS" + LIBS="$LIBS -lgen" + AC_TRY_RUN( + [ +#include +#include + +int main(int argc, char **argv) { + char *s, buf[32]; + + strncpy(buf,"/etc", 32); + s = dirname(buf); + if (!s || strncmp(s, "/", 32) != 0) { + exit(1); + } else { + exit(0); + } +} + ], + [ ac_cv_have_broken_dirname="no" ], + [ ac_cv_have_broken_dirname="yes" ] + ) + LIBS="$save_LIBS" + ]) + if test "x$ac_cv_have_broken_dirname" = "xno" ; then + LIBS="$LIBS -lgen" + AC_DEFINE(HAVE_DIRNAME) + AC_CHECK_HEADERS(libgen.h) + fi + ]) +]) + +dnl Checks for time functions +AC_CHECK_FUNCS(gettimeofday time) +dnl Checks for utmp functions +AC_CHECK_FUNCS(endutent getutent getutid getutline pututline setutent) +AC_CHECK_FUNCS(utmpname) +dnl Checks for utmpx functions +AC_CHECK_FUNCS(endutxent getutxent getutxid getutxline pututxline ) +AC_CHECK_FUNCS(setutxent utmpxname) + +AC_CHECK_FUNC(getuserattr, + [AC_DEFINE(HAVE_GETUSERATTR)], + [AC_CHECK_LIB(s, getuserattr, [LIBS="$LIBS -ls"; AC_DEFINE(HAVE_GETUSERATTR)])] +) + +AC_CHECK_FUNC(daemon, + [AC_DEFINE(HAVE_DAEMON)], + [AC_CHECK_LIB(bsd, daemon, [LIBS="$LIBS -lbsd"; AC_DEFINE(HAVE_DAEMON)])] +) + +AC_CHECK_FUNC(getpagesize, + [AC_DEFINE(HAVE_GETPAGESIZE)], + [AC_CHECK_LIB(ucb, getpagesize, [LIBS="$LIBS -lucb"; AC_DEFINE(HAVE_GETPAGESIZE)])] +) + +# Check for broken snprintf +if test "x$ac_cv_func_snprintf" = "xyes" ; then + AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether snprintf correctly terminates long strings]) + AC_TRY_RUN( + [ +#include +int main(void){char b[5];snprintf(b,5,"123456789");return(b[4]!='\0');} + ], + [AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)], + [ + AC_MSG_RESULT(no) + AC_DEFINE(BROKEN_SNPRINTF) + AC_MSG_WARN([****** Your snprintf() function is broken, complain to your vendor]) + ] + ) +fi + +AC_FUNC_GETPGRP + +# Check for PAM libs +PAM_MSG="no" +AC_ARG_WITH(pam, + [ --with-pam Enable PAM support ], + [ + if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then + if test "x$ac_cv_header_security_pam_appl_h" != "xyes" ; then + AC_MSG_ERROR([PAM headers not found]) + fi + + AC_CHECK_LIB(dl, dlopen, , ) + AC_CHECK_LIB(pam, pam_set_item, , AC_MSG_ERROR([*** libpam missing])) + AC_CHECK_FUNCS(pam_getenvlist) + + disable_shadow=yes + PAM_MSG="yes" + + AC_DEFINE(USE_PAM) + fi + ] +) + +# Check for older PAM +if test "x$PAM_MSG" = "xyes" ; then + # Check PAM strerror arguments (old PAM) + AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether pam_strerror takes only one argument]) + AC_TRY_COMPILE( + [ +#include +#include + ], + [(void)pam_strerror((pam_handle_t *)NULL, -1);], + [AC_MSG_RESULT(no)], + [ + AC_DEFINE(HAVE_OLD_PAM) + AC_MSG_RESULT(yes) + PAM_MSG="yes (old library)" + ] + ) +fi + +# The big search for OpenSSL +AC_ARG_WITH(ssl-dir, + [ --with-ssl-dir=PATH Specify path to OpenSSL installation ], + [ + if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then + tryssldir=$withval + fi + ] +) + +saved_LIBS="$LIBS" +saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS" +saved_CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS" +if test "x$prefix" != "xNONE" ; then + tryssldir="$tryssldir $prefix" +fi +AC_CACHE_CHECK([for OpenSSL directory], ac_cv_openssldir, [ + for ssldir in $tryssldir "" /usr/local/openssl /usr/lib/openssl /usr/local/ssl /usr/lib/ssl /usr/local /usr/pkg /opt /opt/openssl ; do + CPPFLAGS="$saved_CPPFLAGS" + LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS" + LIBS="$saved_LIBS -lcrypto" + + # Skip directories if they don't exist + if test ! -z "$ssldir" -a ! -d "$ssldir" ; then + continue; + fi + if test ! -z "$ssldir" -a "x$ssldir" != "x/usr"; then + # Try to use $ssldir/lib if it exists, otherwise + # $ssldir + if test -d "$ssldir/lib" ; then + LDFLAGS="-L$ssldir/lib $saved_LDFLAGS" + if test ! -z "$need_dash_r" ; then + LDFLAGS="-R$ssldir/lib $LDFLAGS" + fi + else + LDFLAGS="-L$ssldir $saved_LDFLAGS" + if test ! -z "$need_dash_r" ; then + LDFLAGS="-R$ssldir $LDFLAGS" + fi + fi + # Try to use $ssldir/include if it exists, otherwise + # $ssldir + if test -d "$ssldir/include" ; then + CPPFLAGS="-I$ssldir/include $saved_CPPFLAGS" + else + CPPFLAGS="-I$ssldir $saved_CPPFLAGS" + fi + fi + + # Basic test to check for compatible version and correct linking + # *does not* test for RSA - that comes later. + AC_TRY_RUN( + [ +#include +#include +int main(void) +{ + char a[2048]; + memset(a, 0, sizeof(a)); + RAND_add(a, sizeof(a), sizeof(a)); + return(RAND_status() <= 0); +} + ], + [ + found_crypto=1 + break; + ], [] + ) + + if test ! -z "$found_crypto" ; then + break; + fi + done + + if test -z "$found_crypto" ; then + AC_MSG_ERROR([Could not find working OpenSSL library, please install or check config.log]) + fi + if test -z "$ssldir" ; then + ssldir="(system)" + fi + + ac_cv_openssldir=$ssldir +]) + +if (test ! -z "$ac_cv_openssldir" && test "x$ac_cv_openssldir" != "x(system)") ; then + AC_DEFINE(HAVE_OPENSSL) + dnl Need to recover ssldir - test above runs in subshell + ssldir=$ac_cv_openssldir + if test ! -z "$ssldir" -a "x$ssldir" != "x/usr"; then + # Try to use $ssldir/lib if it exists, otherwise + # $ssldir + if test -d "$ssldir/lib" ; then + LDFLAGS="-L$ssldir/lib $saved_LDFLAGS" + if test ! -z "$need_dash_r" ; then + LDFLAGS="-R$ssldir/lib $LDFLAGS" + fi + else + LDFLAGS="-L$ssldir $saved_LDFLAGS" + if test ! -z "$need_dash_r" ; then + LDFLAGS="-R$ssldir $LDFLAGS" + fi + fi + # Try to use $ssldir/include if it exists, otherwise + # $ssldir + if test -d "$ssldir/include" ; then + CPPFLAGS="-I$ssldir/include $saved_CPPFLAGS" + else + CPPFLAGS="-I$ssldir $saved_CPPFLAGS" + fi + fi +fi +LIBS="$saved_LIBS -lcrypto" + +# Now test RSA support +saved_LIBS="$LIBS" +AC_MSG_CHECKING([for RSA support]) +for WANTS_RSAREF in "" 1 ; do + if test -z "$WANTS_RSAREF" ; then + LIBS="$saved_LIBS" + else + LIBS="$saved_LIBS -lRSAglue -lrsaref" + fi + AC_TRY_RUN([ +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +int main(void) +{ + int num; RSA *key; static unsigned char p_in[] = "blahblah"; + unsigned char c[256], p[256]; + memset(c, 0, sizeof(c)); RAND_add(c, sizeof(c), sizeof(c)); + if ((key=RSA_generate_key(512, 3, NULL, NULL))==NULL) return(1); + num = RSA_public_encrypt(sizeof(p_in) - 1, p_in, c, key, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING); + return(-1 == RSA_private_decrypt(num, c, p, key, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)); +} + ], + [ + rsa_works=1 + break; + ], []) +done +LIBS="$saved_LIBS" + +if test ! -z "$no_rsa" ; then + AC_MSG_RESULT(disabled) + RSA_MSG="disabled" +else + if test -z "$rsa_works" ; then + AC_MSG_WARN([*** No RSA support found *** ]) + RSA_MSG="no" + else + if test -z "$WANTS_RSAREF" ; then + AC_MSG_RESULT(yes) + RSA_MSG="yes" + else + RSA_MSG="yes (using RSAref)" + AC_MSG_RESULT(using RSAref) + LIBS="$LIBS -lcrypto -lRSAglue -lrsaref" + fi + fi +fi + +# Some Linux systems (Slackware) need crypt() from libcrypt, *not* the +# version in OpenSSL. Skip this for PAM +if test "x$PAM_MSG" = "xno" -a "x$check_for_libcrypt_later" = "x1"; then + AC_CHECK_LIB(crypt, crypt, LIBS="$LIBS -lcrypt") +fi + +# Cheap hack to ensure NEWS-OS libraries are arranged right. +if test ! -z "$SONY" ; then + LIBS="$LIBS -liberty"; +fi + +# Checks for data types +AC_CHECK_SIZEOF(char, 1) +AC_CHECK_SIZEOF(short int, 2) +AC_CHECK_SIZEOF(int, 4) +AC_CHECK_SIZEOF(long int, 4) +AC_CHECK_SIZEOF(long long int, 8) + +# More checks for data types +AC_CACHE_CHECK([for u_int type], ac_cv_have_u_int, [ + AC_TRY_COMPILE( + [ #include ], + [ u_int a; a = 1;], + [ ac_cv_have_u_int="yes" ], + [ ac_cv_have_u_int="no" ] + ) +]) +if test "x$ac_cv_have_u_int" = "xyes" ; then + AC_DEFINE(HAVE_U_INT) + have_u_int=1 +fi + +AC_CACHE_CHECK([for intXX_t types], ac_cv_have_intxx_t, [ + AC_TRY_COMPILE( + [ #include ], + [ int8_t a; int16_t b; int32_t c; a = b = c = 1;], + [ ac_cv_have_intxx_t="yes" ], + [ ac_cv_have_intxx_t="no" ] + ) +]) +if test "x$ac_cv_have_intxx_t" = "xyes" ; then + AC_DEFINE(HAVE_INTXX_T) + have_intxx_t=1 +fi + +if (test -z "$have_intxx_t" && \ + test "x$ac_cv_header_stdint_h" = "xyes") +then + AC_MSG_CHECKING([for intXX_t types in stdint.h]) + AC_TRY_COMPILE( + [ #include ], + [ int8_t a; int16_t b; int32_t c; a = b = c = 1;], + [ + AC_DEFINE(HAVE_INTXX_T) + AC_MSG_RESULT(yes) + ], + [ AC_MSG_RESULT(no) ] + ) +fi + +AC_CACHE_CHECK([for int64_t type], ac_cv_have_int64_t, [ + AC_TRY_COMPILE( + [ #include ], + [ int64_t a; a = 1;], + [ ac_cv_have_int64_t="yes" ], + [ ac_cv_have_int64_t="no" ] + ) +]) +if test "x$ac_cv_have_int64_t" = "xyes" ; then + AC_DEFINE(HAVE_INT64_T) + have_int64_t=1 +fi + +if test -z "$have_int64_t" ; then + AC_MSG_CHECKING([for int64_t type in sys/socket.h]) + AC_TRY_COMPILE( + [ #include ], + [ int64_t a; a = 1], + [ + AC_DEFINE(HAVE_INT64_T) + AC_MSG_RESULT(yes) + ], + [ AC_MSG_RESULT(no) ] + ) +fi + +AC_CACHE_CHECK([for u_intXX_t types], ac_cv_have_u_intxx_t, [ + AC_TRY_COMPILE( + [ #include ], + [ u_int8_t a; u_int16_t b; u_int32_t c; a = b = c = 1;], + [ ac_cv_have_u_intxx_t="yes" ], + [ ac_cv_have_u_intxx_t="no" ] + ) +]) +if test "x$ac_cv_have_u_intxx_t" = "xyes" ; then + AC_DEFINE(HAVE_U_INTXX_T) + have_u_intxx_t=1 +fi + +if test -z "$have_u_intxx_t" ; then + AC_MSG_CHECKING([for u_intXX_t types in sys/socket.h]) + AC_TRY_COMPILE( + [ #include ], + [ u_int8_t a; u_int16_t b; u_int32_t c; a = b = c = 1;], + [ + AC_DEFINE(HAVE_U_INTXX_T) + AC_MSG_RESULT(yes) + ], + [ AC_MSG_RESULT(no) ] + ) +fi + +AC_CACHE_CHECK([for u_int64_t types], ac_cv_have_u_int64_t, [ + AC_TRY_COMPILE( + [ #include ], + [ u_int64_t a; a = 1;], + [ ac_cv_have_u_int64_t="yes" ], + [ ac_cv_have_u_int64_t="no" ] + ) +]) +if test "x$ac_cv_have_u_int64_t" = "xyes" ; then + AC_DEFINE(HAVE_U_INT64_T) + have_u_int64_t=1 +fi + +if test -z "$have_u_intxx_t" ; then + AC_CACHE_CHECK([for uintXX_t types], ac_cv_have_uintxx_t, [ + AC_TRY_COMPILE( + [ +#include + ], + [ uint8_t a; uint16_t b; uint32_t c; a = b = c = 1; ], + [ ac_cv_have_uintxx_t="yes" ], + [ ac_cv_have_uintxx_t="no" ] + ) + ]) + if test "x$ac_cv_have_uintxx_t" = "xyes" ; then + AC_DEFINE(HAVE_UINTXX_T) + fi +fi + +if test -z "$have_uintxx_t" ; then + AC_MSG_CHECKING([for uintXX_t types in stdint.h]) + AC_TRY_COMPILE( + [ #include ], + [ uint8_t a; uint16_t b; uint32_t c; a = b = c = 1;], + [ + AC_DEFINE(HAVE_UINTXX_T) + AC_MSG_RESULT(yes) + ], + [ AC_MSG_RESULT(no) ] + ) +fi + +if (test -z "$have_u_intxx_t" || test -z "$have_intxx_t" && \ + test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_bitypes_h" = "xyes") +then + AC_MSG_CHECKING([for intXX_t and u_intXX_t types in sys/bitypes.h]) + AC_TRY_COMPILE( + [ +#include + ], + [ + int8_t a; int16_t b; int32_t c; + u_int8_t e; u_int16_t f; u_int32_t g; + a = b = c = e = f = g = 1; + ], + [ + AC_DEFINE(HAVE_U_INTXX_T) + AC_DEFINE(HAVE_INTXX_T) + AC_MSG_RESULT(yes) + ], + [AC_MSG_RESULT(no)] + ) +fi + + +AC_CACHE_CHECK([for u_char], ac_cv_have_u_char, [ + AC_TRY_COMPILE( + [ +#include + ], + [ u_char foo; foo = 125; ], + [ ac_cv_have_u_char="yes" ], + [ ac_cv_have_u_char="no" ] + ) +]) +if test "x$ac_cv_have_u_char" = "xyes" ; then + AC_DEFINE(HAVE_U_CHAR) +fi + +TYPE_SOCKLEN_T + +AC_CACHE_CHECK([for size_t], ac_cv_have_size_t, [ + AC_TRY_COMPILE( + [ +#include + ], + [ size_t foo; foo = 1235; ], + [ ac_cv_have_size_t="yes" ], + [ ac_cv_have_size_t="no" ] + ) +]) +if test "x$ac_cv_have_size_t" = "xyes" ; then + AC_DEFINE(HAVE_SIZE_T) +fi + +AC_CACHE_CHECK([for ssize_t], ac_cv_have_ssize_t, [ + AC_TRY_COMPILE( + [ +#include + ], + [ ssize_t foo; foo = 1235; ], + [ ac_cv_have_ssize_t="yes" ], + [ ac_cv_have_ssize_t="no" ] + ) +]) +if test "x$ac_cv_have_ssize_t" = "xyes" ; then + AC_DEFINE(HAVE_SSIZE_T) +fi + +AC_CACHE_CHECK([for clock_t], ac_cv_have_clock_t, [ + AC_TRY_COMPILE( + [ +#include + ], + [ clock_t foo; foo = 1235; ], + [ ac_cv_have_clock_t="yes" ], + [ ac_cv_have_clock_t="no" ] + ) +]) +if test "x$ac_cv_have_clock_t" = "xyes" ; then + AC_DEFINE(HAVE_CLOCK_T) +fi + +AC_CACHE_CHECK([for sa_family_t], ac_cv_have_sa_family_t, [ + AC_TRY_COMPILE( + [ +#include +#include + ], + [ sa_family_t foo; foo = 1235; ], + [ ac_cv_have_sa_family_t="yes" ], + [ AC_TRY_COMPILE( + [ +#include +#include +#include + ], + [ sa_family_t foo; foo = 1235; ], + [ ac_cv_have_sa_family_t="yes" ], + + [ ac_cv_have_sa_family_t="no" ] + )] + ) +]) +if test "x$ac_cv_have_sa_family_t" = "xyes" ; then + AC_DEFINE(HAVE_SA_FAMILY_T) +fi + +AC_CACHE_CHECK([for pid_t], ac_cv_have_pid_t, [ + AC_TRY_COMPILE( + [ +#include + ], + [ pid_t foo; foo = 1235; ], + [ ac_cv_have_pid_t="yes" ], + [ ac_cv_have_pid_t="no" ] + ) +]) +if test "x$ac_cv_have_pid_t" = "xyes" ; then + AC_DEFINE(HAVE_PID_T) +fi + +AC_CACHE_CHECK([for mode_t], ac_cv_have_mode_t, [ + AC_TRY_COMPILE( + [ +#include + ], + [ mode_t foo; foo = 1235; ], + [ ac_cv_have_mode_t="yes" ], + [ ac_cv_have_mode_t="no" ] + ) +]) +if test "x$ac_cv_have_mode_t" = "xyes" ; then + AC_DEFINE(HAVE_MODE_T) +fi + + +AC_CACHE_CHECK([for struct sockaddr_storage], ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_storage, [ + AC_TRY_COMPILE( + [ +#include +#include + ], + [ struct sockaddr_storage s; ], + [ ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_storage="yes" ], + [ ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_storage="no" ] + ) +]) +if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_storage" = "xyes" ; then + AC_DEFINE(HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_STORAGE) +fi + +AC_CACHE_CHECK([for struct sockaddr_in6], ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_in6, [ + AC_TRY_COMPILE( + [ +#include +#include + ], + [ struct sockaddr_in6 s; s.sin6_family = 0; ], + [ ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_in6="yes" ], + [ ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_in6="no" ] + ) +]) +if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_in6" = "xyes" ; then + AC_DEFINE(HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN6) +fi + +AC_CACHE_CHECK([for struct in6_addr], ac_cv_have_struct_in6_addr, [ + AC_TRY_COMPILE( + [ +#include +#include + ], + [ struct in6_addr s; s.s6_addr[0] = 0; ], + [ ac_cv_have_struct_in6_addr="yes" ], + [ ac_cv_have_struct_in6_addr="no" ] + ) +]) +if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_in6_addr" = "xyes" ; then + AC_DEFINE(HAVE_STRUCT_IN6_ADDR) +fi + +AC_CACHE_CHECK([for struct addrinfo], ac_cv_have_struct_addrinfo, [ + AC_TRY_COMPILE( + [ +#include +#include +#include + ], + [ struct addrinfo s; s.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE; ], + [ ac_cv_have_struct_addrinfo="yes" ], + [ ac_cv_have_struct_addrinfo="no" ] + ) +]) +if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_addrinfo" = "xyes" ; then + AC_DEFINE(HAVE_STRUCT_ADDRINFO) +fi + +AC_CACHE_CHECK([for struct timeval], ac_cv_have_struct_timeval, [ + AC_TRY_COMPILE( + [ #include ], + [ struct timeval tv; tv.tv_sec = 1;], + [ ac_cv_have_struct_timeval="yes" ], + [ ac_cv_have_struct_timeval="no" ] + ) +]) +if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_timeval" = "xyes" ; then + AC_DEFINE(HAVE_STRUCT_TIMEVAL) + have_struct_timeval=1 +fi + +# If we don't have int64_t then we can't compile sftp-server. So don't +# even attempt to do it. +if test "x$ac_cv_have_int64_t" = "xno" -a \ + "x$ac_cv_sizeof_long_int" != "x8" -a \ + "x$ac_cv_sizeof_long_long_int" = "x0" ; then + NO_SFTP='#' +else +dnl test snprintf (broken on SCO w/gcc) + AC_TRY_RUN( + [ +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_SNPRINTF +main() +{ + char buf[50]; + char expected_out[50]; + int mazsize = 50 ; +#if (SIZEOF_LONG_INT == 8) + long int num = 0x7fffffffffffffff; +#else + long long num = 0x7fffffffffffffffll; +#endif + strcpy(expected_out, "9223372036854775807"); + snprintf(buf, mazsize, "%lld", num); + if(strcmp(buf, expected_out) != 0) + exit(1); + exit(0); +} +#else +main() { exit(0); } +#endif + ], [ true ], [ AC_DEFINE(BROKEN_SNPRINTF) ] + ) +fi +AC_SUBST(NO_SFTP) + +dnl Checks for structure members +OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD(ut_host, utmp.h, HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMP) +OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD(ut_host, utmpx.h, HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMPX) +OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD(syslen, utmpx.h, HAVE_SYSLEN_IN_UTMPX) +OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD(ut_pid, utmp.h, HAVE_PID_IN_UTMP) +OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD(ut_type, utmp.h, HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMP) +OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD(ut_type, utmpx.h, HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMPX) +OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD(ut_tv, utmp.h, HAVE_TV_IN_UTMP) +OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD(ut_id, utmp.h, HAVE_ID_IN_UTMP) +OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD(ut_id, utmpx.h, HAVE_ID_IN_UTMPX) +OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD(ut_addr, utmp.h, HAVE_ADDR_IN_UTMP) +OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD(ut_addr, utmpx.h, HAVE_ADDR_IN_UTMPX) +OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD(ut_addr_v6, utmp.h, HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMP) +OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD(ut_addr_v6, utmpx.h, HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMPX) +OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD(ut_exit, utmp.h, HAVE_EXIT_IN_UTMP) +OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD(ut_time, utmp.h, HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMP) +OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD(ut_time, utmpx.h, HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMPX) +OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD(ut_tv, utmpx.h, HAVE_TV_IN_UTMPX) + +AC_CHECK_MEMBERS([struct stat.st_blksize]) + +AC_CACHE_CHECK([for ss_family field in struct sockaddr_storage], + ac_cv_have_ss_family_in_struct_ss, [ + AC_TRY_COMPILE( + [ +#include +#include + ], + [ struct sockaddr_storage s; s.ss_family = 1; ], + [ ac_cv_have_ss_family_in_struct_ss="yes" ], + [ ac_cv_have_ss_family_in_struct_ss="no" ], + ) +]) +if test "x$ac_cv_have_ss_family_in_struct_ss" = "xyes" ; then + AC_DEFINE(HAVE_SS_FAMILY_IN_SS) +fi + +AC_CACHE_CHECK([for __ss_family field in struct sockaddr_storage], + ac_cv_have___ss_family_in_struct_ss, [ + AC_TRY_COMPILE( + [ +#include +#include + ], + [ struct sockaddr_storage s; s.__ss_family = 1; ], + [ ac_cv_have___ss_family_in_struct_ss="yes" ], + [ ac_cv_have___ss_family_in_struct_ss="no" ] + ) +]) +if test "x$ac_cv_have___ss_family_in_struct_ss" = "xyes" ; then + AC_DEFINE(HAVE___SS_FAMILY_IN_SS) +fi + +AC_CACHE_CHECK([for pw_class field in struct passwd], + ac_cv_have_pw_class_in_struct_passwd, [ + AC_TRY_COMPILE( + [ +#include + ], + [ struct passwd p; p.pw_class = 0; ], + [ ac_cv_have_pw_class_in_struct_passwd="yes" ], + [ ac_cv_have_pw_class_in_struct_passwd="no" ] + ) +]) +if test "x$ac_cv_have_pw_class_in_struct_passwd" = "xyes" ; then + AC_DEFINE(HAVE_PW_CLASS_IN_PASSWD) +fi + +AC_CACHE_CHECK([for pw_expire field in struct passwd], + ac_cv_have_pw_expire_in_struct_passwd, [ + AC_TRY_COMPILE( + [ +#include + ], + [ struct passwd p; p.pw_expire = 0; ], + [ ac_cv_have_pw_expire_in_struct_passwd="yes" ], + [ ac_cv_have_pw_expire_in_struct_passwd="no" ] + ) +]) +if test "x$ac_cv_have_pw_expire_in_struct_passwd" = "xyes" ; then + AC_DEFINE(HAVE_PW_EXPIRE_IN_PASSWD) +fi + +AC_CACHE_CHECK([for pw_change field in struct passwd], + ac_cv_have_pw_change_in_struct_passwd, [ + AC_TRY_COMPILE( + [ +#include + ], + [ struct passwd p; p.pw_change = 0; ], + [ ac_cv_have_pw_change_in_struct_passwd="yes" ], + [ ac_cv_have_pw_change_in_struct_passwd="no" ] + ) +]) +if test "x$ac_cv_have_pw_change_in_struct_passwd" = "xyes" ; then + AC_DEFINE(HAVE_PW_CHANGE_IN_PASSWD) +fi + +AC_CACHE_CHECK([if libc defines __progname], ac_cv_libc_defines___progname, [ + AC_TRY_LINK([], + [ extern char *__progname; printf("%s", __progname); ], + [ ac_cv_libc_defines___progname="yes" ], + [ ac_cv_libc_defines___progname="no" ] + ) +]) +if test "x$ac_cv_libc_defines___progname" = "xyes" ; then + AC_DEFINE(HAVE___PROGNAME) +fi + +AC_CACHE_CHECK([whether getopt has optreset support], + ac_cv_have_getopt_optreset, [ + AC_TRY_LINK( + [ +#include + ], + [ extern int optreset; optreset = 0; ], + [ ac_cv_have_getopt_optreset="yes" ], + [ ac_cv_have_getopt_optreset="no" ] + ) +]) +if test "x$ac_cv_have_getopt_optreset" = "xyes" ; then + AC_DEFINE(HAVE_GETOPT_OPTRESET) +fi + +AC_CACHE_CHECK([if libc defines sys_errlist], ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_errlist, [ + AC_TRY_LINK([], + [ extern const char *const sys_errlist[]; printf("%s", sys_errlist[0]);], + [ ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_errlist="yes" ], + [ ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_errlist="no" ] + ) +]) +if test "x$ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_errlist" = "xyes" ; then + AC_DEFINE(HAVE_SYS_ERRLIST) +fi + + +AC_CACHE_CHECK([if libc defines sys_nerr], ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_nerr, [ + AC_TRY_LINK([], + [ extern int sys_nerr; printf("%i", sys_nerr);], + [ ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_nerr="yes" ], + [ ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_nerr="no" ] + ) +]) +if test "x$ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_nerr" = "xyes" ; then + AC_DEFINE(HAVE_SYS_NERR) +fi + + +# Check whether user wants Kerberos support +SCARD_MSG="no" +AC_ARG_WITH(smartcard, + [ --with-smartcard Enable smartcard support], + [ + if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then + if test "x$withval" != "xyes" ; then + CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${withval}" + LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -L${withval}" + if test ! -z "$need_dash_r" ; then + LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -R${withval}" + fi + if test ! -z "$blibpath" ; then + blibpath="$blibpath:${withval}" + fi + fi + AC_CHECK_HEADERS(sectok.h) + if test "$ac_cv_header_sectok_h" != yes; then + AC_MSG_ERROR(Can't find sectok.h) + fi + AC_CHECK_LIB(sectok, sectok_open) + if test "$ac_cv_lib_sectok_sectok_open" != yes; then + AC_MSG_ERROR(Can't find libsectok) + fi + AC_DEFINE(SMARTCARD) + SCARD_MSG="yes" + fi + ] +) + +# Check whether user wants Kerberos support +KRB4_MSG="no" +AC_ARG_WITH(kerberos4, + [ --with-kerberos4=PATH Enable Kerberos 4 support], + [ + if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then + if test "x$withval" != "xyes" ; then + CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${withval}/include" + LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -L${withval}/lib" + if test ! -z "$need_dash_r" ; then + LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -R${withval}/lib" + fi + if test ! -z "$blibpath" ; then + blibpath="$blibpath:${withval}/lib" + fi + else + if test -d /usr/include/kerberosIV ; then + CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I/usr/include/kerberosIV" + fi + fi + + AC_CHECK_HEADERS(krb.h) + if test "$ac_cv_header_krb_h" != yes; then + AC_MSG_WARN([Cannot find krb.h, build may fail]) + fi + AC_CHECK_LIB(krb, main) + if test "$ac_cv_lib_krb_main" != yes; then + AC_CHECK_LIB(krb4, main) + if test "$ac_cv_lib_krb4_main" != yes; then + AC_MSG_WARN([Cannot find libkrb nor libkrb4, build may fail]) + else + KLIBS="-lkrb4" + fi + else + KLIBS="-lkrb" + fi + AC_CHECK_LIB(des, des_cbc_encrypt) + if test "$ac_cv_lib_des_des_cbc_encrypt" != yes; then + AC_CHECK_LIB(des425, des_cbc_encrypt) + if test "$ac_cv_lib_des425_des_cbc_encrypt" != yes; then + AC_MSG_WARN([Cannot find libdes nor libdes425, build may fail]) + else + KLIBS="-ldes425" + fi + else + KLIBS="-ldes" + fi + AC_CHECK_LIB(resolv, dn_expand, , ) + KRB4=yes + KRB4_MSG="yes" + AC_DEFINE(KRB4) + fi + ] +) + +# Check whether user wants AFS support +AFS_MSG="no" +AC_ARG_WITH(afs, + [ --with-afs=PATH Enable AFS support], + [ + if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then + + if test "x$withval" != "xyes" ; then + CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${withval}/include" + LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -L${withval}/lib" + fi + + if test -z "$KRB4" ; then + AC_MSG_WARN([AFS requires Kerberos IV support, build may fail]) + fi + + LIBS="-lkafs $LIBS" + if test ! -z "$AFS_LIBS" ; then + LIBS="$LIBS $AFS_LIBS" + fi + AC_DEFINE(AFS) + AFS_MSG="yes" + fi + ] +) +LIBS="$LIBS $KLIBS" + +# Looking for programs, paths and files +AC_ARG_WITH(rsh, + [ --with-rsh=PATH Specify path to remote shell program ], + [ + if test "x$withval" != "$no" ; then + rsh_path=$withval + fi + ], + [ + AC_PATH_PROG(rsh_path, rsh) + ] +) + +AC_ARG_WITH(xauth, + [ --with-xauth=PATH Specify path to xauth program ], + [ + if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then + xauth_path=$withval + fi + ], + [ + AC_PATH_PROG(xauth_path, xauth,,$PATH:/usr/X/bin:/usr/bin/X11:/usr/X11R6/bin:/usr/openwin/bin) + if (test ! -z "$xauth_path" && test -x "/usr/openwin/bin/xauth") ; then + xauth_path="/usr/openwin/bin/xauth" + fi + ] +) + +if test -z "$xauth_path" ; then + XAUTH_PATH="undefined" + AC_SUBST(XAUTH_PATH) +else + AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(XAUTH_PATH, "$xauth_path") + XAUTH_PATH=$xauth_path + AC_SUBST(XAUTH_PATH) +fi +if test ! -z "$rsh_path" ; then + AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(RSH_PATH, "$rsh_path") +fi + +# Check for mail directory (last resort if we cannot get it from headers) +if test ! -z "$MAIL" ; then + maildir=`dirname $MAIL` + AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(MAIL_DIRECTORY, "$maildir") +fi + +if test -z "$no_dev_ptmx" ; then + AC_CHECK_FILE("/dev/ptmx", + [ + AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(HAVE_DEV_PTMX) + have_dev_ptmx=1 + ] + ) +fi +AC_CHECK_FILE("/dev/ptc", + [ + AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(HAVE_DEV_PTS_AND_PTC) + have_dev_ptc=1 + ] +) + +# Options from here on. Some of these are preset by platform above + +# Check for user-specified random device, otherwise check /dev/urandom +AC_ARG_WITH(random, + [ --with-random=FILE read entropy from FILE (default=/dev/urandom)], + [ + if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then + RANDOM_POOL="$withval"; + AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(RANDOM_POOL, "$RANDOM_POOL") + fi + ], + [ + # Check for random device + AC_CHECK_FILE("/dev/urandom", + [ + RANDOM_POOL="/dev/urandom"; + AC_SUBST(RANDOM_POOL) + AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(RANDOM_POOL, "$RANDOM_POOL") + ] + ) + ] +) + +# Check for PRNGD/EGD pool file +AC_ARG_WITH(prngd-port, + [ --with-prngd-port=PORT read entropy from PRNGD/EGD localhost:PORT], + [ + if test ! -z "$withval" -a "x$withval" != "xno" ; then + PRNGD_PORT="$withval" + AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(PRNGD_PORT, $PRNGD_PORT) + fi + ] +) + +# Check for PRNGD/EGD pool file +AC_ARG_WITH(prngd-socket, + [ --with-prngd-socket=FILE read entropy from PRNGD/EGD socket FILE (default=/var/run/egd-pool)], + [ + if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then + PRNGD_SOCKET="$withval" + AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(PRNGD_SOCKET, "$PRNGD_SOCKET") + fi + ], + [ + # Check for existing socket only if we don't have a random device already + if test -z "$RANDOM_POOL" ; then + AC_MSG_CHECKING(for PRNGD/EGD socket) + # Insert other locations here + for sock in /var/run/egd-pool /dev/egd-pool /etc/entropy; do + if test -r $sock && $TEST_MINUS_S_SH -c "test -S $sock -o -p $sock" ; then + PRNGD_SOCKET="$sock" + AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(PRNGD_SOCKET, "$PRNGD_SOCKET") + break; + fi + done + if test ! -z "$PRNGD_SOCKET" ; then + AC_MSG_RESULT($PRNGD_SOCKET) + else + AC_MSG_RESULT(not found) + fi + fi + ] +) + + +# detect pathnames for entropy gathering commands, if we need them +INSTALL_SSH_PRNG_CMDS="" +rm -f prng_commands +if (test -z "$RANDOM_POOL" && test -z "$PRNGD") ; then + # Use these commands to collect entropy + OSSH_PATH_ENTROPY_PROG(PROG_LS, ls) + OSSH_PATH_ENTROPY_PROG(PROG_NETSTAT, netstat) + OSSH_PATH_ENTROPY_PROG(PROG_ARP, arp) + OSSH_PATH_ENTROPY_PROG(PROG_IFCONFIG, ifconfig) + OSSH_PATH_ENTROPY_PROG(PROG_JSTAT, jstat) + OSSH_PATH_ENTROPY_PROG(PROG_PS, ps) + OSSH_PATH_ENTROPY_PROG(PROG_SAR, sar) + OSSH_PATH_ENTROPY_PROG(PROG_W, w) + OSSH_PATH_ENTROPY_PROG(PROG_WHO, who) + OSSH_PATH_ENTROPY_PROG(PROG_LAST, last) + OSSH_PATH_ENTROPY_PROG(PROG_LASTLOG, lastlog) + OSSH_PATH_ENTROPY_PROG(PROG_DF, df) + OSSH_PATH_ENTROPY_PROG(PROG_VMSTAT, vmstat) + OSSH_PATH_ENTROPY_PROG(PROG_UPTIME, uptime) + OSSH_PATH_ENTROPY_PROG(PROG_IPCS, ipcs) + OSSH_PATH_ENTROPY_PROG(PROG_TAIL, tail) + + INSTALL_SSH_PRNG_CMDS="yes" +fi +AC_SUBST(INSTALL_SSH_PRNG_CMDS) + + +AC_ARG_WITH(mantype, + [ --with-mantype=man|cat|doc Set man page type], + [ + case "$withval" in + man|cat|doc) + MANTYPE=$withval + ;; + *) + AC_MSG_ERROR(invalid man type: $withval) + ;; + esac + ] +) +if test -z "$MANTYPE"; then + AC_PATH_PROGS(NROFF, nroff awf, /bin/false, /usr/bin:/usr/ucb) + if ${NROFF} -mdoc ${srcdir}/ssh.1 >/dev/null 2>&1; then + MANTYPE=doc + elif ${NROFF} -man ${srcdir}/ssh.1 >/dev/null 2>&1; then + MANTYPE=man + else + MANTYPE=cat + fi +fi +AC_SUBST(MANTYPE) +if test "$MANTYPE" = "doc"; then + mansubdir=man; +else + mansubdir=$MANTYPE; +fi +AC_SUBST(mansubdir) + +# Check whether to enable MD5 passwords +MD5_MSG="no" +AC_ARG_WITH(md5-passwords, + [ --with-md5-passwords Enable use of MD5 passwords], + [ + if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then + AC_DEFINE(HAVE_MD5_PASSWORDS) + MD5_MSG="yes" + fi + ] +) + +# Whether to disable shadow password support +AC_ARG_WITH(shadow, + [ --without-shadow Disable shadow password support], + [ + if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then + AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_SHADOW) + disable_shadow=yes + fi + ] +) + +if test -z "$disable_shadow" ; then + AC_MSG_CHECKING([if the systems has expire shadow information]) + AC_TRY_COMPILE( + [ +#include +#include + struct spwd sp; + ],[ sp.sp_expire = sp.sp_lstchg = sp.sp_inact = 0; ], + [ sp_expire_available=yes ], [] + ) + + if test "x$sp_expire_available" = "xyes" ; then + AC_MSG_RESULT(yes) + AC_DEFINE(HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE) + else + AC_MSG_RESULT(no) + fi +fi + +# Use ip address instead of hostname in $DISPLAY +if test ! -z "$IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY" ; then + DISPLAY_HACK_MSG="yes" + AC_DEFINE(IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY) +else + DISPLAY_HACK_MSG="no" + AC_ARG_WITH(ipaddr-display, + [ --with-ipaddr-display Use ip address instead of hostname in \$DISPLAY], + [ + if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then + AC_DEFINE(IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY) + DISPLAY_HACK_MSG="yes" + fi + ] + ) +fi + +# Whether to mess with the default path +SERVER_PATH_MSG="(default)" +AC_ARG_WITH(default-path, + [ --with-default-path=PATH Specify default \$PATH environment for server], + [ + if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then + user_path="$withval" + SERVER_PATH_MSG="$withval" + fi + ], + [ + AC_TRY_RUN( + [ +/* find out what STDPATH is */ +#include +#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H +# include +#endif +#ifndef _PATH_STDPATH +# define _PATH_STDPATH "/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin" +#endif +#include +#include +#include +#define DATA "conftest.stdpath" + +main() +{ + FILE *fd; + int rc; + + fd = fopen(DATA,"w"); + if(fd == NULL) + exit(1); + + if ((rc = fprintf(fd,"%s", _PATH_STDPATH)) < 0) + exit(1); + + exit(0); +} + ], [ user_path=`cat conftest.stdpath` ], + [ user_path="/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin" ], + [ user_path="/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin" ] + ) +# make sure $bindir is in USER_PATH so scp will work + t_bindir=`eval echo ${bindir}` + case $t_bindir in + NONE/*) t_bindir=`echo $t_bindir | sed "s~NONE~$prefix~"` ;; + esac + case $t_bindir in + NONE/*) t_bindir=`echo $t_bindir | sed "s~NONE~$ac_default_prefix~"` ;; + esac + echo $user_path | grep ":$t_bindir" > /dev/null 2>&1 + if test $? -ne 0 ; then + echo $user_path | grep "^$t_bindir" > /dev/null 2>&1 + if test $? -ne 0 ; then + user_path=$user_path:$t_bindir + AC_MSG_RESULT(Adding $t_bindir to USER_PATH so scp will work) + fi + fi + ] +) +AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(USER_PATH, "$user_path") +AC_SUBST(user_path) + +# Whether to force IPv4 by default (needed on broken glibc Linux) +IPV4_HACK_MSG="no" +AC_ARG_WITH(ipv4-default, + [ --with-ipv4-default Use IPv4 by connections unless '-6' specified], + [ + if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then + AC_DEFINE(IPV4_DEFAULT) + IPV4_HACK_MSG="yes" + fi + ] +) + +AC_MSG_CHECKING([if we need to convert IPv4 in IPv6-mapped addresses]) +IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG="no" +AC_ARG_WITH(4in6, + [ --with-4in6 Check for and convert IPv4 in IPv6 mapped addresses], + [ + if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then + AC_MSG_RESULT(yes) + AC_DEFINE(IPV4_IN_IPV6) + IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG="yes" + else + AC_MSG_RESULT(no) + fi + ],[ + if test "x$inet6_default_4in6" = "xyes"; then + AC_MSG_RESULT([yes (default)]) + AC_DEFINE(IPV4_IN_IPV6) + IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG="yes" + else + AC_MSG_RESULT([no (default)]) + fi + ] +) + +# Whether to enable BSD auth support +AC_ARG_WITH(bsd-auth, + [ --with-bsd-auth Enable BSD auth support], + [ + if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then + AC_DEFINE(BSD_AUTH) + bsd_auth=yes + fi + ] +) + +AC_MSG_CHECKING(whether to install ssh as suid root) +AC_ARG_ENABLE(suid-ssh, +[ --enable-suid-ssh Install ssh as suid root (default) + --disable-suid-ssh Install ssh without suid bit], +[ case "$enableval" in + no) + AC_MSG_RESULT(no) + SSHMODE=0711 + ;; + *) AC_MSG_RESULT(yes) + SSHMODE=4711 + ;; + esac ], + AC_MSG_RESULT(yes) + SSHMODE=4711 +) +AC_SUBST(SSHMODE) + + +# Where to place sshd.pid +piddir=/var/run +AC_ARG_WITH(pid-dir, + [ --with-pid-dir=PATH Specify location of ssh.pid file], + [ + if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then + piddir=$withval + fi + ] +) + +# make sure the directory exists +if test ! -d $piddir ; then + piddir=`eval echo ${sysconfdir}` + case $piddir in + NONE/*) piddir=`echo $piddir | sed "s~NONE~$ac_default_prefix~"` ;; + esac +fi + +AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(_PATH_SSH_PIDDIR, "$piddir") +AC_SUBST(piddir) + +dnl allow user to disable some login recording features +AC_ARG_ENABLE(lastlog, + [ --disable-lastlog disable use of lastlog even if detected [no]], + [ AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_LASTLOG) ] +) +AC_ARG_ENABLE(utmp, + [ --disable-utmp disable use of utmp even if detected [no]], + [ AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_UTMP) ] +) +AC_ARG_ENABLE(utmpx, + [ --disable-utmpx disable use of utmpx even if detected [no]], + [ AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_UTMPX) ] +) +AC_ARG_ENABLE(wtmp, + [ --disable-wtmp disable use of wtmp even if detected [no]], + [ AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_WTMP) ] +) +AC_ARG_ENABLE(wtmpx, + [ --disable-wtmpx disable use of wtmpx even if detected [no]], + [ AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_WTMPX) ] +) +AC_ARG_ENABLE(libutil, + [ --disable-libutil disable use of libutil (login() etc.) [no]], + [ AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_LOGIN) ] +) +AC_ARG_ENABLE(pututline, + [ --disable-pututline disable use of pututline() etc. ([uw]tmp) [no]], + [ AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_PUTUTLINE) ] +) +AC_ARG_ENABLE(pututxline, + [ --disable-pututxline disable use of pututxline() etc. ([uw]tmpx) [no]], + [ AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_PUTUTXLINE) ] +) +AC_ARG_WITH(lastlog, + [ --with-lastlog=FILE|DIR specify lastlog location [common locations]], + [ + if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then + AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_LASTLOG) + else + conf_lastlog_location=$withval + fi + ] +) + +dnl lastlog, [uw]tmpx? detection +dnl NOTE: set the paths in the platform section to avoid the +dnl need for command-line parameters +dnl lastlog and [uw]tmp are subject to a file search if all else fails + +dnl lastlog detection +dnl NOTE: the code itself will detect if lastlog is a directory +AC_MSG_CHECKING([if your system defines LASTLOG_FILE]) +AC_TRY_COMPILE([ +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_LASTLOG_H +# include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H +# include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_H +# include +#endif + ], + [ char *lastlog = LASTLOG_FILE; ], + [ AC_MSG_RESULT(yes) ], + [ + AC_MSG_RESULT(no) + AC_MSG_CHECKING([if your system defines _PATH_LASTLOG]) + AC_TRY_COMPILE([ +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_LASTLOG_H +# include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H +# include +#endif + ], + [ char *lastlog = _PATH_LASTLOG; ], + [ AC_MSG_RESULT(yes) ], + [ + AC_MSG_RESULT(no) + system_lastlog_path=no + ]) + ] +) + +if test -z "$conf_lastlog_location"; then + if test x"$system_lastlog_path" = x"no" ; then + for f in /var/log/lastlog /usr/adm/lastlog /var/adm/lastlog /etc/security/lastlog ; do + if (test -d "$f" || test -f "$f") ; then + conf_lastlog_location=$f + fi + done + if test -z "$conf_lastlog_location"; then + AC_MSG_WARN([** Cannot find lastlog **]) + dnl Don't define DISABLE_LASTLOG - that means we don't try wtmp/wtmpx + fi + fi +fi + +if test -n "$conf_lastlog_location"; then + AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(CONF_LASTLOG_FILE, "$conf_lastlog_location") +fi + +dnl utmp detection +AC_MSG_CHECKING([if your system defines UTMP_FILE]) +AC_TRY_COMPILE([ +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H +# include +#endif + ], + [ char *utmp = UTMP_FILE; ], + [ AC_MSG_RESULT(yes) ], + [ AC_MSG_RESULT(no) + system_utmp_path=no ] +) +if test -z "$conf_utmp_location"; then + if test x"$system_utmp_path" = x"no" ; then + for f in /etc/utmp /usr/adm/utmp /var/run/utmp; do + if test -f $f ; then + conf_utmp_location=$f + fi + done + if test -z "$conf_utmp_location"; then + AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_UTMP) + fi + fi +fi +if test -n "$conf_utmp_location"; then + AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(CONF_UTMP_FILE, "$conf_utmp_location") +fi + +dnl wtmp detection +AC_MSG_CHECKING([if your system defines WTMP_FILE]) +AC_TRY_COMPILE([ +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H +# include +#endif + ], + [ char *wtmp = WTMP_FILE; ], + [ AC_MSG_RESULT(yes) ], + [ AC_MSG_RESULT(no) + system_wtmp_path=no ] +) +if test -z "$conf_wtmp_location"; then + if test x"$system_wtmp_path" = x"no" ; then + for f in /usr/adm/wtmp /var/log/wtmp; do + if test -f $f ; then + conf_wtmp_location=$f + fi + done + if test -z "$conf_wtmp_location"; then + AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_WTMP) + fi + fi +fi +if test -n "$conf_wtmp_location"; then + AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(CONF_WTMP_FILE, "$conf_wtmp_location") +fi + + +dnl utmpx detection - I don't know any system so perverse as to require +dnl utmpx, but not define UTMPX_FILE (ditto wtmpx.) No doubt it's out +dnl there, though. +AC_MSG_CHECKING([if your system defines UTMPX_FILE]) +AC_TRY_COMPILE([ +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_UTMPX_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H +# include +#endif + ], + [ char *utmpx = UTMPX_FILE; ], + [ AC_MSG_RESULT(yes) ], + [ AC_MSG_RESULT(no) + system_utmpx_path=no ] +) +if test -z "$conf_utmpx_location"; then + if test x"$system_utmpx_path" = x"no" ; then + AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_UTMPX) + fi +else + AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(CONF_UTMPX_FILE, "$conf_utmpx_location") +fi + +dnl wtmpx detection +AC_MSG_CHECKING([if your system defines WTMPX_FILE]) +AC_TRY_COMPILE([ +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_UTMPX_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H +# include +#endif + ], + [ char *wtmpx = WTMPX_FILE; ], + [ AC_MSG_RESULT(yes) ], + [ AC_MSG_RESULT(no) + system_wtmpx_path=no ] +) +if test -z "$conf_wtmpx_location"; then + if test x"$system_wtmpx_path" = x"no" ; then + AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_WTMPX) + fi +else + AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(CONF_WTMPX_FILE, "$conf_wtmpx_location") +fi + + +# Change default command timeout for builtin PRNG +entropy_timeout=200 +AC_ARG_WITH(entropy-timeout, + [ --with-entropy-timeout Specify entropy gathering command timeout (msec)], + [ + if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then + entropy_timeout=$withval + fi + ] +) +AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(ENTROPY_TIMEOUT_MSEC, $entropy_timeout) + + +if test ! -z "$blibpath" ; then + LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -blibpath:$blibpath" + AC_MSG_WARN([Please check and edit -blibpath in LDFLAGS in Makefile]) +fi + +AC_EXEEXT + +AC_CONFIG_FILES([Makefile openbsd-compat/Makefile scard/Makefile ssh_prng_cmds]) +AC_OUTPUT + +# Print summary of options + +if test ! -z "$RANDOM_POOL" ; then + RAND_MSG="Device ($RANDOM_POOL)" +else + if test ! -z "$PRNGD_PORT" ; then + RAND_MSG="PRNGD/EGD (port localhost:$PRNGD_PORT)" + elif test ! -z "$PRNGD_SOCKET" ; then + RAND_MSG="PRNGD/EGD (socket $PRNGD_SOCKET)" + else + RAND_MSG="Builtin (timeout $entropy_timeout)" + BUILTIN_RNG=1 + fi +fi + +# Someone please show me a better way :) +A=`eval echo ${prefix}` ; A=`eval echo ${A}` +B=`eval echo ${bindir}` ; B=`eval echo ${B}` +C=`eval echo ${sbindir}` ; C=`eval echo ${C}` +D=`eval echo ${sysconfdir}` ; D=`eval echo ${D}` +E=`eval echo ${libexecdir}/ssh-askpass` ; E=`eval echo ${E}` +F=`eval echo ${mandir}/${mansubdir}X` ; F=`eval echo ${F}` +G=`eval echo ${piddir}` ; G=`eval echo ${G}` +H=`eval echo ${user_path}` ; H=`eval echo ${H}` + +echo "" +echo "OpenSSH has been configured with the following options:" +echo " User binaries: $B" +echo " System binaries: $C" +echo " Configuration files: $D" +echo " Askpass program: $E" +echo " Manual pages: $F" +echo " PID file: $G" +echo " sshd default user PATH: $H" +echo " Random number collection: $RAND_MSG" +echo " Manpage format: $MANTYPE" +echo " PAM support: ${PAM_MSG}" +echo " KerberosIV support: $KRB4_MSG" +echo " Smartcard support: $SCARD_MSG" +echo " AFS support: $AFS_MSG" +echo " S/KEY support: $SKEY_MSG" +echo " TCP Wrappers support: $TCPW_MSG" +echo " MD5 password support: $MD5_MSG" +echo " IP address in \$DISPLAY hack: $DISPLAY_HACK_MSG" +echo " Use IPv4 by default hack: $IPV4_HACK_MSG" +echo " Translate v4 in v6 hack: $IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG" + +if test ! -z "$bsd_auth"; then + echo " BSD Auth support: yes" +fi + +echo "" + +echo " Host: ${host}" +echo " Compiler: ${CC}" +echo " Compiler flags: ${CFLAGS}" +echo "Preprocessor flags: ${CPPFLAGS}" +echo " Linker flags: ${LDFLAGS}" +echo " Libraries: ${LIBS}" + +echo "" + +if test "x$PAM_MSG" = "xyes" ; then + echo "PAM is enabled. You may need to install a PAM control file for sshd," + echo "otherwise password authentication may fail. Example PAM control files" + echo "can be found in the contrib/ subdirectory" + echo "" +fi + +if test ! -z "$BUILTIN_RNG" ; then + echo "WARNING: you are using the builtin random number collection service." + echo "Please read WARNING.RNG and request that your OS vendor includes" + echo "/dev/random in future versions of their OS." + echo "" +fi + +if test ! -z "$NO_SFTP"; then + echo "sftp-server will be disabled. Your compiler does not support" + echo "64bit integers." + echo "" +fi + diff --git a/openssh/contrib/README b/openssh/contrib/README new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d255457 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/contrib/README @@ -0,0 +1,62 @@ +Other patches and addons for OpenSSH. Please send submissions to +djm@ibs.com.au + +Elsewhere +--------- + +http://www.imasy.or.jp/~gotoh/connect.c is a Unix and Windows +ProxyCommand which allows OpenSSH to make connections through a SOCKS5 +or http proxy which supports the CONNECT method (eg. Squid). + +In this directory +----------------- + +chroot.diff: + +Ricardo Cerqueira's patch to enable chrooting using the +wu-ftpd style magic home directories (containing '/./'). More details in +the head of the patch itself. + +ssh-copy-id: + +Phil Hands' shell script to automate the process of adding +your public key to a remote machine's ~/.ssh/authorized_keys file. + +gnome-ssh-askpass: + +A GNOME passphrase requester of my own creation. Compilation instructions +are in the top of the file. + +sshd.pam.generic: + +A generic PAM config file which may be useful on your system. YMMV + +sshd.pam.freebsd: + +A PAM config file which works with FreeBSD's PAM port. Contributed by +Dominik Brettnacher + +mdoc2man.pl: + +Converts mdoc formated manpages into normal manpages. This can be used +on Solaris machines to provide manpages that are not preformated. +Contributed by Mark D. Roth + +redhat: + +RPM spec file an scripts for building Redhat packages + +suse: + +RPM spec file an scripts for building SuSE packages + + +Externally maintained +--------------------- + +X11 SSH Askpass: + +Jim Knoble has written an excellent X11 +passphrase requester. This is highly recommended: + +http://www.ntrnet.net/~jmknoble/software/x11-ssh-askpass/index.html diff --git a/openssh/contrib/caldera/openssh.spec b/openssh/contrib/caldera/openssh.spec new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b11e549 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/contrib/caldera/openssh.spec @@ -0,0 +1,227 @@ +%define use-stable 1 +%if %{use-stable} + %define version 3.0.2p1 + %define cvs %{nil} + %define release 1 +%else + %define version 3.0p1 + %define cvs cvs20011102 + %define release 0r1 +%endif +%define xsa x11-ssh-askpass +%define askpass %{xsa}-1.2.4.1 + +Name : openssh +Version : %{version}%{cvs} +Release : %{release} +Group : System/Network + +Summary : OpenSSH free Secure Shell (SSH) implementation. + +Copyright : BSD +Packager : Raymund Will +URL : http://www.openssh.com/ + +Obsoletes : ssh, ssh-clients, openssh-clients + +BuildRoot : /tmp/%{Name}-%{Version} + +# %{use-stable}==1: ftp://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable +# %{use-stable}==0: :pserver:cvs@bass.directhit.com:/cvs/openssh_cvs +Source0: see-above:/.../openssh-%{Version}.tar.gz +%if %{use-stable} +Source1: see-above:/.../openssh-%{Version}.tar.gz.sig +%endif +Source2: http://www.ntrnet.net/~jmknoble/software/%{xsa}/%{askpass}.tar.gz +Source3: http://www.openssh.com/faq.html + + +%Package server +Group : System/Network +Requires : openssh = %{Version} +Obsoletes : ssh-server + +Summary : OpenSSH Secure Shell protocol server (sshd). + + +%Package askpass +Group : System/Network +Requires : openssh = %{Version} +URL : http://www.ntrnet.net/~jmknoble/software/x11-ssh-askpass/ +Obsoletes : ssh-extras + +Summary : OpenSSH X11 pass-phrase dialog. + + +%Prep +%setup %([ -z "%{cvs}" ] || echo "-n %{Name}_cvs") -a2 + +%if ! %{use-stable} + autoreconf +%endif + + +%Build +CFLAGS="$RPM_OPT_FLAGS" \ +./configure \ + --prefix=/usr \ + --sysconfdir=/etc/ssh \ + --libexecdir=/usr/lib/ssh \ + --with-pam \ + --with-tcp-wrappers \ + --with-ipv4-default \ + +make + +cd %{askpass} +./configure +xmkmf +make includes +make + + +%Install +%{mkDESTDIR} + +make DESTDIR="$DESTDIR" install + +make -C %{askpass} BINDIR="/usr/lib/ssh" install + +# OpenLinux specific configuration +mkdir -p $DESTDIR/{etc/pam.d,%{SVIcdir},%{SVIdir}} + +# enabling X11 forwarding on the server is convenient and okay, +# on the client side we consider it a potential security risk! +%{fixUP} -vT $DESTDIR/etc/ssh/sshd_config -e ' + s/X11Forwarding no/X11Forwarding yes/i' + +install -m644 contrib/caldera/sshd.pam $DESTDIR/etc/pam.d/sshd +# FIXME: disabled, find out why this doesn't work with NIS +%{fixUP} -vT $DESTDIR/etc/pam.d/sshd -e 's/^(.*pam_limits.*)$/#$1/' + +install -m 0755 contrib/caldera/sshd.init $DESTDIR%{SVIdir}/sshd +%{fixUP} -vT $DESTDIR/%{SVIdir} -e 's:\@SVIdir\@:%{SVIdir}: + + s:\@sysconfdir\@:/etc/ssh:' + +cat <<-EoD > $DESTDIR%{SVIcdir}/sshd + IDENT=sshd + DESCRIPTIVE="OpenSSH secure shell daemon" + # This service will be marked as 'skipped' on boot if there + # is no host key. Use ssh-host-keygen to generate one. + ONBOOT="yes" + OPTIONS="" +EoD + +SKG=$DESTDIR/usr/sbin/ssh-host-keygen +install -m 0755 contrib/caldera/ssh-host-keygen $SKG +%{fixUP} -T $SKG -e 's:\@sysconfdir\@:/etc/ssh: + + s:\@sshkeygen\@:/usr/bin/ssh-keygen:' + + +# install remaining docs +DocD="$DESTDIR%{_defaultdocdir}/%{Name}-%{Version}"; mkdir -p $DocD/00-LEGAL +cp -a LICENCE $DocD/00-LEGAL +cp -a CREDITS ChangeLog OVERVIEW README* TODO $DocD +install -p -m 0444 -o 0 -g 0 %{SOURCE3} $DocD/faq.html +mkdir -p $DocD/%{askpass} +cp -a %{askpass}/{README,ChangeLog,TODO,SshAskpass*.ad} $DocD/%{askpass} + +cp -p %{askpass}/%{xsa}.man $DESTDIR/usr/man/man1/%{xsa}.1 +ln -s %{xsa}.1 $DESTDIR/usr/man/man1/ssh-askpass.1 + +%{fixManPages} + + +# generate file lists +%{mkLists} -c %{Name} +%{mkLists} -d %{Name} << 'EOF' +/etc/ssh base +^/etc/ IGNORED +%{_defaultdocdir}/$ IGNORED +askpass askpass +* default +EOF +%{mkLists} -a -f %{Name} << 'EOF' +^/etc * prefix(%%config) +/usr/X11R6/lib/X11/app-defaults IGNORED +Ssh.bin IGNORED # for now +[Aa]skpass askpass +%{_defaultdocdir}/%{Name}-%{Version}/ base +ssh-keygen base +moduli server +sshd server +sftp-server server +.* base +EOF + + +%Clean +%{rmDESTDIR} + + +%Post +# Generate host key when none is present to get up and running, +# both client and server require this for host-based auth! +# ssh-host-keygen checks for existing keys. +/usr/sbin/ssh-host-keygen +: # to protect the rpm database + + +%Post server +if [ -x %{LSBinit}-install ]; then + %{LSBinit}-install sshd +else + lisa --SysV-init install sshd S55 3:4:5 K45 0:1:2:6 +fi + +! %{SVIdir}/sshd status || %{SVIdir}/sshd restart +: # to protect the rpm database + + +%PreUn server +[ "$1" = 0 ] || exit 0 + +! %{SVIdir}/sshd status || %{SVIdir}/sshd stop +: # to protect the rpm database + + +%PostUn server +if [ -x %{LSBinit}-remove ]; then + %{LSBinit}-remove sshd +else + lisa --SysV-init remove sshd $1 +fi +: # to protect the rpm database + + +%Files -f files-%{Name}-base +%defattr(-,root,root) + + +%Files server -f files-%{Name}-server +%defattr(-,root,root) + + +%Files askpass -f files-%{Name}-askpass +%defattr(-,root,root) + + +%Description +OpenSSH (Secure Shell) provides access to a remote system. It replaces +telnet, rlogin, rexec, and rsh, and provides secure encrypted +communications between two untrusted hosts over an insecure network. +X11 connections and arbitrary TCP/IP ports can also be forwarded over +the secure channel. + +%Description server +This package installs the sshd, the server portion of OpenSSH. + +%Description askpass +This package contains an X11-based pass-phrase dialog used per +default by ssh-add(1). It is based on %{askpass} +by Jim Knoble . + +%ChangeLog +* Mon Jan 01 1998 ... + +$Id$ diff --git a/openssh/contrib/caldera/ssh-host-keygen b/openssh/contrib/caldera/ssh-host-keygen new file mode 100755 index 0000000..94e3997 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/contrib/caldera/ssh-host-keygen @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +#! /bin/sh +# +# $Id$ +# +# This script is normally run only *once* for a given host +# (in a given period of time) -- on updates/upgrades/recovery +# the ssh_host_key* files _should_ be retained! Otherwise false +# "man-in-the-middle-attack" alerts will frighten unsuspecting +# clients... + +keydir=@sysconfdir@ +keygen=@sshkeygen@ + +if [ -f $keydir/ssh_host_key -o \ + -f $keydir/ssh_host_key.pub ]; then + echo "You already have an SSH1 RSA host key in $keydir/ssh_host_key." +else + echo "Generating 1024 bit SSH1 RSA host key." + $keygen -b 1024 -t rsa1 -f $keydir/ssh_host_key -C '' -N '' +fi + +if [ -f $keydir/ssh_host_rsa_key -o \ + -f $keydir/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub ]; then + echo "You already have an SSH2 RSA host key in $keydir/ssh_host_rsa_key." +else + echo "Generating 1024 bit SSH2 RSA host key." + $keygen -b 1024 -t rsa -f $keydir/ssh_host_rsa_key -C '' -N '' +fi + +if [ -f $keydir/ssh_host_dsa_key -o \ + -f $keydir/ssh_host_dsa_key.pub ]; then + echo "You already have an SSH2 DSA host key in $keydir/ssh_host_dsa_key." +else + echo "Generating SSH2 DSA host key." + $keygen -t dsa -f $keydir/ssh_host_dsa_key -C '' -N '' +fi diff --git a/openssh/contrib/caldera/sshd.init b/openssh/contrib/caldera/sshd.init new file mode 100755 index 0000000..bb0c9f9 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/contrib/caldera/sshd.init @@ -0,0 +1,125 @@ +#! /bin/bash +# +# $Id$ +# +### BEGIN INIT INFO +# Provides: +# Required-Start: $network +# Required-Stop: +# Default-Start: 3 4 5 +# Default-Stop: 0 1 2 6 +# Description: sshd +# Bring up/down the OpenSSH secure shell daemon. +### END INIT INFO +# +# Written by Miquel van Smoorenburg . +# Modified for Debian GNU/Linux by Ian Murdock . +# Modified for OpenLinux by Raymund Will + +NAME=sshd +DAEMON=/usr/sbin/$NAME +# Hack-Alert(TM)! This is necessary to get around the 'reload'-problem +# created by recent OpenSSH daemon/ssd combinations. See Caldera internal +# PR [linux/8278] for details... +PIDF=/var/run/$NAME.pid +NAME=$DAEMON + +_status() { + [ -z "$1" ] || local pidf="$1" + local ret=-1 + local pid + if [ -n "$pidf" ] && [ -r "$pidf" ]; then + pid=$(head -1 $pidf) + else + pid=$(pidof $NAME) + fi + + if [ ! -e $SVIlock ]; then + # no lock-file => not started == stopped? + ret=3 + elif [ -n "$pidf" -a ! -f "$pidf" ] || [ -z "$pid" ]; then + # pid-file given but not present or no pid => died, but was not stopped + ret=2 + elif [ -r /proc/$pid/cmdline ] && + echo -ne $NAME'\000' | cmp -s - /proc/$pid/cmdline; then + # pid-file given and present or pid found => check process... + # but don't compare exe, as this will fail after an update! + # compares OK => all's well, that ends well... + ret=0 + else + # no such process or exe does not match => stale pid-file or process died + # just recently... + ret=1 + fi + return $ret +} + +# Source function library (and set vital variables). +. @SVIdir@/functions + +case "$1" in + start) + [ ! -e $SVIlock ] || exit 0 + [ -x $DAEMON ] || exit 5 + SVIemptyConfig @sysconfdir@/sshd_config && exit 6 + + if [ ! \( -f @sysconfdir@/ssh_host_key -a \ + -f @sysconfdir@/ssh_host_key.pub \) -a \ + ! \( -f @sysconfdir@/ssh_host_rsa_key -a \ + -f @sysconfdir@/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub \) -a \ + ! \( -f @sysconfdir@/ssh_host_dsa_key -a \ + -f @sysconfdir@/ssh_host_dsa_key.pub \) ]; then + + echo "$SVIsubsys: host key not initialized: skipped!" + echo "$SVIsubsys: use ssh-host-keygen to generate one!" + exit 6 + fi + + echo -n "Starting $SVIsubsys services: " + ssd -S -x $DAEMON -n $NAME -- $OPTIONS + ret=$? + + echo "." + touch $SVIlock + ;; + + stop) + [ -e $SVIlock ] || exit 0 + + echo -n "Stopping $SVIsubsys services: " + ssd -K -p $PIDF -n $NAME + ret=$? + + echo "." + rm -f $SVIlock + ;; + + force-reload|reload) + [ -e $SVIlock ] || exit 0 + + echo "Reloading $SVIsubsys configuration files: " + ssd -K --signal 1 -q -p $PIDF -n $NAME + ret=$? + echo "done." + ;; + + restart) + $0 stop + $0 start + ret=$? + ;; + + status) + _status $PIDF + ret=$? + ;; + + *) + echo "Usage: $SVIscript {[re]start|stop|[force-]reload|status}" + ret=2 + ;; + +esac + +exit $ret + diff --git a/openssh/contrib/caldera/sshd.pam b/openssh/contrib/caldera/sshd.pam new file mode 100644 index 0000000..26dcb34 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/contrib/caldera/sshd.pam @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ +#%PAM-1.0 +auth required /lib/security/pam_pwdb.so shadow nodelay +auth required /lib/security/pam_nologin.so +account required /lib/security/pam_pwdb.so +password required /lib/security/pam_cracklib.so +password required /lib/security/pam_pwdb.so shadow nullok use_authtok +session required /lib/security/pam_pwdb.so +session required /lib/security/pam_limits.so diff --git a/openssh/contrib/chroot.diff b/openssh/contrib/chroot.diff new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d2a42d8 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/contrib/chroot.diff @@ -0,0 +1,61 @@ +From: Ricardo Cerqueira + +A patch to cause sshd to chroot when it encounters the magic token +'/./' in a users home directory. The directory portion before the +token is the directory to chroot() to, the portion after the +token is the user's home directory relative to the new root. + +Index: session.c +=================================================================== +RCS file: /var/cvs/openssh/session.c,v +retrieving revision 1.4 +diff -u -r1.4 session.c +--- session.c 2000/04/16 02:31:51 1.4 ++++ session.c 2000/04/16 02:47:55 +@@ -27,6 +27,8 @@ + #include "ssh2.h" + #include "auth.h" + ++#define CHROOT ++ + /* types */ + + #define TTYSZ 64 +@@ -783,6 +785,10 @@ + extern char **environ; + struct stat st; + char *argv[10]; ++#ifdef CHROOT ++ char *user_dir; ++ char *new_root; ++#endif /* CHROOT */ + + #ifndef USE_PAM /* pam_nologin handles this */ + f = fopen("/etc/nologin", "r"); +@@ -799,6 +805,26 @@ + /* Set login name in the kernel. */ + if (setlogin(pw->pw_name) < 0) + error("setlogin failed: %s", strerror(errno)); ++ ++#ifdef CHROOT ++ user_dir = xstrdup(pw->pw_dir); ++ new_root = user_dir + 1; ++ ++ while((new_root = strchr(new_root, '.')) != NULL) { ++ new_root--; ++ if(strncmp(new_root, "/./", 3) == 0) { ++ *new_root = '\0'; ++ new_root += 2; ++ ++ if(chroot(user_dir) != 0) ++ fatal("Couldn't chroot to user directory %s", user_dir); ++ ++ pw->pw_dir = new_root; ++ break; ++ } ++ new_root += 2; ++ } ++#endif /* CHROOT */ + + /* Set uid, gid, and groups. */ + /* Login(1) does this as well, and it needs uid 0 for the "-h" diff --git a/openssh/contrib/cygwin/README b/openssh/contrib/cygwin/README new file mode 100644 index 0000000..dfe1786 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/contrib/cygwin/README @@ -0,0 +1,178 @@ +This package is the actual port of OpenSSH to Cygwin 1.3. + +=========================================================================== +Important change since 2.9p2: + +Since Cygwin is able to switch user context without password beginning +with version 1.3.2, OpenSSH now allows to do so when it's running under +a version >= 1.3.2. Keep in mind that `ntsec' has to be activated to +allow that feature. +=========================================================================== + +=========================================================================== +Important change since 2.3.0p1: + +When using `ntea' or `ntsec' you now have to care for the ownership +and permission bits of your host key files and your private key files. +The host key files have to be owned by the NT account which starts +sshd. The user key files have to be owned by the user. The permission +bits of the private key files (host and user) have to be at least +rw------- (0600)! + +Note that this is forced under `ntsec' only if the files are on a NTFS +filesystem (which is recommended) due to the lack of any basic security +features of the FAT/FAT32 filesystems. +=========================================================================== + +If you are installing OpenSSH the first time, you can generate global config +files and server keys by running + + /usr/bin/ssh-host-config + +Note that this binary archive doesn't contain default config files in /etc. +That files are only created if ssh-host-config is started. + +If you are updating your installation you may run the above ssh-host-config +as well to move your configuration files to the new location and to +erase the files at the old location. + +To support testing and unattended installation ssh-host-config got +some options: + +usage: ssh-host-config [OPTION]... +Options: + --debug -d Enable shell's debug output. + --yes -y Answer all questions with "yes" automatically. + --no -n Answer all questions with "no" automatically. + --port -p sshd listens on port n. + +Additionally ssh-host-config now asks if it should install sshd as a +service when running under NT/W2K. This requires cygrunsrv installed. + +You can create the private and public keys for a user now by running + + /usr/bin/ssh-user-config + +under the users account. + +To support testing and unattended installation ssh-user-config got +some options as well: + +usage: ssh-user-config [OPTION]... +Options: + --debug -d Enable shell's debug output. + --yes -y Answer all questions with "yes" automatically. + --no -n Answer all questions with "no" automatically. + --passphrase -p word Use "word" as passphrase automatically. + +Install sshd as daemon via cygrunsrv.exe (recommended on NT/W2K), via inetd +(results in very slow deamon startup!) or from the command line (recommended +on 9X/ME). + +If you start sshd as deamon via cygrunsrv.exe you MUST give the +"-D" option to sshd. Otherwise the service can't get started at all. + +If starting via inetd, copy sshd to eg. /usr/sbin/in.sshd and add the +following line to your inetd.conf file: + +sshd stream tcp nowait root /usr/sbin/in.sshd sshd -i + +Moreover you'll have to add the following line to your +${SYSTEMROOT}/system32/drivers/etc/services file: + + sshd 22/tcp #SSH daemon + +=========================================================================== +The following restrictions only apply to Cygwin versions up to 1.3.1 +=========================================================================== + +Authentication to sshd is possible in one of two ways. +You'll have to decide before starting sshd! + +- If you want to authenticate via RSA and you want to login to that + machine to exactly one user account you can do so by running sshd + under that user account. You must change /etc/sshd_config + to contain the following: + + RSAAuthentication yes + + Moreover it's possible to use rhosts and/or rhosts with + RSA authentication by setting the following in sshd_config: + + RhostsAuthentication yes + RhostsRSAAuthentication yes + +- If you want to be able to login to different user accounts you'll + have to start sshd under system account or any other account that + is able to switch user context. Note that administrators are _not_ + able to do that by default! You'll have to give the following + special user rights to the user: + "Act as part of the operating system" + "Replace process level token" + "Increase quotas" + and if used via service manager + "Logon as a service". + + The system account does of course own that user rights by default. + + Unfortunately, if you choose that way, you can only logon with + NT password authentification and you should change + /etc/sshd_config to contain the following: + + PasswordAuthentication yes + RhostsAuthentication no + RhostsRSAAuthentication no + RSAAuthentication no + + However you can login to the user which has started sshd with + RSA authentication anyway. If you want that, change the RSA + authentication setting back to "yes": + + RSAAuthentication yes + +Please note that OpenSSH does never use the value of $HOME to +search for the users configuration files! It always uses the +value of the pw_dir field in /etc/passwd as the home directory. +If no home diretory is set in /etc/passwd, the root directory +is used instead! + +You may use all features of the CYGWIN=ntsec setting the same +way as they are used by the `login' port on sources.redhat.com: + + The pw_gecos field may contain an additional field, that begins + with (upper case!) "U-", followed by the domain and the username + separated by a backslash. + CAUTION: The SID _must_ remain the _last_ field in pw_gecos! + BTW: The field separator in pw_gecos is the comma. + The username in pw_name itself may be any nice name: + + domuser::1104:513:John Doe,U-domain\user,S-1-5-21-... + + Now you may use `domuser' as your login name with telnet! + This is possible additionally for local users, if you don't like + your NT login name ;-) You only have to leave out the domain: + + locuser::1104:513:John Doe,U-user,S-1-5-21-... + +SSH2 server and user keys are generated by the `ssh-*-config' scripts +as well. + +If you want to build from source, the following options to +configure are used for the Cygwin binary distribution: + + --prefix=/usr \ + --sysconfdir=/etc \ + --libexecdir='${exec_prefix}/sbin \ + --with-pcre + +You must have installed the zlib, openssl and regex packages to +be able to build OpenSSH! The `--with-pcre' option requires +the installation of the pcre package. + +Please send requests, error reports etc. to cygwin@cygwin.com. + +Have fun, + +Corinna Vinschen +Cygwin Developer +Red Hat Inc. diff --git a/openssh/contrib/cygwin/ssh-host-config b/openssh/contrib/cygwin/ssh-host-config new file mode 100644 index 0000000..bfeee7f --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/contrib/cygwin/ssh-host-config @@ -0,0 +1,495 @@ +#!/bin/sh +# +# ssh-host-config, Copyright 2000, Red Hat Inc. +# +# This file is part of the Cygwin port of OpenSSH. + +# Subdirectory where the new package is being installed +PREFIX=/usr + +# Directory where the config files are stored +SYSCONFDIR=/etc + +# Subdirectory where an old package might be installed +OLDPREFIX=/usr/local +OLDSYSCONFDIR=${OLDPREFIX}/etc + +progname=$0 +auto_answer="" +port_number=22 + +request() +{ + if [ "${auto_answer}" = "yes" ] + then + return 0 + elif [ "${auto_answer}" = "no" ] + then + return 1 + fi + + answer="" + while [ "X${answer}" != "Xyes" -a "X${answer}" != "Xno" ] + do + echo -n "$1 (yes/no) " + read answer + done + if [ "X${answer}" = "Xyes" ] + then + return 0 + else + return 1 + fi +} + +# Check options + +while : +do + case $# in + 0) + break + ;; + esac + + option=$1 + shift + + case "$option" in + -d | --debug ) + set -x + ;; + + -y | --yes ) + auto_answer=yes + ;; + + -n | --no ) + auto_answer=no + ;; + + -p | --port ) + port_number=$1 + shift + ;; + + *) + echo "usage: ${progname} [OPTION]..." + echo + echo "This script creates an OpenSSH host configuration." + echo + echo "Options:" + echo " --debug -d Enable shell's debug output." + echo " --yes -y Answer all questions with \"yes\" automatically." + echo " --no -n Answer all questions with \"no\" automatically." + echo " --port -p sshd listens on port n." + echo + exit 1 + ;; + + esac +done + +# Check for running ssh/sshd processes first. Refuse to do anything while +# some ssh processes are still running + +if ps -ef | grep -v grep | grep -q ssh +then + echo + echo "There are still ssh processes running. Please shut them down first." + echo + #exit 1 +fi + +# Check for ${SYSCONFDIR} directory + +if [ -e "${SYSCONFDIR}" -a ! -d "${SYSCONFDIR}" ] +then + echo + echo "${SYSCONFDIR} is existant but not a directory." + echo "Cannot create global configuration files." + echo + exit 1 +fi + +# Create it if necessary + +if [ ! -e "${SYSCONFDIR}" ] +then + mkdir "${SYSCONFDIR}" + if [ ! -e "${SYSCONFDIR}" ] + then + echo + echo "Creating ${SYSCONFDIR} directory failed" + echo + exit 1 + fi +fi + +# Check for an old installation in ${OLDPREFIX} unless ${OLDPREFIX} isn't +# the same as ${PREFIX} + +old_install=0 +if [ "${OLDPREFIX}" != "${PREFIX}" ] +then + if [ -f "${OLDPREFIX}/sbin/sshd" ] + then + echo + echo "You seem to have an older installation in ${OLDPREFIX}." + echo + # Check if old global configuration files exist + if [ -f "${OLDSYSCONFDIR}/ssh_host_key" ] + then + if request "Do you want to copy your config files to your new installation?" + then + cp -f ${OLDSYSCONFDIR}/ssh_host_key ${SYSCONFDIR} + cp -f ${OLDSYSCONFDIR}/ssh_host_key.pub ${SYSCONFDIR} + cp -f ${OLDSYSCONFDIR}/ssh_host_dsa_key ${SYSCONFDIR} + cp -f ${OLDSYSCONFDIR}/ssh_host_dsa_key.pub ${SYSCONFDIR} + cp -f ${OLDSYSCONFDIR}/ssh_config ${SYSCONFDIR} + cp -f ${OLDSYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config ${SYSCONFDIR} + fi + fi + if request "Do you want to erase your old installation?" + then + rm -f ${OLDPREFIX}/bin/ssh.exe + rm -f ${OLDPREFIX}/bin/ssh-config + rm -f ${OLDPREFIX}/bin/scp.exe + rm -f ${OLDPREFIX}/bin/ssh-add.exe + rm -f ${OLDPREFIX}/bin/ssh-agent.exe + rm -f ${OLDPREFIX}/bin/ssh-keygen.exe + rm -f ${OLDPREFIX}/bin/slogin + rm -f ${OLDSYSCONFDIR}/ssh_host_key + rm -f ${OLDSYSCONFDIR}/ssh_host_key.pub + rm -f ${OLDSYSCONFDIR}/ssh_host_dsa_key + rm -f ${OLDSYSCONFDIR}/ssh_host_dsa_key.pub + rm -f ${OLDSYSCONFDIR}/ssh_config + rm -f ${OLDSYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config + rm -f ${OLDPREFIX}/man/man1/ssh.1 + rm -f ${OLDPREFIX}/man/man1/scp.1 + rm -f ${OLDPREFIX}/man/man1/ssh-add.1 + rm -f ${OLDPREFIX}/man/man1/ssh-agent.1 + rm -f ${OLDPREFIX}/man/man1/ssh-keygen.1 + rm -f ${OLDPREFIX}/man/man1/slogin.1 + rm -f ${OLDPREFIX}/man/man8/sshd.8 + rm -f ${OLDPREFIX}/sbin/sshd.exe + rm -f ${OLDPREFIX}/sbin/sftp-server.exe + fi + old_install=1 + fi +fi + +# First generate host keys if not already existing + +if [ ! -f "${SYSCONFDIR}/ssh_host_key" ] +then + echo "Generating ${SYSCONFDIR}/ssh_host_key" + ssh-keygen -t rsa1 -f ${SYSCONFDIR}/ssh_host_key -N '' > /dev/null +fi + +if [ ! -f "${SYSCONFDIR}/ssh_host_rsa_key" ] +then + echo "Generating ${SYSCONFDIR}/ssh_host_rsa_key" + ssh-keygen -t rsa -f ${SYSCONFDIR}/ssh_host_rsa_key -N '' > /dev/null +fi + +if [ ! -f "${SYSCONFDIR}/ssh_host_dsa_key" ] +then + echo "Generating ${SYSCONFDIR}/ssh_host_dsa_key" + ssh-keygen -t dsa -f ${SYSCONFDIR}/ssh_host_dsa_key -N '' > /dev/null +fi + +# Check if ssh_config exists. If yes, ask for overwriting + +if [ -f "${SYSCONFDIR}/ssh_config" ] +then + if request "Overwrite existing ${SYSCONFDIR}/ssh_config file?" + then + rm -f "${SYSCONFDIR}/ssh_config" + if [ -f "${SYSCONFDIR}/ssh_config" ] + then + echo "Can't overwrite. ${SYSCONFDIR}/ssh_config is write protected." + fi + fi +fi + +# Create default ssh_config from here script + +if [ ! -f "${SYSCONFDIR}/ssh_config" ] +then + echo "Generating ${SYSCONFDIR}/ssh_config file" + cat > ${SYSCONFDIR}/ssh_config << EOF +# This is ssh client systemwide configuration file. This file provides +# defaults for users, and the values can be changed in per-user configuration +# files or on the command line. + +# Configuration data is parsed as follows: +# 1. command line options +# 2. user-specific file +# 3. system-wide file +# Any configuration value is only changed the first time it is set. +# Thus, host-specific definitions should be at the beginning of the +# configuration file, and defaults at the end. + +# Site-wide defaults for various options + +# Host * +# ForwardAgent no +# ForwardX11 no +# RhostsAuthentication no +# RhostsRSAAuthentication yes +# RSAAuthentication yes +# PasswordAuthentication yes +# FallBackToRsh no +# UseRsh no +# BatchMode no +# CheckHostIP yes +# StrictHostKeyChecking yes +# IdentityFile ~/.ssh/identity +# IdentityFile ~/.ssh/id_dsa +# IdentityFile ~/.ssh/id_rsa +# Port 22 +# Protocol 2,1 +# Cipher blowfish +# EscapeChar ~ +EOF + if [ "$port_number" != "22" ] + then + echo "Host localhost" >> ${SYSCONFDIR}/ssh_config + echo " Port $port_number" >> ${SYSCONFDIR}/ssh_config + fi +fi + +# Check if sshd_config exists. If yes, ask for overwriting + +if [ -f "${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config" ] +then + if request "Overwrite existing ${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config file?" + then + rm -f "${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config" + if [ -f "${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config" ] + then + echo "Can't overwrite. ${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config is write protected." + fi + fi +fi + +# Create default sshd_config from here script + +if [ ! -f "${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config" ] +then + echo "Generating ${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config file" + cat > ${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config << EOF +# This is the sshd server system-wide configuration file. See sshd(8) +# for more information. + +Port $port_number +#Protocol 2,1 +#ListenAddress 0.0.0.0 +#ListenAddress :: + +# HostKey for protocol version 1 +HostKey /etc/ssh_host_key +# HostKeys for protocol version 2 +HostKey /etc/ssh_host_rsa_key +HostKey /etc/ssh_host_dsa_key + +# Lifetime and size of ephemeral version 1 server ke +KeyRegenerationInterval 3600 +ServerKeyBits 768 + +# Logging +SyslogFacility AUTH +LogLevel INFO +#obsoletes QuietMode and FascistLogging + +# Authentication: + +LoginGraceTime 600 +PermitRootLogin yes +# The following setting overrides permission checks on host key files +# and directories. For security reasons set this to "yes" when running +# NT/W2K, NTFS and CYGWIN=ntsec. +StrictModes no + +RSAAuthentication yes +PubkeyAuthentication yes +#AuthorizedKeysFile %h/.ssh/authorized_keys + +# rhosts authentication should not be used +RhostsAuthentication no +# Don't read ~/.rhosts and ~/.shosts files +IgnoreRhosts yes +# For this to work you will also need host keys in /etc/ssh_known_hosts +RhostsRSAAuthentication no +# similar for protocol version 2 +HostbasedAuthentication no +# Uncomment if you don't trust ~/.ssh/known_hosts for RhostsRSAAuthentication +#IgnoreUserKnownHosts yes + +# To disable tunneled clear text passwords, change to no here! +PasswordAuthentication yes +PermitEmptyPasswords no + +X11Forwarding no +X11DisplayOffset 10 +PrintMotd yes +#PrintLastLog no +KeepAlive yes +#UseLogin no + +#MaxStartups 10:30:60 +#Banner /etc/issue.net +#ReverseMappingCheck yes + +Subsystem sftp /usr/sbin/sftp-server +EOF +fi + +# Care for services file +_sys="`uname -a`" +_nt=`expr "$_sys" : "CYGWIN_NT"` +if [ $_nt -gt 0 ] +then + _wservices="${SYSTEMROOT}\\system32\\drivers\\etc\\services" + _wserv_tmp="${SYSTEMROOT}\\system32\\drivers\\etc\\srv.out.$$" +else + _wservices="${WINDIR}\\SERVICES" + _wserv_tmp="${WINDIR}\\SERV.$$" +fi +_services=`cygpath -u "${_wservices}"` +_serv_tmp=`cygpath -u "${_wserv_tmp}"` + +mount -t -f "${_wservices}" "${_services}" +mount -t -f "${_wserv_tmp}" "${_serv_tmp}" + +# Remove sshd 22/port from services +if [ `grep -q 'sshd[ \t][ \t]*22' "${_services}"; echo $?` -eq 0 ] +then + grep -v 'sshd[ \t][ \t]*22' "${_services}" > "${_serv_tmp}" + if [ -f "${_serv_tmp}" ] + then + if mv "${_serv_tmp}" "${_services}" + then + echo "Removing sshd from ${_services}" + else + echo "Removing sshd from ${_services} failed\!" + fi + rm -f "${_serv_tmp}" + else + echo "Removing sshd from ${_services} failed\!" + fi +fi + +# Add ssh 22/tcp and ssh 22/udp to services +if [ `grep -q 'ssh[ \t][ \t]*22' "${_services}"; echo $?` -ne 0 ] +then + awk '{ if ( $2 ~ /^23\/tcp/ ) print "ssh 22/tcp #SSH Remote Login Protocol\nssh 22/udp #SSH Remote Login Protocol"; print $0; }' < "${_services}" > "${_serv_tmp}" + if [ -f "${_serv_tmp}" ] + then + if mv "${_serv_tmp}" "${_services}" + then + echo "Added ssh to ${_services}" + else + echo "Adding ssh to ${_services} failed\!" + fi + rm -f "${_serv_tmp}" + else + echo "Adding ssh to ${_services} failed\!" + fi +fi + +umount "${_services}" +umount "${_serv_tmp}" + +# Care for inetd.conf file +_inetcnf="/etc/inetd.conf" +_inetcnf_tmp="/etc/inetd.conf.$$" + +if [ -f "${_inetcnf}" ] +then + # Check if ssh service is already in use as sshd + with_comment=1 + grep -q '^[ \t]*sshd' "${_inetcnf}" && with_comment=0 + # Remove sshd line from inetd.conf + if [ `grep -q '^[# \t]*sshd' "${_inetcnf}"; echo $?` -eq 0 ] + then + grep -v '^[# \t]*sshd' "${_inetcnf}" >> "${_inetcnf_tmp}" + if [ -f "${_inetcnf_tmp}" ] + then + if mv "${_inetcnf_tmp}" "${_inetcnf}" + then + echo "Removed sshd from ${_inetcnf}" + else + echo "Removing sshd from ${_inetcnf} failed\!" + fi + rm -f "${_inetcnf_tmp}" + else + echo "Removing sshd from ${_inetcnf} failed\!" + fi + fi + + # Add ssh line to inetd.conf + if [ `grep -q '^[# \t]*ssh' "${_inetcnf}"; echo $?` -ne 0 ] + then + if [ "${with_comment}" -eq 0 ] + then + echo 'ssh stream tcp nowait root /usr/sbin/sshd -i' >> "${_inetcnf}" + else + echo '# ssh stream tcp nowait root /usr/sbin/sshd -i' >> "${_inetcnf}" + fi + echo "Added ssh to ${_inetcnf}" + fi +fi + +# Create /var/log and /var/log/lastlog if not already existing + +if [ -f /var/log ] +then + echo "Creating /var/log failed\!" +else + if [ ! -d /var/log ] + then + mkdir /var/log + fi + if [ -d /var/log/lastlog ] + then + echo "Creating /var/log/lastlog failed\!" + elif [ ! -f /var/log/lastlog ] + then + cat /dev/null > /var/log/lastlog + fi +fi + +# On NT ask if sshd should be installed as service +if [ $_nt -gt 0 ] +then + echo + echo "Do you want to install sshd as service?" + if request "(Say \"no\" if it's already installed as service)" + then + echo + echo "Which value should the environment variable CYGWIN have when" + echo "sshd starts? It's recommended to set at least \"ntsec\" to be" + echo "able to change user context without password." + echo -n "Default is \"binmode ntsec tty\". CYGWIN=" + read _cygwin + [ -z "${_cygwin}" ] && _cygwin="binmode ntsec tty" + if cygrunsrv -I sshd -d "CYGWIN sshd" -p /usr/sbin/sshd -a -D -e "CYGWIN=${_cygwin}" + then + chown system /etc/ssh* + echo + echo "The service has been installed under LocalSystem account." + fi + fi +fi + +if [ "${old_install}" = "1" ] +then + echo + echo "Note: If you have used sshd as service or from inetd, don't forget to" + echo " change the path to sshd.exe in the service entry or in inetd.conf." +fi + +echo +echo "Host configuration finished. Have fun!" diff --git a/openssh/contrib/cygwin/ssh-user-config b/openssh/contrib/cygwin/ssh-user-config new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5a76adb --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/contrib/cygwin/ssh-user-config @@ -0,0 +1,200 @@ +#!/bin/sh +# +# ssh-user-config, Copyright 2000, Red Hat Inc. +# +# This file is part of the Cygwin port of OpenSSH. + +progname=$0 +auto_answer="" +auto_passphrase="no" +passphrase="" + +request() +{ + if [ "${auto_answer}" = "yes" ] + then + return 0 + elif [ "${auto_answer}" = "no" ] + then + return 1 + fi + + answer="" + while [ "X${answer}" != "Xyes" -a "X${answer}" != "Xno" ] + do + echo -n "$1 (yes/no) " + read answer + done + if [ "X${answer}" = "Xyes" ] + then + return 0 + else + return 1 + fi +} + +# Check options + +while : +do + case $# in + 0) + break + ;; + esac + + option=$1 + shift + + case "$option" in + -d | --debug ) + set -x + ;; + + -y | --yes ) + auto_answer=yes + ;; + + -n | --no ) + auto_answer=no + ;; + + -p | --passphrase ) + with_passphrase="yes" + passphrase=$1 + shift + ;; + + *) + echo "usage: ${progname} [OPTION]..." + echo + echo "This script creates an OpenSSH user configuration." + echo + echo "Options:" + echo " --debug -d Enable shell's debug output." + echo " --yes -y Answer all questions with \"yes\" automatically." + echo " --no -n Answer all questions with \"no\" automatically." + echo " --passphrase -p word Use \"word\" as passphrase automatically." + echo + exit 1 + ;; + + esac +done + +# Ask user if user identity should be generated + +if [ ! -f /etc/passwd ] +then + echo '/etc/passwd is nonexistant. Please generate an /etc/passwd file' + echo 'first using mkpasswd. Check if it contains an entry for you and' + echo 'please care for the home directory in your entry as well.' + exit 1 +fi + +uid=`id -u` +pwdhome=`awk -F: '{ if ( $3 == '${uid}' ) print $6; }' < /etc/passwd` + +if [ "X${pwdhome}" = "X" ] +then + echo 'There is no home directory set for you in /etc/passwd.' + echo 'Setting $HOME is not sufficient!' + exit 1 +fi + +if [ ! -d "${pwdhome}" ] +then + echo "${pwdhome} is set in /etc/passwd as your home directory" + echo 'but it is not a valid directory. Cannot create user identity files.' + exit 1 +fi + +# If home is the root dir, set home to empty string to avoid error messages +# in subsequent parts of that script. +if [ "X${pwdhome}" = "X/" ] +then + # But first raise a warning! + echo 'Your home directory in /etc/passwd is set to root (/). This is not recommended!' + if request "Would you like to proceed anyway?" + then + pwdhome='' + else + exit 1 + fi +fi + +if [ -e "${pwdhome}/.ssh" -a ! -d "${pwdhome}/.ssh" ] +then + echo "${pwdhome}/.ssh is existant but not a directory. Cannot create user identity files." + exit 1 +fi + +if [ ! -e "${pwdhome}/.ssh" ] +then + mkdir "${pwdhome}/.ssh" + if [ ! -e "${pwdhome}/.ssh" ] + then + echo "Creating users ${pwdhome}/.ssh directory failed" + exit 1 + fi +fi + +if [ ! -f "${pwdhome}/.ssh/identity" ] +then + if request "Shall I create an SSH1 RSA identity file for you?" + then + echo "Generating ${pwdhome}/.ssh/identity" + if [ "${with_passphrase}" = "yes" ] + then + ssh-keygen -t rsa1 -N "${passphrase}" -f "${pwdhome}/.ssh/identity" > /dev/null + else + ssh-keygen -t rsa1 -f "${pwdhome}/.ssh/identity" > /dev/null + fi + if request "Do you want to use this identity to login to this machine?" + then + echo "Adding to ${pwdhome}/.ssh/authorized_keys" + cat "${pwdhome}/.ssh/identity.pub" >> "${pwdhome}/.ssh/authorized_keys" + fi + fi +fi + +if [ ! -f "${pwdhome}/.ssh/id_rsa" ] +then + if request "Shall I create an SSH2 RSA identity file for you? (yes/no) " + then + echo "Generating ${pwdhome}/.ssh/id_rsa" + if [ "${with_passphrase}" = "yes" ] + then + ssh-keygen -t rsa -N "${passphrase}" -f "${pwdhome}/.ssh/id_rsa" > /dev/null + else + ssh-keygen -t rsa -f "${pwdhome}/.ssh/id_rsa" > /dev/null + fi + if request "Do you want to use this identity to login to this machine?" + then + echo "Adding to ${pwdhome}/.ssh/authorized_keys2" + cat "${pwdhome}/.ssh/id_rsa.pub" >> "${pwdhome}/.ssh/authorized_keys2" + fi + fi +fi + +if [ ! -f "${pwdhome}/.ssh/id_dsa" ] +then + if request "Shall I create an SSH2 DSA identity file for you? (yes/no) " + then + echo "Generating ${pwdhome}/.ssh/id_dsa" + if [ "${with_passphrase}" = "yes" ] + then + ssh-keygen -t dsa -N "${passphrase}" -f "${pwdhome}/.ssh/id_dsa" > /dev/null + else + ssh-keygen -t dsa -f "${pwdhome}/.ssh/id_dsa" > /dev/null + fi + if request "Do you want to use this identity to login to this machine?" + then + echo "Adding to ${pwdhome}/.ssh/authorized_keys2" + cat "${pwdhome}/.ssh/id_dsa.pub" >> "${pwdhome}/.ssh/authorized_keys2" + fi + fi +fi + +echo +echo "Configuration finished. Have fun!" diff --git a/openssh/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass.c b/openssh/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..27e5cca --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass.c @@ -0,0 +1,150 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* + * Compile with: + * + * cc `gnome-config --cflags gnome gnomeui` \ + * gnome-ssh-askpass.c -o gnome-ssh-askpass \ + * `gnome-config --libs gnome gnomeui` + * + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +void +report_failed_grab (void) +{ + GtkWidget *err; + + err = gnome_message_box_new("Could not grab keyboard or mouse.\n" + "A malicious client may be eavesdropping on your session.", + GNOME_MESSAGE_BOX_ERROR, "EXIT", NULL); + gtk_window_set_position(GTK_WINDOW(err), GTK_WIN_POS_CENTER); + gtk_object_set(GTK_OBJECT(err), "type", GTK_WINDOW_POPUP, NULL); + + gnome_dialog_run_and_close(GNOME_DIALOG(err)); +} + +void +passphrase_dialog(char *message) +{ + char *passphrase; + char **messages; + int result, i; + + GtkWidget *dialog, *entry, *label; + + dialog = gnome_dialog_new("OpenSSH", GNOME_STOCK_BUTTON_OK, + GNOME_STOCK_BUTTON_CANCEL, NULL); + + messages = g_strsplit(message, "\\n", 0); + if (messages) + for(i = 0; messages[i]; i++) { + label = gtk_label_new(messages[i]); + gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(GNOME_DIALOG(dialog)->vbox), + label, FALSE, FALSE, 0); + } + + entry = gtk_entry_new(); + gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(GNOME_DIALOG(dialog)->vbox), entry, FALSE, + FALSE, 0); + gtk_entry_set_visibility(GTK_ENTRY(entry), FALSE); + gtk_widget_grab_focus(entry); + + /* Center window and prepare for grab */ + gtk_object_set(GTK_OBJECT(dialog), "type", GTK_WINDOW_POPUP, NULL); + gnome_dialog_set_default(GNOME_DIALOG(dialog), 0); + gtk_window_set_position (GTK_WINDOW(dialog), GTK_WIN_POS_CENTER); + gtk_window_set_policy(GTK_WINDOW(dialog), FALSE, FALSE, TRUE); + gnome_dialog_close_hides(GNOME_DIALOG(dialog), TRUE); + gtk_container_set_border_width(GTK_CONTAINER(GNOME_DIALOG(dialog)->vbox), + GNOME_PAD); + gtk_widget_show_all(dialog); + + /* Grab focus */ + XGrabServer(GDK_DISPLAY()); + if (gdk_pointer_grab(dialog->window, TRUE, 0, NULL, NULL, + GDK_CURRENT_TIME)) + goto nograb; + if (gdk_keyboard_grab(dialog->window, FALSE, GDK_CURRENT_TIME)) + goto nograbkb; + + /* Make close dialog */ + gnome_dialog_editable_enters(GNOME_DIALOG(dialog), GTK_EDITABLE(entry)); + + /* Run dialog */ + result = gnome_dialog_run(GNOME_DIALOG(dialog)); + + /* Ungrab */ + XUngrabServer(GDK_DISPLAY()); + gdk_pointer_ungrab(GDK_CURRENT_TIME); + gdk_keyboard_ungrab(GDK_CURRENT_TIME); + gdk_flush(); + + /* Report passphrase if user selected OK */ + passphrase = gtk_entry_get_text(GTK_ENTRY(entry)); + if (result == 0) + puts(passphrase); + + /* Zero passphrase in memory */ + memset(passphrase, '\0', strlen(passphrase)); + gtk_entry_set_text(GTK_ENTRY(entry), passphrase); + + gnome_dialog_close(GNOME_DIALOG(dialog)); + return; + + /* At least one grab failed - ungrab what we got, and report + the failure to the user. Note that XGrabServer() cannot + fail. */ + nograbkb: + gdk_pointer_ungrab(GDK_CURRENT_TIME); + nograb: + XUngrabServer(GDK_DISPLAY()); + gnome_dialog_close(GNOME_DIALOG(dialog)); + + report_failed_grab(); +} + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + char *message; + + gnome_init("GNOME ssh-askpass", "0.1", argc, argv); + + if (argc == 2) + message = argv[1]; + else + message = "Enter your OpenSSH passphrase:"; + + setvbuf(stdout, 0, _IONBF, 0); + passphrase_dialog(message); + return 0; +} diff --git a/openssh/contrib/hpux/README b/openssh/contrib/hpux/README new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f8bfa84 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/contrib/hpux/README @@ -0,0 +1,45 @@ +README for OpenSSH HP-UX contrib files +Kevin Steves + +sshd: configuration file for sshd.rc +sshd.rc: SSH startup script +egd: configuration file for egd.rc +egd.rc: EGD (entropy gathering daemon) startup script + +To install: + +sshd.rc: + +o Verify paths in sshd.rc match your local installation + (WHAT_PATH and WHAT_PID) +o Customize sshd if needed (SSHD_ARGS) +o Install: + + # cp sshd /etc/rc.config.d + # chmod 444 /etc/rc.config.d/sshd + # cp sshd.rc /sbin/init.d + # chmod 555 /sbin/init.d/sshd.rc + # ln -s /sbin/init.d/sshd.rc /sbin/rc1.d/K100sshd + # ln -s /sbin/init.d/sshd.rc /sbin/rc2.d/S900sshd + +egd.rc: + +o Verify egd.pl path in egd.rc matches your local installation + (WHAT_PATH) +o Customize egd if needed (EGD_ARGS and EGD_LOG) +o Add pseudo account: + + # groupadd egd + # useradd -g egd egd + # mkdir -p /etc/opt/egd + # chown egd:egd /etc/opt/egd + # chmod 711 /etc/opt/egd + +o Install: + + # cp egd /etc/rc.config.d + # chmod 444 /etc/rc.config.d/egd + # cp egd.rc /sbin/init.d + # chmod 555 /sbin/init.d/egd.rc + # ln -s /sbin/init.d/egd.rc /sbin/rc1.d/K600egd + # ln -s /sbin/init.d/egd.rc /sbin/rc2.d/S400egd diff --git a/openssh/contrib/hpux/egd b/openssh/contrib/hpux/egd new file mode 100644 index 0000000..21af0bd --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/contrib/hpux/egd @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +# EGD_START: Set to 1 to start entropy gathering daemon +# EGD_ARGS: Command line arguments to pass to egd +# EGD_LOG: EGD stdout and stderr log file (default /etc/opt/egd/egd.log) +# +# To configure the egd environment: + +# groupadd egd +# useradd -g egd egd +# mkdir -p /etc/opt/egd +# chown egd:egd /etc/opt/egd +# chmod 711 /etc/opt/egd + +EGD_START=1 +EGD_ARGS='/etc/opt/egd/entropy' +EGD_LOG= diff --git a/openssh/contrib/hpux/egd.rc b/openssh/contrib/hpux/egd.rc new file mode 100755 index 0000000..919dea7 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/contrib/hpux/egd.rc @@ -0,0 +1,98 @@ +#!/sbin/sh + +# +# egd.rc: EGD start-up and shutdown script +# + +# Allowed exit values: +# 0 = success; causes "OK" to show up in checklist. +# 1 = failure; causes "FAIL" to show up in checklist. +# 2 = skip; causes "N/A" to show up in the checklist. +# Use this value if execution of this script is overridden +# by the use of a control variable, or if this script is not +# appropriate to execute for some other reason. +# 3 = reboot; causes the system to be rebooted after execution. + +# Input and output: +# stdin is redirected from /dev/null +# +# stdout and stderr are redirected to the /etc/rc.log file +# during checklist mode, or to the console in raw mode. + +umask 022 + +PATH=/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin +export PATH + +WHAT='EGD (entropy gathering daemon)' +WHAT_PATH=/opt/perl/bin/egd.pl +WHAT_CONFIG=/etc/rc.config.d/egd +WHAT_LOG=/etc/opt/egd/egd.log + +# NOTE: If your script executes in run state 0 or state 1, then /usr might +# not be available. Do not attempt to access commands or files in +# /usr unless your script executes in run state 2 or greater. Other +# file systems typically not mounted until run state 2 include /var +# and /opt. + +rval=0 + +# Check the exit value of a command run by this script. If non-zero, the +# exit code is echoed to the log file and the return value of this script +# is set to indicate failure. + +set_return() { + x=$? + if [ $x -ne 0 ]; then + echo "EXIT CODE: $x" + rval=1 # script FAILed + fi +} + +case $1 in +'start_msg') + echo "Starting $WHAT" + ;; + +'stop_msg') + echo "Stopping $WHAT" + ;; + +'start') + if [ -f $WHAT_CONFIG ] ; then + . $WHAT_CONFIG + else + echo "ERROR: $WHAT_CONFIG defaults file MISSING" + fi + + + if [ "$EGD_START" -eq 1 -a -x $WHAT_PATH ]; then + EGD_LOG=${EGD_LOG:-$WHAT_LOG} + su egd -c "nohup $WHAT_PATH $EGD_ARGS >$EGD_LOG 2>&1" && + echo $WHAT started + set_return + else + rval=2 + fi + ;; + +'stop') + pid=`ps -fuegd | awk '$1 == "egd" { print $2 }'` + if [ "X$pid" != "X" ]; then + if kill "$pid"; then + echo "$WHAT stopped" + else + rval=1 + echo "Unable to stop $WHAT" + fi + fi + set_return + ;; + +*) + echo "usage: $0 {start|stop|start_msg|stop_msg}" + rval=1 + ;; +esac + +exit $rval diff --git a/openssh/contrib/hpux/sshd b/openssh/contrib/hpux/sshd new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8eb5e92 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/contrib/hpux/sshd @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +# SSHD_START: Set to 1 to start SSH daemon +# SSHD_ARGS: Command line arguments to pass to sshd +# +SSHD_START=1 +SSHD_ARGS= diff --git a/openssh/contrib/hpux/sshd.rc b/openssh/contrib/hpux/sshd.rc new file mode 100755 index 0000000..f9a1099 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/contrib/hpux/sshd.rc @@ -0,0 +1,90 @@ +#!/sbin/sh + +# +# sshd.rc: SSH daemon start-up and shutdown script +# + +# Allowed exit values: +# 0 = success; causes "OK" to show up in checklist. +# 1 = failure; causes "FAIL" to show up in checklist. +# 2 = skip; causes "N/A" to show up in the checklist. +# Use this value if execution of this script is overridden +# by the use of a control variable, or if this script is not +# appropriate to execute for some other reason. +# 3 = reboot; causes the system to be rebooted after execution. + +# Input and output: +# stdin is redirected from /dev/null +# +# stdout and stderr are redirected to the /etc/rc.log file +# during checklist mode, or to the console in raw mode. + +PATH=/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin +export PATH + +WHAT='OpenSSH' +WHAT_PATH=/opt/openssh/sbin/sshd +WHAT_PID=/var/run/sshd.pid +WHAT_CONFIG=/etc/rc.config.d/sshd + +# NOTE: If your script executes in run state 0 or state 1, then /usr might +# not be available. Do not attempt to access commands or files in +# /usr unless your script executes in run state 2 or greater. Other +# file systems typically not mounted until run state 2 include /var +# and /opt. + +rval=0 + +# Check the exit value of a command run by this script. If non-zero, the +# exit code is echoed to the log file and the return value of this script +# is set to indicate failure. + +set_return() { + x=$? + if [ $x -ne 0 ]; then + echo "EXIT CODE: $x" + rval=1 # script FAILed + fi +} + +case $1 in +'start_msg') + echo "Starting $WHAT" + ;; + +'stop_msg') + echo "Stopping $WHAT" + ;; + +'start') + if [ -f $WHAT_CONFIG ] ; then + . $WHAT_CONFIG + else + echo "ERROR: $WHAT_CONFIG defaults file MISSING" + fi + + if [ "$SSHD_START" -eq 1 -a -x "$WHAT_PATH" ]; then + $WHAT_PATH $SSHD_ARGS && echo "$WHAT started" + set_return + else + rval=2 + fi + ;; + +'stop') + if kill `cat $WHAT_PID`; then + echo "$WHAT stopped" + else + rval=1 + echo "Unable to stop $WHAT" + fi + set_return + ;; + +*) + echo "usage: $0 {start|stop|start_msg|stop_msg}" + rval=1 + ;; +esac + +exit $rval diff --git a/openssh/contrib/redhat/openssh.spec b/openssh/contrib/redhat/openssh.spec new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8ab6859 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/contrib/redhat/openssh.spec @@ -0,0 +1,335 @@ +# Version of OpenSSH +%define oversion 3.0.2p1 + +# Version of ssh-askpass +%define aversion 1.2.4.1 + +# Do we want to disable building of x11-askpass? (1=yes 0=no) +%define no_x11_askpass 0 + +# Do we want to disable building of gnome-askpass? (1=yes 0=no) +%define no_gnome_askpass 0 + +# Do we want to link against a static libcrypto? (1=yes 0=no) +%define static_libcrypto 0 + +# Do we want smartcard support (1=yes 0=no) +%define scard 0 + +# Use Redhat 7.0 pam control file +%define redhat7 0 + +# Disable IPv6 (avoids DNS hangs on some glibc versions) +%define noip6 0 + +# Reserve options to override askpass settings with: +# rpm -ba|--rebuild --define 'skip_xxx 1' +%{?skip_x11_askpass:%define no_x11_askpass 1} +%{?skip_gnome_askpass:%define no_gnome_askpass 1} + +# Options for Redhat version: +# rpm -ba|--rebuild --define "rh7 1" +%{?rh7:%define redhat7 1} + +# Options for static OpenSSL link: +# rpm -ba|--rebuild --define "static_openssl 1" +%{?static_openssl:%define static_libcrypto 1} + +# Options for Smartcard support: (needs libsectok and openssl-engine) +# rpm -ba|--rebuild --define "smartcard 1" +%{?smartcard:%define scard 1} + +# Option to disable ipv6 +# rpm -ba|--rebuild --define "noipv6 1" +%{?noipv6:%define noip6 1} + +%define exact_openssl_version %(rpm -q openssl | cut -d - -f 2) + +Summary: The OpenSSH implementation of SSH protocol versions 1 and 2 +Name: openssh +Version: %{oversion} +Release: 1 +Packager: Damien Miller +URL: http://www.openssh.com/portable.html +Source0: ftp://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-%{oversion}.tar.gz +%if ! %{no_x11_askpass} +Source1: http://www.pobox.com/~jmknoble/software/x11-ssh-askpass/x11-ssh-askpass-%{aversion}.tar.gz +%endif +License: BSD +Group: Applications/Internet +BuildRoot: %{_tmppath}/%{name}-%{version}-buildroot +Obsoletes: ssh +BuildPreReq: perl, openssl-devel, tcp_wrappers +BuildPreReq: /bin/login, /usr/include/security/pam_appl.h +BuildPreReq: rpm >= 3.0.5 +%if ! %{no_x11_askpass} +BuildPreReq: XFree86-devel +%endif +%if ! %{no_gnome_askpass} +BuildPreReq: gnome-libs-devel +%endif +%if ! %{static_libcrypto} +PreReq: openssl >= 0.9.5a +PreReq: openssl = %{exact_openssl_version} +Requires: openssl >= 0.9.5a +%endif +Requires: rpm >= 3.0.5 + +%package clients +Summary: OpenSSH clients. +Requires: openssh = %{version}-%{release} +Group: Applications/Internet +Obsoletes: ssh-clients + +%package server +Summary: The OpenSSH server daemon. +Group: System Environment/Daemons +Obsoletes: ssh-server +PreReq: openssh = %{version}-%{release}, chkconfig >= 0.9 +%if %{redhat7} +Requires: /etc/pam.d/system-auth +%endif + +%package askpass +Summary: A passphrase dialog for OpenSSH and X. +Group: Applications/Internet +Requires: openssh = %{version}-%{release} +Obsoletes: ssh-extras + +%package askpass-gnome +Summary: A passphrase dialog for OpenSSH, X, and GNOME. +Group: Applications/Internet +Requires: openssh = %{version}-%{release} +Obsoletes: ssh-extras + +%description +OpenSSH is OpenBSD's SSH (Secure SHell) protocol implementation. SSH +replaces rlogin and rsh, to provide secure encrypted communications +between two untrusted hosts over an insecure network. X11 connections +and arbitrary TCP/IP ports can also be forwarded over the secure +channel. Public key authentication may be used for "passwordless" +access to servers. + +This package includes the core files necessary for both the OpenSSH +client and server. To make this package useful, you should also +install openssh-clients, openssh-server, or both. + +%description clients +OpenSSH is OpenBSD's SSH (Secure SHell) protocol implementation. + +This package includes the clients necessary to make encrypted +connections to SSH protocol servers. You'll also need to install the +openssh package on OpenSSH clients. + +%description server +OpenSSH is OpenBSD's SSH (Secure SHell) protocol implementation. + +This package contains the secure shell daemon (sshd). The sshd daemon +allows SSH clients to securely connect to your SSH server. You also +need to have the openssh package installed. + +%description askpass +OpenSSH is OpenBSD's SSH (Secure SHell) protocol implementation. + +This package contains an X11 passphrase dialog for OpenSSH. + +%description askpass-gnome +OpenSSH is OpenBSD's SSH (Secure SHell) protocol implementation. + +This package contains an X11 passphrase dialog for OpenSSH and the +GNOME GUI desktop environment. + +%prep + +%if ! %{no_x11_askpass} +%setup -q -a 1 +%else +%setup -q +%endif + +%build + +%define _sysconfdir /etc/ssh + +EXTRA_OPTS="" + +%if %{scard} + EXTRA_OPTS="$EXTRA_OPTS --with-smartcard" +%endif + +%if %{noip6} + EXTRA_OPTS="$EXTRA_OPTS --with-ipv4-default " +%endif + +%configure \ + --libexecdir=%{_libexecdir}/openssh \ + --datadir=%{_datadir}/openssh \ + --with-pam \ + --with-tcp-wrappers \ + --with-rsh=/usr/bin/rsh \ + --with-default-path=/bin:/usr/bin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/X11R6/bin \ + $EXTRA_OPTS + +%if %{static_libcrypto} +perl -pi -e "s|-lcrypto|/usr/lib/libcrypto.a|g" Makefile +%endif + +make + +%if ! %{no_x11_askpass} +pushd x11-ssh-askpass-%{aversion} +%configure \ + --libexecdir=%{_libexecdir}/openssh +xmkmf -a +make +popd +%endif + +%if ! %{no_gnome_askpass} +pushd contrib +gcc -O -g `gnome-config --cflags gnome gnomeui` \ + gnome-ssh-askpass.c -o gnome-ssh-askpass \ + `gnome-config --libs gnome gnomeui` +popd +%endif + +%install +rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT +%{makeinstall} \ + libexecdir=$RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/openssh \ + datadir=$RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_datadir}/openssh \ + DESTDIR=/ # Hack to disable key generation + + +install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/pam.d/ +install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/rc.d/init.d +install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/openssh +%if %{redhat7} +install -m644 contrib/redhat/sshd.pam-7.x $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/pam.d/sshd +%else +install -m644 contrib/redhat/sshd.pam $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/pam.d/sshd +%endif +install -m755 contrib/redhat/sshd.init $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/rc.d/init.d/sshd + +%if ! %{no_x11_askpass} +install -s x11-ssh-askpass-%{aversion}/x11-ssh-askpass $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/openssh/x11-ssh-askpass +ln -s /usr/libexec/openssh/x11-ssh-askpass $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-askpass +%endif + +%if ! %{no_gnome_askpass} +install -s contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/openssh/gnome-ssh-askpass +%endif + +perl -pi -e "s|$RPM_BUILD_ROOT||g" $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/man*/* + +%clean +rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT + +%post server +/sbin/chkconfig --add sshd +if test -r /var/run/sshd.pid ; then + /etc/rc.d/init.d/sshd restart >&2 +fi + +%preun server +if [ "$1" = 0 ] ; then + /etc/rc.d/init.d/sshd stop >&2 + /sbin/chkconfig --del sshd +fi + +%files +%defattr(-,root,root) +%doc CREDITS ChangeLog INSTALL LICENCE OVERVIEW README* RFC* TODO WARNING* +%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-keygen +%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/scp +%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-keygen.1* +%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/scp.1* +%attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_sysconfdir} +%attr(0600,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/moduli +%attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_libexecdir}/openssh +%if %{scard} +%attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_datadir}/openssh +%attr(0644,root,root) %{_datadir}/openssh/Ssh.bin +%endif + +%files clients +%defattr(-,root,root) +%attr(4755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh +%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-agent +%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-add +%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-keyscan +%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/sftp +%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/ssh.1* +%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-agent.1* +%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-add.1* +%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-keyscan.1* +%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/sftp.1* +%attr(0644,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh_config +%attr(-,root,root) %{_bindir}/slogin +%attr(-,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/slogin.1* + +%files server +%defattr(-,root,root) +%attr(0755,root,root) %{_sbindir}/sshd +%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/sftp-server +%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/sshd.8* +%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/sftp-server.8* +#%attr(0600,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/sshd_config +%attr(0600,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/sshd_config +%attr(0600,root,root) %config(noreplace) /etc/pam.d/sshd +%attr(0755,root,root) %config /etc/rc.d/init.d/sshd + +%if ! %{no_x11_askpass} +%files askpass +%defattr(-,root,root) +%doc x11-ssh-askpass-%{aversion}/README +%doc x11-ssh-askpass-%{aversion}/ChangeLog +%doc x11-ssh-askpass-%{aversion}/SshAskpass*.ad +%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-askpass +%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/x11-ssh-askpass +%endif + +%if ! %{no_gnome_askpass} +%files askpass-gnome +%defattr(-,root,root) +%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/gnome-ssh-askpass +%endif + +%changelog +* Mon Oct 18 2000 Damien Miller +- Merge some of Nalin Dahyabhai changes from the + Redhat 7.0 spec file +* Tue Sep 05 2000 Damien Miller +- Use RPM configure macro +* Tue Aug 08 2000 Damien Miller +- Some surgery to sshd.init (generate keys at runtime) +- Cleanup of groups and removal of keygen calls +* Wed Jul 12 2000 Damien Miller +- Make building of X11-askpass and gnome-askpass optional +* Mon Jun 12 2000 Damien Miller +- Glob manpages to catch compressed files +* Wed Mar 15 2000 Damien Miller +- Updated for new location +- Updated for new gnome-ssh-askpass build +* Sun Dec 26 1999 Damien Miller +- Added Jim Knoble's askpass +* Mon Nov 15 1999 Damien Miller +- Split subpackages further based on patch from jim knoble +* Sat Nov 13 1999 Damien Miller +- Added 'Obsoletes' directives +* Tue Nov 09 1999 Damien Miller +- Use make install +- Subpackages +* Mon Nov 08 1999 Damien Miller +- Added links for slogin +- Fixed perms on manpages +* Sat Oct 30 1999 Damien Miller +- Renamed init script +* Fri Oct 29 1999 Damien Miller +- Back to old binary names +* Thu Oct 28 1999 Damien Miller +- Use autoconf +- New binary names +* Wed Oct 27 1999 Damien Miller +- Initial RPMification, based on Jan "Yenya" Kasprzak's spec. + diff --git a/openssh/contrib/redhat/sshd.init b/openssh/contrib/redhat/sshd.init new file mode 100755 index 0000000..86b040c --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/contrib/redhat/sshd.init @@ -0,0 +1,163 @@ +#!/bin/bash + +# Init file for OpenSSH server daemon +# +# chkconfig: 2345 55 25 +# description: OpenSSH server daemon +# +# processname: sshd +# config: /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key +# config: /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key.pub +# config: /etc/ssh/ssh_random_seed +# config: /etc/ssh/sshd_config +# pidfile: /var/run/sshd.pid + +# source function library +. /etc/rc.d/init.d/functions + +[ -f /etc/sysconfig/sshd ] && . /etc/sysconfig/sshd + +RETVAL=0 + +# Some functions to make the below more readable +KEYGEN=/usr/bin/ssh-keygen +RSA1_KEY=/etc/ssh/ssh_host_key +RSA_KEY=/etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key +DSA_KEY=/etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key +PID_FILE=/var/run/sshd.pid +my_success() { + local msg + if [ $# -gt 1 ]; then + msg="$2" + else + msg="done" + fi + case "`type -type success`" in + function) + success "$1" + ;; + *) + echo -n "${msg}" + ;; + esac +} +my_failure() { + local msg + if [ $# -gt 1 ]; then + msg="$2" + else + msg="FAILED" + fi + case "`type -type failure`" in + function) + failure "$1" + ;; + *) + echo -n "${msg}" + ;; + esac +} +do_rsa1_keygen() { + if ! test -f $RSA1_KEY ; then + echo -n "Generating SSH1 RSA host key: " + if $KEYGEN -q -t rsa1 -f $RSA1_KEY -C '' -N '' >&/dev/null; then + my_success "RSA1 key generation" + echo + else + my_failure "RSA1 key generation" + echo + exit 1 + fi + fi +} +do_rsa_keygen() { + if ! test -f $RSA_KEY ; then + echo -n "Generating SSH2 RSA host key: " + if $KEYGEN -q -t rsa -f $RSA_KEY -C '' -N '' >&/dev/null; then + my_success "RSA key generation" + echo + else + my_failure "RSA key generation" + echo + exit 1 + fi + fi +} +do_dsa_keygen() { + if ! test -f $DSA_KEY ; then + echo -n "Generating SSH2 DSA host key: " + if $KEYGEN -q -t dsa -f $DSA_KEY -C '' -N '' >&/dev/null; then + my_success "DSA key generation" + echo + else + my_failure "DSA key generation" + echo + exit 1 + fi + fi +} +do_restart_sanity_check() { + sshd -t + RETVAL=$? + if [ ! "$RETVAL" = 0 ]; then + my_failure "Configuration file or keys" + echo + exit $RETVAL + fi +} + + +case "$1" in + start) + # Create keys if necessary + do_rsa1_keygen; + do_rsa_keygen; + do_dsa_keygen; + + echo -n "Starting sshd: " + if [ ! -f $PID_FILE ] ; then + sshd $OPTIONS + RETVAL=$? + if [ "$RETVAL" = "0" ] ; then + my_success "sshd startup" "sshd" + touch /var/lock/subsys/sshd + else + my_failure "sshd startup" "" + fi + fi + echo + ;; + stop) + echo -n "Shutting down sshd: " + if [ -f $PID_FILE ] ; then + killproc sshd + RETVAL=$? + [ $RETVAL -eq 0 ] && rm -f /var/lock/subsys/sshd + fi + echo + ;; + restart) + do_restart_sanity_check + $0 stop + $0 start + RETVAL=$? + ;; + condrestart) + if [ -f /var/lock/subsys/sshd ] ; then + do_restart_sanity_check + $0 stop + $0 start + RETVAL=$? + fi + ;; + status) + status sshd + RETVAL=$? + ;; + *) + echo "Usage: sshd {start|stop|restart|status|condrestart}" + exit 1 + ;; +esac + +exit $RETVAL diff --git a/openssh/contrib/redhat/sshd.pam b/openssh/contrib/redhat/sshd.pam new file mode 100644 index 0000000..26dcb34 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/contrib/redhat/sshd.pam @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ +#%PAM-1.0 +auth required /lib/security/pam_pwdb.so shadow nodelay +auth required /lib/security/pam_nologin.so +account required /lib/security/pam_pwdb.so +password required /lib/security/pam_cracklib.so +password required /lib/security/pam_pwdb.so shadow nullok use_authtok +session required /lib/security/pam_pwdb.so +session required /lib/security/pam_limits.so diff --git a/openssh/contrib/redhat/sshd.pam-7.x b/openssh/contrib/redhat/sshd.pam-7.x new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d2ab073 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/contrib/redhat/sshd.pam-7.x @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ +#%PAM-1.0 +auth required /lib/security/pam_stack.so service=system-auth +auth required /lib/security/pam_nologin.so +account required /lib/security/pam_stack.so service=system-auth +password required /lib/security/pam_stack.so service=system-auth +session required /lib/security/pam_stack.so service=system-auth +session required /lib/security/pam_limits.so +session optional /lib/security/pam_console.so diff --git a/openssh/contrib/solaris/README b/openssh/contrib/solaris/README new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5585249 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/contrib/solaris/README @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +The following is a new package build script for Solaris. This is being +introduced into OpenSSH 3.0 and above in hopes of simplifying the build +process. + +The build process is called a 'dummy install'.. Which means the software does +a "make install-nokeys DESTDIR=[fakeroot]". This way all manpages should +be handled correctly and key are defered until the first time the sshd +is started. + +Directions: + +1. make -F Makefile.in distprep (Only if you are getting from the CVS tree) +2. ./configure --with-pam [..any other options you want..] +3. cd contrib/solaris; ./buildpkg.sh + +If all goes well you should have a solaris package ready to be installed. + +If you have any problems with this script please post them to +openssh-unix-dev@mindrot.org and I will try to assist you as best as I can. + +- Ben Lindstrom + +TODO: +- Expand to cover all sysvr4 family of OSes +- Clean things up a bit more. +- Detect if sshd is running and refuse to start. +- SHOULD check for existing sshd_config nor ssh_config (does not currently). + [Post install script? Ugh.. Nasty] diff --git a/openssh/contrib/solaris/buildpkg.sh b/openssh/contrib/solaris/buildpkg.sh new file mode 100755 index 0000000..05abb22 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/contrib/solaris/buildpkg.sh @@ -0,0 +1,85 @@ +#!/bin/sh +# +# Fake Root Solaris Build System - Prototype +# +# The following code has been provide under Public Domain License. I really +# don't care what you use it for. Just as long as you don't complain to me +# nor my employer if you break it. - Ben Lindstrom (mouring@eviladmin.org) +# +umask 022 +PKGNAME=OpenSSH + +## Extract common info requires for the 'info' part of the package. +VERSION=`tail -1 ../../version.h | sed -e 's/.*_\([0-9]\)/\1/g' | sed 's/\"$//'` +ARCH=`uname -p` + +## Start by faking root install +echo "Faking root install..." +START=`pwd` +FAKE_ROOT=$START/package +mkdir $FAKE_ROOT +cd ../.. +make install-nokeys DESTDIR=$FAKE_ROOT + +## Fill in some details, like prefix and sysconfdir +ETCDIR=`grep "^sysconfdir=" Makefile | sed 's/sysconfdir=//'` +PREFIX=`grep "^prefix=" Makefile | cut -d = -f 2` +PIDDIR=`grep "^piddir=" Makefile | cut -d = -f 2` +cd $FAKE_ROOT + +## Setup our run level stuff while we are at it. +mkdir -p $FAKE_ROOT/etc/init.d +mkdir -p $FAKE_ROOT/etc/rcS.d +mkdir -p $FAKE_ROOT/etc/rc0.d +mkdir -p $FAKE_ROOT/etc/rc1.d +mkdir -p $FAKE_ROOT/etc/rc2.d + + +## setup our initscript correctly +sed -e "s#%%configDir%%#$ETCDIR#g" \ + -e "s#%%openSSHDir%%#$PREFIX#g" \ + -e "s#%%pidDir%%#$PIDDIR#g" \ + ../opensshd.in > $FAKE_ROOT/etc/init.d/opensshd +chmod 711 $FAKE_ROOT/etc/init.d/opensshd + +ln -s ../init.d/opensshd $FAKE_ROOT/etc/rcS.d/K30opensshd +ln -s ../init.d/opensshd $FAKE_ROOT/etc/rc0.d/K30opensshd +ln -s ../init.d/opensshd $FAKE_ROOT/etc/rc1.d/K30opensshd +ln -s ../init.d/opensshd $FAKE_ROOT/etc/rc2.d/S98opensshd + + +## Ok, this is outright wrong, but it will work. I'm tired of pkgmk +## whining. +for i in *; do + PROTO_ARGS="$PROTO_ARGS $i=/$i"; +done + +## Build info file +echo "Building pkginfo file..." +cat > pkginfo << _EOF +PKG=$PKGNAME +NAME=OpenSSH Portable for Solaris +DESC="Secure Shell remote access utility; replaces telnet and rlogin/rsh." +VENDOR="OpenSSH Portable Team - http://www.openssh.com/portable.html" +BASEDIR=$FAKE_ROOT +ARCH=$ARCH +VERSION=$VERSION +CATEGORY=Security +BASEDIR=/ +_EOF + +## Next Build our prototype +echo "Building prototype file..." +find . | egrep -v "prototype|pkginfo" | sort | pkgproto $PROTO_ARGS | \ + awk ' + BEGIN { print "i pkginfo" } + { $5="root"; $6="sys"; } + { print; }' > prototype + +## Step back a directory and now build the package. +echo "Building package.." +cd .. +pkgmk -d . -f $FAKE_ROOT/prototype -o +rm -rf $FAKE_ROOT +echo | pkgtrans -os . $PKGNAME-$ARCH-$VERSION.pkg +rm -rf $PKGNAME diff --git a/openssh/contrib/solaris/opensshd.in b/openssh/contrib/solaris/opensshd.in new file mode 100755 index 0000000..212254d --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/contrib/solaris/opensshd.in @@ -0,0 +1,90 @@ +#!/sbin/sh +# Donated code that was put under PD license. +# +# Stripped PRNGd out of it for the time being. + +AWK=/usr/bin/awk +CAT=/usr/bin/cat +KILL=/usr/bin/kill +PS=/usr/bin/ps +XARGS=/usr/bin/xargs + +prefix=%%openSSHDir%% +etcdir=%%configDir%% +piddir=%%pidDir%% + +SSHD=$prefix/sbin/sshd +PIDFILE=$piddir/sshd.pid +SSH_KEYGEN=$prefix/bin/ssh-keygen +HOST_KEY_RSA1=$etcdir/ssh_host_key +HOST_KEY_DSA=$etcdir/ssh_host_dsa_key +HOST_KEY_RSA=$etcdir/ssh_host_rsa_key + +killproc() { + _procname=$1 + _signal=$2 + ${PS} -u root | ${AWK} '/'"$_procname"'$/ {print $1}' | ${XARGS} ${KILL} +} + + +checkkeys() { + if [ ! -f $HOST_KEY_RSA1 ]; then + ${SSH_KEYGEN} -t rsa1 -f ${HOST_KEY_RSA1} -N "" + fi + if [ ! -f $HOST_KEY_DSA ]; then + ${SSH_KEYGEN} -t dsa -f ${HOST_KEY_DSA} -N "" + fi + if [ ! -f $HOST_KEY_RSA ]; then + ${SSH_KEYGEN} -t rsa -f ${HOST_KEY_RSA} -N "" + fi +} + +stop_service() { + if [ -r $PIDFILE -a ! -z ${PIDFILE} ]; then + PID=`${CAT} ${PIDFILE}` + fi + if [ ${PID:=0} -gt 1 -a ! "X$PID" = "X " ]; then + ${KILL} ${PID} + else + echo "Unable to read PID file, killing using alternate method" + killproc sshd TERM + fi +} + +start_service() { + # XXX We really should check if the service is already going, but + # XXX we will opt out at this time. - Bal + + # Check to see if we have keys that need to be made + checkkeys + + # Start SSHD + echo "starting $SSHD... \c" ; $SSHD + + sshd_rc=$? + if [ $sshd_rc -ne 0 ]; then + echo "$0: Error ${sshd_rc} starting ${SSHD}... bailing." + exit $sshd_rc + fi + echo done. +} + +case $1 in + +'start') + start_service + ;; + +'stop') + stop_service + ;; + +'restart') + stop_service + start_service + ;; + +*) + echo "$0: usage: $0 {start|stop|restart}" + ;; +esac diff --git a/openssh/contrib/ssh-copy-id b/openssh/contrib/ssh-copy-id new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2346761 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/contrib/ssh-copy-id @@ -0,0 +1,45 @@ +#!/bin/sh + +# Shell script to install your identity.pub on a remote machine +# Takes the remote machine name as an argument. +# Obviously, the remote machine must accept password authentication, +# or one of the other keys in your ssh-agent, for this to work. + +ID_FILE="${HOME}/.ssh/identity.pub" + +if [ "-i" = "$1" ]; then + shift + # check if we have 2 parameters left, if so the first is the new ID file + if [ -n "$2" ]; then + if expr "$1" : ".*\.pub" ; then + ID_FILE="$1" + else + ID_FILE="$1.pub" + fi + shift # and this should leave $1 as the target name + fi +else + if [ x$SSH_AUTH_SOCK != x ] ; then + GET_ID="$GET_ID ssh-add -L" + fi +fi + +if [ -z "`eval $GET_ID`" -a -r "${ID_FILE}" ] ; then + GET_ID="cat ${ID_FILE}" +fi + +if [ -z "`eval $GET_ID`" ]; then + echo "$0: ERROR: No identities found" + exit 1 +fi + +{ eval "$GET_ID" ; } | ssh $1 "umask 077; test -d .ssh || mkdir .ssh ; cat >> .ssh/authorized_keys" + +cat < + +Permission is granted to make and distribute verbatim copies of +this manual provided the copyright notice and this permission notice +are preserved on all copies. + +Permission is granted to copy and distribute modified versions of this +manual under the conditions for verbatim copying, provided that the +entire resulting derived work is distributed under the terms of a +permission notice identical to this one. + +Permission is granted to copy and distribute translations of this +manual into another language, under the above conditions for modified +versions, except that this permission notice may be included in +translations approved by the Free Software Foundation instead of in +the original English. +.. +.TH SSH-COPY-ID 1 "14 November 1999" "OpenSSH" +.SH NAME +ssh-copy-id \- install your identity.pub in a remote machine's authorized_keys +.SH SYNOPSIS +.B ssh-copy-id [-i [identity_file]] +.I "[user@]machine" +.br +.SH DESCRIPTION +.BR ssh-copy-id +is a script that uses ssh to log into a remote machine (presumably +using a login password, so password authentication should be enabled, +unless you've done some clever use of multiple identities) +.PP +It also changes the permissions of the remote user's home, +.BR ~/.ssh , +and +.B ~/.ssh/authorized_keys +to remove group writability (which would otherwise prevent you from logging in, if the remote +.B sshd +has +.B StrictModes +set in its configuration). +.PP +If the +.B -i +option is given then the identity file (defaults to +.BR ~/.ssh/identity.pub ) +is used, regardless of whether there are any keys in your +.BR ssh-agent . +Otherwise, if this: +.PP +.B " ssh-add -L" +.PP +provides any output, it uses that in preference to the identity file. +.PP +If the +.B -i +option is used, or the +.B ssh-add +produced no output, then it uses the contents of the identity +file. Once it has one or more fingerprints (by whatever means) it +uses ssh to append them to +.B ~/.ssh/authorized_keys +on the remote machine (creating the file, and directory, if necessary) + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +.BR ssh (1), +.BR ssh-agent (1), +.BR sshd (8) diff --git a/openssh/contrib/sshd.pam.freebsd b/openssh/contrib/sshd.pam.freebsd new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c0bc364 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/contrib/sshd.pam.freebsd @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +sshd auth required pam_unix.so try_first_pass +sshd account required pam_unix.so +sshd password required pam_permit.so +sshd session required pam_permit.so + diff --git a/openssh/contrib/sshd.pam.generic b/openssh/contrib/sshd.pam.generic new file mode 100644 index 0000000..cf5af30 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/contrib/sshd.pam.generic @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ +#%PAM-1.0 +auth required /lib/security/pam_unix.so shadow nodelay +auth required /lib/security/pam_nologin.so +account required /lib/security/pam_unix.so +password required /lib/security/pam_cracklib.so +password required /lib/security/pam_unix.so shadow nullok use_authtok +session required /lib/security/pam_unix.so +session required /lib/security/pam_limits.so diff --git a/openssh/contrib/suse/openssh.spec b/openssh/contrib/suse/openssh.spec new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b3bc0c0 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/contrib/suse/openssh.spec @@ -0,0 +1,199 @@ +Summary: OpenSSH, a free Secure Shell (SSH) protocol implementation +Name: openssh +Version: 3.0.2p1 +URL: http://www.openssh.com/ +Release: 1 +Source0: openssh-%{version}.tar.gz +Copyright: BSD +Group: Applications/Internet +BuildRoot: /tmp/openssh-%{version}-buildroot +PreReq: openssl +Obsoletes: ssh +# +# (Build[ing] Prereq[uisites] only work for RPM 2.95 and newer.) +# building prerequisites -- stuff for +# OpenSSL (openssl-devel), +# TCP Wrappers (nkitb), +# and Gnome (glibdev, gtkdev, and gnlibsd) +# +BuildPrereq: openssl +BuildPrereq: nkitb +BuildPrereq: glibdev +BuildPrereq: gtkdev +BuildPrereq: gnlibsd + +%description +Ssh (Secure Shell) a program for logging into a remote machine and for +executing commands in a remote machine. It is intended to replace +rlogin and rsh, and provide secure encrypted communications between +two untrusted hosts over an insecure network. X11 connections and +arbitrary TCP/IP ports can also be forwarded over the secure channel. + +OpenSSH is OpenBSD's rework of the last free version of SSH, bringing it +up to date in terms of security and features, as well as removing all +patented algorithms to seperate libraries (OpenSSL). + +This package includes all files necessary for both the OpenSSH +client and server. Additionally, this package contains the GNOME +passphrase dialog. + +%changelog +* Mon Jun 12 2000 Damien Miller +- Glob manpages to catch compressed files +* Wed Mar 15 2000 Damien Miller +- Updated for new location +- Updated for new gnome-ssh-askpass build +* Sun Dec 26 1999 Chris Saia +- Made symlink to gnome-ssh-askpass called ssh-askpass +* Wed Nov 24 1999 Chris Saia +- Removed patches that included /etc/pam.d/sshd, /sbin/init.d/rc.sshd, and + /var/adm/fillup-templates/rc.config.sshd, since Damien merged these into + his released tarfile +- Changed permissions on ssh_config in the install procedure to 644 from 600 + even though it was correct in the %files section and thus right in the RPMs +- Postinstall script for the server now only prints "Generating SSH host + key..." if we need to actually do this, in order to eliminate a confusing + message if an SSH host key is already in place +- Marked all manual pages as %doc(umentation) +* Mon Nov 22 1999 Chris Saia +- Added flag to configure daemon with TCP Wrappers support +- Added building prerequisites (works in RPM 3.0 and newer) +* Thu Nov 18 1999 Chris Saia +- Made this package correct for SuSE. +- Changed instances of pam_pwdb.so to pam_unix.so, since it works more properly + with SuSE, and lib_pwdb.so isn't installed by default. +* Mon Nov 15 1999 Damien Miller +- Split subpackages further based on patch from jim knoble +* Sat Nov 13 1999 Damien Miller +- Added 'Obsoletes' directives +* Tue Nov 09 1999 Damien Miller +- Use make install +- Subpackages +* Mon Nov 08 1999 Damien Miller +- Added links for slogin +- Fixed perms on manpages +* Sat Oct 30 1999 Damien Miller +- Renamed init script +* Fri Oct 29 1999 Damien Miller +- Back to old binary names +* Thu Oct 28 1999 Damien Miller +- Use autoconf +- New binary names +* Wed Oct 27 1999 Damien Miller +- Initial RPMification, based on Jan "Yenya" Kasprzak's spec. + +%prep + +%setup -q + +%build +CFLAGS="$RPM_OPT_FLAGS" \ +./configure --prefix=/usr \ + --sysconfdir=/etc/ssh \ + --datadir=/usr/share/openssh \ + --with-pam \ + --with-gnome-askpass \ + --with-tcp-wrappers \ + --with-ipv4-default \ + --libexecdir=/usr/lib/ssh +make + +cd contrib +gcc -O -g `gnome-config --cflags gnome gnomeui` \ + gnome-ssh-askpass.c -o gnome-ssh-askpass \ + `gnome-config --libs gnome gnomeui` +cd .. + +%install +rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT +make install DESTDIR=$RPM_BUILD_ROOT/ +install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/ssh/ +install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/pam.d/ +install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/sbin/init.d/ +install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/var/adm/fillup-templates +install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/usr/lib/ssh +install -m644 contrib/sshd.pam.generic $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/pam.d/sshd +install -m744 contrib/suse/rc.sshd $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/sbin/init.d/sshd +ln -s ../../sbin/init.d/sshd $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/usr/sbin/rcsshd +install -s contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/usr/lib/ssh/gnome-ssh-askpass +ln -s gnome-ssh-askpass $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/usr/lib/ssh/ssh-askpass +install -m744 contrib/suse/rc.config.sshd \ + $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/var/adm/fillup-templates + +%clean +rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT + +%post +if [ "$1" = 1 ]; then + echo "Creating SSH stop/start scripts in the rc directories..." + ln -s ../sshd /sbin/init.d/rc2.d/K20sshd + ln -s ../sshd /sbin/init.d/rc2.d/S20sshd + ln -s ../sshd /sbin/init.d/rc3.d/K20sshd + ln -s ../sshd /sbin/init.d/rc3.d/S20sshd +fi +echo "Updating /etc/rc.config..." +if [ -x /bin/fillup ] ; then + /bin/fillup -q -d = etc/rc.config var/adm/fillup-templates/rc.config.sshd +else + echo "ERROR: fillup not found. This should NOT happen in SuSE Linux." + echo "Update /etc/rc.config by hand from the following template file:" + echo " /var/adm/fillup-templates/rc.config.sshd" +fi +if [ ! -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key -o ! -s /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key ]; then + echo "Generating SSH host key..." + /usr/bin/ssh-keygen -b 1024 -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key -N '' >&2 +fi +if [ ! -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key -o ! -s /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key ]; then + echo "Generating SSH DSA host key..." + /usr/bin/ssh-keygen -d -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key -N '' >&2 +fi +if test -r /var/run/sshd.pid +then + echo "Restarting the running SSH daemon..." + /usr/sbin/rcsshd restart >&2 +fi + +%preun +if [ "$1" = 0 ] +then + echo "Stopping the SSH daemon..." + /usr/sbin/rcsshd stop >&2 + echo "Removing SSH stop/start scripts from the rc directories..." + rm /sbin/init.d/rc2.d/K20sshd + rm /sbin/init.d/rc2.d/S20sshd + rm /sbin/init.d/rc3.d/K20sshd + rm /sbin/init.d/rc3.d/S20sshd +fi + +%files +%defattr(-,root,root) +%doc ChangeLog OVERVIEW README* +%doc RFC.nroff TODO CREDITS LICENSE +%attr(0755,root,root) %dir /etc/ssh +%attr(0644,root,root) %config /etc/ssh/ssh_config +%attr(0600,root,root) %config /etc/ssh/sshd_config +%attr(0600,root,root) %config /etc/ssh/moduli +%attr(0644,root,root) %config /etc/pam.d/sshd +%attr(0755,root,root) %config /sbin/init.d/sshd +%attr(0755,root,root) /usr/bin/ssh-keygen +%attr(0755,root,root) /usr/bin/scp +%attr(4755,root,root) /usr/bin/ssh +%attr(-,root,root) /usr/bin/slogin +%attr(0755,root,root) /usr/bin/ssh-agent +%attr(0755,root,root) /usr/bin/ssh-add +%attr(0755,root,root) /usr/bin/ssh-keyscan +%attr(0755,root,root) /usr/bin/sftp +%attr(0755,root,root) /usr/sbin/sshd +%attr(-,root,root) /usr/sbin/rcsshd +%attr(0755,root,root) %dir /usr/lib/ssh +%attr(0755,root,root) /usr/lib/ssh/ssh-askpass +%attr(0755,root,root) /usr/lib/ssh/gnome-ssh-askpass +%attr(0644,root,root) %doc /usr/man/man1/scp.1* +%attr(0644,root,root) %doc /usr/man/man1/ssh.1* +%attr(-,root,root) %doc /usr/man/man1/slogin.1* +%attr(0644,root,root) %doc /usr/man/man1/ssh-agent.1* +%attr(0644,root,root) %doc /usr/man/man1/ssh-add.1* +%attr(0644,root,root) %doc /usr/man/man1/ssh-keygen.1* +%attr(0644,root,root) %doc /usr/man/man8/sshd.8* +%attr(0644,root,root) /var/adm/fillup-templates/rc.config.sshd + diff --git a/openssh/contrib/suse/rc.config.sshd b/openssh/contrib/suse/rc.config.sshd new file mode 100644 index 0000000..baaa7a5 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/contrib/suse/rc.config.sshd @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +# +# Start the Secure Shell (SSH) Daemon? +# +START_SSHD="yes" + diff --git a/openssh/contrib/suse/rc.sshd b/openssh/contrib/suse/rc.sshd new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f7d431e --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/contrib/suse/rc.sshd @@ -0,0 +1,80 @@ +#! /bin/sh +# Copyright (c) 1995-1998 SuSE GmbH Nuernberg, Germany. +# +# Author: Chris Saia +# +# /sbin/init.d/sshd +# +# and symbolic its link +# +# /sbin/rcsshd +# + +. /etc/rc.config + +# Determine the base and follow a runlevel link name. +base=${0##*/} +link=${base#*[SK][0-9][0-9]} + +# Force execution if not called by a runlevel directory. +test $link = $base && START_SSHD=yes +test "$START_SSHD" = yes || exit 0 + +# The echo return value for success (defined in /etc/rc.config). +return=$rc_done +case "$1" in + start) + echo -n "Starting service sshd" + ## Start daemon with startproc(8). If this fails + ## the echo return value is set appropriate. + + startproc /usr/sbin/sshd || return=$rc_failed + + echo -e "$return" + ;; + stop) + echo -n "Stopping service sshd" + ## Stop daemon with killproc(8) and if this fails + ## set echo the echo return value. + + killproc -TERM /usr/sbin/sshd || return=$rc_failed + + echo -e "$return" + ;; + restart) + ## If first returns OK call the second, if first or + ## second command fails, set echo return value. + $0 stop && $0 start || return=$rc_failed + ;; + reload) + ## Choose ONE of the following two cases: + + ## First possibility: A few services accepts a signal + ## to reread the (changed) configuration. + + echo -n "Reload service sshd" + killproc -HUP /usr/sbin/sshd || return=$rc_failed + echo -e "$return" + ;; + status) + echo -n "Checking for service sshd" + ## Check status with checkproc(8), if process is running + ## checkproc will return with exit status 0. + + checkproc /usr/sbin/sshd && echo OK || echo No process + ;; + probe) + ## Optional: Probe for the necessity of a reload, + ## give out the argument which is required for a reload. + + test /etc/ssh/sshd_config -nt /var/run/sshd.pid && echo reload + ;; + *) + echo "Usage: $0 {start|stop|status|restart|reload[|probe]}" + exit 1 + ;; +esac + +# Inform the caller not only verbosely and set an exit status. +test "$return" = "$rc_done" || exit 1 +exit 0 diff --git a/openssh/crc32.c b/openssh/crc32.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4774c8b --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/crc32.c @@ -0,0 +1,114 @@ +/* + * COPYRIGHT (C) 1986 Gary S. Brown. You may use this program, or + * code or tables extracted from it, as desired without restriction. + * + * First, the polynomial itself and its table of feedback terms. The + * polynomial is + * X^32+X^26+X^23+X^22+X^16+X^12+X^11+X^10+X^8+X^7+X^5+X^4+X^2+X^1+X^0 + * + * Note that we take it "backwards" and put the highest-order term in + * the lowest-order bit. The X^32 term is "implied"; the LSB is the + * X^31 term, etc. The X^0 term (usually shown as "+1") results in + * the MSB being 1 + * + * Note that the usual hardware shift register implementation, which + * is what we're using (we're merely optimizing it by doing eight-bit + * chunks at a time) shifts bits into the lowest-order term. In our + * implementation, that means shifting towards the right. Why do we + * do it this way? Because the calculated CRC must be transmitted in + * order from highest-order term to lowest-order term. UARTs transmit + * characters in order from LSB to MSB. By storing the CRC this way + * we hand it to the UART in the order low-byte to high-byte; the UART + * sends each low-bit to hight-bit; and the result is transmission bit + * by bit from highest- to lowest-order term without requiring any bit + * shuffling on our part. Reception works similarly + * + * The feedback terms table consists of 256, 32-bit entries. Notes + * + * The table can be generated at runtime if desired; code to do so + * is shown later. It might not be obvious, but the feedback + * terms simply represent the results of eight shift/xor opera + * tions for all combinations of data and CRC register values + * + * The values must be right-shifted by eight bits by the "updcrc + * logic; the shift must be u_(bring in zeroes). On some + * hardware you could probably optimize the shift in assembler by + * using byte-swap instructions + * polynomial $edb88320 + */ + + +#include "includes.h" +RCSID("$OpenBSD: crc32.c,v 1.8 2000/12/19 23:17:56 markus Exp $"); + +#include "crc32.h" + +static u_int crc32_tab[] = { + 0x00000000L, 0x77073096L, 0xee0e612cL, 0x990951baL, 0x076dc419L, + 0x706af48fL, 0xe963a535L, 0x9e6495a3L, 0x0edb8832L, 0x79dcb8a4L, + 0xe0d5e91eL, 0x97d2d988L, 0x09b64c2bL, 0x7eb17cbdL, 0xe7b82d07L, + 0x90bf1d91L, 0x1db71064L, 0x6ab020f2L, 0xf3b97148L, 0x84be41deL, + 0x1adad47dL, 0x6ddde4ebL, 0xf4d4b551L, 0x83d385c7L, 0x136c9856L, + 0x646ba8c0L, 0xfd62f97aL, 0x8a65c9ecL, 0x14015c4fL, 0x63066cd9L, + 0xfa0f3d63L, 0x8d080df5L, 0x3b6e20c8L, 0x4c69105eL, 0xd56041e4L, + 0xa2677172L, 0x3c03e4d1L, 0x4b04d447L, 0xd20d85fdL, 0xa50ab56bL, + 0x35b5a8faL, 0x42b2986cL, 0xdbbbc9d6L, 0xacbcf940L, 0x32d86ce3L, + 0x45df5c75L, 0xdcd60dcfL, 0xabd13d59L, 0x26d930acL, 0x51de003aL, + 0xc8d75180L, 0xbfd06116L, 0x21b4f4b5L, 0x56b3c423L, 0xcfba9599L, + 0xb8bda50fL, 0x2802b89eL, 0x5f058808L, 0xc60cd9b2L, 0xb10be924L, + 0x2f6f7c87L, 0x58684c11L, 0xc1611dabL, 0xb6662d3dL, 0x76dc4190L, + 0x01db7106L, 0x98d220bcL, 0xefd5102aL, 0x71b18589L, 0x06b6b51fL, + 0x9fbfe4a5L, 0xe8b8d433L, 0x7807c9a2L, 0x0f00f934L, 0x9609a88eL, + 0xe10e9818L, 0x7f6a0dbbL, 0x086d3d2dL, 0x91646c97L, 0xe6635c01L, + 0x6b6b51f4L, 0x1c6c6162L, 0x856530d8L, 0xf262004eL, 0x6c0695edL, + 0x1b01a57bL, 0x8208f4c1L, 0xf50fc457L, 0x65b0d9c6L, 0x12b7e950L, + 0x8bbeb8eaL, 0xfcb9887cL, 0x62dd1ddfL, 0x15da2d49L, 0x8cd37cf3L, + 0xfbd44c65L, 0x4db26158L, 0x3ab551ceL, 0xa3bc0074L, 0xd4bb30e2L, + 0x4adfa541L, 0x3dd895d7L, 0xa4d1c46dL, 0xd3d6f4fbL, 0x4369e96aL, + 0x346ed9fcL, 0xad678846L, 0xda60b8d0L, 0x44042d73L, 0x33031de5L, + 0xaa0a4c5fL, 0xdd0d7cc9L, 0x5005713cL, 0x270241aaL, 0xbe0b1010L, + 0xc90c2086L, 0x5768b525L, 0x206f85b3L, 0xb966d409L, 0xce61e49fL, + 0x5edef90eL, 0x29d9c998L, 0xb0d09822L, 0xc7d7a8b4L, 0x59b33d17L, + 0x2eb40d81L, 0xb7bd5c3bL, 0xc0ba6cadL, 0xedb88320L, 0x9abfb3b6L, + 0x03b6e20cL, 0x74b1d29aL, 0xead54739L, 0x9dd277afL, 0x04db2615L, + 0x73dc1683L, 0xe3630b12L, 0x94643b84L, 0x0d6d6a3eL, 0x7a6a5aa8L, + 0xe40ecf0bL, 0x9309ff9dL, 0x0a00ae27L, 0x7d079eb1L, 0xf00f9344L, + 0x8708a3d2L, 0x1e01f268L, 0x6906c2feL, 0xf762575dL, 0x806567cbL, + 0x196c3671L, 0x6e6b06e7L, 0xfed41b76L, 0x89d32be0L, 0x10da7a5aL, + 0x67dd4accL, 0xf9b9df6fL, 0x8ebeeff9L, 0x17b7be43L, 0x60b08ed5L, + 0xd6d6a3e8L, 0xa1d1937eL, 0x38d8c2c4L, 0x4fdff252L, 0xd1bb67f1L, + 0xa6bc5767L, 0x3fb506ddL, 0x48b2364bL, 0xd80d2bdaL, 0xaf0a1b4cL, + 0x36034af6L, 0x41047a60L, 0xdf60efc3L, 0xa867df55L, 0x316e8eefL, + 0x4669be79L, 0xcb61b38cL, 0xbc66831aL, 0x256fd2a0L, 0x5268e236L, + 0xcc0c7795L, 0xbb0b4703L, 0x220216b9L, 0x5505262fL, 0xc5ba3bbeL, + 0xb2bd0b28L, 0x2bb45a92L, 0x5cb36a04L, 0xc2d7ffa7L, 0xb5d0cf31L, + 0x2cd99e8bL, 0x5bdeae1dL, 0x9b64c2b0L, 0xec63f226L, 0x756aa39cL, + 0x026d930aL, 0x9c0906a9L, 0xeb0e363fL, 0x72076785L, 0x05005713L, + 0x95bf4a82L, 0xe2b87a14L, 0x7bb12baeL, 0x0cb61b38L, 0x92d28e9bL, + 0xe5d5be0dL, 0x7cdcefb7L, 0x0bdbdf21L, 0x86d3d2d4L, 0xf1d4e242L, + 0x68ddb3f8L, 0x1fda836eL, 0x81be16cdL, 0xf6b9265bL, 0x6fb077e1L, + 0x18b74777L, 0x88085ae6L, 0xff0f6a70L, 0x66063bcaL, 0x11010b5cL, + 0x8f659effL, 0xf862ae69L, 0x616bffd3L, 0x166ccf45L, 0xa00ae278L, + 0xd70dd2eeL, 0x4e048354L, 0x3903b3c2L, 0xa7672661L, 0xd06016f7L, + 0x4969474dL, 0x3e6e77dbL, 0xaed16a4aL, 0xd9d65adcL, 0x40df0b66L, + 0x37d83bf0L, 0xa9bcae53L, 0xdebb9ec5L, 0x47b2cf7fL, 0x30b5ffe9L, + 0xbdbdf21cL, 0xcabac28aL, 0x53b39330L, 0x24b4a3a6L, 0xbad03605L, + 0xcdd70693L, 0x54de5729L, 0x23d967bfL, 0xb3667a2eL, 0xc4614ab8L, + 0x5d681b02L, 0x2a6f2b94L, 0xb40bbe37L, 0xc30c8ea1L, 0x5a05df1bL, + 0x2d02ef8dL +}; + +/* Return a 32-bit CRC of the contents of the buffer. */ + +u_int +ssh_crc32(const u_char *s, u_int len) +{ + u_int i; + u_int crc32val; + + crc32val = 0; + for (i = 0; i < len; i ++) { + crc32val = crc32_tab[(crc32val ^ s[i]) & 0xff] ^ (crc32val >> 8); + } + return crc32val; +} diff --git a/openssh/crc32.h b/openssh/crc32.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..bdabc1b --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/crc32.h @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1992 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * Functions for computing 32-bit CRC. + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + */ + +/* RCSID("$OpenBSD: crc32.h,v 1.12 2001/06/26 17:27:23 markus Exp $"); */ + +#ifndef CRC32_H +#define CRC32_H + +u_int ssh_crc32(const u_char *, u_int); + +#endif /* CRC32_H */ diff --git a/openssh/deattack.c b/openssh/deattack.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1a89be4 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/deattack.c @@ -0,0 +1,155 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: deattack.c,v 1.14 2001/06/23 15:12:18 itojun Exp $ */ + +/* + * Cryptographic attack detector for ssh - source code + * + * Copyright (c) 1998 CORE SDI S.A., Buenos Aires, Argentina. + * + * All rights reserved. Redistribution and use in source and binary + * forms, with or without modification, are permitted provided that + * this copyright notice is retained. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL CORE SDI S.A. BE + * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY OR + * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES RESULTING FROM THE USE OR MISUSE OF THIS + * SOFTWARE. + * + * Ariel Futoransky + * + */ + +#include "includes.h" +#include "deattack.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "crc32.h" +#include "getput.h" +#include "xmalloc.h" + +/* SSH Constants */ +#define SSH_MAXBLOCKS (32 * 1024) +#define SSH_BLOCKSIZE (8) + +/* Hashing constants */ +#define HASH_MINSIZE (8 * 1024) +#define HASH_ENTRYSIZE (2) +#define HASH_FACTOR(x) ((x)*3/2) +#define HASH_UNUSEDCHAR (0xff) +#define HASH_UNUSED (0xffff) +#define HASH_IV (0xfffe) + +#define HASH_MINBLOCKS (7*SSH_BLOCKSIZE) + + +/* Hash function (Input keys are cipher results) */ +#define HASH(x) GET_32BIT(x) + +#define CMP(a, b) (memcmp(a, b, SSH_BLOCKSIZE)) + +static void +crc_update(u_int32_t *a, u_int32_t b) +{ + b ^= *a; + *a = ssh_crc32((u_char *) &b, sizeof(b)); +} + +/* detect if a block is used in a particular pattern */ +static int +check_crc(u_char *S, u_char *buf, u_int32_t len, + u_char *IV) +{ + u_int32_t crc; + u_char *c; + + crc = 0; + if (IV && !CMP(S, IV)) { + crc_update(&crc, 1); + crc_update(&crc, 0); + } + for (c = buf; c < buf + len; c += SSH_BLOCKSIZE) { + if (!CMP(S, c)) { + crc_update(&crc, 1); + crc_update(&crc, 0); + } else { + crc_update(&crc, 0); + crc_update(&crc, 0); + } + } + return (crc == 0); +} + + +/* Detect a crc32 compensation attack on a packet */ +int +detect_attack(u_char *buf, u_int32_t len, u_char *IV) +{ + static u_int16_t *h = (u_int16_t *) NULL; + static u_int32_t n = HASH_MINSIZE / HASH_ENTRYSIZE; + register u_int32_t i, j; + u_int32_t l; + register u_char *c; + u_char *d; + + if (len > (SSH_MAXBLOCKS * SSH_BLOCKSIZE) || + len % SSH_BLOCKSIZE != 0) { + fatal("detect_attack: bad length %d", len); + } + for (l = n; l < HASH_FACTOR(len / SSH_BLOCKSIZE); l = l << 2) + ; + + if (h == NULL) { + debug("Installing crc compensation attack detector."); + n = l; + h = (u_int16_t *) xmalloc(n * HASH_ENTRYSIZE); + } else { + if (l > n) { + n = l; + h = (u_int16_t *) xrealloc(h, n * HASH_ENTRYSIZE); + } + } + + if (len <= HASH_MINBLOCKS) { + for (c = buf; c < buf + len; c += SSH_BLOCKSIZE) { + if (IV && (!CMP(c, IV))) { + if ((check_crc(c, buf, len, IV))) + return (DEATTACK_DETECTED); + else + break; + } + for (d = buf; d < c; d += SSH_BLOCKSIZE) { + if (!CMP(c, d)) { + if ((check_crc(c, buf, len, IV))) + return (DEATTACK_DETECTED); + else + break; + } + } + } + return (DEATTACK_OK); + } + memset(h, HASH_UNUSEDCHAR, n * HASH_ENTRYSIZE); + + if (IV) + h[HASH(IV) & (n - 1)] = HASH_IV; + + for (c = buf, j = 0; c < (buf + len); c += SSH_BLOCKSIZE, j++) { + for (i = HASH(c) & (n - 1); h[i] != HASH_UNUSED; + i = (i + 1) & (n - 1)) { + if (h[i] == HASH_IV) { + if (!CMP(c, IV)) { + if (check_crc(c, buf, len, IV)) + return (DEATTACK_DETECTED); + else + break; + } + } else if (!CMP(c, buf + h[i] * SSH_BLOCKSIZE)) { + if (check_crc(c, buf, len, IV)) + return (DEATTACK_DETECTED); + else + break; + } + } + h[i] = j; + } + return (DEATTACK_OK); +} diff --git a/openssh/deattack.h b/openssh/deattack.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ddccdea --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/deattack.h @@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: deattack.h,v 1.7 2001/06/26 17:27:23 markus Exp $ */ + +/* + * Cryptographic attack detector for ssh - Header file + * + * Copyright (c) 1998 CORE SDI S.A., Buenos Aires, Argentina. + * + * All rights reserved. Redistribution and use in source and binary + * forms, with or without modification, are permitted provided that + * this copyright notice is retained. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL CORE SDI S.A. BE + * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY OR + * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES RESULTING FROM THE USE OR MISUSE OF THIS + * SOFTWARE. + * + * Ariel Futoransky + * + */ + +#ifndef _DEATTACK_H +#define _DEATTACK_H + +/* Return codes */ +#define DEATTACK_OK 0 +#define DEATTACK_DETECTED 1 + +int detect_attack(u_char *, u_int32_t, u_char[8]); +#endif diff --git a/openssh/defines.h b/openssh/defines.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3c2287e --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/defines.h @@ -0,0 +1,558 @@ +#ifndef _DEFINES_H +#define _DEFINES_H + +/* $Id$ */ + +/* Necessary headers */ + +#include /* For [u]intxx_t */ +#include /* For SHUT_XXXX */ +#include /* For MAXPATHLEN and roundup() */ +#include /* For typedefs */ +#include /* For IPv6 macros */ +#include /* For IPTOS macros */ +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_UN_H +# include /* For sockaddr_un */ +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_BITYPES_H +# include /* For u_intXX_t */ +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H +# include /* For _PATH_XXX */ +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_LIMITS_H +# include /* For PATH_MAX */ +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H +# include /* For timersub */ +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_MAILLOCK_H +# include /* For _PATH_MAILDIR */ +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_CDEFS_H +# include /* For __P() */ +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SYSMACROS_H +# include /* For MIN, MAX, etc */ +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H +# include /* For S_* constants and macros */ +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NEXT +# include +#endif + +#include /* For STDIN_FILENO, etc */ +#include /* Struct winsize */ +#include /* For O_NONBLOCK */ +#include /* For OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER */ + +/* *-*-nto-qnx needs these headers for strcasecmp and LASTLOG_FILE respectively */ +#ifdef HAVE_STRINGS_H +# include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_H +# include +#endif + + +/* Constants */ + +#ifndef SHUT_RDWR +enum +{ + SHUT_RD = 0, /* No more receptions. */ + SHUT_WR, /* No more transmissions. */ + SHUT_RDWR /* No more receptions or transmissions. */ +}; +# define SHUT_RD SHUT_RD +# define SHUT_WR SHUT_WR +# define SHUT_RDWR SHUT_RDWR +#endif + +#ifndef IPTOS_LOWDELAY +# define IPTOS_LOWDELAY 0x10 +# define IPTOS_THROUGHPUT 0x08 +# define IPTOS_RELIABILITY 0x04 +# define IPTOS_LOWCOST 0x02 +# define IPTOS_MINCOST IPTOS_LOWCOST +#endif /* IPTOS_LOWDELAY */ + +#ifndef MAXPATHLEN +# ifdef PATH_MAX +# define MAXPATHLEN PATH_MAX +# else /* PATH_MAX */ +# define MAXPATHLEN 64 /* Should be safe */ +# endif /* PATH_MAX */ +#endif /* MAXPATHLEN */ + +#ifndef STDIN_FILENO +# define STDIN_FILENO 0 +#endif +#ifndef STDOUT_FILENO +# define STDOUT_FILENO 1 +#endif +#ifndef STDERR_FILENO +# define STDERR_FILENO 2 +#endif + +#ifndef NGROUPS_MAX /* Disable groupaccess if NGROUP_MAX is not set */ +#ifdef NGROUPS +#define NGROUPS_MAX NGROUPS +#else +#define NGROUPS_MAX 0 +#endif +#endif + +#ifndef O_NONBLOCK /* Non Blocking Open */ +# define O_NONBLOCK 00004 +#endif + +#ifndef S_ISDIR +# define S_ISDIR(mode) (((mode) & (_S_IFMT)) == (_S_IFDIR)) +#endif /* S_ISDIR */ + +#ifndef S_ISREG +# define S_ISREG(mode) (((mode) & (_S_IFMT)) == (_S_IFREG)) +#endif /* S_ISREG */ + +#ifndef S_ISLNK +# define S_ISLNK(mode) (((mode) & S_IFMT) == S_IFLNK) +#endif /* S_ISLNK */ + +#ifndef S_IXUSR +# define S_IXUSR 0000100 /* execute/search permission, */ +# define S_IXGRP 0000010 /* execute/search permission, */ +# define S_IXOTH 0000001 /* execute/search permission, */ +# define _S_IWUSR 0000200 /* write permission, */ +# define S_IWUSR _S_IWUSR /* write permission, owner */ +# define S_IWGRP 0000020 /* write permission, group */ +# define S_IWOTH 0000002 /* write permission, other */ +# define S_IRUSR 0000400 /* read permission, owner */ +# define S_IRGRP 0000040 /* read permission, group */ +# define S_IROTH 0000004 /* read permission, other */ +# define S_IRWXU 0000700 /* read, write, execute */ +# define S_IRWXG 0000070 /* read, write, execute */ +# define S_IRWXO 0000007 /* read, write, execute */ +#endif /* S_IXUSR */ + +/* *-*-nto-qnx doesn't define this constant in the system headers */ +#ifdef MISSING_NFDBITS +# define NFDBITS (8 * sizeof(unsigned long)) +#endif + +/* Types */ + +/* If sys/types.h does not supply intXX_t, supply them ourselves */ +/* (or die trying) */ + + +#ifndef HAVE_U_INT +typedef unsigned int u_int; +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_INTXX_T +# if (SIZEOF_CHAR == 1) +typedef char int8_t; +# else +# error "8 bit int type not found." +# endif +# if (SIZEOF_SHORT_INT == 2) +typedef short int int16_t; +# else +# ifdef _CRAY +typedef long int16_t; +# else +# error "16 bit int type not found." +# endif /* _CRAY */ +# endif +# if (SIZEOF_INT == 4) +typedef int int32_t; +# else +# ifdef _CRAY +typedef long int32_t; +# else +# error "32 bit int type not found." +# endif /* _CRAY */ +# endif +#endif + +/* If sys/types.h does not supply u_intXX_t, supply them ourselves */ +#ifndef HAVE_U_INTXX_T +# ifdef HAVE_UINTXX_T +typedef uint8_t u_int8_t; +typedef uint16_t u_int16_t; +typedef uint32_t u_int32_t; +# define HAVE_U_INTXX_T 1 +# else +# if (SIZEOF_CHAR == 1) +typedef unsigned char u_int8_t; +# else +# error "8 bit int type not found." +# endif +# if (SIZEOF_SHORT_INT == 2) +typedef unsigned short int u_int16_t; +# else +# ifdef _CRAY +typedef unsigned long u_int16_t; +# else +# error "16 bit int type not found." +# endif +# endif +# if (SIZEOF_INT == 4) +typedef unsigned int u_int32_t; +# else +# ifdef _CRAY +typedef unsigned long u_int32_t; +# else +# error "32 bit int type not found." +# endif +# endif +# endif +#define __BIT_TYPES_DEFINED__ +#endif + +/* 64-bit types */ +#ifndef HAVE_INT64_T +# if (SIZEOF_LONG_INT == 8) +typedef long int int64_t; +# define HAVE_INT64_T 1 +# else +# if (SIZEOF_LONG_LONG_INT == 8) +typedef long long int int64_t; +# define HAVE_INT64_T 1 +# endif +# endif +#endif +#ifndef HAVE_U_INT64_T +# if (SIZEOF_LONG_INT == 8) +typedef unsigned long int u_int64_t; +# define HAVE_U_INT64_T 1 +# else +# if (SIZEOF_LONG_LONG_INT == 8) +typedef unsigned long long int u_int64_t; +# define HAVE_U_INT64_T 1 +# endif +# endif +#endif +#if !defined(HAVE_LONG_LONG_INT) && (SIZEOF_LONG_LONG_INT == 8) +# define HAVE_LONG_LONG_INT 1 +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_U_CHAR +typedef unsigned char u_char; +# define HAVE_U_CHAR +#endif /* HAVE_U_CHAR */ + +#ifndef HAVE_SIZE_T +typedef unsigned int size_t; +# define HAVE_SIZE_T +#endif /* HAVE_SIZE_T */ + +#ifndef HAVE_SSIZE_T +typedef int ssize_t; +# define HAVE_SSIZE_T +#endif /* HAVE_SSIZE_T */ + +#ifndef HAVE_CLOCK_T +typedef long clock_t; +# define HAVE_CLOCK_T +#endif /* HAVE_CLOCK_T */ + +#ifndef HAVE_SA_FAMILY_T +typedef int sa_family_t; +# define HAVE_SA_FAMILY_T +#endif /* HAVE_SA_FAMILY_T */ + +#ifndef HAVE_PID_T +typedef int pid_t; +# define HAVE_PID_T +#endif /* HAVE_PID_T */ + +#ifndef HAVE_MODE_T +typedef int mode_t; +# define HAVE_MODE_T +#endif /* HAVE_MODE_T */ + +#if !defined(HAVE_SS_FAMILY_IN_SS) && defined(HAVE___SS_FAMILY_IN_SS) +# define ss_family __ss_family +#endif /* !defined(HAVE_SS_FAMILY_IN_SS) && defined(HAVE_SA_FAMILY_IN_SS) */ + +#ifndef HAVE_SYS_UN_H +struct sockaddr_un { + short sun_family; /* AF_UNIX */ + char sun_path[108]; /* path name (gag) */ +}; +#endif /* HAVE_SYS_UN_H */ + +#if defined(BROKEN_SYS_TERMIO_H) && !defined(_STRUCT_WINSIZE) +#define _STRUCT_WINSIZE +struct winsize { + unsigned short ws_row; /* rows, in characters */ + unsigned short ws_col; /* columns, in character */ + unsigned short ws_xpixel; /* horizontal size, pixels */ + unsigned short ws_ypixel; /* vertical size, pixels */ +}; +#endif + +/* *-*-nto-qnx does not define this type in the system headers */ +#ifdef MISSING_FD_MASK + typedef unsigned long int fd_mask; +#endif + +/* Paths */ + +#ifndef _PATH_BSHELL +# define _PATH_BSHELL "/bin/sh" +#endif +#ifndef _PATH_CSHELL +# define _PATH_CSHELL "/bin/csh" +#endif +#ifndef _PATH_SHELLS +# define _PATH_SHELLS "/etc/shells" +#endif + +#ifdef USER_PATH +# ifdef _PATH_STDPATH +# undef _PATH_STDPATH +# endif +# define _PATH_STDPATH USER_PATH +#endif + +#ifndef _PATH_STDPATH +# define _PATH_STDPATH "/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin" +#endif + +#ifndef _PATH_DEVNULL +# define _PATH_DEVNULL "/dev/null" +#endif + +#ifndef MAIL_DIRECTORY +# define MAIL_DIRECTORY "/var/spool/mail" +#endif + +#ifndef MAILDIR +# define MAILDIR MAIL_DIRECTORY +#endif + +#if !defined(_PATH_MAILDIR) && defined(MAILDIR) +# define _PATH_MAILDIR MAILDIR +#endif /* !defined(_PATH_MAILDIR) && defined(MAILDIR) */ + +#ifndef _PATH_RSH +# ifdef RSH_PATH +# define _PATH_RSH RSH_PATH +# else /* RSH_PATH */ +# define _PATH_RSH "/usr/bin/rsh" +# endif /* RSH_PATH */ +#endif /* _PATH_RSH */ + +#ifndef _PATH_NOLOGIN +# define _PATH_NOLOGIN "/etc/nologin" +#endif + +/* Define this to be the path of the xauth program. */ +#ifdef XAUTH_PATH +#define _PATH_XAUTH XAUTH_PATH +#endif /* XAUTH_PATH */ + +#ifndef _PATH_TTY +# define _PATH_TTY "/dev/tty" +#endif + +/* Macros */ + +#if defined(HAVE_LOGIN_GETCAPBOOL) && defined(HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H) +# define HAVE_LOGIN_CAP +#endif + +#ifndef MAX +# define MAX(a,b) (((a)>(b))?(a):(b)) +# define MIN(a,b) (((a)<(b))?(a):(b)) +#endif + +#ifndef roundup +# define roundup(x, y) ((((x)+((y)-1))/(y))*(y)) +#endif + +#ifndef timersub +#define timersub(a, b, result) \ + do { \ + (result)->tv_sec = (a)->tv_sec - (b)->tv_sec; \ + (result)->tv_usec = (a)->tv_usec - (b)->tv_usec; \ + if ((result)->tv_usec < 0) { \ + --(result)->tv_sec; \ + (result)->tv_usec += 1000000; \ + } \ + } while (0) +#endif + +#ifndef __P +# define __P(x) x +#endif + +#if !defined(IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED) +# define IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(a) \ + ((((u_int32_t *) (a))[0] == 0) && (((u_int32_t *) (a))[1] == 0) && \ + (((u_int32_t *) (a))[2] == htonl (0xffff))) +#endif /* !defined(IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED) */ + +#if !defined(__GNUC__) || (__GNUC__ < 2) +# define __attribute__(x) +#endif /* !defined(__GNUC__) || (__GNUC__ < 2) */ + +/* *-*-nto-qnx doesn't define this macro in the system headers */ +#ifdef MISSING_HOWMANY +# define howmany(x,y) (((x)+((y)-1))/(y)) +#endif + +/* Function replacement / compatibility hacks */ + +/* In older versions of libpam, pam_strerror takes a single argument */ +#ifdef HAVE_OLD_PAM +# define PAM_STRERROR(a,b) pam_strerror((b)) +#else +# define PAM_STRERROR(a,b) pam_strerror((a),(b)) +#endif + +#ifdef PAM_SUN_CODEBASE +# define PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, n, member) ((*(msg))[(n)].member) +#else +# define PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, n, member) ((msg)[(n)]->member) +#endif + +#if defined(BROKEN_GETADDRINFO) && defined(HAVE_GETADDRINFO) +# undef HAVE_GETADDRINFO +#endif +#if defined(BROKEN_GETADDRINFO) && defined(HAVE_FREEADDRINFO) +# undef HAVE_FREEADDRINFO +#endif +#if defined(BROKEN_GETADDRINFO) && defined(HAVE_GAI_STRERROR) +# undef HAVE_GAI_STRERROR +#endif + +#if !defined(HAVE_MEMMOVE) && defined(HAVE_BCOPY) +# define memmove(s1, s2, n) bcopy((s2), (s1), (n)) +#endif /* !defined(HAVE_MEMMOVE) && defined(HAVE_BCOPY) */ + +#if !defined(HAVE_ATEXIT) && defined(HAVE_ON_EXIT) +# define atexit(a, NULL) on_exit(a, NULL) +#else +# if defined(HAVE_XATEXIT) +# define atexit(a) xatexit(a) +# endif /* defined(HAVE_XATEXIT) */ +#endif /* !defined(HAVE_ATEXIT) && defined(HAVE_ON_EXIT) */ + +#if defined(HAVE_VHANGUP) && !defined(HAVE_DEV_PTMX) +# define USE_VHANGUP +#endif /* defined(HAVE_VHANGUP) && !defined(HAVE_DEV_PTMX) */ + +#ifndef GETPGRP_VOID +# define getpgrp() getpgrp(0) +#endif + +/* OPENSSL_free() is Free() in versions before OpenSSL 0.9.6 */ +#if !defined(OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER) || (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x0090600f) +# define OPENSSL_free(x) Free(x) +#endif + +/* + * Define this to use pipes instead of socketpairs for communicating with the + * client program. Socketpairs do not seem to work on all systems. + * + * configure.ac sets this for a few OS's which are known to have problems + * but you may need to set it yourself + */ +/* #define USE_PIPES 1 */ + +/** + ** login recorder definitions + **/ + +/* preprocess */ + +#ifdef HAVE_UTMP_H +# ifdef HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMP +# include +# endif +# include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_UTMPX_H +# ifdef HAVE_TV_IN_UTMPX +# include +# endif +# include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_LASTLOG_H +# include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H +# include +#endif + +/* FIXME: put default paths back in */ +#ifndef UTMP_FILE +# ifdef _PATH_UTMP +# define UTMP_FILE _PATH_UTMP +# else +# ifdef CONF_UTMP_FILE +# define UTMP_FILE CONF_UTMP_FILE +# endif +# endif +#endif +#ifndef WTMP_FILE +# ifdef _PATH_WTMP +# define WTMP_FILE _PATH_WTMP +# else +# ifdef CONF_WTMP_FILE +# define WTMP_FILE CONF_WTMP_FILE +# endif +# endif +#endif +/* pick up the user's location for lastlog if given */ +#ifndef LASTLOG_FILE +# ifdef _PATH_LASTLOG +# define LASTLOG_FILE _PATH_LASTLOG +# else +# ifdef CONF_LASTLOG_FILE +# define LASTLOG_FILE CONF_LASTLOG_FILE +# endif +# endif +#endif + + +/* The login() library function in libutil is first choice */ +#if defined(HAVE_LOGIN) && !defined(DISABLE_LOGIN) +# define USE_LOGIN + +#else +/* Simply select your favourite login types. */ +/* Can't do if-else because some systems use several... */ +# if defined(UTMPX_FILE) && !defined(DISABLE_UTMPX) +# define USE_UTMPX +# endif +# if defined(UTMP_FILE) && !defined(DISABLE_UTMP) +# define USE_UTMP +# endif +# if defined(WTMPX_FILE) && !defined(DISABLE_WTMPX) +# define USE_WTMPX +# endif +# if defined(WTMP_FILE) && !defined(DISABLE_WTMP) +# define USE_WTMP +# endif + +#endif + +/* I hope that the presence of LASTLOG_FILE is enough to detect this */ +#if defined(LASTLOG_FILE) && !defined(DISABLE_LASTLOG) +# define USE_LASTLOG +#endif + +/* which type of time to use? (api.c) */ +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H +# define USE_TIMEVAL +#endif + +/** end of login recorder definitions */ + +#endif /* _DEFINES_H */ diff --git a/openssh/dh.c b/openssh/dh.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fa2508a --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/dh.c @@ -0,0 +1,290 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000 Niels Provos. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" +RCSID("$OpenBSD: dh.c,v 1.17 2001/06/23 15:12:18 itojun Exp $"); + +#include "xmalloc.h" + +#include +#include +#include + +#include "buffer.h" +#include "cipher.h" +#include "kex.h" +#include "dh.h" +#include "pathnames.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "misc.h" + +static int +parse_prime(int linenum, char *line, struct dhgroup *dhg) +{ + char *cp, *arg; + char *strsize, *gen, *prime; + + cp = line; + arg = strdelim(&cp); + /* Ignore leading whitespace */ + if (*arg == '\0') + arg = strdelim(&cp); + if (!*arg || *arg == '#') + return 0; + + /* time */ + if (cp == NULL || *arg == '\0') + goto fail; + arg = strsep(&cp, " "); /* type */ + if (cp == NULL || *arg == '\0') + goto fail; + arg = strsep(&cp, " "); /* tests */ + if (cp == NULL || *arg == '\0') + goto fail; + arg = strsep(&cp, " "); /* tries */ + if (cp == NULL || *arg == '\0') + goto fail; + strsize = strsep(&cp, " "); /* size */ + if (cp == NULL || *strsize == '\0' || + (dhg->size = atoi(strsize)) == 0) + goto fail; + /* The whole group is one bit larger */ + dhg->size++; + gen = strsep(&cp, " "); /* gen */ + if (cp == NULL || *gen == '\0') + goto fail; + prime = strsep(&cp, " "); /* prime */ + if (cp != NULL || *prime == '\0') + goto fail; + + dhg->g = BN_new(); + dhg->p = BN_new(); + if (BN_hex2bn(&dhg->g, gen) == 0) + goto failclean; + + if (BN_hex2bn(&dhg->p, prime) == 0) + goto failclean; + + if (BN_num_bits(dhg->p) != dhg->size) + goto failclean; + + return (1); + + failclean: + BN_free(dhg->g); + BN_free(dhg->p); + fail: + error("Bad prime description in line %d", linenum); + return (0); +} + +DH * +choose_dh(int min, int wantbits, int max) +{ + FILE *f; + char line[2048]; + int best, bestcount, which; + int linenum; + struct dhgroup dhg; + + if ((f = fopen(_PATH_DH_MODULI, "r")) == NULL && + (f = fopen(_PATH_DH_PRIMES, "r")) == NULL) { + log("WARNING: %s does not exist, using old modulus", _PATH_DH_MODULI); + return (dh_new_group1()); + } + + linenum = 0; + best = bestcount = 0; + while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), f)) { + linenum++; + if (!parse_prime(linenum, line, &dhg)) + continue; + BN_free(dhg.g); + BN_free(dhg.p); + + if (dhg.size > max || dhg.size < min) + continue; + + if ((dhg.size > wantbits && dhg.size < best) || + (dhg.size > best && best < wantbits)) { + best = dhg.size; + bestcount = 0; + } + if (dhg.size == best) + bestcount++; + } + rewind(f); + + if (bestcount == 0) { + fclose(f); + log("WARNING: no suitable primes in %s", _PATH_DH_PRIMES); + return (NULL); + } + + linenum = 0; + which = arc4random() % bestcount; + while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), f)) { + if (!parse_prime(linenum, line, &dhg)) + continue; + if ((dhg.size > max || dhg.size < min) || + dhg.size != best || + linenum++ != which) { + BN_free(dhg.g); + BN_free(dhg.p); + continue; + } + break; + } + fclose(f); + if (linenum != which+1) + fatal("WARNING: line %d disappeared in %s, giving up", + which, _PATH_DH_PRIMES); + + return (dh_new_group(dhg.g, dhg.p)); +} + +/* diffie-hellman-group1-sha1 */ + +int +dh_pub_is_valid(DH *dh, BIGNUM *dh_pub) +{ + int i; + int n = BN_num_bits(dh_pub); + int bits_set = 0; + + if (dh_pub->neg) { + log("invalid public DH value: negativ"); + return 0; + } + for (i = 0; i <= n; i++) + if (BN_is_bit_set(dh_pub, i)) + bits_set++; + debug("bits set: %d/%d", bits_set, BN_num_bits(dh->p)); + + /* if g==2 and bits_set==1 then computing log_g(dh_pub) is trivial */ + if (bits_set > 1 && (BN_cmp(dh_pub, dh->p) == -1)) + return 1; + log("invalid public DH value (%d/%d)", bits_set, BN_num_bits(dh->p)); + return 0; +} + +void +dh_gen_key(DH *dh, int need) +{ + int i, bits_set = 0, tries = 0; + + if (dh->p == NULL) + fatal("dh_gen_key: dh->p == NULL"); + if (2*need >= BN_num_bits(dh->p)) + fatal("dh_gen_key: group too small: %d (2*need %d)", + BN_num_bits(dh->p), 2*need); + do { + if (dh->priv_key != NULL) + BN_free(dh->priv_key); + dh->priv_key = BN_new(); + if (dh->priv_key == NULL) + fatal("dh_gen_key: BN_new failed"); + /* generate a 2*need bits random private exponent */ + if (!BN_rand(dh->priv_key, 2*need, 0, 0)) + fatal("dh_gen_key: BN_rand failed"); + if (DH_generate_key(dh) == 0) + fatal("DH_generate_key"); + for (i = 0; i <= BN_num_bits(dh->priv_key); i++) + if (BN_is_bit_set(dh->priv_key, i)) + bits_set++; + debug("dh_gen_key: priv key bits set: %d/%d", + bits_set, BN_num_bits(dh->priv_key)); + if (tries++ > 10) + fatal("dh_gen_key: too many bad keys: giving up"); + } while (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh->pub_key)); +} + +DH * +dh_new_group_asc(const char *gen, const char *modulus) +{ + DH *dh; + + dh = DH_new(); + if (dh == NULL) + fatal("DH_new"); + + if (BN_hex2bn(&dh->p, modulus) == 0) + fatal("BN_hex2bn p"); + if (BN_hex2bn(&dh->g, gen) == 0) + fatal("BN_hex2bn g"); + + return (dh); +} + +/* + * This just returns the group, we still need to generate the exchange + * value. + */ + +DH * +dh_new_group(BIGNUM *gen, BIGNUM *modulus) +{ + DH *dh; + + dh = DH_new(); + if (dh == NULL) + fatal("DH_new"); + dh->p = modulus; + dh->g = gen; + + return (dh); +} + +DH * +dh_new_group1(void) +{ + static char *gen = "2", *group1 = + "FFFFFFFF" "FFFFFFFF" "C90FDAA2" "2168C234" "C4C6628B" "80DC1CD1" + "29024E08" "8A67CC74" "020BBEA6" "3B139B22" "514A0879" "8E3404DD" + "EF9519B3" "CD3A431B" "302B0A6D" "F25F1437" "4FE1356D" "6D51C245" + "E485B576" "625E7EC6" "F44C42E9" "A637ED6B" "0BFF5CB6" "F406B7ED" + "EE386BFB" "5A899FA5" "AE9F2411" "7C4B1FE6" "49286651" "ECE65381" + "FFFFFFFF" "FFFFFFFF"; + + return (dh_new_group_asc(gen, group1)); +} + +/* + * Estimates the group order for a Diffie-Hellman group that has an + * attack complexity approximately the same as O(2**bits). Estimate + * with: O(exp(1.9223 * (ln q)^(1/3) (ln ln q)^(2/3))) + */ + +int +dh_estimate(int bits) +{ + + if (bits < 64) + return (512); /* O(2**63) */ + if (bits < 128) + return (1024); /* O(2**86) */ + if (bits < 192) + return (2048); /* O(2**116) */ + return (4096); /* O(2**156) */ +} diff --git a/openssh/dh.h b/openssh/dh.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a0c97b2 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/dh.h @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: dh.h,v 1.7 2001/06/26 17:27:23 markus Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000 Niels Provos. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ +#ifndef DH_H +#define DH_H + +struct dhgroup { + int size; + BIGNUM *g; + BIGNUM *p; +}; + +DH *choose_dh(int, int, int); +DH *dh_new_group_asc(const char *, const char *); +DH *dh_new_group(BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *); +DH *dh_new_group1(void); + +void dh_gen_key(DH *, int); +int dh_pub_is_valid(DH *, BIGNUM *); + +int dh_estimate(int); + +#define DH_GRP_MIN 1024 +#define DH_GRP_MAX 8192 + +#endif diff --git a/openssh/dispatch.c b/openssh/dispatch.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..64873d5 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/dispatch.c @@ -0,0 +1,77 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ +#include "includes.h" +RCSID("$OpenBSD: dispatch.c,v 1.11 2001/06/10 11:29:20 markus Exp $"); + +#include "ssh1.h" +#include "ssh2.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "dispatch.h" +#include "packet.h" +#include "compat.h" + +#define DISPATCH_MIN 0 +#define DISPATCH_MAX 255 + +dispatch_fn *dispatch[DISPATCH_MAX]; + +void +dispatch_protocol_error(int type, int plen, void *ctxt) +{ + fatal("dispatch_protocol_error: type %d plen %d", type, plen); +} +void +dispatch_init(dispatch_fn *dflt) +{ + int i; + for (i = 0; i < DISPATCH_MAX; i++) + dispatch[i] = dflt; +} +void +dispatch_set(int type, dispatch_fn *fn) +{ + dispatch[type] = fn; +} +void +dispatch_run(int mode, int *done, void *ctxt) +{ + for (;;) { + int plen; + int type; + + if (mode == DISPATCH_BLOCK) { + type = packet_read(&plen); + } else { + type = packet_read_poll(&plen); + if (type == SSH_MSG_NONE) + return; + } + if (type > 0 && type < DISPATCH_MAX && dispatch[type] != NULL) + (*dispatch[type])(type, plen, ctxt); + else + packet_disconnect("protocol error: rcvd type %d", type); + if (done != NULL && *done) + return; + } +} diff --git a/openssh/dispatch.h b/openssh/dispatch.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7b94032 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/dispatch.h @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: dispatch.h,v 1.6 2001/06/26 17:27:23 markus Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ +enum { + DISPATCH_BLOCK, + DISPATCH_NONBLOCK +}; + +typedef void dispatch_fn(int, int, void *); + +void dispatch_init(dispatch_fn *); +void dispatch_set(int, dispatch_fn *); +void dispatch_run(int, int *, void *); +void dispatch_protocol_error(int, int, void *); diff --git a/openssh/entropy.c b/openssh/entropy.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9588f79 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/entropy.c @@ -0,0 +1,917 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include +#include + +/* SunOS 4.4.4 needs this */ +#ifdef HAVE_FLOATINGPOINT_H +# include +#endif /* HAVE_FLOATINGPOINT_H */ + +#include "ssh.h" +#include "misc.h" +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "atomicio.h" +#include "pathnames.h" +#include "log.h" + +RCSID("$Id$"); + +#ifndef offsetof +# define offsetof(type, member) ((size_t) &((type *)0)->member) +#endif + +/* Number of times to pass through command list gathering entropy */ +#define NUM_ENTROPY_RUNS 1 + +/* Scale entropy estimates back by this amount on subsequent runs */ +#define SCALE_PER_RUN 10.0 + +/* Minimum number of commands to be considered valid */ +#define MIN_ENTROPY_SOURCES 16 + +#define WHITESPACE " \t\n" + +#ifndef RUSAGE_SELF +# define RUSAGE_SELF 0 +#endif +#ifndef RUSAGE_CHILDREN +# define RUSAGE_CHILDREN 0 +#endif + +#if defined(_POSIX_SAVED_IDS) && !defined(BROKEN_SAVED_UIDS) +# define SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID +#endif + +static void +check_openssl_version(void) +{ + if (SSLeay() != OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER) + fatal("OpenSSL version mismatch. Built against %lx, you " + "have %lx", OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER, SSLeay()); +} + +#if defined(PRNGD_SOCKET) || defined(PRNGD_PORT) +# define USE_PRNGD +#endif + +#if defined(USE_PRNGD) || defined(RANDOM_POOL) + +#ifdef USE_PRNGD +/* Collect entropy from PRNGD/EGD */ +int +get_random_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int len) +{ + int fd; + char msg[2]; +#ifdef PRNGD_PORT + struct sockaddr_in addr; +#else + struct sockaddr_un addr; +#endif + int addr_len, rval, errors; + mysig_t old_sigpipe; + + memset(&addr, '\0', sizeof(addr)); + +#ifdef PRNGD_PORT + addr.sin_family = AF_INET; + addr.sin_addr.s_addr = htonl(INADDR_LOOPBACK); + addr.sin_port = htons(PRNGD_PORT); + addr_len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in); +#else /* use IP socket PRNGD_SOCKET instead */ + /* Sanity checks */ + if (sizeof(PRNGD_SOCKET) > sizeof(addr.sun_path)) + fatal("Random pool path is too long"); + if (len > 255) + fatal("Too many bytes to read from PRNGD"); + + addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX; + strlcpy(addr.sun_path, PRNGD_SOCKET, sizeof(addr.sun_path)); + addr_len = offsetof(struct sockaddr_un, sun_path) + + sizeof(PRNGD_SOCKET); +#endif + + old_sigpipe = mysignal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); + + errors = rval = 0; +reopen: +#ifdef PRNGD_PORT + fd = socket(addr.sin_family, SOCK_STREAM, 0); + if (fd == -1) { + error("Couldn't create AF_INET socket: %s", strerror(errno)); + goto done; + } +#else + fd = socket(addr.sun_family, SOCK_STREAM, 0); + if (fd == -1) { + error("Couldn't create AF_UNIX socket: %s", strerror(errno)); + goto done; + } +#endif + + if (connect(fd, (struct sockaddr*)&addr, addr_len) == -1) { +#ifdef PRNGD_PORT + error("Couldn't connect to PRNGD port %d: %s", + PRNGD_PORT, strerror(errno)); +#else + error("Couldn't connect to PRNGD socket \"%s\": %s", + addr.sun_path, strerror(errno)); +#endif + goto done; + } + + /* Send blocking read request to PRNGD */ + msg[0] = 0x02; + msg[1] = len; + + if (atomicio(write, fd, msg, sizeof(msg)) != sizeof(msg)) { + if (errno == EPIPE && errors < 10) { + close(fd); + errors++; + goto reopen; + } + error("Couldn't write to PRNGD socket: %s", + strerror(errno)); + goto done; + } + + if (atomicio(read, fd, buf, len) != len) { + if (errno == EPIPE && errors < 10) { + close(fd); + errors++; + goto reopen; + } + error("Couldn't read from PRNGD socket: %s", + strerror(errno)); + goto done; + } + + rval = 1; +done: + mysignal(SIGPIPE, old_sigpipe); + if (fd != -1) + close(fd); + return(rval); +} +#else /* !USE_PRNGD */ +#ifdef RANDOM_POOL +/* Collect entropy from /dev/urandom or pipe */ +static int +get_random_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int len) +{ + int random_pool; + + random_pool = open(RANDOM_POOL, O_RDONLY); + if (random_pool == -1) { + error("Couldn't open random pool \"%s\": %s", + RANDOM_POOL, strerror(errno)); + return(0); + } + + if (atomicio(read, random_pool, buf, len) != len) { + error("Couldn't read from random pool \"%s\": %s", + RANDOM_POOL, strerror(errno)); + close(random_pool); + return(0); + } + + close(random_pool); + + return(1); +} +#endif /* RANDOM_POOL */ +#endif /* USE_PRNGD */ + +/* + * Seed OpenSSL's random number pool from Kernel random number generator + * or PRNGD/EGD + */ +void +seed_rng(void) +{ + unsigned char buf[32]; + + debug("Seeding random number generator"); + + if (!get_random_bytes(buf, sizeof(buf))) { + if (!RAND_status()) + fatal("Entropy collection failed and entropy exhausted"); + } else { + RAND_add(buf, sizeof(buf), sizeof(buf)); + } + + memset(buf, '\0', sizeof(buf)); +} + +void +init_rng(void) +{ + check_openssl_version(); +} + +#else /* defined(USE_PRNGD) || defined(RANDOM_POOL) */ + +/* + * FIXME: proper entropy estimations. All current values are guesses + * FIXME: (ATL) do estimates at compile time? + * FIXME: More entropy sources + */ + +/* slow command timeouts (all in milliseconds) */ +/* static int entropy_timeout_default = ENTROPY_TIMEOUT_MSEC; */ +static int entropy_timeout_current = ENTROPY_TIMEOUT_MSEC; + +static int prng_seed_saved = 0; +static int prng_initialised = 0; +uid_t original_uid; + +typedef struct +{ + /* Proportion of data that is entropy */ + double rate; + /* Counter goes positive if this command times out */ + unsigned int badness; + /* Increases by factor of two each timeout */ + unsigned int sticky_badness; + /* Path to executable */ + char *path; + /* argv to pass to executable */ + char *args[5]; + /* full command string (debug) */ + char *cmdstring; +} entropy_source_t; + +double stir_from_system(void); +double stir_from_programs(void); +double stir_gettimeofday(double entropy_estimate); +double stir_clock(double entropy_estimate); +double stir_rusage(int who, double entropy_estimate); +double hash_output_from_command(entropy_source_t *src, char *hash); + +/* this is initialised from a file, by prng_read_commands() */ +entropy_source_t *entropy_sources = NULL; + +double +stir_from_system(void) +{ + double total_entropy_estimate; + long int i; + + total_entropy_estimate = 0; + + i = getpid(); + RAND_add(&i, sizeof(i), 0.5); + total_entropy_estimate += 0.1; + + i = getppid(); + RAND_add(&i, sizeof(i), 0.5); + total_entropy_estimate += 0.1; + + i = getuid(); + RAND_add(&i, sizeof(i), 0.0); + i = getgid(); + RAND_add(&i, sizeof(i), 0.0); + + total_entropy_estimate += stir_gettimeofday(1.0); + total_entropy_estimate += stir_clock(0.5); + total_entropy_estimate += stir_rusage(RUSAGE_SELF, 2.0); + + return(total_entropy_estimate); +} + +double +stir_from_programs(void) +{ + int i; + int c; + double entropy_estimate; + double total_entropy_estimate; + char hash[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; + + total_entropy_estimate = 0; + for(i = 0; i < NUM_ENTROPY_RUNS; i++) { + c = 0; + while (entropy_sources[c].path != NULL) { + + if (!entropy_sources[c].badness) { + /* Hash output from command */ + entropy_estimate = hash_output_from_command(&entropy_sources[c], hash); + + /* Scale back entropy estimate according to command's rate */ + entropy_estimate *= entropy_sources[c].rate; + + /* Upper bound of entropy estimate is SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH */ + if (entropy_estimate > SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) + entropy_estimate = SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; + + /* Scale back estimates for subsequent passes through list */ + entropy_estimate /= SCALE_PER_RUN * (i + 1.0); + + /* Stir it in */ + RAND_add(hash, sizeof(hash), entropy_estimate); + + debug3("Got %0.2f bytes of entropy from '%s'", entropy_estimate, + entropy_sources[c].cmdstring); + + total_entropy_estimate += entropy_estimate; + + /* Execution times should be a little unpredictable */ + total_entropy_estimate += stir_gettimeofday(0.05); + total_entropy_estimate += stir_clock(0.05); + total_entropy_estimate += stir_rusage(RUSAGE_SELF, 0.1); + total_entropy_estimate += stir_rusage(RUSAGE_CHILDREN, 0.1); + } else { + debug2("Command '%s' disabled (badness %d)", + entropy_sources[c].cmdstring, entropy_sources[c].badness); + + if (entropy_sources[c].badness > 0) + entropy_sources[c].badness--; + } + + c++; + } + } + + return(total_entropy_estimate); +} + +double +stir_gettimeofday(double entropy_estimate) +{ + struct timeval tv; + + if (gettimeofday(&tv, NULL) == -1) + fatal("Couldn't gettimeofday: %s", strerror(errno)); + + RAND_add(&tv, sizeof(tv), entropy_estimate); + + return(entropy_estimate); +} + +double +stir_clock(double entropy_estimate) +{ +#ifdef HAVE_CLOCK + clock_t c; + + c = clock(); + RAND_add(&c, sizeof(c), entropy_estimate); + + return(entropy_estimate); +#else /* _HAVE_CLOCK */ + return(0); +#endif /* _HAVE_CLOCK */ +} + +double +stir_rusage(int who, double entropy_estimate) +{ +#ifdef HAVE_GETRUSAGE + struct rusage ru; + + if (getrusage(who, &ru) == -1) + return(0); + + RAND_add(&ru, sizeof(ru), entropy_estimate); + + return(entropy_estimate); +#else /* _HAVE_GETRUSAGE */ + return(0); +#endif /* _HAVE_GETRUSAGE */ +} + + +static int +_get_timeval_msec_difference(struct timeval *t1, struct timeval *t2) { + int secdiff, usecdiff; + + secdiff = t2->tv_sec - t1->tv_sec; + usecdiff = (secdiff*1000000) + (t2->tv_usec - t1->tv_usec); + return (int)(usecdiff / 1000); +} + +double +hash_output_from_command(entropy_source_t *src, char *hash) +{ + static int devnull = -1; + int p[2]; + fd_set rdset; + int cmd_eof = 0, error_abort = 0; + struct timeval tv_start, tv_current; + int msec_elapsed = 0; + pid_t pid; + int status; + char buf[16384]; + int bytes_read; + int total_bytes_read; + SHA_CTX sha; + + debug3("Reading output from \'%s\'", src->cmdstring); + + if (devnull == -1) { + devnull = open("/dev/null", O_RDWR); + if (devnull == -1) + fatal("Couldn't open /dev/null: %s", strerror(errno)); + } + + if (pipe(p) == -1) + fatal("Couldn't open pipe: %s", strerror(errno)); + + (void)gettimeofday(&tv_start, NULL); /* record start time */ + + switch (pid = fork()) { + case -1: /* Error */ + close(p[0]); + close(p[1]); + fatal("Couldn't fork: %s", strerror(errno)); + /* NOTREACHED */ + case 0: /* Child */ + dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO); + dup2(p[1], STDOUT_FILENO); + dup2(p[1], STDERR_FILENO); + close(p[0]); + close(p[1]); + close(devnull); + + setuid(original_uid); + execv(src->path, (char**)(src->args)); + debug("(child) Couldn't exec '%s': %s", src->cmdstring, + strerror(errno)); + _exit(-1); + default: /* Parent */ + break; + } + + RAND_add(&pid, sizeof(&pid), 0.0); + + close(p[1]); + + /* Hash output from child */ + SHA1_Init(&sha); + total_bytes_read = 0; + + while (!error_abort && !cmd_eof) { + int ret; + struct timeval tv; + int msec_remaining; + + (void) gettimeofday(&tv_current, 0); + msec_elapsed = _get_timeval_msec_difference(&tv_start, &tv_current); + if (msec_elapsed >= entropy_timeout_current) { + error_abort=1; + continue; + } + msec_remaining = entropy_timeout_current - msec_elapsed; + + FD_ZERO(&rdset); + FD_SET(p[0], &rdset); + tv.tv_sec = msec_remaining / 1000; + tv.tv_usec = (msec_remaining % 1000) * 1000; + + ret = select(p[0]+1, &rdset, NULL, NULL, &tv); + + RAND_add(&tv, sizeof(tv), 0.0); + + switch (ret) { + case 0: + /* timer expired */ + error_abort = 1; + break; + case 1: + /* command input */ + do { + bytes_read = read(p[0], buf, sizeof(buf)); + } while (bytes_read == -1 && errno == EINTR); + RAND_add(&bytes_read, sizeof(&bytes_read), 0.0); + if (bytes_read == -1) { + error_abort = 1; + break; + } else if (bytes_read) { + SHA1_Update(&sha, buf, bytes_read); + total_bytes_read += bytes_read; + } else { + cmd_eof = 1; + } + break; + case -1: + default: + /* error */ + debug("Command '%s': select() failed: %s", src->cmdstring, + strerror(errno)); + error_abort = 1; + break; + } + } + + SHA1_Final(hash, &sha); + + close(p[0]); + + debug3("Time elapsed: %d msec", msec_elapsed); + + if (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) { + error("Couldn't wait for child '%s' completion: %s", src->cmdstring, + strerror(errno)); + return(0.0); + } + + RAND_add(&status, sizeof(&status), 0.0); + + if (error_abort) { + /* closing p[0] on timeout causes the entropy command to + * SIGPIPE. Take whatever output we got, and mark this command + * as slow */ + debug2("Command '%s' timed out", src->cmdstring); + src->sticky_badness *= 2; + src->badness = src->sticky_badness; + return(total_bytes_read); + } + + if (WIFEXITED(status)) { + if (WEXITSTATUS(status)==0) { + return(total_bytes_read); + } else { + debug2("Command '%s' exit status was %d", src->cmdstring, + WEXITSTATUS(status)); + src->badness = src->sticky_badness = 128; + return (0.0); + } + } else if (WIFSIGNALED(status)) { + debug2("Command '%s' returned on uncaught signal %d !", src->cmdstring, + status); + src->badness = src->sticky_badness = 128; + return(0.0); + } else + return(0.0); +} + +/* + * prng seedfile functions + */ +int +prng_check_seedfile(char *filename) { + + struct stat st; + + /* FIXME raceable: eg replace seed between this stat and subsequent open */ + /* Not such a problem because we don't trust the seed file anyway */ + if (lstat(filename, &st) == -1) { + /* Give up on hard errors */ + if (errno != ENOENT) + debug("WARNING: Couldn't stat random seed file \"%s\": %s", + filename, strerror(errno)); + + return(0); + } + + /* regular file? */ + if (!S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) + fatal("PRNG seedfile %.100s is not a regular file", filename); + + /* mode 0600, owned by root or the current user? */ + if (((st.st_mode & 0177) != 0) || !(st.st_uid == original_uid)) { + debug("WARNING: PRNG seedfile %.100s must be mode 0600, owned by uid %d", + filename, getuid()); + return(0); + } + + return(1); +} + +void +prng_write_seedfile(void) { + int fd; + char seed[1024]; + char filename[1024]; + struct passwd *pw; + + /* Don't bother if we have already saved a seed */ + if (prng_seed_saved) + return; + + setuid(original_uid); + + prng_seed_saved = 1; + + pw = getpwuid(original_uid); + if (pw == NULL) + fatal("Couldn't get password entry for current user (%i): %s", + original_uid, strerror(errno)); + + /* Try to ensure that the parent directory is there */ + snprintf(filename, sizeof(filename), "%.512s/%s", pw->pw_dir, + _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR); + mkdir(filename, 0700); + + snprintf(filename, sizeof(filename), "%.512s/%s", pw->pw_dir, + SSH_PRNG_SEED_FILE); + + debug("writing PRNG seed to file %.100s", filename); + + RAND_bytes(seed, sizeof(seed)); + + /* Don't care if the seed doesn't exist */ + prng_check_seedfile(filename); + + if ((fd = open(filename, O_WRONLY|O_TRUNC|O_CREAT, 0600)) == -1) { + debug("WARNING: couldn't access PRNG seedfile %.100s (%.100s)", + filename, strerror(errno)); + } else { + if (atomicio(write, fd, &seed, sizeof(seed)) != sizeof(seed)) + fatal("problem writing PRNG seedfile %.100s (%.100s)", filename, + strerror(errno)); + + close(fd); + } +} + +void +prng_read_seedfile(void) { + int fd; + char seed[1024]; + char filename[1024]; + struct passwd *pw; + + pw = getpwuid(original_uid); + if (pw == NULL) + fatal("Couldn't get password entry for current user (%i): %s", + original_uid, strerror(errno)); + + snprintf(filename, sizeof(filename), "%.512s/%s", pw->pw_dir, + SSH_PRNG_SEED_FILE); + + debug("loading PRNG seed from file %.100s", filename); + + if (!prng_check_seedfile(filename)) { + verbose("Random seed file not found or not valid, ignoring."); + return; + } + + /* open the file and read in the seed */ + fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY); + if (fd == -1) + fatal("could not open PRNG seedfile %.100s (%.100s)", filename, + strerror(errno)); + + if (atomicio(read, fd, &seed, sizeof(seed)) != sizeof(seed)) { + verbose("invalid or short read from PRNG seedfile %.100s - ignoring", + filename); + memset(seed, '\0', sizeof(seed)); + } + close(fd); + + /* stir in the seed, with estimated entropy zero */ + RAND_add(&seed, sizeof(seed), 0.0); +} + + +/* + * entropy command initialisation functions + */ +int +prng_read_commands(char *cmdfilename) +{ + FILE *f; + char *cp; + char line[1024]; + char cmd[1024]; + char path[256]; + int linenum; + int num_cmds = 64; + int cur_cmd = 0; + double est; + entropy_source_t *entcmd; + + f = fopen(cmdfilename, "r"); + if (!f) { + fatal("couldn't read entropy commands file %.100s: %.100s", + cmdfilename, strerror(errno)); + } + + entcmd = (entropy_source_t *)xmalloc(num_cmds * sizeof(entropy_source_t)); + memset(entcmd, '\0', num_cmds * sizeof(entropy_source_t)); + + /* Read in file */ + linenum = 0; + while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), f)) { + int arg; + char *argv; + + linenum++; + + /* skip leading whitespace, test for blank line or comment */ + cp = line + strspn(line, WHITESPACE); + if ((*cp == 0) || (*cp == '#')) + continue; /* done with this line */ + + /* First non-whitespace char should be double quote delimiting */ + /* commandline */ + if (*cp != '"') { + error("bad entropy command, %.100s line %d", cmdfilename, + linenum); + continue; + } + + /* first token, command args (incl. argv[0]) in double quotes */ + cp = strtok(cp, "\""); + if (cp == NULL) { + error("missing or bad command string, %.100s line %d -- ignored", + cmdfilename, linenum); + continue; + } + strlcpy(cmd, cp, sizeof(cmd)); + + /* second token, full command path */ + if ((cp = strtok(NULL, WHITESPACE)) == NULL) { + error("missing command path, %.100s line %d -- ignored", + cmdfilename, linenum); + continue; + } + + /* did configure mark this as dead? */ + if (strncmp("undef", cp, 5) == 0) + continue; + + strlcpy(path, cp, sizeof(path)); + + /* third token, entropy rate estimate for this command */ + if ((cp = strtok(NULL, WHITESPACE)) == NULL) { + error("missing entropy estimate, %.100s line %d -- ignored", + cmdfilename, linenum); + continue; + } + est = strtod(cp, &argv); + + /* end of line */ + if ((cp = strtok(NULL, WHITESPACE)) != NULL) { + error("garbage at end of line %d in %.100s -- ignored", linenum, + cmdfilename); + continue; + } + + /* save the command for debug messages */ + entcmd[cur_cmd].cmdstring = xstrdup(cmd); + + /* split the command args */ + cp = strtok(cmd, WHITESPACE); + arg = 0; + argv = NULL; + do { + char *s = (char*)xmalloc(strlen(cp) + 1); + strncpy(s, cp, strlen(cp) + 1); + entcmd[cur_cmd].args[arg] = s; + arg++; + } while ((arg < 5) && (cp = strtok(NULL, WHITESPACE))); + + if (strtok(NULL, WHITESPACE)) + error("ignored extra command elements (max 5), %.100s line %d", + cmdfilename, linenum); + + /* Copy the command path and rate estimate */ + entcmd[cur_cmd].path = xstrdup(path); + entcmd[cur_cmd].rate = est; + + /* Initialise other values */ + entcmd[cur_cmd].sticky_badness = 1; + + cur_cmd++; + + /* If we've filled the array, reallocate it twice the size */ + /* Do this now because even if this we're on the last command, + we need another slot to mark the last entry */ + if (cur_cmd == num_cmds) { + num_cmds *= 2; + entcmd = xrealloc(entcmd, num_cmds * sizeof(entropy_source_t)); + } + } + + /* zero the last entry */ + memset(&entcmd[cur_cmd], '\0', sizeof(entropy_source_t)); + + /* trim to size */ + entropy_sources = xrealloc(entcmd, (cur_cmd+1) * sizeof(entropy_source_t)); + + debug("Loaded %d entropy commands from %.100s", cur_cmd, cmdfilename); + + return (cur_cmd >= MIN_ENTROPY_SOURCES); +} + +/* + * Write a keyfile at exit + */ +void +prng_seed_cleanup(void *junk) +{ + prng_write_seedfile(); +} + +/* + * Conditionally Seed OpenSSL's random number pool from + * syscalls and program output + */ +void +seed_rng(void) +{ + mysig_t old_sigchld_handler; + + if (!prng_initialised) + fatal("RNG not initialised"); + + /* Make sure some other sigchld handler doesn't reap our entropy */ + /* commands */ + old_sigchld_handler = mysignal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL); + + debug("Seeded RNG with %i bytes from programs", + (int)stir_from_programs()); + debug("Seeded RNG with %i bytes from system calls", + (int)stir_from_system()); + + if (!RAND_status()) + fatal("Not enough entropy in RNG"); + + mysignal(SIGCHLD, old_sigchld_handler); + + if (!RAND_status()) + fatal("Couldn't initialise builtin random number generator -- exiting."); +} + +void +init_rng(void) +{ + int original_euid; + + check_openssl_version(); + + original_uid = getuid(); + original_euid = geteuid(); + + /* Read in collection commands */ + if (!prng_read_commands(SSH_PRNG_COMMAND_FILE)) + fatal("PRNG initialisation failed -- exiting."); + + /* Set ourselves up to save a seed upon exit */ + prng_seed_saved = 0; + + /* Give up privs while reading seed file */ +#ifdef SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID + if ((original_uid != original_euid) && (seteuid(original_uid) == -1)) + fatal("Couldn't give up privileges"); +#else /* SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID */ + /* + * Propagate the privileged uid to all of our uids. + * Set the effective uid to the given (unprivileged) uid. + */ + if (original_uid != original_euid && (setuid(original_euid) == -1 || + seteuid(original_uid) == -1)) + fatal("Couldn't give up privileges"); +#endif /* SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID */ + + prng_read_seedfile(); + +#ifdef SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID + if ((original_uid != original_euid) && (seteuid(original_euid) == -1)) + fatal("Couldn't restore privileges"); +#else /* SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID */ + /* + * We are unable to restore the real uid to its unprivileged value. + * Propagate the real uid (usually more privileged) to effective uid + * as well. + */ + if (original_uid != original_euid && (seteuid(original_euid) == -1 || + setuid(original_uid) == -1)) + fatal("Couldn't restore privileges"); +#endif /* SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID */ + + fatal_add_cleanup(prng_seed_cleanup, NULL); + atexit(prng_write_seedfile); + + prng_initialised = 1; +} + +#endif /* defined(USE_PRNGD) || defined(RANDOM_POOL) */ diff --git a/openssh/entropy.h b/openssh/entropy.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..270eacb --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/entropy.h @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999-2000 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id$ */ + +#ifndef _RANDOMS_H +#define _RANDOMS_H + +void seed_rng(void); +void init_rng(void); + +#endif /* _RANDOMS_H */ diff --git a/openssh/fixpaths b/openssh/fixpaths new file mode 100755 index 0000000..7e4178e --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/fixpaths @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +#!/usr/bin/perl -w +# +# fixpaths - substitute makefile variables into text files + + +$usage = "Usage: $0 [-Dstring=replacement] [[infile] ...]\n"; + +if (!defined(@ARGV)) { die ("$usage"); } + +# read in the command line and get some definitions +while ($_=$ARGV[0], /^-/) { + if (/^-D/) { + # definition + shift(@ARGV); + if ( /-D(.*)=(.*)/ ) { + $def{"$1"}=$2; + } else { + die ("$usage$0: error in command line arguments.\n"); + } + } else { + @cmd = split(//, $ARGV[0]); $opt = $cmd[1]; + die ("$usage$0: unknown option '-$opt'\n"); + } +} # while parsing arguments + +if (!defined(%def)) { + die ("$0: nothing to do - no substitutions listed!\n"); +} + +for $f (@ARGV) { + + $f =~ /(.*\/)*(.*)$/; + + open(IN, "<$f") || die ("$0: input file $f missing!\n"); + while () { + for $s (keys(%def)) { + s#$s#$def{$s}#; + } # for $s + print; + } # while +} # for $f + +exit 0; diff --git a/openssh/fixprogs b/openssh/fixprogs new file mode 100755 index 0000000..61840cf --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/fixprogs @@ -0,0 +1,72 @@ +#!/usr/bin/perl +# +# fixprogs - run through the list of entropy commands and +# score out the losers +# + +$entscale = 50; # divisor for optional entropy measurement + +sub usage { + return("Usage: $0 \n"); +} + +if (($#ARGV == -1) || ($#ARGV>1)) { + die(&usage); +} + +# 'undocumented' option - run ent (in second param) on the output +if ($#ARGV==1) { + $entcmd=$ARGV[1] +} else { + $entcmd = "" +}; + +$infilename = $ARGV[0]; + +if (!open(IN, "<".$infilename)) { + die("Couldn't open input file"); +} +$outfilename=$infilename.".out"; +if (!open(OUT, ">$outfilename")) { + die("Couldn't open output file $outfilename"); +} +@infile=; + +select(OUT); $|=1; select(STDOUT); + +foreach (@infile) { + if (/^\s*\#/ || /^\s*$/) { + print OUT; + next; + } + ($cmd, $path, $est) = /^\"([^\"]+)\"\s+([\w\/_-]+)\s+([\d\.\-]+)/o; + @args = split(/ /, $cmd); + if (! ($pid = fork())) { + # child + close STDIN; close STDOUT; close STDERR; + open (STDIN, "/dev/null"); + open (STDERR, ">/dev/null"); + exec $path @args; + exit 1; # shouldn't be here + } + # parent + waitpid ($pid, 0); $ret=$? >> 8; + + if ($ret != 0) { + $path = "undef"; + } else { + if ($entcmd ne "") { + # now try to run ent on the command + $mostargs=join(" ", splice(@args,1)); + print "Evaluating '$path $mostargs'\n"; + @ent = qx{$path $mostargs | $entcmd -b -t}; + @ent = grep(/^1,/, @ent); + ($null, $null, $rate) = split(/,/, $ent[0]); + $est = $rate / $entscale; # scale the estimate back + } + } + print OUT "\"$cmd\" $path $est\n"; +} + +close(IN); diff --git a/openssh/getput.h b/openssh/getput.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1a19d22 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/getput.h @@ -0,0 +1,58 @@ +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * Macros for storing and retrieving data in msb first and lsb first order. + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + */ + +/* RCSID("$OpenBSD: getput.h,v 1.7 2001/01/10 22:56:22 markus Exp $"); */ + +#ifndef GETPUT_H +#define GETPUT_H + +/*------------ macros for storing/extracting msb first words -------------*/ + +#define GET_64BIT(cp) (((u_int64_t)(u_char)(cp)[0] << 56) | \ + ((u_int64_t)(u_char)(cp)[1] << 48) | \ + ((u_int64_t)(u_char)(cp)[2] << 40) | \ + ((u_int64_t)(u_char)(cp)[3] << 32) | \ + ((u_int64_t)(u_char)(cp)[4] << 24) | \ + ((u_int64_t)(u_char)(cp)[5] << 16) | \ + ((u_int64_t)(u_char)(cp)[6] << 8) | \ + ((u_int64_t)(u_char)(cp)[7])) + +#define GET_32BIT(cp) (((u_long)(u_char)(cp)[0] << 24) | \ + ((u_long)(u_char)(cp)[1] << 16) | \ + ((u_long)(u_char)(cp)[2] << 8) | \ + ((u_long)(u_char)(cp)[3])) + +#define GET_16BIT(cp) (((u_long)(u_char)(cp)[0] << 8) | \ + ((u_long)(u_char)(cp)[1])) + +#define PUT_64BIT(cp, value) do { \ + (cp)[0] = (value) >> 56; \ + (cp)[1] = (value) >> 48; \ + (cp)[2] = (value) >> 40; \ + (cp)[3] = (value) >> 32; \ + (cp)[4] = (value) >> 24; \ + (cp)[5] = (value) >> 16; \ + (cp)[6] = (value) >> 8; \ + (cp)[7] = (value); } while (0) + +#define PUT_32BIT(cp, value) do { \ + (cp)[0] = (value) >> 24; \ + (cp)[1] = (value) >> 16; \ + (cp)[2] = (value) >> 8; \ + (cp)[3] = (value); } while (0) + +#define PUT_16BIT(cp, value) do { \ + (cp)[0] = (value) >> 8; \ + (cp)[1] = (value); } while (0) + +#endif /* GETPUT_H */ diff --git a/openssh/groupaccess.c b/openssh/groupaccess.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..cbfe720 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/groupaccess.c @@ -0,0 +1,89 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: groupaccess.c,v 1.4 2001/06/26 17:27:23 markus Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001 Kevin Steves. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include "groupaccess.h" +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "match.h" +#include "log.h" + +static int ngroups; +static char *groups_byname[NGROUPS_MAX + 1]; /* +1 for base/primary group */ + +/* + * Initialize group access list for user with primary (base) and + * supplementary groups. Return the number of groups in the list. + */ +int +ga_init(const char *user, gid_t base) +{ + gid_t groups_bygid[NGROUPS_MAX + 1]; + int i, j; + struct group *gr; + + if (ngroups > 0) + ga_free(); + + ngroups = sizeof(groups_bygid) / sizeof(gid_t); + if (getgrouplist(user, base, groups_bygid, &ngroups) == -1) + log("getgrouplist: groups list too small"); + for (i = 0, j = 0; i < ngroups; i++) + if ((gr = getgrgid(groups_bygid[i])) != NULL) + groups_byname[j++] = xstrdup(gr->gr_name); + return (ngroups = j); +} + +/* + * Return 1 if one of user's groups is contained in groups. + * Return 0 otherwise. Use match_pattern() for string comparison. + */ +int +ga_match(char * const *groups, int n) +{ + int i, j; + + for (i = 0; i < ngroups; i++) + for (j = 0; j < n; j++) + if (match_pattern(groups_byname[i], groups[j])) + return 1; + return 0; +} + +/* + * Free memory allocated for group access list. + */ +void +ga_free(void) +{ + int i; + + if (ngroups > 0) { + for (i = 0; i < ngroups; i++) + xfree(groups_byname[i]); + ngroups = 0; + } +} diff --git a/openssh/groupaccess.h b/openssh/groupaccess.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ede4805 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/groupaccess.h @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: groupaccess.h,v 1.4 2001/06/26 17:27:23 markus Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001 Kevin Steves. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifndef GROUPACCESS_H +#define GROUPACCESS_H + +#include + +int ga_init(const char *, gid_t); +int ga_match(char * const *, int); +void ga_free(void); + +#endif diff --git a/openssh/hostfile.c b/openssh/hostfile.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..eeed920 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/hostfile.c @@ -0,0 +1,215 @@ +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * Functions for manipulating the known hosts files. + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + * + * + * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 1999 Niels Provos. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" +RCSID("$OpenBSD: hostfile.c,v 1.28 2001/06/25 08:25:37 markus Exp $"); + +#include "packet.h" +#include "match.h" +#include "key.h" +#include "hostfile.h" +#include "log.h" + +/* + * Parses an RSA (number of bits, e, n) or DSA key from a string. Moves the + * pointer over the key. Skips any whitespace at the beginning and at end. + */ + +static int +hostfile_read_key(char **cpp, u_int *bitsp, Key *ret) +{ + char *cp; + + /* Skip leading whitespace. */ + for (cp = *cpp; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++) + ; + + if (key_read(ret, &cp) != 1) + return 0; + + /* Skip trailing whitespace. */ + for (; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++) + ; + + /* Return results. */ + *cpp = cp; + *bitsp = key_size(ret); + return 1; +} + +int +auth_rsa_read_key(char **cpp, u_int *bitsp, BIGNUM * e, BIGNUM * n) +{ + Key *k = key_new(KEY_RSA1); + int ret = hostfile_read_key(cpp, bitsp, k); + BN_copy(e, k->rsa->e); + BN_copy(n, k->rsa->n); + key_free(k); + return ret; +} + +static int +hostfile_check_key(int bits, Key *key, const char *host, const char *filename, int linenum) +{ + if (key == NULL || key->type != KEY_RSA1 || key->rsa == NULL) + return 1; + if (bits != BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n)) { + log("Warning: %s, line %d: keysize mismatch for host %s: " + "actual %d vs. announced %d.", + filename, linenum, host, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n), bits); + log("Warning: replace %d with %d in %s, line %d.", + bits, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n), filename, linenum); + } + return 1; +} + +/* + * Checks whether the given host (which must be in all lowercase) is already + * in the list of our known hosts. Returns HOST_OK if the host is known and + * has the specified key, HOST_NEW if the host is not known, and HOST_CHANGED + * if the host is known but used to have a different host key. + */ + +HostStatus +check_host_in_hostfile(const char *filename, const char *host, Key *key, + Key *found, int *numret) +{ + FILE *f; + char line[8192]; + int linenum = 0; + u_int kbits; + char *cp, *cp2; + HostStatus end_return; + + debug3("check_host_in_hostfile: filename %s", filename); + if (key == NULL) + fatal("no key to look up"); + /* Open the file containing the list of known hosts. */ + f = fopen(filename, "r"); + if (!f) + return HOST_NEW; + + /* + * Return value when the loop terminates. This is set to + * HOST_CHANGED if we have seen a different key for the host and have + * not found the proper one. + */ + end_return = HOST_NEW; + + /* Go through the file. */ + while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), f)) { + cp = line; + linenum++; + + /* Skip any leading whitespace, comments and empty lines. */ + for (; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++) + ; + if (!*cp || *cp == '#' || *cp == '\n') + continue; + + /* Find the end of the host name portion. */ + for (cp2 = cp; *cp2 && *cp2 != ' ' && *cp2 != '\t'; cp2++) + ; + + /* Check if the host name matches. */ + if (match_hostname(host, cp, (u_int) (cp2 - cp)) != 1) + continue; + + /* Got a match. Skip host name. */ + cp = cp2; + + /* + * Extract the key from the line. This will skip any leading + * whitespace. Ignore badly formatted lines. + */ + if (!hostfile_read_key(&cp, &kbits, found)) + continue; + if (!hostfile_check_key(kbits, found, host, filename, linenum)) + continue; + + if (numret != NULL) + *numret = linenum; + + /* Check if the current key is the same as the given key. */ + if (key_equal(key, found)) { + /* Ok, they match. */ + debug3("check_host_in_hostfile: match line %d", linenum); + fclose(f); + return HOST_OK; + } + /* + * They do not match. We will continue to go through the + * file; however, we note that we will not return that it is + * new. + */ + end_return = HOST_CHANGED; + } + /* Clear variables and close the file. */ + fclose(f); + + /* + * Return either HOST_NEW or HOST_CHANGED, depending on whether we + * saw a different key for the host. + */ + return end_return; +} + +/* + * Appends an entry to the host file. Returns false if the entry could not + * be appended. + */ + +int +add_host_to_hostfile(const char *filename, const char *host, Key *key) +{ + FILE *f; + int success = 0; + if (key == NULL) + return 1; /* XXX ? */ + f = fopen(filename, "a"); + if (!f) + return 0; + fprintf(f, "%s ", host); + if (key_write(key, f)) { + success = 1; + } else { + error("add_host_to_hostfile: saving key in %s failed", filename); + } + fprintf(f, "\n"); + fclose(f); + return success; +} diff --git a/openssh/hostfile.h b/openssh/hostfile.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..05ef691 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/hostfile.h @@ -0,0 +1,26 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: hostfile.h,v 1.9 2001/06/26 17:27:23 markus Exp $ */ + +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + */ +#ifndef HOSTFILE_H +#define HOSTFILE_H + +typedef enum { + HOST_OK, HOST_NEW, HOST_CHANGED +} HostStatus; + +HostStatus +check_host_in_hostfile(const char *, const char *, Key *, Key *, int *); +int add_host_to_hostfile(const char *, const char *, Key *); +int auth_rsa_read_key(char **, u_int *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *); + +#endif diff --git a/openssh/includes.h b/openssh/includes.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f9cf9c7 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/includes.h @@ -0,0 +1,106 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: includes.h,v 1.15 2001/06/08 15:25:40 markus Exp $ */ + +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * This file includes most of the needed system headers. + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + */ + +#ifndef INCLUDES_H +#define INCLUDES_H + +#define RCSID(msg) \ +static /**/const char *const rcsid[] = { (char *)rcsid, "\100(#)" msg } + +#include "config.h" + +#include "openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h" + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#ifdef HAVE_LIMITS_H +# include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_GETOPT_H +# include +#endif +#ifndef HAVE_GETOPT_OPTRESET +#define getopt(ac, av, o) BSDgetopt(ac, av, o) +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_BSTRING_H +# include +#endif +#if defined(HAVE_GLOB_H) && defined(GLOB_HAS_ALTDIRFUNC) && \ + defined(GLOB_HAS_GL_MATCHC) +# include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETGROUP_H +# include +#endif +#if defined(HAVE_NETDB_H) +# include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_ENDIAN_H +# include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H +# include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H +# include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_BSDTTY_H +# include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_TTYENT_H +# include +#endif +#ifdef USE_PAM +# include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_POLL_H +# include +#else +# ifdef HAVE_SYS_POLL_H +# include +# endif +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SYSMACROS_H +# include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_UTIME_H +# include +#endif +#include "version.h" +#include "openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h" +#include "openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h" +#include "entropy.h" + +#endif /* INCLUDES_H */ diff --git a/openssh/install-sh b/openssh/install-sh new file mode 100755 index 0000000..e9de238 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/install-sh @@ -0,0 +1,251 @@ +#!/bin/sh +# +# install - install a program, script, or datafile +# This comes from X11R5 (mit/util/scripts/install.sh). +# +# Copyright 1991 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology +# +# Permission to use, copy, modify, distribute, and sell this software and its +# documentation for any purpose is hereby granted without fee, provided that +# the above copyright notice appear in all copies and that both that +# copyright notice and this permission notice appear in supporting +# documentation, and that the name of M.I.T. not be used in advertising or +# publicity pertaining to distribution of the software without specific, +# written prior permission. M.I.T. makes no representations about the +# suitability of this software for any purpose. It is provided "as is" +# without express or implied warranty. +# +# Calling this script install-sh is preferred over install.sh, to prevent +# `make' implicit rules from creating a file called install from it +# when there is no Makefile. +# +# This script is compatible with the BSD install script, but was written +# from scratch. It can only install one file at a time, a restriction +# shared with many OS's install programs. + + +# set DOITPROG to echo to test this script + +# Don't use :- since 4.3BSD and earlier shells don't like it. +doit="${DOITPROG-}" + + +# put in absolute paths if you don't have them in your path; or use env. vars. + +mvprog="${MVPROG-mv}" +cpprog="${CPPROG-cp}" +chmodprog="${CHMODPROG-chmod}" +chownprog="${CHOWNPROG-chown}" +chgrpprog="${CHGRPPROG-chgrp}" +stripprog="${STRIPPROG-strip}" +rmprog="${RMPROG-rm}" +mkdirprog="${MKDIRPROG-mkdir}" + +transformbasename="" +transform_arg="" +instcmd="$mvprog" +chmodcmd="$chmodprog 0755" +chowncmd="" +chgrpcmd="" +stripcmd="" +rmcmd="$rmprog -f" +mvcmd="$mvprog" +src="" +dst="" +dir_arg="" + +while [ x"$1" != x ]; do + case $1 in + -c) instcmd="$cpprog" + shift + continue;; + + -d) dir_arg=true + shift + continue;; + + -m) chmodcmd="$chmodprog $2" + shift + shift + continue;; + + -o) chowncmd="$chownprog $2" + shift + shift + continue;; + + -g) chgrpcmd="$chgrpprog $2" + shift + shift + continue;; + + -s) stripcmd="$stripprog" + shift + continue;; + + -t=*) transformarg=`echo $1 | sed 's/-t=//'` + shift + continue;; + + -b=*) transformbasename=`echo $1 | sed 's/-b=//'` + shift + continue;; + + *) if [ x"$src" = x ] + then + src=$1 + else + # this colon is to work around a 386BSD /bin/sh bug + : + dst=$1 + fi + shift + continue;; + esac +done + +if [ x"$src" = x ] +then + echo "install: no input file specified" + exit 1 +else + true +fi + +if [ x"$dir_arg" != x ]; then + dst=$src + src="" + + if [ -d $dst ]; then + instcmd=: + chmodcmd="" + else + instcmd=mkdir + fi +else + +# Waiting for this to be detected by the "$instcmd $src $dsttmp" command +# might cause directories to be created, which would be especially bad +# if $src (and thus $dsttmp) contains '*'. + + if [ -f $src -o -d $src ] + then + true + else + echo "install: $src does not exist" + exit 1 + fi + + if [ x"$dst" = x ] + then + echo "install: no destination specified" + exit 1 + else + true + fi + +# If destination is a directory, append the input filename; if your system +# does not like double slashes in filenames, you may need to add some logic + + if [ -d $dst ] + then + dst="$dst"/`basename $src` + else + true + fi +fi + +## this sed command emulates the dirname command +dstdir=`echo $dst | sed -e 's,[^/]*$,,;s,/$,,;s,^$,.,'` + +# Make sure that the destination directory exists. +# this part is taken from Noah Friedman's mkinstalldirs script + +# Skip lots of stat calls in the usual case. +if [ ! -d "$dstdir" ]; then +defaultIFS=' +' +IFS="${IFS-${defaultIFS}}" + +oIFS="${IFS}" +# Some sh's can't handle IFS=/ for some reason. +IFS='%' +set - `echo ${dstdir} | sed -e 's@/@%@g' -e 's@^%@/@'` +IFS="${oIFS}" + +pathcomp='' + +while [ $# -ne 0 ] ; do + pathcomp="${pathcomp}${1}" + shift + + if [ ! -d "${pathcomp}" ] ; + then + $mkdirprog "${pathcomp}" + else + true + fi + + pathcomp="${pathcomp}/" +done +fi + +if [ x"$dir_arg" != x ] +then + $doit $instcmd $dst && + + if [ x"$chowncmd" != x ]; then $doit $chowncmd $dst; else true ; fi && + if [ x"$chgrpcmd" != x ]; then $doit $chgrpcmd $dst; else true ; fi && + if [ x"$stripcmd" != x ]; then $doit $stripcmd $dst; else true ; fi && + if [ x"$chmodcmd" != x ]; then $doit $chmodcmd $dst; else true ; fi +else + +# If we're going to rename the final executable, determine the name now. + + if [ x"$transformarg" = x ] + then + dstfile=`basename $dst` + else + dstfile=`basename $dst $transformbasename | + sed $transformarg`$transformbasename + fi + +# don't allow the sed command to completely eliminate the filename + + if [ x"$dstfile" = x ] + then + dstfile=`basename $dst` + else + true + fi + +# Make a temp file name in the proper directory. + + dsttmp=$dstdir/#inst.$$# + +# Move or copy the file name to the temp name + + $doit $instcmd $src $dsttmp && + + trap "rm -f ${dsttmp}" 0 && + +# and set any options; do chmod last to preserve setuid bits + +# If any of these fail, we abort the whole thing. If we want to +# ignore errors from any of these, just make sure not to ignore +# errors from the above "$doit $instcmd $src $dsttmp" command. + + if [ x"$chowncmd" != x ]; then $doit $chowncmd $dsttmp; else true;fi && + if [ x"$chgrpcmd" != x ]; then $doit $chgrpcmd $dsttmp; else true;fi && + if [ x"$stripcmd" != x ]; then $doit $stripcmd $dsttmp; else true;fi && + if [ x"$chmodcmd" != x ]; then $doit $chmodcmd $dsttmp; else true;fi && + +# Now rename the file to the real destination. + + $doit $rmcmd -f $dstdir/$dstfile && + $doit $mvcmd $dsttmp $dstdir/$dstfile + +fi && + + +exit 0 diff --git a/openssh/kex.c b/openssh/kex.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1a412ce --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/kex.c @@ -0,0 +1,456 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" +RCSID("$OpenBSD: kex.c,v 1.36 2001/06/25 08:25:37 markus Exp $"); + +#include + +#include "ssh2.h" +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "buffer.h" +#include "bufaux.h" +#include "packet.h" +#include "compat.h" +#include "cipher.h" +#include "kex.h" +#include "key.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "mac.h" +#include "match.h" +#include "dispatch.h" + +#define KEX_COOKIE_LEN 16 + +/* prototype */ +static void kex_kexinit_finish(Kex *); +static void kex_choose_conf(Kex *); + +/* put algorithm proposal into buffer */ +static void +kex_prop2buf(Buffer *b, char *proposal[PROPOSAL_MAX]) +{ + u_int32_t rand = 0; + int i; + + buffer_clear(b); + for (i = 0; i < KEX_COOKIE_LEN; i++) { + if (i % 4 == 0) + rand = arc4random(); + buffer_put_char(b, rand & 0xff); + rand >>= 8; + } + for (i = 0; i < PROPOSAL_MAX; i++) + buffer_put_cstring(b, proposal[i]); + buffer_put_char(b, 0); /* first_kex_packet_follows */ + buffer_put_int(b, 0); /* uint32 reserved */ +} + +/* parse buffer and return algorithm proposal */ +static char ** +kex_buf2prop(Buffer *raw) +{ + Buffer b; + int i; + char **proposal; + + proposal = xmalloc(PROPOSAL_MAX * sizeof(char *)); + + buffer_init(&b); + buffer_append(&b, buffer_ptr(raw), buffer_len(raw)); + /* skip cookie */ + for (i = 0; i < KEX_COOKIE_LEN; i++) + buffer_get_char(&b); + /* extract kex init proposal strings */ + for (i = 0; i < PROPOSAL_MAX; i++) { + proposal[i] = buffer_get_string(&b,NULL); + debug2("kex_parse_kexinit: %s", proposal[i]); + } + /* first kex follows / reserved */ + i = buffer_get_char(&b); + debug2("kex_parse_kexinit: first_kex_follows %d ", i); + i = buffer_get_int(&b); + debug2("kex_parse_kexinit: reserved %d ", i); + buffer_free(&b); + return proposal; +} + +static void +kex_prop_free(char **proposal) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < PROPOSAL_MAX; i++) + xfree(proposal[i]); + xfree(proposal); +} + +static void +kex_protocol_error(int type, int plen, void *ctxt) +{ + error("Hm, kex protocol error: type %d plen %d", type, plen); +} + +static void +kex_clear_dispatch(void) +{ + int i; + + /* Numbers 30-49 are used for kex packets */ + for (i = 30; i <= 49; i++) + dispatch_set(i, &kex_protocol_error); +} + +void +kex_finish(Kex *kex) +{ + int plen; + + kex_clear_dispatch(); + + packet_start(SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS); + packet_send(); + /* packet_write_wait(); */ + debug("SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS sent"); + + debug("waiting for SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS"); + packet_read_expect(&plen, SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS); + debug("SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS received"); + + kex->done = 1; + buffer_clear(&kex->peer); + /* buffer_clear(&kex->my); */ + kex->flags &= ~KEX_INIT_SENT; + xfree(kex->name); + kex->name = NULL; +} + +void +kex_send_kexinit(Kex *kex) +{ + if (kex == NULL) { + error("kex_send_kexinit: no kex, cannot rekey"); + return; + } + if (kex->flags & KEX_INIT_SENT) { + debug("KEX_INIT_SENT"); + return; + } + kex->done = 0; + packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT); + packet_put_raw(buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my)); + packet_send(); + debug("SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT sent"); + kex->flags |= KEX_INIT_SENT; +} + +void +kex_input_kexinit(int type, int plen, void *ctxt) +{ + char *ptr; + int dlen; + int i; + Kex *kex = (Kex *)ctxt; + + debug("SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT received"); + if (kex == NULL) + fatal("kex_input_kexinit: no kex, cannot rekey"); + + ptr = packet_get_raw(&dlen); + buffer_append(&kex->peer, ptr, dlen); + + /* discard packet */ + for (i = 0; i < KEX_COOKIE_LEN; i++) + packet_get_char(); + for (i = 0; i < PROPOSAL_MAX; i++) + xfree(packet_get_string(NULL)); + packet_get_char(); + packet_get_int(); + packet_done(); + + kex_kexinit_finish(kex); +} + +Kex * +kex_setup(char *proposal[PROPOSAL_MAX]) +{ + Kex *kex; + + kex = xmalloc(sizeof(*kex)); + memset(kex, 0, sizeof(*kex)); + buffer_init(&kex->peer); + buffer_init(&kex->my); + kex_prop2buf(&kex->my, proposal); + kex->done = 0; + + kex_send_kexinit(kex); /* we start */ + kex_clear_dispatch(); + dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, &kex_input_kexinit); + + return kex; +} + +static void +kex_kexinit_finish(Kex *kex) +{ + if (!(kex->flags & KEX_INIT_SENT)) + kex_send_kexinit(kex); + + kex_choose_conf(kex); + + switch(kex->kex_type) { + case DH_GRP1_SHA1: + kexdh(kex); + break; + case DH_GEX_SHA1: + kexgex(kex); + break; + default: + fatal("Unsupported key exchange %d", kex->kex_type); + } +} + +static void +choose_enc(Enc *enc, char *client, char *server) +{ + char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL); + if (name == NULL) + fatal("no matching cipher found: client %s server %s", client, server); + enc->cipher = cipher_by_name(name); + if (enc->cipher == NULL) + fatal("matching cipher is not supported: %s", name); + enc->name = name; + enc->enabled = 0; + enc->iv = NULL; + enc->key = NULL; +} +static void +choose_mac(Mac *mac, char *client, char *server) +{ + char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL); + if (name == NULL) + fatal("no matching mac found: client %s server %s", client, server); + if (mac_init(mac, name) < 0) + fatal("unsupported mac %s", name); + /* truncate the key */ + if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_HMAC) + mac->key_len = 16; + mac->name = name; + mac->key = NULL; + mac->enabled = 0; +} +static void +choose_comp(Comp *comp, char *client, char *server) +{ + char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL); + if (name == NULL) + fatal("no matching comp found: client %s server %s", client, server); + if (strcmp(name, "zlib") == 0) { + comp->type = 1; + } else if (strcmp(name, "none") == 0) { + comp->type = 0; + } else { + fatal("unsupported comp %s", name); + } + comp->name = name; +} +static void +choose_kex(Kex *k, char *client, char *server) +{ + k->name = match_list(client, server, NULL); + if (k->name == NULL) + fatal("no kex alg"); + if (strcmp(k->name, KEX_DH1) == 0) { + k->kex_type = DH_GRP1_SHA1; + } else if (strcmp(k->name, KEX_DHGEX) == 0) { + k->kex_type = DH_GEX_SHA1; + } else + fatal("bad kex alg %s", k->name); +} +static void +choose_hostkeyalg(Kex *k, char *client, char *server) +{ + char *hostkeyalg = match_list(client, server, NULL); + if (hostkeyalg == NULL) + fatal("no hostkey alg"); + k->hostkey_type = key_type_from_name(hostkeyalg); + if (k->hostkey_type == KEY_UNSPEC) + fatal("bad hostkey alg '%s'", hostkeyalg); + xfree(hostkeyalg); +} + +static void +kex_choose_conf(Kex *kex) +{ + Newkeys *newkeys; + char **my, **peer; + char **cprop, **sprop; + int nenc, nmac, ncomp; + int mode; + int ctos; /* direction: if true client-to-server */ + int need; + + my = kex_buf2prop(&kex->my); + peer = kex_buf2prop(&kex->peer); + + if (kex->server) { + cprop=peer; + sprop=my; + } else { + cprop=my; + sprop=peer; + } + + /* Algorithm Negotiation */ + for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) { + newkeys = xmalloc(sizeof(*newkeys)); + memset(newkeys, 0, sizeof(*newkeys)); + kex->newkeys[mode] = newkeys; + ctos = (!kex->server && mode == MODE_OUT) || (kex->server && mode == MODE_IN); + nenc = ctos ? PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS : PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC; + nmac = ctos ? PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS : PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC; + ncomp = ctos ? PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS : PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC; + choose_enc (&newkeys->enc, cprop[nenc], sprop[nenc]); + choose_mac (&newkeys->mac, cprop[nmac], sprop[nmac]); + choose_comp(&newkeys->comp, cprop[ncomp], sprop[ncomp]); + debug("kex: %s %s %s %s", + ctos ? "client->server" : "server->client", + newkeys->enc.name, + newkeys->mac.name, + newkeys->comp.name); + } + choose_kex(kex, cprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS], sprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]); + choose_hostkeyalg(kex, cprop[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS], + sprop[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]); + need = 0; + for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) { + newkeys = kex->newkeys[mode]; + if (need < newkeys->enc.cipher->key_len) + need = newkeys->enc.cipher->key_len; + if (need < newkeys->enc.cipher->block_size) + need = newkeys->enc.cipher->block_size; + if (need < newkeys->mac.key_len) + need = newkeys->mac.key_len; + } + /* XXX need runden? */ + kex->we_need = need; + + kex_prop_free(my); + kex_prop_free(peer); +} + +static u_char * +derive_key(Kex *kex, int id, int need, u_char *hash, BIGNUM *shared_secret) +{ + Buffer b; + EVP_MD *evp_md = EVP_sha1(); + EVP_MD_CTX md; + char c = id; + int have; + int mdsz = evp_md->md_size; + u_char *digest = xmalloc(roundup(need, mdsz)); + + buffer_init(&b); + buffer_put_bignum2(&b, shared_secret); + + /* K1 = HASH(K || H || "A" || session_id) */ + EVP_DigestInit(&md, evp_md); + if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_DERIVEKEY)) + EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b)); + EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, hash, mdsz); + EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, &c, 1); + EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, kex->session_id, kex->session_id_len); + EVP_DigestFinal(&md, digest, NULL); + + /* + * expand key: + * Kn = HASH(K || H || K1 || K2 || ... || Kn-1) + * Key = K1 || K2 || ... || Kn + */ + for (have = mdsz; need > have; have += mdsz) { + EVP_DigestInit(&md, evp_md); + if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_DERIVEKEY)) + EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b)); + EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, hash, mdsz); + EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, digest, have); + EVP_DigestFinal(&md, digest + have, NULL); + } + buffer_free(&b); +#ifdef DEBUG_KEX + fprintf(stderr, "key '%c'== ", c); + dump_digest("key", digest, need); +#endif + return digest; +} + +Newkeys *current_keys[MODE_MAX]; + +#define NKEYS 6 +void +kex_derive_keys(Kex *kex, u_char *hash, BIGNUM *shared_secret) +{ + u_char *keys[NKEYS]; + int i, mode, ctos; + + for (i = 0; i < NKEYS; i++) + keys[i] = derive_key(kex, 'A'+i, kex->we_need, hash, shared_secret); + + debug("kex_derive_keys"); + for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) { + current_keys[mode] = kex->newkeys[mode]; + kex->newkeys[mode] = NULL; + ctos = (!kex->server && mode == MODE_OUT) || (kex->server && mode == MODE_IN); + current_keys[mode]->enc.iv = keys[ctos ? 0 : 1]; + current_keys[mode]->enc.key = keys[ctos ? 2 : 3]; + current_keys[mode]->mac.key = keys[ctos ? 4 : 5]; + } +} + +Newkeys * +kex_get_newkeys(int mode) +{ + Newkeys *ret; + + ret = current_keys[mode]; + current_keys[mode] = NULL; + return ret; +} + +#if defined(DEBUG_KEX) || defined(DEBUG_KEXDH) +void +dump_digest(char *msg, u_char *digest, int len) +{ + int i; + + fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", msg); + for (i = 0; i< len; i++){ + fprintf(stderr, "%02x", digest[i]); + if (i%32 == 31) + fprintf(stderr, "\n"); + else if (i%8 == 7) + fprintf(stderr, " "); + } + fprintf(stderr, "\n"); +} +#endif diff --git a/openssh/kex.h b/openssh/kex.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fe33921 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/kex.h @@ -0,0 +1,130 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: kex.h,v 1.26 2001/06/26 17:27:23 markus Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ +#ifndef KEX_H +#define KEX_H + +#include +#include "buffer.h" +#include "cipher.h" +#include "key.h" + +#define KEX_DH1 "diffie-hellman-group1-sha1" +#define KEX_DHGEX "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1" + +enum kex_init_proposals { + PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS, + PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS, + PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS, + PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC, + PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS, + PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC, + PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS, + PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC, + PROPOSAL_LANG_CTOS, + PROPOSAL_LANG_STOC, + PROPOSAL_MAX +}; + +enum kex_modes { + MODE_IN, + MODE_OUT, + MODE_MAX +}; + +enum kex_exchange { + DH_GRP1_SHA1, + DH_GEX_SHA1 +}; + +#define KEX_INIT_SENT 0x0001 + +typedef struct Kex Kex; +typedef struct Mac Mac; +typedef struct Comp Comp; +typedef struct Enc Enc; +typedef struct Newkeys Newkeys; + +struct Enc { + char *name; + Cipher *cipher; + int enabled; + u_char *key; + u_char *iv; +}; +struct Mac { + char *name; + int enabled; + EVP_MD *md; + int mac_len; + u_char *key; + int key_len; +}; +struct Comp { + int type; + int enabled; + char *name; +}; +struct Newkeys { + Enc enc; + Mac mac; + Comp comp; +}; +struct Kex { + u_char *session_id; + int session_id_len; + Newkeys *newkeys[MODE_MAX]; + int we_need; + int server; + char *name; + int hostkey_type; + int kex_type; + Buffer my; + Buffer peer; + int done; + int flags; + char *client_version_string; + char *server_version_string; + int (*verify_host_key)(Key *); + Key *(*load_host_key)(int); +}; + +Kex *kex_setup(char *[PROPOSAL_MAX]); +void kex_finish(Kex *); + +void kex_send_kexinit(Kex *); +void kex_input_kexinit(int, int, void *); +void kex_derive_keys(Kex *, u_char *, BIGNUM *); + +void kexdh(Kex *); +void kexgex(Kex *); + +Newkeys *kex_get_newkeys(int); + +#if defined(DEBUG_KEX) || defined(DEBUG_KEXDH) +void dump_digest(char *, u_char *, int); +#endif + +#endif diff --git a/openssh/kexdh.c b/openssh/kexdh.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b850a1a --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/kexdh.c @@ -0,0 +1,305 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" +RCSID("$OpenBSD: kexdh.c,v 1.7 2001/09/17 19:27:15 stevesk Exp $"); + +#include +#include + +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "buffer.h" +#include "bufaux.h" +#include "key.h" +#include "kex.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "packet.h" +#include "dh.h" +#include "ssh2.h" + +static u_char * +kex_dh_hash( + char *client_version_string, + char *server_version_string, + char *ckexinit, int ckexinitlen, + char *skexinit, int skexinitlen, + u_char *serverhostkeyblob, int sbloblen, + BIGNUM *client_dh_pub, + BIGNUM *server_dh_pub, + BIGNUM *shared_secret) +{ + Buffer b; + static u_char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; + EVP_MD *evp_md = EVP_sha1(); + EVP_MD_CTX md; + + buffer_init(&b); + buffer_put_cstring(&b, client_version_string); + buffer_put_cstring(&b, server_version_string); + + /* kexinit messages: fake header: len+SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT */ + buffer_put_int(&b, ckexinitlen+1); + buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT); + buffer_append(&b, ckexinit, ckexinitlen); + buffer_put_int(&b, skexinitlen+1); + buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT); + buffer_append(&b, skexinit, skexinitlen); + + buffer_put_string(&b, serverhostkeyblob, sbloblen); + buffer_put_bignum2(&b, client_dh_pub); + buffer_put_bignum2(&b, server_dh_pub); + buffer_put_bignum2(&b, shared_secret); + +#ifdef DEBUG_KEX + buffer_dump(&b); +#endif + EVP_DigestInit(&md, evp_md); + EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b)); + EVP_DigestFinal(&md, digest, NULL); + + buffer_free(&b); + +#ifdef DEBUG_KEX + dump_digest("hash", digest, evp_md->md_size); +#endif + return digest; +} + +/* client */ + +static void +kexdh_client(Kex *kex) +{ + BIGNUM *dh_server_pub = NULL, *shared_secret = NULL; + DH *dh; + Key *server_host_key; + u_char *server_host_key_blob = NULL, *signature = NULL; + u_char *kbuf, *hash; + u_int klen, kout, slen, sbloblen; + int dlen, plen; + + /* generate and send 'e', client DH public key */ + dh = dh_new_group1(); + dh_gen_key(dh, kex->we_need * 8); + packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT); + packet_put_bignum2(dh->pub_key); + packet_send(); + + debug("sending SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT"); +#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH + DHparams_print_fp(stderr, dh); + fprintf(stderr, "pub= "); + BN_print_fp(stderr, dh->pub_key); + fprintf(stderr, "\n"); +#endif + + debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY"); + packet_read_expect(&plen, SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY); + + /* key, cert */ + server_host_key_blob = packet_get_string(&sbloblen); + server_host_key = key_from_blob(server_host_key_blob, sbloblen); + if (server_host_key == NULL) + fatal("cannot decode server_host_key_blob"); + + if (kex->verify_host_key == NULL) + fatal("cannot verify server_host_key"); + if (kex->verify_host_key(server_host_key) == -1) + fatal("server_host_key verification failed"); + + /* DH paramter f, server public DH key */ + dh_server_pub = BN_new(); + if (dh_server_pub == NULL) + fatal("dh_server_pub == NULL"); + packet_get_bignum2(dh_server_pub, &dlen); + +#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH + fprintf(stderr, "dh_server_pub= "); + BN_print_fp(stderr, dh_server_pub); + fprintf(stderr, "\n"); + debug("bits %d", BN_num_bits(dh_server_pub)); +#endif + + /* signed H */ + signature = packet_get_string(&slen); + packet_done(); + + if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh_server_pub)) + packet_disconnect("bad server public DH value"); + + klen = DH_size(dh); + kbuf = xmalloc(klen); + kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_server_pub, dh); +#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH + dump_digest("shared secret", kbuf, kout); +#endif + shared_secret = BN_new(); + BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret); + memset(kbuf, 0, klen); + xfree(kbuf); + + /* calc and verify H */ + hash = kex_dh_hash( + kex->client_version_string, + kex->server_version_string, + buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my), + buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer), + server_host_key_blob, sbloblen, + dh->pub_key, + dh_server_pub, + shared_secret + ); + xfree(server_host_key_blob); + BN_free(dh_server_pub); + DH_free(dh); + + if (key_verify(server_host_key, signature, slen, hash, 20) != 1) + fatal("key_verify failed for server_host_key"); + key_free(server_host_key); + xfree(signature); + + /* save session id */ + if (kex->session_id == NULL) { + kex->session_id_len = 20; + kex->session_id = xmalloc(kex->session_id_len); + memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len); + } + + kex_derive_keys(kex, hash, shared_secret); + BN_clear_free(shared_secret); + kex_finish(kex); +} + +/* server */ + +static void +kexdh_server(Kex *kex) +{ + BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL, *dh_client_pub = NULL; + DH *dh; + Key *server_host_key; + u_char *kbuf, *hash, *signature = NULL, *server_host_key_blob = NULL; + u_int sbloblen, klen, kout; + int dlen, slen, plen; + + /* generate server DH public key */ + dh = dh_new_group1(); + dh_gen_key(dh, kex->we_need * 8); + + debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT"); + packet_read_expect(&plen, SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT); + + if (kex->load_host_key == NULL) + fatal("Cannot load hostkey"); + server_host_key = kex->load_host_key(kex->hostkey_type); + if (server_host_key == NULL) + fatal("Unsupported hostkey type %d", kex->hostkey_type); + + /* key, cert */ + dh_client_pub = BN_new(); + if (dh_client_pub == NULL) + fatal("dh_client_pub == NULL"); + packet_get_bignum2(dh_client_pub, &dlen); + +#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH + fprintf(stderr, "dh_client_pub= "); + BN_print_fp(stderr, dh_client_pub); + fprintf(stderr, "\n"); + debug("bits %d", BN_num_bits(dh_client_pub)); +#endif + +#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH + DHparams_print_fp(stderr, dh); + fprintf(stderr, "pub= "); + BN_print_fp(stderr, dh->pub_key); + fprintf(stderr, "\n"); +#endif + if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh_client_pub)) + packet_disconnect("bad client public DH value"); + + klen = DH_size(dh); + kbuf = xmalloc(klen); + kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_client_pub, dh); +#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH + dump_digest("shared secret", kbuf, kout); +#endif + shared_secret = BN_new(); + BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret); + memset(kbuf, 0, klen); + xfree(kbuf); + + key_to_blob(server_host_key, &server_host_key_blob, &sbloblen); + + /* calc H */ + hash = kex_dh_hash( + kex->client_version_string, + kex->server_version_string, + buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer), + buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my), + server_host_key_blob, sbloblen, + dh_client_pub, + dh->pub_key, + shared_secret + ); + BN_free(dh_client_pub); + + /* save session id := H */ + /* XXX hashlen depends on KEX */ + if (kex->session_id == NULL) { + kex->session_id_len = 20; + kex->session_id = xmalloc(kex->session_id_len); + memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len); + } + + /* sign H */ + /* XXX hashlen depends on KEX */ + key_sign(server_host_key, &signature, &slen, hash, 20); + + /* destroy_sensitive_data(); */ + + /* send server hostkey, DH pubkey 'f' and singed H */ + packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY); + packet_put_string(server_host_key_blob, sbloblen); + packet_put_bignum2(dh->pub_key); /* f */ + packet_put_string(signature, slen); + packet_send(); + + xfree(signature); + xfree(server_host_key_blob); + /* have keys, free DH */ + DH_free(dh); + + kex_derive_keys(kex, hash, shared_secret); + BN_clear_free(shared_secret); + kex_finish(kex); +} + +void +kexdh(Kex *kex) +{ + if (kex->server) + kexdh_server(kex); + else + kexdh_client(kex); +} diff --git a/openssh/kexgex.c b/openssh/kexgex.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f06f2c3 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/kexgex.c @@ -0,0 +1,409 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000 Niels Provos. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" +RCSID("$OpenBSD: kexgex.c,v 1.9 2001/09/17 19:27:15 stevesk Exp $"); + +#include + +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "buffer.h" +#include "bufaux.h" +#include "key.h" +#include "kex.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "packet.h" +#include "dh.h" +#include "ssh2.h" +#include "compat.h" + +static u_char * +kexgex_hash( + char *client_version_string, + char *server_version_string, + char *ckexinit, int ckexinitlen, + char *skexinit, int skexinitlen, + u_char *serverhostkeyblob, int sbloblen, + int min, int wantbits, int max, BIGNUM *prime, BIGNUM *gen, + BIGNUM *client_dh_pub, + BIGNUM *server_dh_pub, + BIGNUM *shared_secret) +{ + Buffer b; + static u_char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; + EVP_MD *evp_md = EVP_sha1(); + EVP_MD_CTX md; + + buffer_init(&b); + buffer_put_cstring(&b, client_version_string); + buffer_put_cstring(&b, server_version_string); + + /* kexinit messages: fake header: len+SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT */ + buffer_put_int(&b, ckexinitlen+1); + buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT); + buffer_append(&b, ckexinit, ckexinitlen); + buffer_put_int(&b, skexinitlen+1); + buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT); + buffer_append(&b, skexinit, skexinitlen); + + buffer_put_string(&b, serverhostkeyblob, sbloblen); + if (min == -1 || max == -1) + buffer_put_int(&b, wantbits); + else { + buffer_put_int(&b, min); + buffer_put_int(&b, wantbits); + buffer_put_int(&b, max); + } + buffer_put_bignum2(&b, prime); + buffer_put_bignum2(&b, gen); + buffer_put_bignum2(&b, client_dh_pub); + buffer_put_bignum2(&b, server_dh_pub); + buffer_put_bignum2(&b, shared_secret); + +#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH + buffer_dump(&b); +#endif + EVP_DigestInit(&md, evp_md); + EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b)); + EVP_DigestFinal(&md, digest, NULL); + + buffer_free(&b); + +#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH + dump_digest("hash", digest, evp_md->md_size); +#endif + return digest; +} + +/* client */ + +static void +kexgex_client(Kex *kex) +{ + BIGNUM *dh_server_pub = NULL, *shared_secret = NULL; + BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL; + Key *server_host_key; + u_char *kbuf, *hash, *signature = NULL, *server_host_key_blob = NULL; + u_int klen, kout, slen, sbloblen; + int dlen, plen, min, max, nbits; + DH *dh; + + nbits = dh_estimate(kex->we_need * 8); + + if (datafellows & SSH_OLD_DHGEX) { + debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST_OLD sent"); + + /* Old GEX request */ + packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST_OLD); + packet_put_int(nbits); + min = DH_GRP_MIN; + max = DH_GRP_MAX; + } else { + debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST sent"); + + /* New GEX request */ + min = DH_GRP_MIN; + max = DH_GRP_MAX; + packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST); + packet_put_int(min); + packet_put_int(nbits); + packet_put_int(max); + } +#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH + fprintf(stderr, "\nmin = %d, nbits = %d, max = %d\n", + min, nbits, max); +#endif + packet_send(); + + debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP"); + packet_read_expect(&plen, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP); + + if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL) + fatal("BN_new"); + packet_get_bignum2(p, &dlen); + if ((g = BN_new()) == NULL) + fatal("BN_new"); + packet_get_bignum2(g, &dlen); + packet_done(); + + if (BN_num_bits(p) < min || BN_num_bits(p) > max) + fatal("DH_GEX group out of range: %d !< %d !< %d", + min, BN_num_bits(p), max); + + dh = dh_new_group(g, p); + dh_gen_key(dh, kex->we_need * 8); + +#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH + DHparams_print_fp(stderr, dh); + fprintf(stderr, "pub= "); + BN_print_fp(stderr, dh->pub_key); + fprintf(stderr, "\n"); +#endif + + debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT sent"); + /* generate and send 'e', client DH public key */ + packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT); + packet_put_bignum2(dh->pub_key); + packet_send(); + + debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY"); + packet_read_expect(&plen, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY); + + /* key, cert */ + server_host_key_blob = packet_get_string(&sbloblen); + server_host_key = key_from_blob(server_host_key_blob, sbloblen); + if (server_host_key == NULL) + fatal("cannot decode server_host_key_blob"); + + if (kex->verify_host_key == NULL) + fatal("cannot verify server_host_key"); + if (kex->verify_host_key(server_host_key) == -1) + fatal("server_host_key verification failed"); + + /* DH paramter f, server public DH key */ + dh_server_pub = BN_new(); + if (dh_server_pub == NULL) + fatal("dh_server_pub == NULL"); + packet_get_bignum2(dh_server_pub, &dlen); + +#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH + fprintf(stderr, "dh_server_pub= "); + BN_print_fp(stderr, dh_server_pub); + fprintf(stderr, "\n"); + debug("bits %d", BN_num_bits(dh_server_pub)); +#endif + + /* signed H */ + signature = packet_get_string(&slen); + packet_done(); + + if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh_server_pub)) + packet_disconnect("bad server public DH value"); + + klen = DH_size(dh); + kbuf = xmalloc(klen); + kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_server_pub, dh); +#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH + dump_digest("shared secret", kbuf, kout); +#endif + shared_secret = BN_new(); + BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret); + memset(kbuf, 0, klen); + xfree(kbuf); + + if (datafellows & SSH_OLD_DHGEX) + min = max = -1; + + /* calc and verify H */ + hash = kexgex_hash( + kex->client_version_string, + kex->server_version_string, + buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my), + buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer), + server_host_key_blob, sbloblen, + min, nbits, max, + dh->p, dh->g, + dh->pub_key, + dh_server_pub, + shared_secret + ); + /* have keys, free DH */ + DH_free(dh); + xfree(server_host_key_blob); + BN_free(dh_server_pub); + + if (key_verify(server_host_key, signature, slen, hash, 20) != 1) + fatal("key_verify failed for server_host_key"); + key_free(server_host_key); + xfree(signature); + + /* save session id */ + if (kex->session_id == NULL) { + kex->session_id_len = 20; + kex->session_id = xmalloc(kex->session_id_len); + memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len); + } + kex_derive_keys(kex, hash, shared_secret); + BN_clear_free(shared_secret); + + kex_finish(kex); +} + +/* server */ + +static void +kexgex_server(Kex *kex) +{ + BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL, *dh_client_pub = NULL; + Key *server_host_key; + DH *dh = dh; + u_char *kbuf, *hash, *signature = NULL, *server_host_key_blob = NULL; + u_int sbloblen, klen, kout; + int min = -1, max = -1, nbits = -1, type, plen, dlen, slen; + + if (kex->load_host_key == NULL) + fatal("Cannot load hostkey"); + server_host_key = kex->load_host_key(kex->hostkey_type); + if (server_host_key == NULL) + fatal("Unsupported hostkey type %d", kex->hostkey_type); + + type = packet_read(&plen); + switch(type){ + case SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST: + debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST received"); + min = packet_get_int(); + nbits = packet_get_int(); + max = packet_get_int(); + min = MAX(DH_GRP_MIN, min); + max = MIN(DH_GRP_MAX, max); + break; + case SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST_OLD: + debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST_OLD received"); + nbits = packet_get_int(); + min = DH_GRP_MIN; + max = DH_GRP_MAX; + /* unused for old GEX */ + break; + default: + fatal("protocol error during kex, no DH_GEX_REQUEST: %d", type); + } + packet_done(); + + if (max < min || nbits < min || max < nbits) + fatal("DH_GEX_REQUEST, bad parameters: %d !< %d !< %d", + min, nbits, max); + + dh = choose_dh(min, nbits, max); + if (dh == NULL) + packet_disconnect("Protocol error: no matching DH grp found"); + + debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP sent"); + packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP); + packet_put_bignum2(dh->p); + packet_put_bignum2(dh->g); + packet_send(); + + /* flush */ + packet_write_wait(); + + /* Compute our exchange value in parallel with the client */ + dh_gen_key(dh, kex->we_need * 8); + + debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT"); + packet_read_expect(&plen, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT); + + /* key, cert */ + dh_client_pub = BN_new(); + if (dh_client_pub == NULL) + fatal("dh_client_pub == NULL"); + packet_get_bignum2(dh_client_pub, &dlen); + +#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH + fprintf(stderr, "dh_client_pub= "); + BN_print_fp(stderr, dh_client_pub); + fprintf(stderr, "\n"); + debug("bits %d", BN_num_bits(dh_client_pub)); +#endif + +#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH + DHparams_print_fp(stderr, dh); + fprintf(stderr, "pub= "); + BN_print_fp(stderr, dh->pub_key); + fprintf(stderr, "\n"); +#endif + if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh_client_pub)) + packet_disconnect("bad client public DH value"); + + klen = DH_size(dh); + kbuf = xmalloc(klen); + kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_client_pub, dh); +#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH + dump_digest("shared secret", kbuf, kout); +#endif + shared_secret = BN_new(); + BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret); + memset(kbuf, 0, klen); + xfree(kbuf); + + key_to_blob(server_host_key, &server_host_key_blob, &sbloblen); + + if (type == SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST_OLD) + min = max = -1; + + /* calc H */ /* XXX depends on 'kex' */ + hash = kexgex_hash( + kex->client_version_string, + kex->server_version_string, + buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer), + buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my), + server_host_key_blob, sbloblen, + min, nbits, max, + dh->p, dh->g, + dh_client_pub, + dh->pub_key, + shared_secret + ); + BN_free(dh_client_pub); + + /* save session id := H */ + /* XXX hashlen depends on KEX */ + if (kex->session_id == NULL) { + kex->session_id_len = 20; + kex->session_id = xmalloc(kex->session_id_len); + memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len); + } + + /* sign H */ + /* XXX hashlen depends on KEX */ + key_sign(server_host_key, &signature, &slen, hash, 20); + + /* destroy_sensitive_data(); */ + + /* send server hostkey, DH pubkey 'f' and singed H */ + debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY sent"); + packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY); + packet_put_string(server_host_key_blob, sbloblen); + packet_put_bignum2(dh->pub_key); /* f */ + packet_put_string(signature, slen); + packet_send(); + xfree(signature); + xfree(server_host_key_blob); + /* have keys, free DH */ + DH_free(dh); + + kex_derive_keys(kex, hash, shared_secret); + BN_clear_free(shared_secret); + + kex_finish(kex); +} + +void +kexgex(Kex *kex) +{ + if (kex->server) + kexgex_server(kex); + else + kexgex_client(kex); +} diff --git a/openssh/key.c b/openssh/key.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..57df5b9 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/key.c @@ -0,0 +1,788 @@ +/* + * read_bignum(): + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + * + * + * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ +#include "includes.h" +RCSID("$OpenBSD: key.c,v 1.33 2001/10/04 14:34:16 markus Exp $"); + +#include + +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "key.h" +#include "rsa.h" +#include "ssh-dss.h" +#include "ssh-rsa.h" +#include "uuencode.h" +#include "buffer.h" +#include "bufaux.h" +#include "log.h" + +Key * +key_new(int type) +{ + Key *k; + RSA *rsa; + DSA *dsa; + k = xmalloc(sizeof(*k)); + k->type = type; + k->flags = 0; + k->dsa = NULL; + k->rsa = NULL; + switch (k->type) { + case KEY_RSA1: + case KEY_RSA: + rsa = RSA_new(); + rsa->n = BN_new(); + rsa->e = BN_new(); + k->rsa = rsa; + break; + case KEY_DSA: + dsa = DSA_new(); + dsa->p = BN_new(); + dsa->q = BN_new(); + dsa->g = BN_new(); + dsa->pub_key = BN_new(); + k->dsa = dsa; + break; + case KEY_UNSPEC: + break; + default: + fatal("key_new: bad key type %d", k->type); + break; + } + return k; +} +Key * +key_new_private(int type) +{ + Key *k = key_new(type); + switch (k->type) { + case KEY_RSA1: + case KEY_RSA: + k->rsa->d = BN_new(); + k->rsa->iqmp = BN_new(); + k->rsa->q = BN_new(); + k->rsa->p = BN_new(); + k->rsa->dmq1 = BN_new(); + k->rsa->dmp1 = BN_new(); + break; + case KEY_DSA: + k->dsa->priv_key = BN_new(); + break; + case KEY_UNSPEC: + break; + default: + break; + } + return k; +} +void +key_free(Key *k) +{ + switch (k->type) { + case KEY_RSA1: + case KEY_RSA: + if (k->rsa != NULL) + RSA_free(k->rsa); + k->rsa = NULL; + break; + case KEY_DSA: + if (k->dsa != NULL) + DSA_free(k->dsa); + k->dsa = NULL; + break; + case KEY_UNSPEC: + break; + default: + fatal("key_free: bad key type %d", k->type); + break; + } + xfree(k); +} +int +key_equal(Key *a, Key *b) +{ + if (a == NULL || b == NULL || a->type != b->type) + return 0; + switch (a->type) { + case KEY_RSA1: + case KEY_RSA: + return a->rsa != NULL && b->rsa != NULL && + BN_cmp(a->rsa->e, b->rsa->e) == 0 && + BN_cmp(a->rsa->n, b->rsa->n) == 0; + break; + case KEY_DSA: + return a->dsa != NULL && b->dsa != NULL && + BN_cmp(a->dsa->p, b->dsa->p) == 0 && + BN_cmp(a->dsa->q, b->dsa->q) == 0 && + BN_cmp(a->dsa->g, b->dsa->g) == 0 && + BN_cmp(a->dsa->pub_key, b->dsa->pub_key) == 0; + break; + default: + fatal("key_equal: bad key type %d", a->type); + break; + } + return 0; +} + +static u_char* +key_fingerprint_raw(Key *k, enum fp_type dgst_type, size_t *dgst_raw_length) +{ + EVP_MD *md = NULL; + EVP_MD_CTX ctx; + u_char *blob = NULL; + u_char *retval = NULL; + int len = 0; + int nlen, elen; + + *dgst_raw_length = 0; + + switch (dgst_type) { + case SSH_FP_MD5: + md = EVP_md5(); + break; + case SSH_FP_SHA1: + md = EVP_sha1(); + break; + default: + fatal("key_fingerprint_raw: bad digest type %d", + dgst_type); + } + switch (k->type) { + case KEY_RSA1: + nlen = BN_num_bytes(k->rsa->n); + elen = BN_num_bytes(k->rsa->e); + len = nlen + elen; + blob = xmalloc(len); + BN_bn2bin(k->rsa->n, blob); + BN_bn2bin(k->rsa->e, blob + nlen); + break; + case KEY_DSA: + case KEY_RSA: + key_to_blob(k, &blob, &len); + break; + case KEY_UNSPEC: + return retval; + break; + default: + fatal("key_fingerprint_raw: bad key type %d", k->type); + break; + } + if (blob != NULL) { + retval = xmalloc(EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); + EVP_DigestInit(&ctx, md); + EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, blob, len); + EVP_DigestFinal(&ctx, retval, NULL); + *dgst_raw_length = md->md_size; + memset(blob, 0, len); + xfree(blob); + } else { + fatal("key_fingerprint_raw: blob is null"); + } + return retval; +} + +static char* +key_fingerprint_hex(u_char* dgst_raw, size_t dgst_raw_len) +{ + char *retval; + int i; + + retval = xmalloc(dgst_raw_len * 3 + 1); + retval[0] = '\0'; + for(i = 0; i < dgst_raw_len; i++) { + char hex[4]; + snprintf(hex, sizeof(hex), "%02x:", dgst_raw[i]); + strlcat(retval, hex, dgst_raw_len * 3); + } + retval[(dgst_raw_len * 3) - 1] = '\0'; + return retval; +} + +static char* +key_fingerprint_bubblebabble(u_char* dgst_raw, size_t dgst_raw_len) +{ + char vowels[] = { 'a', 'e', 'i', 'o', 'u', 'y' }; + char consonants[] = { 'b', 'c', 'd', 'f', 'g', 'h', 'k', 'l', 'm', + 'n', 'p', 'r', 's', 't', 'v', 'z', 'x' }; + u_int i, j = 0, rounds, seed = 1; + char *retval; + + rounds = (dgst_raw_len / 2) + 1; + retval = xmalloc(sizeof(char) * (rounds*6)); + retval[j++] = 'x'; + for (i = 0; i < rounds; i++) { + u_int idx0, idx1, idx2, idx3, idx4; + if ((i + 1 < rounds) || (dgst_raw_len % 2 != 0)) { + idx0 = (((((u_int)(dgst_raw[2 * i])) >> 6) & 3) + + seed) % 6; + idx1 = (((u_int)(dgst_raw[2 * i])) >> 2) & 15; + idx2 = ((((u_int)(dgst_raw[2 * i])) & 3) + + (seed / 6)) % 6; + retval[j++] = vowels[idx0]; + retval[j++] = consonants[idx1]; + retval[j++] = vowels[idx2]; + if ((i + 1) < rounds) { + idx3 = (((u_int)(dgst_raw[(2 * i) + 1])) >> 4) & 15; + idx4 = (((u_int)(dgst_raw[(2 * i) + 1]))) & 15; + retval[j++] = consonants[idx3]; + retval[j++] = '-'; + retval[j++] = consonants[idx4]; + seed = ((seed * 5) + + ((((u_int)(dgst_raw[2 * i])) * 7) + + ((u_int)(dgst_raw[(2 * i) + 1])))) % 36; + } + } else { + idx0 = seed % 6; + idx1 = 16; + idx2 = seed / 6; + retval[j++] = vowels[idx0]; + retval[j++] = consonants[idx1]; + retval[j++] = vowels[idx2]; + } + } + retval[j++] = 'x'; + retval[j++] = '\0'; + return retval; +} + +char* +key_fingerprint(Key *k, enum fp_type dgst_type, enum fp_rep dgst_rep) +{ + char *retval = NULL; + u_char *dgst_raw; + size_t dgst_raw_len; + + dgst_raw = key_fingerprint_raw(k, dgst_type, &dgst_raw_len); + if (!dgst_raw) + fatal("key_fingerprint: null from key_fingerprint_raw()"); + switch(dgst_rep) { + case SSH_FP_HEX: + retval = key_fingerprint_hex(dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len); + break; + case SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE: + retval = key_fingerprint_bubblebabble(dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len); + break; + default: + fatal("key_fingerprint_ex: bad digest representation %d", + dgst_rep); + break; + } + memset(dgst_raw, 0, dgst_raw_len); + xfree(dgst_raw); + return retval; +} + +/* + * Reads a multiple-precision integer in decimal from the buffer, and advances + * the pointer. The integer must already be initialized. This function is + * permitted to modify the buffer. This leaves *cpp to point just beyond the + * last processed (and maybe modified) character. Note that this may modify + * the buffer containing the number. + */ +static int +read_bignum(char **cpp, BIGNUM * value) +{ + char *cp = *cpp; + int old; + + /* Skip any leading whitespace. */ + for (; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++) + ; + + /* Check that it begins with a decimal digit. */ + if (*cp < '0' || *cp > '9') + return 0; + + /* Save starting position. */ + *cpp = cp; + + /* Move forward until all decimal digits skipped. */ + for (; *cp >= '0' && *cp <= '9'; cp++) + ; + + /* Save the old terminating character, and replace it by \0. */ + old = *cp; + *cp = 0; + + /* Parse the number. */ + if (BN_dec2bn(&value, *cpp) == 0) + return 0; + + /* Restore old terminating character. */ + *cp = old; + + /* Move beyond the number and return success. */ + *cpp = cp; + return 1; +} +static int +write_bignum(FILE *f, BIGNUM *num) +{ + char *buf = BN_bn2dec(num); + if (buf == NULL) { + error("write_bignum: BN_bn2dec() failed"); + return 0; + } + fprintf(f, " %s", buf); + OPENSSL_free(buf); + return 1; +} + +/* returns 1 ok, -1 error */ +int +key_read(Key *ret, char **cpp) +{ + Key *k; + int success = -1; + char *cp, *space; + int len, n, type; + u_int bits; + u_char *blob; + + cp = *cpp; + + switch(ret->type) { + case KEY_RSA1: + /* Get number of bits. */ + if (*cp < '0' || *cp > '9') + return -1; /* Bad bit count... */ + for (bits = 0; *cp >= '0' && *cp <= '9'; cp++) + bits = 10 * bits + *cp - '0'; + if (bits == 0) + return -1; + *cpp = cp; + /* Get public exponent, public modulus. */ + if (!read_bignum(cpp, ret->rsa->e)) + return -1; + if (!read_bignum(cpp, ret->rsa->n)) + return -1; + success = 1; + break; + case KEY_UNSPEC: + case KEY_RSA: + case KEY_DSA: + space = strchr(cp, ' '); + if (space == NULL) { + debug3("key_read: no space"); + return -1; + } + *space = '\0'; + type = key_type_from_name(cp); + *space = ' '; + if (type == KEY_UNSPEC) { + debug3("key_read: no key found"); + return -1; + } + cp = space+1; + if (*cp == '\0') { + debug3("key_read: short string"); + return -1; + } + if (ret->type == KEY_UNSPEC) { + ret->type = type; + } else if (ret->type != type) { + /* is a key, but different type */ + debug3("key_read: type mismatch"); + return -1; + } + len = 2*strlen(cp); + blob = xmalloc(len); + n = uudecode(cp, blob, len); + if (n < 0) { + error("key_read: uudecode %s failed", cp); + return -1; + } + k = key_from_blob(blob, n); + if (k == NULL) { + error("key_read: key_from_blob %s failed", cp); + return -1; + } + xfree(blob); + if (k->type != type) { + error("key_read: type mismatch: encoding error"); + key_free(k); + return -1; + } +/*XXXX*/ + if (ret->type == KEY_RSA) { + if (ret->rsa != NULL) + RSA_free(ret->rsa); + ret->rsa = k->rsa; + k->rsa = NULL; + success = 1; +#ifdef DEBUG_PK + RSA_print_fp(stderr, ret->rsa, 8); +#endif + } else { + if (ret->dsa != NULL) + DSA_free(ret->dsa); + ret->dsa = k->dsa; + k->dsa = NULL; + success = 1; +#ifdef DEBUG_PK + DSA_print_fp(stderr, ret->dsa, 8); +#endif + } +/*XXXX*/ + if (success != 1) + break; + key_free(k); + /* advance cp: skip whitespace and data */ + while (*cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t') + cp++; + while (*cp != '\0' && *cp != ' ' && *cp != '\t') + cp++; + *cpp = cp; + break; + default: + fatal("key_read: bad key type: %d", ret->type); + break; + } + return success; +} +int +key_write(Key *key, FILE *f) +{ + int success = 0; + u_int bits = 0; + + if (key->type == KEY_RSA1 && key->rsa != NULL) { + /* size of modulus 'n' */ + bits = BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n); + fprintf(f, "%u", bits); + if (write_bignum(f, key->rsa->e) && + write_bignum(f, key->rsa->n)) { + success = 1; + } else { + error("key_write: failed for RSA key"); + } + } else if ((key->type == KEY_DSA && key->dsa != NULL) || + (key->type == KEY_RSA && key->rsa != NULL)) { + int len, n; + u_char *blob, *uu; + key_to_blob(key, &blob, &len); + uu = xmalloc(2*len); + n = uuencode(blob, len, uu, 2*len); + if (n > 0) { + fprintf(f, "%s %s", key_ssh_name(key), uu); + success = 1; + } + xfree(blob); + xfree(uu); + } + return success; +} +char * +key_type(Key *k) +{ + switch (k->type) { + case KEY_RSA1: + return "RSA1"; + break; + case KEY_RSA: + return "RSA"; + break; + case KEY_DSA: + return "DSA"; + break; + } + return "unknown"; +} +char * +key_ssh_name(Key *k) +{ + switch (k->type) { + case KEY_RSA: + return "ssh-rsa"; + break; + case KEY_DSA: + return "ssh-dss"; + break; + } + return "ssh-unknown"; +} +u_int +key_size(Key *k){ + switch (k->type) { + case KEY_RSA1: + case KEY_RSA: + return BN_num_bits(k->rsa->n); + break; + case KEY_DSA: + return BN_num_bits(k->dsa->p); + break; + } + return 0; +} + +static RSA * +rsa_generate_private_key(u_int bits) +{ + RSA *private; + private = RSA_generate_key(bits, 35, NULL, NULL); + if (private == NULL) + fatal("rsa_generate_private_key: key generation failed."); + return private; +} + +static DSA* +dsa_generate_private_key(u_int bits) +{ + DSA *private = DSA_generate_parameters(bits, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL); + if (private == NULL) + fatal("dsa_generate_private_key: DSA_generate_parameters failed"); + if (!DSA_generate_key(private)) + fatal("dsa_generate_private_key: DSA_generate_key failed."); + if (private == NULL) + fatal("dsa_generate_private_key: NULL."); + return private; +} + +Key * +key_generate(int type, u_int bits) +{ + Key *k = key_new(KEY_UNSPEC); + switch (type) { + case KEY_DSA: + k->dsa = dsa_generate_private_key(bits); + break; + case KEY_RSA: + case KEY_RSA1: + k->rsa = rsa_generate_private_key(bits); + break; + default: + fatal("key_generate: unknown type %d", type); + } + k->type = type; + return k; +} + +Key * +key_from_private(Key *k) +{ + Key *n = NULL; + switch (k->type) { + case KEY_DSA: + n = key_new(k->type); + BN_copy(n->dsa->p, k->dsa->p); + BN_copy(n->dsa->q, k->dsa->q); + BN_copy(n->dsa->g, k->dsa->g); + BN_copy(n->dsa->pub_key, k->dsa->pub_key); + break; + case KEY_RSA: + case KEY_RSA1: + n = key_new(k->type); + BN_copy(n->rsa->n, k->rsa->n); + BN_copy(n->rsa->e, k->rsa->e); + break; + default: + fatal("key_from_private: unknown type %d", k->type); + break; + } + return n; +} + +int +key_type_from_name(char *name) +{ + if (strcmp(name, "rsa1") == 0){ + return KEY_RSA1; + } else if (strcmp(name, "rsa") == 0){ + return KEY_RSA; + } else if (strcmp(name, "dsa") == 0){ + return KEY_DSA; + } else if (strcmp(name, "ssh-rsa") == 0){ + return KEY_RSA; + } else if (strcmp(name, "ssh-dss") == 0){ + return KEY_DSA; + } + debug2("key_type_from_name: unknown key type '%s'", name); + return KEY_UNSPEC; +} + +int +key_names_valid2(const char *names) +{ + char *s, *cp, *p; + + if (names == NULL || strcmp(names, "") == 0) + return 0; + s = cp = xstrdup(names); + for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0'; + (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) { + switch (key_type_from_name(p)) { + case KEY_RSA1: + case KEY_UNSPEC: + xfree(s); + return 0; + } + } + debug3("key names ok: [%s]", names); + xfree(s); + return 1; +} + +Key * +key_from_blob(u_char *blob, int blen) +{ + Buffer b; + char *ktype; + int rlen, type; + Key *key = NULL; + +#ifdef DEBUG_PK + dump_base64(stderr, blob, blen); +#endif + buffer_init(&b); + buffer_append(&b, blob, blen); + ktype = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL); + type = key_type_from_name(ktype); + + switch(type){ + case KEY_RSA: + key = key_new(type); + buffer_get_bignum2(&b, key->rsa->e); + buffer_get_bignum2(&b, key->rsa->n); +#ifdef DEBUG_PK + RSA_print_fp(stderr, key->rsa, 8); +#endif + break; + case KEY_DSA: + key = key_new(type); + buffer_get_bignum2(&b, key->dsa->p); + buffer_get_bignum2(&b, key->dsa->q); + buffer_get_bignum2(&b, key->dsa->g); + buffer_get_bignum2(&b, key->dsa->pub_key); +#ifdef DEBUG_PK + DSA_print_fp(stderr, key->dsa, 8); +#endif + break; + case KEY_UNSPEC: + key = key_new(type); + break; + default: + error("key_from_blob: cannot handle type %s", ktype); + break; + } + rlen = buffer_len(&b); + if (key != NULL && rlen != 0) + error("key_from_blob: remaining bytes in key blob %d", rlen); + xfree(ktype); + buffer_free(&b); + return key; +} + +int +key_to_blob(Key *key, u_char **blobp, u_int *lenp) +{ + Buffer b; + int len; + u_char *buf; + + if (key == NULL) { + error("key_to_blob: key == NULL"); + return 0; + } + buffer_init(&b); + switch(key->type){ + case KEY_DSA: + buffer_put_cstring(&b, key_ssh_name(key)); + buffer_put_bignum2(&b, key->dsa->p); + buffer_put_bignum2(&b, key->dsa->q); + buffer_put_bignum2(&b, key->dsa->g); + buffer_put_bignum2(&b, key->dsa->pub_key); + break; + case KEY_RSA: + buffer_put_cstring(&b, key_ssh_name(key)); + buffer_put_bignum2(&b, key->rsa->e); + buffer_put_bignum2(&b, key->rsa->n); + break; + default: + error("key_to_blob: unsupported key type %d", key->type); + buffer_free(&b); + return 0; + } + len = buffer_len(&b); + buf = xmalloc(len); + memcpy(buf, buffer_ptr(&b), len); + memset(buffer_ptr(&b), 0, len); + buffer_free(&b); + if (lenp != NULL) + *lenp = len; + if (blobp != NULL) + *blobp = buf; + return len; +} + +int +key_sign( + Key *key, + u_char **sigp, int *lenp, + u_char *data, int datalen) +{ + switch(key->type){ + case KEY_DSA: + return ssh_dss_sign(key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen); + break; + case KEY_RSA: + return ssh_rsa_sign(key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen); + break; + default: + error("key_sign: illegal key type %d", key->type); + return -1; + break; + } +} + +int +key_verify( + Key *key, + u_char *signature, int signaturelen, + u_char *data, int datalen) +{ + if (signaturelen == 0) + return -1; + + switch(key->type){ + case KEY_DSA: + return ssh_dss_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen); + break; + case KEY_RSA: + return ssh_rsa_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen); + break; + default: + error("key_verify: illegal key type %d", key->type); + return -1; + break; + } +} diff --git a/openssh/key.h b/openssh/key.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..00eebb7 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/key.h @@ -0,0 +1,80 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: key.h,v 1.17 2001/09/17 19:27:15 stevesk Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ +#ifndef KEY_H +#define KEY_H + +#include +#include + +typedef struct Key Key; +enum types { + KEY_RSA1, + KEY_RSA, + KEY_DSA, + KEY_UNSPEC +}; +enum fp_type { + SSH_FP_SHA1, + SSH_FP_MD5 +}; +enum fp_rep { + SSH_FP_HEX, + SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE +}; + +/* key is stored in external hardware */ +#define KEY_FLAG_EXT 0x0001 + +struct Key { + int type; + int flags; + RSA *rsa; + DSA *dsa; +}; + +Key *key_new(int); +Key *key_new_private(int); +void key_free(Key *); +int key_equal(Key *, Key *); +char *key_fingerprint(Key *, enum fp_type, enum fp_rep); +char *key_type(Key *); +int key_write(Key *, FILE *); +int key_read(Key *, char **); +u_int key_size(Key *); + +Key *key_generate(int, u_int); +Key *key_from_private(Key *); +int key_type_from_name(char *); + +Key *key_from_blob(u_char *, int); +int key_to_blob(Key *, u_char **, u_int *); +char *key_ssh_name(Key *); +int key_names_valid2(const char *); + +int key_sign(Key *, u_char **, int *, u_char *, int); +int key_verify(Key *, u_char *, int, u_char *, int); + +#endif diff --git a/openssh/log.c b/openssh/log.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..39bc8b5 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/log.c @@ -0,0 +1,389 @@ +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" +RCSID("$OpenBSD: log.c,v 1.18 2001/06/26 17:27:23 markus Exp $"); + +#include "log.h" +#include "xmalloc.h" + +#include + +static LogLevel log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO; +static int log_on_stderr = 1; +static int log_facility = LOG_AUTH; +static char *argv0; + +extern char *__progname; + +/* textual representation of log-facilities/levels */ + +static struct { + const char *name; + SyslogFacility val; +} log_facilities[] = { + { "DAEMON", SYSLOG_FACILITY_DAEMON }, + { "USER", SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER }, + { "AUTH", SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH }, +#ifdef LOG_AUTHPRIV + { "AUTHPRIV", SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTHPRIV }, +#endif + { "LOCAL0", SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL0 }, + { "LOCAL1", SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL1 }, + { "LOCAL2", SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL2 }, + { "LOCAL3", SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL3 }, + { "LOCAL4", SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL4 }, + { "LOCAL5", SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL5 }, + { "LOCAL6", SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL6 }, + { "LOCAL7", SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL7 }, + { NULL, 0 } +}; + +static struct { + const char *name; + LogLevel val; +} log_levels[] = +{ + { "QUIET", SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET }, + { "FATAL", SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL }, + { "ERROR", SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR }, + { "INFO", SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO }, + { "VERBOSE", SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE }, + { "DEBUG", SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1 }, + { "DEBUG1", SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1 }, + { "DEBUG2", SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG2 }, + { "DEBUG3", SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3 }, + { NULL, 0 } +}; + +static void do_log(LogLevel level, const char *fmt, va_list args); + +SyslogFacility +log_facility_number(char *name) +{ + int i; + if (name != NULL) + for (i = 0; log_facilities[i].name; i++) + if (strcasecmp(log_facilities[i].name, name) == 0) + return log_facilities[i].val; + return (SyslogFacility) - 1; +} + +LogLevel +log_level_number(char *name) +{ + int i; + if (name != NULL) + for (i = 0; log_levels[i].name; i++) + if (strcasecmp(log_levels[i].name, name) == 0) + return log_levels[i].val; + return (LogLevel) - 1; +} +/* Fatal messages. This function never returns. */ + +void +fatal(const char *fmt,...) +{ + va_list args; + va_start(args, fmt); + do_log(SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL, fmt, args); + va_end(args); + fatal_cleanup(); +} + +/* Error messages that should be logged. */ + +void +error(const char *fmt,...) +{ + va_list args; + va_start(args, fmt); + do_log(SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR, fmt, args); + va_end(args); +} + +/* Log this message (information that usually should go to the log). */ + +void +log(const char *fmt,...) +{ + va_list args; + va_start(args, fmt); + do_log(SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO, fmt, args); + va_end(args); +} + +/* More detailed messages (information that does not need to go to the log). */ + +void +verbose(const char *fmt,...) +{ + va_list args; + va_start(args, fmt); + do_log(SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE, fmt, args); + va_end(args); +} + +/* Debugging messages that should not be logged during normal operation. */ + +void +debug(const char *fmt,...) +{ + va_list args; + va_start(args, fmt); + do_log(SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1, fmt, args); + va_end(args); +} + +void +debug2(const char *fmt,...) +{ + va_list args; + va_start(args, fmt); + do_log(SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG2, fmt, args); + va_end(args); +} + +void +debug3(const char *fmt,...) +{ + va_list args; + va_start(args, fmt); + do_log(SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3, fmt, args); + va_end(args); +} + +/* Fatal cleanup */ + +struct fatal_cleanup { + struct fatal_cleanup *next; + void (*proc) (void *); + void *context; +}; + +static struct fatal_cleanup *fatal_cleanups = NULL; + +/* Registers a cleanup function to be called by fatal() before exiting. */ + +void +fatal_add_cleanup(void (*proc) (void *), void *context) +{ + struct fatal_cleanup *cu; + + cu = xmalloc(sizeof(*cu)); + cu->proc = proc; + cu->context = context; + cu->next = fatal_cleanups; + fatal_cleanups = cu; +} + +/* Removes a cleanup frunction to be called at fatal(). */ + +void +fatal_remove_cleanup(void (*proc) (void *context), void *context) +{ + struct fatal_cleanup **cup, *cu; + + for (cup = &fatal_cleanups; *cup; cup = &cu->next) { + cu = *cup; + if (cu->proc == proc && cu->context == context) { + *cup = cu->next; + xfree(cu); + return; + } + } + fatal("fatal_remove_cleanup: no such cleanup function: 0x%lx 0x%lx", + (u_long) proc, (u_long) context); +} + +/* Cleanup and exit */ +void +fatal_cleanup(void) +{ + struct fatal_cleanup *cu, *next_cu; + static int called = 0; + + if (called) + exit(255); + called = 1; + /* Call cleanup functions. */ + for (cu = fatal_cleanups; cu; cu = next_cu) { + next_cu = cu->next; + debug("Calling cleanup 0x%lx(0x%lx)", + (u_long) cu->proc, (u_long) cu->context); + (*cu->proc) (cu->context); + } + exit(255); +} + + +/* + * Initialize the log. + */ + +void +log_init(char *av0, LogLevel level, SyslogFacility facility, int on_stderr) +{ + argv0 = av0; + + switch (level) { + case SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET: + case SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL: + case SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR: + case SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO: + case SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE: + case SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1: + case SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG2: + case SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3: + log_level = level; + break; + default: + fprintf(stderr, "Unrecognized internal syslog level code %d\n", + (int) level); + exit(1); + } + + log_on_stderr = on_stderr; + if (on_stderr) + return; + + switch (facility) { + case SYSLOG_FACILITY_DAEMON: + log_facility = LOG_DAEMON; + break; + case SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER: + log_facility = LOG_USER; + break; + case SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH: + log_facility = LOG_AUTH; + break; +#ifdef LOG_AUTHPRIV + case SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTHPRIV: + log_facility = LOG_AUTHPRIV; + break; +#endif + case SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL0: + log_facility = LOG_LOCAL0; + break; + case SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL1: + log_facility = LOG_LOCAL1; + break; + case SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL2: + log_facility = LOG_LOCAL2; + break; + case SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL3: + log_facility = LOG_LOCAL3; + break; + case SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL4: + log_facility = LOG_LOCAL4; + break; + case SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL5: + log_facility = LOG_LOCAL5; + break; + case SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL6: + log_facility = LOG_LOCAL6; + break; + case SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL7: + log_facility = LOG_LOCAL7; + break; + default: + fprintf(stderr, + "Unrecognized internal syslog facility code %d\n", + (int) facility); + exit(1); + } +} + +#define MSGBUFSIZ 1024 + +static void +do_log(LogLevel level, const char *fmt, va_list args) +{ + char msgbuf[MSGBUFSIZ]; + char fmtbuf[MSGBUFSIZ]; + char *txt = NULL; + int pri = LOG_INFO; + + if (level > log_level) + return; + + switch (level) { + case SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL: + if (!log_on_stderr) + txt = "fatal"; + pri = LOG_CRIT; + break; + case SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR: + if (!log_on_stderr) + txt = "error"; + pri = LOG_ERR; + break; + case SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO: + pri = LOG_INFO; + break; + case SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE: + pri = LOG_INFO; + break; + case SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1: + txt = "debug1"; + pri = LOG_DEBUG; + break; + case SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG2: + txt = "debug2"; + pri = LOG_DEBUG; + break; + case SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3: + txt = "debug3"; + pri = LOG_DEBUG; + break; + default: + txt = "internal error"; + pri = LOG_ERR; + break; + } + if (txt != NULL) { + snprintf(fmtbuf, sizeof(fmtbuf), "%s: %s", txt, fmt); + vsnprintf(msgbuf, sizeof(msgbuf), fmtbuf, args); + } else { + vsnprintf(msgbuf, sizeof(msgbuf), fmt, args); + } + if (log_on_stderr) { + fprintf(stderr, "%s\r\n", msgbuf); + } else { + openlog(argv0 ? argv0 : __progname, LOG_PID, log_facility); + syslog(pri, "%.500s", msgbuf); + closelog(); + } +} diff --git a/openssh/log.h b/openssh/log.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..23451f7 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/log.h @@ -0,0 +1,66 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: log.h,v 1.4 2001/06/26 17:27:24 markus Exp $ */ + +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + */ + +#ifndef SSH_LOG_H +#define SSH_LOG_H + +#include /* Needed for LOG_AUTHPRIV (if present) */ + +/* Supported syslog facilities and levels. */ +typedef enum { + SYSLOG_FACILITY_DAEMON, + SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, + SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH, +#ifdef LOG_AUTHPRIV + SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTHPRIV, +#endif + SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL0, + SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL1, + SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL2, + SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL3, + SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL4, + SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL5, + SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL6, + SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL7 +} SyslogFacility; + +typedef enum { + SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET, + SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL, + SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR, + SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO, + SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE, + SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1, + SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG2, + SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3 +} LogLevel; + +void log_init(char *, LogLevel, SyslogFacility, int); + +SyslogFacility log_facility_number(char *); +LogLevel log_level_number(char *); + +void fatal(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2))); +void error(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2))); +void log(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2))); +void verbose(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2))); +void debug(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2))); +void debug2(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2))); +void debug3(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2))); + +void fatal_cleanup(void); +void fatal_add_cleanup(void (*) (void *), void *); +void fatal_remove_cleanup(void (*) (void *), void *); + +#endif diff --git a/openssh/loginrec.c b/openssh/loginrec.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..87c336d --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/loginrec.c @@ -0,0 +1,1507 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000 Andre Lucas. All rights reserved. + * Portions copyright (c) 1998 Todd C. Miller + * Portions copyright (c) 1996 Jason Downs + * Portions copyright (c) 1996 Theo de Raadt + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by Markus Friedl. + * 4. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/** + ** loginrec.c: platform-independent login recording and lastlog retrieval + **/ + +/* + The new login code explained + ============================ + + This code attempts to provide a common interface to login recording + (utmp and friends) and last login time retrieval. + + Its primary means of achieving this is to use 'struct logininfo', a + union of all the useful fields in the various different types of + system login record structures one finds on UNIX variants. + + We depend on autoconf to define which recording methods are to be + used, and which fields are contained in the relevant data structures + on the local system. Many C preprocessor symbols affect which code + gets compiled here. + + The code is designed to make it easy to modify a particular + recording method, without affecting other methods nor requiring so + many nested conditional compilation blocks as were commonplace in + the old code. + + For login recording, we try to use the local system's libraries as + these are clearly most likely to work correctly. For utmp systems + this usually means login() and logout() or setutent() etc., probably + in libutil, along with logwtmp() etc. On these systems, we fall back + to writing the files directly if we have to, though this method + requires very thorough testing so we do not corrupt local auditing + information. These files and their access methods are very system + specific indeed. + + For utmpx systems, the corresponding library functions are + setutxent() etc. To the author's knowledge, all utmpx systems have + these library functions and so no direct write is attempted. If such + a system exists and needs support, direct analogues of the [uw]tmp + code should suffice. + + Retrieving the time of last login ('lastlog') is in some ways even + more problemmatic than login recording. Some systems provide a + simple table of all users which we seek based on uid and retrieve a + relatively standard structure. Others record the same information in + a directory with a separate file, and others don't record the + information separately at all. For systems in the latter category, + we look backwards in the wtmp or wtmpx file for the last login entry + for our user. Naturally this is slower and on busy systems could + incur a significant performance penalty. + + Calling the new code + -------------------- + + In OpenSSH all login recording and retrieval is performed in + login.c. Here you'll find working examples. Also, in the logintest.c + program there are more examples. + + Internal handler calling method + ------------------------------- + + When a call is made to login_login() or login_logout(), both + routines set a struct logininfo flag defining which action (log in, + or log out) is to be taken. They both then call login_write(), which + calls whichever of the many structure-specific handlers autoconf + selects for the local system. + + The handlers themselves handle system data structure specifics. Both + struct utmp and struct utmpx have utility functions (see + construct_utmp*()) to try to make it simpler to add extra systems + that introduce new features to either structure. + + While it may seem terribly wasteful to replicate so much similar + code for each method, experience has shown that maintaining code to + write both struct utmp and utmpx in one function, whilst maintaining + support for all systems whether they have library support or not, is + a difficult and time-consuming task. + + Lastlog support proceeds similarly. Functions login_get_lastlog() + (and its OpenSSH-tuned friend login_get_lastlog_time()) call + getlast_entry(), which tries one of three methods to find the last + login time. It uses local system lastlog support if it can, + otherwise it tries wtmp or wtmpx before giving up and returning 0, + meaning "tilt". + + Maintenance + ----------- + + In many cases it's possible to tweak autoconf to select the correct + methods for a particular platform, either by improving the detection + code (best), or by presetting DISABLE_ or CONF__FILE + symbols for the platform. + + Use logintest to check which symbols are defined before modifying + configure.ac and loginrec.c. (You have to build logintest yourself + with 'make logintest' as it's not built by default.) + + Otherwise, patches to the specific method(s) are very helpful! + +*/ + +/** + ** TODO: + ** homegrown ttyslot() + ** test, test, test + ** + ** Platform status: + ** ---------------- + ** + ** Known good: + ** Linux (Redhat 6.2, Debian) + ** Solaris + ** HP-UX 10.20 (gcc only) + ** IRIX + ** NeXT - M68k/HPPA/Sparc (4.2/3.3) + ** + ** Testing required: Please send reports! + ** NetBSD + ** HP-UX 11 + ** AIX + ** + ** Platforms with known problems: + ** Some variants of Slackware Linux + ** + **/ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include "ssh.h" +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "loginrec.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "atomicio.h" + +RCSID("$Id$"); + +#ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H +# include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_LIBUTIL_H +# include +#endif + +/** + ** prototypes for helper functions in this file + **/ + +#if HAVE_UTMP_H +void set_utmp_time(struct logininfo *li, struct utmp *ut); +void construct_utmp(struct logininfo *li, struct utmp *ut); +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_UTMPX_H +void set_utmpx_time(struct logininfo *li, struct utmpx *ut); +void construct_utmpx(struct logininfo *li, struct utmpx *ut); +#endif + +int utmp_write_entry(struct logininfo *li); +int utmpx_write_entry(struct logininfo *li); +int wtmp_write_entry(struct logininfo *li); +int wtmpx_write_entry(struct logininfo *li); +int lastlog_write_entry(struct logininfo *li); +int syslogin_write_entry(struct logininfo *li); + +int getlast_entry(struct logininfo *li); +int lastlog_get_entry(struct logininfo *li); +int wtmp_get_entry(struct logininfo *li); +int wtmpx_get_entry(struct logininfo *li); + +/* pick the shortest string */ +#define MIN_SIZEOF(s1,s2) ( sizeof(s1) < sizeof(s2) ? sizeof(s1) : sizeof(s2) ) + +/** + ** platform-independent login functions + **/ + +/* login_login(struct logininfo *) -Record a login + * + * Call with a pointer to a struct logininfo initialised with + * login_init_entry() or login_alloc_entry() + * + * Returns: + * >0 if successful + * 0 on failure (will use OpenSSH's logging facilities for diagnostics) + */ +int +login_login (struct logininfo *li) +{ + li->type = LTYPE_LOGIN; + return login_write(li); +} + + +/* login_logout(struct logininfo *) - Record a logout + * + * Call as with login_login() + * + * Returns: + * >0 if successful + * 0 on failure (will use OpenSSH's logging facilities for diagnostics) + */ +int +login_logout(struct logininfo *li) +{ + li->type = LTYPE_LOGOUT; + return login_write(li); +} + +/* login_get_lastlog_time(int) - Retrieve the last login time + * + * Retrieve the last login time for the given uid. Will try to use the + * system lastlog facilities if they are available, but will fall back + * to looking in wtmp/wtmpx if necessary + * + * Returns: + * 0 on failure, or if user has never logged in + * Time in seconds from the epoch if successful + * + * Useful preprocessor symbols: + * DISABLE_LASTLOG: If set, *never* even try to retrieve lastlog + * info + * USE_LASTLOG: If set, indicates the presence of system lastlog + * facilities. If this and DISABLE_LASTLOG are not set, + * try to retrieve lastlog information from wtmp/wtmpx. + */ +unsigned int +login_get_lastlog_time(const int uid) +{ + struct logininfo li; + + if (login_get_lastlog(&li, uid)) + return li.tv_sec; + else + return 0; +} + +/* login_get_lastlog(struct logininfo *, int) - Retrieve a lastlog entry + * + * Retrieve a logininfo structure populated (only partially) with + * information from the system lastlog data, or from wtmp/wtmpx if no + * system lastlog information exists. + * + * Note this routine must be given a pre-allocated logininfo. + * + * Returns: + * >0: A pointer to your struct logininfo if successful + * 0 on failure (will use OpenSSH's logging facilities for diagnostics) + * + */ +struct logininfo * +login_get_lastlog(struct logininfo *li, const int uid) +{ + struct passwd *pw; + + memset(li, '\0', sizeof(*li)); + li->uid = uid; + + /* + * If we don't have a 'real' lastlog, we need the username to + * reliably search wtmp(x) for the last login (see + * wtmp_get_entry().) + */ + pw = getpwuid(uid); + if (pw == NULL) + fatal("login_get_lastlog: Cannot find account for uid %i", uid); + + /* No MIN_SIZEOF here - we absolutely *must not* truncate the + * username */ + strlcpy(li->username, pw->pw_name, sizeof(li->username)); + + if (getlast_entry(li)) + return li; + else + return NULL; +} + + +/* login_alloc_entry(int, char*, char*, char*) - Allocate and initialise + * a logininfo structure + * + * This function creates a new struct logininfo, a data structure + * meant to carry the information required to portably record login info. + * + * Returns a pointer to a newly created struct logininfo. If memory + * allocation fails, the program halts. + */ +struct +logininfo *login_alloc_entry(int pid, const char *username, + const char *hostname, const char *line) +{ + struct logininfo *newli; + + newli = (struct logininfo *) xmalloc (sizeof(*newli)); + (void)login_init_entry(newli, pid, username, hostname, line); + return newli; +} + + +/* login_free_entry(struct logininfo *) - free struct memory */ +void +login_free_entry(struct logininfo *li) +{ + xfree(li); +} + + +/* login_init_entry(struct logininfo *, int, char*, char*, char*) + * - initialise a struct logininfo + * + * Populates a new struct logininfo, a data structure meant to carry + * the information required to portably record login info. + * + * Returns: 1 + */ +int +login_init_entry(struct logininfo *li, int pid, const char *username, + const char *hostname, const char *line) +{ + struct passwd *pw; + + memset(li, 0, sizeof(*li)); + + li->pid = pid; + + /* set the line information */ + if (line) + line_fullname(li->line, line, sizeof(li->line)); + + if (username) { + strlcpy(li->username, username, sizeof(li->username)); + pw = getpwnam(li->username); + if (pw == NULL) + fatal("login_init_entry: Cannot find user \"%s\"", li->username); + li->uid = pw->pw_uid; + } + + if (hostname) + strlcpy(li->hostname, hostname, sizeof(li->hostname)); + + return 1; +} + +/* login_set_current_time(struct logininfo *) - set the current time + * + * Set the current time in a logininfo structure. This function is + * meant to eliminate the need to deal with system dependencies for + * time handling. + */ +void +login_set_current_time(struct logininfo *li) +{ + struct timeval tv; + + gettimeofday(&tv, NULL); + + li->tv_sec = tv.tv_sec; + li->tv_usec = tv.tv_usec; +} + +/* copy a sockaddr_* into our logininfo */ +void +login_set_addr(struct logininfo *li, const struct sockaddr *sa, + const unsigned int sa_size) +{ + unsigned int bufsize = sa_size; + + /* make sure we don't overrun our union */ + if (sizeof(li->hostaddr) < sa_size) + bufsize = sizeof(li->hostaddr); + + memcpy((void *)&(li->hostaddr.sa), (const void *)sa, bufsize); +} + + +/** + ** login_write: Call low-level recording functions based on autoconf + ** results + **/ +int +login_write (struct logininfo *li) +{ +#ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN + if ((int)geteuid() != 0) { + log("Attempt to write login records by non-root user (aborting)"); + return 1; + } +#endif + + /* set the timestamp */ + login_set_current_time(li); +#ifdef USE_LOGIN + syslogin_write_entry(li); +#endif +#ifdef USE_LASTLOG + if (li->type == LTYPE_LOGIN) { + lastlog_write_entry(li); + } +#endif +#ifdef USE_UTMP + utmp_write_entry(li); +#endif +#ifdef USE_WTMP + wtmp_write_entry(li); +#endif +#ifdef USE_UTMPX + utmpx_write_entry(li); +#endif +#ifdef USE_WTMPX + wtmpx_write_entry(li); +#endif + return 0; +} + +#ifdef LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX +int +login_utmp_only(struct logininfo *li) +{ + li->type = LTYPE_LOGIN; + login_set_current_time(li); +# ifdef USE_UTMP + utmp_write_entry(li); +# endif +# ifdef USE_WTMP + wtmp_write_entry(li); +# endif +# ifdef USE_UTMPX + utmpx_write_entry(li); +# endif +# ifdef USE_WTMPX + wtmpx_write_entry(li); +# endif + return 0; +} +#endif + +/** + ** getlast_entry: Call low-level functions to retrieve the last login + ** time. + **/ + +/* take the uid in li and return the last login time */ +int +getlast_entry(struct logininfo *li) +{ +#ifdef USE_LASTLOG + return(lastlog_get_entry(li)); +#else /* !USE_LASTLOG */ + +#ifdef DISABLE_LASTLOG + /* On some systems we shouldn't even try to obtain last login + * time, e.g. AIX */ + return 0; +# else /* DISABLE_LASTLOG */ + /* Try to retrieve the last login time from wtmp */ +# if defined(USE_WTMP) && (defined(HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMP) || defined(HAVE_TV_IN_UTMP)) + /* retrieve last login time from utmp */ + return (wtmp_get_entry(li)); +# else /* defined(USE_WTMP) && (defined(HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMP) || defined(HAVE_TV_IN_UTMP)) */ + /* If wtmp isn't available, try wtmpx */ +# if defined(USE_WTMPX) && (defined(HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMPX) || defined(HAVE_TV_IN_UTMPX)) + /* retrieve last login time from utmpx */ + return (wtmpx_get_entry(li)); +# else + /* Give up: No means of retrieving last login time */ + return 0; +# endif /* USE_WTMPX && (HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMPX || HAVE_TV_IN_UTMPX) */ +# endif /* USE_WTMP && (HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMP || HAVE_TV_IN_UTMP) */ +# endif /* DISABLE_LASTLOG */ +#endif /* USE_LASTLOG */ +} + + + +/* + * 'line' string utility functions + * + * These functions process the 'line' string into one of three forms: + * + * 1. The full filename (including '/dev') + * 2. The stripped name (excluding '/dev') + * 3. The abbreviated name (e.g. /dev/ttyp00 -> yp00 + * /dev/pts/1 -> ts/1 ) + * + * Form 3 is used on some systems to identify a .tmp.? entry when + * attempting to remove it. Typically both addition and removal is + * performed by one application - say, sshd - so as long as the choice + * uniquely identifies a terminal it's ok. + */ + + +/* line_fullname(): add the leading '/dev/' if it doesn't exist make + * sure dst has enough space, if not just copy src (ugh) */ +char * +line_fullname(char *dst, const char *src, int dstsize) +{ + memset(dst, '\0', dstsize); + if ((strncmp(src, "/dev/", 5) == 0) || (dstsize < (strlen(src) + 5))) { + strlcpy(dst, src, dstsize); + } else { + strlcpy(dst, "/dev/", dstsize); + strlcat(dst, src, dstsize); + } + return dst; +} + +/* line_stripname(): strip the leading '/dev' if it exists, return dst */ +char * +line_stripname(char *dst, const char *src, int dstsize) +{ + memset(dst, '\0', dstsize); + if (strncmp(src, "/dev/", 5) == 0) + strlcpy(dst, src + 5, dstsize); + else + strlcpy(dst, src, dstsize); + return dst; +} + +/* line_abbrevname(): Return the abbreviated (usually four-character) + * form of the line (Just use the last characters of the + * full name.) + * + * NOTE: use strncpy because we do NOT necessarily want zero + * termination */ +char * +line_abbrevname(char *dst, const char *src, int dstsize) +{ + size_t len; + + memset(dst, '\0', dstsize); + + /* Always skip prefix if present */ + if (strncmp(src, "/dev/", 5) == 0) + src += 5; + + len = strlen(src); + + if (len > 0) { + if (((int)len - dstsize) > 0) + src += ((int)len - dstsize); + + /* note: _don't_ change this to strlcpy */ + strncpy(dst, src, (size_t)dstsize); + } + + return dst; +} + +/** + ** utmp utility functions + ** + ** These functions manipulate struct utmp, taking system differences + ** into account. + **/ + +#if defined(USE_UTMP) || defined (USE_WTMP) || defined (USE_LOGIN) + +/* build the utmp structure */ +void +set_utmp_time(struct logininfo *li, struct utmp *ut) +{ +# ifdef HAVE_TV_IN_UTMP + ut->ut_tv.tv_sec = li->tv_sec; + ut->ut_tv.tv_usec = li->tv_usec; +# else +# ifdef HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMP + ut->ut_time = li->tv_sec; +# endif +# endif +} + +void +construct_utmp(struct logininfo *li, + struct utmp *ut) +{ + memset(ut, '\0', sizeof(*ut)); + + /* First fill out fields used for both logins and logouts */ + +# ifdef HAVE_ID_IN_UTMP + line_abbrevname(ut->ut_id, li->line, sizeof(ut->ut_id)); +# endif + +# ifdef HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMP + /* This is done here to keep utmp constants out of struct logininfo */ + switch (li->type) { + case LTYPE_LOGIN: + ut->ut_type = USER_PROCESS; +#ifdef _CRAY + cray_set_tmpdir(ut); +#endif + break; + case LTYPE_LOGOUT: + ut->ut_type = DEAD_PROCESS; +#ifdef _CRAY + cray_retain_utmp(ut, li->pid); +#endif + break; + } +# endif + set_utmp_time(li, ut); + + line_stripname(ut->ut_line, li->line, sizeof(ut->ut_line)); + +# ifdef HAVE_PID_IN_UTMP + ut->ut_pid = li->pid; +# endif + + /* If we're logging out, leave all other fields blank */ + if (li->type == LTYPE_LOGOUT) + return; + + /* + * These fields are only used when logging in, and are blank + * for logouts. + */ + + /* Use strncpy because we don't necessarily want null termination */ + strncpy(ut->ut_name, li->username, MIN_SIZEOF(ut->ut_name, li->username)); +# ifdef HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMP + strncpy(ut->ut_host, li->hostname, MIN_SIZEOF(ut->ut_host, li->hostname)); +# endif +# ifdef HAVE_ADDR_IN_UTMP + /* this is just a 32-bit IP address */ + if (li->hostaddr.sa.sa_family == AF_INET) + ut->ut_addr = li->hostaddr.sa_in.sin_addr.s_addr; +# endif +} +#endif /* USE_UTMP || USE_WTMP || USE_LOGIN */ + +/** + ** utmpx utility functions + ** + ** These functions manipulate struct utmpx, accounting for system + ** variations. + **/ + +#if defined(USE_UTMPX) || defined (USE_WTMPX) +/* build the utmpx structure */ +void +set_utmpx_time(struct logininfo *li, struct utmpx *utx) +{ +# ifdef HAVE_TV_IN_UTMPX + utx->ut_tv.tv_sec = li->tv_sec; + utx->ut_tv.tv_usec = li->tv_usec; +# else /* HAVE_TV_IN_UTMPX */ +# ifdef HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMPX + utx->ut_time = li->tv_sec; +# endif /* HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMPX */ +# endif /* HAVE_TV_IN_UTMPX */ +} + +void +construct_utmpx(struct logininfo *li, struct utmpx *utx) +{ + memset(utx, '\0', sizeof(*utx)); +# ifdef HAVE_ID_IN_UTMPX + line_abbrevname(utx->ut_id, li->line, sizeof(utx->ut_id)); +# endif + + /* this is done here to keep utmp constants out of loginrec.h */ + switch (li->type) { + case LTYPE_LOGIN: + utx->ut_type = USER_PROCESS; + break; + case LTYPE_LOGOUT: + utx->ut_type = DEAD_PROCESS; + break; + } + line_stripname(utx->ut_line, li->line, sizeof(utx->ut_line)); + set_utmpx_time(li, utx); + utx->ut_pid = li->pid; + + if (li->type == LTYPE_LOGOUT) + return; + + /* + * These fields are only used when logging in, and are blank + * for logouts. + */ + + /* strncpy(): Don't necessarily want null termination */ + strncpy(utx->ut_name, li->username, MIN_SIZEOF(utx->ut_name, li->username)); +# ifdef HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMPX + strncpy(utx->ut_host, li->hostname, MIN_SIZEOF(utx->ut_host, li->hostname)); +# endif +# ifdef HAVE_ADDR_IN_UTMPX + /* this is just a 32-bit IP address */ + if (li->hostaddr.sa.sa_family == AF_INET) + utx->ut_addr = li->hostaddr.sa_in.sin_addr.s_addr; +# endif +# ifdef HAVE_SYSLEN_IN_UTMPX + /* ut_syslen is the length of the utx_host string */ + utx->ut_syslen = MIN(strlen(li->hostname), sizeof(utx->ut_host)); +# endif +} +#endif /* USE_UTMPX || USE_WTMPX */ + +/** + ** Low-level utmp functions + **/ + +/* FIXME: (ATL) utmp_write_direct needs testing */ +#ifdef USE_UTMP + +/* if we can, use pututline() etc. */ +# if !defined(DISABLE_PUTUTLINE) && defined(HAVE_SETUTENT) && \ + defined(HAVE_PUTUTLINE) +# define UTMP_USE_LIBRARY +# endif + + +/* write a utmp entry with the system's help (pututline() and pals) */ +# ifdef UTMP_USE_LIBRARY +static int +utmp_write_library(struct logininfo *li, struct utmp *ut) +{ + setutent(); + pututline(ut); + +# ifdef HAVE_ENDUTENT + endutent(); +# endif + return 1; +} +# else /* UTMP_USE_LIBRARY */ + +/* write a utmp entry direct to the file */ +/* This is a slightly modification of code in OpenBSD's login.c */ +static int +utmp_write_direct(struct logininfo *li, struct utmp *ut) +{ + struct utmp old_ut; + register int fd; + int tty; + + /* FIXME: (ATL) ttyslot() needs local implementation */ + +#if defined(HAVE_GETTTYENT) + register struct ttyent *ty; + + tty=0; + + setttyent(); + while ((struct ttyent *)0 != (ty = getttyent())) { + tty++; + if (!strncmp(ty->ty_name, ut->ut_line, sizeof(ut->ut_line))) + break; + } + endttyent(); + + if((struct ttyent *)0 == ty) { + log("utmp_write_entry: tty not found"); + return(1); + } +#else /* FIXME */ + + tty = ttyslot(); /* seems only to work for /dev/ttyp? style names */ + +#endif /* HAVE_GETTTYENT */ + + if (tty > 0 && (fd = open(UTMP_FILE, O_RDWR|O_CREAT, 0644)) >= 0) { + (void)lseek(fd, (off_t)(tty * sizeof(struct utmp)), SEEK_SET); + /* + * Prevent luser from zero'ing out ut_host. + * If the new ut_line is empty but the old one is not + * and ut_line and ut_name match, preserve the old ut_line. + */ + if (atomicio(read, fd, &old_ut, sizeof(old_ut)) == sizeof(old_ut) && + (ut->ut_host[0] == '\0') && (old_ut.ut_host[0] != '\0') && + (strncmp(old_ut.ut_line, ut->ut_line, sizeof(ut->ut_line)) == 0) && + (strncmp(old_ut.ut_name, ut->ut_name, sizeof(ut->ut_name)) == 0)) { + (void)memcpy(ut->ut_host, old_ut.ut_host, sizeof(ut->ut_host)); + } + + (void)lseek(fd, (off_t)(tty * sizeof(struct utmp)), SEEK_SET); + if (atomicio(write, fd, ut, sizeof(*ut)) != sizeof(*ut)) + log("utmp_write_direct: error writing %s: %s", + UTMP_FILE, strerror(errno)); + + (void)close(fd); + return 1; + } else { + return 0; + } +} +# endif /* UTMP_USE_LIBRARY */ + +static int +utmp_perform_login(struct logininfo *li) +{ + struct utmp ut; + + construct_utmp(li, &ut); +# ifdef UTMP_USE_LIBRARY + if (!utmp_write_library(li, &ut)) { + log("utmp_perform_login: utmp_write_library() failed"); + return 0; + } +# else + if (!utmp_write_direct(li, &ut)) { + log("utmp_perform_login: utmp_write_direct() failed"); + return 0; + } +# endif + return 1; +} + + +static int +utmp_perform_logout(struct logininfo *li) +{ + struct utmp ut; + + construct_utmp(li, &ut); +# ifdef UTMP_USE_LIBRARY + if (!utmp_write_library(li, &ut)) { + log("utmp_perform_logout: utmp_write_library() failed"); + return 0; + } +# else + if (!utmp_write_direct(li, &ut)) { + log("utmp_perform_logout: utmp_write_direct() failed"); + return 0; + } +# endif + return 1; +} + + +int +utmp_write_entry(struct logininfo *li) +{ + switch(li->type) { + case LTYPE_LOGIN: + return utmp_perform_login(li); + + case LTYPE_LOGOUT: + return utmp_perform_logout(li); + + default: + log("utmp_write_entry: invalid type field"); + return 0; + } +} +#endif /* USE_UTMP */ + + +/** + ** Low-level utmpx functions + **/ + +/* not much point if we don't want utmpx entries */ +#ifdef USE_UTMPX + +/* if we have the wherewithall, use pututxline etc. */ +# if !defined(DISABLE_PUTUTXLINE) && defined(HAVE_SETUTXENT) && \ + defined(HAVE_PUTUTXLINE) +# define UTMPX_USE_LIBRARY +# endif + + +/* write a utmpx entry with the system's help (pututxline() and pals) */ +# ifdef UTMPX_USE_LIBRARY +static int +utmpx_write_library(struct logininfo *li, struct utmpx *utx) +{ + setutxent(); + pututxline(utx); + +# ifdef HAVE_ENDUTXENT + endutxent(); +# endif + return 1; +} + +# else /* UTMPX_USE_LIBRARY */ + +/* write a utmp entry direct to the file */ +static int +utmpx_write_direct(struct logininfo *li, struct utmpx *utx) +{ + log("utmpx_write_direct: not implemented!"); + return 0; +} +# endif /* UTMPX_USE_LIBRARY */ + +static int +utmpx_perform_login(struct logininfo *li) +{ + struct utmpx utx; + + construct_utmpx(li, &utx); +# ifdef UTMPX_USE_LIBRARY + if (!utmpx_write_library(li, &utx)) { + log("utmpx_perform_login: utmp_write_library() failed"); + return 0; + } +# else + if (!utmpx_write_direct(li, &ut)) { + log("utmpx_perform_login: utmp_write_direct() failed"); + return 0; + } +# endif + return 1; +} + + +static int +utmpx_perform_logout(struct logininfo *li) +{ + struct utmpx utx; + + memset(&utx, '\0', sizeof(utx)); + set_utmpx_time(li, &utx); + line_stripname(utx.ut_line, li->line, sizeof(utx.ut_line)); +# ifdef HAVE_ID_IN_UTMPX + line_abbrevname(utx.ut_id, li->line, sizeof(utx.ut_id)); +# endif +# ifdef HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMPX + utx.ut_type = DEAD_PROCESS; +# endif + +# ifdef UTMPX_USE_LIBRARY + utmpx_write_library(li, &utx); +# else + utmpx_write_direct(li, &utx); +# endif + return 1; +} + +int +utmpx_write_entry(struct logininfo *li) +{ + switch(li->type) { + case LTYPE_LOGIN: + return utmpx_perform_login(li); + case LTYPE_LOGOUT: + return utmpx_perform_logout(li); + default: + log("utmpx_write_entry: invalid type field"); + return 0; + } +} +#endif /* USE_UTMPX */ + + +/** + ** Low-level wtmp functions + **/ + +#ifdef USE_WTMP + +/* write a wtmp entry direct to the end of the file */ +/* This is a slight modification of code in OpenBSD's logwtmp.c */ +static int +wtmp_write(struct logininfo *li, struct utmp *ut) +{ + struct stat buf; + int fd, ret = 1; + + if ((fd = open(WTMP_FILE, O_WRONLY|O_APPEND, 0)) < 0) { + log("wtmp_write: problem writing %s: %s", + WTMP_FILE, strerror(errno)); + return 0; + } + if (fstat(fd, &buf) == 0) + if (atomicio(write, fd, ut, sizeof(*ut)) != sizeof(*ut)) { + ftruncate(fd, buf.st_size); + log("wtmp_write: problem writing %s: %s", + WTMP_FILE, strerror(errno)); + ret = 0; + } + (void)close(fd); + return ret; +} + +static int +wtmp_perform_login(struct logininfo *li) +{ + struct utmp ut; + + construct_utmp(li, &ut); + return wtmp_write(li, &ut); +} + + +static int +wtmp_perform_logout(struct logininfo *li) +{ + struct utmp ut; + + construct_utmp(li, &ut); + return wtmp_write(li, &ut); +} + + +int +wtmp_write_entry(struct logininfo *li) +{ + switch(li->type) { + case LTYPE_LOGIN: + return wtmp_perform_login(li); + case LTYPE_LOGOUT: + return wtmp_perform_logout(li); + default: + log("wtmp_write_entry: invalid type field"); + return 0; + } +} + + +/* Notes on fetching login data from wtmp/wtmpx + * + * Logouts are usually recorded with (amongst other things) a blank + * username on a given tty line. However, some systems (HP-UX is one) + * leave all fields set, but change the ut_type field to DEAD_PROCESS. + * + * Since we're only looking for logins here, we know that the username + * must be set correctly. On systems that leave it in, we check for + * ut_type==USER_PROCESS (indicating a login.) + * + * Portability: Some systems may set something other than USER_PROCESS + * to indicate a login process. I don't know of any as I write. Also, + * it's possible that some systems may both leave the username in + * place and not have ut_type. + */ + +/* return true if this wtmp entry indicates a login */ +static int +wtmp_islogin(struct logininfo *li, struct utmp *ut) +{ + if (strncmp(li->username, ut->ut_name, + MIN_SIZEOF(li->username, ut->ut_name)) == 0) { +# ifdef HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMP + if (ut->ut_type & USER_PROCESS) + return 1; +# else + return 1; +# endif + } + return 0; +} + +int +wtmp_get_entry(struct logininfo *li) +{ + struct stat st; + struct utmp ut; + int fd, found=0; + + /* Clear the time entries in our logininfo */ + li->tv_sec = li->tv_usec = 0; + + if ((fd = open(WTMP_FILE, O_RDONLY)) < 0) { + log("wtmp_get_entry: problem opening %s: %s", + WTMP_FILE, strerror(errno)); + return 0; + } + if (fstat(fd, &st) != 0) { + log("wtmp_get_entry: couldn't stat %s: %s", + WTMP_FILE, strerror(errno)); + close(fd); + return 0; + } + + /* Seek to the start of the last struct utmp */ + if (lseek(fd, -(off_t)sizeof(struct utmp), SEEK_END) == -1) { + /* Looks like we've got a fresh wtmp file */ + close(fd); + return 0; + } + + while (!found) { + if (atomicio(read, fd, &ut, sizeof(ut)) != sizeof(ut)) { + log("wtmp_get_entry: read of %s failed: %s", + WTMP_FILE, strerror(errno)); + close (fd); + return 0; + } + if ( wtmp_islogin(li, &ut) ) { + found = 1; + /* We've already checked for a time in struct + * utmp, in login_getlast(). */ +# ifdef HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMP + li->tv_sec = ut.ut_time; +# else +# if HAVE_TV_IN_UTMP + li->tv_sec = ut.ut_tv.tv_sec; +# endif +# endif + line_fullname(li->line, ut.ut_line, + MIN_SIZEOF(li->line, ut.ut_line)); +# ifdef HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMP + strlcpy(li->hostname, ut.ut_host, + MIN_SIZEOF(li->hostname, ut.ut_host)); +# endif + continue; + } + /* Seek back 2 x struct utmp */ + if (lseek(fd, -(off_t)(2 * sizeof(struct utmp)), SEEK_CUR) == -1) { + /* We've found the start of the file, so quit */ + close (fd); + return 0; + } + } + + /* We found an entry. Tidy up and return */ + close(fd); + return 1; +} +# endif /* USE_WTMP */ + + +/** + ** Low-level wtmpx functions + **/ + +#ifdef USE_WTMPX +/* write a wtmpx entry direct to the end of the file */ +/* This is a slight modification of code in OpenBSD's logwtmp.c */ +static int +wtmpx_write(struct logininfo *li, struct utmpx *utx) +{ + struct stat buf; + int fd, ret = 1; + + if ((fd = open(WTMPX_FILE, O_WRONLY|O_APPEND, 0)) < 0) { + log("wtmpx_write: problem opening %s: %s", + WTMPX_FILE, strerror(errno)); + return 0; + } + + if (fstat(fd, &buf) == 0) + if (atomicio(write, fd, utx, sizeof(*utx)) != sizeof(*utx)) { + ftruncate(fd, buf.st_size); + log("wtmpx_write: problem writing %s: %s", + WTMPX_FILE, strerror(errno)); + ret = 0; + } + (void)close(fd); + + return ret; +} + + +static int +wtmpx_perform_login(struct logininfo *li) +{ + struct utmpx utx; + + construct_utmpx(li, &utx); + return wtmpx_write(li, &utx); +} + + +static int +wtmpx_perform_logout(struct logininfo *li) +{ + struct utmpx utx; + + construct_utmpx(li, &utx); + return wtmpx_write(li, &utx); +} + + +int +wtmpx_write_entry(struct logininfo *li) +{ + switch(li->type) { + case LTYPE_LOGIN: + return wtmpx_perform_login(li); + case LTYPE_LOGOUT: + return wtmpx_perform_logout(li); + default: + log("wtmpx_write_entry: invalid type field"); + return 0; + } +} + +/* Please see the notes above wtmp_islogin() for information about the + next two functions */ + +/* Return true if this wtmpx entry indicates a login */ +static int +wtmpx_islogin(struct logininfo *li, struct utmpx *utx) +{ + if ( strncmp(li->username, utx->ut_name, + MIN_SIZEOF(li->username, utx->ut_name)) == 0 ) { +# ifdef HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMPX + if (utx->ut_type == USER_PROCESS) + return 1; +# else + return 1; +# endif + } + return 0; +} + + +int +wtmpx_get_entry(struct logininfo *li) +{ + struct stat st; + struct utmpx utx; + int fd, found=0; + + /* Clear the time entries */ + li->tv_sec = li->tv_usec = 0; + + if ((fd = open(WTMPX_FILE, O_RDONLY)) < 0) { + log("wtmpx_get_entry: problem opening %s: %s", + WTMPX_FILE, strerror(errno)); + return 0; + } + if (fstat(fd, &st) != 0) { + log("wtmpx_get_entry: couldn't stat %s: %s", + WTMP_FILE, strerror(errno)); + close(fd); + return 0; + } + + /* Seek to the start of the last struct utmpx */ + if (lseek(fd, -(off_t)sizeof(struct utmpx), SEEK_END) == -1 ) { + /* probably a newly rotated wtmpx file */ + close(fd); + return 0; + } + + while (!found) { + if (atomicio(read, fd, &utx, sizeof(utx)) != sizeof(utx)) { + log("wtmpx_get_entry: read of %s failed: %s", + WTMPX_FILE, strerror(errno)); + close (fd); + return 0; + } + /* Logouts are recorded as a blank username on a particular line. + * So, we just need to find the username in struct utmpx */ + if ( wtmpx_islogin(li, &utx) ) { +# ifdef HAVE_TV_IN_UTMPX + li->tv_sec = utx.ut_tv.tv_sec; +# else +# ifdef HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMPX + li->tv_sec = utx.ut_time; +# endif +# endif + line_fullname(li->line, utx.ut_line, sizeof(li->line)); +# ifdef HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMPX + strlcpy(li->hostname, utx.ut_host, + MIN_SIZEOF(li->hostname, utx.ut_host)); +# endif + continue; + } + if (lseek(fd, -(off_t)(2 * sizeof(struct utmpx)), SEEK_CUR) == -1) { + close (fd); + return 0; + } + } + + close(fd); + return 1; +} +#endif /* USE_WTMPX */ + +/** + ** Low-level libutil login() functions + **/ + +#ifdef USE_LOGIN +static int +syslogin_perform_login(struct logininfo *li) +{ + struct utmp *ut; + + if (! (ut = (struct utmp *)malloc(sizeof(*ut)))) { + log("syslogin_perform_login: couldn't malloc()"); + return 0; + } + construct_utmp(li, ut); + login(ut); + + return 1; +} + +static int +syslogin_perform_logout(struct logininfo *li) +{ +# ifdef HAVE_LOGOUT + char line[8]; + + (void)line_stripname(line, li->line, sizeof(line)); + + if (!logout(line)) { + log("syslogin_perform_logout: logout() returned an error"); +# ifdef HAVE_LOGWTMP + } else { + logwtmp(line, "", ""); +# endif + } + /* FIXME: (ATL - if the need arises) What to do if we have + * login, but no logout? what if logout but no logwtmp? All + * routines are in libutil so they should all be there, + * but... */ +# endif + return 1; +} + +int +syslogin_write_entry(struct logininfo *li) +{ + switch (li->type) { + case LTYPE_LOGIN: + return syslogin_perform_login(li); + case LTYPE_LOGOUT: + return syslogin_perform_logout(li); + default: + log("syslogin_write_entry: Invalid type field"); + return 0; + } +} +#endif /* USE_LOGIN */ + +/* end of file log-syslogin.c */ + +/** + ** Low-level lastlog functions + **/ + +#ifdef USE_LASTLOG +#define LL_FILE 1 +#define LL_DIR 2 +#define LL_OTHER 3 + +static void +lastlog_construct(struct logininfo *li, struct lastlog *last) +{ + /* clear the structure */ + memset(last, '\0', sizeof(*last)); + + (void)line_stripname(last->ll_line, li->line, sizeof(last->ll_line)); + strlcpy(last->ll_host, li->hostname, + MIN_SIZEOF(last->ll_host, li->hostname)); + last->ll_time = li->tv_sec; +} + +static int +lastlog_filetype(char *filename) +{ + struct stat st; + + if (stat(LASTLOG_FILE, &st) != 0) { + log("lastlog_perform_login: Couldn't stat %s: %s", LASTLOG_FILE, + strerror(errno)); + return 0; + } + if (S_ISDIR(st.st_mode)) + return LL_DIR; + else if (S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) + return LL_FILE; + else + return LL_OTHER; +} + + +/* open the file (using filemode) and seek to the login entry */ +static int +lastlog_openseek(struct logininfo *li, int *fd, int filemode) +{ + off_t offset; + int type; + char lastlog_file[1024]; + + type = lastlog_filetype(LASTLOG_FILE); + switch (type) { + case LL_FILE: + strlcpy(lastlog_file, LASTLOG_FILE, sizeof(lastlog_file)); + break; + case LL_DIR: + snprintf(lastlog_file, sizeof(lastlog_file), "%s/%s", + LASTLOG_FILE, li->username); + break; + default: + log("lastlog_openseek: %.100s is not a file or directory!", + LASTLOG_FILE); + return 0; + } + + *fd = open(lastlog_file, filemode); + if ( *fd < 0) { + debug("lastlog_openseek: Couldn't open %s: %s", + lastlog_file, strerror(errno)); + return 0; + } + + if (type == LL_FILE) { + /* find this uid's offset in the lastlog file */ + offset = (off_t) ((long)li->uid * sizeof(struct lastlog)); + + if ( lseek(*fd, offset, SEEK_SET) != offset ) { + log("lastlog_openseek: %s->lseek(): %s", + lastlog_file, strerror(errno)); + return 0; + } + } + + return 1; +} + +static int +lastlog_perform_login(struct logininfo *li) +{ + struct lastlog last; + int fd; + + /* create our struct lastlog */ + lastlog_construct(li, &last); + + if (!lastlog_openseek(li, &fd, O_RDWR|O_CREAT)) + return(0); + + /* write the entry */ + if (atomicio(write, fd, &last, sizeof(last)) != sizeof(last)) { + close(fd); + log("lastlog_write_filemode: Error writing to %s: %s", + LASTLOG_FILE, strerror(errno)); + return 0; + } + + close(fd); + return 1; +} + +int +lastlog_write_entry(struct logininfo *li) +{ + switch(li->type) { + case LTYPE_LOGIN: + return lastlog_perform_login(li); + default: + log("lastlog_write_entry: Invalid type field"); + return 0; + } +} + +static void +lastlog_populate_entry(struct logininfo *li, struct lastlog *last) +{ + line_fullname(li->line, last->ll_line, sizeof(li->line)); + strlcpy(li->hostname, last->ll_host, + MIN_SIZEOF(li->hostname, last->ll_host)); + li->tv_sec = last->ll_time; +} + +int +lastlog_get_entry(struct logininfo *li) +{ + struct lastlog last; + int fd; + + if (!lastlog_openseek(li, &fd, O_RDONLY)) + return 0; + + if (atomicio(read, fd, &last, sizeof(last)) != sizeof(last)) { + close(fd); + log("lastlog_get_entry: Error reading from %s: %s", + LASTLOG_FILE, strerror(errno)); + return 0; + } + + close(fd); + + lastlog_populate_entry(li, &last); + + return 1; +} +#endif /* USE_LASTLOG */ diff --git a/openssh/loginrec.h b/openssh/loginrec.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a741205 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/loginrec.h @@ -0,0 +1,140 @@ +#ifndef _HAVE_LOGINREC_H_ +#define _HAVE_LOGINREC_H_ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000 Andre Lucas. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by Markus Friedl. + * 4. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/** + ** loginrec.h: platform-independent login recording and lastlog retrieval + **/ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include +#include + +/* RCSID("$Id$"); */ + +/** + ** you should use the login_* calls to work around platform dependencies + **/ + +/* + * login_netinfo structure + */ + +union login_netinfo { + struct sockaddr sa; + struct sockaddr_in sa_in; + struct sockaddr_storage sa_storage; +}; + +/* + * * logininfo structure * + */ +/* types - different to utmp.h 'type' macros */ +/* (though set to the same value as linux, openbsd and others...) */ +#define LTYPE_LOGIN 7 +#define LTYPE_LOGOUT 8 + +/* string lengths - set very long */ +#define LINFO_PROGSIZE 64 +#define LINFO_LINESIZE 64 +#define LINFO_NAMESIZE 64 +#define LINFO_HOSTSIZE 256 + +struct logininfo { + char progname[LINFO_PROGSIZE]; /* name of program (for PAM) */ + int progname_null; + short int type; /* type of login (LTYPE_*) */ + int pid; /* PID of login process */ + int uid; /* UID of this user */ + char line[LINFO_LINESIZE]; /* tty/pty name */ + char username[LINFO_NAMESIZE]; /* login username */ + char hostname[LINFO_HOSTSIZE]; /* remote hostname */ + /* 'exit_status' structure components */ + int exit; /* process exit status */ + int termination; /* process termination status */ + /* struct timeval (sys/time.h) isn't always available, if it isn't we'll + * use time_t's value as tv_sec and set tv_usec to 0 + */ + unsigned int tv_sec; + unsigned int tv_usec; + union login_netinfo hostaddr; /* caller's host address(es) */ +}; /* struct logininfo */ + +/* + * login recording functions + */ + +/** 'public' functions */ + +/* construct a new login entry */ +struct logininfo *login_alloc_entry(int pid, const char *username, + const char *hostname, const char *line); +/* free a structure */ +void login_free_entry(struct logininfo *li); +/* fill out a pre-allocated structure with useful information */ +int login_init_entry(struct logininfo *li, int pid, const char *username, + const char *hostname, const char *line); +/* place the current time in a logininfo struct */ +void login_set_current_time(struct logininfo *li); + +/* record the entry */ +int login_login (struct logininfo *li); +int login_logout(struct logininfo *li); +#ifdef LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX +int login_utmp_only(struct logininfo *li); +#endif + +/** End of public functions */ + +/* record the entry */ +int login_write (struct logininfo *li); +int login_log_entry(struct logininfo *li); + +/* set the network address based on network address type */ +void login_set_addr(struct logininfo *li, const struct sockaddr *sa, + const unsigned int sa_size); + +/* + * lastlog retrieval functions + */ +/* lastlog *entry* functions fill out a logininfo */ +struct logininfo *login_get_lastlog(struct logininfo *li, const int uid); +/* lastlog *time* functions return time_t equivalent (uint) */ +unsigned int login_get_lastlog_time(const int uid); + +/* produce various forms of the line filename */ +char *line_fullname(char *dst, const char *src, int dstsize); +char *line_stripname(char *dst, const char *src, int dstsize); +char *line_abbrevname(char *dst, const char *src, int dstsize); + +#endif /* _HAVE_LOGINREC_H_ */ diff --git a/openssh/logintest.c b/openssh/logintest.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..aa3f5f4 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/logintest.c @@ -0,0 +1,315 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000 Andre Lucas. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by Markus Friedl. + * 4. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/** + ** logintest.c: simple test driver for platform-independent login recording + ** and lastlog retrieval + **/ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_TIME_H +#include +#endif + +#include "loginrec.h" + +RCSID("$Id$"); + +#ifdef HAVE___PROGNAME +extern char *__progname; +#else +char *__progname; +#endif + +#define PAUSE_BEFORE_LOGOUT 3 + +int nologtest = 0; +int compile_opts_only = 0; +int be_verbose = 0; + + +/* Dump a logininfo to stdout. Assumes a tab size of 8 chars. */ +void +dump_logininfo(struct logininfo *li, char *descname) +{ + /* yes I know how nasty this is */ + printf("struct logininfo %s = {\n\t" + "progname\t'%s'\n\ttype\t\t%d\n\t" + "pid\t\t%d\n\tuid\t\t%d\n\t" + "line\t\t'%s'\n\tusername\t'%s'\n\t" + "hostname\t'%s'\n\texit\t\t%d\n\ttermination\t%d\n\t" + "tv_sec\t%d\n\ttv_usec\t%d\n\t" + "struct login_netinfo hostaddr {\n\t\t" + "struct sockaddr sa {\n" + "\t\t\tfamily\t%d\n\t\t}\n" + "\t}\n" + "}\n", + descname, li->progname, li->type, + li->pid, li->uid, li->line, + li->username, li->hostname, li->exit, + li->termination, li->tv_sec, li->tv_usec, + li->hostaddr.sa.sa_family); +} + + +int +testAPI() +{ + struct logininfo *li1; + struct passwd *pw; + struct hostent *he; + struct sockaddr_in sa_in4; + char cmdstring[256], stripline[8]; + char username[32]; +#ifdef HAVE_TIME_H + time_t t0, t1, t2, logintime, logouttime; + char s_t0[64],s_t1[64],s_t2[64]; + char s_logintime[64], s_logouttime[64]; /* ctime() strings */ +#endif + + printf("**\n** Testing the API...\n**\n"); + + pw = getpwuid(getuid()); + strlcpy(username, pw->pw_name, sizeof(username)); + + /* gethostname(hostname, sizeof(hostname)); */ + + printf("login_alloc_entry test (no host info):\n"); + + /* FIXME fake tty more effectively - this could upset some platforms */ + li1 = login_alloc_entry((int)getpid(), username, NULL, ttyname(0)); + strlcpy(li1->progname, "OpenSSH-logintest", sizeof(li1->progname)); + + if (be_verbose) + dump_logininfo(li1, "li1"); + + printf("Setting host address info for 'localhost' (may call out):\n"); + if (! (he = gethostbyname("localhost"))) { + printf("Couldn't set hostname(lookup failed)\n"); + } else { + /* NOTE: this is messy, but typically a program wouldn't have to set + * any of this, a sockaddr_in* would be already prepared */ + memcpy((void *)&(sa_in4.sin_addr), (void *)&(he->h_addr_list[0][0]), + sizeof(struct in_addr)); + login_set_addr(li1, (struct sockaddr *) &sa_in4, sizeof(sa_in4)); + strlcpy(li1->hostname, "localhost", sizeof(li1->hostname)); + } + if (be_verbose) + dump_logininfo(li1, "li1"); + + if ((int)geteuid() != 0) { + printf("NOT RUNNING LOGIN TESTS - you are not root!\n"); + return 1; + } + + if (nologtest) + return 1; + + line_stripname(stripline, li1->line, sizeof(stripline)); + + printf("Performing an invalid login attempt (no type field)\n--\n"); + login_write(li1); + printf("--\n(Should have written errors to stderr)\n"); + +#ifdef HAVE_TIME_H + (void)time(&t0); + strlcpy(s_t0, ctime(&t0), sizeof(s_t0)); + t1 = login_get_lastlog_time(getuid()); + strlcpy(s_t1, ctime(&t1), sizeof(s_t1)); + printf("Before logging in:\n\tcurrent time is %d - %s\t" + "lastlog time is %d - %s\n", + (int)t0, s_t0, (int)t1, s_t1); +#endif + + printf("Performing a login on line %s ", stripline); +#ifdef HAVE_TIME_H + (void)time(&logintime); + strlcpy(s_logintime, ctime(&logintime), sizeof(s_logintime)); + printf("at %d - %s", (int)logintime, s_logintime); +#endif + printf("--\n"); + login_login(li1); + + snprintf(cmdstring, sizeof(cmdstring), "who | grep '%s '", + stripline); + system(cmdstring); + + printf("--\nPausing for %d second(s)...\n", PAUSE_BEFORE_LOGOUT); + sleep(PAUSE_BEFORE_LOGOUT); + + printf("Performing a logout "); +#ifdef HAVE_TIME_H + (void)time(&logouttime); + strlcpy(s_logouttime, ctime(&logouttime), sizeof(s_logouttime)); + printf("at %d - %s", (int)logouttime, s_logouttime); +#endif + printf("\nThe root login shown above should be gone.\n" + "If the root login hasn't gone, but another user on the same\n" + "pty has, this is OK - we're hacking it here, and there\n" + "shouldn't be two users on one pty in reality...\n" + "-- ('who' output follows)\n"); + login_logout(li1); + + system(cmdstring); + printf("-- ('who' output ends)\n"); + +#ifdef HAVE_TIME_H + t2 = login_get_lastlog_time(getuid()); + strlcpy(s_t2, ctime(&t2), sizeof(s_t2)); + printf("After logging in, lastlog time is %d - %s\n", (int)t2, s_t2); + if (t1 == t2) + printf("The lastlog times before and after logging in are the " + "same.\nThis indicates that lastlog is ** NOT WORKING " + "CORRECTLY **\n"); + else if (t0 != t2) + /* We can be off by a second or so, even when recording works fine. + * I'm not 100% sure why, but it's true. */ + printf("** The login time and the lastlog time differ.\n" + "** This indicates that lastlog is either recording the " + "wrong time,\n** or retrieving the wrong entry.\n" + "If it's off by less than %d second(s) " + "run the test again.\n", PAUSE_BEFORE_LOGOUT); + else + printf("lastlog agrees with the login time. This is a good thing.\n"); + +#endif + + printf("--\nThe output of 'last' shown next should have " + "an entry for root \n on %s for the time shown above:\n--\n", + stripline); + snprintf(cmdstring, sizeof(cmdstring), "last | grep '%s ' | head -3", + stripline); + system(cmdstring); + + printf("--\nEnd of login test.\n"); + + login_free_entry(li1); + + return 1; +} /* testAPI() */ + + +void +testLineName(char *line) +{ + /* have to null-terminate - these functions are designed for + * structures with fixed-length char arrays, and don't null-term.*/ + char full[17], strip[9], abbrev[5]; + + memset(full, '\0', sizeof(full)); + memset(strip, '\0', sizeof(strip)); + memset(abbrev, '\0', sizeof(abbrev)); + + line_fullname(full, line, sizeof(full)-1); + line_stripname(strip, full, sizeof(strip)-1); + line_abbrevname(abbrev, full, sizeof(abbrev)-1); + printf("%s: %s, %s, %s\n", line, full, strip, abbrev); + +} /* testLineName() */ + + +int +testOutput() +{ + printf("**\n** Testing linename functions\n**\n"); + testLineName("/dev/pts/1"); + testLineName("pts/1"); + testLineName("pts/999"); + testLineName("/dev/ttyp00"); + testLineName("ttyp00"); + + return 1; +} /* testOutput() */ + + +/* show which options got compiled in */ +void +showOptions(void) +{ + printf("**\n** Compile-time options\n**\n"); + + printf("login recording methods selected:\n"); +#ifdef USE_LOGIN + printf("\tUSE_LOGIN\n"); +#endif +#ifdef USE_UTMP + printf("\tUSE_UTMP (UTMP_FILE=%s)\n", UTMP_FILE); +#endif +#ifdef USE_UTMPX + printf("\tUSE_UTMPX (UTMPX_FILE=%s)\n", UTMPX_FILE); +#endif +#ifdef USE_WTMP + printf("\tUSE_WTMP (WTMP_FILE=%s)\n", WTMP_FILE); +#endif +#ifdef USE_WTMPX + printf("\tUSE_WTMPX (WTMPX_FILE=%s)\n", WTMPX_FILE); +#endif +#ifdef USE_LASTLOG + printf("\tUSE_LASTLOG (LASTLOG_FILE=%s)\n", LASTLOG_FILE); +#endif + printf("\n"); + +} /* showOptions() */ + + +int +main(int argc, char *argv[]) +{ + printf("Platform-independent login recording test driver\n"); + + __progname = get_progname(argv[0]); + if (argc == 2) { + if (strncmp(argv[1], "-i", 3) == 0) + compile_opts_only = 1; + else if (strncmp(argv[1], "-v", 3) == 0) + be_verbose=1; + } + + if (!compile_opts_only) { + if (be_verbose && !testOutput()) + return 1; + + if (!testAPI()) + return 1; + } + + showOptions(); + + return 0; +} /* main() */ + diff --git a/openssh/mac.c b/openssh/mac.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e8b4267 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/mac.c @@ -0,0 +1,114 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" +RCSID("$OpenBSD: mac.c,v 1.2 2001/04/05 10:42:51 markus Exp $"); + +#include + +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "getput.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "cipher.h" +#include "kex.h" +#include "mac.h" + +struct { + char *name; + EVP_MD * (*mdfunc)(void); + int truncatebits; /* truncate digest if != 0 */ +} macs[] = { + { "hmac-sha1", EVP_sha1, 0, }, + { "hmac-sha1-96", EVP_sha1, 96 }, + { "hmac-md5", EVP_md5, 0 }, + { "hmac-md5-96", EVP_md5, 96 }, + { "hmac-ripemd160", EVP_ripemd160, 0 }, + { "hmac-ripemd160@openssh.com", EVP_ripemd160, 0 }, + { NULL, NULL, 0 } +}; + +int +mac_init(Mac *mac, char *name) +{ + int i; + for (i = 0; macs[i].name; i++) { + if (strcmp(name, macs[i].name) == 0) { + if (mac != NULL) { + mac->md = (*macs[i].mdfunc)(); + mac->key_len = mac->mac_len = mac->md->md_size; + if (macs[i].truncatebits != 0) + mac->mac_len = macs[i].truncatebits/8; + } + debug2("mac_init: found %s", name); + return (0); + } + } + debug2("mac_init: unknown %s", name); + return (-1); +} + +u_char * +mac_compute(Mac *mac, u_int32_t seqno, u_char *data, int datalen) +{ + HMAC_CTX c; + static u_char m[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; + u_char b[4]; + + if (mac->key == NULL) + fatal("mac_compute: no key"); + if (mac->mac_len > sizeof(m)) + fatal("mac_compute: mac too long"); + HMAC_Init(&c, mac->key, mac->key_len, mac->md); + PUT_32BIT(b, seqno); + HMAC_Update(&c, b, sizeof(b)); + HMAC_Update(&c, data, datalen); + HMAC_Final(&c, m, NULL); + HMAC_cleanup(&c); + return (m); +} + +/* XXX copied from ciphers_valid */ +#define MAC_SEP "," +int +mac_valid(const char *names) +{ + char *maclist, *cp, *p; + + if (names == NULL || strcmp(names, "") == 0) + return (0); + maclist = cp = xstrdup(names); + for ((p = strsep(&cp, MAC_SEP)); p && *p != '\0'; + (p = strsep(&cp, MAC_SEP))) { + if (mac_init(NULL, p) < 0) { + debug("bad mac %s [%s]", p, names); + xfree(maclist); + return (0); + } else { + debug3("mac ok: %s [%s]", p, names); + } + } + debug3("macs ok: [%s]", names); + xfree(maclist); + return (1); +} diff --git a/openssh/mac.h b/openssh/mac.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..43b485d --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/mac.h @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: mac.h,v 1.3 2001/06/26 17:27:24 markus Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +int mac_valid(const char *); +int mac_init(Mac *, char *); +u_char *mac_compute(Mac *, u_int32_t, u_char *, int); diff --git a/openssh/match.c b/openssh/match.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..188b9a4 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/match.c @@ -0,0 +1,255 @@ +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * Simple pattern matching, with '*' and '?' as wildcards. + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" +RCSID("$OpenBSD: match.c,v 1.14 2001/06/27 04:48:53 markus Exp $"); + +#include "match.h" +#include "xmalloc.h" + +/* + * Returns true if the given string matches the pattern (which may contain ? + * and * as wildcards), and zero if it does not match. + */ + +int +match_pattern(const char *s, const char *pattern) +{ + for (;;) { + /* If at end of pattern, accept if also at end of string. */ + if (!*pattern) + return !*s; + + if (*pattern == '*') { + /* Skip the asterisk. */ + pattern++; + + /* If at end of pattern, accept immediately. */ + if (!*pattern) + return 1; + + /* If next character in pattern is known, optimize. */ + if (*pattern != '?' && *pattern != '*') { + /* + * Look instances of the next character in + * pattern, and try to match starting from + * those. + */ + for (; *s; s++) + if (*s == *pattern && + match_pattern(s + 1, pattern + 1)) + return 1; + /* Failed. */ + return 0; + } + /* + * Move ahead one character at a time and try to + * match at each position. + */ + for (; *s; s++) + if (match_pattern(s, pattern)) + return 1; + /* Failed. */ + return 0; + } + /* + * There must be at least one more character in the string. + * If we are at the end, fail. + */ + if (!*s) + return 0; + + /* Check if the next character of the string is acceptable. */ + if (*pattern != '?' && *pattern != *s) + return 0; + + /* Move to the next character, both in string and in pattern. */ + s++; + pattern++; + } + /* NOTREACHED */ +} + +/* + * Tries to match the host name (which must be in all lowercase) against the + * comma-separated sequence of subpatterns (each possibly preceded by ! to + * indicate negation). Returns -1 if negation matches, 1 if there is + * a positive match, 0 if there is no match at all. + */ + +int +match_hostname(const char *host, const char *pattern, u_int len) +{ + char sub[1024]; + int negated; + int got_positive; + u_int i, subi; + + got_positive = 0; + for (i = 0; i < len;) { + /* Check if the subpattern is negated. */ + if (pattern[i] == '!') { + negated = 1; + i++; + } else + negated = 0; + + /* + * Extract the subpattern up to a comma or end. Convert the + * subpattern to lowercase. + */ + for (subi = 0; + i < len && subi < sizeof(sub) - 1 && pattern[i] != ','; + subi++, i++) + sub[subi] = isupper(pattern[i]) ? tolower(pattern[i]) : pattern[i]; + /* If subpattern too long, return failure (no match). */ + if (subi >= sizeof(sub) - 1) + return 0; + + /* If the subpattern was terminated by a comma, skip the comma. */ + if (i < len && pattern[i] == ',') + i++; + + /* Null-terminate the subpattern. */ + sub[subi] = '\0'; + + /* Try to match the subpattern against the host name. */ + if (match_pattern(host, sub)) { + if (negated) + return -1; /* Negative */ + else + got_positive = 1; /* Positive */ + } + } + + /* + * Return success if got a positive match. If there was a negative + * match, we have already returned -1 and never get here. + */ + return got_positive; +} + +/* + * returns 0 if we get a negative match for the hostname or the ip + * or if we get no match at all. returns 1 otherwise. + */ +int +match_host_and_ip(const char *host, const char *ipaddr, + const char *patterns) +{ + int mhost, mip; + + /* negative ipaddr match */ + if ((mip = match_hostname(ipaddr, patterns, strlen(patterns))) == -1) + return 0; + /* negative hostname match */ + if ((mhost = match_hostname(host, patterns, strlen(patterns))) == -1) + return 0; + /* no match at all */ + if (mhost == 0 && mip == 0) + return 0; + return 1; +} + +/* + * match user, user@host_or_ip, user@host_or_ip_list against pattern + */ +int +match_user(const char *user, const char *host, const char *ipaddr, + const char *pattern) +{ + char *p, *pat; + int ret; + + if ((p = strchr(pattern,'@')) == NULL) + return match_pattern(user, pattern); + + pat = xstrdup(pattern); + p = strchr(pat, '@'); + *p++ = '\0'; + + if ((ret = match_pattern(user, pat)) == 1) + ret = match_host_and_ip(host, ipaddr, p); + xfree(pat); + + return ret; +} + +/* + * Returns first item from client-list that is also supported by server-list, + * caller must xfree() returned string. + */ +#define MAX_PROP 20 +#define SEP "," +char * +match_list(const char *client, const char *server, u_int *next) +{ + char *sproposals[MAX_PROP]; + char *c, *s, *p, *ret, *cp, *sp; + int i, j, nproposals; + + c = cp = xstrdup(client); + s = sp = xstrdup(server); + + for ((p = strsep(&sp, SEP)), i=0; p && *p != '\0'; + (p = strsep(&sp, SEP)), i++) { + if (i < MAX_PROP) + sproposals[i] = p; + else + break; + } + nproposals = i; + + for ((p = strsep(&cp, SEP)), i=0; p && *p != '\0'; + (p = strsep(&cp, SEP)), i++) { + for (j = 0; j < nproposals; j++) { + if (strcmp(p, sproposals[j]) == 0) { + ret = xstrdup(p); + if (next != NULL) + *next = (cp == NULL) ? + strlen(c) : cp - c; + xfree(c); + xfree(s); + return ret; + } + } + } + if (next != NULL) + *next = strlen(c); + xfree(c); + xfree(s); + return NULL; +} diff --git a/openssh/match.h b/openssh/match.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f05fe9b --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/match.h @@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: match.h,v 1.9 2001/06/26 06:32:56 itojun Exp $ */ + +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + */ +#ifndef MATCH_H +#define MATCH_H + +int match_pattern(const char *, const char *); +int match_hostname(const char *, const char *, u_int); +int match_host_and_ip(const char *, const char *, const char *); +int match_user(const char *, const char *, const char *, const char *); +char *match_list(const char *, const char *, u_int *); + +#endif diff --git a/openssh/md5crypt.c b/openssh/md5crypt.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c1479d2 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/md5crypt.c @@ -0,0 +1,159 @@ +/* + * ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- + * "THE BEER-WARE LICENSE" (Revision 42): + * wrote this file. As long as you retain this notice you + * can do whatever you want with this stuff. If we meet some day, and you think + * this stuff is worth it, you can buy me a beer in return. Poul-Henning Kamp + * ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- + */ + +/* + * Ported from FreeBSD to Linux, only minimal changes. --marekm + */ + +/* + * Adapted from shadow-19990607 by Tudor Bosman, tudorb@jm.nu + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +RCSID("$Id$"); + +#if defined(HAVE_MD5_PASSWORDS) && !defined(HAVE_MD5_CRYPT) + +#include + +static unsigned char itoa64[] = /* 0 ... 63 => ascii - 64 */ + "./0123456789ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz"; + +static char *magic = "$1$"; /* + * This string is magic for + * this algorithm. Having + * it this way, we can get + * get better later on + */ + +static void +to64(char *s, unsigned long v, int n) +{ + while (--n >= 0) { + *s++ = itoa64[v&0x3f]; + v >>= 6; + } +} + +int +is_md5_salt(const char *salt) +{ + return (!strncmp(salt, magic, strlen(magic))); +} + +/* + * UNIX password + * + * Use MD5 for what it is best at... + */ + +char * +md5_crypt(const char *pw, const char *salt) +{ + static char passwd[120], *p; + static const char *sp,*ep; + unsigned char final[16]; + int sl,pl,i,j; + MD5_CTX ctx,ctx1; + unsigned long l; + + /* Refine the Salt first */ + sp = salt; + + /* If it starts with the magic string, then skip that */ + if(!strncmp(sp,magic,strlen(magic))) + sp += strlen(magic); + + /* It stops at the first '$', max 8 chars */ + for(ep=sp;*ep && *ep != '$' && ep < (sp+8);ep++) + continue; + + /* get the length of the true salt */ + sl = ep - sp; + + MD5_Init(&ctx); + + /* The password first, since that is what is most unknown */ + MD5_Update(&ctx,pw,strlen(pw)); + + /* Then our magic string */ + MD5_Update(&ctx,magic,strlen(magic)); + + /* Then the raw salt */ + MD5_Update(&ctx,sp,sl); + + /* Then just as many characters of the MD5(pw,salt,pw) */ + MD5_Init(&ctx1); + MD5_Update(&ctx1,pw,strlen(pw)); + MD5_Update(&ctx1,sp,sl); + MD5_Update(&ctx1,pw,strlen(pw)); + MD5_Final(final,&ctx1); + for(pl = strlen(pw); pl > 0; pl -= 16) + MD5_Update(&ctx,final,pl>16 ? 16 : pl); + + /* Don't leave anything around in vm they could use. */ + memset(final,0,sizeof final); + + /* Then something really weird... */ + for (j=0,i = strlen(pw); i ; i >>= 1) + if(i&1) + MD5_Update(&ctx, final+j, 1); + else + MD5_Update(&ctx, pw+j, 1); + + /* Now make the output string */ + strcpy(passwd,magic); + strncat(passwd,sp,sl); + strcat(passwd,"$"); + + MD5_Final(final,&ctx); + + /* + * and now, just to make sure things don't run too fast + * On a 60 Mhz Pentium this takes 34 msec, so you would + * need 30 seconds to build a 1000 entry dictionary... + */ + for(i=0;i<1000;i++) { + MD5_Init(&ctx1); + if(i & 1) + MD5_Update(&ctx1,pw,strlen(pw)); + else + MD5_Update(&ctx1,final,16); + + if(i % 3) + MD5_Update(&ctx1,sp,sl); + + if(i % 7) + MD5_Update(&ctx1,pw,strlen(pw)); + + if(i & 1) + MD5_Update(&ctx1,final,16); + else + MD5_Update(&ctx1,pw,strlen(pw)); + MD5_Final(final,&ctx1); + } + + p = passwd + strlen(passwd); + + l = (final[ 0]<<16) | (final[ 6]<<8) | final[12]; to64(p,l,4); p += 4; + l = (final[ 1]<<16) | (final[ 7]<<8) | final[13]; to64(p,l,4); p += 4; + l = (final[ 2]<<16) | (final[ 8]<<8) | final[14]; to64(p,l,4); p += 4; + l = (final[ 3]<<16) | (final[ 9]<<8) | final[15]; to64(p,l,4); p += 4; + l = (final[ 4]<<16) | (final[10]<<8) | final[ 5]; to64(p,l,4); p += 4; + l = final[11] ; to64(p,l,2); p += 2; + *p = '\0'; + + /* Don't leave anything around in vm they could use. */ + memset(final,0,sizeof final); + + return passwd; +} + +#endif /* defined(HAVE_MD5_PASSWORDS) && !defined(HAVE_MD5_CRYPT) */ diff --git a/openssh/md5crypt.h b/openssh/md5crypt.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a134ed0 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/md5crypt.h @@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ +/* + * ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- + * "THE BEER-WARE LICENSE" (Revision 42): + * wrote this file. As long as you retain this notice you + * can do whatever you want with this stuff. If we meet some day, and you think + * this stuff is worth it, you can buy me a beer in return. Poul-Henning Kamp + * ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- + */ + +/* + * Ported from FreeBSD to Linux, only minimal changes. --marekm + */ + +/* + * Adapted from shadow-19990607 by Tudor Bosman, tudorb@jm.nu + */ + +/* $Id$ */ + +#ifndef _MD5CRYPT_H +#define _MD5CRYPT_H + +#include "config.h" + +#if defined(HAVE_MD5_PASSWORDS) && !defined(HAVE_MD5_CRYPT) + +int is_md5_salt(const char *salt); +char *md5_crypt(const char *pw, const char *salt); + +#endif /* defined(HAVE_MD5_PASSWORDS) && !defined(HAVE_MD5_CRYPT) */ + +#endif /* MD5CRYPT_H */ diff --git a/openssh/mdoc2man.pl b/openssh/mdoc2man.pl new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fddb2e0 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/mdoc2man.pl @@ -0,0 +1,590 @@ +#!/usr/bin/perl +### +### Quick usage: mdoc2man.pl < mdoc_manpage.8 > man_manpage.8 +### +### +### Copyright (c) 2001 University of Illinois Board of Trustees +### Copyright (c) 2001 Mark D. Roth +### All rights reserved. +### +### Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +### modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +### are met: +### 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright +### notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +### 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +### notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +### documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +### 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software +### must display the following acknowledgement: +### This product includes software developed by the University of +### Illinois at Urbana, and their contributors. +### 4. The University nor the names of their +### contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived from +### this software without specific prior written permission. +### +### THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE TRUSTEES AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND +### ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE +### IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE +### ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE TRUSTEES OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE +### FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL +### DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS +### OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) +### HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT +### LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY +### OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF +### SUCH DAMAGE. +### + +use strict; + +my ($name, $date, $id); +my ($line); +my ($optlist, $oldoptlist, $nospace, $enum, $synopsis); +my ($reference, $block, $ext, $extopt, $literal); +my (@refauthors, $reftitle, $refissue, $refdate, $refopt); + + +$optlist = 0; ### 1 = bullet, 2 = enum, 3 = tag, 4 = item +$oldoptlist = 0; +$nospace = 0; +$synopsis = 0; +$reference = 0; +$block = 0; +$ext = 0; +$extopt = 0; +$literal = 0; + +while ($line = ) +{ + if ($line !~ /^\./) + { + print $line; + print ".br\n" + if ($literal); + next; + } + + $line =~ s/^\.//; + + next + if ($line =~ m/\\"/); + + $line = ParseMacro($line); + print($line) + if (defined $line); +} + + + +sub ParseMacro # ($line) +{ + my ($line) = @_; + my (@words, $retval, $option, $parens); + + @words = split(/\s+/, $line); + $retval = ''; + $option = 0; + $parens = 0; + +# print('@words = ', scalar(@words), ': ', join(' ', @words), "\n"); + + while ($_ = shift @words) + { +# print "WORD: $_\n"; + + next + if (/^(Li|Pf)$/); + + if (/^Xo$/) + { + $ext = 1; + $retval .= ' ' + if ($retval ne '' && $retval !~ m/[\n ]$/); + next; + } + + if (/^Xc$/) + { + $ext = 0; + $retval .= "\n" + if (! $extopt); + last; + } + + if (/^Bd$/) + { + $literal = 1 + if ($words[0] eq '-literal'); + $retval .= "\n"; + last; + } + + if (/^Ed$/) + { + $literal = 0; + last; + } + + if (/^Ns$/) + { + $nospace = 1 + if (! $nospace); + $retval =~ s/ $//; + next; + } + + if (/^No$/) + { + $retval =~ s/ $//; + $retval .= shift @words; + next; + } + + if (/^Dq$/) + { + $retval .= '``'; + do + { + $retval .= (shift @words) . ' '; + } + while (@words > 0 && $words[0] !~ m/^[\.,]/); + $retval =~ s/ $//; + $retval .= '\'\''; + $nospace = 1 + if (! $nospace && $words[0] =~ m/^[\.,]/); + next; + } + + if (/^(Sq|Ql)$/) + { + $retval .= '`' . (shift @words) . '\''; + $nospace = 1 + if (! $nospace && $words[0] =~ m/^[\.,]/); + next; + } + +# if (/^Ic$/) +# { +# $retval .= '\\fB' . shift(@words) . '\\fP'; +# next; +# } + + if (/^Oo$/) + { +# $retval .= "[\\c\n"; + $extopt = 1; + $nospace = 1 + if (! $nospace); + $retval .= '['; + next; + } + + if (/^Oc$/) + { + $extopt = 0; + $retval .= ']'; + next; + } + + $retval .= ' ' + if (! $nospace && $retval ne '' && $retval !~ m/[\n ]$/); + $nospace = 0 + if ($nospace == 1); + + if (/^Dd$/) + { + $date = join(' ', @words); + return undef; + } + + if (/^Dt$/) + { + $id = join(' ', @words); + return undef; + } + + if (/^Os$/) + { + $retval .= '.TH ' + . $id + . " \"$date\" \"" + . join(' ', @words) + . "\""; + last; + } + + if (/^Sh$/) + { + $retval .= '.SH'; + if ($words[0] eq 'SYNOPSIS') + { + $synopsis = 1; + } + else + { + $synopsis = 0; + } + next; + } + + if (/^Xr$/) + { + $retval .= '\\fB' . (shift @words) . + '\\fP(' . (shift @words) . ')' + . (shift @words); + last; + } + + if (/^Rs/) + { + @refauthors = (); + $reftitle = ''; + $refissue = ''; + $refdate = ''; + $refopt = ''; + $reference = 1; + last; + } + + if (/^Re/) + { + $retval .= "\n"; + + # authors + while (scalar(@refauthors) > 1) + { + $retval .= shift(@refauthors) . ', '; + } + $retval .= 'and ' + if ($retval ne ''); + $retval .= shift(@refauthors); + + # title + $retval .= ', \\fI' . $reftitle . '\\fP'; + + # issue + $retval .= ', ' . $refissue + if ($refissue ne ''); + + # date + $retval .= ', ' . $refdate + if ($refdate ne ''); + + # optional info + $retval .= ', ' . $refopt + if ($refopt ne ''); + + $retval .= ".\n"; + + $reference = 0; + last; + } + + if ($reference) + { + if (/^%A$/) + { + unshift(@refauthors, join(' ', @words)); + last; + } + + if (/^%T$/) + { + $reftitle = join(' ', @words); + $reftitle =~ s/^"//; + $reftitle =~ s/"$//; + last; + } + + if (/^%N$/) + { + $refissue = join(' ', @words); + last; + } + + if (/^%D$/) + { + $refdate = join(' ', @words); + last; + } + + if (/^%O$/) + { + $refopt = join(' ', @words); + last; + } + } + + if (/^Nm$/) + { + $name = shift @words + if (@words > 0); + $retval .= ".br\n" + if ($synopsis); + $retval .= "\\fB$name\\fP"; + $nospace = 1 + if (! $nospace && $words[0] =~ m/^[\.,]/); + next; + } + + if (/^Nd$/) + { + $retval .= '\\-'; + next; + } + + if (/^Fl$/) + { + $retval .= '\\fB\\-' . (shift @words) . '\\fP'; + $nospace = 1 + if (! $nospace && $words[0] =~ m/^[\.,]/); + next; + } + + if (/^Ar$/) + { + $retval .= '\\fI'; + if (! defined $words[0]) + { + $retval .= 'file ...\\fP'; + } + else + { + $retval .= shift(@words) . '\\fP'; + while ($words[0] eq '|') + { + $retval .= ' ' . shift(@words); + $retval .= ' \\fI' . shift(@words); + $retval .= '\\fP'; + } + } + $nospace = 1 + if (! $nospace && $words[0] =~ m/^[\.,]/); + next; + } + + if (/^Cm$/) + { + $retval .= '\\fB' . (shift @words) . '\\fP'; + while ($words[0] =~ m/^[\.,:)]$/) + { + $retval .= shift(@words); + } + next; + } + + if (/^Op$/) + { + $option = 1; + $nospace = 1 + if (! $nospace); + $retval .= '['; +# my $tmp = pop(@words); +# $tmp .= ']'; +# push(@words, $tmp); + next; + } + + if (/^Pp$/) + { + $retval .= "\n"; + next; + } + + if (/^Ss$/) + { + $retval .= '.SS'; + next; + } + + if (/^Pa$/ && ! $option) + { + $retval .= '\\fI'; + $retval .= '\\&' + if ($words[0] =~ m/^\./); + $retval .= (shift @words) . '\\fP'; + while ($words[0] =~ m/^[\.,:;)]$/) + { + $retval .= shift(@words); + } +# $nospace = 1 +# if (! $nospace && $words[0] =~ m/^[\.,:)]/); + next; + } + + if (/^Dv$/) + { + $retval .= '.BR'; + next; + } + + if (/^(Em|Ev)$/) + { + $retval .= '.IR'; + next; + } + + if (/^Pq$/) + { + $retval .= '('; + $nospace = 1; + $parens = 1; + next; + } + + if (/^(S[xy])$/) + { + $retval .= '.B ' . join(' ', @words); + last; + } + + if (/^Ic$/) + { + $retval .= '\\fB'; + while (defined $words[0] + && $words[0] !~ m/^[\.,]/) + { + if ($words[0] eq 'Op') + { + shift(@words); + $retval .= '['; + my $tmp = pop(@words); + $tmp .= ']'; + push(@words, $tmp); + next; + } + if ($words[0] eq 'Ar') + { + shift @words; + $retval .= '\\fI'; + $retval .= shift @words; + $retval .= '\\fP'; + } + else + { + $retval .= shift @words; + } + $retval .= ' ' + if (! $nospace); + } + $retval =~ s/ $//; + $retval .= '\\fP'; + $retval .= shift @words + if (defined $words[0]); + last; + } + + if (/^Bl$/) + { + $oldoptlist = $optlist; + if ($words[0] eq '-bullet') + { + $optlist = 1; + } + elsif ($words[0] eq '-enum') + { + $optlist = 2; + $enum = 0; + } + elsif ($words[0] eq '-tag') + { + $optlist = 3; + } + elsif ($words[0] eq '-item') + { + $optlist = 4; + } + last; + } + + if (/^El$/) + { + $optlist = $oldoptlist; + next; + } + + if ($optlist && /^It$/) + { + if ($optlist == 1) + { + # bullets + $retval .= '.IP \\(bu'; + next; + } + + if ($optlist == 2) + { + # enum + $retval .= '.IP ' . (++$enum) . '.'; + next; + } + + if ($optlist == 3) + { + # tags + $retval .= ".TP\n"; + if ($words[0] =~ m/^(Pa|Ev)$/) + { + shift @words; + $retval .= '.B'; + } + next; + } + + if ($optlist == 4) + { + # item + $retval .= ".IP\n"; + next; + } + + next; + } + + if (/^Sm$/) + { + if ($words[0] eq 'off') + { + $nospace = 2; + } + elsif ($words[0] eq 'on') + { +# $retval .= "\n"; + $nospace = 0; + } + shift @words; + next; + } + + $retval .= "$_"; + } + + return undef + if ($retval eq '.'); + + $retval =~ s/^\.([^a-zA-Z])/$1/; +# $retval =~ s/ $//; + + $retval .= ')' + if ($parens == 1); + + $retval .= ']' + if ($option == 1); + +# $retval .= ' ' +# if ($nospace && $retval ne '' && $retval !~ m/\n$/); + +# $retval .= ' ' +# if ($extended && $retval !~ m/ $/); + + $retval .= ' ' + if ($ext && ! $extopt && $retval !~ m/ $/); + + $retval .= "\n" + if (! $ext && ! $extopt && $retval ne '' && $retval !~ m/\n$/); + + return $retval; +} + + diff --git a/openssh/misc.c b/openssh/misc.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..620121f --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/misc.c @@ -0,0 +1,333 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: misc.c,v 1.12 2001/06/26 17:27:24 markus Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" +RCSID("$OpenBSD: misc.c,v 1.12 2001/06/26 17:27:24 markus Exp $"); + +#include "misc.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "xmalloc.h" + +/* remove newline at end of string */ +char * +chop(char *s) +{ + char *t = s; + while (*t) { + if(*t == '\n' || *t == '\r') { + *t = '\0'; + return s; + } + t++; + } + return s; + +} + +/* set/unset filedescriptor to non-blocking */ +void +set_nonblock(int fd) +{ + int val; + + val = fcntl(fd, F_GETFL, 0); + if (val < 0) { + error("fcntl(%d, F_GETFL, 0): %s", fd, strerror(errno)); + return; + } + if (val & O_NONBLOCK) { + debug2("fd %d is O_NONBLOCK", fd); + return; + } + debug("fd %d setting O_NONBLOCK", fd); + val |= O_NONBLOCK; + if (fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, val) == -1) + if (errno != ENODEV) + error("fcntl(%d, F_SETFL, O_NONBLOCK): %s", + fd, strerror(errno)); +} + +void +unset_nonblock(int fd) +{ + int val; + + val = fcntl(fd, F_GETFL, 0); + if (val < 0) { + error("fcntl(%d, F_GETFL, 0): %s", fd, strerror(errno)); + return; + } + if (!(val & O_NONBLOCK)) { + debug2("fd %d is not O_NONBLOCK", fd); + return; + } + debug("fd %d clearing O_NONBLOCK", fd); + val &= ~O_NONBLOCK; + if (fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, val) == -1) + if (errno != ENODEV) + error("fcntl(%d, F_SETFL, O_NONBLOCK): %s", + fd, strerror(errno)); +} + +/* Characters considered whitespace in strsep calls. */ +#define WHITESPACE " \t\r\n" + +/* return next token in configuration line */ +char * +strdelim(char **s) +{ + char *old; + int wspace = 0; + + if (*s == NULL) + return NULL; + + old = *s; + + *s = strpbrk(*s, WHITESPACE "="); + if (*s == NULL) + return (old); + + /* Allow only one '=' to be skipped */ + if (*s[0] == '=') + wspace = 1; + *s[0] = '\0'; + + *s += strspn(*s + 1, WHITESPACE) + 1; + if (*s[0] == '=' && !wspace) + *s += strspn(*s + 1, WHITESPACE) + 1; + + return (old); +} + +struct passwd * +pwcopy(struct passwd *pw) +{ + struct passwd *copy = xmalloc(sizeof(*copy)); + + memset(copy, 0, sizeof(*copy)); + copy->pw_name = xstrdup(pw->pw_name); + copy->pw_passwd = xstrdup(pw->pw_passwd); + copy->pw_gecos = xstrdup(pw->pw_gecos); + copy->pw_uid = pw->pw_uid; + copy->pw_gid = pw->pw_gid; +#ifdef HAVE_PW_EXPIRE_IN_PASSWD + copy->pw_expire = pw->pw_expire; +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_PW_CHANGE_IN_PASSWD + copy->pw_change = pw->pw_change; +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_PW_CLASS_IN_PASSWD + copy->pw_class = xstrdup(pw->pw_class); +#endif + copy->pw_dir = xstrdup(pw->pw_dir); + copy->pw_shell = xstrdup(pw->pw_shell); + return copy; +} + +/* + * Convert ASCII string to TCP/IP port number. + * Port must be >0 and <=65535. + * Return 0 if invalid. + */ +int +a2port(const char *s) +{ + long port; + char *endp; + + errno = 0; + port = strtol(s, &endp, 0); + if (s == endp || *endp != '\0' || + (errno == ERANGE && (port == LONG_MIN || port == LONG_MAX)) || + port <= 0 || port > 65535) + return 0; + + return port; +} + +#define SECONDS 1 +#define MINUTES (SECONDS * 60) +#define HOURS (MINUTES * 60) +#define DAYS (HOURS * 24) +#define WEEKS (DAYS * 7) + +/* + * Convert a time string into seconds; format is + * a sequence of: + * time[qualifier] + * + * Valid time qualifiers are: + * seconds + * s|S seconds + * m|M minutes + * h|H hours + * d|D days + * w|W weeks + * + * Examples: + * 90m 90 minutes + * 1h30m 90 minutes + * 2d 2 days + * 1w 1 week + * + * Return -1 if time string is invalid. + */ +long +convtime(const char *s) +{ + long total, secs; + const char *p; + char *endp; + + errno = 0; + total = 0; + p = s; + + if (p == NULL || *p == '\0') + return -1; + + while (*p) { + secs = strtol(p, &endp, 10); + if (p == endp || + (errno == ERANGE && (secs == LONG_MIN || secs == LONG_MAX)) || + secs < 0) + return -1; + + switch (*endp++) { + case '\0': + endp--; + case 's': + case 'S': + break; + case 'm': + case 'M': + secs *= MINUTES; + break; + case 'h': + case 'H': + secs *= HOURS; + break; + case 'd': + case 'D': + secs *= DAYS; + break; + case 'w': + case 'W': + secs *= WEEKS; + break; + default: + return -1; + } + total += secs; + if (total < 0) + return -1; + p = endp; + } + + return total; +} + +char * +cleanhostname(char *host) +{ + if (*host == '[' && host[strlen(host) - 1] == ']') { + host[strlen(host) - 1] = '\0'; + return (host + 1); + } else + return host; +} + +char * +colon(char *cp) +{ + int flag = 0; + + if (*cp == ':') /* Leading colon is part of file name. */ + return (0); + if (*cp == '[') + flag = 1; + + for (; *cp; ++cp) { + if (*cp == '@' && *(cp+1) == '[') + flag = 1; + if (*cp == ']' && *(cp+1) == ':' && flag) + return (cp+1); + if (*cp == ':' && !flag) + return (cp); + if (*cp == '/') + return (0); + } + return (0); +} + +/* function to assist building execv() arguments */ +void +addargs(arglist *args, char *fmt, ...) +{ + va_list ap; + char buf[1024]; + + va_start(ap, fmt); + vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, ap); + va_end(ap); + + if (args->list == NULL) { + args->nalloc = 32; + args->num = 0; + } else if (args->num+2 >= args->nalloc) + args->nalloc *= 2; + + args->list = xrealloc(args->list, args->nalloc * sizeof(char *)); + args->list[args->num++] = xstrdup(buf); + args->list[args->num] = NULL; +} + +mysig_t +mysignal(int sig, mysig_t act) +{ +#ifdef HAVE_SIGACTION + struct sigaction sa, osa; + + if (sigaction(sig, NULL, &osa) == -1) + return (mysig_t) -1; + if (osa.sa_handler != act) { + memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa)); + sigemptyset(&sa.sa_mask); + sa.sa_flags = 0; +#if defined(SA_INTERRUPT) + if (sig == SIGALRM) + sa.sa_flags |= SA_INTERRUPT; +#endif + sa.sa_handler = act; + if (sigaction(sig, &sa, NULL) == -1) + return (mysig_t) -1; + } + return (osa.sa_handler); +#else + return (signal(sig, act)); +#endif +} diff --git a/openssh/misc.h b/openssh/misc.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fc56452 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/misc.h @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: misc.h,v 1.10 2001/06/26 17:27:24 markus Exp $ */ + +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + */ + +char *chop(char *); +char *strdelim(char **); +void set_nonblock(int); +void unset_nonblock(int); +int a2port(const char *); +char *cleanhostname(char *); +char *colon(char *); +long convtime(const char *); + +struct passwd *pwcopy(struct passwd *); + +typedef struct arglist arglist; +struct arglist { + char **list; + int num; + int nalloc; +}; +void addargs(arglist *, char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3))); + +/* wrapper for signal interface */ +typedef void (*mysig_t)(int); +mysig_t mysignal(int sig, mysig_t act); diff --git a/openssh/mkinstalldirs b/openssh/mkinstalldirs new file mode 100755 index 0000000..6b3b5fc --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/mkinstalldirs @@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +#! /bin/sh +# mkinstalldirs --- make directory hierarchy +# Author: Noah Friedman +# Created: 1993-05-16 +# Public domain + +# $Id$ + +errstatus=0 + +for file +do + set fnord `echo ":$file" | sed -ne 's/^:\//#/;s/^://;s/\// /g;s/^#/\//;p'` + shift + + pathcomp= + for d + do + pathcomp="$pathcomp$d" + case "$pathcomp" in + -* ) pathcomp=./$pathcomp ;; + esac + + if test ! -d "$pathcomp"; then + echo "mkdir $pathcomp" + + mkdir "$pathcomp" || lasterr=$? + + if test ! -d "$pathcomp"; then + errstatus=$lasterr + fi + fi + + pathcomp="$pathcomp/" + done +done + +exit $errstatus + +# mkinstalldirs ends here diff --git a/openssh/moduli b/openssh/moduli new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6b94e2e --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/moduli @@ -0,0 +1,158 @@ +# $OpenBSD: moduli,v 1.1 2001/06/22 22:07:54 provos Exp $ + +# Time Type Tests Tries Size Generator Modulus +20010328182134 2 6 100 1023 2 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diff --git a/openssh/mpaux.c b/openssh/mpaux.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0c48627 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/mpaux.c @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * This file contains various auxiliary functions related to multiple + * precision integers. + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + */ + +#include "includes.h" +RCSID("$OpenBSD: mpaux.c,v 1.16 2001/02/08 19:30:52 itojun Exp $"); + +#include +#include "getput.h" +#include "xmalloc.h" + +#include + +#include "mpaux.h" + +void +compute_session_id(u_char session_id[16], + u_char cookie[8], + BIGNUM* host_key_n, + BIGNUM* session_key_n) +{ + u_int host_key_bytes = BN_num_bytes(host_key_n); + u_int session_key_bytes = BN_num_bytes(session_key_n); + u_int bytes = host_key_bytes + session_key_bytes; + u_char *buf = xmalloc(bytes); + MD5_CTX md; + + BN_bn2bin(host_key_n, buf); + BN_bn2bin(session_key_n, buf + host_key_bytes); + MD5_Init(&md); + MD5_Update(&md, buf, bytes); + MD5_Update(&md, cookie, 8); + MD5_Final(session_id, &md); + memset(buf, 0, bytes); + xfree(buf); +} diff --git a/openssh/mpaux.h b/openssh/mpaux.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..082b7fd --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/mpaux.h @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * This file contains various auxiliary functions related to multiple + * precision integers. + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + */ + +/* RCSID("$OpenBSD: mpaux.h,v 1.11 2001/06/26 17:27:24 markus Exp $"); */ + +#ifndef MPAUX_H +#define MPAUX_H + +void compute_session_id(u_char[16], u_char[8], BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *); + +#endif /* MPAUX_H */ diff --git a/openssh/myproposal.h b/openssh/myproposal.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4a9a363 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/myproposal.h @@ -0,0 +1,52 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: myproposal.h,v 1.12 2001/03/05 15:56:16 deraadt Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ +#define KEX_DEFAULT_KEX "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1,diffie-hellman-group1-sha1" +#define KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG "ssh-rsa,ssh-dss" +#define KEX_DEFAULT_ENCRYPT \ + "aes128-cbc,3des-cbc,blowfish-cbc,cast128-cbc,arcfour," \ + "aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc," \ + "rijndael128-cbc,rijndael192-cbc,rijndael256-cbc," \ + "rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se" +#define KEX_DEFAULT_MAC \ + "hmac-md5,hmac-sha1,hmac-ripemd160," \ + "hmac-ripemd160@openssh.com," \ + "hmac-sha1-96,hmac-md5-96" +#define KEX_DEFAULT_COMP "none,zlib" +#define KEX_DEFAULT_LANG "" + + +static char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { + KEX_DEFAULT_KEX, + KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, + KEX_DEFAULT_ENCRYPT, + KEX_DEFAULT_ENCRYPT, + KEX_DEFAULT_MAC, + KEX_DEFAULT_MAC, + KEX_DEFAULT_COMP, + KEX_DEFAULT_COMP, + KEX_DEFAULT_LANG, + KEX_DEFAULT_LANG +}; diff --git a/openssh/nchan.c b/openssh/nchan.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2680f0a --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/nchan.c @@ -0,0 +1,560 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" +RCSID("$OpenBSD: nchan.c,v 1.32 2001/10/10 22:18:47 markus Exp $"); + +#include "ssh1.h" +#include "ssh2.h" +#include "buffer.h" +#include "packet.h" +#include "channels.h" +#include "compat.h" +#include "log.h" + +/* + * SSH Protocol 1.5 aka New Channel Protocol + * Thanks to Martina, Axel and everyone who left Erlangen, leaving me bored. + * Written by Markus Friedl in October 1999 + * + * Protocol versions 1.3 and 1.5 differ in the handshake protocol used for the + * tear down of channels: + * + * 1.3: strict request-ack-protocol: + * CLOSE -> + * <- CLOSE_CONFIRM + * + * 1.5: uses variations of: + * IEOF -> + * <- OCLOSE + * <- IEOF + * OCLOSE -> + * i.e. both sides have to close the channel + * + * 2.0: the EOF messages are optional + * + * See the debugging output from 'ssh -v' and 'sshd -d' of + * ssh-1.2.27 as an example. + * + */ + +/* functions manipulating channel states */ +/* + * EVENTS update channel input/output states execute ACTIONS + */ +/* events concerning the INPUT from socket for channel (istate) */ +chan_event_fn *chan_rcvd_oclose = NULL; +chan_event_fn *chan_read_failed = NULL; +chan_event_fn *chan_ibuf_empty = NULL; +/* events concerning the OUTPUT from channel for socket (ostate) */ +chan_event_fn *chan_rcvd_ieof = NULL; +chan_event_fn *chan_write_failed = NULL; +chan_event_fn *chan_obuf_empty = NULL; +/* + * ACTIONS: should never update the channel states + */ +static void chan_send_ieof1(Channel *); +static void chan_send_oclose1(Channel *); +static void chan_send_close2(Channel *); +static void chan_send_eof2(Channel *); + +/* helper */ +static void chan_shutdown_write(Channel *); +static void chan_shutdown_read(Channel *); + +/* + * SSH1 specific implementation of event functions + */ + +static void +chan_rcvd_oclose1(Channel *c) +{ + debug("channel %d: rcvd oclose", c->self); + switch (c->istate) { + case CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_OCLOSE: + debug("channel %d: input wait_oclose -> closed", c->self); + c->istate = CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED; + break; + case CHAN_INPUT_OPEN: + debug("channel %d: input open -> closed", c->self); + chan_shutdown_read(c); + chan_send_ieof1(c); + c->istate = CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED; + break; + case CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN: + /* both local read_failed and remote write_failed */ + log("channel %d: input drain -> closed", c->self); + chan_send_ieof1(c); + c->istate = CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED; + break; + default: + error("channel %d: protocol error: rcvd_oclose for istate %d", + c->self, c->istate); + return; + } +} +static void +chan_read_failed_12(Channel *c) +{ + debug("channel %d: read failed", c->self); + switch (c->istate) { + case CHAN_INPUT_OPEN: + debug("channel %d: input open -> drain", c->self); + chan_shutdown_read(c); + c->istate = CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN; +#if 0 + if (buffer_len(&c->input) == 0) { + debug("channel %d: input: no drain shortcut", c->self); + chan_ibuf_empty(c); + } +#endif + break; + default: + error("channel %d: chan_read_failed for istate %d", + c->self, c->istate); + break; + } +} +static void +chan_ibuf_empty1(Channel *c) +{ + debug("channel %d: ibuf empty", c->self); + if (buffer_len(&c->input)) { + error("channel %d: chan_ibuf_empty for non empty buffer", + c->self); + return; + } + switch (c->istate) { + case CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN: + debug("channel %d: input drain -> wait_oclose", c->self); + chan_send_ieof1(c); + c->istate = CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_OCLOSE; + break; + default: + error("channel %d: chan_ibuf_empty for istate %d", + c->self, c->istate); + break; + } +} +static void +chan_rcvd_ieof1(Channel *c) +{ + debug("channel %d: rcvd ieof", c->self); + if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) { + debug("channel %d: non-open", c->self); + if (c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_OPEN) { + debug("channel %d: non-open: input open -> wait_oclose", + c->self); + chan_shutdown_read(c); + chan_send_ieof1(c); + c->istate = CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_OCLOSE; + } else { + error("channel %d: non-open: istate %d != open", + c->self, c->istate); + } + if (c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN) { + debug("channel %d: non-open: output open -> closed", + c->self); + chan_send_oclose1(c); + c->ostate = CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED; + } else { + error("channel %d: non-open: ostate %d != open", + c->self, c->ostate); + } + return; + } + switch (c->ostate) { + case CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN: + debug("channel %d: output open -> drain", c->self); + c->ostate = CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN; + break; + case CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_IEOF: + debug("channel %d: output wait_ieof -> closed", c->self); + c->ostate = CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED; + break; + default: + error("channel %d: protocol error: rcvd_ieof for ostate %d", + c->self, c->ostate); + break; + } +} +static void +chan_write_failed1(Channel *c) +{ + debug("channel %d: write failed", c->self); + switch (c->ostate) { + case CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN: + debug("channel %d: output open -> wait_ieof", c->self); + chan_send_oclose1(c); + c->ostate = CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_IEOF; + break; + case CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN: + debug("channel %d: output wait_drain -> closed", c->self); + chan_send_oclose1(c); + c->ostate = CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED; + break; + default: + error("channel %d: chan_write_failed for ostate %d", + c->self, c->ostate); + break; + } +} +static void +chan_obuf_empty1(Channel *c) +{ + debug("channel %d: obuf empty", c->self); + if (buffer_len(&c->output)) { + error("channel %d: chan_obuf_empty for non empty buffer", + c->self); + return; + } + switch (c->ostate) { + case CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN: + debug("channel %d: output drain -> closed", c->self); + chan_send_oclose1(c); + c->ostate = CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED; + break; + default: + error("channel %d: internal error: obuf_empty for ostate %d", + c->self, c->ostate); + break; + } +} +static void +chan_send_ieof1(Channel *c) +{ + debug("channel %d: send ieof", c->self); + switch (c->istate) { + case CHAN_INPUT_OPEN: + case CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN: + packet_start(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_INPUT_EOF); + packet_put_int(c->remote_id); + packet_send(); + break; + default: + error("channel %d: cannot send ieof for istate %d", + c->self, c->istate); + break; + } +} +static void +chan_send_oclose1(Channel *c) +{ + debug("channel %d: send oclose", c->self); + switch (c->ostate) { + case CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN: + case CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN: + chan_shutdown_write(c); + buffer_consume(&c->output, buffer_len(&c->output)); + packet_start(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OUTPUT_CLOSE); + packet_put_int(c->remote_id); + packet_send(); + break; + default: + error("channel %d: cannot send oclose for ostate %d", + c->self, c->ostate); + break; + } +} + +/* + * the same for SSH2 + */ +static void +chan_rcvd_oclose2(Channel *c) +{ + debug("channel %d: rcvd close", c->self); + if (c->flags & CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD) + error("channel %d: protocol error: close rcvd twice", c->self); + c->flags |= CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD; + if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL) { + /* tear down larval channels immediately */ + c->ostate = CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED; + c->istate = CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED; + return; + } + switch (c->ostate) { + case CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN: + /* + * wait until a data from the channel is consumed if a CLOSE + * is received + */ + debug("channel %d: output open -> drain", c->self); + c->ostate = CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN; + break; + } + switch (c->istate) { + case CHAN_INPUT_OPEN: + debug("channel %d: input open -> closed", c->self); + chan_shutdown_read(c); + break; + case CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN: + debug("channel %d: input drain -> closed", c->self); + chan_send_eof2(c); + break; + } + c->istate = CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED; +} +static void +chan_ibuf_empty2(Channel *c) +{ + debug("channel %d: ibuf empty", c->self); + if (buffer_len(&c->input)) { + error("channel %d: chan_ibuf_empty for non empty buffer", + c->self); + return; + } + switch (c->istate) { + case CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN: + debug("channel %d: input drain -> closed", c->self); + if (!(c->flags & CHAN_CLOSE_SENT)) + chan_send_eof2(c); + c->istate = CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED; + break; + default: + error("channel %d: chan_ibuf_empty for istate %d", + c->self, c->istate); + break; + } +} +static void +chan_rcvd_ieof2(Channel *c) +{ + debug("channel %d: rcvd eof", c->self); + if (c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN) { + debug("channel %d: output open -> drain", c->self); + c->ostate = CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN; + } +} +static void +chan_write_failed2(Channel *c) +{ + debug("channel %d: write failed", c->self); + switch (c->ostate) { + case CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN: + debug("channel %d: output open -> closed", c->self); + chan_shutdown_write(c); /* ?? */ + c->ostate = CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED; + break; + case CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN: + debug("channel %d: output drain -> closed", c->self); + chan_shutdown_write(c); + c->ostate = CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED; + break; + default: + error("channel %d: chan_write_failed for ostate %d", + c->self, c->ostate); + break; + } +} +static void +chan_obuf_empty2(Channel *c) +{ + debug("channel %d: obuf empty", c->self); + if (buffer_len(&c->output)) { + error("channel %d: chan_obuf_empty for non empty buffer", + c->self); + return; + } + switch (c->ostate) { + case CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN: + debug("channel %d: output drain -> closed", c->self); + chan_shutdown_write(c); + c->ostate = CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED; + break; + default: + error("channel %d: chan_obuf_empty for ostate %d", + c->self, c->ostate); + break; + } +} +static void +chan_send_eof2(Channel *c) +{ + debug("channel %d: send eof", c->self); + switch (c->istate) { + case CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN: + packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF); + packet_put_int(c->remote_id); + packet_send(); + break; + default: + error("channel %d: cannot send eof for istate %d", + c->self, c->istate); + break; + } +} +static void +chan_send_close2(Channel *c) +{ + debug("channel %d: send close", c->self); + if (c->ostate != CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED || + c->istate != CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED) { + error("channel %d: cannot send close for istate/ostate %d/%d", + c->self, c->istate, c->ostate); + } else if (c->flags & CHAN_CLOSE_SENT) { + error("channel %d: already sent close", c->self); + } else { + packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE); + packet_put_int(c->remote_id); + packet_send(); + c->flags |= CHAN_CLOSE_SENT; + } +} + +/* shared */ + +void +chan_mark_dead(Channel *c) +{ + c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_ZOMBIE; +} + +int +chan_is_dead(Channel *c, int send) +{ + if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_ZOMBIE) { + debug("channel %d: zombie", c->self); + return 1; + } + if (c->istate != CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED || c->ostate != CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED) + return 0; + if (!compat20) { + debug("channel %d: is dead", c->self); + return 1; + } + /* + * we have to delay the close message if the efd (for stderr) is + * still active + */ + if (((c->extended_usage != CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE) && + buffer_len(&c->extended) > 0) +#if 0 + || ((c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_READ) && + c->efd != -1) +#endif + ) { + debug2("channel %d: active efd: %d len %d type %s", + c->self, c->efd, buffer_len(&c->extended), + c->extended_usage==CHAN_EXTENDED_READ ? + "read": "write"); + } else { + if (!(c->flags & CHAN_CLOSE_SENT)) { + if (send) { + chan_send_close2(c); + } else { + /* channel would be dead if we sent a close */ + if (c->flags & CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD) { + debug("channel %d: almost dead", + c->self); + return 1; + } + } + } + if ((c->flags & CHAN_CLOSE_SENT) && + (c->flags & CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD)) { + debug("channel %d: is dead", c->self); + return 1; + } + } + return 0; +} + +void +chan_init_iostates(Channel *c) +{ + c->ostate = CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN; + c->istate = CHAN_INPUT_OPEN; + c->flags = 0; +} + +/* init */ +void +chan_init(void) +{ + if (compat20) { + chan_rcvd_oclose = chan_rcvd_oclose2; + chan_read_failed = chan_read_failed_12; + chan_ibuf_empty = chan_ibuf_empty2; + + chan_rcvd_ieof = chan_rcvd_ieof2; + chan_write_failed = chan_write_failed2; + chan_obuf_empty = chan_obuf_empty2; + } else { + chan_rcvd_oclose = chan_rcvd_oclose1; + chan_read_failed = chan_read_failed_12; + chan_ibuf_empty = chan_ibuf_empty1; + + chan_rcvd_ieof = chan_rcvd_ieof1; + chan_write_failed = chan_write_failed1; + chan_obuf_empty = chan_obuf_empty1; + } +} + +/* helper */ +static void +chan_shutdown_write(Channel *c) +{ + buffer_consume(&c->output, buffer_len(&c->output)); + if (compat20 && c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL) + return; + /* shutdown failure is allowed if write failed already */ + debug("channel %d: close_write", c->self); + if (c->sock != -1) { + if (shutdown(c->sock, SHUT_WR) < 0) + debug("channel %d: chan_shutdown_write: " + "shutdown() failed for fd%d: %.100s", + c->self, c->sock, strerror(errno)); + } else { + if (channel_close_fd(&c->wfd) < 0) + log("channel %d: chan_shutdown_write: " + "close() failed for fd%d: %.100s", + c->self, c->wfd, strerror(errno)); + } +} +static void +chan_shutdown_read(Channel *c) +{ + if (compat20 && c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL) + return; + debug("channel %d: close_read", c->self); + if (c->sock != -1) { + /* + * shutdown(sock, SHUT_READ) may return ENOTCONN if the + * write side has been closed already. (bug on Linux) + * HP-UX may return ENOTCONN also. + */ + if (shutdown(c->sock, SHUT_RD) < 0 + && errno != ENOTCONN) + error("channel %d: chan_shutdown_read: " + "shutdown() failed for fd%d [i%d o%d]: %.100s", + c->self, c->sock, c->istate, c->ostate, + strerror(errno)); + } else { + if (channel_close_fd(&c->rfd) < 0) + log("channel %d: chan_shutdown_read: " + "close() failed for fd%d: %.100s", + c->self, c->rfd, strerror(errno)); + } +} diff --git a/openssh/nchan.ms b/openssh/nchan.ms new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2d08022 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/nchan.ms @@ -0,0 +1,99 @@ +.\" $OpenBSD: nchan.ms,v 1.7 2001/01/29 01:58:17 niklas Exp $ +.\" +.\" +.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. +.\" +.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +.\" are met: +.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +.\" +.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR +.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES +.\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. +.\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, +.\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT +.\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, +.\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY +.\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT +.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF +.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. +.\" +.TL +OpenSSH Channel Close Protocol 1.5 Implementation +.SH +Channel Input State Diagram +.PS +reset +l=1 +s=1.2 +ellipsewid=s*ellipsewid +boxwid=s*boxwid +ellipseht=s*ellipseht +S1: ellipse "INPUT" "OPEN" +move right 2*l from last ellipse.e +S4: ellipse "INPUT" "CLOSED" +move down l from last ellipse.s +S3: ellipse "INPUT" "WAIT" "OCLOSED" +move down l from 1st ellipse.s +S2: ellipse "INPUT" "WAIT" "DRAIN" +arrow "" "rcvd OCLOSE/" "shutdown_read" "send IEOF" from S1.e to S4.w +arrow "ibuf_empty/" "send IEOF" from S2.e to S3.w +arrow from S1.s to S2.n +box invis "read_failed/" "shutdown_read" with .e at last arrow.c +arrow from S3.n to S4.s +box invis "rcvd OCLOSE/" "-" with .w at last arrow.c +ellipse wid .9*ellipsewid ht .9*ellipseht at S4 +arrow "start" "" from S1.w+(-0.5,0) to S1.w +arrow from S2.ne to S4.sw +box invis "rcvd OCLOSE/ " with .e at last arrow.c +box invis " send IEOF" with .w at last arrow.c +.PE +.SH +Channel Output State Diagram +.PS +S1: ellipse "OUTPUT" "OPEN" +move right 2*l from last ellipse.e +S3: ellipse "OUTPUT" "WAIT" "IEOF" +move down l from last ellipse.s +S4: ellipse "OUTPUT" "CLOSED" +move down l from 1st ellipse.s +S2: ellipse "OUTPUT" "WAIT" "DRAIN" +arrow "" "write_failed/" "shutdown_write" "send OCLOSE" from S1.e to S3.w +arrow "obuf_empty ||" "write_failed/" "shutdown_write" "send OCLOSE" from S2.e to S4.w +arrow from S1.s to S2.n +box invis "rcvd IEOF/" "-" with .e at last arrow.c +arrow from S3.s to S4.n +box invis "rcvd IEOF/" "-" with .w at last arrow.c +ellipse wid .9*ellipsewid ht .9*ellipseht at S4 +arrow "start" "" from S1.w+(-0.5,0) to S1.w +.PE +.SH +Notes +.PP +The input buffer is filled with data from the socket +(the socket represents the local consumer/producer of the +forwarded channel). +The data is then sent over the INPUT-end (transmit-end) of the channel to the +remote peer. +Data sent by the peer is received on the OUTPUT-end (receive-end), +saved in the output buffer and written to the socket. +.PP +If the local protocol instance has forwarded all data on the +INPUT-end of the channel, it sends an IEOF message to the peer. +If the peer receives the IEOF and has consumed all +data he replies with an OCLOSE. +When the local instance receives the OCLOSE +he considers the INPUT-half of the channel closed. +The peer has his OUTOUT-half closed. +.PP +A channel can be deallocated by a protocol instance +if both the INPUT- and the OUTOUT-half on his +side of the channel are closed. +Note that when an instance is unable to consume the +received data, he is permitted to send an OCLOSE +before the matching IEOF is received. diff --git a/openssh/nchan2.ms b/openssh/nchan2.ms new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1cc51fa --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/nchan2.ms @@ -0,0 +1,88 @@ +.\" $OpenBSD: nchan2.ms,v 1.2 2001/10/03 10:05:57 markus Exp $ +.\" +.\" Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. +.\" +.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +.\" are met: +.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +.\" +.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR +.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES +.\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. +.\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, +.\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT +.\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, +.\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY +.\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT +.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF +.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. +.\" +.TL +OpenSSH Channel Close Protocol 2.0 Implementation +.SH +Channel Input State Diagram +.PS +reset +l=1 +s=1.2 +ellipsewid=s*ellipsewid +boxwid=s*boxwid +ellipseht=s*ellipseht +S1: ellipse "INPUT" "OPEN" +move right 2*l from last ellipse.e +S3: ellipse invis +move down l from last ellipse.s +S4: ellipse "INPUT" "CLOSED" +move down l from 1st ellipse.s +S2: ellipse "INPUT" "WAIT" "DRAIN" +arrow from S1.e to S4.n +box invis "rcvd CLOSE/" "shutdown_read" with .sw at last arrow.c +arrow "ibuf_empty ||" "rcvd CLOSE/" "send EOF" "" from S2.e to S4.w +arrow from S1.s to S2.n +box invis "read_failed/" "shutdown_read" with .e at last arrow.c +ellipse wid .9*ellipsewid ht .9*ellipseht at S4 +arrow "start" "" from S1.w+(-0.5,0) to S1.w +.PE +.SH +Channel Output State Diagram +.PS +S1: ellipse "OUTPUT" "OPEN" +move right 2*l from last ellipse.e +S3: ellipse invis +move down l from last ellipse.s +S4: ellipse "OUTPUT" "CLOSED" +move down l from 1st ellipse.s +S2: ellipse "OUTPUT" "WAIT" "DRAIN" +arrow from S1.e to S4.n +box invis "write_failed/" "shutdown_write" with .sw at last arrow.c +arrow "obuf_empty ||" "write_failed/" "shutdown_write" "" from S2.e to S4.w +arrow from S1.s to S2.n +box invis "rcvd EOF ||" "rcvd CLOSE/" "-" with .e at last arrow.c +ellipse wid .9*ellipsewid ht .9*ellipseht at S4 +arrow "start" "" from S1.w+(-0.5,0) to S1.w +.PE +.SH +Notes +.PP +The input buffer is filled with data from the socket +(the socket represents the local consumer/producer of the +forwarded channel). +The data is then sent over the INPUT-end (transmit-end) of the channel to the +remote peer. +Data sent by the peer is received on the OUTPUT-end (receive-end), +saved in the output buffer and written to the socket. +.PP +If the local protocol instance has forwarded all data on the +INPUT-end of the channel, it sends an EOF message to the peer. +.PP +A CLOSE message is sent to the peer if +both the INPUT- and the OUTOUT-half of the local +end of the channel are closed. +.PP +The channel can be deallocated by a protocol instance +if a CLOSE message he been both sent and received. diff --git a/openssh/openbsd-compat/.cvsignore b/openssh/openbsd-compat/.cvsignore new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f3c7a7c --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/openbsd-compat/.cvsignore @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +Makefile diff --git a/openssh/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in b/openssh/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in new file mode 100644 index 0000000..31f9ea9 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +# $Id$ + +sysconfdir=@sysconfdir@ +piddir=@piddir@ +srcdir=@srcdir@ +top_srcdir=@top_srcdir@ + +VPATH=@srcdir@ +CC=@CC@ +LD=@LD@ +CFLAGS=@CFLAGS@ +CPPFLAGS=-I. -I.. -I$(srcdir) -I$(srcdir)/.. @CPPFLAGS@ @DEFS@ +LIBS=@LIBS@ +AR=@AR@ +RANLIB=@RANLIB@ +INSTALL=@INSTALL@ +LDFLAGS=-L. @LDFLAGS@ + +OPENBSD=base64.o bindresvport.o daemon.o dirname.o getcwd.o getgrouplist.o getopt.o glob.o inet_aton.o inet_ntoa.o inet_ntop.o mktemp.o readpassphrase.o realpath.o rresvport.o setenv.o setproctitle.o sigact.o strlcat.o strlcpy.o strmode.o strsep.o + +COMPAT=bsd-arc4random.o bsd-cray.o bsd-cygwin_util.o bsd-misc.o bsd-nextstep.o bsd-snprintf.o bsd-waitpid.o fake-getaddrinfo.o fake-getnameinfo.o + +.c.o: + $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -c $< + +all: libopenbsd-compat.a + +$(COMPAT): ../config.h +$(OPENBSD): ../config.h + +libopenbsd-compat.a: $(COMPAT) $(OPENBSD) + $(AR) rv $@ $(COMPAT) $(OPENBSD) + $(RANLIB) $@ + +clean: + rm -f *.o *.a core + +distclean: clean + rm -f Makefile *~ diff --git a/openssh/openbsd-compat/base64.c b/openssh/openbsd-compat/base64.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d12b993 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/openbsd-compat/base64.c @@ -0,0 +1,316 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: base64.c,v 1.3 1997/11/08 20:46:55 deraadt Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 1996 by Internet Software Consortium. + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND INTERNET SOFTWARE CONSORTIUM DISCLAIMS + * ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL INTERNET SOFTWARE + * CONSORTIUM BE LIABLE FOR ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR + * PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS + * ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS + * SOFTWARE. + */ + +/* + * Portions Copyright (c) 1995 by International Business Machines, Inc. + * + * International Business Machines, Inc. (hereinafter called IBM) grants + * permission under its copyrights to use, copy, modify, and distribute this + * Software with or without fee, provided that the above copyright notice and + * all paragraphs of this notice appear in all copies, and that the name of IBM + * not be used in connection with the marketing of any product incorporating + * the Software or modifications thereof, without specific, written prior + * permission. + * + * To the extent it has a right to do so, IBM grants an immunity from suit + * under its patents, if any, for the use, sale or manufacture of products to + * the extent that such products are used for performing Domain Name System + * dynamic updates in TCP/IP networks by means of the Software. No immunity is + * granted for any product per se or for any other function of any product. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", AND IBM DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, + * INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A + * PARTICULAR PURPOSE. IN NO EVENT SHALL IBM BE LIABLE FOR ANY SPECIAL, + * DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER ARISING + * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN + * IF IBM IS APPRISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES. + */ + +#include "config.h" + +#if !defined(HAVE_B64_NTOP) && !defined(HAVE___B64_NTOP) + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#include + +#include +#include + +#include "base64.h" + +#define Assert(Cond) if (!(Cond)) abort() + +static const char Base64[] = + "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/"; +static const char Pad64 = '='; + +/* (From RFC1521 and draft-ietf-dnssec-secext-03.txt) + The following encoding technique is taken from RFC 1521 by Borenstein + and Freed. It is reproduced here in a slightly edited form for + convenience. + + A 65-character subset of US-ASCII is used, enabling 6 bits to be + represented per printable character. (The extra 65th character, "=", + is used to signify a special processing function.) + + The encoding process represents 24-bit groups of input bits as output + strings of 4 encoded characters. Proceeding from left to right, a + 24-bit input group is formed by concatenating 3 8-bit input groups. + These 24 bits are then treated as 4 concatenated 6-bit groups, each + of which is translated into a single digit in the base64 alphabet. + + Each 6-bit group is used as an index into an array of 64 printable + characters. The character referenced by the index is placed in the + output string. + + Table 1: The Base64 Alphabet + + Value Encoding Value Encoding Value Encoding Value Encoding + 0 A 17 R 34 i 51 z + 1 B 18 S 35 j 52 0 + 2 C 19 T 36 k 53 1 + 3 D 20 U 37 l 54 2 + 4 E 21 V 38 m 55 3 + 5 F 22 W 39 n 56 4 + 6 G 23 X 40 o 57 5 + 7 H 24 Y 41 p 58 6 + 8 I 25 Z 42 q 59 7 + 9 J 26 a 43 r 60 8 + 10 K 27 b 44 s 61 9 + 11 L 28 c 45 t 62 + + 12 M 29 d 46 u 63 / + 13 N 30 e 47 v + 14 O 31 f 48 w (pad) = + 15 P 32 g 49 x + 16 Q 33 h 50 y + + Special processing is performed if fewer than 24 bits are available + at the end of the data being encoded. A full encoding quantum is + always completed at the end of a quantity. When fewer than 24 input + bits are available in an input group, zero bits are added (on the + right) to form an integral number of 6-bit groups. Padding at the + end of the data is performed using the '=' character. + + Since all base64 input is an integral number of octets, only the + ------------------------------------------------- + following cases can arise: + + (1) the final quantum of encoding input is an integral + multiple of 24 bits; here, the final unit of encoded + output will be an integral multiple of 4 characters + with no "=" padding, + (2) the final quantum of encoding input is exactly 8 bits; + here, the final unit of encoded output will be two + characters followed by two "=" padding characters, or + (3) the final quantum of encoding input is exactly 16 bits; + here, the final unit of encoded output will be three + characters followed by one "=" padding character. + */ + +int +b64_ntop(u_char const *src, size_t srclength, char *target, size_t targsize) +{ + size_t datalength = 0; + u_char input[3]; + u_char output[4]; + int i; + + while (2 < srclength) { + input[0] = *src++; + input[1] = *src++; + input[2] = *src++; + srclength -= 3; + + output[0] = input[0] >> 2; + output[1] = ((input[0] & 0x03) << 4) + (input[1] >> 4); + output[2] = ((input[1] & 0x0f) << 2) + (input[2] >> 6); + output[3] = input[2] & 0x3f; + Assert(output[0] < 64); + Assert(output[1] < 64); + Assert(output[2] < 64); + Assert(output[3] < 64); + + if (datalength + 4 > targsize) + return (-1); + target[datalength++] = Base64[output[0]]; + target[datalength++] = Base64[output[1]]; + target[datalength++] = Base64[output[2]]; + target[datalength++] = Base64[output[3]]; + } + + /* Now we worry about padding. */ + if (0 != srclength) { + /* Get what's left. */ + input[0] = input[1] = input[2] = '\0'; + for (i = 0; i < srclength; i++) + input[i] = *src++; + + output[0] = input[0] >> 2; + output[1] = ((input[0] & 0x03) << 4) + (input[1] >> 4); + output[2] = ((input[1] & 0x0f) << 2) + (input[2] >> 6); + Assert(output[0] < 64); + Assert(output[1] < 64); + Assert(output[2] < 64); + + if (datalength + 4 > targsize) + return (-1); + target[datalength++] = Base64[output[0]]; + target[datalength++] = Base64[output[1]]; + if (srclength == 1) + target[datalength++] = Pad64; + else + target[datalength++] = Base64[output[2]]; + target[datalength++] = Pad64; + } + if (datalength >= targsize) + return (-1); + target[datalength] = '\0'; /* Returned value doesn't count \0. */ + return (datalength); +} + +/* skips all whitespace anywhere. + converts characters, four at a time, starting at (or after) + src from base - 64 numbers into three 8 bit bytes in the target area. + it returns the number of data bytes stored at the target, or -1 on error. + */ + +int +b64_pton(char const *src, u_char *target, size_t targsize) +{ + int tarindex, state, ch; + char *pos; + + state = 0; + tarindex = 0; + + while ((ch = *src++) != '\0') { + if (isspace(ch)) /* Skip whitespace anywhere. */ + continue; + + if (ch == Pad64) + break; + + pos = strchr(Base64, ch); + if (pos == 0) /* A non-base64 character. */ + return (-1); + + switch (state) { + case 0: + if (target) { + if (tarindex >= targsize) + return (-1); + target[tarindex] = (pos - Base64) << 2; + } + state = 1; + break; + case 1: + if (target) { + if (tarindex + 1 >= targsize) + return (-1); + target[tarindex] |= (pos - Base64) >> 4; + target[tarindex+1] = ((pos - Base64) & 0x0f) + << 4 ; + } + tarindex++; + state = 2; + break; + case 2: + if (target) { + if (tarindex + 1 >= targsize) + return (-1); + target[tarindex] |= (pos - Base64) >> 2; + target[tarindex+1] = ((pos - Base64) & 0x03) + << 6; + } + tarindex++; + state = 3; + break; + case 3: + if (target) { + if (tarindex >= targsize) + return (-1); + target[tarindex] |= (pos - Base64); + } + tarindex++; + state = 0; + break; + } + } + + /* + * We are done decoding Base-64 chars. Let's see if we ended + * on a byte boundary, and/or with erroneous trailing characters. + */ + + if (ch == Pad64) { /* We got a pad char. */ + ch = *src++; /* Skip it, get next. */ + switch (state) { + case 0: /* Invalid = in first position */ + case 1: /* Invalid = in second position */ + return (-1); + + case 2: /* Valid, means one byte of info */ + /* Skip any number of spaces. */ + for (; ch != '\0'; ch = *src++) + if (!isspace(ch)) + break; + /* Make sure there is another trailing = sign. */ + if (ch != Pad64) + return (-1); + ch = *src++; /* Skip the = */ + /* Fall through to "single trailing =" case. */ + /* FALLTHROUGH */ + + case 3: /* Valid, means two bytes of info */ + /* + * We know this char is an =. Is there anything but + * whitespace after it? + */ + for (; ch != '\0'; ch = *src++) + if (!isspace(ch)) + return (-1); + + /* + * Now make sure for cases 2 and 3 that the "extra" + * bits that slopped past the last full byte were + * zeros. If we don't check them, they become a + * subliminal channel. + */ + if (target && target[tarindex] != 0) + return (-1); + } + } else { + /* + * We ended by seeing the end of the string. Make sure we + * have no partial bytes lying around. + */ + if (state != 0) + return (-1); + } + + return (tarindex); +} + +#endif /* !defined(HAVE_B64_NTOP) && !defined(HAVE___B64_NTOP) */ diff --git a/openssh/openbsd-compat/base64.h b/openssh/openbsd-compat/base64.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0ebfdd3 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/openbsd-compat/base64.h @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ +/* $Id$ */ + +#ifndef _BSD_BASE64_H +#define _BSD_BASE64_H + +#include "config.h" + +#ifndef HAVE___B64_NTOP +# ifndef HAVE_B64_NTOP +int b64_ntop(u_char const *src, size_t srclength, char *target, + size_t targsize); +int b64_pton(char const *src, u_char *target, size_t targsize); +# endif /* !HAVE_B64_NTOP */ +# define __b64_ntop b64_ntop +# define __b64_pton b64_pton +#endif /* HAVE___B64_NTOP */ + +#endif /* _BSD_BINRESVPORT_H */ diff --git a/openssh/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c b/openssh/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..332bcb0 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c @@ -0,0 +1,123 @@ +/* This file has be modified from the original OpenBSD source */ + +/* + * Sun RPC is a product of Sun Microsystems, Inc. and is provided for + * unrestricted use provided that this legend is included on all tape + * media and as a part of the software program in whole or part. Users + * may copy or modify Sun RPC without charge, but are not authorized + * to license or distribute it to anyone else except as part of a product or + * program developed by the user. + * + * SUN RPC IS PROVIDED AS IS WITH NO WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND INCLUDING THE + * WARRANTIES OF DESIGN, MERCHANTIBILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE, OR ARISING FROM A COURSE OF DEALING, USAGE OR TRADE PRACTICE. + * + * Sun RPC is provided with no support and without any obligation on the + * part of Sun Microsystems, Inc. to assist in its use, correction, + * modification or enhancement. + * + * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC. SHALL HAVE NO LIABILITY WITH RESPECT TO THE + * INFRINGEMENT OF COPYRIGHTS, TRADE SECRETS OR ANY PATENTS BY SUN RPC + * OR ANY PART THEREOF. + * + * In no event will Sun Microsystems, Inc. be liable for any lost revenue + * or profits or other special, indirect and consequential damages, even if + * Sun has been advised of the possibility of such damages. + * + * Sun Microsystems, Inc. + * 2550 Garcia Avenue + * Mountain View, California 94043 + */ + +#include "config.h" + +#ifndef HAVE_BINDRESVPORT_SA + +#if defined(LIBC_SCCS) && !defined(lint) +static char *rcsid = "$OpenBSD: bindresvport.c,v 1.13 2000/01/26 03:43:21 deraadt Exp $"; +#endif /* LIBC_SCCS and not lint */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 1987 by Sun Microsystems, Inc. + * + * Portions Copyright(C) 1996, Jason Downs. All rights reserved. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#define STARTPORT 600 +#define ENDPORT (IPPORT_RESERVED - 1) +#define NPORTS (ENDPORT - STARTPORT + 1) + +/* + * Bind a socket to a privileged IP port + */ +int +bindresvport_sa(sd, sa) + int sd; + struct sockaddr *sa; +{ + int error, af; + struct sockaddr_storage myaddr; + struct sockaddr_in *sin; + struct sockaddr_in6 *sin6; + u_int16_t *portp; + u_int16_t port; + socklen_t salen; + int i; + + if (sa == NULL) { + memset(&myaddr, 0, sizeof(myaddr)); + sa = (struct sockaddr *)&myaddr; + + if (getsockname(sd, sa, &salen) == -1) + return -1; /* errno is correctly set */ + + af = sa->sa_family; + memset(&myaddr, 0, salen); + } else + af = sa->sa_family; + + if (af == AF_INET) { + sin = (struct sockaddr_in *)sa; + salen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in); + portp = &sin->sin_port; + } else if (af == AF_INET6) { + sin6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)sa; + salen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6); + portp = &sin6->sin6_port; + } else { + errno = EPFNOSUPPORT; + return (-1); + } + sa->sa_family = af; + + port = ntohs(*portp); + if (port == 0) + port = (arc4random() % NPORTS) + STARTPORT; + + /* Avoid warning */ + error = -1; + + for(i = 0; i < NPORTS; i++) { + *portp = htons(port); + + error = bind(sd, sa, salen); + + /* Terminate on success */ + if (error == 0) + break; + + /* Terminate on errors, except "address already in use" */ + if ((error < 0) && !((errno == EADDRINUSE) || (errno == EINVAL))) + break; + + port++; + if (port > ENDPORT) + port = STARTPORT; + } + + return (error); +} + +#endif /* HAVE_BINDRESVPORT_SA */ diff --git a/openssh/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.h b/openssh/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b56afd3 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.h @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +/* $Id$ */ + +#ifndef _BSD_BINDRESVPORT_H +#define _BSD_BINDRESVPORT_H + +#include "config.h" + +#ifndef HAVE_BINDRESVPORT_SA +int bindresvport_sa(int sd, struct sockaddr *sa); +#endif /* !HAVE_BINDRESVPORT_SA */ + +#endif /* _BSD_BINDRESVPORT_H */ diff --git a/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-arc4random.c b/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-arc4random.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4fcfc6e --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-arc4random.c @@ -0,0 +1,77 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999-2000 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" +#include "log.h" + +RCSID("$Id$"); + +#ifndef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM + +#include +#include +#include + +/* Size of key to use */ +#define SEED_SIZE 20 + +/* Number of bytes to reseed after */ +#define REKEY_BYTES (1 << 24) + +static int rc4_ready = 0; +static RC4_KEY rc4; + +unsigned int arc4random(void) +{ + unsigned int r = 0; + static int first_time = 1; + + if (rc4_ready <= 0) { + if (!first_time) + seed_rng(); + first_time = 0; + arc4random_stir(); + } + + RC4(&rc4, sizeof(r), (unsigned char *)&r, (unsigned char *)&r); + + rc4_ready -= sizeof(r); + + return(r); +} + +void arc4random_stir(void) +{ + unsigned char rand_buf[SEED_SIZE]; + + memset(&rc4, 0, sizeof(rc4)); + if (!RAND_bytes(rand_buf, sizeof(rand_buf))) + fatal("Couldn't obtain random bytes (error %ld)", + ERR_get_error()); + RC4_set_key(&rc4, sizeof(rand_buf), rand_buf); + memset(rand_buf, 0, sizeof(rand_buf)); + + rc4_ready = REKEY_BYTES; +} +#endif /* !HAVE_ARC4RANDOM */ diff --git a/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-arc4random.h b/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-arc4random.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3e913c3 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-arc4random.h @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999-2000 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id$ */ + +#ifndef _BSD_ARC4RANDOM_H +#define _BSD_ARC4RANDOM_H + +#include "config.h" + +#ifndef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM +unsigned int arc4random(void); +void arc4random_stir(void); +#endif /* !HAVE_ARC4RANDOM */ + +#endif /* _BSD_ARC4RANDOM_H */ diff --git a/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-cray.c b/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-cray.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fa76641 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-cray.c @@ -0,0 +1,273 @@ +/* + * XXX: license? + */ + +/* + * The modules contains code to support cray t3e and sv1 computers. + * It is here to minimize the modifcations to the openssh base code. + */ + +#ifdef _CRAY + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "bsd-cray.h" + +char cray_tmpdir[TPATHSIZ+1]; /* job TMPDIR path */ + +/* + * Functions. + */ +void cray_retain_utmp(struct utmp *, int); +void cray_delete_tmpdir(char *, int, uid_t); +void cray_init_job(struct passwd *); +void cray_set_tmpdir(struct utmp *); + + +/* + * Orignal written by: + * Wayne Schroeder + * San Diego Supercomputer Center + * schroeder@sdsc.edu +*/ +void +cray_setup(uid_t uid, char *username) +{ + struct udb *p; + extern char *setlimits(); + int i, j; + int accts[MAXVIDS]; + int naccts; + int err; + char *sr; + int pid; + struct jtab jbuf; + int jid; + + if ((jid = getjtab(&jbuf)) < 0) + fatal("getjtab: no jid"); + + err = setudb(); /* open and rewind the Cray User DataBase */ + if (err != 0) + fatal("UDB open failure"); + naccts = 0; + p = getudbnam(username); + if (p == NULL) + fatal("No UDB entry for %.100s", username); + if (uid != p->ue_uid) + fatal("UDB entry %.100s uid(%d) does not match uid %d", + username, (int) p->ue_uid, (int) uid); + for (j = 0; p->ue_acids[j] != -1 && j < MAXVIDS; j++) { + accts[naccts] = p->ue_acids[j]; + naccts++; + } + endudb(); /* close the udb */ + + if (naccts != 0) { + /* Perhaps someday we'll prompt users who have multiple accounts + to let them pick one (like CRI's login does), but for now just set + the account to the first entry. */ + if (acctid(0, accts[0]) < 0) + fatal("System call acctid failed, accts[0]=%d", accts[0]); + } + + /* Now set limits, including CPU time for the (interactive) job and process, + and set up permissions (for chown etc), etc. This is via an internal CRI + routine, setlimits, used by CRI's login. */ + + pid = getpid(); + sr = setlimits(username, C_PROC, pid, UDBRC_INTER); + if (sr != NULL) + fatal("%.200s", sr); + + sr = setlimits(username, C_JOB, jid, UDBRC_INTER); + if (sr != NULL) + fatal("%.200s", sr); + +} + +/* + * The rc.* and /etc/sdaemon methods of starting a program on unicos/unicosmk + * can have pal privileges that sshd can inherit which + * could allow a user to su to root with out a password. + * This subroutine clears all privileges. + */ +void +drop_cray_privs() +{ +#if defined(_SC_CRAY_PRIV_SU) + priv_proc_t* privstate; + int result; + extern int priv_set_proc(); + extern priv_proc_t* priv_init_proc(); + struct usrv usrv; + + /* + * If ether of theses two flags are not set + * then don't allow this version of ssh to run. + */ + if (!sysconf(_SC_CRAY_PRIV_SU)) + fatal("Not PRIV_SU system."); + if (!sysconf(_SC_CRAY_POSIX_PRIV)) + fatal("Not POSIX_PRIV."); + + debug("Dropping privileges."); + + memset(&usrv, 0, sizeof(usrv)); + if (setusrv(&usrv) < 0) + fatal("%s(%d): setusrv(): %s", __FILE__, __LINE__, + strerror(errno)); + + if ((privstate = priv_init_proc()) != NULL) { + result = priv_set_proc(privstate); + if (result != 0 ) + fatal("%s(%d): priv_set_proc(): %s", + __FILE__, __LINE__, strerror(errno)); + priv_free_proc(privstate); + } + debug ("Privileges should be cleared..."); +#else + /* XXX: do this differently */ +# error Cray systems must be run with _SC_CRAY_PRIV_SU on! +#endif +} + + +/* + * Retain utmp/wtmp information - used by cray accounting. + */ +void +cray_retain_utmp(struct utmp *ut, int pid) +{ + int fd; + struct utmp utmp; + + if ((fd = open(UTMP_FILE, O_RDONLY)) != -1) { + while (read(fd, (char *)&utmp, sizeof(utmp)) == sizeof(utmp)) { + if (pid == utmp.ut_pid) { + ut->ut_jid = utmp.ut_jid; + /* XXX: MIN_SIZEOF here? can this go in loginrec? */ + strncpy(ut->ut_tpath, utmp.ut_tpath, sizeof(utmp.ut_tpath)); + strncpy(ut->ut_host, utmp.ut_host, sizeof(utmp.ut_host)); + strncpy(ut->ut_name, utmp.ut_name, sizeof(utmp.ut_name)); + break; + } + } + close(fd); + } + /* XXX: error message? */ +} + +/* + * tmpdir support. + */ + +/* + * find and delete jobs tmpdir. + */ +void +cray_delete_tmpdir(char *login, int jid, uid_t uid) +{ + int child; + static char jtmp[TPATHSIZ]; + struct stat statbuf; + int c; + int wstat; + + for (c = 'a'; c <= 'z'; c++) { + snprintf(jtmp, TPATHSIZ, "%s/jtmp.%06d%c", JTMPDIR, jid, c); + if (stat(jtmp, &statbuf) == 0 && statbuf.st_uid == uid) + break; + } + + if (c > 'z') + return; + + if ((child = fork()) == 0) { + execl(CLEANTMPCMD, CLEANTMPCMD, login, jtmp, (char *)NULL); + fatal("cray_delete_tmpdir: execl of CLEANTMPCMD failed"); + } + + while (waitpid(child, &wstat, 0) == -1 && errno == EINTR) + ; +} + +/* + * Remove tmpdir on job termination. + */ +void +cray_job_termination_handler(int sig) +{ + int jid; + char *login = NULL; + struct jtab jtab; + + debug("Received SIG JOB."); + + if ((jid = waitjob(&jtab)) == -1 || + (login = uid2nam(jtab.j_uid)) == NULL) + return; + + cray_delete_tmpdir(login, jid, jtab.j_uid); +} + +/* + * Set job id and create tmpdir directory. + */ +void +cray_init_job(struct passwd *pw) +{ + int jid; + int c; + + jid = setjob(pw->pw_uid, WJSIGNAL); + if (jid < 0) + fatal("System call setjob failure"); + + for (c = 'a'; c <= 'z'; c++) { + snprintf(cray_tmpdir, TPATHSIZ, "%s/jtmp.%06d%c", JTMPDIR, jid, c); + if (mkdir(cray_tmpdir, JTMPMODE) != 0) + continue; + if (chown(cray_tmpdir, pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_gid) != 0) { + rmdir(cray_tmpdir); + continue; + } + break; + } + + if (c > 'z') + cray_tmpdir[0] = '\0'; +} + +void +cray_set_tmpdir(struct utmp *ut) +{ + int jid; + struct jtab jbuf; + + if ((jid = getjtab(&jbuf)) < 0) + return; + + /* + * Set jid and tmpdir in utmp record. + */ + ut->ut_jid = jid; + strncpy(ut->ut_tpath, cray_tmpdir, TPATHSIZ); +} +#endif diff --git a/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-cray.h b/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-cray.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ef36652 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-cray.h @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +#ifndef _BSD_CRAY_H +#define _BSD_CRAY_H + +#ifdef _CRAY +void cray_init_job(struct passwd *); /* init cray job */ +void cray_job_termination_handler(int); /* process end of job signal */ +void cray_setup(uid_t, char *); /* set cray limits */ +extern char cray_tmpdir[]; /* cray tmpdir */ +#endif + +#endif /* _BSD_CRAY_H */ diff --git a/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.c b/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f513331 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.c @@ -0,0 +1,142 @@ +/* + * + * cygwin_util.c + * + * Author: Corinna Vinschen + * + * Copyright (c) 2000 Corinna Vinschen , Duisburg, Germany + * All rights reserved + * + * Created: Sat Sep 02 12:17:00 2000 cv + * + * This file contains functions for forcing opened file descriptors to + * binary mode on Windows systems. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +RCSID("$Id$"); + +#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#define is_winnt (GetVersion() < 0x80000000) + +#define ntsec_on(c) ((c) && strstr((c),"ntsec") && !strstr((c),"nontsec")) +#define ntea_on(c) ((c) && strstr((c),"ntea") && !strstr((c),"nontea")) + +#if defined(open) && open == binary_open +# undef open +#endif +#if defined(pipe) && open == binary_pipe +# undef pipe +#endif + +int binary_open(const char *filename, int flags, ...) +{ + va_list ap; + mode_t mode; + + va_start(ap, flags); + mode = va_arg(ap, mode_t); + va_end(ap); + return open(filename, flags | O_BINARY, mode); +} + +int binary_pipe(int fd[2]) +{ + int ret = pipe(fd); + + if (!ret) { + setmode (fd[0], O_BINARY); + setmode (fd[1], O_BINARY); + } + return ret; +} + +int check_nt_auth(int pwd_authenticated, uid_t uid) +{ + /* + * The only authentication which is able to change the user + * context on NT systems is the password authentication. So + * we deny all requsts for changing the user context if another + * authentication method is used. + * + * This doesn't apply to Cygwin versions >= 1.3.2 anymore which + * uses the undocumented NtCreateToken() call to create a user + * token if the process has the appropriate privileges and if + * CYGWIN ntsec setting is on. + */ + static int has_create_token = -1; + + if (is_winnt) { + if (has_create_token < 0) { + struct utsname uts; + int major_high = 0, major_low = 0, minor = 0; + char *cygwin = getenv("CYGWIN"); + + has_create_token = 0; + if (ntsec_on(cygwin) && !uname(&uts)) { + sscanf(uts.release, "%d.%d.%d", + &major_high, &major_low, &minor); + if (major_high > 1 || + (major_high == 1 && (major_low > 3 || + (major_low == 3 && minor >= 2)))) + has_create_token = 1; + } + } + if (has_create_token < 1 && + !pwd_authenticated && geteuid() != uid) + return 0; + } + return 1; +} + +int check_ntsec(const char *filename) +{ + char *cygwin; + int allow_ntea = 0; + int allow_ntsec = 0; + struct statfs fsstat; + + /* Windows 95/98/ME don't support file system security at all. */ + if (!is_winnt) + return 0; + + /* Evaluate current CYGWIN settings. */ + cygwin = getenv("CYGWIN"); + allow_ntea = ntea_on(cygwin); + allow_ntsec = ntsec_on(cygwin); + + /* + * `ntea' is an emulation of POSIX attributes. It doesn't support + * real file level security as ntsec on NTFS file systems does + * but it supports FAT filesystems. `ntea' is minimum requirement + * for security checks. + */ + if (allow_ntea) + return 1; + + /* + * Retrieve file system flags. In Cygwin, file system flags are + * copied to f_type which has no meaning in Win32 itself. + */ + if (statfs(filename, &fsstat)) + return 1; + + /* + * Only file systems supporting ACLs are able to set permissions. + * `ntsec' is the setting in Cygwin which switches using of NTFS + * ACLs to support POSIX permissions on files. + */ + if (fsstat.f_type & FS_PERSISTENT_ACLS) + return allow_ntsec; + + return 0; +} + +#endif /* HAVE_CYGWIN */ diff --git a/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h b/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8bd5fad --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +/* + * + * cygwin_util.c + * + * Author: Corinna Vinschen + * + * Copyright (c) 2000 Corinna Vinschen , Duisburg, Germany + * All rights reserved + * + * Created: Sat Sep 02 12:17:00 2000 cv + * + * This file contains functions for forcing opened file descriptors to + * binary mode on Windows systems. + */ + +/* $Id$ */ + +#ifndef _BSD_CYGWIN_UTIL_H +#define _BSD_CYGWIN_UTIL_H + +#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN + +#include + +int binary_open(const char *filename, int flags, ...); +int binary_pipe(int fd[2]); +int check_nt_auth(int pwd_authenticated, uid_t uid); +int check_ntsec(const char *filename); + +#define open binary_open +#define pipe binary_pipe + +#endif /* HAVE_CYGWIN */ + +#endif /* _BSD_CYGWIN_UTIL_H */ diff --git a/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.c b/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d87d562 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.c @@ -0,0 +1,101 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999-2000 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +RCSID("$Id$"); + +char *get_progname(char *argv0) +{ +#ifdef HAVE___PROGNAME + extern char *__progname; + + return __progname; +#else + char *p; + + if (argv0 == NULL) + return "unknown"; /* XXX */ + p = strrchr(argv0, '/'); + if (p == NULL) + p = argv0; + else + p++; + return p; +#endif +} + +#ifndef HAVE_SETLOGIN +int setlogin(const char *name) +{ + return(0); +} +#endif /* !HAVE_SETLOGIN */ + +#ifndef HAVE_INNETGR +int innetgr(const char *netgroup, const char *host, + const char *user, const char *domain) +{ + return(0); +} +#endif /* HAVE_INNETGR */ + +#if !defined(HAVE_SETEUID) && defined(HAVE_SETREUID) +int seteuid(uid_t euid) +{ + return(setreuid(-1,euid)); +} +#endif /* !defined(HAVE_SETEUID) && defined(HAVE_SETREUID) */ + +#if !defined(HAVE_SETEGID) && defined(HAVE_SETRESGID) +int setegid(uid_t egid) +{ + return(setresgid(-1,egid,-1)); +} +#endif /* !defined(HAVE_SETEGID) && defined(HAVE_SETRESGID) */ + +#if !defined(HAVE_STRERROR) && defined(HAVE_SYS_ERRLIST) && defined(HAVE_SYS_NERR) +const char *strerror(int e) +{ + extern int sys_nerr; + extern char *sys_errlist[]; + + if ((e >= 0) && (e < sys_nerr)) + return(sys_errlist[e]); + else + return("unlisted error"); +} +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_UTIMES +int utimes(char *filename, struct timeval *tvp) +{ + struct utimbuf ub; + + ub.actime = tvp->tv_sec; + ub.modtime = tvp->tv_usec; + + return(utime(filename, &ub)); +} +#endif diff --git a/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h b/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3a85526 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h @@ -0,0 +1,76 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999-2000 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id$ */ + +#ifndef _BSD_MISC_H +#define _BSD_MISC_H + +#include "config.h" + +char *get_progname(char *argv0); + +#ifndef HAVE_SETSID +#define setsid() setpgrp(0, getpid()) +#endif /* !HAVE_SETSID */ + +#ifndef HAVE_SETENV +int setenv(const char *name, const char *value, int overwrite); +#endif /* !HAVE_SETENV */ + +#ifndef HAVE_SETLOGIN +int setlogin(const char *name); +#endif /* !HAVE_SETLOGIN */ + +#ifndef HAVE_INNETGR +int innetgr(const char *netgroup, const char *host, + const char *user, const char *domain); +#endif /* HAVE_INNETGR */ + +#if !defined(HAVE_SETEUID) && defined(HAVE_SETREUID) +int seteuid(uid_t euid); +#endif /* !defined(HAVE_SETEUID) && defined(HAVE_SETREUID) */ + +#if !defined(HAVE_SETEGID) && defined(HAVE_SETRESGID) +int setegid(uid_t egid); +#endif /* !defined(HAVE_SETEGID) && defined(HAVE_SETRESGID) */ + +#if !defined(HAVE_STRERROR) && defined(HAVE_SYS_ERRLIST) && defined(HAVE_SYS_NERR) +const char *strerror(int e); +#endif + + +#ifndef HAVE_UTIMES +#ifndef HAVE_STRUCT_TIMEVAL +struct timeval { + long tv_sec; + long tv_usec; +} +#endif /* HAVE_STRUCT_TIMEVAL */ + +int utimes(char *filename, struct timeval *tvp); +#endif /* HAVE_UTIMES */ + + +#endif /* _BSD_MISC_H */ diff --git a/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.c b/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f3c1fb6 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.c @@ -0,0 +1,103 @@ +/* + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +RCSID("$Id$"); + +#ifdef HAVE_NEXT +#include +#include +#include "bsd-nextstep.h" + +pid_t +posix_wait(int *status) +{ + union wait statusp; + pid_t wait_pid; + + #undef wait /* Use NeXT's wait() function */ + wait_pid = wait(&statusp); + if (status) + *status = (int) statusp.w_status; + + return wait_pid; +} + +int +tcgetattr(int fd, struct termios *t) +{ + return (ioctl(fd, TIOCGETA, t)); +} + +int +tcsetattr(int fd, int opt, const struct termios *t) +{ + struct termios localterm; + + if (opt & TCSASOFT) { + localterm = *t; + localterm.c_cflag |= CIGNORE; + t = &localterm; + } + switch (opt & ~TCSASOFT) { + case TCSANOW: + return (ioctl(fd, TIOCSETA, t)); + case TCSADRAIN: + return (ioctl(fd, TIOCSETAW, t)); + case TCSAFLUSH: + return (ioctl(fd, TIOCSETAF, t)); + default: + errno = EINVAL; + return (-1); + } +} + +int tcsetpgrp(int fd, pid_t pgrp) +{ + return (ioctl(fd, TIOCSPGRP, &pgrp)); +} + +speed_t cfgetospeed(const struct termios *t) +{ + return (t->c_ospeed); +} + +speed_t cfgetispeed(const struct termios *t) +{ + return (t->c_ispeed); +} + +int +cfsetospeed(struct termios *t,int speed) +{ + t->c_ospeed = speed; + return (0); +} + +int +cfsetispeed(struct termios *t, int speed) +{ + t->c_ispeed = speed; + return (0); +} +#endif /* HAVE_NEXT */ diff --git a/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h b/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fb7cb15 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h @@ -0,0 +1,58 @@ +/* + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + */ + +/* $Id$ */ + +#ifndef _NEXT_POSIX_H +#define _NEXT_POSIX_H + +#ifdef HAVE_NEXT +#include + +/* NGROUPS_MAX is behind -lposix. Use the BSD version which is NGROUPS */ +#undef NGROUPS_MAX +#define NGROUPS_MAX NGROUPS + +/* NeXT's readdir() is BSD (struct direct) not POSIX (struct dirent) */ +#define dirent direct + +/* Swap out NeXT's BSD wait() for a more POSIX complient one */ +pid_t posix_wait(int *status); +#define wait(a) posix_wait(a) + +/* #ifdef wrapped functions that need defining for clean compiling */ +pid_t getppid(void); +void vhangup(void); +int innetgr(const char *netgroup, const char *host, const char *user, + const char *domain); + +/* TERMCAP */ +int tcgetattr(int fd, struct termios *t); +int tcsetattr(int fd, int opt, const struct termios *t); +int tcsetpgrp(int fd, pid_t pgrp); +speed_t cfgetospeed(const struct termios *t); +speed_t cfgetispeed(const struct termios *t); +int cfsetospeed(struct termios *t, int speed); +int cfsetispeed(struct termios *t, int speed); +#endif /* HAVE_NEXT */ +#endif /* _NEXT_POSIX_H */ diff --git a/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-snprintf.c b/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-snprintf.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..cf3665a --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-snprintf.c @@ -0,0 +1,744 @@ +/************************************************************** + * Original: + * Patrick Powell Tue Apr 11 09:48:21 PDT 1995 + * A bombproof version of doprnt (dopr) included. + * Sigh. This sort of thing is always nasty do deal with. Note that + * the version here does not include floating point... + * + * snprintf() is used instead of sprintf() as it does limit checks + * for string length. This covers a nasty loophole. + * + * The other functions are there to prevent NULL pointers from + * causing nast effects. + * + * More Recently: + * Brandon Long 9/15/96 for mutt 0.43 + * This was ugly. It is still ugly. I opted out of floating point + * numbers, but the formatter understands just about everything + * from the normal C string format, at least as far as I can tell from + * the Solaris 2.5 printf(3S) man page. + * + * Brandon Long 10/22/97 for mutt 0.87.1 + * Ok, added some minimal floating point support, which means this + * probably requires libm on most operating systems. Don't yet + * support the exponent (e,E) and sigfig (g,G). Also, fmtint() + * was pretty badly broken, it just wasn't being exercised in ways + * which showed it, so that's been fixed. Also, formated the code + * to mutt conventions, and removed dead code left over from the + * original. Also, there is now a builtin-test, just compile with: + * gcc -DTEST_SNPRINTF -o snprintf snprintf.c -lm + * and run snprintf for results. + * + * Thomas Roessler 01/27/98 for mutt 0.89i + * The PGP code was using unsigned hexadecimal formats. + * Unfortunately, unsigned formats simply didn't work. + * + * Michael Elkins 03/05/98 for mutt 0.90.8 + * The original code assumed that both snprintf() and vsnprintf() were + * missing. Some systems only have snprintf() but not vsnprintf(), so + * the code is now broken down under HAVE_SNPRINTF and HAVE_VSNPRINTF. + * + * Ben Lindstrom 09/27/00 for OpenSSH + * Welcome to the world of %lld and %qd support. With other + * long long support. This is needed for sftp-server to work + * right. + * + * Ben Lindstrom 02/12/01 for OpenSSH + * Removed all hint of VARARGS stuff and banished it to the void, + * and did a bit of KNF style work to make things a bit more + * acceptable. Consider stealing from mutt or enlightenment. + **************************************************************/ + +#include "includes.h" + +RCSID("$Id$"); + +#if defined(BROKEN_SNPRINTF) /* For those with broken snprintf() */ +# undef HAVE_SNPRINTF +# undef HAVE_VSNPRINTF +#endif + +#if !defined(HAVE_SNPRINTF) || !defined(HAVE_VSNPRINTF) + +static void +dopr(char *buffer, size_t maxlen, const char *format, va_list args); + +static void +fmtstr(char *buffer, size_t *currlen, size_t maxlen, char *value, int flags, + int min, int max); + +static void +fmtint(char *buffer, size_t *currlen, size_t maxlen, long value, int base, + int min, int max, int flags); + +static void +fmtfp(char *buffer, size_t *currlen, size_t maxlen, long double fvalue, + int min, int max, int flags); + +static void +dopr_outch(char *buffer, size_t *currlen, size_t maxlen, char c); + +/* + * dopr(): poor man's version of doprintf + */ + +/* format read states */ +#define DP_S_DEFAULT 0 +#define DP_S_FLAGS 1 +#define DP_S_MIN 2 +#define DP_S_DOT 3 +#define DP_S_MAX 4 +#define DP_S_MOD 5 +#define DP_S_CONV 6 +#define DP_S_DONE 7 + +/* format flags - Bits */ +#define DP_F_MINUS (1 << 0) +#define DP_F_PLUS (1 << 1) +#define DP_F_SPACE (1 << 2) +#define DP_F_NUM (1 << 3) +#define DP_F_ZERO (1 << 4) +#define DP_F_UP (1 << 5) +#define DP_F_UNSIGNED (1 << 6) + +/* Conversion Flags */ +#define DP_C_SHORT 1 +#define DP_C_LONG 2 +#define DP_C_LDOUBLE 3 +#define DP_C_LONG_LONG 4 + +#define char_to_int(p) (p - '0') +#define abs_val(p) (p < 0 ? -p : p) + + +static void +dopr(char *buffer, size_t maxlen, const char *format, va_list args) +{ + char *strvalue; + char ch; + long value; + long double fvalue; + int min = 0; + int max = -1; + int state = DP_S_DEFAULT; + int flags = 0; + int cflags = 0; + size_t currlen = 0; + + ch = *format++; + + while (state != DP_S_DONE) { + if ((ch == '\0') || (currlen >= maxlen)) + state = DP_S_DONE; + + switch(state) { + case DP_S_DEFAULT: + if (ch == '%') + state = DP_S_FLAGS; + else + dopr_outch(buffer, &currlen, maxlen, ch); + ch = *format++; + break; + case DP_S_FLAGS: + switch (ch) { + case '-': + flags |= DP_F_MINUS; + ch = *format++; + break; + case '+': + flags |= DP_F_PLUS; + ch = *format++; + break; + case ' ': + flags |= DP_F_SPACE; + ch = *format++; + break; + case '#': + flags |= DP_F_NUM; + ch = *format++; + break; + case '0': + flags |= DP_F_ZERO; + ch = *format++; + break; + default: + state = DP_S_MIN; + break; + } + break; + case DP_S_MIN: + if (isdigit((unsigned char)ch)) { + min = 10*min + char_to_int (ch); + ch = *format++; + } else if (ch == '*') { + min = va_arg (args, int); + ch = *format++; + state = DP_S_DOT; + } else + state = DP_S_DOT; + break; + case DP_S_DOT: + if (ch == '.') { + state = DP_S_MAX; + ch = *format++; + } else + state = DP_S_MOD; + break; + case DP_S_MAX: + if (isdigit((unsigned char)ch)) { + if (max < 0) + max = 0; + max = 10*max + char_to_int(ch); + ch = *format++; + } else if (ch == '*') { + max = va_arg (args, int); + ch = *format++; + state = DP_S_MOD; + } else + state = DP_S_MOD; + break; + case DP_S_MOD: + switch (ch) { + case 'h': + cflags = DP_C_SHORT; + ch = *format++; + break; + case 'l': + cflags = DP_C_LONG; + ch = *format++; + if (ch == 'l') { + cflags = DP_C_LONG_LONG; + ch = *format++; + } + break; + case 'q': + cflags = DP_C_LONG_LONG; + ch = *format++; + break; + case 'L': + cflags = DP_C_LDOUBLE; + ch = *format++; + break; + default: + break; + } + state = DP_S_CONV; + break; + case DP_S_CONV: + switch (ch) { + case 'd': + case 'i': + if (cflags == DP_C_SHORT) + value = va_arg(args, int); + else if (cflags == DP_C_LONG) + value = va_arg(args, long int); + else if (cflags == DP_C_LONG_LONG) + value = va_arg (args, long long); + else + value = va_arg (args, int); + fmtint(buffer, &currlen, maxlen, value, 10, min, max, flags); + break; + case 'o': + flags |= DP_F_UNSIGNED; + if (cflags == DP_C_SHORT) + value = va_arg(args, unsigned int); + else if (cflags == DP_C_LONG) + value = va_arg(args, unsigned long int); + else if (cflags == DP_C_LONG_LONG) + value = va_arg(args, unsigned long long); + else + value = va_arg(args, unsigned int); + fmtint(buffer, &currlen, maxlen, value, 8, min, max, flags); + break; + case 'u': + flags |= DP_F_UNSIGNED; + if (cflags == DP_C_SHORT) + value = va_arg(args, unsigned int); + else if (cflags == DP_C_LONG) + value = va_arg(args, unsigned long int); + else if (cflags == DP_C_LONG_LONG) + value = va_arg(args, unsigned long long); + else + value = va_arg(args, unsigned int); + fmtint (buffer, &currlen, maxlen, value, 10, min, max, flags); + break; + case 'X': + flags |= DP_F_UP; + case 'x': + flags |= DP_F_UNSIGNED; + if (cflags == DP_C_SHORT) + value = va_arg(args, unsigned int); + else if (cflags == DP_C_LONG) + value = va_arg(args, unsigned long int); + else if (cflags == DP_C_LONG_LONG) + value = va_arg(args, unsigned long long); + else + value = va_arg(args, unsigned int); + fmtint(buffer, &currlen, maxlen, value, 16, min, max, flags); + break; + case 'f': + if (cflags == DP_C_LDOUBLE) + fvalue = va_arg(args, long double); + else + fvalue = va_arg(args, double); + /* um, floating point? */ + fmtfp(buffer, &currlen, maxlen, fvalue, min, max, flags); + break; + case 'E': + flags |= DP_F_UP; + case 'e': + if (cflags == DP_C_LDOUBLE) + fvalue = va_arg(args, long double); + else + fvalue = va_arg(args, double); + break; + case 'G': + flags |= DP_F_UP; + case 'g': + if (cflags == DP_C_LDOUBLE) + fvalue = va_arg(args, long double); + else + fvalue = va_arg(args, double); + break; + case 'c': + dopr_outch(buffer, &currlen, maxlen, va_arg(args, int)); + break; + case 's': + strvalue = va_arg(args, char *); + if (max < 0) + max = maxlen; /* ie, no max */ + fmtstr(buffer, &currlen, maxlen, strvalue, flags, min, max); + break; + case 'p': + strvalue = va_arg(args, void *); + fmtint(buffer, &currlen, maxlen, (long) strvalue, 16, min, max, flags); + break; + case 'n': + if (cflags == DP_C_SHORT) { + short int *num; + num = va_arg(args, short int *); + *num = currlen; + } else if (cflags == DP_C_LONG) { + long int *num; + num = va_arg(args, long int *); + *num = currlen; + } else if (cflags == DP_C_LONG_LONG) { + long long *num; + num = va_arg(args, long long *); + *num = currlen; + } else { + int *num; + num = va_arg(args, int *); + *num = currlen; + } + break; + case '%': + dopr_outch(buffer, &currlen, maxlen, ch); + break; + case 'w': /* not supported yet, treat as next char */ + ch = *format++; + break; + default: /* Unknown, skip */ + break; + } + ch = *format++; + state = DP_S_DEFAULT; + flags = cflags = min = 0; + max = -1; + break; + case DP_S_DONE: + break; + default: /* hmm? */ + break; /* some picky compilers need this */ + } + } + if (currlen < maxlen - 1) + buffer[currlen] = '\0'; + else + buffer[maxlen - 1] = '\0'; +} + +static void +fmtstr(char *buffer, size_t *currlen, size_t maxlen, + char *value, int flags, int min, int max) +{ + int padlen, strln; /* amount to pad */ + int cnt = 0; + + if (value == 0) + value = ""; + + for (strln = 0; value[strln]; ++strln); /* strlen */ + padlen = min - strln; + if (padlen < 0) + padlen = 0; + if (flags & DP_F_MINUS) + padlen = -padlen; /* Left Justify */ + + while ((padlen > 0) && (cnt < max)) { + dopr_outch(buffer, currlen, maxlen, ' '); + --padlen; + ++cnt; + } + while (*value && (cnt < max)) { + dopr_outch(buffer, currlen, maxlen, *value++); + ++cnt; + } + while ((padlen < 0) && (cnt < max)) { + dopr_outch(buffer, currlen, maxlen, ' '); + ++padlen; + ++cnt; + } +} + +/* Have to handle DP_F_NUM (ie 0x and 0 alternates) */ + +static void +fmtint(char *buffer, size_t *currlen, size_t maxlen, + long value, int base, int min, int max, int flags) +{ + unsigned long uvalue; + char convert[20]; + int signvalue = 0; + int place = 0; + int spadlen = 0; /* amount to space pad */ + int zpadlen = 0; /* amount to zero pad */ + int caps = 0; + + if (max < 0) + max = 0; + + uvalue = value; + + if (!(flags & DP_F_UNSIGNED)) { + if (value < 0) { + signvalue = '-'; + uvalue = -value; + } else if (flags & DP_F_PLUS) /* Do a sign (+/i) */ + signvalue = '+'; + else if (flags & DP_F_SPACE) + signvalue = ' '; + } + + if (flags & DP_F_UP) + caps = 1; /* Should characters be upper case? */ + + do { + convert[place++] = + (caps? "0123456789ABCDEF":"0123456789abcdef") + [uvalue % (unsigned)base]; + uvalue = (uvalue / (unsigned)base ); + } while (uvalue && (place < 20)); + if (place == 20) + place--; + convert[place] = 0; + + zpadlen = max - place; + spadlen = min - MAX (max, place) - (signvalue ? 1 : 0); + if (zpadlen < 0) + zpadlen = 0; + if (spadlen < 0) + spadlen = 0; + if (flags & DP_F_ZERO) { + zpadlen = MAX(zpadlen, spadlen); + spadlen = 0; + } + if (flags & DP_F_MINUS) + spadlen = -spadlen; /* Left Justifty */ + + + /* Spaces */ + while (spadlen > 0) { + dopr_outch(buffer, currlen, maxlen, ' '); + --spadlen; + } + + /* Sign */ + if (signvalue) + dopr_outch(buffer, currlen, maxlen, signvalue); + + /* Zeros */ + if (zpadlen > 0) { + while (zpadlen > 0) { + dopr_outch(buffer, currlen, maxlen, '0'); + --zpadlen; + } + } + + /* Digits */ + while (place > 0) + dopr_outch(buffer, currlen, maxlen, convert[--place]); + + /* Left Justified spaces */ + while (spadlen < 0) { + dopr_outch (buffer, currlen, maxlen, ' '); + ++spadlen; + } +} + +static long double +pow10(int exp) +{ + long double result = 1; + + while (exp) { + result *= 10; + exp--; + } + + return result; +} + +static long +round(long double value) +{ + long intpart = value; + + value -= intpart; + if (value >= 0.5) + intpart++; + + return intpart; +} + +static void +fmtfp(char *buffer, size_t *currlen, size_t maxlen, long double fvalue, + int min, int max, int flags) +{ + char iconvert[20]; + char fconvert[20]; + int signvalue = 0; + int iplace = 0; + int fplace = 0; + int padlen = 0; /* amount to pad */ + int zpadlen = 0; + int caps = 0; + long intpart; + long fracpart; + long double ufvalue; + + /* + * AIX manpage says the default is 0, but Solaris says the default + * is 6, and sprintf on AIX defaults to 6 + */ + if (max < 0) + max = 6; + + ufvalue = abs_val(fvalue); + + if (fvalue < 0) + signvalue = '-'; + else if (flags & DP_F_PLUS) /* Do a sign (+/i) */ + signvalue = '+'; + else if (flags & DP_F_SPACE) + signvalue = ' '; + + intpart = ufvalue; + + /* + * Sorry, we only support 9 digits past the decimal because of our + * conversion method + */ + if (max > 9) + max = 9; + + /* We "cheat" by converting the fractional part to integer by + * multiplying by a factor of 10 + */ + fracpart = round((pow10 (max)) * (ufvalue - intpart)); + + if (fracpart >= pow10 (max)) { + intpart++; + fracpart -= pow10 (max); + } + + /* Convert integer part */ + do { + iconvert[iplace++] = + (caps? "0123456789ABCDEF":"0123456789abcdef")[intpart % 10]; + intpart = (intpart / 10); + } while(intpart && (iplace < 20)); + if (iplace == 20) + iplace--; + iconvert[iplace] = 0; + + /* Convert fractional part */ + do { + fconvert[fplace++] = + (caps? "0123456789ABCDEF":"0123456789abcdef")[fracpart % 10]; + fracpart = (fracpart / 10); + } while(fracpart && (fplace < 20)); + if (fplace == 20) + fplace--; + fconvert[fplace] = 0; + + /* -1 for decimal point, another -1 if we are printing a sign */ + padlen = min - iplace - max - 1 - ((signvalue) ? 1 : 0); + zpadlen = max - fplace; + if (zpadlen < 0) + zpadlen = 0; + if (padlen < 0) + padlen = 0; + if (flags & DP_F_MINUS) + padlen = -padlen; /* Left Justifty */ + + if ((flags & DP_F_ZERO) && (padlen > 0)) { + if (signvalue) { + dopr_outch(buffer, currlen, maxlen, signvalue); + --padlen; + signvalue = 0; + } + while (padlen > 0) { + dopr_outch(buffer, currlen, maxlen, '0'); + --padlen; + } + } + while (padlen > 0) { + dopr_outch(buffer, currlen, maxlen, ' '); + --padlen; + } + if (signvalue) + dopr_outch(buffer, currlen, maxlen, signvalue); + + while (iplace > 0) + dopr_outch(buffer, currlen, maxlen, iconvert[--iplace]); + + /* + * Decimal point. This should probably use locale to find the correct + * char to print out. + */ + dopr_outch(buffer, currlen, maxlen, '.'); + + while (fplace > 0) + dopr_outch(buffer, currlen, maxlen, fconvert[--fplace]); + + while (zpadlen > 0) { + dopr_outch(buffer, currlen, maxlen, '0'); + --zpadlen; + } + + while (padlen < 0) { + dopr_outch(buffer, currlen, maxlen, ' '); + ++padlen; + } +} + +static void +dopr_outch(char *buffer, size_t *currlen, size_t maxlen, char c) +{ + if (*currlen < maxlen) + buffer[(*currlen)++] = c; +} +#endif /* !defined(HAVE_SNPRINTF) || !defined(HAVE_VSNPRINTF) */ + +#ifndef HAVE_VSNPRINTF +int +vsnprintf(char *str, size_t count, const char *fmt, va_list args) +{ + str[0] = 0; + dopr(str, count, fmt, args); + + return(strlen(str)); +} +#endif /* !HAVE_VSNPRINTF */ + +#ifndef HAVE_SNPRINTF +int +snprintf(char *str,size_t count,const char *fmt,...) +{ + va_list ap; + + va_start(ap, fmt); + (void) vsnprintf(str, count, fmt, ap); + va_end(ap); + + return(strlen(str)); +} + +#ifdef TEST_SNPRINTF +int +main(void) +{ +#define LONG_STRING 1024 + char buf1[LONG_STRING]; + char buf2[LONG_STRING]; + char *fp_fmt[] = { + "%-1.5f", + "%1.5f", + "%123.9f", + "%10.5f", + "% 10.5f", + "%+22.9f", + "%+4.9f", + "%01.3f", + "%4f", + "%3.1f", + "%3.2f", + NULL + }; + double fp_nums[] = { + -1.5, + 134.21, + 91340.2, + 341.1234, + 0203.9, + 0.96, + 0.996, + 0.9996, + 1.996, + 4.136, + 0 + }; + char *int_fmt[] = { + "%-1.5d", + "%1.5d", + "%123.9d", + "%5.5d", + "%10.5d", + "% 10.5d", + "%+22.33d", + "%01.3d", + "%4d", + "%lld", + "%qd", + NULL + }; + long long int_nums[] = { -1, 134, 91340, 341, 0203, 0, 9999999 }; + int x, y; + int fail = 0; + int num = 0; + + printf("Testing snprintf format codes against system sprintf...\n"); + + for (x = 0; fp_fmt[x] != NULL ; x++) { + for (y = 0; fp_nums[y] != 0 ; y++) { + snprintf(buf1, sizeof (buf1), fp_fmt[x], fp_nums[y]); + sprintf (buf2, fp_fmt[x], fp_nums[y]); + if (strcmp (buf1, buf2)) { + printf("snprintf doesn't match Format: %s\n\t" + "snprintf = %s\n\tsprintf = %s\n", + fp_fmt[x], buf1, buf2); + fail++; + } + num++; + } + } + for (x = 0; int_fmt[x] != NULL ; x++) { + for (y = 0; int_nums[y] != 0 ; y++) { + snprintf(buf1, sizeof (buf1), int_fmt[x], int_nums[y]); + sprintf(buf2, int_fmt[x], int_nums[y]); + if (strcmp (buf1, buf2)) { + printf("snprintf doesn't match Format: %s\n\t" + "snprintf = %s\n\tsprintf = %s\n", + int_fmt[x], buf1, buf2); + fail++; + } + num++; + } + } + printf("%d tests failed out of %d.\n", fail, num); + return(0); +} +#endif /* SNPRINTF_TEST */ + +#endif /* !HAVE_SNPRINTF */ diff --git a/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-snprintf.h b/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-snprintf.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ce5a1f4 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-snprintf.h @@ -0,0 +1,19 @@ +/* $Id$ */ + +#ifndef _BSD_SNPRINTF_H +#define _BSD_SNPRINTF_H + +#include "config.h" + +#include /* For size_t */ + +#ifndef HAVE_SNPRINTF +int snprintf(char *str, size_t count, const char *fmt, ...); +#endif /* !HAVE_SNPRINTF */ + +#ifndef HAVE_VSNPRINTF +int vsnprintf(char *str, size_t count, const char *fmt, va_list args); +#endif /* !HAVE_SNPRINTF */ + + +#endif /* _BSD_SNPRINTF_H */ diff --git a/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.c b/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c2178d6 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.c @@ -0,0 +1,52 @@ +/* + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +RCSID("$Id$"); + +#ifndef HAVE_WAITPID +#include +#include +#include "bsd-waitpid.h" + +pid_t +waitpid(int pid, int *stat_loc, int options) +{ + union wait statusp; + pid_t wait_pid; + + if (pid <= 0) { + if (pid != -1) { + errno = EINVAL; + return -1; + } + pid = 0; /* wait4() wants pid=0 for indiscriminate wait. */ + } + wait_pid = wait4(pid, &statusp, options, NULL); + if (stat_loc) + *stat_loc = (int) statusp.w_status; + + return wait_pid; +} + +#endif /* !HAVE_WAITPID */ diff --git a/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h b/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..bc50189 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h @@ -0,0 +1,49 @@ +/* + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + */ + +/* $Id$ */ + +#ifndef _BSD_WAITPID_H +#define _BSD_WAITPID_H + +#ifndef HAVE_WAITPID +/* Clean out any potental issues */ +#undef WIFEXITED +#undef WIFSTOPPED +#undef WIFSIGNALED + +/* Define required functions to mimic a POSIX look and feel */ +#define _W_INT(w) (*(int*)&(w)) /* convert union wait to int */ +#define WIFEXITED(w) (!((_W_INT(w)) & 0377)) +#define WIFSTOPPED(w) ((_W_INT(w)) & 0100) +#define WIFSIGNALED(w) (!WIFEXITED(w) && !WIFSTOPPED(w)) +#define WEXITSTATUS(w) (int)(WIFEXITED(w) ? ((_W_INT(w) >> 8) & 0377) : -1) +#define WTERMSIG(w) (int)(WIFSIGNALED(w) ? (_W_INT(w) & 0177) : -1) +#define WCOREFLAG 0x80 +#define WCOREDUMP(w) ((_W_INT(w)) & WCOREFLAG) + +/* Prototype */ +pid_t waitpid(int pid, int *stat_loc, int options); + +#endif /* !HAVE_WAITPID */ +#endif /* _BSD_WAITPID_H */ diff --git a/openssh/openbsd-compat/daemon.c b/openssh/openbsd-compat/daemon.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f704a90 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/openbsd-compat/daemon.c @@ -0,0 +1,81 @@ +/*- + * Copyright (c) 1990, 1993 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the University of + * California, Berkeley and its contributors. + * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#ifndef HAVE_DAEMON + +#if defined(LIBC_SCCS) && !defined(lint) +static char rcsid[] = "$OpenBSD: daemon.c,v 1.2 1996/08/19 08:22:13 tholo Exp $"; +#endif /* LIBC_SCCS and not lint */ + +int +daemon(nochdir, noclose) + int nochdir, noclose; +{ + int fd; + + switch (fork()) { + case -1: + return (-1); + case 0: + break; + default: +#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN + /* + * This sleep avoids a race condition which kills the + * child process if parent is started by a NT/W2K service. + */ + sleep(1); +#endif + _exit(0); + } + + if (setsid() == -1) + return (-1); + + if (!nochdir) + (void)chdir("/"); + + if (!noclose && (fd = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR, 0)) != -1) { + (void)dup2(fd, STDIN_FILENO); + (void)dup2(fd, STDOUT_FILENO); + (void)dup2(fd, STDERR_FILENO); + if (fd > 2) + (void)close (fd); + } + return (0); +} + +#endif /* !HAVE_DAEMON */ + diff --git a/openssh/openbsd-compat/daemon.h b/openssh/openbsd-compat/daemon.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..241867f --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/openbsd-compat/daemon.h @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +/* $Id$ */ + +#ifndef _BSD_DAEMON_H +#define _BSD_DAEMON_H + +#include "config.h" +#ifndef HAVE_DAEMON +int daemon(int nochdir, int noclose); +#endif /* !HAVE_DAEMON */ + +#endif /* _BSD_DAEMON_H */ diff --git a/openssh/openbsd-compat/dirname.c b/openssh/openbsd-compat/dirname.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a76a1dc --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/openbsd-compat/dirname.c @@ -0,0 +1,80 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: dirname.c,v 1.5 2001/06/27 00:58:54 lebel Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 Todd C. Miller + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, + * INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY + * AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL + * THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, + * PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; + * OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, + * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR + * OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF + * ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" +#ifndef HAVE_DIRNAME + +#if defined(LIBC_SCCS) && !defined(lint) +static char rcsid[] = "$OpenBSD: dirname.c,v 1.5 2001/06/27 00:58:54 lebel Exp $"; +#endif /* LIBC_SCCS and not lint */ + +#include +#include +#include + +char * +dirname(path) + const char *path; +{ + static char bname[MAXPATHLEN]; + register const char *endp; + + /* Empty or NULL string gets treated as "." */ + if (path == NULL || *path == '\0') { + (void)strcpy(bname, "."); + return(bname); + } + + /* Strip trailing slashes */ + endp = path + strlen(path) - 1; + while (endp > path && *endp == '/') + endp--; + + /* Find the start of the dir */ + while (endp > path && *endp != '/') + endp--; + + /* Either the dir is "/" or there are no slashes */ + if (endp == path) { + (void)strcpy(bname, *endp == '/' ? "/" : "."); + return(bname); + } else { + do { + endp--; + } while (endp > path && *endp == '/'); + } + + if (endp - path + 1 > sizeof(bname)) { + errno = ENAMETOOLONG; + return(NULL); + } + strlcpy(bname, path, endp - path + 2); + return(bname); +} +#endif diff --git a/openssh/openbsd-compat/dirname.h b/openssh/openbsd-compat/dirname.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1d61dd0 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/openbsd-compat/dirname.h @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +#ifndef HAVE_DIRNAME + +char *dirname(const char *path); + +#endif diff --git a/openssh/openbsd-compat/fake-gai-errnos.h b/openssh/openbsd-compat/fake-gai-errnos.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..af51a1c --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/openbsd-compat/fake-gai-errnos.h @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +/* + * fake library for ssh + * + * This file is included in getaddrinfo.c and getnameinfo.c. + * See getaddrinfo.c and getnameinfo.c. + */ + +/* $Id$ */ + +/* for old netdb.h */ +#ifndef EAI_NODATA +#define EAI_NODATA 1 +#define EAI_MEMORY 2 +#endif diff --git a/openssh/openbsd-compat/fake-getaddrinfo.c b/openssh/openbsd-compat/fake-getaddrinfo.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5a1ad97 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/openbsd-compat/fake-getaddrinfo.c @@ -0,0 +1,121 @@ +/* + * fake library for ssh + * + * This file includes getaddrinfo(), freeaddrinfo() and gai_strerror(). + * These funtions are defined in rfc2133. + * + * But these functions are not implemented correctly. The minimum subset + * is implemented for ssh use only. For exapmle, this routine assumes + * that ai_family is AF_INET. Don't use it for another purpose. + */ + +#include "includes.h" +#include "ssh.h" + +RCSID("$Id$"); + +#ifndef HAVE_GAI_STRERROR +char *gai_strerror(int ecode) +{ + switch (ecode) { + case EAI_NODATA: + return "no address associated with hostname."; + case EAI_MEMORY: + return "memory allocation failure."; + default: + return "unknown error."; + } +} +#endif /* !HAVE_GAI_STRERROR */ + +#ifndef HAVE_FREEADDRINFO +void freeaddrinfo(struct addrinfo *ai) +{ + struct addrinfo *next; + + do { + next = ai->ai_next; + free(ai); + } while (NULL != (ai = next)); +} +#endif /* !HAVE_FREEADDRINFO */ + +#ifndef HAVE_GETADDRINFO +static struct addrinfo *malloc_ai(int port, u_long addr) +{ + struct addrinfo *ai; + + ai = malloc(sizeof(struct addrinfo) + sizeof(struct sockaddr_in)); + if (ai == NULL) + return(NULL); + + memset(ai, 0, sizeof(struct addrinfo) + sizeof(struct sockaddr_in)); + + ai->ai_addr = (struct sockaddr *)(ai + 1); + /* XXX -- ssh doesn't use sa_len */ + ai->ai_addrlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in); + ai->ai_addr->sa_family = ai->ai_family = AF_INET; + + ((struct sockaddr_in *)(ai)->ai_addr)->sin_port = port; + ((struct sockaddr_in *)(ai)->ai_addr)->sin_addr.s_addr = addr; + + return(ai); +} + +int getaddrinfo(const char *hostname, const char *servname, + const struct addrinfo *hints, struct addrinfo **res) +{ + struct addrinfo *cur, *prev = NULL; + struct hostent *hp; + struct in_addr in; + int i, port; + + if (servname) + port = htons(atoi(servname)); + else + port = 0; + + if (hints && hints->ai_flags & AI_PASSIVE) { + if (NULL != (*res = malloc_ai(port, htonl(0x00000000)))) + return 0; + else + return EAI_MEMORY; + } + + if (!hostname) { + if (NULL != (*res = malloc_ai(port, htonl(0x7f000001)))) + return 0; + else + return EAI_MEMORY; + } + + if (inet_aton(hostname, &in)) { + if (NULL != (*res = malloc_ai(port, in.s_addr))) + return 0; + else + return EAI_MEMORY; + } + + hp = gethostbyname(hostname); + if (hp && hp->h_name && hp->h_name[0] && hp->h_addr_list[0]) { + for (i = 0; hp->h_addr_list[i]; i++) { + cur = malloc_ai(port, ((struct in_addr *)hp->h_addr_list[i])->s_addr); + if (cur == NULL) { + if (*res) + freeaddrinfo(*res); + return EAI_MEMORY; + } + + if (prev) + prev->ai_next = cur; + else + *res = cur; + + prev = cur; + } + return 0; + } + + return EAI_NODATA; +} +#endif /* !HAVE_GETADDRINFO */ diff --git a/openssh/openbsd-compat/fake-getaddrinfo.h b/openssh/openbsd-compat/fake-getaddrinfo.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ba5e3fe --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/openbsd-compat/fake-getaddrinfo.h @@ -0,0 +1,47 @@ +/* $Id$ */ + +#ifndef _FAKE_GETADDRINFO_H +#define _FAKE_GETADDRINFO_H + +#include "config.h" + +#include "fake-gai-errnos.h" + +#ifndef AI_PASSIVE +# define AI_PASSIVE 1 +# define AI_CANONNAME 2 +#endif + +#ifndef NI_NUMERICHOST +# define NI_NUMERICHOST 2 +# define NI_NAMEREQD 4 +# define NI_NUMERICSERV 8 +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_STRUCT_ADDRINFO +struct addrinfo { + int ai_flags; /* AI_PASSIVE, AI_CANONNAME */ + int ai_family; /* PF_xxx */ + int ai_socktype; /* SOCK_xxx */ + int ai_protocol; /* 0 or IPPROTO_xxx for IPv4 and IPv6 */ + size_t ai_addrlen; /* length of ai_addr */ + char *ai_canonname; /* canonical name for hostname */ + struct sockaddr *ai_addr; /* binary address */ + struct addrinfo *ai_next; /* next structure in linked list */ +}; +#endif /* !HAVE_STRUCT_ADDRINFO */ + +#ifndef HAVE_GETADDRINFO +int getaddrinfo(const char *hostname, const char *servname, + const struct addrinfo *hints, struct addrinfo **res); +#endif /* !HAVE_GETADDRINFO */ + +#ifndef HAVE_GAI_STRERROR +char *gai_strerror(int ecode); +#endif /* !HAVE_GAI_STRERROR */ + +#ifndef HAVE_FREEADDRINFO +void freeaddrinfo(struct addrinfo *ai); +#endif /* !HAVE_FREEADDRINFO */ + +#endif /* _FAKE_GETADDRINFO_H */ diff --git a/openssh/openbsd-compat/fake-getnameinfo.c b/openssh/openbsd-compat/fake-getnameinfo.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8f6f19e --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/openbsd-compat/fake-getnameinfo.c @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ +/* + * fake library for ssh + * + * This file includes getnameinfo(). + * These funtions are defined in rfc2133. + * + * But these functions are not implemented correctly. The minimum subset + * is implemented for ssh use only. For exapmle, this routine assumes + * that ai_family is AF_INET. Don't use it for another purpose. + */ + +#include "includes.h" +#include "ssh.h" + +RCSID("$Id$"); + +#ifndef HAVE_GETNAMEINFO +int getnameinfo(const struct sockaddr *sa, size_t salen, char *host, + size_t hostlen, char *serv, size_t servlen, int flags) +{ + struct sockaddr_in *sin = (struct sockaddr_in *)sa; + struct hostent *hp; + char tmpserv[16]; + + if (serv) { + snprintf(tmpserv, sizeof(tmpserv), "%d", ntohs(sin->sin_port)); + if (strlen(tmpserv) >= servlen) + return EAI_MEMORY; + else + strcpy(serv, tmpserv); + } + + if (host) { + if (flags & NI_NUMERICHOST) { + if (strlen(inet_ntoa(sin->sin_addr)) >= hostlen) + return EAI_MEMORY; + + strcpy(host, inet_ntoa(sin->sin_addr)); + return 0; + } else { + hp = gethostbyaddr((char *)&sin->sin_addr, + sizeof(struct in_addr), AF_INET); + if (hp == NULL) + return EAI_NODATA; + + if (strlen(hp->h_name) >= hostlen) + return EAI_MEMORY; + + strcpy(host, hp->h_name); + return 0; + } + } + return 0; +} +#endif /* !HAVE_GETNAMEINFO */ diff --git a/openssh/openbsd-compat/fake-getnameinfo.h b/openssh/openbsd-compat/fake-getnameinfo.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b91c791 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/openbsd-compat/fake-getnameinfo.h @@ -0,0 +1,20 @@ +/* $Id$ */ + +#ifndef _FAKE_GETNAMEINFO_H +#define _FAKE_GETNAMEINFO_H + +#include "config.h" + +#ifndef HAVE_GETNAMEINFO +int getnameinfo(const struct sockaddr *sa, size_t salen, char *host, + size_t hostlen, char *serv, size_t servlen, int flags); +#endif /* !HAVE_GETNAMEINFO */ + +#ifndef NI_MAXSERV +# define NI_MAXSERV 32 +#endif /* !NI_MAXSERV */ +#ifndef NI_MAXHOST +# define NI_MAXHOST 1025 +#endif /* !NI_MAXHOST */ + +#endif /* _FAKE_GETNAMEINFO_H */ diff --git a/openssh/openbsd-compat/fake-queue.h b/openssh/openbsd-compat/fake-queue.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..269af41 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/openbsd-compat/fake-queue.h @@ -0,0 +1,490 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: queue.h,v 1.16 2000/09/07 19:47:59 art Exp $ */ +/* $NetBSD: queue.h,v 1.11 1996/05/16 05:17:14 mycroft Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 1991, 1993 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the University of + * California, Berkeley and its contributors. + * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * @(#)queue.h 8.5 (Berkeley) 8/20/94 + */ + +#ifndef _SYS_QUEUE_H_ +#define _SYS_QUEUE_H_ + +/* + * This file defines five types of data structures: singly-linked lists, + * lists, simple queues, tail queues, and circular queues. + * + * + * A singly-linked list is headed by a single forward pointer. The elements + * are singly linked for minimum space and pointer manipulation overhead at + * the expense of O(n) removal for arbitrary elements. New elements can be + * added to the list after an existing element or at the head of the list. + * Elements being removed from the head of the list should use the explicit + * macro for this purpose for optimum efficiency. A singly-linked list may + * only be traversed in the forward direction. Singly-linked lists are ideal + * for applications with large datasets and few or no removals or for + * implementing a LIFO queue. + * + * A list is headed by a single forward pointer (or an array of forward + * pointers for a hash table header). The elements are doubly linked + * so that an arbitrary element can be removed without a need to + * traverse the list. New elements can be added to the list before + * or after an existing element or at the head of the list. A list + * may only be traversed in the forward direction. + * + * A simple queue is headed by a pair of pointers, one the head of the + * list and the other to the tail of the list. The elements are singly + * linked to save space, so elements can only be removed from the + * head of the list. New elements can be added to the list before or after + * an existing element, at the head of the list, or at the end of the + * list. A simple queue may only be traversed in the forward direction. + * + * A tail queue is headed by a pair of pointers, one to the head of the + * list and the other to the tail of the list. The elements are doubly + * linked so that an arbitrary element can be removed without a need to + * traverse the list. New elements can be added to the list before or + * after an existing element, at the head of the list, or at the end of + * the list. A tail queue may be traversed in either direction. + * + * A circle queue is headed by a pair of pointers, one to the head of the + * list and the other to the tail of the list. The elements are doubly + * linked so that an arbitrary element can be removed without a need to + * traverse the list. New elements can be added to the list before or after + * an existing element, at the head of the list, or at the end of the list. + * A circle queue may be traversed in either direction, but has a more + * complex end of list detection. + * + * For details on the use of these macros, see the queue(3) manual page. + */ + +/* + * Singly-linked List definitions. + */ +#define SLIST_HEAD(name, type) \ +struct name { \ + struct type *slh_first; /* first element */ \ +} + +#define SLIST_HEAD_INITIALIZER(head) \ + { NULL } + +#define SLIST_ENTRY(type) \ +struct { \ + struct type *sle_next; /* next element */ \ +} + +/* + * Singly-linked List access methods. + */ +#define SLIST_FIRST(head) ((head)->slh_first) +#define SLIST_END(head) NULL +#define SLIST_EMPTY(head) (SLIST_FIRST(head) == SLIST_END(head)) +#define SLIST_NEXT(elm, field) ((elm)->field.sle_next) + +#define SLIST_FOREACH(var, head, field) \ + for((var) = SLIST_FIRST(head); \ + (var) != SLIST_END(head); \ + (var) = SLIST_NEXT(var, field)) + +/* + * Singly-linked List functions. + */ +#define SLIST_INIT(head) { \ + SLIST_FIRST(head) = SLIST_END(head); \ +} + +#define SLIST_INSERT_AFTER(slistelm, elm, field) do { \ + (elm)->field.sle_next = (slistelm)->field.sle_next; \ + (slistelm)->field.sle_next = (elm); \ +} while (0) + +#define SLIST_INSERT_HEAD(head, elm, field) do { \ + (elm)->field.sle_next = (head)->slh_first; \ + (head)->slh_first = (elm); \ +} while (0) + +#define SLIST_REMOVE_HEAD(head, field) do { \ + (head)->slh_first = (head)->slh_first->field.sle_next; \ +} while (0) + +/* + * List definitions. + */ +#define LIST_HEAD(name, type) \ +struct name { \ + struct type *lh_first; /* first element */ \ +} + +#define LIST_HEAD_INITIALIZER(head) \ + { NULL } + +#define LIST_ENTRY(type) \ +struct { \ + struct type *le_next; /* next element */ \ + struct type **le_prev; /* address of previous next element */ \ +} + +/* + * List access methods + */ +#define LIST_FIRST(head) ((head)->lh_first) +#define LIST_END(head) NULL +#define LIST_EMPTY(head) (LIST_FIRST(head) == LIST_END(head)) +#define LIST_NEXT(elm, field) ((elm)->field.le_next) + +#define LIST_FOREACH(var, head, field) \ + for((var) = LIST_FIRST(head); \ + (var)!= LIST_END(head); \ + (var) = LIST_NEXT(var, field)) + +/* + * List functions. + */ +#define LIST_INIT(head) do { \ + LIST_FIRST(head) = LIST_END(head); \ +} while (0) + +#define LIST_INSERT_AFTER(listelm, elm, field) do { \ + if (((elm)->field.le_next = (listelm)->field.le_next) != NULL) \ + (listelm)->field.le_next->field.le_prev = \ + &(elm)->field.le_next; \ + (listelm)->field.le_next = (elm); \ + (elm)->field.le_prev = &(listelm)->field.le_next; \ +} while (0) + +#define LIST_INSERT_BEFORE(listelm, elm, field) do { \ + (elm)->field.le_prev = (listelm)->field.le_prev; \ + (elm)->field.le_next = (listelm); \ + *(listelm)->field.le_prev = (elm); \ + (listelm)->field.le_prev = &(elm)->field.le_next; \ +} while (0) + +#define LIST_INSERT_HEAD(head, elm, field) do { \ + if (((elm)->field.le_next = (head)->lh_first) != NULL) \ + (head)->lh_first->field.le_prev = &(elm)->field.le_next;\ + (head)->lh_first = (elm); \ + (elm)->field.le_prev = &(head)->lh_first; \ +} while (0) + +#define LIST_REMOVE(elm, field) do { \ + if ((elm)->field.le_next != NULL) \ + (elm)->field.le_next->field.le_prev = \ + (elm)->field.le_prev; \ + *(elm)->field.le_prev = (elm)->field.le_next; \ +} while (0) + +#define LIST_REPLACE(elm, elm2, field) do { \ + if (((elm2)->field.le_next = (elm)->field.le_next) != NULL) \ + (elm2)->field.le_next->field.le_prev = \ + &(elm2)->field.le_next; \ + (elm2)->field.le_prev = (elm)->field.le_prev; \ + *(elm2)->field.le_prev = (elm2); \ +} while (0) + +/* + * Simple queue definitions. + */ +#define SIMPLEQ_HEAD(name, type) \ +struct name { \ + struct type *sqh_first; /* first element */ \ + struct type **sqh_last; /* addr of last next element */ \ +} + +#define SIMPLEQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER(head) \ + { NULL, &(head).sqh_first } + +#define SIMPLEQ_ENTRY(type) \ +struct { \ + struct type *sqe_next; /* next element */ \ +} + +/* + * Simple queue access methods. + */ +#define SIMPLEQ_FIRST(head) ((head)->sqh_first) +#define SIMPLEQ_END(head) NULL +#define SIMPLEQ_EMPTY(head) (SIMPLEQ_FIRST(head) == SIMPLEQ_END(head)) +#define SIMPLEQ_NEXT(elm, field) ((elm)->field.sqe_next) + +#define SIMPLEQ_FOREACH(var, head, field) \ + for((var) = SIMPLEQ_FIRST(head); \ + (var) != SIMPLEQ_END(head); \ + (var) = SIMPLEQ_NEXT(var, field)) + +/* + * Simple queue functions. + */ +#define SIMPLEQ_INIT(head) do { \ + (head)->sqh_first = NULL; \ + (head)->sqh_last = &(head)->sqh_first; \ +} while (0) + +#define SIMPLEQ_INSERT_HEAD(head, elm, field) do { \ + if (((elm)->field.sqe_next = (head)->sqh_first) == NULL) \ + (head)->sqh_last = &(elm)->field.sqe_next; \ + (head)->sqh_first = (elm); \ +} while (0) + +#define SIMPLEQ_INSERT_TAIL(head, elm, field) do { \ + (elm)->field.sqe_next = NULL; \ + *(head)->sqh_last = (elm); \ + (head)->sqh_last = &(elm)->field.sqe_next; \ +} while (0) + +#define SIMPLEQ_INSERT_AFTER(head, listelm, elm, field) do { \ + if (((elm)->field.sqe_next = (listelm)->field.sqe_next) == NULL)\ + (head)->sqh_last = &(elm)->field.sqe_next; \ + (listelm)->field.sqe_next = (elm); \ +} while (0) + +#define SIMPLEQ_REMOVE_HEAD(head, elm, field) do { \ + if (((head)->sqh_first = (elm)->field.sqe_next) == NULL) \ + (head)->sqh_last = &(head)->sqh_first; \ +} while (0) + +/* + * Tail queue definitions. + */ +#define TAILQ_HEAD(name, type) \ +struct name { \ + struct type *tqh_first; /* first element */ \ + struct type **tqh_last; /* addr of last next element */ \ +} + +#define TAILQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER(head) \ + { NULL, &(head).tqh_first } + +#define TAILQ_ENTRY(type) \ +struct { \ + struct type *tqe_next; /* next element */ \ + struct type **tqe_prev; /* address of previous next element */ \ +} + +/* + * tail queue access methods + */ +#define TAILQ_FIRST(head) ((head)->tqh_first) +#define TAILQ_END(head) NULL +#define TAILQ_NEXT(elm, field) ((elm)->field.tqe_next) +#define TAILQ_LAST(head, headname) \ + (*(((struct headname *)((head)->tqh_last))->tqh_last)) +/* XXX */ +#define TAILQ_PREV(elm, headname, field) \ + (*(((struct headname *)((elm)->field.tqe_prev))->tqh_last)) +#define TAILQ_EMPTY(head) \ + (TAILQ_FIRST(head) == TAILQ_END(head)) + +#define TAILQ_FOREACH(var, head, field) \ + for((var) = TAILQ_FIRST(head); \ + (var) != TAILQ_END(head); \ + (var) = TAILQ_NEXT(var, field)) + +#define TAILQ_FOREACH_REVERSE(var, head, field, headname) \ + for((var) = TAILQ_LAST(head, headname); \ + (var) != TAILQ_END(head); \ + (var) = TAILQ_PREV(var, headname, field)) + +/* + * Tail queue functions. + */ +#define TAILQ_INIT(head) do { \ + (head)->tqh_first = NULL; \ + (head)->tqh_last = &(head)->tqh_first; \ +} while (0) + +#define TAILQ_INSERT_HEAD(head, elm, field) do { \ + if (((elm)->field.tqe_next = (head)->tqh_first) != NULL) \ + (head)->tqh_first->field.tqe_prev = \ + &(elm)->field.tqe_next; \ + else \ + (head)->tqh_last = &(elm)->field.tqe_next; \ + (head)->tqh_first = (elm); \ + (elm)->field.tqe_prev = &(head)->tqh_first; \ +} while (0) + +#define TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(head, elm, field) do { \ + (elm)->field.tqe_next = NULL; \ + (elm)->field.tqe_prev = (head)->tqh_last; \ + *(head)->tqh_last = (elm); \ + (head)->tqh_last = &(elm)->field.tqe_next; \ +} while (0) + +#define TAILQ_INSERT_AFTER(head, listelm, elm, field) do { \ + if (((elm)->field.tqe_next = (listelm)->field.tqe_next) != NULL)\ + (elm)->field.tqe_next->field.tqe_prev = \ + &(elm)->field.tqe_next; \ + else \ + (head)->tqh_last = &(elm)->field.tqe_next; \ + (listelm)->field.tqe_next = (elm); \ + (elm)->field.tqe_prev = &(listelm)->field.tqe_next; \ +} while (0) + +#define TAILQ_INSERT_BEFORE(listelm, elm, field) do { \ + (elm)->field.tqe_prev = (listelm)->field.tqe_prev; \ + (elm)->field.tqe_next = (listelm); \ + *(listelm)->field.tqe_prev = (elm); \ + (listelm)->field.tqe_prev = &(elm)->field.tqe_next; \ +} while (0) + +#define TAILQ_REMOVE(head, elm, field) do { \ + if (((elm)->field.tqe_next) != NULL) \ + (elm)->field.tqe_next->field.tqe_prev = \ + (elm)->field.tqe_prev; \ + else \ + (head)->tqh_last = (elm)->field.tqe_prev; \ + *(elm)->field.tqe_prev = (elm)->field.tqe_next; \ +} while (0) + +#define TAILQ_REPLACE(head, elm, elm2, field) do { \ + if (((elm2)->field.tqe_next = (elm)->field.tqe_next) != NULL) \ + (elm2)->field.tqe_next->field.tqe_prev = \ + &(elm2)->field.tqe_next; \ + else \ + (head)->tqh_last = &(elm2)->field.tqe_next; \ + (elm2)->field.tqe_prev = (elm)->field.tqe_prev; \ + *(elm2)->field.tqe_prev = (elm2); \ +} while (0) + +/* + * Circular queue definitions. + */ +#define CIRCLEQ_HEAD(name, type) \ +struct name { \ + struct type *cqh_first; /* first element */ \ + struct type *cqh_last; /* last element */ \ +} + +#define CIRCLEQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER(head) \ + { CIRCLEQ_END(&head), CIRCLEQ_END(&head) } + +#define CIRCLEQ_ENTRY(type) \ +struct { \ + struct type *cqe_next; /* next element */ \ + struct type *cqe_prev; /* previous element */ \ +} + +/* + * Circular queue access methods + */ +#define CIRCLEQ_FIRST(head) ((head)->cqh_first) +#define CIRCLEQ_LAST(head) ((head)->cqh_last) +#define CIRCLEQ_END(head) ((void *)(head)) +#define CIRCLEQ_NEXT(elm, field) ((elm)->field.cqe_next) +#define CIRCLEQ_PREV(elm, field) ((elm)->field.cqe_prev) +#define CIRCLEQ_EMPTY(head) \ + (CIRCLEQ_FIRST(head) == CIRCLEQ_END(head)) + +#define CIRCLEQ_FOREACH(var, head, field) \ + for((var) = CIRCLEQ_FIRST(head); \ + (var) != CIRCLEQ_END(head); \ + (var) = CIRCLEQ_NEXT(var, field)) + +#define CIRCLEQ_FOREACH_REVERSE(var, head, field) \ + for((var) = CIRCLEQ_LAST(head); \ + (var) != CIRCLEQ_END(head); \ + (var) = CIRCLEQ_PREV(var, field)) + +/* + * Circular queue functions. + */ +#define CIRCLEQ_INIT(head) do { \ + (head)->cqh_first = CIRCLEQ_END(head); \ + (head)->cqh_last = CIRCLEQ_END(head); \ +} while (0) + +#define CIRCLEQ_INSERT_AFTER(head, listelm, elm, field) do { \ + (elm)->field.cqe_next = (listelm)->field.cqe_next; \ + (elm)->field.cqe_prev = (listelm); \ + if ((listelm)->field.cqe_next == CIRCLEQ_END(head)) \ + (head)->cqh_last = (elm); \ + else \ + (listelm)->field.cqe_next->field.cqe_prev = (elm); \ + (listelm)->field.cqe_next = (elm); \ +} while (0) + +#define CIRCLEQ_INSERT_BEFORE(head, listelm, elm, field) do { \ + (elm)->field.cqe_next = (listelm); \ + (elm)->field.cqe_prev = (listelm)->field.cqe_prev; \ + if ((listelm)->field.cqe_prev == CIRCLEQ_END(head)) \ + (head)->cqh_first = (elm); \ + else \ + (listelm)->field.cqe_prev->field.cqe_next = (elm); \ + (listelm)->field.cqe_prev = (elm); \ +} while (0) + +#define CIRCLEQ_INSERT_HEAD(head, elm, field) do { \ + (elm)->field.cqe_next = (head)->cqh_first; \ + (elm)->field.cqe_prev = CIRCLEQ_END(head); \ + if ((head)->cqh_last == CIRCLEQ_END(head)) \ + (head)->cqh_last = (elm); \ + else \ + (head)->cqh_first->field.cqe_prev = (elm); \ + (head)->cqh_first = (elm); \ +} while (0) + +#define CIRCLEQ_INSERT_TAIL(head, elm, field) do { \ + (elm)->field.cqe_next = CIRCLEQ_END(head); \ + (elm)->field.cqe_prev = (head)->cqh_last; \ + if ((head)->cqh_first == CIRCLEQ_END(head)) \ + (head)->cqh_first = (elm); \ + else \ + (head)->cqh_last->field.cqe_next = (elm); \ + (head)->cqh_last = (elm); \ +} while (0) + +#define CIRCLEQ_REMOVE(head, elm, field) do { \ + if ((elm)->field.cqe_next == CIRCLEQ_END(head)) \ + (head)->cqh_last = (elm)->field.cqe_prev; \ + else \ + (elm)->field.cqe_next->field.cqe_prev = \ + (elm)->field.cqe_prev; \ + if ((elm)->field.cqe_prev == CIRCLEQ_END(head)) \ + (head)->cqh_first = (elm)->field.cqe_next; \ + else \ + (elm)->field.cqe_prev->field.cqe_next = \ + (elm)->field.cqe_next; \ +} while (0) + +#define CIRCLEQ_REPLACE(head, elm, elm2, field) do { \ + if (((elm2)->field.cqe_next = (elm)->field.cqe_next) == \ + CIRCLEQ_END(head)) \ + (head).cqh_last = (elm2); \ + else \ + (elm2)->field.cqe_next->field.cqe_prev = (elm2); \ + if (((elm2)->field.cqe_prev = (elm)->field.cqe_prev) == \ + CIRCLEQ_END(head)) \ + (head).cqh_first = (elm2); \ + else \ + (elm2)->field.cqe_prev->field.cqe_next = (elm2); \ +} while (0) + +#endif /* !_SYS_QUEUE_H_ */ diff --git a/openssh/openbsd-compat/fake-regex.h b/openssh/openbsd-compat/fake-regex.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8f7f6ed --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/openbsd-compat/fake-regex.h @@ -0,0 +1,106 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: regex.h,v 1.3 1997/09/21 10:45:48 niklas Exp $ */ +/* $NetBSD: regex.h,v 1.4.6.1 1996/06/10 18:57:07 explorer Exp $ */ + +/*- + * Copyright (c) 1992 Henry Spencer. + * Copyright (c) 1992, 1993 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * This code is derived from software contributed to Berkeley by + * Henry Spencer of the University of Toronto. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the University of + * California, Berkeley and its contributors. + * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * @(#)regex.h 8.1 (Berkeley) 6/2/93 + */ + +#ifndef _REGEX_H_ +#define _REGEX_H_ + +#include + +/* types */ +typedef off_t regoff_t; + +typedef struct { + int re_magic; + size_t re_nsub; /* number of parenthesized subexpressions */ + const char *re_endp; /* end pointer for REG_PEND */ + struct re_guts *re_g; /* none of your business :-) */ +} regex_t; + +typedef struct { + regoff_t rm_so; /* start of match */ + regoff_t rm_eo; /* end of match */ +} regmatch_t; + +/* regcomp() flags */ +#define REG_BASIC 0000 +#define REG_EXTENDED 0001 +#define REG_ICASE 0002 +#define REG_NOSUB 0004 +#define REG_NEWLINE 0010 +#define REG_NOSPEC 0020 +#define REG_PEND 0040 +#define REG_DUMP 0200 + +/* regerror() flags */ +#define REG_NOMATCH 1 +#define REG_BADPAT 2 +#define REG_ECOLLATE 3 +#define REG_ECTYPE 4 +#define REG_EESCAPE 5 +#define REG_ESUBREG 6 +#define REG_EBRACK 7 +#define REG_EPAREN 8 +#define REG_EBRACE 9 +#define REG_BADBR 10 +#define REG_ERANGE 11 +#define REG_ESPACE 12 +#define REG_BADRPT 13 +#define REG_EMPTY 14 +#define REG_ASSERT 15 +#define REG_INVARG 16 +#define REG_ATOI 255 /* convert name to number (!) */ +#define REG_ITOA 0400 /* convert number to name (!) */ + +/* regexec() flags */ +#define REG_NOTBOL 00001 +#define REG_NOTEOL 00002 +#define REG_STARTEND 00004 +#define REG_TRACE 00400 /* tracing of execution */ +#define REG_LARGE 01000 /* force large representation */ +#define REG_BACKR 02000 /* force use of backref code */ + +int regcomp(regex_t*, const char*, int); +size_t regerror(int, const regex_t*, char*, size_t); +int regexec(const regex_t*, const char*, size_t, regmatch_t[], int); +void regfree(regex_t*); + +#endif /* !_REGEX_H_ */ diff --git a/openssh/openbsd-compat/fake-socket.h b/openssh/openbsd-compat/fake-socket.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..79f8ed4 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/openbsd-compat/fake-socket.h @@ -0,0 +1,47 @@ +/* $Id$ */ + +#ifndef _FAKE_SOCKET_H +#define _FAKE_SOCKET_H + +#include "config.h" +#include "sys/types.h" + +#ifndef HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_STORAGE +# define _SS_MAXSIZE 128 /* Implementation specific max size */ +# define _SS_PADSIZE (_SS_MAXSIZE - sizeof (struct sockaddr)) + +struct sockaddr_storage { + struct sockaddr ss_sa; + char __ss_pad2[_SS_PADSIZE]; +}; +# define ss_family ss_sa.sa_family +#endif /* !HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_STORAGE */ + +#ifndef IN6_IS_ADDR_LOOPBACK +# define IN6_IS_ADDR_LOOPBACK(a) \ + (((u_int32_t *) (a))[0] == 0 && ((u_int32_t *) (a))[1] == 0 && \ + ((u_int32_t *) (a))[2] == 0 && ((u_int32_t *) (a))[3] == htonl (1)) +#endif /* !IN6_IS_ADDR_LOOPBACK */ + +#ifndef HAVE_STRUCT_IN6_ADDR +struct in6_addr { + u_int8_t s6_addr[16]; +}; +#endif /* !HAVE_STRUCT_IN6_ADDR */ + +#ifndef HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN6 +struct sockaddr_in6 { + unsigned short sin6_family; + u_int16_t sin6_port; + u_int32_t sin6_flowinfo; + struct in6_addr sin6_addr; +}; +#endif /* !HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN6 */ + +#ifndef AF_INET6 +/* Define it to something that should never appear */ +#define AF_INET6 AF_MAX +#endif + +#endif /* !_FAKE_SOCKET_H */ + diff --git a/openssh/openbsd-compat/getcwd.c b/openssh/openbsd-compat/getcwd.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..de3bacc --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/openbsd-compat/getcwd.c @@ -0,0 +1,237 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1989, 1991, 1993 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "config.h" + +#if !defined(HAVE_GETCWD) + +#if defined(LIBC_SCCS) && !defined(lint) +static char rcsid[] = "$OpenBSD: getcwd.c,v 1.6 2000/07/19 15:25:13 deraadt Exp $"; +#endif /* LIBC_SCCS and not lint */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include "includes.h" + +#define ISDOT(dp) \ + (dp->d_name[0] == '.' && (dp->d_name[1] == '\0' || \ + (dp->d_name[1] == '.' && dp->d_name[2] == '\0'))) + +char * +getcwd(char *pt,size_t size) +{ + register struct dirent *dp; + register DIR *dir = NULL; + register dev_t dev; + register ino_t ino; + register int first; + register char *bpt, *bup; + struct stat s; + dev_t root_dev; + ino_t root_ino; + size_t ptsize, upsize; + int save_errno; + char *ept, *eup, *up; + + /* + * If no buffer specified by the user, allocate one as necessary. + * If a buffer is specified, the size has to be non-zero. The path + * is built from the end of the buffer backwards. + */ + if (pt) { + ptsize = 0; + if (!size) { + errno = EINVAL; + return (NULL); + } + ept = pt + size; + } else { + if ((pt = malloc(ptsize = 1024 - 4)) == NULL) + return (NULL); + ept = pt + ptsize; + } + bpt = ept - 1; + *bpt = '\0'; + + /* + * Allocate bytes (1024 - malloc space) for the string of "../"'s. + * Should always be enough (it's 340 levels). If it's not, allocate + * as necessary. Special * case the first stat, it's ".", not "..". + */ + if ((up = malloc(upsize = 1024 - 4)) == NULL) + goto err; + eup = up + MAXPATHLEN; + bup = up; + up[0] = '.'; + up[1] = '\0'; + + /* Save root values, so know when to stop. */ + if (stat("/", &s)) + goto err; + root_dev = s.st_dev; + root_ino = s.st_ino; + + errno = 0; /* XXX readdir has no error return. */ + + for (first = 1;; first = 0) { + /* Stat the current level. */ + if (lstat(up, &s)) + goto err; + + /* Save current node values. */ + ino = s.st_ino; + dev = s.st_dev; + + /* Check for reaching root. */ + if (root_dev == dev && root_ino == ino) { + *--bpt = '/'; + /* + * It's unclear that it's a requirement to copy the + * path to the beginning of the buffer, but it's always + * been that way and stuff would probably break. + */ + memmove(pt, bpt, ept - bpt); + free(up); + return (pt); + } + + /* + * Build pointer to the parent directory, allocating memory + * as necessary. Max length is 3 for "../", the largest + * possible component name, plus a trailing NULL. + */ + if (bup + 3 + MAXNAMLEN + 1 >= eup) { + char *nup; + + if ((nup = realloc(up, upsize *= 2)) == NULL) + goto err; + up = nup; + bup = up; + eup = up + upsize; + } + *bup++ = '.'; + *bup++ = '.'; + *bup = '\0'; + + /* Open and stat parent directory. + * RACE?? - replaced fstat(dirfd(dir), &s) w/ lstat(up,&s) + */ + if (!(dir = opendir(up)) || lstat(up,&s)) + goto err; + + /* Add trailing slash for next directory. */ + *bup++ = '/'; + + /* + * If it's a mount point, have to stat each element because + * the inode number in the directory is for the entry in the + * parent directory, not the inode number of the mounted file. + */ + save_errno = 0; + if (s.st_dev == dev) { + for (;;) { + if (!(dp = readdir(dir))) + goto notfound; + if (dp->d_fileno == ino) + break; + } + } else + for (;;) { + if (!(dp = readdir(dir))) + goto notfound; + if (ISDOT(dp)) + continue; + memmove(bup, dp->d_name, dp->d_namlen + 1); + + /* Save the first error for later. */ + if (lstat(up, &s)) { + if (!save_errno) + save_errno = errno; + errno = 0; + continue; + } + if (s.st_dev == dev && s.st_ino == ino) + break; + } + + /* + * Check for length of the current name, preceding slash, + * leading slash. + */ + if (bpt - pt < dp->d_namlen + (first ? 1 : 2)) { + size_t len, off; + char *npt; + + if (!ptsize) { + errno = ERANGE; + goto err; + } + off = bpt - pt; + len = ept - bpt; + if ((npt = realloc(pt, ptsize *= 2)) == NULL) + goto err; + pt = npt; + bpt = pt + off; + ept = pt + ptsize; + memmove(ept - len, bpt, len); + bpt = ept - len; + } + if (!first) + *--bpt = '/'; + bpt -= dp->d_namlen; + memmove(bpt, dp->d_name, dp->d_namlen); + (void)closedir(dir); + + /* Truncate any file name. */ + *bup = '\0'; + } + +notfound: + /* + * If readdir set errno, use it, not any saved error; otherwise, + * didn't find the current directory in its parent directory, set + * errno to ENOENT. + */ + if (!errno) + errno = save_errno ? save_errno : ENOENT; + /* FALLTHROUGH */ +err: + if (ptsize) + free(pt); + if (up) + free(up); + if (dir) + (void)closedir(dir); + return (NULL); +} + +#endif /* !defined(HAVE_GETCWD) */ diff --git a/openssh/openbsd-compat/getcwd.h b/openssh/openbsd-compat/getcwd.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..bb41770 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/openbsd-compat/getcwd.h @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +/* $Id$ */ + +#ifndef _BSD_GETCWD_H +#define _BSD_GETCWD_H +#include "config.h" + +#if !defined(HAVE_GETCWD) + +char *getcwd(char *pt, size_t size); + +#endif /* !defined(HAVE_GETCWD) */ +#endif /* _BSD_GETCWD_H */ diff --git a/openssh/openbsd-compat/getgrouplist.c b/openssh/openbsd-compat/getgrouplist.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f7a27c3 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/openbsd-compat/getgrouplist.c @@ -0,0 +1,103 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1991, 1993 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the University of + * California, Berkeley and its contributors. + * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#ifndef HAVE_GETGROUPLIST + +#if defined(LIBC_SCCS) && !defined(lint) +static char rcsid[] = "$OpenBSD: getgrouplist.c,v 1.7 1997/08/19 19:13:27 deraadt Exp $"; +#endif /* LIBC_SCCS and not lint */ + +/* + * get credential + */ +#include +#include +#include + +int +getgrouplist(uname, agroup, groups, grpcnt) + const char *uname; + gid_t agroup; + register gid_t *groups; + int *grpcnt; +{ + register struct group *grp; + register int i, ngroups; + int ret, maxgroups; + int bail; + + ret = 0; + ngroups = 0; + maxgroups = *grpcnt; + + /* + * install primary group + */ + if (ngroups >= maxgroups) { + *grpcnt = ngroups; + return (-1); + } + groups[ngroups++] = agroup; + + /* + * Scan the group file to find additional groups. + */ + setgrent(); + while ((grp = getgrent())) { + if (grp->gr_gid == agroup) + continue; + for (bail = 0, i = 0; bail == 0 && i < ngroups; i++) + if (groups[i] == grp->gr_gid) + bail = 1; + if (bail) + continue; + for (i = 0; grp->gr_mem[i]; i++) { + if (!strcmp(grp->gr_mem[i], uname)) { + if (ngroups >= maxgroups) { + ret = -1; + goto out; + } + groups[ngroups++] = grp->gr_gid; + break; + } + } + } +out: + endgrent(); + *grpcnt = ngroups; + return (ret); +} + +#endif /* HAVE_GETGROUPLIST */ diff --git a/openssh/openbsd-compat/getgrouplist.h b/openssh/openbsd-compat/getgrouplist.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..210dd41 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/openbsd-compat/getgrouplist.h @@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ +/* $Id$ */ + +#ifndef _BSD_GETGROUPLIST_H +#define _BSD_GETGROUPLIST_H + +#include "config.h" + +#ifndef HAVE_GETGROUPLIST + +#include + +int getgrouplist(const char *, gid_t, gid_t *, int *); + +#endif + +#endif diff --git a/openssh/openbsd-compat/getopt.c b/openssh/openbsd-compat/getopt.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9e13504 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/openbsd-compat/getopt.c @@ -0,0 +1,122 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1987, 1993, 1994 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the University of + * California, Berkeley and its contributors. + * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "config.h" +#if !defined(HAVE_GETOPT) || !defined(HAVE_GETOPT_OPTRESET) + +#if defined(LIBC_SCCS) && !defined(lint) +static char *rcsid = "$OpenBSD: getopt.c,v 1.2 1996/08/19 08:33:32 tholo Exp $"; +#endif /* LIBC_SCCS and not lint */ + +#include +#include +#include + +int opterr = 1, /* if error message should be printed */ + optind = 1, /* index into parent argv vector */ + optopt, /* character checked for validity */ + optreset; /* reset getopt */ +char *optarg; /* argument associated with option */ + +#define BADCH (int)'?' +#define BADARG (int)':' +#define EMSG "" + +/* + * getopt -- + * Parse argc/argv argument vector. + */ +int +BSDgetopt(nargc, nargv, ostr) + int nargc; + char * const *nargv; + const char *ostr; +{ + extern char *__progname; + static char *place = EMSG; /* option letter processing */ + char *oli; /* option letter list index */ + + if (optreset || !*place) { /* update scanning pointer */ + optreset = 0; + if (optind >= nargc || *(place = nargv[optind]) != '-') { + place = EMSG; + return (-1); + } + if (place[1] && *++place == '-') { /* found "--" */ + ++optind; + place = EMSG; + return (-1); + } + } /* option letter okay? */ + if ((optopt = (int)*place++) == (int)':' || + !(oli = strchr(ostr, optopt))) { + /* + * if the user didn't specify '-' as an option, + * assume it means -1. + */ + if (optopt == (int)'-') + return (-1); + if (!*place) + ++optind; + if (opterr && *ostr != ':') + (void)fprintf(stderr, + "%s: illegal option -- %c\n", __progname, optopt); + return (BADCH); + } + if (*++oli != ':') { /* don't need argument */ + optarg = NULL; + if (!*place) + ++optind; + } + else { /* need an argument */ + if (*place) /* no white space */ + optarg = place; + else if (nargc <= ++optind) { /* no arg */ + place = EMSG; + if (*ostr == ':') + return (BADARG); + if (opterr) + (void)fprintf(stderr, + "%s: option requires an argument -- %c\n", + __progname, optopt); + return (BADCH); + } + else /* white space */ + optarg = nargv[optind]; + place = EMSG; + ++optind; + } + return (optopt); /* dump back option letter */ +} + +#endif /* !defined(HAVE_GETOPT) || !defined(HAVE_OPTRESET) */ diff --git a/openssh/openbsd-compat/getopt.h b/openssh/openbsd-compat/getopt.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3f0f163 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/openbsd-compat/getopt.h @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +/* $Id$ */ + +#ifndef _BSDGETOPT_H +#define _BSDGETOPT_H + +#include "config.h" + +#if !defined(HAVE_GETOPT) || !defined(HAVE_GETOPT_OPTRESET) + +int BSDgetopt(int argc, char * const *argv, const char *opts); + +#endif + +#endif /* _BSDGETOPT_H */ diff --git a/openssh/openbsd-compat/glob.c b/openssh/openbsd-compat/glob.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..365d433 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/openbsd-compat/glob.c @@ -0,0 +1,915 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1989, 1993 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * This code is derived from software contributed to Berkeley by + * Guido van Rossum. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the University of + * California, Berkeley and its contributors. + * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" +#include + +static long +get_arg_max(void) +{ +#ifdef ARG_MAX + return(ARG_MAX); +#elif defined(HAVE_SYSCONF) && defined(_SC_ARG_MAX) + return(sysconf(_SC_ARG_MAX)); +#else + return(256); /* XXX: arbitrary */ +#endif +} + +#if !defined(HAVE_GLOB) || !defined(GLOB_HAS_ALTDIRFUNC) || \ + !defined(GLOB_HAS_GL_MATCHC) + +#if defined(LIBC_SCCS) && !defined(lint) +#if 0 +static char sccsid[] = "@(#)glob.c 8.3 (Berkeley) 10/13/93"; +#else +static char rcsid[] = "$OpenBSD: glob.c,v 1.16 2001/04/05 18:36:12 deraadt Exp $"; +#endif +#endif /* LIBC_SCCS and not lint */ + +/* + * glob(3) -- a superset of the one defined in POSIX 1003.2. + * + * The [!...] convention to negate a range is supported (SysV, Posix, ksh). + * + * Optional extra services, controlled by flags not defined by POSIX: + * + * GLOB_QUOTE: + * Escaping convention: \ inhibits any special meaning the following + * character might have (except \ at end of string is retained). + * GLOB_MAGCHAR: + * Set in gl_flags if pattern contained a globbing character. + * GLOB_NOMAGIC: + * Same as GLOB_NOCHECK, but it will only append pattern if it did + * not contain any magic characters. [Used in csh style globbing] + * GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC: + * Use alternately specified directory access functions. + * GLOB_TILDE: + * expand ~user/foo to the /home/dir/of/user/foo + * GLOB_BRACE: + * expand {1,2}{a,b} to 1a 1b 2a 2b + * gl_matchc: + * Number of matches in the current invocation of glob. + */ + + +#define DOLLAR '$' +#define DOT '.' +#define EOS '\0' +#define LBRACKET '[' +#define NOT '!' +#define QUESTION '?' +#define QUOTE '\\' +#define RANGE '-' +#define RBRACKET ']' +#define SEP '/' +#define STAR '*' +#define TILDE '~' +#define UNDERSCORE '_' +#define LBRACE '{' +#define RBRACE '}' +#define SLASH '/' +#define COMMA ',' + +#ifndef DEBUG + +#define M_QUOTE 0x8000 +#define M_PROTECT 0x4000 +#define M_MASK 0xffff +#define M_ASCII 0x00ff + +typedef u_short Char; + +#else + +#define M_QUOTE 0x80 +#define M_PROTECT 0x40 +#define M_MASK 0xff +#define M_ASCII 0x7f + +typedef char Char; + +#endif + + +#define CHAR(c) ((Char)((c)&M_ASCII)) +#define META(c) ((Char)((c)|M_QUOTE)) +#define M_ALL META('*') +#define M_END META(']') +#define M_NOT META('!') +#define M_ONE META('?') +#define M_RNG META('-') +#define M_SET META('[') +#define ismeta(c) (((c)&M_QUOTE) != 0) + + +static int compare __P((const void *, const void *)); +static int g_Ctoc __P((const Char *, char *, u_int)); +static int g_lstat __P((Char *, struct stat *, glob_t *)); +static DIR *g_opendir __P((Char *, glob_t *)); +static Char *g_strchr __P((Char *, int)); +static int g_stat __P((Char *, struct stat *, glob_t *)); +static int glob0 __P((const Char *, glob_t *)); +static int glob1 __P((Char *, Char *, glob_t *, size_t *)); +static int glob2 __P((Char *, Char *, Char *, Char *, Char *, Char *, + glob_t *, size_t *)); +static int glob3 __P((Char *, Char *, Char *, Char *, Char *, Char *, + Char *, Char *, glob_t *, size_t *)); +static int globextend __P((const Char *, glob_t *, size_t *)); +static const Char * + globtilde __P((const Char *, Char *, size_t, glob_t *)); +static int globexp1 __P((const Char *, glob_t *)); +static int globexp2 __P((const Char *, const Char *, glob_t *, int *)); +static int match __P((Char *, Char *, Char *)); +#ifdef DEBUG +static void qprintf __P((const char *, Char *)); +#endif + +int +glob(pattern, flags, errfunc, pglob) + const char *pattern; + int flags, (*errfunc) __P((const char *, int)); + glob_t *pglob; +{ + const u_char *patnext; + int c; + Char *bufnext, *bufend, patbuf[MAXPATHLEN]; + + patnext = (u_char *) pattern; + if (!(flags & GLOB_APPEND)) { + pglob->gl_pathc = 0; + pglob->gl_pathv = NULL; + if (!(flags & GLOB_DOOFFS)) + pglob->gl_offs = 0; + } + pglob->gl_flags = flags & ~GLOB_MAGCHAR; + pglob->gl_errfunc = errfunc; + pglob->gl_matchc = 0; + + bufnext = patbuf; + bufend = bufnext + MAXPATHLEN - 1; + if (flags & GLOB_NOESCAPE) + while (bufnext < bufend && (c = *patnext++) != EOS) + *bufnext++ = c; + else { + /* Protect the quoted characters. */ + while (bufnext < bufend && (c = *patnext++) != EOS) + if (c == QUOTE) { + if ((c = *patnext++) == EOS) { + c = QUOTE; + --patnext; + } + *bufnext++ = c | M_PROTECT; + } else + *bufnext++ = c; + } + *bufnext = EOS; + + if (flags & GLOB_BRACE) + return globexp1(patbuf, pglob); + else + return glob0(patbuf, pglob); +} + +/* + * Expand recursively a glob {} pattern. When there is no more expansion + * invoke the standard globbing routine to glob the rest of the magic + * characters + */ +static int +globexp1(pattern, pglob) + const Char *pattern; + glob_t *pglob; +{ + const Char* ptr = pattern; + int rv; + + /* Protect a single {}, for find(1), like csh */ + if (pattern[0] == LBRACE && pattern[1] == RBRACE && pattern[2] == EOS) + return glob0(pattern, pglob); + + while ((ptr = (const Char *) g_strchr((Char *) ptr, LBRACE)) != NULL) + if (!globexp2(ptr, pattern, pglob, &rv)) + return rv; + + return glob0(pattern, pglob); +} + + +/* + * Recursive brace globbing helper. Tries to expand a single brace. + * If it succeeds then it invokes globexp1 with the new pattern. + * If it fails then it tries to glob the rest of the pattern and returns. + */ +static int +globexp2(ptr, pattern, pglob, rv) + const Char *ptr, *pattern; + glob_t *pglob; + int *rv; +{ + int i; + Char *lm, *ls; + const Char *pe, *pm, *pl; + Char patbuf[MAXPATHLEN]; + + /* copy part up to the brace */ + for (lm = patbuf, pm = pattern; pm != ptr; *lm++ = *pm++) + ; + *lm = EOS; + ls = lm; + + /* Find the balanced brace */ + for (i = 0, pe = ++ptr; *pe; pe++) + if (*pe == LBRACKET) { + /* Ignore everything between [] */ + for (pm = pe++; *pe != RBRACKET && *pe != EOS; pe++) + ; + if (*pe == EOS) { + /* + * We could not find a matching RBRACKET. + * Ignore and just look for RBRACE + */ + pe = pm; + } + } else if (*pe == LBRACE) + i++; + else if (*pe == RBRACE) { + if (i == 0) + break; + i--; + } + + /* Non matching braces; just glob the pattern */ + if (i != 0 || *pe == EOS) { + *rv = glob0(patbuf, pglob); + return 0; + } + + for (i = 0, pl = pm = ptr; pm <= pe; pm++) { + switch (*pm) { + case LBRACKET: + /* Ignore everything between [] */ + for (pl = pm++; *pm != RBRACKET && *pm != EOS; pm++) + ; + if (*pm == EOS) { + /* + * We could not find a matching RBRACKET. + * Ignore and just look for RBRACE + */ + pm = pl; + } + break; + + case LBRACE: + i++; + break; + + case RBRACE: + if (i) { + i--; + break; + } + /* FALLTHROUGH */ + case COMMA: + if (i && *pm == COMMA) + break; + else { + /* Append the current string */ + for (lm = ls; (pl < pm); *lm++ = *pl++) + ; + + /* + * Append the rest of the pattern after the + * closing brace + */ + for (pl = pe + 1; (*lm++ = *pl++) != EOS; ) + ; + + /* Expand the current pattern */ +#ifdef DEBUG + qprintf("globexp2:", patbuf); +#endif + *rv = globexp1(patbuf, pglob); + + /* move after the comma, to the next string */ + pl = pm + 1; + } + break; + + default: + break; + } + } + *rv = 0; + return 0; +} + + + +/* + * expand tilde from the passwd file. + */ +static const Char * +globtilde(pattern, patbuf, patbuf_len, pglob) + const Char *pattern; + Char *patbuf; + size_t patbuf_len; + glob_t *pglob; +{ + struct passwd *pwd; + char *h; + const Char *p; + Char *b, *eb; + + if (*pattern != TILDE || !(pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_TILDE)) + return pattern; + + /* Copy up to the end of the string or / */ + eb = &patbuf[patbuf_len - 1]; + for (p = pattern + 1, h = (char *) patbuf; + h < (char *)eb && *p && *p != SLASH; *h++ = *p++) + ; + + *h = EOS; + +#if 0 + if (h == (char *)eb) + return what; +#endif + + if (((char *) patbuf)[0] == EOS) { + /* + * handle a plain ~ or ~/ by expanding $HOME + * first and then trying the password file + */ +#if 0 + if (issetugid() != 0 || (h = getenv("HOME")) == NULL) { +#endif + if ((getuid() != geteuid()) || (h = getenv("HOME")) == NULL) { + if ((pwd = getpwuid(getuid())) == NULL) + return pattern; + else + h = pwd->pw_dir; + } + } else { + /* + * Expand a ~user + */ + if ((pwd = getpwnam((char*) patbuf)) == NULL) + return pattern; + else + h = pwd->pw_dir; + } + + /* Copy the home directory */ + for (b = patbuf; b < eb && *h; *b++ = *h++) + ; + + /* Append the rest of the pattern */ + while (b < eb && (*b++ = *p++) != EOS) + ; + *b = EOS; + + return patbuf; +} + + +/* + * The main glob() routine: compiles the pattern (optionally processing + * quotes), calls glob1() to do the real pattern matching, and finally + * sorts the list (unless unsorted operation is requested). Returns 0 + * if things went well, nonzero if errors occurred. It is not an error + * to find no matches. + */ +static int +glob0(pattern, pglob) + const Char *pattern; + glob_t *pglob; +{ + const Char *qpatnext; + int c, err, oldpathc; + Char *bufnext, patbuf[MAXPATHLEN]; + size_t limit = 0; + + qpatnext = globtilde(pattern, patbuf, MAXPATHLEN, pglob); + oldpathc = pglob->gl_pathc; + bufnext = patbuf; + + /* We don't need to check for buffer overflow any more. */ + while ((c = *qpatnext++) != EOS) { + switch (c) { + case LBRACKET: + c = *qpatnext; + if (c == NOT) + ++qpatnext; + if (*qpatnext == EOS || + g_strchr((Char *) qpatnext+1, RBRACKET) == NULL) { + *bufnext++ = LBRACKET; + if (c == NOT) + --qpatnext; + break; + } + *bufnext++ = M_SET; + if (c == NOT) + *bufnext++ = M_NOT; + c = *qpatnext++; + do { + *bufnext++ = CHAR(c); + if (*qpatnext == RANGE && + (c = qpatnext[1]) != RBRACKET) { + *bufnext++ = M_RNG; + *bufnext++ = CHAR(c); + qpatnext += 2; + } + } while ((c = *qpatnext++) != RBRACKET); + pglob->gl_flags |= GLOB_MAGCHAR; + *bufnext++ = M_END; + break; + case QUESTION: + pglob->gl_flags |= GLOB_MAGCHAR; + *bufnext++ = M_ONE; + break; + case STAR: + pglob->gl_flags |= GLOB_MAGCHAR; + /* collapse adjacent stars to one, + * to avoid exponential behavior + */ + if (bufnext == patbuf || bufnext[-1] != M_ALL) + *bufnext++ = M_ALL; + break; + default: + *bufnext++ = CHAR(c); + break; + } + } + *bufnext = EOS; +#ifdef DEBUG + qprintf("glob0:", patbuf); +#endif + + if ((err = glob1(patbuf, patbuf+MAXPATHLEN-1, pglob, &limit)) != 0) + return(err); + + /* + * If there was no match we are going to append the pattern + * if GLOB_NOCHECK was specified or if GLOB_NOMAGIC was specified + * and the pattern did not contain any magic characters + * GLOB_NOMAGIC is there just for compatibility with csh. + */ + if (pglob->gl_pathc == oldpathc) { + if ((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_NOCHECK) || + ((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_NOMAGIC) && + !(pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_MAGCHAR))) + return(globextend(pattern, pglob, &limit)); + else + return(GLOB_NOMATCH); + } + if (!(pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_NOSORT)) + qsort(pglob->gl_pathv + pglob->gl_offs + oldpathc, + pglob->gl_pathc - oldpathc, sizeof(char *), compare); + return(0); +} + +static int +compare(p, q) + const void *p, *q; +{ + return(strcmp(*(char **)p, *(char **)q)); +} + +static int +glob1(pattern, pattern_last, pglob, limitp) + Char *pattern, *pattern_last; + glob_t *pglob; + size_t *limitp; +{ + Char pathbuf[MAXPATHLEN]; + + /* A null pathname is invalid -- POSIX 1003.1 sect. 2.4. */ + if (*pattern == EOS) + return(0); + return(glob2(pathbuf, pathbuf+MAXPATHLEN-1, + pathbuf, pathbuf+MAXPATHLEN-1, + pattern, pattern_last, pglob, limitp)); +} + +/* + * The functions glob2 and glob3 are mutually recursive; there is one level + * of recursion for each segment in the pattern that contains one or more + * meta characters. + */ +static int +glob2(pathbuf, pathbuf_last, pathend, pathend_last, pattern, + pattern_last, pglob, limitp) + Char *pathbuf, *pathbuf_last, *pathend, *pathend_last; + Char *pattern, *pattern_last; + glob_t *pglob; + size_t *limitp; +{ + struct stat sb; + Char *p, *q; + int anymeta; + + /* + * Loop over pattern segments until end of pattern or until + * segment with meta character found. + */ + for (anymeta = 0;;) { + if (*pattern == EOS) { /* End of pattern? */ + *pathend = EOS; + if (g_lstat(pathbuf, &sb, pglob)) + return(0); + + if (((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_MARK) && + pathend[-1] != SEP) && (S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode) || + (S_ISLNK(sb.st_mode) && + (g_stat(pathbuf, &sb, pglob) == 0) && + S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode)))) { + if (pathend+1 > pathend_last) + return (1); + *pathend++ = SEP; + *pathend = EOS; + } + ++pglob->gl_matchc; + return(globextend(pathbuf, pglob, limitp)); + } + + /* Find end of next segment, copy tentatively to pathend. */ + q = pathend; + p = pattern; + while (*p != EOS && *p != SEP) { + if (ismeta(*p)) + anymeta = 1; + if (q+1 > pathend_last) + return (1); + *q++ = *p++; + } + + if (!anymeta) { /* No expansion, do next segment. */ + pathend = q; + pattern = p; + while (*pattern == SEP) { + if (pathend+1 > pathend_last) + return (1); + *pathend++ = *pattern++; + } + } else + /* Need expansion, recurse. */ + return(glob3(pathbuf, pathbuf_last, pathend, + pathend_last, pattern, pattern_last, + p, pattern_last, pglob, limitp)); + } + /* NOTREACHED */ +} + +static int +glob3(pathbuf, pathbuf_last, pathend, pathend_last, pattern, pattern_last, + restpattern, restpattern_last, pglob, limitp) + Char *pathbuf, *pathbuf_last, *pathend, *pathend_last; + Char *pattern, *pattern_last, *restpattern, *restpattern_last; + glob_t *pglob; + size_t *limitp; +{ + register struct dirent *dp; + DIR *dirp; + int err; + char buf[MAXPATHLEN]; + + /* + * The readdirfunc declaration can't be prototyped, because it is + * assigned, below, to two functions which are prototyped in glob.h + * and dirent.h as taking pointers to differently typed opaque + * structures. + */ + struct dirent *(*readdirfunc)(); + + if (pathend > pathend_last) + return (1); + *pathend = EOS; + errno = 0; + + if ((dirp = g_opendir(pathbuf, pglob)) == NULL) { + /* TODO: don't call for ENOENT or ENOTDIR? */ + if (pglob->gl_errfunc) { + if (g_Ctoc(pathbuf, buf, sizeof(buf))) + return(GLOB_ABORTED); + if (pglob->gl_errfunc(buf, errno) || + pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_ERR) + return(GLOB_ABORTED); + } + return(0); + } + + err = 0; + + /* Search directory for matching names. */ + if (pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC) + readdirfunc = pglob->gl_readdir; + else + readdirfunc = readdir; + while ((dp = (*readdirfunc)(dirp))) { + register u_char *sc; + register Char *dc; + + /* Initial DOT must be matched literally. */ + if (dp->d_name[0] == DOT && *pattern != DOT) + continue; + dc = pathend; + sc = (u_char *) dp->d_name; + while (dc < pathend_last && (*dc++ = *sc++) != EOS) + ; + if (dc >= pathend_last) { + *dc = EOS; + err = 1; + break; + } + + if (!match(pathend, pattern, restpattern)) { + *pathend = EOS; + continue; + } + err = glob2(pathbuf, pathbuf_last, --dc, pathend_last, + restpattern, restpattern_last, pglob, limitp); + if (err) + break; + } + + if (pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC) + (*pglob->gl_closedir)(dirp); + else + closedir(dirp); + return(err); +} + + +/* + * Extend the gl_pathv member of a glob_t structure to accomodate a new item, + * add the new item, and update gl_pathc. + * + * This assumes the BSD realloc, which only copies the block when its size + * crosses a power-of-two boundary; for v7 realloc, this would cause quadratic + * behavior. + * + * Return 0 if new item added, error code if memory couldn't be allocated. + * + * Invariant of the glob_t structure: + * Either gl_pathc is zero and gl_pathv is NULL; or gl_pathc > 0 and + * gl_pathv points to (gl_offs + gl_pathc + 1) items. + */ +static int +globextend(path, pglob, limitp) + const Char *path; + glob_t *pglob; + size_t *limitp; +{ + register char **pathv; + register int i; + u_int newsize, len; + char *copy; + const Char *p; + + newsize = sizeof(*pathv) * (2 + pglob->gl_pathc + pglob->gl_offs); + pathv = pglob->gl_pathv ? realloc((char *)pglob->gl_pathv, newsize) : + malloc(newsize); + if (pathv == NULL) { + if (pglob->gl_pathv) { + free(pglob->gl_pathv); + pglob->gl_pathv = NULL; + } + return(GLOB_NOSPACE); + } + + if (pglob->gl_pathv == NULL && pglob->gl_offs > 0) { + /* first time around -- clear initial gl_offs items */ + pathv += pglob->gl_offs; + for (i = pglob->gl_offs; --i >= 0; ) + *--pathv = NULL; + } + pglob->gl_pathv = pathv; + + for (p = path; *p++;) + ; + len = (size_t)(p - path); + *limitp += len; + if ((copy = malloc(len)) != NULL) { + if (g_Ctoc(path, copy, len)) { + free(copy); + return(GLOB_NOSPACE); + } + pathv[pglob->gl_offs + pglob->gl_pathc++] = copy; + } + pathv[pglob->gl_offs + pglob->gl_pathc] = NULL; + + if ((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_LIMIT) && + newsize + *limitp >= (u_int) get_arg_max()) { + errno = 0; + return(GLOB_NOSPACE); + } + + return(copy == NULL ? GLOB_NOSPACE : 0); +} + + +/* + * pattern matching function for filenames. Each occurrence of the * + * pattern causes a recursion level. + */ +static int +match(name, pat, patend) + register Char *name, *pat, *patend; +{ + int ok, negate_range; + Char c, k; + + while (pat < patend) { + c = *pat++; + switch (c & M_MASK) { + case M_ALL: + if (pat == patend) + return(1); + do + if (match(name, pat, patend)) + return(1); + while (*name++ != EOS) + ; + return(0); + case M_ONE: + if (*name++ == EOS) + return(0); + break; + case M_SET: + ok = 0; + if ((k = *name++) == EOS) + return(0); + if ((negate_range = ((*pat & M_MASK) == M_NOT)) != EOS) + ++pat; + while (((c = *pat++) & M_MASK) != M_END) + if ((*pat & M_MASK) == M_RNG) { + if (c <= k && k <= pat[1]) + ok = 1; + pat += 2; + } else if (c == k) + ok = 1; + if (ok == negate_range) + return(0); + break; + default: + if (*name++ != c) + return(0); + break; + } + } + return(*name == EOS); +} + +/* Free allocated data belonging to a glob_t structure. */ +void +globfree(pglob) + glob_t *pglob; +{ + register int i; + register char **pp; + + if (pglob->gl_pathv != NULL) { + pp = pglob->gl_pathv + pglob->gl_offs; + for (i = pglob->gl_pathc; i--; ++pp) + if (*pp) + free(*pp); + free(pglob->gl_pathv); + pglob->gl_pathv = NULL; + } +} + +static DIR * +g_opendir(str, pglob) + register Char *str; + glob_t *pglob; +{ + char buf[MAXPATHLEN]; + + if (!*str) + strcpy(buf, "."); + else { + if (g_Ctoc(str, buf, sizeof(buf))) + return(NULL); + } + + if (pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC) + return((*pglob->gl_opendir)(buf)); + + return(opendir(buf)); +} + +static int +g_lstat(fn, sb, pglob) + register Char *fn; + struct stat *sb; + glob_t *pglob; +{ + char buf[MAXPATHLEN]; + + if (g_Ctoc(fn, buf, sizeof(buf))) + return(-1); + if (pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC) + return((*pglob->gl_lstat)(buf, sb)); + return(lstat(buf, sb)); +} + +static int +g_stat(fn, sb, pglob) + register Char *fn; + struct stat *sb; + glob_t *pglob; +{ + char buf[MAXPATHLEN]; + + if (g_Ctoc(fn, buf, sizeof(buf))) + return(-1); + if (pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC) + return((*pglob->gl_stat)(buf, sb)); + return(stat(buf, sb)); +} + +static Char * +g_strchr(str, ch) + Char *str; + int ch; +{ + do { + if (*str == ch) + return (str); + } while (*str++); + return (NULL); +} + +static int +g_Ctoc(str, buf, len) + register const Char *str; + char *buf; + u_int len; +{ + + while (len--) { + if ((*buf++ = *str++) == EOS) + return (0); + } + return (1); +} + +#ifdef DEBUG +static void +qprintf(str, s) + const char *str; + register Char *s; +{ + register Char *p; + + (void)printf("%s:\n", str); + for (p = s; *p; p++) + (void)printf("%c", CHAR(*p)); + (void)printf("\n"); + for (p = s; *p; p++) + (void)printf("%c", *p & M_PROTECT ? '"' : ' '); + (void)printf("\n"); + for (p = s; *p; p++) + (void)printf("%c", ismeta(*p) ? '_' : ' '); + (void)printf("\n"); +} +#endif + +#endif /* !defined(HAVE_GLOB) || !defined(GLOB_HAS_ALTDIRFUNC) || + !defined(GLOB_HAS_GL_MATCHC) */ + diff --git a/openssh/openbsd-compat/glob.h b/openssh/openbsd-compat/glob.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b4c8f7a --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/openbsd-compat/glob.h @@ -0,0 +1,101 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: glob.h,v 1.5 2001/03/18 17:18:58 deraadt Exp $ */ +/* $NetBSD: glob.h,v 1.5 1994/10/26 00:55:56 cgd Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 1989, 1993 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * This code is derived from software contributed to Berkeley by + * Guido van Rossum. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the University of + * California, Berkeley and its contributors. + * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * @(#)glob.h 8.1 (Berkeley) 6/2/93 + */ + +#if !defined(HAVE_GLOB_H) || !defined(GLOB_HAS_ALTDIRFUNC) || \ + !defined(GLOB_HAS_GL_MATCHC) + +#ifndef _GLOB_H_ +#define _GLOB_H_ + +struct stat; +typedef struct { + int gl_pathc; /* Count of total paths so far. */ + int gl_matchc; /* Count of paths matching pattern. */ + int gl_offs; /* Reserved at beginning of gl_pathv. */ + int gl_flags; /* Copy of flags parameter to glob. */ + char **gl_pathv; /* List of paths matching pattern. */ + /* Copy of errfunc parameter to glob. */ + int (*gl_errfunc) __P((const char *, int)); + + /* + * Alternate filesystem access methods for glob; replacement + * versions of closedir(3), readdir(3), opendir(3), stat(2) + * and lstat(2). + */ + void (*gl_closedir) __P((void *)); + struct dirent *(*gl_readdir) __P((void *)); + void *(*gl_opendir) __P((const char *)); + int (*gl_lstat) __P((const char *, struct stat *)); + int (*gl_stat) __P((const char *, struct stat *)); +} glob_t; + +/* Flags */ +#define GLOB_APPEND 0x0001 /* Append to output from previous call. */ +#define GLOB_DOOFFS 0x0002 /* Use gl_offs. */ +#define GLOB_ERR 0x0004 /* Return on error. */ +#define GLOB_MARK 0x0008 /* Append / to matching directories. */ +#define GLOB_NOCHECK 0x0010 /* Return pattern itself if nothing matches. */ +#define GLOB_NOSORT 0x0020 /* Don't sort. */ + +#define GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC 0x0040 /* Use alternately specified directory funcs. */ +#define GLOB_BRACE 0x0080 /* Expand braces ala csh. */ +#define GLOB_MAGCHAR 0x0100 /* Pattern had globbing characters. */ +#define GLOB_NOMAGIC 0x0200 /* GLOB_NOCHECK without magic chars (csh). */ +#define GLOB_QUOTE 0x0400 /* Quote special chars with \. */ +#define GLOB_TILDE 0x0800 /* Expand tilde names from the passwd file. */ +#define GLOB_NOESCAPE 0x1000 /* Disable backslash escaping. */ +#define GLOB_LIMIT 0x2000 /* Limit pattern match output to ARG_MAX */ + +/* Error values returned by glob(3) */ +#define GLOB_NOSPACE (-1) /* Malloc call failed. */ +#define GLOB_ABORTED (-2) /* Unignored error. */ +#define GLOB_NOMATCH (-3) /* No match and GLOB_NOCHECK not set. */ +#define GLOB_NOSYS (-4) /* Function not supported. */ +#define GLOB_ABEND GLOB_ABORTED + +int glob __P((const char *, int, int (*)(const char *, int), glob_t *)); +void globfree __P((glob_t *)); + +#endif /* !_GLOB_H_ */ + +#endif /* !defined(HAVE_GLOB_H) || !defined(GLOB_HAS_ALTDIRFUNC) || + !defined(GLOB_HAS_GL_MATCHC */ + diff --git a/openssh/openbsd-compat/inet_aton.c b/openssh/openbsd-compat/inet_aton.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..18e31e7 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/openbsd-compat/inet_aton.c @@ -0,0 +1,193 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: inet_addr.c,v 1.6 1999/05/03 22:31:14 yanick Exp $ */ + +/* + * ++Copyright++ 1983, 1990, 1993 + * - + * Copyright (c) 1983, 1990, 1993 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the University of + * California, Berkeley and its contributors. + * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * - + * Portions Copyright (c) 1993 by Digital Equipment Corporation. + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies, and that + * the name of Digital Equipment Corporation not be used in advertising or + * publicity pertaining to distribution of the document or software without + * specific, written prior permission. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND DIGITAL EQUIPMENT CORP. DISCLAIMS ALL + * WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE, INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL DIGITAL EQUIPMENT + * CORPORATION BE LIABLE FOR ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR + * PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS + * ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS + * SOFTWARE. + * - + * --Copyright-- + */ + +#include "config.h" + +#if !defined(HAVE_INET_ATON) + +#if defined(LIBC_SCCS) && !defined(lint) +#if 0 +static char sccsid[] = "@(#)inet_addr.c 8.1 (Berkeley) 6/17/93"; +static char rcsid[] = "$From: inet_addr.c,v 8.5 1996/08/05 08:31:35 vixie Exp $"; +#else +static char rcsid[] = "$OpenBSD: inet_addr.c,v 1.6 1999/05/03 22:31:14 yanick Exp $"; +#endif +#endif /* LIBC_SCCS and not lint */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#if 0 +/* + * Ascii internet address interpretation routine. + * The value returned is in network order. + */ +in_addr_t +inet_addr(cp) + register const char *cp; +{ + struct in_addr val; + + if (inet_aton(cp, &val)) + return (val.s_addr); + return (INADDR_NONE); +} +#endif + +/* + * Check whether "cp" is a valid ascii representation + * of an Internet address and convert to a binary address. + * Returns 1 if the address is valid, 0 if not. + * This replaces inet_addr, the return value from which + * cannot distinguish between failure and a local broadcast address. + */ +int +inet_aton(const char *cp, struct in_addr *addr) +{ + register u_int32_t val; + register int base, n; + register char c; + unsigned int parts[4]; + register unsigned int *pp = parts; + + c = *cp; + for (;;) { + /* + * Collect number up to ``.''. + * Values are specified as for C: + * 0x=hex, 0=octal, isdigit=decimal. + */ + if (!isdigit(c)) + return (0); + val = 0; base = 10; + if (c == '0') { + c = *++cp; + if (c == 'x' || c == 'X') + base = 16, c = *++cp; + else + base = 8; + } + for (;;) { + if (isascii(c) && isdigit(c)) { + val = (val * base) + (c - '0'); + c = *++cp; + } else if (base == 16 && isascii(c) && isxdigit(c)) { + val = (val << 4) | + (c + 10 - (islower(c) ? 'a' : 'A')); + c = *++cp; + } else + break; + } + if (c == '.') { + /* + * Internet format: + * a.b.c.d + * a.b.c (with c treated as 16 bits) + * a.b (with b treated as 24 bits) + */ + if (pp >= parts + 3) + return (0); + *pp++ = val; + c = *++cp; + } else + break; + } + /* + * Check for trailing characters. + */ + if (c != '\0' && (!isascii(c) || !isspace(c))) + return (0); + /* + * Concoct the address according to + * the number of parts specified. + */ + n = pp - parts + 1; + switch (n) { + + case 0: + return (0); /* initial nondigit */ + + case 1: /* a -- 32 bits */ + break; + + case 2: /* a.b -- 8.24 bits */ + if ((val > 0xffffff) || (parts[0] > 0xff)) + return (0); + val |= parts[0] << 24; + break; + + case 3: /* a.b.c -- 8.8.16 bits */ + if ((val > 0xffff) || (parts[0] > 0xff) || (parts[1] > 0xff)) + return (0); + val |= (parts[0] << 24) | (parts[1] << 16); + break; + + case 4: /* a.b.c.d -- 8.8.8.8 bits */ + if ((val > 0xff) || (parts[0] > 0xff) || (parts[1] > 0xff) || (parts[2] > 0xff)) + return (0); + val |= (parts[0] << 24) | (parts[1] << 16) | (parts[2] << 8); + break; + } + if (addr) + addr->s_addr = htonl(val); + return (1); +} + +#endif /* !defined(HAVE_INET_ATON) */ diff --git a/openssh/openbsd-compat/inet_aton.h b/openssh/openbsd-compat/inet_aton.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4e4b9ac --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/openbsd-compat/inet_aton.h @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +/* $Id$ */ + +#ifndef _BSD_INET_ATON_H +#define _BSD_INET_ATON_H + +#include "config.h" + +#ifndef HAVE_INET_ATON +int inet_aton(const char *cp, struct in_addr *addr); +#endif /* HAVE_INET_ATON */ + +#endif /* _BSD_INET_ATON_H */ diff --git a/openssh/openbsd-compat/inet_ntoa.c b/openssh/openbsd-compat/inet_ntoa.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8a8b3c8 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/openbsd-compat/inet_ntoa.c @@ -0,0 +1,64 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1983, 1993 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the University of + * California, Berkeley and its contributors. + * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "config.h" + +#if defined(BROKEN_INET_NTOA) || !defined(HAVE_INET_NTOA) + +#if defined(LIBC_SCCS) && !defined(lint) +static char rcsid[] = "$OpenBSD: inet_ntoa.c,v 1.2 1996/08/19 08:29:16 tholo Exp $"; +#endif /* LIBC_SCCS and not lint */ + +/* + * Convert network-format internet address + * to base 256 d.d.d.d representation. + */ +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include "inet_ntoa.h" + +char *inet_ntoa(struct in_addr in) +{ + static char b[18]; + register char *p; + + p = (char *)∈ +#define UC(b) (((int)b)&0xff) + (void)snprintf(b, sizeof(b), + "%d.%d.%d.%d", UC(p[0]), UC(p[1]), UC(p[2]), UC(p[3])); + return (b); +} + +#endif /* defined(BROKEN_INET_NTOA) || !defined(HAVE_INET_NTOA) */ diff --git a/openssh/openbsd-compat/inet_ntoa.h b/openssh/openbsd-compat/inet_ntoa.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c3a6bb9 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/openbsd-compat/inet_ntoa.h @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +/* $Id$ */ + +#ifndef _BSD_INET_NTOA_H +#define _BSD_INET_NTOA_H + +#include "config.h" + +#if defined(BROKEN_INET_NTOA) || !defined(HAVE_INET_NTOA) +char *inet_ntoa(struct in_addr in); +#endif /* defined(BROKEN_INET_NTOA) || !defined(HAVE_INET_NTOA) */ + +#endif /* _BSD_INET_NTOA_H */ diff --git a/openssh/openbsd-compat/inet_ntop.c b/openssh/openbsd-compat/inet_ntop.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2b8d31f --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/openbsd-compat/inet_ntop.c @@ -0,0 +1,213 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: inet_ntop.c,v 1.1 1997/03/13 19:07:32 downsj Exp $ */ + +/* Copyright (c) 1996 by Internet Software Consortium. + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND INTERNET SOFTWARE CONSORTIUM DISCLAIMS + * ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL INTERNET SOFTWARE + * CONSORTIUM BE LIABLE FOR ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR + * PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS + * ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS + * SOFTWARE. + */ + +#include "config.h" + +#ifndef HAVE_INET_NTOP + +#if defined(LIBC_SCCS) && !defined(lint) +#if 0 +static char rcsid[] = "$From: inet_ntop.c,v 8.7 1996/08/05 08:41:18 vixie Exp $"; +#else +static char rcsid[] = "$OpenBSD: inet_ntop.c,v 1.1 1997/03/13 19:07:32 downsj Exp $"; +#endif +#endif /* LIBC_SCCS and not lint */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include "openbsd-compat/fake-socket.h" +#include +#include +#ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN +#include +#endif +#include +#include +#include + +#ifndef IN6ADDRSZ +#define IN6ADDRSZ 16 /* IPv6 T_AAAA */ +#endif + +#ifndef INT16SZ +#define INT16SZ 2 /* for systems without 16-bit ints */ +#endif + +/* + * WARNING: Don't even consider trying to compile this on a system where + * sizeof(int) < 4. sizeof(int) > 4 is fine; all the world's not a VAX. + */ + +static const char *inet_ntop4 __P((const u_char *src, char *dst, size_t size)); +static const char *inet_ntop6 __P((const u_char *src, char *dst, size_t size)); + +/* char * + * inet_ntop(af, src, dst, size) + * convert a network format address to presentation format. + * return: + * pointer to presentation format address (`dst'), or NULL (see errno). + * author: + * Paul Vixie, 1996. + */ +const char * +inet_ntop(af, src, dst, size) + int af; + const void *src; + char *dst; + size_t size; +{ + switch (af) { + case AF_INET: + return (inet_ntop4(src, dst, size)); + case AF_INET6: + return (inet_ntop6(src, dst, size)); + default: + errno = EAFNOSUPPORT; + return (NULL); + } + /* NOTREACHED */ +} + +/* const char * + * inet_ntop4(src, dst, size) + * format an IPv4 address, more or less like inet_ntoa() + * return: + * `dst' (as a const) + * notes: + * (1) uses no statics + * (2) takes a u_char* not an in_addr as input + * author: + * Paul Vixie, 1996. + */ +static const char * +inet_ntop4(src, dst, size) + const u_char *src; + char *dst; + size_t size; +{ + static const char fmt[] = "%u.%u.%u.%u"; + char tmp[sizeof "255.255.255.255"]; + + if (snprintf(tmp, sizeof(tmp), fmt, src[0], src[1], src[2], + src[3]) > size) { + errno = ENOSPC; + return (NULL); + } + strcpy(dst, tmp); + return (dst); +} + +/* const char * + * inet_ntop6(src, dst, size) + * convert IPv6 binary address into presentation (printable) format + * author: + * Paul Vixie, 1996. + */ +static const char * +inet_ntop6(src, dst, size) + const u_char *src; + char *dst; + size_t size; +{ + /* + * Note that int32_t and int16_t need only be "at least" large enough + * to contain a value of the specified size. On some systems, like + * Crays, there is no such thing as an integer variable with 16 bits. + * Keep this in mind if you think this function should have been coded + * to use pointer overlays. All the world's not a VAX. + */ + char tmp[sizeof "ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:255.255.255.255"], *tp; + struct { int base, len; } best, cur; + u_int words[IN6ADDRSZ / INT16SZ]; + int i; + + /* + * Preprocess: + * Copy the input (bytewise) array into a wordwise array. + * Find the longest run of 0x00's in src[] for :: shorthanding. + */ + memset(words, '\0', sizeof words); + for (i = 0; i < IN6ADDRSZ; i++) + words[i / 2] |= (src[i] << ((1 - (i % 2)) << 3)); + best.base = -1; + cur.base = -1; + for (i = 0; i < (IN6ADDRSZ / INT16SZ); i++) { + if (words[i] == 0) { + if (cur.base == -1) + cur.base = i, cur.len = 1; + else + cur.len++; + } else { + if (cur.base != -1) { + if (best.base == -1 || cur.len > best.len) + best = cur; + cur.base = -1; + } + } + } + if (cur.base != -1) { + if (best.base == -1 || cur.len > best.len) + best = cur; + } + if (best.base != -1 && best.len < 2) + best.base = -1; + + /* + * Format the result. + */ + tp = tmp; + for (i = 0; i < (IN6ADDRSZ / INT16SZ); i++) { + /* Are we inside the best run of 0x00's? */ + if (best.base != -1 && i >= best.base && + i < (best.base + best.len)) { + if (i == best.base) + *tp++ = ':'; + continue; + } + /* Are we following an initial run of 0x00s or any real hex? */ + if (i != 0) + *tp++ = ':'; + /* Is this address an encapsulated IPv4? */ + if (i == 6 && best.base == 0 && + (best.len == 6 || (best.len == 5 && words[5] == 0xffff))) { + if (!inet_ntop4(src+12, tp, sizeof tmp - (tp - tmp))) + return (NULL); + tp += strlen(tp); + break; + } + snprintf(tp, sizeof(tmp - (tp - tmp)), "%x", words[i]); + tp += strlen(tp); + } + /* Was it a trailing run of 0x00's? */ + if (best.base != -1 && (best.base + best.len) == (IN6ADDRSZ / INT16SZ)) + *tp++ = ':'; + *tp++ = '\0'; + + /* + * Check for overflow, copy, and we're done. + */ + if ((size_t)(tp - tmp) > size) { + errno = ENOSPC; + return (NULL); + } + strcpy(dst, tmp); + return (dst); +} + +#endif /* !HAVE_INET_NTOP */ diff --git a/openssh/openbsd-compat/inet_ntop.h b/openssh/openbsd-compat/inet_ntop.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..dc0eb99 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/openbsd-compat/inet_ntop.h @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ +/* $Id$ */ + +#ifndef _BSD_INET_NTOP_H +#define _BSD_INET_NTOP_H + +#include "config.h" + +#ifndef HAVE_INET_NTOP +const char * +inet_ntop(int af, const void *src, char *dst, size_t size); +#endif /* !HAVE_INET_NTOP */ + +#endif /* _BSD_INET_NTOP_H */ diff --git a/openssh/openbsd-compat/mktemp.c b/openssh/openbsd-compat/mktemp.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9ed1bc8 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/openbsd-compat/mktemp.c @@ -0,0 +1,183 @@ +/* THIS FILE HAS BEEN MODIFIED FROM THE ORIGINAL OPENBSD SOURCE */ +/* Changes: Removed mktemp */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 1987, 1993 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the University of + * California, Berkeley and its contributors. + * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#ifndef HAVE_MKDTEMP + +#if defined(LIBC_SCCS) && !defined(lint) +static char rcsid[] = "$OpenBSD: mktemp.c,v 1.13 1998/06/30 23:03:13 deraadt Exp $"; +#endif /* LIBC_SCCS and not lint */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN +#define open binary_open +extern int binary_open(); +#endif + +static int _gettemp(char *, int *, int, int); + +int +mkstemps(path, slen) + char *path; + int slen; +{ + int fd; + + return (_gettemp(path, &fd, 0, slen) ? fd : -1); +} + +int +mkstemp(path) + char *path; +{ + int fd; + + return (_gettemp(path, &fd, 0, 0) ? fd : -1); +} + +char * +mkdtemp(path) + char *path; +{ + return(_gettemp(path, (int *)NULL, 1, 0) ? path : (char *)NULL); +} + +static int +_gettemp(path, doopen, domkdir, slen) + char *path; + register int *doopen; + int domkdir; + int slen; +{ + register char *start, *trv, *suffp; + struct stat sbuf; + int pid, rval; + + if (doopen && domkdir) { + errno = EINVAL; + return(0); + } + + for (trv = path; *trv; ++trv) + ; + trv -= slen; + suffp = trv; + --trv; + if (trv < path) { + errno = EINVAL; + return (0); + } + pid = getpid(); + while (*trv == 'X' && pid != 0) { + *trv-- = (pid % 10) + '0'; + pid /= 10; + } + while (*trv == 'X') { + char c; + + pid = (arc4random() & 0xffff) % (26+26); + if (pid < 26) + c = pid + 'A'; + else + c = (pid - 26) + 'a'; + *trv-- = c; + } + start = trv + 1; + + /* + * check the target directory; if you have six X's and it + * doesn't exist this runs for a *very* long time. + */ + if (doopen || domkdir) { + for (;; --trv) { + if (trv <= path) + break; + if (*trv == '/') { + *trv = '\0'; + rval = stat(path, &sbuf); + *trv = '/'; + if (rval != 0) + return(0); + if (!S_ISDIR(sbuf.st_mode)) { + errno = ENOTDIR; + return(0); + } + break; + } + } + } + + for (;;) { + if (doopen) { + if ((*doopen = + open(path, O_CREAT|O_EXCL|O_RDWR, 0600)) >= 0) + return(1); + if (errno != EEXIST) + return(0); + } else if (domkdir) { + if (mkdir(path, 0700) == 0) + return(1); + if (errno != EEXIST) + return(0); + } else if (lstat(path, &sbuf)) + return(errno == ENOENT ? 1 : 0); + + /* tricky little algorithm for backward compatibility */ + for (trv = start;;) { + if (!*trv) + return (0); + if (*trv == 'Z') { + if (trv == suffp) + return (0); + *trv++ = 'a'; + } else { + if (isdigit(*trv)) + *trv = 'a'; + else if (*trv == 'z') /* inc from z to A */ + *trv = 'A'; + else { + if (trv == suffp) + return (0); + ++*trv; + } + break; + } + } + } + /*NOTREACHED*/ +} + +#endif /* !HAVE_MKDTEMP */ diff --git a/openssh/openbsd-compat/mktemp.h b/openssh/openbsd-compat/mktemp.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f799387 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/openbsd-compat/mktemp.h @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ +/* $Id$ */ + +#ifndef _BSD_MKTEMP_H +#define _BSD_MKTEMP_H + +#include "config.h" +#ifndef HAVE_MKDTEMP +int mkstemps(char *path, int slen); +int mkstemp(char *path); +char *mkdtemp(char *path); +#endif /* !HAVE_MKDTEMP */ + +#endif /* _BSD_MKTEMP_H */ diff --git a/openssh/openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h b/openssh/openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..845d98f --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ +/* $Id$ */ + +#ifndef _OPENBSD_H +#define _OPENBSD_H + +#include "config.h" + +/* OpenBSD function replacements */ +#include "bindresvport.h" +#include "getcwd.h" +#include "realpath.h" +#include "rresvport.h" +#include "strlcpy.h" +#include "strlcat.h" +#include "strmode.h" +#include "mktemp.h" +#include "daemon.h" +#include "dirname.h" +#include "base64.h" +#include "sigact.h" +#include "inet_ntoa.h" +#include "inet_ntop.h" +#include "strsep.h" +#include "setproctitle.h" +#include "getgrouplist.h" +#include "glob.h" +#include "readpassphrase.h" +#include "getopt.h" + +/* Home grown routines */ +#include "bsd-arc4random.h" +#include "bsd-misc.h" +#include "bsd-snprintf.h" +#include "bsd-waitpid.h" + +/* rfc2553 socket API replacements */ +#include "fake-getaddrinfo.h" +#include "fake-getnameinfo.h" +#include "fake-socket.h" + +/* Routines for a single OS platform */ +#include "bsd-cray.h" + +#endif /* _OPENBSD_H */ diff --git a/openssh/openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.c b/openssh/openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fdef158 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.c @@ -0,0 +1,167 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000 Todd C. Miller + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, + * INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY + * AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL + * THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, + * PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; + * OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, + * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR + * OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF + * ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#if defined(LIBC_SCCS) && !defined(lint) +static char rcsid[] = "$OpenBSD: readpassphrase.c,v 1.5 2001/06/27 13:23:30 djm Exp $"; +#endif /* LIBC_SCCS and not lint */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#ifndef HAVE_READPASSPHRASE + +#include +#include + +#ifdef TCSASOFT +# define _T_FLUSH (TCSAFLUSH|TCSASOFT) +#else +# define _T_FLUSH (TCSAFLUSH) +#endif + +/* SunOS 4.x which lacks _POSIX_VDISABLE, but has VDISABLE */ +#if !defined(_POSIX_VDISABLE) && defined(VDISABLE) +# define _POSIX_VDISABLE VDISABLE +#endif + +char * +readpassphrase(prompt, buf, bufsiz, flags) + const char *prompt; + char *buf; + size_t bufsiz; + int flags; +{ + struct termios term; + char ch, *p, *end; +#ifdef _POSIX_VDISABLE + u_char status; +#endif + int echo, input, output; + sigset_t oset, nset; + + /* I suppose we could alloc on demand in this case (XXX). */ + if (bufsiz == 0) { + errno = EINVAL; + return(NULL); + } + + /* + * Read and write to /dev/tty if available. If not, read from + * stdin and write to stderr unless a tty is required. + */ + if ((input = output = open(_PATH_TTY, O_RDWR)) == -1) { + if (flags & RPP_REQUIRE_TTY) { + errno = ENOTTY; + return(NULL); + } + input = STDIN_FILENO; + output = STDERR_FILENO; + } + + /* + * We block SIGINT and SIGTSTP so the terminal is not left + * in an inconsistent state (ie: no echo). It would probably + * be better to simply catch these though. + */ + sigemptyset(&nset); + sigaddset(&nset, SIGINT); + sigaddset(&nset, SIGTSTP); + (void)sigprocmask(SIG_BLOCK, &nset, &oset); + + /* Turn off echo if possible. */ + echo = 0; +#ifdef _POSIX_VDISABLE + status = _POSIX_VDISABLE; +#endif + if (tcgetattr(input, &term) == 0) { + if (!(flags & RPP_ECHO_ON) && (term.c_lflag & ECHO)) { + echo = 1; + term.c_lflag &= ~ECHO; + } +#ifdef VSTATUS + if (term.c_cc[VSTATUS] != _POSIX_VDISABLE) { + status = term.c_cc[VSTATUS]; + term.c_cc[VSTATUS] = _POSIX_VDISABLE; + } +#endif + (void)tcsetattr(input, _T_FLUSH, &term); + } + if (!(flags & RPP_ECHO_ON)) { + if (tcgetattr(input, &term) == 0 && (term.c_lflag & ECHO)) { + echo = 1; + term.c_lflag &= ~ECHO; + (void)tcsetattr(input, _T_FLUSH, &term); + } + } + + (void)write(output, prompt, strlen(prompt)); + end = buf + bufsiz - 1; + for (p = buf; read(input, &ch, 1) == 1 && ch != '\n' && ch != '\r';) { + if (p < end) { + if ((flags & RPP_SEVENBIT)) + ch &= 0x7f; + if (isalpha(ch)) { + if ((flags & RPP_FORCELOWER)) + ch = tolower(ch); + if ((flags & RPP_FORCEUPPER)) + ch = toupper(ch); + } + *p++ = ch; + } + } + *p = '\0'; +#ifdef _POSIX_VDISABLE + if (echo || status != _POSIX_VDISABLE) { +#else + if (echo) { +#endif + if (echo) { + (void)write(output, "\n", 1); + term.c_lflag |= ECHO; + } +#ifdef VSTATUS + if (status != _POSIX_VDISABLE) + term.c_cc[VSTATUS] = status; +#endif + (void)tcsetattr(input, _T_FLUSH, &term); + } + (void)sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &oset, NULL); + if (input != STDIN_FILENO) + (void)close(input); + return(buf); +} +#endif /* HAVE_READPASSPHRASE */ + +#if 0 +char * +getpass(prompt) + const char *prompt; +{ + static char buf[_PASSWORD_LEN + 1]; + + return(readpassphrase(prompt, buf, sizeof(buf), RPP_ECHO_OFF)); +} +#endif diff --git a/openssh/openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h b/openssh/openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9077b6e --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: readpassphrase.h,v 1.1 2000/11/21 00:48:38 millert Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000 Todd C. Miller + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, + * INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY + * AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL + * THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, + * PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; + * OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, + * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR + * OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF + * ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifndef _READPASSPHRASE_H_ +#define _READPASSPHRASE_H_ + +#include "includes.h" + +#ifndef HAVE_READPASSPHRASE + +#define RPP_ECHO_OFF 0x00 /* Turn off echo (default). */ +#define RPP_ECHO_ON 0x01 /* Leave echo on. */ +#define RPP_REQUIRE_TTY 0x02 /* Fail if there is no tty. */ +#define RPP_FORCELOWER 0x04 /* Force input to lower case. */ +#define RPP_FORCEUPPER 0x08 /* Force input to upper case. */ +#define RPP_SEVENBIT 0x10 /* Strip the high bit from input. */ + +char *readpassphrase(const char *, char *, size_t, int); + +#endif /* HAVE_READPASSPHRASE */ + +#endif /* !_READPASSPHRASE_H_ */ diff --git a/openssh/openbsd-compat/realpath.c b/openssh/openbsd-compat/realpath.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ec801d4 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/openbsd-compat/realpath.c @@ -0,0 +1,162 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1994 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * This code is derived from software contributed to Berkeley by + * Jan-Simon Pendry. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#if !defined(HAVE_REALPATH) || defined(BROKEN_REALPATH) + +#if defined(LIBC_SCCS) && !defined(lint) +static char *rcsid = "$OpenBSD: realpath.c,v 1.5 2001/06/27 00:58:56 lebel Exp $"; +#endif /* LIBC_SCCS and not lint */ + +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +/* + * MAXSYMLINKS + */ +#ifndef MAXSYMLINKS +#define MAXSYMLINKS 5 +#endif + +/* + * char *realpath(const char *path, char resolved_path[MAXPATHLEN]); + * + * Find the real name of path, by removing all ".", ".." and symlink + * components. Returns (resolved) on success, or (NULL) on failure, + * in which case the path which caused trouble is left in (resolved). + */ +char * +realpath(const char *path, char *resolved) +{ + struct stat sb; + int fd, n, rootd, serrno = 0; + char *p, *q, wbuf[MAXPATHLEN], start[MAXPATHLEN]; + int symlinks = 0; + + /* Save the starting point. */ + getcwd(start,MAXPATHLEN); + if ((fd = open(".", O_RDONLY)) < 0) { + (void)strcpy(resolved, "."); + return (NULL); + } + close(fd); + + /* + * Find the dirname and basename from the path to be resolved. + * Change directory to the dirname component. + * lstat the basename part. + * if it is a symlink, read in the value and loop. + * if it is a directory, then change to that directory. + * get the current directory name and append the basename. + */ + strlcpy(resolved, path, MAXPATHLEN); +loop: + q = strrchr(resolved, '/'); + if (q != NULL) { + p = q + 1; + if (q == resolved) + q = "/"; + else { + do { + --q; + } while (q > resolved && *q == '/'); + q[1] = '\0'; + q = resolved; + } + if (chdir(q) < 0) + goto err1; + } else + p = resolved; + + /* Deal with the last component. */ + if (lstat(p, &sb) == 0) { + if (S_ISLNK(sb.st_mode)) { + if (++symlinks > MAXSYMLINKS) { + serrno = ELOOP; + goto err1; + } + n = readlink(p, resolved, MAXPATHLEN-1); + if (n < 0) + goto err1; + resolved[n] = '\0'; + goto loop; + } + if (S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode)) { + if (chdir(p) < 0) + goto err1; + p = ""; + } + } + + /* + * Save the last component name and get the full pathname of + * the current directory. + */ + (void)strcpy(wbuf, p); + if (getcwd(resolved, MAXPATHLEN) == 0) + goto err1; + + /* + * Join the two strings together, ensuring that the right thing + * happens if the last component is empty, or the dirname is root. + */ + if (resolved[0] == '/' && resolved[1] == '\0') + rootd = 1; + else + rootd = 0; + + if (*wbuf) { + if (strlen(resolved) + strlen(wbuf) + rootd + 1 > MAXPATHLEN) { + serrno = ENAMETOOLONG; + goto err1; + } + if (rootd == 0) + (void)strcat(resolved, "/"); + (void)strcat(resolved, wbuf); + } + + /* Go back to where we came from. */ + if (chdir(start) < 0) { + serrno = errno; + goto err2; + } + return (resolved); + +err1: chdir(start); +err2: errno = serrno; + return (NULL); +} +#endif /* !defined(HAVE_REALPATH) || defined(BROKEN_REALPATH) */ diff --git a/openssh/openbsd-compat/realpath.h b/openssh/openbsd-compat/realpath.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0a2445d --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/openbsd-compat/realpath.h @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ +/* $Id$ */ + +#ifndef _BSD_REALPATH_H +#define _BSD_REALPATH_H + +#include "config.h" + +#if !defined(HAVE_REALPATH) || defined(BROKEN_REALPATH) + +char *realpath(const char *path, char *resolved); + +#endif /* !defined(HAVE_REALPATH) || defined(BROKEN_REALPATH) */ +#endif /* _BSD_REALPATH_H */ diff --git a/openssh/openbsd-compat/rresvport.c b/openssh/openbsd-compat/rresvport.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..44eac20 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/openbsd-compat/rresvport.c @@ -0,0 +1,106 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1998 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 1983, 1993, 1994 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the University of + * California, Berkeley and its contributors. + * This product includes software developed by Theo de Raadt. + * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "config.h" + +#ifndef HAVE_RRESVPORT_AF + +#if defined(LIBC_SCCS) && !defined(lint) +static char *rcsid = "$OpenBSD: rresvport.c,v 1.5 2000/01/26 03:43:20 deraadt Exp $"; +#endif /* LIBC_SCCS and not lint */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#if 0 +int +rresvport(alport) + int *alport; +{ + return rresvport_af(alport, AF_INET); +} +#endif + +int +rresvport_af(int *alport, sa_family_t af) +{ + struct sockaddr_storage ss; + struct sockaddr *sa; + u_int16_t *portp; + int s; + socklen_t salen; + + memset(&ss, '\0', sizeof ss); + sa = (struct sockaddr *)&ss; + + switch (af) { + case AF_INET: + salen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in); + portp = &((struct sockaddr_in *)sa)->sin_port; + break; + case AF_INET6: + salen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6); + portp = &((struct sockaddr_in6 *)sa)->sin6_port; + break; + default: + errno = EPFNOSUPPORT; + return (-1); + } + sa->sa_family = af; + + s = socket(af, SOCK_STREAM, 0); + if (s < 0) + return (-1); + + *portp = htons(*alport); + if (*alport < IPPORT_RESERVED - 1) { + if (bind(s, sa, salen) >= 0) + return (s); + if (errno != EADDRINUSE) { + (void)close(s); + return (-1); + } + } + + *portp = 0; + sa->sa_family = af; + if (bindresvport_sa(s, sa) == -1) { + (void)close(s); + return (-1); + } + *alport = ntohs(*portp); + return (s); +} + +#endif /* HAVE_RRESVPORT_AF */ diff --git a/openssh/openbsd-compat/rresvport.h b/openssh/openbsd-compat/rresvport.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..cd908e1 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/openbsd-compat/rresvport.h @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +/* $Id$ */ + +#ifndef _BSD_RRESVPORT_H +#define _BSD_RRESVPORT_H + +#include "config.h" + +#ifndef HAVE_RRESVPORT_AF +int rresvport_af(int *alport, sa_family_t af); +#endif /* !HAVE_RRESVPORT_AF */ + +#endif /* _BSD_RRESVPORT_H */ diff --git a/openssh/openbsd-compat/setenv.c b/openssh/openbsd-compat/setenv.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ac9670b --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/openbsd-compat/setenv.c @@ -0,0 +1,161 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1987 Regents of the University of California. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the University of + * California, Berkeley and its contributors. + * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "config.h" +#ifndef HAVE_SETENV + +#if defined(LIBC_SCCS) && !defined(lint) +static char *rcsid = "$OpenBSD: setenv.c,v 1.3 1998/02/02 22:44:53 millert Exp $"; +#endif /* LIBC_SCCS and not lint */ + +#include +#include + +/* + * __findenv -- + * Returns pointer to value associated with name, if any, else NULL. + * Sets offset to be the offset of the name/value combination in the + * environmental array, for use by setenv(3) and unsetenv(3). + * Explicitly removes '=' in argument name. + * + * This routine *should* be a static; don't use it. + */ +char * +__findenv(name, offset) + register const char *name; + int *offset; +{ + extern char **environ; + register int len, i; + register const char *np; + register char **p, *cp; + + if (name == NULL || environ == NULL) + return (NULL); + for (np = name; *np && *np != '='; ++np) + ; + len = np - name; + for (p = environ; (cp = *p) != NULL; ++p) { + for (np = name, i = len; i && *cp; i--) + if (*cp++ != *np++) + break; + if (i == 0 && *cp++ == '=') { + *offset = p - environ; + return (cp); + } + } + return (NULL); +} + +/* + * setenv -- + * Set the value of the environmental variable "name" to be + * "value". If rewrite is set, replace any current value. + */ +int +setenv(name, value, rewrite) + register const char *name; + register const char *value; + int rewrite; +{ + extern char **environ; + static int alloced; /* if allocated space before */ + register char *C; + int l_value, offset; + char *__findenv(); + + if (*value == '=') /* no `=' in value */ + ++value; + l_value = strlen(value); + if ((C = __findenv(name, &offset))) { /* find if already exists */ + if (!rewrite) + return (0); + if (strlen(C) >= l_value) { /* old larger; copy over */ + while ((*C++ = *value++)); + return (0); + } + } else { /* create new slot */ + register int cnt; + register char **P; + + for (P = environ, cnt = 0; *P; ++P, ++cnt); + if (alloced) { /* just increase size */ + P = (char **)realloc((void *)environ, + (size_t)(sizeof(char *) * (cnt + 2))); + if (!P) + return (-1); + environ = P; + } + else { /* get new space */ + alloced = 1; /* copy old entries into it */ + P = (char **)malloc((size_t)(sizeof(char *) * + (cnt + 2))); + if (!P) + return (-1); + memmove(P, environ, cnt * sizeof(char *)); + environ = P; + } + environ[cnt + 1] = NULL; + offset = cnt; + } + for (C = (char *)name; *C && *C != '='; ++C); /* no `=' in name */ + if (!(environ[offset] = /* name + `=' + value */ + malloc((size_t)((int)(C - name) + l_value + 2)))) + return (-1); + for (C = environ[offset]; (*C = *name++) && *C != '='; ++C) + ; + for (*C++ = '='; (*C++ = *value++); ) + ; + return (0); +} + +/* + * unsetenv(name) -- + * Delete environmental variable "name". + */ +void +unsetenv(name) + const char *name; +{ + extern char **environ; + register char **P; + int offset; + char *__findenv(); + + while (__findenv(name, &offset)) /* if set multiple times */ + for (P = &environ[offset];; ++P) + if (!(*P = *(P + 1))) + break; +} + +#endif /* HAVE_SETENV */ diff --git a/openssh/openbsd-compat/setenv.h b/openssh/openbsd-compat/setenv.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b938054 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/openbsd-compat/setenv.h @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +/* $Id$ */ + +#ifndef _BSD_SETENV_H +#define _BSD_SETENV_H + +#include "config.h" + +#ifndef HAVE_SETENV + +int setenv(register const char *name, register const char *value, int rewrite); + +#endif /* !HAVE_SETENV */ + +#endif /* _BSD_SETENV_H */ diff --git a/openssh/openbsd-compat/setproctitle.c b/openssh/openbsd-compat/setproctitle.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..38eca9a --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/openbsd-compat/setproctitle.c @@ -0,0 +1,102 @@ +/* + * Modified for OpenSSH by Kevin Steves + * October 2000 + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 1994, 1995 Christopher G. Demetriou + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by Christopher G. Demetriou + * for the NetBSD Project. + * 4. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#if defined(LIBC_SCCS) && !defined(lint) +static char rcsid[] = "$OpenBSD: setproctitle.c,v 1.7 1999/02/25 22:10:12 art Exp $"; +#endif /* LIBC_SCCS and not lint */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#ifndef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE + +#define SPT_NONE 0 +#define SPT_PSTAT 1 + +#ifndef SPT_TYPE +#define SPT_TYPE SPT_NONE +#endif + +#if SPT_TYPE == SPT_PSTAT +#include +#include +#endif /* SPT_TYPE == SPT_PSTAT */ + +#define MAX_PROCTITLE 2048 + +extern char *__progname; + +/* + * Set Process Title (SPT) defines. Modeled after sendmail's + * SPT type definition strategy. + * + * SPT_TYPE: + * + * SPT_NONE: Don't set the process title. Default. + * SPT_PSTAT: Use pstat(PSTAT_SETCMD). HP-UX specific. + */ + +void +setproctitle(const char *fmt, ...) +{ +#if SPT_TYPE != SPT_NONE + va_list ap; + + char buf[MAX_PROCTITLE]; + size_t used; + +#if SPT_TYPE == SPT_PSTAT + union pstun pst; +#endif /* SPT_TYPE == SPT_PSTAT */ + + va_start(ap, fmt); + if (fmt != NULL) { + used = snprintf(buf, MAX_PROCTITLE, "%s: ", __progname); + if (used >= MAX_PROCTITLE) + used = MAX_PROCTITLE - 1; + (void)vsnprintf(buf + used, MAX_PROCTITLE - used, fmt, ap); + } else + (void)snprintf(buf, MAX_PROCTITLE, "%s", __progname); + va_end(ap); + used = strlen(buf); + +#if SPT_TYPE == SPT_PSTAT + pst.pst_command = buf; + pstat(PSTAT_SETCMD, pst, used, 0, 0); +#endif /* SPT_TYPE == SPT_PSTAT */ + +#endif /* SPT_TYPE != SPT_NONE */ +} +#endif /* HAVE_SETPROCTITLE */ diff --git a/openssh/openbsd-compat/setproctitle.h b/openssh/openbsd-compat/setproctitle.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..73ae9f9 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/openbsd-compat/setproctitle.h @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +/* $Id$ */ + +#ifndef _BSD_SETPROCTITLE_H +#define _BSD_SETPROCTITLE_H + +#include "config.h" + +#ifndef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE +void setproctitle(const char *fmt, ...); +#endif + +#endif /* _BSD_SETPROCTITLE_H */ diff --git a/openssh/openbsd-compat/sigact.c b/openssh/openbsd-compat/sigact.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..806eb02 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/openbsd-compat/sigact.c @@ -0,0 +1,102 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: sigaction.c,v 1.3 1999/06/27 08:14:21 millert Exp $ */ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Copyright (c) 1998 Free Software Foundation, Inc. * + * * + * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a * + * copy of this software and associated documentation files (the * + * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including * + * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, * + * distribute, distribute with modifications, sublicense, and/or sell * + * copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is * + * furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions: * + * * + * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included * + * in all copies or substantial portions of the Software. * + * * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS * + * OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF * + * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. * + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE ABOVE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, * + * DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR * + * OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR * + * THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE. * + * * + * Except as contained in this notice, the name(s) of the above copyright * + * holders shall not be used in advertising or otherwise to promote the * + * sale, use or other dealings in this Software without prior written * + * authorization. * + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Author: Zeyd M. Ben-Halim 1992,1995 * + * and: Eric S. Raymond * + ****************************************************************************/ + +#include "config.h" +#include +#include "sigact.h" + +/* This file provides sigaction() emulation using sigvec() */ +/* Use only if this is non POSIX system */ + +#if !HAVE_SIGACTION && HAVE_SIGVEC + +int +sigaction(int sig, struct sigaction *sigact, struct sigaction *osigact) +{ + return sigvec(sig, &(sigact->sv), &(osigact->sv)); +} + +int +sigemptyset (sigset_t * mask) +{ + *mask = 0; + return 0; +} + +int +sigprocmask (int mode, sigset_t * mask, sigset_t * omask) +{ + sigset_t current = sigsetmask(0); + + if (omask) *omask = current; + + if (mode==SIG_BLOCK) + current |= *mask; + else if (mode==SIG_UNBLOCK) + current &= ~*mask; + else if (mode==SIG_SETMASK) + current = *mask; + + sigsetmask(current); + return 0; +} + +int +sigsuspend (sigset_t * mask) +{ + return sigpause(*mask); +} + +int +sigdelset (sigset_t * mask, int sig) +{ + *mask &= ~sigmask(sig); + return 0; +} + +int +sigaddset (sigset_t * mask, int sig) +{ + *mask |= sigmask(sig); + return 0; +} + +int +sigismember (sigset_t * mask, int sig) +{ + return (*mask & sigmask(sig)) != 0; +} + +#endif diff --git a/openssh/openbsd-compat/sigact.h b/openssh/openbsd-compat/sigact.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b37c1f8 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/openbsd-compat/sigact.h @@ -0,0 +1,88 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: SigAction.h,v 1.2 1999/06/27 08:15:19 millert Exp $ */ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Copyright (c) 1998 Free Software Foundation, Inc. * + * * + * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a * + * copy of this software and associated documentation files (the * + * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including * + * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, * + * distribute, distribute with modifications, sublicense, and/or sell * + * copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is * + * furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions: * + * * + * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included * + * in all copies or substantial portions of the Software. * + * * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS * + * OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF * + * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. * + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE ABOVE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, * + * DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR * + * OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR * + * THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE. * + * * + * Except as contained in this notice, the name(s) of the above copyright * + * holders shall not be used in advertising or otherwise to promote the * + * sale, use or other dealings in this Software without prior written * + * authorization. * + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Author: Zeyd M. Ben-Halim 1992,1995 * + * and: Eric S. Raymond * + ****************************************************************************/ + +/* + * $From: SigAction.h,v 1.5 1999/06/19 23:00:54 tom Exp $ + * + * This file exists to handle non-POSIX systems which don't have , + * and usually no sigaction() nor + */ + +#ifndef _SIGACTION_H +#define _SIGACTION_H + +#if !defined(HAVE_SIGACTION) && defined(HAVE_SIGVEC) + +#undef SIG_BLOCK +#define SIG_BLOCK 00 + +#undef SIG_UNBLOCK +#define SIG_UNBLOCK 01 + +#undef SIG_SETMASK +#define SIG_SETMASK 02 + +/* + * is in the Linux 1.2.8 + gcc 2.7.0 configuration, + * and is useful for testing this header file. + */ +#if HAVE_BSD_SIGNAL_H +# include +#endif + +struct sigaction +{ + struct sigvec sv; +}; + +typedef unsigned long sigset_t; + +#undef sa_mask +#define sa_mask sv.sv_mask +#undef sa_handler +#define sa_handler sv.sv_handler +#undef sa_flags +#define sa_flags sv.sv_flags + +int sigaction(int sig, struct sigaction *sigact, struct sigaction *osigact); +int sigprocmask (int how, sigset_t *mask, sigset_t *omask); +int sigemptyset (sigset_t *mask); +int sigsuspend (sigset_t *mask); +int sigdelset (sigset_t *mask, int sig); +int sigaddset (sigset_t *mask, int sig); + +#endif /* !defined(HAVE_SIGACTION) && defined(HAVE_SIGVEC) */ + +#endif /* !defined(_SIGACTION_H) */ diff --git a/openssh/openbsd-compat/strlcat.c b/openssh/openbsd-compat/strlcat.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6ff65c1 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/openbsd-compat/strlcat.c @@ -0,0 +1,79 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: strlcat.c,v 1.8 2001/05/13 15:40:15 deraadt Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 1998 Todd C. Miller + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, + * INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY + * AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL + * THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, + * PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; + * OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, + * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR + * OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF + * ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "config.h" +#ifndef HAVE_STRLCAT + +#if defined(LIBC_SCCS) && !defined(lint) +static char *rcsid = "$OpenBSD: strlcat.c,v 1.8 2001/05/13 15:40:15 deraadt Exp $"; +#endif /* LIBC_SCCS and not lint */ + +#include +#include +#include "strlcat.h" + +/* + * Appends src to string dst of size siz (unlike strncat, siz is the + * full size of dst, not space left). At most siz-1 characters + * will be copied. Always NUL terminates (unless siz <= strlen(dst)). + * Returns strlen(src) + MIN(siz, strlen(initial dst)). + * If retval >= siz, truncation occurred. + */ +size_t +strlcat(dst, src, siz) + char *dst; + const char *src; + size_t siz; +{ + register char *d = dst; + register const char *s = src; + register size_t n = siz; + size_t dlen; + + /* Find the end of dst and adjust bytes left but don't go past end */ + while (n-- != 0 && *d != '\0') + d++; + dlen = d - dst; + n = siz - dlen; + + if (n == 0) + return(dlen + strlen(s)); + while (*s != '\0') { + if (n != 1) { + *d++ = *s; + n--; + } + s++; + } + *d = '\0'; + + return(dlen + (s - src)); /* count does not include NUL */ +} + +#endif /* !HAVE_STRLCAT */ diff --git a/openssh/openbsd-compat/strlcat.h b/openssh/openbsd-compat/strlcat.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..02fbc39 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/openbsd-compat/strlcat.h @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +/* $Id$ */ + +#ifndef _BSD_STRLCAT_H +#define _BSD_STRLCAT_H + +#include "config.h" +#ifndef HAVE_STRLCAT +#include +size_t strlcat(char *dst, const char *src, size_t siz); +#endif /* !HAVE_STRLCAT */ + +#endif /* _BSD_STRLCAT_H */ diff --git a/openssh/openbsd-compat/strlcpy.c b/openssh/openbsd-compat/strlcpy.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b5e5a55 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/openbsd-compat/strlcpy.c @@ -0,0 +1,75 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: strlcpy.c,v 1.5 2001/05/13 15:40:16 deraadt Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 1998 Todd C. Miller + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, + * INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY + * AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL + * THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, + * PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; + * OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, + * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR + * OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF + * ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "config.h" +#ifndef HAVE_STRLCPY + +#if defined(LIBC_SCCS) && !defined(lint) +static char *rcsid = "$OpenBSD: strlcpy.c,v 1.5 2001/05/13 15:40:16 deraadt Exp $"; +#endif /* LIBC_SCCS and not lint */ + +#include +#include +#include "strlcpy.h" + +/* + * Copy src to string dst of size siz. At most siz-1 characters + * will be copied. Always NUL terminates (unless siz == 0). + * Returns strlen(src); if retval >= siz, truncation occurred. + */ +size_t +strlcpy(dst, src, siz) + char *dst; + const char *src; + size_t siz; +{ + register char *d = dst; + register const char *s = src; + register size_t n = siz; + + /* Copy as many bytes as will fit */ + if (n != 0 && --n != 0) { + do { + if ((*d++ = *s++) == 0) + break; + } while (--n != 0); + } + + /* Not enough room in dst, add NUL and traverse rest of src */ + if (n == 0) { + if (siz != 0) + *d = '\0'; /* NUL-terminate dst */ + while (*s++) + ; + } + + return(s - src - 1); /* count does not include NUL */ +} + +#endif /* !HAVE_STRLCPY */ diff --git a/openssh/openbsd-compat/strlcpy.h b/openssh/openbsd-compat/strlcpy.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7b33e4f --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/openbsd-compat/strlcpy.h @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +/* $Id$ */ + +#ifndef _BSD_STRLCPY_H +#define _BSD_STRLCPY_H + +#include "config.h" +#ifndef HAVE_STRLCPY +#include +size_t strlcpy(char *dst, const char *src, size_t siz); +#endif /* !HAVE_STRLCPY */ + +#endif /* _BSD_STRLCPY_H */ diff --git a/openssh/openbsd-compat/strmode.c b/openssh/openbsd-compat/strmode.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e64d198 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/openbsd-compat/strmode.c @@ -0,0 +1,156 @@ +/*- + * Copyright (c) 1990 The Regents of the University of California. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the University of + * California, Berkeley and its contributors. + * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" +#ifndef HAVE_STRMODE + +#if defined(LIBC_SCCS) && !defined(lint) +static char *rcsid = "$OpenBSD: strmode.c,v 1.3 1997/06/13 13:57:20 deraadt Exp $"; +#endif /* LIBC_SCCS and not lint */ + +#include +#include +#include + +void +strmode(register mode_t mode, register char *p) +{ + /* print type */ + switch (mode & S_IFMT) { + case S_IFDIR: /* directory */ + *p++ = 'd'; + break; + case S_IFCHR: /* character special */ + *p++ = 'c'; + break; + case S_IFBLK: /* block special */ + *p++ = 'b'; + break; + case S_IFREG: /* regular */ + *p++ = '-'; + break; + case S_IFLNK: /* symbolic link */ + *p++ = 'l'; + break; +#ifdef S_IFSOCK + case S_IFSOCK: /* socket */ + *p++ = 's'; + break; +#endif +#ifdef S_IFIFO + case S_IFIFO: /* fifo */ + *p++ = 'p'; + break; +#endif +#ifdef S_IFWHT + case S_IFWHT: /* whiteout */ + *p++ = 'w'; + break; +#endif + default: /* unknown */ + *p++ = '?'; + break; + } + /* usr */ + if (mode & S_IRUSR) + *p++ = 'r'; + else + *p++ = '-'; + if (mode & S_IWUSR) + *p++ = 'w'; + else + *p++ = '-'; + switch (mode & (S_IXUSR | S_ISUID)) { + case 0: + *p++ = '-'; + break; + case S_IXUSR: + *p++ = 'x'; + break; + case S_ISUID: + *p++ = 'S'; + break; + case S_IXUSR | S_ISUID: + *p++ = 's'; + break; + } + /* group */ + if (mode & S_IRGRP) + *p++ = 'r'; + else + *p++ = '-'; + if (mode & S_IWGRP) + *p++ = 'w'; + else + *p++ = '-'; + switch (mode & (S_IXGRP | S_ISGID)) { + case 0: + *p++ = '-'; + break; + case S_IXGRP: + *p++ = 'x'; + break; + case S_ISGID: + *p++ = 'S'; + break; + case S_IXGRP | S_ISGID: + *p++ = 's'; + break; + } + /* other */ + if (mode & S_IROTH) + *p++ = 'r'; + else + *p++ = '-'; + if (mode & S_IWOTH) + *p++ = 'w'; + else + *p++ = '-'; + switch (mode & (S_IXOTH | S_ISVTX)) { + case 0: + *p++ = '-'; + break; + case S_IXOTH: + *p++ = 'x'; + break; + case S_ISVTX: + *p++ = 'T'; + break; + case S_IXOTH | S_ISVTX: + *p++ = 't'; + break; + } + *p++ = ' '; /* will be a '+' if ACL's implemented */ + *p = '\0'; +} +#endif diff --git a/openssh/openbsd-compat/strmode.h b/openssh/openbsd-compat/strmode.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9166379 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/openbsd-compat/strmode.h @@ -0,0 +1,7 @@ +/* $Id$ */ + +#ifndef HAVE_STRMODE + +void strmode(register mode_t mode, register char *p); + +#endif diff --git a/openssh/openbsd-compat/strsep.c b/openssh/openbsd-compat/strsep.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c03649c --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/openbsd-compat/strsep.c @@ -0,0 +1,89 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: strsep.c,v 1.3 1997/08/20 04:28:14 millert Exp $ */ + +/*- + * Copyright (c) 1990, 1993 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the University of + * California, Berkeley and its contributors. + * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "config.h" + +#if !defined(HAVE_STRSEP) + +#include +#include + +#if defined(LIBC_SCCS) && !defined(lint) +#if 0 +static char sccsid[] = "@(#)strsep.c 8.1 (Berkeley) 6/4/93"; +#else +static char *rcsid = "$OpenBSD: strsep.c,v 1.3 1997/08/20 04:28:14 millert Exp $"; +#endif +#endif /* LIBC_SCCS and not lint */ + +/* + * Get next token from string *stringp, where tokens are possibly-empty + * strings separated by characters from delim. + * + * Writes NULs into the string at *stringp to end tokens. + * delim need not remain constant from call to call. + * On return, *stringp points past the last NUL written (if there might + * be further tokens), or is NULL (if there are definitely no more tokens). + * + * If *stringp is NULL, strsep returns NULL. + */ +char * +strsep(char **stringp, const char *delim) +{ + register char *s; + register const char *spanp; + register int c, sc; + char *tok; + + if ((s = *stringp) == NULL) + return (NULL); + for (tok = s;;) { + c = *s++; + spanp = delim; + do { + if ((sc = *spanp++) == c) { + if (c == 0) + s = NULL; + else + s[-1] = 0; + *stringp = s; + return (tok); + } + } while (sc != 0); + } + /* NOTREACHED */ +} + +#endif /* !defined(HAVE_STRSEP) */ diff --git a/openssh/openbsd-compat/strsep.h b/openssh/openbsd-compat/strsep.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9e54e05 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/openbsd-compat/strsep.h @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +/* $Id$ */ + +#ifndef _BSD_STRSEP_H +#define _BSD_STRSEP_H + +#include "config.h" + +#ifndef HAVE_STRSEP +char *strsep(char **stringp, const char *delim); +#endif /* HAVE_STRSEP */ + +#endif /* _BSD_STRSEP_H */ diff --git a/openssh/packet.c b/openssh/packet.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7b94169 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/packet.c @@ -0,0 +1,1286 @@ +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * This file contains code implementing the packet protocol and communication + * with the other side. This same code is used both on client and server side. + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + * + * + * SSH2 packet format added by Markus Friedl. + * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" +RCSID("$OpenBSD: packet.c,v 1.72 2001/11/10 13:37:20 markus Exp $"); + +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "buffer.h" +#include "packet.h" +#include "bufaux.h" +#include "crc32.h" +#include "getput.h" + +#include "compress.h" +#include "deattack.h" +#include "channels.h" + +#include "compat.h" +#include "ssh1.h" +#include "ssh2.h" + +#include "cipher.h" +#include "kex.h" +#include "mac.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "canohost.h" + +#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG +#define DBG(x) x +#else +#define DBG(x) +#endif + +/* + * This variable contains the file descriptors used for communicating with + * the other side. connection_in is used for reading; connection_out for + * writing. These can be the same descriptor, in which case it is assumed to + * be a socket. + */ +static int connection_in = -1; +static int connection_out = -1; + +/* Protocol flags for the remote side. */ +static u_int remote_protocol_flags = 0; + +/* Encryption context for receiving data. This is only used for decryption. */ +static CipherContext receive_context; + +/* Encryption context for sending data. This is only used for encryption. */ +static CipherContext send_context; + +/* Buffer for raw input data from the socket. */ +static Buffer input; + +/* Buffer for raw output data going to the socket. */ +static Buffer output; + +/* Buffer for the partial outgoing packet being constructed. */ +static Buffer outgoing_packet; + +/* Buffer for the incoming packet currently being processed. */ +static Buffer incoming_packet; + +/* Scratch buffer for packet compression/decompression. */ +static Buffer compression_buffer; +static int compression_buffer_ready = 0; + +/* Flag indicating whether packet compression/decompression is enabled. */ +static int packet_compression = 0; + +/* default maximum packet size */ +int max_packet_size = 32768; + +/* Flag indicating whether this module has been initialized. */ +static int initialized = 0; + +/* Set to true if the connection is interactive. */ +static int interactive_mode = 0; + +/* Session key information for Encryption and MAC */ +Newkeys *newkeys[MODE_MAX]; + +/* roundup current message to extra_pad bytes */ +static u_char extra_pad = 0; + +/* + * Sets the descriptors used for communication. Disables encryption until + * packet_set_encryption_key is called. + */ +void +packet_set_connection(int fd_in, int fd_out) +{ + Cipher *none = cipher_by_name("none"); + if (none == NULL) + fatal("packet_set_connection: cannot load cipher 'none'"); + connection_in = fd_in; + connection_out = fd_out; + cipher_init(&send_context, none, (u_char *) "", 0, NULL, 0); + cipher_init(&receive_context, none, (u_char *) "", 0, NULL, 0); + newkeys[MODE_IN] = newkeys[MODE_OUT] = NULL; + if (!initialized) { + initialized = 1; + buffer_init(&input); + buffer_init(&output); + buffer_init(&outgoing_packet); + buffer_init(&incoming_packet); + } + /* Kludge: arrange the close function to be called from fatal(). */ + fatal_add_cleanup((void (*) (void *)) packet_close, NULL); +} + +/* Returns 1 if remote host is connected via socket, 0 if not. */ + +int +packet_connection_is_on_socket() +{ + struct sockaddr_storage from, to; + socklen_t fromlen, tolen; + + /* filedescriptors in and out are the same, so it's a socket */ + if (connection_in == connection_out) + return 1; + fromlen = sizeof(from); + memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from)); + if (getpeername(connection_in, (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) + return 0; + tolen = sizeof(to); + memset(&to, 0, sizeof(to)); + if (getpeername(connection_out, (struct sockaddr *)&to, &tolen) < 0) + return 0; + if (fromlen != tolen || memcmp(&from, &to, fromlen) != 0) + return 0; + if (from.ss_family != AF_INET && from.ss_family != AF_INET6) + return 0; + return 1; +} + +/* returns 1 if connection is via ipv4 */ + +int +packet_connection_is_ipv4() +{ + struct sockaddr_storage to; + socklen_t tolen = sizeof(to); + + memset(&to, 0, sizeof(to)); + if (getsockname(connection_out, (struct sockaddr *)&to, &tolen) < 0) + return 0; + if (to.ss_family != AF_INET) + return 0; + return 1; +} + +/* Sets the connection into non-blocking mode. */ + +void +packet_set_nonblocking() +{ + /* Set the socket into non-blocking mode. */ + if (fcntl(connection_in, F_SETFL, O_NONBLOCK) < 0) + error("fcntl O_NONBLOCK: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + + if (connection_out != connection_in) { + if (fcntl(connection_out, F_SETFL, O_NONBLOCK) < 0) + error("fcntl O_NONBLOCK: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + } +} + +/* Returns the socket used for reading. */ + +int +packet_get_connection_in() +{ + return connection_in; +} + +/* Returns the descriptor used for writing. */ + +int +packet_get_connection_out() +{ + return connection_out; +} + +/* Closes the connection and clears and frees internal data structures. */ + +void +packet_close() +{ + if (!initialized) + return; + initialized = 0; + if (connection_in == connection_out) { + shutdown(connection_out, SHUT_RDWR); + close(connection_out); + } else { + close(connection_in); + close(connection_out); + } + buffer_free(&input); + buffer_free(&output); + buffer_free(&outgoing_packet); + buffer_free(&incoming_packet); + if (compression_buffer_ready) { + buffer_free(&compression_buffer); + buffer_compress_uninit(); + } +} + +/* Sets remote side protocol flags. */ + +void +packet_set_protocol_flags(u_int protocol_flags) +{ + remote_protocol_flags = protocol_flags; +} + +/* Returns the remote protocol flags set earlier by the above function. */ + +u_int +packet_get_protocol_flags() +{ + return remote_protocol_flags; +} + +/* + * Starts packet compression from the next packet on in both directions. + * Level is compression level 1 (fastest) - 9 (slow, best) as in gzip. + */ + +static void +packet_init_compression(void) +{ + if (compression_buffer_ready == 1) + return; + compression_buffer_ready = 1; + buffer_init(&compression_buffer); +} + +void +packet_start_compression(int level) +{ + if (packet_compression && !compat20) + fatal("Compression already enabled."); + packet_compression = 1; + packet_init_compression(); + buffer_compress_init_send(level); + buffer_compress_init_recv(); +} + +/* + * Causes any further packets to be encrypted using the given key. The same + * key is used for both sending and reception. However, both directions are + * encrypted independently of each other. + */ +void +packet_set_encryption_key(const u_char *key, u_int keylen, + int number) +{ + Cipher *cipher = cipher_by_number(number); + if (cipher == NULL) + fatal("packet_set_encryption_key: unknown cipher number %d", number); + if (keylen < 20) + fatal("packet_set_encryption_key: keylen too small: %d", keylen); + cipher_init(&receive_context, cipher, key, keylen, NULL, 0); + cipher_init(&send_context, cipher, key, keylen, NULL, 0); +} + +/* Start constructing a packet to send. */ +void +packet_start(u_char type) +{ + u_char buf[9]; + int len; + + DBG(debug("packet_start[%d]", type)); + len = compat20 ? 6 : 9; + memset(buf, 0, len - 1); + buf[len - 1] = type; + buffer_clear(&outgoing_packet); + buffer_append(&outgoing_packet, buf, len); +} + +/* Append payload. */ +void +packet_put_char(int value) +{ + char ch = value; + buffer_append(&outgoing_packet, &ch, 1); +} +void +packet_put_int(u_int value) +{ + buffer_put_int(&outgoing_packet, value); +} +void +packet_put_string(const char *buf, u_int len) +{ + buffer_put_string(&outgoing_packet, buf, len); +} +void +packet_put_cstring(const char *str) +{ + buffer_put_cstring(&outgoing_packet, str); +} +void +packet_put_raw(const char *buf, u_int len) +{ + buffer_append(&outgoing_packet, buf, len); +} +void +packet_put_bignum(BIGNUM * value) +{ + buffer_put_bignum(&outgoing_packet, value); +} +void +packet_put_bignum2(BIGNUM * value) +{ + buffer_put_bignum2(&outgoing_packet, value); +} + +/* + * Finalizes and sends the packet. If the encryption key has been set, + * encrypts the packet before sending. + */ + +static void +packet_send1(void) +{ + char buf[8], *cp; + int i, padding, len; + u_int checksum; + u_int32_t rand = 0; + + /* + * If using packet compression, compress the payload of the outgoing + * packet. + */ + if (packet_compression) { + buffer_clear(&compression_buffer); + /* Skip padding. */ + buffer_consume(&outgoing_packet, 8); + /* padding */ + buffer_append(&compression_buffer, "\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0", 8); + buffer_compress(&outgoing_packet, &compression_buffer); + buffer_clear(&outgoing_packet); + buffer_append(&outgoing_packet, buffer_ptr(&compression_buffer), + buffer_len(&compression_buffer)); + } + /* Compute packet length without padding (add checksum, remove padding). */ + len = buffer_len(&outgoing_packet) + 4 - 8; + + /* Insert padding. Initialized to zero in packet_start1() */ + padding = 8 - len % 8; + if (send_context.cipher->number != SSH_CIPHER_NONE) { + cp = buffer_ptr(&outgoing_packet); + for (i = 0; i < padding; i++) { + if (i % 4 == 0) + rand = arc4random(); + cp[7 - i] = rand & 0xff; + rand >>= 8; + } + } + buffer_consume(&outgoing_packet, 8 - padding); + + /* Add check bytes. */ + checksum = ssh_crc32((u_char *) buffer_ptr(&outgoing_packet), + buffer_len(&outgoing_packet)); + PUT_32BIT(buf, checksum); + buffer_append(&outgoing_packet, buf, 4); + +#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG + fprintf(stderr, "packet_send plain: "); + buffer_dump(&outgoing_packet); +#endif + + /* Append to output. */ + PUT_32BIT(buf, len); + buffer_append(&output, buf, 4); + buffer_append_space(&output, &cp, buffer_len(&outgoing_packet)); + cipher_encrypt(&send_context, cp, buffer_ptr(&outgoing_packet), + buffer_len(&outgoing_packet)); + +#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG + fprintf(stderr, "encrypted: "); + buffer_dump(&output); +#endif + + buffer_clear(&outgoing_packet); + + /* + * Note that the packet is now only buffered in output. It won\'t be + * actually sent until packet_write_wait or packet_write_poll is + * called. + */ +} + +static void +set_newkeys(int mode) +{ + Enc *enc; + Mac *mac; + Comp *comp; + CipherContext *cc; + + debug("newkeys: mode %d", mode); + + cc = (mode == MODE_OUT) ? &send_context : &receive_context; + if (newkeys[mode] != NULL) { + debug("newkeys: rekeying"); + /* todo: free old keys, reset compression/cipher-ctxt; */ + memset(cc, 0, sizeof(*cc)); + enc = &newkeys[mode]->enc; + mac = &newkeys[mode]->mac; + comp = &newkeys[mode]->comp; + memset(mac->key, 0, mac->key_len); + xfree(enc->name); + xfree(enc->iv); + xfree(enc->key); + xfree(mac->name); + xfree(mac->key); + xfree(comp->name); + xfree(newkeys[mode]); + } + newkeys[mode] = kex_get_newkeys(mode); + if (newkeys[mode] == NULL) + fatal("newkeys: no keys for mode %d", mode); + enc = &newkeys[mode]->enc; + mac = &newkeys[mode]->mac; + comp = &newkeys[mode]->comp; + if (mac->md != NULL) + mac->enabled = 1; + DBG(debug("cipher_init_context: %d", mode)); + cipher_init(cc, enc->cipher, enc->key, enc->cipher->key_len, + enc->iv, enc->cipher->block_size); + memset(enc->iv, 0, enc->cipher->block_size); + memset(enc->key, 0, enc->cipher->key_len); + if (comp->type != 0 && comp->enabled == 0) { + packet_init_compression(); + if (mode == MODE_OUT) + buffer_compress_init_send(6); + else + buffer_compress_init_recv(); + comp->enabled = 1; + } +} + +/* + * Finalize packet in SSH2 format (compress, mac, encrypt, enqueue) + */ +static void +packet_send2(void) +{ + static u_int32_t seqnr = 0; + u_char type, *ucp, *macbuf = NULL; + u_char padlen, pad; + char *cp; + u_int packet_length = 0; + u_int i, len; + u_int32_t rand = 0; + Enc *enc = NULL; + Mac *mac = NULL; + Comp *comp = NULL; + int block_size; + + if (newkeys[MODE_OUT] != NULL) { + enc = &newkeys[MODE_OUT]->enc; + mac = &newkeys[MODE_OUT]->mac; + comp = &newkeys[MODE_OUT]->comp; + } + block_size = enc ? enc->cipher->block_size : 8; + + ucp = (u_char *) buffer_ptr(&outgoing_packet); + type = ucp[5]; + +#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG + fprintf(stderr, "plain: "); + buffer_dump(&outgoing_packet); +#endif + + if (comp && comp->enabled) { + len = buffer_len(&outgoing_packet); + /* skip header, compress only payload */ + buffer_consume(&outgoing_packet, 5); + buffer_clear(&compression_buffer); + buffer_compress(&outgoing_packet, &compression_buffer); + buffer_clear(&outgoing_packet); + buffer_append(&outgoing_packet, "\0\0\0\0\0", 5); + buffer_append(&outgoing_packet, buffer_ptr(&compression_buffer), + buffer_len(&compression_buffer)); + DBG(debug("compression: raw %d compressed %d", len, + buffer_len(&outgoing_packet))); + } + + /* sizeof (packet_len + pad_len + payload) */ + len = buffer_len(&outgoing_packet); + + /* + * calc size of padding, alloc space, get random data, + * minimum padding is 4 bytes + */ + padlen = block_size - (len % block_size); + if (padlen < 4) + padlen += block_size; + if (extra_pad) { + /* will wrap if extra_pad+padlen > 255 */ + extra_pad = roundup(extra_pad, block_size); + pad = extra_pad - ((len + padlen) % extra_pad); + debug("packet_send2: adding %d (len %d padlen %d extra_pad %d)", + pad, len, padlen, extra_pad); + padlen += pad; + extra_pad = 0; + } + buffer_append_space(&outgoing_packet, &cp, padlen); + if (enc && enc->cipher->number != SSH_CIPHER_NONE) { + /* random padding */ + for (i = 0; i < padlen; i++) { + if (i % 4 == 0) + rand = arc4random(); + cp[i] = rand & 0xff; + rand >>= 8; + } + } else { + /* clear padding */ + memset(cp, 0, padlen); + } + /* packet_length includes payload, padding and padding length field */ + packet_length = buffer_len(&outgoing_packet) - 4; + ucp = (u_char *)buffer_ptr(&outgoing_packet); + PUT_32BIT(ucp, packet_length); + ucp[4] = padlen; + DBG(debug("send: len %d (includes padlen %d)", packet_length+4, padlen)); + + /* compute MAC over seqnr and packet(length fields, payload, padding) */ + if (mac && mac->enabled) { + macbuf = mac_compute(mac, seqnr, + (u_char *) buffer_ptr(&outgoing_packet), + buffer_len(&outgoing_packet)); + DBG(debug("done calc MAC out #%d", seqnr)); + } + /* encrypt packet and append to output buffer. */ + buffer_append_space(&output, &cp, buffer_len(&outgoing_packet)); + cipher_encrypt(&send_context, cp, buffer_ptr(&outgoing_packet), + buffer_len(&outgoing_packet)); + /* append unencrypted MAC */ + if (mac && mac->enabled) + buffer_append(&output, (char *)macbuf, mac->mac_len); +#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG + fprintf(stderr, "encrypted: "); + buffer_dump(&output); +#endif + /* increment sequence number for outgoing packets */ + if (++seqnr == 0) + log("outgoing seqnr wraps around"); + buffer_clear(&outgoing_packet); + + if (type == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS) + set_newkeys(MODE_OUT); +} + +void +packet_send() +{ + if (compat20) + packet_send2(); + else + packet_send1(); + DBG(debug("packet_send done")); +} + +/* + * Waits until a packet has been received, and returns its type. Note that + * no other data is processed until this returns, so this function should not + * be used during the interactive session. + */ + +int +packet_read(int *payload_len_ptr) +{ + int type, len; + fd_set *setp; + char buf[8192]; + DBG(debug("packet_read()")); + + setp = (fd_set *)xmalloc(howmany(connection_in+1, NFDBITS) * + sizeof(fd_mask)); + + /* Since we are blocking, ensure that all written packets have been sent. */ + packet_write_wait(); + + /* Stay in the loop until we have received a complete packet. */ + for (;;) { + /* Try to read a packet from the buffer. */ + type = packet_read_poll(payload_len_ptr); + if (!compat20 && ( + type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS + || type == SSH_SMSG_FAILURE + || type == SSH_CMSG_EOF + || type == SSH_CMSG_EXIT_CONFIRMATION)) + packet_integrity_check(*payload_len_ptr, 0, type); + /* If we got a packet, return it. */ + if (type != SSH_MSG_NONE) { + xfree(setp); + return type; + } + /* + * Otherwise, wait for some data to arrive, add it to the + * buffer, and try again. + */ + memset(setp, 0, howmany(connection_in + 1, NFDBITS) * + sizeof(fd_mask)); + FD_SET(connection_in, setp); + + /* Wait for some data to arrive. */ + while (select(connection_in + 1, setp, NULL, NULL, NULL) == -1 && + (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR)) + ; + + /* Read data from the socket. */ + len = read(connection_in, buf, sizeof(buf)); + if (len == 0) { + log("Connection closed by %.200s", get_remote_ipaddr()); + fatal_cleanup(); + } + if (len < 0) + fatal("Read from socket failed: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + /* Append it to the buffer. */ + packet_process_incoming(buf, len); + } + /* NOTREACHED */ +} + +/* + * Waits until a packet has been received, verifies that its type matches + * that given, and gives a fatal error and exits if there is a mismatch. + */ + +void +packet_read_expect(int *payload_len_ptr, int expected_type) +{ + int type; + + type = packet_read(payload_len_ptr); + if (type != expected_type) + packet_disconnect("Protocol error: expected packet type %d, got %d", + expected_type, type); +} + +/* Checks if a full packet is available in the data received so far via + * packet_process_incoming. If so, reads the packet; otherwise returns + * SSH_MSG_NONE. This does not wait for data from the connection. + * + * SSH_MSG_DISCONNECT is handled specially here. Also, + * SSH_MSG_IGNORE messages are skipped by this function and are never returned + * to higher levels. + * + * The returned payload_len does include space consumed by: + * Packet length + * Padding + * Packet type + * Check bytes + */ + +static int +packet_read_poll1(int *payload_len_ptr) +{ + u_int len, padded_len; + u_char *ucp, type; + char *cp; + u_int checksum, stored_checksum; + + /* Check if input size is less than minimum packet size. */ + if (buffer_len(&input) < 4 + 8) + return SSH_MSG_NONE; + /* Get length of incoming packet. */ + ucp = (u_char *) buffer_ptr(&input); + len = GET_32BIT(ucp); + if (len < 1 + 2 + 2 || len > 256 * 1024) + packet_disconnect("Bad packet length %d.", len); + padded_len = (len + 8) & ~7; + + /* Check if the packet has been entirely received. */ + if (buffer_len(&input) < 4 + padded_len) + return SSH_MSG_NONE; + + /* The entire packet is in buffer. */ + + /* Consume packet length. */ + buffer_consume(&input, 4); + + /* + * Cryptographic attack detector for ssh + * (C)1998 CORE-SDI, Buenos Aires Argentina + * Ariel Futoransky(futo@core-sdi.com) + */ + if (receive_context.cipher->number != SSH_CIPHER_NONE && + detect_attack(buffer_ptr(&input), padded_len, NULL) == DEATTACK_DETECTED) + packet_disconnect("crc32 compensation attack: network attack detected"); + + /* Decrypt data to incoming_packet. */ + buffer_clear(&incoming_packet); + buffer_append_space(&incoming_packet, &cp, padded_len); + cipher_decrypt(&receive_context, cp, buffer_ptr(&input), padded_len); + + buffer_consume(&input, padded_len); + +#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG + fprintf(stderr, "read_poll plain: "); + buffer_dump(&incoming_packet); +#endif + + /* Compute packet checksum. */ + checksum = ssh_crc32((u_char *) buffer_ptr(&incoming_packet), + buffer_len(&incoming_packet) - 4); + + /* Skip padding. */ + buffer_consume(&incoming_packet, 8 - len % 8); + + /* Test check bytes. */ + if (len != buffer_len(&incoming_packet)) + packet_disconnect("packet_read_poll: len %d != buffer_len %d.", + len, buffer_len(&incoming_packet)); + + ucp = (u_char *) buffer_ptr(&incoming_packet) + len - 4; + stored_checksum = GET_32BIT(ucp); + if (checksum != stored_checksum) + packet_disconnect("Corrupted check bytes on input."); + buffer_consume_end(&incoming_packet, 4); + + if (packet_compression) { + buffer_clear(&compression_buffer); + buffer_uncompress(&incoming_packet, &compression_buffer); + buffer_clear(&incoming_packet); + buffer_append(&incoming_packet, buffer_ptr(&compression_buffer), + buffer_len(&compression_buffer)); + } + type = buffer_get_char(&incoming_packet); + *payload_len_ptr = buffer_len(&incoming_packet); + return type; +} + +static int +packet_read_poll2(int *payload_len_ptr) +{ + static u_int32_t seqnr = 0; + static u_int packet_length = 0; + u_int padlen, need; + u_char *macbuf, *ucp, type; + char *cp; + int maclen, block_size; + Enc *enc = NULL; + Mac *mac = NULL; + Comp *comp = NULL; + + if (newkeys[MODE_IN] != NULL) { + enc = &newkeys[MODE_IN]->enc; + mac = &newkeys[MODE_IN]->mac; + comp = &newkeys[MODE_IN]->comp; + } + maclen = mac && mac->enabled ? mac->mac_len : 0; + block_size = enc ? enc->cipher->block_size : 8; + + if (packet_length == 0) { + /* + * check if input size is less than the cipher block size, + * decrypt first block and extract length of incoming packet + */ + if (buffer_len(&input) < block_size) + return SSH_MSG_NONE; + buffer_clear(&incoming_packet); + buffer_append_space(&incoming_packet, &cp, block_size); + cipher_decrypt(&receive_context, cp, buffer_ptr(&input), + block_size); + ucp = (u_char *) buffer_ptr(&incoming_packet); + packet_length = GET_32BIT(ucp); + if (packet_length < 1 + 4 || packet_length > 256 * 1024) { + buffer_dump(&incoming_packet); + packet_disconnect("Bad packet length %d.", packet_length); + } + DBG(debug("input: packet len %d", packet_length+4)); + buffer_consume(&input, block_size); + } + /* we have a partial packet of block_size bytes */ + need = 4 + packet_length - block_size; + DBG(debug("partial packet %d, need %d, maclen %d", block_size, + need, maclen)); + if (need % block_size != 0) + fatal("padding error: need %d block %d mod %d", + need, block_size, need % block_size); + /* + * check if the entire packet has been received and + * decrypt into incoming_packet + */ + if (buffer_len(&input) < need + maclen) + return SSH_MSG_NONE; +#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG + fprintf(stderr, "read_poll enc/full: "); + buffer_dump(&input); +#endif + buffer_append_space(&incoming_packet, &cp, need); + cipher_decrypt(&receive_context, cp, buffer_ptr(&input), need); + buffer_consume(&input, need); + /* + * compute MAC over seqnr and packet, + * increment sequence number for incoming packet + */ + if (mac && mac->enabled) { + macbuf = mac_compute(mac, seqnr, + (u_char *) buffer_ptr(&incoming_packet), + buffer_len(&incoming_packet)); + if (memcmp(macbuf, buffer_ptr(&input), mac->mac_len) != 0) + packet_disconnect("Corrupted MAC on input."); + DBG(debug("MAC #%d ok", seqnr)); + buffer_consume(&input, mac->mac_len); + } + if (++seqnr == 0) + log("incoming seqnr wraps around"); + + /* get padlen */ + cp = buffer_ptr(&incoming_packet) + 4; + padlen = (u_char) *cp; + DBG(debug("input: padlen %d", padlen)); + if (padlen < 4) + packet_disconnect("Corrupted padlen %d on input.", padlen); + + /* skip packet size + padlen, discard padding */ + buffer_consume(&incoming_packet, 4 + 1); + buffer_consume_end(&incoming_packet, padlen); + + DBG(debug("input: len before de-compress %d", buffer_len(&incoming_packet))); + if (comp && comp->enabled) { + buffer_clear(&compression_buffer); + buffer_uncompress(&incoming_packet, &compression_buffer); + buffer_clear(&incoming_packet); + buffer_append(&incoming_packet, buffer_ptr(&compression_buffer), + buffer_len(&compression_buffer)); + DBG(debug("input: len after de-compress %d", buffer_len(&incoming_packet))); + } + /* + * get packet type, implies consume. + * return length of payload (without type field) + */ + type = buffer_get_char(&incoming_packet); + if (type == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS) + set_newkeys(MODE_IN); + *payload_len_ptr = buffer_len(&incoming_packet); +#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG + fprintf(stderr, "read/plain[%d]:\r\n", type); + buffer_dump(&incoming_packet); +#endif + /* reset for next packet */ + packet_length = 0; + return type; +} + +int +packet_read_poll(int *payload_len_ptr) +{ + int reason; + u_char type; + char *msg; + + for (;;) { + if (compat20) { + type = packet_read_poll2(payload_len_ptr); + if (type) + DBG(debug("received packet type %d", type)); + switch(type) { + case SSH2_MSG_IGNORE: + break; + case SSH2_MSG_DEBUG: + packet_get_char(); + msg = packet_get_string(NULL); + debug("Remote: %.900s", msg); + xfree(msg); + msg = packet_get_string(NULL); + xfree(msg); + break; + case SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT: + reason = packet_get_int(); + msg = packet_get_string(NULL); + log("Received disconnect from %s: %d: %.400s", get_remote_ipaddr(), + reason, msg); + xfree(msg); + fatal_cleanup(); + break; + default: + return type; + break; + } + } else { + type = packet_read_poll1(payload_len_ptr); + switch(type) { + case SSH_MSG_IGNORE: + break; + case SSH_MSG_DEBUG: + msg = packet_get_string(NULL); + debug("Remote: %.900s", msg); + xfree(msg); + break; + case SSH_MSG_DISCONNECT: + msg = packet_get_string(NULL); + log("Received disconnect from %s: %.400s", get_remote_ipaddr(), + msg); + fatal_cleanup(); + xfree(msg); + break; + default: + if (type) + DBG(debug("received packet type %d", type)); + return type; + break; + } + } + } +} + +/* + * Buffers the given amount of input characters. This is intended to be used + * together with packet_read_poll. + */ + +void +packet_process_incoming(const char *buf, u_int len) +{ + buffer_append(&input, buf, len); +} + +/* Returns a character from the packet. */ + +u_int +packet_get_char() +{ + char ch; + buffer_get(&incoming_packet, &ch, 1); + return (u_char) ch; +} + +/* Returns an integer from the packet data. */ + +u_int +packet_get_int() +{ + return buffer_get_int(&incoming_packet); +} + +/* + * Returns an arbitrary precision integer from the packet data. The integer + * must have been initialized before this call. + */ + +void +packet_get_bignum(BIGNUM * value, int *length_ptr) +{ + *length_ptr = buffer_get_bignum(&incoming_packet, value); +} + +void +packet_get_bignum2(BIGNUM * value, int *length_ptr) +{ + *length_ptr = buffer_get_bignum2(&incoming_packet, value); +} + +char * +packet_get_raw(int *length_ptr) +{ + int bytes = buffer_len(&incoming_packet); + if (length_ptr != NULL) + *length_ptr = bytes; + return buffer_ptr(&incoming_packet); +} + +int +packet_remaining(void) +{ + return buffer_len(&incoming_packet); +} + +/* + * Returns a string from the packet data. The string is allocated using + * xmalloc; it is the responsibility of the calling program to free it when + * no longer needed. The length_ptr argument may be NULL, or point to an + * integer into which the length of the string is stored. + */ + +char * +packet_get_string(u_int *length_ptr) +{ + return buffer_get_string(&incoming_packet, length_ptr); +} + +/* + * Sends a diagnostic message from the server to the client. This message + * can be sent at any time (but not while constructing another message). The + * message is printed immediately, but only if the client is being executed + * in verbose mode. These messages are primarily intended to ease debugging + * authentication problems. The length of the formatted message must not + * exceed 1024 bytes. This will automatically call packet_write_wait. + */ + +void +packet_send_debug(const char *fmt,...) +{ + char buf[1024]; + va_list args; + + if (compat20 && (datafellows & SSH_BUG_DEBUG)) + return; + + va_start(args, fmt); + vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args); + va_end(args); + + if (compat20) { + packet_start(SSH2_MSG_DEBUG); + packet_put_char(0); /* bool: always display */ + packet_put_cstring(buf); + packet_put_cstring(""); + } else { + packet_start(SSH_MSG_DEBUG); + packet_put_cstring(buf); + } + packet_send(); + packet_write_wait(); +} + +/* + * Logs the error plus constructs and sends a disconnect packet, closes the + * connection, and exits. This function never returns. The error message + * should not contain a newline. The length of the formatted message must + * not exceed 1024 bytes. + */ + +void +packet_disconnect(const char *fmt,...) +{ + char buf[1024]; + va_list args; + static int disconnecting = 0; + if (disconnecting) /* Guard against recursive invocations. */ + fatal("packet_disconnect called recursively."); + disconnecting = 1; + + /* + * Format the message. Note that the caller must make sure the + * message is of limited size. + */ + va_start(args, fmt); + vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args); + va_end(args); + + /* Send the disconnect message to the other side, and wait for it to get sent. */ + if (compat20) { + packet_start(SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT); + packet_put_int(SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR); + packet_put_cstring(buf); + packet_put_cstring(""); + } else { + packet_start(SSH_MSG_DISCONNECT); + packet_put_cstring(buf); + } + packet_send(); + packet_write_wait(); + + /* Stop listening for connections. */ + channel_close_all(); + + /* Close the connection. */ + packet_close(); + + /* Display the error locally and exit. */ + log("Disconnecting: %.100s", buf); + fatal_cleanup(); +} + +/* Checks if there is any buffered output, and tries to write some of the output. */ + +void +packet_write_poll() +{ + int len = buffer_len(&output); + if (len > 0) { + len = write(connection_out, buffer_ptr(&output), len); + if (len <= 0) { + if (errno == EAGAIN) + return; + else + fatal("Write failed: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + } + buffer_consume(&output, len); + } +} + +/* + * Calls packet_write_poll repeatedly until all pending output data has been + * written. + */ + +void +packet_write_wait() +{ + fd_set *setp; + + setp = (fd_set *)xmalloc(howmany(connection_out + 1, NFDBITS) * + sizeof(fd_mask)); + packet_write_poll(); + while (packet_have_data_to_write()) { + memset(setp, 0, howmany(connection_out + 1, NFDBITS) * + sizeof(fd_mask)); + FD_SET(connection_out, setp); + while (select(connection_out + 1, NULL, setp, NULL, NULL) == -1 && + (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR)) + ; + packet_write_poll(); + } + xfree(setp); +} + +/* Returns true if there is buffered data to write to the connection. */ + +int +packet_have_data_to_write() +{ + return buffer_len(&output) != 0; +} + +/* Returns true if there is not too much data to write to the connection. */ + +int +packet_not_very_much_data_to_write() +{ + if (interactive_mode) + return buffer_len(&output) < 16384; + else + return buffer_len(&output) < 128 * 1024; +} + +/* Informs that the current session is interactive. Sets IP flags for that. */ + +void +packet_set_interactive(int interactive) +{ + static int called = 0; +#if defined(IP_TOS) && !defined(IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN) + int lowdelay = IPTOS_LOWDELAY; + int throughput = IPTOS_THROUGHPUT; +#endif + int on = 1; + + if (called) + return; + called = 1; + + /* Record that we are in interactive mode. */ + interactive_mode = interactive; + + /* Only set socket options if using a socket. */ + if (!packet_connection_is_on_socket()) + return; + /* + * IPTOS_LOWDELAY and IPTOS_THROUGHPUT are IPv4 only + */ + if (interactive) { + /* + * Set IP options for an interactive connection. Use + * IPTOS_LOWDELAY and TCP_NODELAY. + */ +#if defined(IP_TOS) && !defined(IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN) + if (packet_connection_is_ipv4()) { + if (setsockopt(connection_in, IPPROTO_IP, IP_TOS, + (void *) &lowdelay, sizeof(lowdelay)) < 0) + error("setsockopt IPTOS_LOWDELAY: %.100s", + strerror(errno)); + } +#endif + if (setsockopt(connection_in, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_NODELAY, (void *) &on, + sizeof(on)) < 0) + error("setsockopt TCP_NODELAY: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + } else if (packet_connection_is_ipv4()) { + /* + * Set IP options for a non-interactive connection. Use + * IPTOS_THROUGHPUT. + */ +#if defined(IP_TOS) && !defined(IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN) + if (setsockopt(connection_in, IPPROTO_IP, IP_TOS, (void *) &throughput, + sizeof(throughput)) < 0) + error("setsockopt IPTOS_THROUGHPUT: %.100s", strerror(errno)); +#endif + } +} + +/* Returns true if the current connection is interactive. */ + +int +packet_is_interactive() +{ + return interactive_mode; +} + +int +packet_set_maxsize(int s) +{ + static int called = 0; + if (called) { + log("packet_set_maxsize: called twice: old %d new %d", + max_packet_size, s); + return -1; + } + if (s < 4 * 1024 || s > 1024 * 1024) { + log("packet_set_maxsize: bad size %d", s); + return -1; + } + called = 1; + debug("packet_set_maxsize: setting to %d", s); + max_packet_size = s; + return s; +} + +/* roundup current message to pad bytes */ +void +packet_add_padding(u_char pad) +{ + extra_pad = pad; +} + +/* + * 9.2. Ignored Data Message + * + * byte SSH_MSG_IGNORE + * string data + * + * All implementations MUST understand (and ignore) this message at any + * time (after receiving the protocol version). No implementation is + * required to send them. This message can be used as an additional + * protection measure against advanced traffic analysis techniques. + */ +void +packet_send_ignore(int nbytes) +{ + u_int32_t rand = 0; + int i; + + packet_start(compat20 ? SSH2_MSG_IGNORE : SSH_MSG_IGNORE); + packet_put_int(nbytes); + for(i = 0; i < nbytes; i++) { + if (i % 4 == 0) + rand = arc4random(); + packet_put_char(rand & 0xff); + rand >>= 8; + } +} diff --git a/openssh/packet.h b/openssh/packet.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d547300 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/packet.h @@ -0,0 +1,95 @@ +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * Interface for the packet protocol functions. + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + */ + +/* RCSID("$OpenBSD: packet.h,v 1.26 2001/11/07 16:03:17 markus Exp $"); */ + +#ifndef PACKET_H +#define PACKET_H + +#include + +void packet_set_connection(int, int); +void packet_set_nonblocking(void); +int packet_get_connection_in(void); +int packet_get_connection_out(void); +void packet_close(void); +void packet_set_encryption_key(const u_char *, u_int, int); +void packet_set_protocol_flags(u_int); +u_int packet_get_protocol_flags(void); +void packet_start_compression(int); +void packet_set_interactive(int); +int packet_is_interactive(void); + +void packet_start(u_char); +void packet_put_char(int ch); +void packet_put_int(u_int value); +void packet_put_bignum(BIGNUM * value); +void packet_put_bignum2(BIGNUM * value); +void packet_put_string(const char *buf, u_int len); +void packet_put_cstring(const char *str); +void packet_put_raw(const char *buf, u_int len); +void packet_send(void); + +int packet_read(int *payload_len_ptr); +void packet_read_expect(int *payload_len_ptr, int type); +int packet_read_poll(int *packet_len_ptr); +void packet_process_incoming(const char *buf, u_int len); + +u_int packet_get_char(void); +u_int packet_get_int(void); +void packet_get_bignum(BIGNUM * value, int *length_ptr); +void packet_get_bignum2(BIGNUM * value, int *length_ptr); +char *packet_get_raw(int *length_ptr); +char *packet_get_string(u_int *length_ptr); +void packet_disconnect(const char *fmt,...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2))); +void packet_send_debug(const char *fmt,...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2))); + +void packet_write_poll(void); +void packet_write_wait(void); +int packet_have_data_to_write(void); +int packet_not_very_much_data_to_write(void); + +int packet_connection_is_on_socket(void); +int packet_connection_is_ipv4(void); +int packet_remaining(void); +void packet_send_ignore(int); +void packet_add_padding(u_char); + +void tty_make_modes(int, struct termios *); +void tty_parse_modes(int, int *); + +extern int max_packet_size; +int packet_set_maxsize(int); +#define packet_get_maxsize() max_packet_size + +#define packet_integrity_check(payload_len, expected_len, type) \ +do { \ + int _p = (payload_len), _e = (expected_len); \ + if (_p != _e) { \ + log("Packet integrity error (%d != %d) at %s:%d", \ + _p, _e, __FILE__, __LINE__); \ + packet_disconnect("Packet integrity error. (%d)", (type)); \ + } \ +} while (0) + +#define packet_done() \ +do { \ + int _len = packet_remaining(); \ + if (_len > 0) { \ + log("Packet integrity error (%d bytes remaining) at %s:%d", \ + _len ,__FILE__, __LINE__); \ + packet_disconnect("Packet integrity error."); \ + } \ +} while (0) + +#endif /* PACKET_H */ diff --git a/openssh/pathnames.h b/openssh/pathnames.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0470a21 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/pathnames.h @@ -0,0 +1,161 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: pathnames.h,v 1.9 2001/06/23 02:34:30 markus Exp $ */ + +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + */ + +#ifndef ETCDIR +#define ETCDIR "/etc" +#endif + +#ifndef _PATH_SSH_PIDDIR +#define _PATH_SSH_PIDDIR "/var/run" +#endif + +/* + * System-wide file containing host keys of known hosts. This file should be + * world-readable. + */ +#define _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_HOSTFILE ETCDIR "/ssh_known_hosts" +/* backward compat for protocol 2 */ +#define _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_HOSTFILE2 ETCDIR "/ssh_known_hosts2" + +/* + * Of these, ssh_host_key must be readable only by root, whereas ssh_config + * should be world-readable. + */ +#define _PATH_SERVER_CONFIG_FILE ETCDIR "/sshd_config" +#define _PATH_HOST_CONFIG_FILE ETCDIR "/ssh_config" +#define _PATH_HOST_KEY_FILE ETCDIR "/ssh_host_key" +#define _PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE ETCDIR "/ssh_host_dsa_key" +#define _PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE ETCDIR "/ssh_host_rsa_key" +#define _PATH_DH_MODULI ETCDIR "/moduli" +/* Backwards compatibility */ +#define _PATH_DH_PRIMES ETCDIR "/primes" + +#ifndef _PATH_SSH_PROGRAM +#define _PATH_SSH_PROGRAM "/usr/bin/ssh" +#endif + +/* + * The process id of the daemon listening for connections is saved here to + * make it easier to kill the correct daemon when necessary. + */ +#define _PATH_SSH_DAEMON_PID_FILE _PATH_SSH_PIDDIR "/sshd.pid" + +/* + * The directory in user\'s home directory in which the files reside. The + * directory should be world-readable (though not all files are). + */ +#define _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR ".ssh" + +/* + * Per-user file containing host keys of known hosts. This file need not be + * readable by anyone except the user him/herself, though this does not + * contain anything particularly secret. + */ +#define _PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE "~/.ssh/known_hosts" +/* backward compat for protocol 2 */ +#define _PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE2 "~/.ssh/known_hosts2" + +/* + * Name of the default file containing client-side authentication key. This + * file should only be readable by the user him/herself. + */ +#define _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_IDENTITY ".ssh/identity" +#define _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_DSA ".ssh/id_dsa" +#define _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_RSA ".ssh/id_rsa" + +/* + * Configuration file in user\'s home directory. This file need not be + * readable by anyone but the user him/herself, but does not contain anything + * particularly secret. If the user\'s home directory resides on an NFS + * volume where root is mapped to nobody, this may need to be world-readable. + */ +#define _PATH_SSH_USER_CONFFILE ".ssh/config" + +/* + * File containing a list of those rsa keys that permit logging in as this + * user. This file need not be readable by anyone but the user him/herself, + * but does not contain anything particularly secret. If the user\'s home + * directory resides on an NFS volume where root is mapped to nobody, this + * may need to be world-readable. (This file is read by the daemon which is + * running as root.) + */ +#define _PATH_SSH_USER_PERMITTED_KEYS ".ssh/authorized_keys" + +/* backward compat for protocol v2 */ +#define _PATH_SSH_USER_PERMITTED_KEYS2 ".ssh/authorized_keys2" + +/* + * Per-user and system-wide ssh "rc" files. These files are executed with + * /bin/sh before starting the shell or command if they exist. They will be + * passed "proto cookie" as arguments if X11 forwarding with spoofing is in + * use. xauth will be run if neither of these exists. + */ +#define _PATH_SSH_USER_RC ".ssh/rc" +#define _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_RC ETCDIR "/sshrc" + +/* + * Ssh-only version of /etc/hosts.equiv. Additionally, the daemon may use + * ~/.rhosts and /etc/hosts.equiv if rhosts authentication is enabled. + */ +#define _PATH_SSH_HOSTS_EQUIV ETCDIR "/shosts.equiv" +#define _PATH_RHOSTS_EQUIV "/etc/hosts.equiv" + +/* + * Default location of askpass + */ +#ifndef _PATH_SSH_ASKPASS_DEFAULT +#define _PATH_SSH_ASKPASS_DEFAULT "/usr/X11R6/bin/ssh-askpass" +#endif + +/* xauth for X11 forwarding */ +#ifndef _PATH_XAUTH +#define _PATH_XAUTH "/usr/X11R6/bin/xauth" +#endif + +/* for scp */ +#ifndef _PATH_CP +#define _PATH_CP "cp" +#endif + +/* for sftp */ +#ifndef _PATH_SFTP_SERVER +#define _PATH_SFTP_SERVER "/usr/libexec/sftp-server" +#endif +#ifndef _PATH_LS +#define _PATH_LS "ls" +#endif + +/* path to login program */ +#ifndef LOGIN_PROGRAM +# ifdef LOGIN_PROGRAM_FALLBACK +# define LOGIN_PROGRAM LOGIN_PROGRAM_FALLBACK +# else +# define LOGIN_PROGRAM "/usr/bin/login" +# endif +#endif /* LOGIN_PROGRAM */ + +/* Askpass program define */ +#ifndef ASKPASS_PROGRAM +#define ASKPASS_PROGRAM "/usr/lib/ssh/ssh-askpass" +#endif /* ASKPASS_PROGRAM */ + +/* + * Relevant only when using builtin PRNG. + */ +#ifndef SSH_PRNG_SEED_FILE +# define SSH_PRNG_SEED_FILE _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR"/prng_seed" +#endif /* SSH_PRNG_SEED_FILE */ +#ifndef SSH_PRNG_COMMAND_FILE +# define SSH_PRNG_COMMAND_FILE ETCDIR "/ssh_prng_cmds" +#endif /* SSH_PRNG_COMMAND_FILE */ diff --git a/openssh/radix.c b/openssh/radix.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..26b1ebe --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/radix.c @@ -0,0 +1,214 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999 Dug Song. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" +#include "uuencode.h" + +RCSID("$OpenBSD: radix.c,v 1.16 2001/06/23 15:12:19 itojun Exp $"); + +#ifdef AFS +#include + +#include + +typedef u_char my_u_char; +typedef u_int my_u_int32_t; +typedef u_short my_u_short; + +/* Nasty macros from BIND-4.9.2 */ + +#define GETSHORT(s, cp) { \ + register my_u_char *t_cp = (my_u_char *)(cp); \ + (s) = (((my_u_short)t_cp[0]) << 8) \ + | (((my_u_short)t_cp[1])) \ + ; \ + (cp) += 2; \ +} + +#define GETLONG(l, cp) { \ + register my_u_char *t_cp = (my_u_char *)(cp); \ + (l) = (((my_u_int32_t)t_cp[0]) << 24) \ + | (((my_u_int32_t)t_cp[1]) << 16) \ + | (((my_u_int32_t)t_cp[2]) << 8) \ + | (((my_u_int32_t)t_cp[3])) \ + ; \ + (cp) += 4; \ +} + +#define PUTSHORT(s, cp) { \ + register my_u_short t_s = (my_u_short)(s); \ + register my_u_char *t_cp = (my_u_char *)(cp); \ + *t_cp++ = t_s >> 8; \ + *t_cp = t_s; \ + (cp) += 2; \ +} + +#define PUTLONG(l, cp) { \ + register my_u_int32_t t_l = (my_u_int32_t)(l); \ + register my_u_char *t_cp = (my_u_char *)(cp); \ + *t_cp++ = t_l >> 24; \ + *t_cp++ = t_l >> 16; \ + *t_cp++ = t_l >> 8; \ + *t_cp = t_l; \ + (cp) += 4; \ +} + +#define GETSTRING(s, p, p_l) { \ + register char *p_targ = (p) + p_l; \ + register char *s_c = (s); \ + register char *p_c = (p); \ + while (*p_c && (p_c < p_targ)) { \ + *s_c++ = *p_c++; \ + } \ + if (p_c == p_targ) { \ + return 1; \ + } \ + *s_c = *p_c++; \ + (p_l) = (p_l) - (p_c - (p)); \ + (p) = p_c; \ +} + + +int +creds_to_radix(CREDENTIALS *creds, u_char *buf, size_t buflen) +{ + char *p, *s; + int len; + char temp[2048]; + + p = temp; + *p++ = 1; /* version */ + s = creds->service; + while (*s) + *p++ = *s++; + *p++ = *s; + s = creds->instance; + while (*s) + *p++ = *s++; + *p++ = *s; + s = creds->realm; + while (*s) + *p++ = *s++; + *p++ = *s; + + s = creds->pname; + while (*s) + *p++ = *s++; + *p++ = *s; + s = creds->pinst; + while (*s) + *p++ = *s++; + *p++ = *s; + /* Null string to repeat the realm. */ + *p++ = '\0'; + + PUTLONG(creds->issue_date, p); + { + u_int endTime; + endTime = (u_int) krb_life_to_time(creds->issue_date, + creds->lifetime); + PUTLONG(endTime, p); + } + + memcpy(p, &creds->session, sizeof(creds->session)); + p += sizeof(creds->session); + + PUTSHORT(creds->kvno, p); + PUTLONG(creds->ticket_st.length, p); + + memcpy(p, creds->ticket_st.dat, creds->ticket_st.length); + p += creds->ticket_st.length; + len = p - temp; + + return (uuencode((u_char *)temp, len, (char *)buf, buflen)); +} + +int +radix_to_creds(const char *buf, CREDENTIALS *creds) +{ + + char *p; + int len, tl; + char version; + char temp[2048]; + + len = uudecode(buf, (u_char *)temp, sizeof(temp)); + if (len < 0) + return 0; + + p = temp; + + /* check version and length! */ + if (len < 1) + return 0; + version = *p; + p++; + len--; + + GETSTRING(creds->service, p, len); + GETSTRING(creds->instance, p, len); + GETSTRING(creds->realm, p, len); + + GETSTRING(creds->pname, p, len); + GETSTRING(creds->pinst, p, len); + /* Ignore possibly different realm. */ + while (*p && len) + p++, len--; + if (len == 0) + return 0; + p++, len--; + + /* Enough space for remaining fixed-length parts? */ + if (len < (4 + 4 + sizeof(creds->session) + 2 + 4)) + return 0; + + GETLONG(creds->issue_date, p); + len -= 4; + { + u_int endTime; + GETLONG(endTime, p); + len -= 4; + creds->lifetime = krb_time_to_life(creds->issue_date, endTime); + } + + memcpy(&creds->session, p, sizeof(creds->session)); + p += sizeof(creds->session); + len -= sizeof(creds->session); + + GETSHORT(creds->kvno, p); + len -= 2; + GETLONG(creds->ticket_st.length, p); + len -= 4; + + tl = creds->ticket_st.length; + if (tl < 0 || tl > len || tl > sizeof(creds->ticket_st.dat)) + return 0; + + memcpy(creds->ticket_st.dat, p, tl); + p += tl; + len -= tl; + + return 1; +} +#endif /* AFS */ diff --git a/openssh/radix.h b/openssh/radix.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e94e4ac --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/radix.h @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: radix.h,v 1.4 2001/06/26 17:27:24 markus Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999 Dug Song. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +int creds_to_radix(CREDENTIALS *, u_char *, size_t); +int radix_to_creds(const char *, CREDENTIALS *); diff --git a/openssh/readconf.c b/openssh/readconf.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..63035b3 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/readconf.c @@ -0,0 +1,927 @@ +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * Functions for reading the configuration files. + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + */ + +#include "includes.h" +RCSID("$OpenBSD: readconf.c,v 1.91 2001/10/01 21:51:16 markus Exp $"); + +#include "ssh.h" +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "compat.h" +#include "cipher.h" +#include "pathnames.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "readconf.h" +#include "match.h" +#include "misc.h" +#include "kex.h" +#include "mac.h" + +/* Format of the configuration file: + + # Configuration data is parsed as follows: + # 1. command line options + # 2. user-specific file + # 3. system-wide file + # Any configuration value is only changed the first time it is set. + # Thus, host-specific definitions should be at the beginning of the + # configuration file, and defaults at the end. + + # Host-specific declarations. These may override anything above. A single + # host may match multiple declarations; these are processed in the order + # that they are given in. + + Host *.ngs.fi ngs.fi + FallBackToRsh no + + Host fake.com + HostName another.host.name.real.org + User blaah + Port 34289 + ForwardX11 no + ForwardAgent no + + Host books.com + RemoteForward 9999 shadows.cs.hut.fi:9999 + Cipher 3des + + Host fascist.blob.com + Port 23123 + User tylonen + RhostsAuthentication no + PasswordAuthentication no + + Host puukko.hut.fi + User t35124p + ProxyCommand ssh-proxy %h %p + + Host *.fr + UseRsh yes + + Host *.su + Cipher none + PasswordAuthentication no + + # Defaults for various options + Host * + ForwardAgent no + ForwardX11 no + RhostsAuthentication yes + PasswordAuthentication yes + RSAAuthentication yes + RhostsRSAAuthentication yes + FallBackToRsh no + UseRsh no + StrictHostKeyChecking yes + KeepAlives no + IdentityFile ~/.ssh/identity + Port 22 + EscapeChar ~ + +*/ + +/* Keyword tokens. */ + +typedef enum { + oBadOption, + oForwardAgent, oForwardX11, oGatewayPorts, oRhostsAuthentication, + oPasswordAuthentication, oRSAAuthentication, oFallBackToRsh, oUseRsh, + oChallengeResponseAuthentication, oXAuthLocation, +#if defined(KRB4) || defined(KRB5) + oKerberosAuthentication, +#endif +#if defined(AFS) || defined(KRB5) + oKerberosTgtPassing, +#endif +#ifdef AFS + oAFSTokenPassing, +#endif + oIdentityFile, oHostName, oPort, oCipher, oRemoteForward, oLocalForward, + oUser, oHost, oEscapeChar, oRhostsRSAAuthentication, oProxyCommand, + oGlobalKnownHostsFile, oUserKnownHostsFile, oConnectionAttempts, + oBatchMode, oCheckHostIP, oStrictHostKeyChecking, oCompression, + oCompressionLevel, oKeepAlives, oNumberOfPasswordPrompts, + oUsePrivilegedPort, oLogLevel, oCiphers, oProtocol, oMacs, + oGlobalKnownHostsFile2, oUserKnownHostsFile2, oPubkeyAuthentication, + oKbdInteractiveAuthentication, oKbdInteractiveDevices, oHostKeyAlias, + oDynamicForward, oPreferredAuthentications, oHostbasedAuthentication, + oHostKeyAlgorithms, oBindAddress, oSmartcardDevice, + oClearAllForwardings, oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost +} OpCodes; + +/* Textual representations of the tokens. */ + +static struct { + const char *name; + OpCodes opcode; +} keywords[] = { + { "forwardagent", oForwardAgent }, + { "forwardx11", oForwardX11 }, + { "xauthlocation", oXAuthLocation }, + { "gatewayports", oGatewayPorts }, + { "useprivilegedport", oUsePrivilegedPort }, + { "rhostsauthentication", oRhostsAuthentication }, + { "passwordauthentication", oPasswordAuthentication }, + { "kbdinteractiveauthentication", oKbdInteractiveAuthentication }, + { "kbdinteractivedevices", oKbdInteractiveDevices }, + { "rsaauthentication", oRSAAuthentication }, + { "pubkeyauthentication", oPubkeyAuthentication }, + { "dsaauthentication", oPubkeyAuthentication }, /* alias */ + { "rhostsrsaauthentication", oRhostsRSAAuthentication }, + { "hostbasedauthentication", oHostbasedAuthentication }, + { "challengeresponseauthentication", oChallengeResponseAuthentication }, + { "skeyauthentication", oChallengeResponseAuthentication }, /* alias */ + { "tisauthentication", oChallengeResponseAuthentication }, /* alias */ +#if defined(KRB4) || defined(KRB5) + { "kerberosauthentication", oKerberosAuthentication }, +#endif +#if defined(AFS) || defined(KRB5) + { "kerberostgtpassing", oKerberosTgtPassing }, +#endif +#ifdef AFS + { "afstokenpassing", oAFSTokenPassing }, +#endif + { "fallbacktorsh", oFallBackToRsh }, + { "usersh", oUseRsh }, + { "identityfile", oIdentityFile }, + { "identityfile2", oIdentityFile }, /* alias */ + { "hostname", oHostName }, + { "hostkeyalias", oHostKeyAlias }, + { "proxycommand", oProxyCommand }, + { "port", oPort }, + { "cipher", oCipher }, + { "ciphers", oCiphers }, + { "macs", oMacs }, + { "protocol", oProtocol }, + { "remoteforward", oRemoteForward }, + { "localforward", oLocalForward }, + { "user", oUser }, + { "host", oHost }, + { "escapechar", oEscapeChar }, + { "globalknownhostsfile", oGlobalKnownHostsFile }, + { "userknownhostsfile", oUserKnownHostsFile }, /* obsolete */ + { "globalknownhostsfile2", oGlobalKnownHostsFile2 }, + { "userknownhostsfile2", oUserKnownHostsFile2 }, /* obsolete */ + { "connectionattempts", oConnectionAttempts }, + { "batchmode", oBatchMode }, + { "checkhostip", oCheckHostIP }, + { "stricthostkeychecking", oStrictHostKeyChecking }, + { "compression", oCompression }, + { "compressionlevel", oCompressionLevel }, + { "keepalive", oKeepAlives }, + { "numberofpasswordprompts", oNumberOfPasswordPrompts }, + { "loglevel", oLogLevel }, + { "dynamicforward", oDynamicForward }, + { "preferredauthentications", oPreferredAuthentications }, + { "hostkeyalgorithms", oHostKeyAlgorithms }, + { "bindaddress", oBindAddress }, + { "smartcarddevice", oSmartcardDevice }, + { "clearallforwardings", oClearAllForwardings }, + { "nohostauthenticationforlocalhost", oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost }, + { NULL, 0 } +}; + +/* + * Adds a local TCP/IP port forward to options. Never returns if there is an + * error. + */ + +void +add_local_forward(Options *options, u_short port, const char *host, + u_short host_port) +{ + Forward *fwd; +#ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN + extern uid_t original_real_uid; + if (port < IPPORT_RESERVED && original_real_uid != 0) + fatal("Privileged ports can only be forwarded by root."); +#endif + if (options->num_local_forwards >= SSH_MAX_FORWARDS_PER_DIRECTION) + fatal("Too many local forwards (max %d).", SSH_MAX_FORWARDS_PER_DIRECTION); + fwd = &options->local_forwards[options->num_local_forwards++]; + fwd->port = port; + fwd->host = xstrdup(host); + fwd->host_port = host_port; +} + +/* + * Adds a remote TCP/IP port forward to options. Never returns if there is + * an error. + */ + +void +add_remote_forward(Options *options, u_short port, const char *host, + u_short host_port) +{ + Forward *fwd; + if (options->num_remote_forwards >= SSH_MAX_FORWARDS_PER_DIRECTION) + fatal("Too many remote forwards (max %d).", + SSH_MAX_FORWARDS_PER_DIRECTION); + fwd = &options->remote_forwards[options->num_remote_forwards++]; + fwd->port = port; + fwd->host = xstrdup(host); + fwd->host_port = host_port; +} + +static void +clear_forwardings(Options *options) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < options->num_local_forwards; i++) + xfree(options->local_forwards[i].host); + options->num_local_forwards = 0; + for (i = 0; i < options->num_remote_forwards; i++) + xfree(options->remote_forwards[i].host); + options->num_remote_forwards = 0; +} + +/* + * Returns the number of the token pointed to by cp or oBadOption. + */ + +static OpCodes +parse_token(const char *cp, const char *filename, int linenum) +{ + u_int i; + + for (i = 0; keywords[i].name; i++) + if (strcasecmp(cp, keywords[i].name) == 0) + return keywords[i].opcode; + + error("%s: line %d: Bad configuration option: %s", + filename, linenum, cp); + return oBadOption; +} + +/* + * Processes a single option line as used in the configuration files. This + * only sets those values that have not already been set. + */ + +int +process_config_line(Options *options, const char *host, + char *line, const char *filename, int linenum, + int *activep) +{ + char buf[256], *s, *string, **charptr, *endofnumber, *keyword, *arg; + int opcode, *intptr, value; + u_short fwd_port, fwd_host_port; + char sfwd_host_port[6]; + + s = line; + /* Get the keyword. (Each line is supposed to begin with a keyword). */ + keyword = strdelim(&s); + /* Ignore leading whitespace. */ + if (*keyword == '\0') + keyword = strdelim(&s); + if (keyword == NULL || !*keyword || *keyword == '\n' || *keyword == '#') + return 0; + + opcode = parse_token(keyword, filename, linenum); + + switch (opcode) { + case oBadOption: + /* don't panic, but count bad options */ + return -1; + /* NOTREACHED */ + case oForwardAgent: + intptr = &options->forward_agent; +parse_flag: + arg = strdelim(&s); + if (!arg || *arg == '\0') + fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing yes/no argument.", filename, linenum); + value = 0; /* To avoid compiler warning... */ + if (strcmp(arg, "yes") == 0 || strcmp(arg, "true") == 0) + value = 1; + else if (strcmp(arg, "no") == 0 || strcmp(arg, "false") == 0) + value = 0; + else + fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad yes/no argument.", filename, linenum); + if (*activep && *intptr == -1) + *intptr = value; + break; + + case oForwardX11: + intptr = &options->forward_x11; + goto parse_flag; + + case oGatewayPorts: + intptr = &options->gateway_ports; + goto parse_flag; + + case oUsePrivilegedPort: + intptr = &options->use_privileged_port; + goto parse_flag; + + case oRhostsAuthentication: + intptr = &options->rhosts_authentication; + goto parse_flag; + + case oPasswordAuthentication: + intptr = &options->password_authentication; + goto parse_flag; + + case oKbdInteractiveAuthentication: + intptr = &options->kbd_interactive_authentication; + goto parse_flag; + + case oKbdInteractiveDevices: + charptr = &options->kbd_interactive_devices; + goto parse_string; + + case oPubkeyAuthentication: + intptr = &options->pubkey_authentication; + goto parse_flag; + + case oRSAAuthentication: + intptr = &options->rsa_authentication; + goto parse_flag; + + case oRhostsRSAAuthentication: + intptr = &options->rhosts_rsa_authentication; + goto parse_flag; + + case oHostbasedAuthentication: + intptr = &options->hostbased_authentication; + goto parse_flag; + + case oChallengeResponseAuthentication: + intptr = &options->challenge_response_authentication; + goto parse_flag; +#if defined(KRB4) || defined(KRB5) + case oKerberosAuthentication: + intptr = &options->kerberos_authentication; + goto parse_flag; +#endif +#if defined(AFS) || defined(KRB5) + case oKerberosTgtPassing: + intptr = &options->kerberos_tgt_passing; + goto parse_flag; +#endif +#ifdef AFS + case oAFSTokenPassing: + intptr = &options->afs_token_passing; + goto parse_flag; +#endif + case oFallBackToRsh: + intptr = &options->fallback_to_rsh; + goto parse_flag; + + case oUseRsh: + intptr = &options->use_rsh; + goto parse_flag; + + case oBatchMode: + intptr = &options->batch_mode; + goto parse_flag; + + case oCheckHostIP: + intptr = &options->check_host_ip; + goto parse_flag; + + case oStrictHostKeyChecking: + intptr = &options->strict_host_key_checking; + arg = strdelim(&s); + if (!arg || *arg == '\0') + fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing yes/no/ask argument.", + filename, linenum); + value = 0; /* To avoid compiler warning... */ + if (strcmp(arg, "yes") == 0 || strcmp(arg, "true") == 0) + value = 1; + else if (strcmp(arg, "no") == 0 || strcmp(arg, "false") == 0) + value = 0; + else if (strcmp(arg, "ask") == 0) + value = 2; + else + fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad yes/no/ask argument.", filename, linenum); + if (*activep && *intptr == -1) + *intptr = value; + break; + + case oCompression: + intptr = &options->compression; + goto parse_flag; + + case oKeepAlives: + intptr = &options->keepalives; + goto parse_flag; + + case oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost: + intptr = &options->no_host_authentication_for_localhost; + goto parse_flag; + + case oNumberOfPasswordPrompts: + intptr = &options->number_of_password_prompts; + goto parse_int; + + case oCompressionLevel: + intptr = &options->compression_level; + goto parse_int; + + case oIdentityFile: + arg = strdelim(&s); + if (!arg || *arg == '\0') + fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); + if (*activep) { + intptr = &options->num_identity_files; + if (*intptr >= SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES) + fatal("%.200s line %d: Too many identity files specified (max %d).", + filename, linenum, SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES); + charptr = &options->identity_files[*intptr]; + *charptr = xstrdup(arg); + *intptr = *intptr + 1; + } + break; + + case oXAuthLocation: + charptr=&options->xauth_location; + goto parse_string; + + case oUser: + charptr = &options->user; +parse_string: + arg = strdelim(&s); + if (!arg || *arg == '\0') + fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); + if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) + *charptr = xstrdup(arg); + break; + + case oGlobalKnownHostsFile: + charptr = &options->system_hostfile; + goto parse_string; + + case oUserKnownHostsFile: + charptr = &options->user_hostfile; + goto parse_string; + + case oGlobalKnownHostsFile2: + charptr = &options->system_hostfile2; + goto parse_string; + + case oUserKnownHostsFile2: + charptr = &options->user_hostfile2; + goto parse_string; + + case oHostName: + charptr = &options->hostname; + goto parse_string; + + case oHostKeyAlias: + charptr = &options->host_key_alias; + goto parse_string; + + case oPreferredAuthentications: + charptr = &options->preferred_authentications; + goto parse_string; + + case oBindAddress: + charptr = &options->bind_address; + goto parse_string; + + case oSmartcardDevice: + charptr = &options->smartcard_device; + goto parse_string; + + case oProxyCommand: + charptr = &options->proxy_command; + string = xstrdup(""); + while ((arg = strdelim(&s)) != NULL && *arg != '\0') { + string = xrealloc(string, strlen(string) + strlen(arg) + 2); + strcat(string, " "); + strcat(string, arg); + } + if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) + *charptr = string; + else + xfree(string); + return 0; + + case oPort: + intptr = &options->port; +parse_int: + arg = strdelim(&s); + if (!arg || *arg == '\0') + fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); + if (arg[0] < '0' || arg[0] > '9') + fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad number.", filename, linenum); + + /* Octal, decimal, or hex format? */ + value = strtol(arg, &endofnumber, 0); + if (arg == endofnumber) + fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad number.", filename, linenum); + if (*activep && *intptr == -1) + *intptr = value; + break; + + case oConnectionAttempts: + intptr = &options->connection_attempts; + goto parse_int; + + case oCipher: + intptr = &options->cipher; + arg = strdelim(&s); + if (!arg || *arg == '\0') + fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); + value = cipher_number(arg); + if (value == -1) + fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad cipher '%s'.", + filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); + if (*activep && *intptr == -1) + *intptr = value; + break; + + case oCiphers: + arg = strdelim(&s); + if (!arg || *arg == '\0') + fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); + if (!ciphers_valid(arg)) + fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad SSH2 cipher spec '%s'.", + filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); + if (*activep && options->ciphers == NULL) + options->ciphers = xstrdup(arg); + break; + + case oMacs: + arg = strdelim(&s); + if (!arg || *arg == '\0') + fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); + if (!mac_valid(arg)) + fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad SSH2 Mac spec '%s'.", + filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); + if (*activep && options->macs == NULL) + options->macs = xstrdup(arg); + break; + + case oHostKeyAlgorithms: + arg = strdelim(&s); + if (!arg || *arg == '\0') + fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); + if (!key_names_valid2(arg)) + fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad protocol 2 host key algorithms '%s'.", + filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); + if (*activep && options->hostkeyalgorithms == NULL) + options->hostkeyalgorithms = xstrdup(arg); + break; + + case oProtocol: + intptr = &options->protocol; + arg = strdelim(&s); + if (!arg || *arg == '\0') + fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); + value = proto_spec(arg); + if (value == SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN) + fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad protocol spec '%s'.", + filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); + if (*activep && *intptr == SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN) + *intptr = value; + break; + + case oLogLevel: + intptr = (int *) &options->log_level; + arg = strdelim(&s); + value = log_level_number(arg); + if (value == (LogLevel) - 1) + fatal("%.200s line %d: unsupported log level '%s'", + filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); + if (*activep && (LogLevel) * intptr == -1) + *intptr = (LogLevel) value; + break; + + case oLocalForward: + case oRemoteForward: + arg = strdelim(&s); + if (!arg || *arg == '\0') + fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing port argument.", + filename, linenum); + if ((fwd_port = a2port(arg)) == 0) + fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad listen port.", + filename, linenum); + arg = strdelim(&s); + if (!arg || *arg == '\0') + fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing second argument.", + filename, linenum); + if (sscanf(arg, "%255[^:]:%5[0-9]", buf, sfwd_host_port) != 2 && + sscanf(arg, "%255[^/]/%5[0-9]", buf, sfwd_host_port) != 2) + fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad forwarding specification.", + filename, linenum); + if ((fwd_host_port = a2port(sfwd_host_port)) == 0) + fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad forwarding port.", + filename, linenum); + if (*activep) { + if (opcode == oLocalForward) + add_local_forward(options, fwd_port, buf, + fwd_host_port); + else if (opcode == oRemoteForward) + add_remote_forward(options, fwd_port, buf, + fwd_host_port); + } + break; + + case oDynamicForward: + arg = strdelim(&s); + if (!arg || *arg == '\0') + fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing port argument.", + filename, linenum); + fwd_port = a2port(arg); + if (fwd_port == 0) + fatal("%.200s line %d: Badly formatted port number.", + filename, linenum); + if (*activep) + add_local_forward(options, fwd_port, "socks4", 0); + break; + + case oClearAllForwardings: + intptr = &options->clear_forwardings; + goto parse_flag; + + case oHost: + *activep = 0; + while ((arg = strdelim(&s)) != NULL && *arg != '\0') + if (match_pattern(host, arg)) { + debug("Applying options for %.100s", arg); + *activep = 1; + break; + } + /* Avoid garbage check below, as strdelim is done. */ + return 0; + + case oEscapeChar: + intptr = &options->escape_char; + arg = strdelim(&s); + if (!arg || *arg == '\0') + fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); + if (arg[0] == '^' && arg[2] == 0 && + (u_char) arg[1] >= 64 && (u_char) arg[1] < 128) + value = (u_char) arg[1] & 31; + else if (strlen(arg) == 1) + value = (u_char) arg[0]; + else if (strcmp(arg, "none") == 0) + value = SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE; + else { + fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad escape character.", + filename, linenum); + /* NOTREACHED */ + value = 0; /* Avoid compiler warning. */ + } + if (*activep && *intptr == -1) + *intptr = value; + break; + + default: + fatal("process_config_line: Unimplemented opcode %d", opcode); + } + + /* Check that there is no garbage at end of line. */ + if ((arg = strdelim(&s)) != NULL && *arg != '\0') { + fatal("%.200s line %d: garbage at end of line; \"%.200s\".", + filename, linenum, arg); + } + return 0; +} + + +/* + * Reads the config file and modifies the options accordingly. Options + * should already be initialized before this call. This never returns if + * there is an error. If the file does not exist, this returns 0. + */ + +int +read_config_file(const char *filename, const char *host, Options *options) +{ + FILE *f; + char line[1024]; + int active, linenum; + int bad_options = 0; + + /* Open the file. */ + f = fopen(filename, "r"); + if (!f) + return 0; + + debug("Reading configuration data %.200s", filename); + + /* + * Mark that we are now processing the options. This flag is turned + * on/off by Host specifications. + */ + active = 1; + linenum = 0; + while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), f)) { + /* Update line number counter. */ + linenum++; + if (process_config_line(options, host, line, filename, linenum, &active) != 0) + bad_options++; + } + fclose(f); + if (bad_options > 0) + fatal("%s: terminating, %d bad configuration options", + filename, bad_options); + return 1; +} + +/* + * Initializes options to special values that indicate that they have not yet + * been set. Read_config_file will only set options with this value. Options + * are processed in the following order: command line, user config file, + * system config file. Last, fill_default_options is called. + */ + +void +initialize_options(Options * options) +{ + memset(options, 'X', sizeof(*options)); + options->forward_agent = -1; + options->forward_x11 = -1; + options->xauth_location = NULL; + options->gateway_ports = -1; + options->use_privileged_port = -1; + options->rhosts_authentication = -1; + options->rsa_authentication = -1; + options->pubkey_authentication = -1; + options->challenge_response_authentication = -1; +#if defined(KRB4) || defined(KRB5) + options->kerberos_authentication = -1; +#endif +#if defined(AFS) || defined(KRB5) + options->kerberos_tgt_passing = -1; +#endif +#ifdef AFS + options->afs_token_passing = -1; +#endif + options->password_authentication = -1; + options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1; + options->kbd_interactive_devices = NULL; + options->rhosts_rsa_authentication = -1; + options->hostbased_authentication = -1; + options->fallback_to_rsh = -1; + options->use_rsh = -1; + options->batch_mode = -1; + options->check_host_ip = -1; + options->strict_host_key_checking = -1; + options->compression = -1; + options->keepalives = -1; + options->compression_level = -1; + options->port = -1; + options->connection_attempts = -1; + options->number_of_password_prompts = -1; + options->cipher = -1; + options->ciphers = NULL; + options->macs = NULL; + options->hostkeyalgorithms = NULL; + options->protocol = SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN; + options->num_identity_files = 0; + options->hostname = NULL; + options->host_key_alias = NULL; + options->proxy_command = NULL; + options->user = NULL; + options->escape_char = -1; + options->system_hostfile = NULL; + options->user_hostfile = NULL; + options->system_hostfile2 = NULL; + options->user_hostfile2 = NULL; + options->num_local_forwards = 0; + options->num_remote_forwards = 0; + options->clear_forwardings = -1; + options->log_level = (LogLevel) - 1; + options->preferred_authentications = NULL; + options->bind_address = NULL; + options->smartcard_device = NULL; + options->no_host_authentication_for_localhost = - 1; +} + +/* + * Called after processing other sources of option data, this fills those + * options for which no value has been specified with their default values. + */ + +void +fill_default_options(Options * options) +{ + int len; + + if (options->forward_agent == -1) + options->forward_agent = 0; + if (options->forward_x11 == -1) + options->forward_x11 = 0; +#ifdef _PATH_XAUTH + if (options->xauth_location == NULL) + options->xauth_location = _PATH_XAUTH; +#endif + if (options->gateway_ports == -1) + options->gateway_ports = 0; + if (options->use_privileged_port == -1) + options->use_privileged_port = 0; + if (options->rhosts_authentication == -1) + options->rhosts_authentication = 1; + if (options->rsa_authentication == -1) + options->rsa_authentication = 1; + if (options->pubkey_authentication == -1) + options->pubkey_authentication = 1; + if (options->challenge_response_authentication == -1) + options->challenge_response_authentication = 1; +#if defined(KRB4) || defined(KRB5) + if (options->kerberos_authentication == -1) + options->kerberos_authentication = 1; +#endif +#if defined(AFS) || defined(KRB5) + if (options->kerberos_tgt_passing == -1) + options->kerberos_tgt_passing = 1; +#endif +#ifdef AFS + if (options->afs_token_passing == -1) + options->afs_token_passing = 1; +#endif + if (options->password_authentication == -1) + options->password_authentication = 1; + if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1) + options->kbd_interactive_authentication = 1; + if (options->rhosts_rsa_authentication == -1) + options->rhosts_rsa_authentication = 1; + if (options->hostbased_authentication == -1) + options->hostbased_authentication = 0; + if (options->fallback_to_rsh == -1) + options->fallback_to_rsh = 0; + if (options->use_rsh == -1) + options->use_rsh = 0; + if (options->batch_mode == -1) + options->batch_mode = 0; + if (options->check_host_ip == -1) + options->check_host_ip = 1; + if (options->strict_host_key_checking == -1) + options->strict_host_key_checking = 2; /* 2 is default */ + if (options->compression == -1) + options->compression = 0; + if (options->keepalives == -1) + options->keepalives = 1; + if (options->compression_level == -1) + options->compression_level = 6; + if (options->port == -1) + options->port = 0; /* Filled in ssh_connect. */ + if (options->connection_attempts == -1) + options->connection_attempts = 1; + if (options->number_of_password_prompts == -1) + options->number_of_password_prompts = 3; + /* Selected in ssh_login(). */ + if (options->cipher == -1) + options->cipher = SSH_CIPHER_NOT_SET; + /* options->ciphers, default set in myproposals.h */ + /* options->macs, default set in myproposals.h */ + /* options->hostkeyalgorithms, default set in myproposals.h */ + if (options->protocol == SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN) + options->protocol = SSH_PROTO_1|SSH_PROTO_2; + if (options->num_identity_files == 0) { + if (options->protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) { + len = 2 + strlen(_PATH_SSH_CLIENT_IDENTITY) + 1; + options->identity_files[options->num_identity_files] = + xmalloc(len); + snprintf(options->identity_files[options->num_identity_files++], + len, "~/%.100s", _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_IDENTITY); + } + if (options->protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) { + len = 2 + strlen(_PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_RSA) + 1; + options->identity_files[options->num_identity_files] = + xmalloc(len); + snprintf(options->identity_files[options->num_identity_files++], + len, "~/%.100s", _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_RSA); + + len = 2 + strlen(_PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_DSA) + 1; + options->identity_files[options->num_identity_files] = + xmalloc(len); + snprintf(options->identity_files[options->num_identity_files++], + len, "~/%.100s", _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_DSA); + } + } + if (options->escape_char == -1) + options->escape_char = '~'; + if (options->system_hostfile == NULL) + options->system_hostfile = _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_HOSTFILE; + if (options->user_hostfile == NULL) + options->user_hostfile = _PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE; + if (options->system_hostfile2 == NULL) + options->system_hostfile2 = _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_HOSTFILE2; + if (options->user_hostfile2 == NULL) + options->user_hostfile2 = _PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE2; + if (options->log_level == (LogLevel) - 1) + options->log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO; + if (options->clear_forwardings == 1) + clear_forwardings(options); + if (options->no_host_authentication_for_localhost == - 1) + options->no_host_authentication_for_localhost = 0; + /* options->proxy_command should not be set by default */ + /* options->user will be set in the main program if appropriate */ + /* options->hostname will be set in the main program if appropriate */ + /* options->host_key_alias should not be set by default */ + /* options->preferred_authentications will be set in ssh */ +} diff --git a/openssh/readconf.h b/openssh/readconf.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..25ffa46 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/readconf.h @@ -0,0 +1,118 @@ +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * Functions for reading the configuration file. + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + */ + +/* RCSID("$OpenBSD: readconf.h,v 1.40 2001/10/01 21:51:16 markus Exp $"); */ + +#ifndef READCONF_H +#define READCONF_H + +#include "key.h" + +/* Data structure for representing a forwarding request. */ + +typedef struct { + u_short port; /* Port to forward. */ + char *host; /* Host to connect. */ + u_short host_port; /* Port to connect on host. */ +} Forward; +/* Data structure for representing option data. */ + +typedef struct { + int forward_agent; /* Forward authentication agent. */ + int forward_x11; /* Forward X11 display. */ + char *xauth_location; /* Location for xauth program */ + int gateway_ports; /* Allow remote connects to forwarded ports. */ + int use_privileged_port; /* Don't use privileged port if false. */ + int rhosts_authentication; /* Try rhosts authentication. */ + int rhosts_rsa_authentication; /* Try rhosts with RSA + * authentication. */ + int rsa_authentication; /* Try RSA authentication. */ + int pubkey_authentication; /* Try ssh2 pubkey authentication. */ + int hostbased_authentication; /* ssh2's rhosts_rsa */ + int challenge_response_authentication; + /* Try S/Key or TIS, authentication. */ +#if defined(KRB4) || defined(KRB5) + int kerberos_authentication; /* Try Kerberos authentication. */ +#endif +#if defined(AFS) || defined(KRB5) + int kerberos_tgt_passing; /* Try Kerberos TGT passing. */ +#endif +#ifdef AFS + int afs_token_passing; /* Try AFS token passing. */ +#endif + int password_authentication; /* Try password + * authentication. */ + int kbd_interactive_authentication; /* Try keyboard-interactive auth. */ + char *kbd_interactive_devices; /* Keyboard-interactive auth devices. */ + int fallback_to_rsh;/* Use rsh if cannot connect with ssh. */ + int use_rsh; /* Always use rsh (don\'t try ssh). */ + int batch_mode; /* Batch mode: do not ask for passwords. */ + int check_host_ip; /* Also keep track of keys for IP address */ + int strict_host_key_checking; /* Strict host key checking. */ + int compression; /* Compress packets in both directions. */ + int compression_level; /* Compression level 1 (fast) to 9 + * (best). */ + int keepalives; /* Set SO_KEEPALIVE. */ + LogLevel log_level; /* Level for logging. */ + + int port; /* Port to connect. */ + int connection_attempts; /* Max attempts (seconds) before + * giving up */ + int number_of_password_prompts; /* Max number of password + * prompts. */ + int cipher; /* Cipher to use. */ + char *ciphers; /* SSH2 ciphers in order of preference. */ + char *macs; /* SSH2 macs in order of preference. */ + char *hostkeyalgorithms; /* SSH2 server key types in order of preference. */ + int protocol; /* Protocol in order of preference. */ + char *hostname; /* Real host to connect. */ + char *host_key_alias; /* hostname alias for .ssh/known_hosts */ + char *proxy_command; /* Proxy command for connecting the host. */ + char *user; /* User to log in as. */ + int escape_char; /* Escape character; -2 = none */ + + char *system_hostfile;/* Path for /etc/ssh_known_hosts. */ + char *user_hostfile; /* Path for $HOME/.ssh/known_hosts. */ + char *system_hostfile2; + char *user_hostfile2; + char *preferred_authentications; + char *bind_address; /* local socket address for connection to sshd */ + char *smartcard_device; /* Smartcard reader device */ + + int num_identity_files; /* Number of files for RSA/DSA identities. */ + char *identity_files[SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES]; + Key *identity_keys[SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES]; + + /* Local TCP/IP forward requests. */ + int num_local_forwards; + Forward local_forwards[SSH_MAX_FORWARDS_PER_DIRECTION]; + + /* Remote TCP/IP forward requests. */ + int num_remote_forwards; + Forward remote_forwards[SSH_MAX_FORWARDS_PER_DIRECTION]; + int clear_forwardings; + int no_host_authentication_for_localhost; +} Options; + + +void initialize_options(Options *); +void fill_default_options(Options *); +int read_config_file(const char *, const char *, Options *); + +int +process_config_line(Options *, const char *, char *, const char *, int, int *); + +void add_local_forward(Options *, u_short, const char *, u_short); +void add_remote_forward(Options *, u_short, const char *, u_short); + +#endif /* READCONF_H */ diff --git a/openssh/readpass.c b/openssh/readpass.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a042981 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/readpass.c @@ -0,0 +1,127 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1988, 1993 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the University of + * California, Berkeley and its contributors. + * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" +RCSID("$OpenBSD: readpass.c,v 1.23 2001/11/08 10:51:08 markus Exp $"); + +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "readpass.h" +#include "pathnames.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "ssh.h" + +static char * +ssh_askpass(char *askpass, const char *msg) +{ + pid_t pid; + size_t len; + char *pass; + int p[2], status; + char buf[1024]; + + if (fflush(stdout) != 0) + error("ssh_askpass: fflush: %s", strerror(errno)); + if (askpass == NULL) + fatal("internal error: askpass undefined"); + if (pipe(p) < 0) { + error("ssh_askpass: pipe: %s", strerror(errno)); + return xstrdup(""); + } + if ((pid = fork()) < 0) { + error("ssh_askpass: fork: %s", strerror(errno)); + return xstrdup(""); + } + if (pid == 0) { + seteuid(getuid()); + setuid(getuid()); + close(p[0]); + if (dup2(p[1], STDOUT_FILENO) < 0) + fatal("ssh_askpass: dup2: %s", strerror(errno)); + execlp(askpass, askpass, msg, (char *) 0); + fatal("ssh_askpass: exec(%s): %s", askpass, strerror(errno)); + } + close(p[1]); + len = read(p[0], buf, sizeof buf -1); + close(p[0]); + while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) < 0) + if (errno != EINTR) + break; + if (len <= 1) + return xstrdup(""); + buf[len] = '\0'; + buf[strcspn(buf, "\r\n")] = '\0'; + pass = xstrdup(buf); + memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); + return pass; +} + +/* + * Reads a passphrase from /dev/tty with echo turned off/on. Returns the + * passphrase (allocated with xmalloc). Exits if EOF is encountered. If + * RP_ALLOW_STDIN is set, the passphrase will be read from stdin if no + * tty is available + */ +char * +read_passphrase(const char *prompt, int flags) +{ + char *askpass = NULL, *ret, buf[1024]; + int rppflags, use_askpass = 0, ttyfd; + + rppflags = (flags & RP_ECHO) ? RPP_ECHO_ON : RPP_ECHO_OFF; + if (flags & RP_ALLOW_STDIN) { + if (!isatty(STDIN_FILENO)) + use_askpass = 1; + } else { + rppflags |= RPP_REQUIRE_TTY; + ttyfd = open("/dev/tty", O_RDWR); + if (ttyfd >= 0) + close(ttyfd); + else + use_askpass = 1; + } + + if (use_askpass && getenv("DISPLAY")) { + if (getenv(SSH_ASKPASS_ENV)) + askpass = getenv(SSH_ASKPASS_ENV); + else + askpass = _PATH_SSH_ASKPASS_DEFAULT; + return ssh_askpass(askpass, prompt); + } + + if (readpassphrase(prompt, buf, sizeof buf, rppflags) == NULL) + return xstrdup(""); + + ret = xstrdup(buf); + memset(buf, 'x', sizeof buf); + return ret; +} diff --git a/openssh/readpass.h b/openssh/readpass.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..229973c --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/readpass.h @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: readpass.h,v 1.6 2001/06/26 17:27:24 markus Exp $ */ + +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + */ + +#define RP_ECHO 0x0001 +#define RP_ALLOW_STDIN 0x0002 + +char *read_passphrase(const char *, int); diff --git a/openssh/rijndael.c b/openssh/rijndael.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f28a9c6 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/rijndael.c @@ -0,0 +1,1245 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: rijndael.c,v 1.12 2001/09/13 09:48:39 markus Exp $ */ + +/** + * rijndael-alg-fst.c + * + * @version 3.0 (December 2000) + * + * Optimised ANSI C code for the Rijndael cipher (now AES) + * + * @author Vincent Rijmen + * @author Antoon Bosselaers + * @author Paulo Barreto + * + * This code is hereby placed in the public domain. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHORS ''AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS + * OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE + * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR + * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF + * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR + * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, + * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE + * OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, + * EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ +#include "config.h" + +#include +#include + +#include "rijndael.h" + +#define FULL_UNROLL + +/* +Te0[x] = S [x].[02, 01, 01, 03]; +Te1[x] = S [x].[03, 02, 01, 01]; +Te2[x] = S [x].[01, 03, 02, 01]; +Te3[x] = S [x].[01, 01, 03, 02]; +Te4[x] = S [x].[01, 01, 01, 01]; + +Td0[x] = Si[x].[0e, 09, 0d, 0b]; +Td1[x] = Si[x].[0b, 0e, 09, 0d]; +Td2[x] = Si[x].[0d, 0b, 0e, 09]; +Td3[x] = Si[x].[09, 0d, 0b, 0e]; +Td4[x] = Si[x].[01, 01, 01, 01]; +*/ + +static const u32 Te0[256] = { + 0xc66363a5U, 0xf87c7c84U, 0xee777799U, 0xf67b7b8dU, + 0xfff2f20dU, 0xd66b6bbdU, 0xde6f6fb1U, 0x91c5c554U, + 0x60303050U, 0x02010103U, 0xce6767a9U, 0x562b2b7dU, + 0xe7fefe19U, 0xb5d7d762U, 0x4dababe6U, 0xec76769aU, + 0x8fcaca45U, 0x1f82829dU, 0x89c9c940U, 0xfa7d7d87U, + 0xeffafa15U, 0xb25959ebU, 0x8e4747c9U, 0xfbf0f00bU, + 0x41adadecU, 0xb3d4d467U, 0x5fa2a2fdU, 0x45afafeaU, + 0x239c9cbfU, 0x53a4a4f7U, 0xe4727296U, 0x9bc0c05bU, + 0x75b7b7c2U, 0xe1fdfd1cU, 0x3d9393aeU, 0x4c26266aU, + 0x6c36365aU, 0x7e3f3f41U, 0xf5f7f702U, 0x83cccc4fU, + 0x6834345cU, 0x51a5a5f4U, 0xd1e5e534U, 0xf9f1f108U, + 0xe2717193U, 0xabd8d873U, 0x62313153U, 0x2a15153fU, + 0x0804040cU, 0x95c7c752U, 0x46232365U, 0x9dc3c35eU, + 0x30181828U, 0x379696a1U, 0x0a05050fU, 0x2f9a9ab5U, + 0x0e070709U, 0x24121236U, 0x1b80809bU, 0xdfe2e23dU, + 0xcdebeb26U, 0x4e272769U, 0x7fb2b2cdU, 0xea75759fU, + 0x1209091bU, 0x1d83839eU, 0x582c2c74U, 0x341a1a2eU, + 0x361b1b2dU, 0xdc6e6eb2U, 0xb45a5aeeU, 0x5ba0a0fbU, + 0xa45252f6U, 0x763b3b4dU, 0xb7d6d661U, 0x7db3b3ceU, + 0x5229297bU, 0xdde3e33eU, 0x5e2f2f71U, 0x13848497U, + 0xa65353f5U, 0xb9d1d168U, 0x00000000U, 0xc1eded2cU, + 0x40202060U, 0xe3fcfc1fU, 0x79b1b1c8U, 0xb65b5bedU, + 0xd46a6abeU, 0x8dcbcb46U, 0x67bebed9U, 0x7239394bU, + 0x944a4adeU, 0x984c4cd4U, 0xb05858e8U, 0x85cfcf4aU, + 0xbbd0d06bU, 0xc5efef2aU, 0x4faaaae5U, 0xedfbfb16U, + 0x864343c5U, 0x9a4d4dd7U, 0x66333355U, 0x11858594U, + 0x8a4545cfU, 0xe9f9f910U, 0x04020206U, 0xfe7f7f81U, + 0xa05050f0U, 0x783c3c44U, 0x259f9fbaU, 0x4ba8a8e3U, + 0xa25151f3U, 0x5da3a3feU, 0x804040c0U, 0x058f8f8aU, + 0x3f9292adU, 0x219d9dbcU, 0x70383848U, 0xf1f5f504U, + 0x63bcbcdfU, 0x77b6b6c1U, 0xafdada75U, 0x42212163U, + 0x20101030U, 0xe5ffff1aU, 0xfdf3f30eU, 0xbfd2d26dU, + 0x81cdcd4cU, 0x180c0c14U, 0x26131335U, 0xc3ecec2fU, + 0xbe5f5fe1U, 0x359797a2U, 0x884444ccU, 0x2e171739U, + 0x93c4c457U, 0x55a7a7f2U, 0xfc7e7e82U, 0x7a3d3d47U, + 0xc86464acU, 0xba5d5de7U, 0x3219192bU, 0xe6737395U, + 0xc06060a0U, 0x19818198U, 0x9e4f4fd1U, 0xa3dcdc7fU, + 0x44222266U, 0x542a2a7eU, 0x3b9090abU, 0x0b888883U, + 0x8c4646caU, 0xc7eeee29U, 0x6bb8b8d3U, 0x2814143cU, + 0xa7dede79U, 0xbc5e5ee2U, 0x160b0b1dU, 0xaddbdb76U, + 0xdbe0e03bU, 0x64323256U, 0x743a3a4eU, 0x140a0a1eU, + 0x924949dbU, 0x0c06060aU, 0x4824246cU, 0xb85c5ce4U, + 0x9fc2c25dU, 0xbdd3d36eU, 0x43acacefU, 0xc46262a6U, + 0x399191a8U, 0x319595a4U, 0xd3e4e437U, 0xf279798bU, + 0xd5e7e732U, 0x8bc8c843U, 0x6e373759U, 0xda6d6db7U, + 0x018d8d8cU, 0xb1d5d564U, 0x9c4e4ed2U, 0x49a9a9e0U, + 0xd86c6cb4U, 0xac5656faU, 0xf3f4f407U, 0xcfeaea25U, + 0xca6565afU, 0xf47a7a8eU, 0x47aeaee9U, 0x10080818U, + 0x6fbabad5U, 0xf0787888U, 0x4a25256fU, 0x5c2e2e72U, + 0x381c1c24U, 0x57a6a6f1U, 0x73b4b4c7U, 0x97c6c651U, + 0xcbe8e823U, 0xa1dddd7cU, 0xe874749cU, 0x3e1f1f21U, + 0x964b4bddU, 0x61bdbddcU, 0x0d8b8b86U, 0x0f8a8a85U, + 0xe0707090U, 0x7c3e3e42U, 0x71b5b5c4U, 0xcc6666aaU, + 0x904848d8U, 0x06030305U, 0xf7f6f601U, 0x1c0e0e12U, + 0xc26161a3U, 0x6a35355fU, 0xae5757f9U, 0x69b9b9d0U, + 0x17868691U, 0x99c1c158U, 0x3a1d1d27U, 0x279e9eb9U, + 0xd9e1e138U, 0xebf8f813U, 0x2b9898b3U, 0x22111133U, + 0xd26969bbU, 0xa9d9d970U, 0x078e8e89U, 0x339494a7U, + 0x2d9b9bb6U, 0x3c1e1e22U, 0x15878792U, 0xc9e9e920U, + 0x87cece49U, 0xaa5555ffU, 0x50282878U, 0xa5dfdf7aU, + 0x038c8c8fU, 0x59a1a1f8U, 0x09898980U, 0x1a0d0d17U, + 0x65bfbfdaU, 0xd7e6e631U, 0x844242c6U, 0xd06868b8U, + 0x824141c3U, 0x299999b0U, 0x5a2d2d77U, 0x1e0f0f11U, + 0x7bb0b0cbU, 0xa85454fcU, 0x6dbbbbd6U, 0x2c16163aU, +}; +static const u32 Te1[256] = { + 0xa5c66363U, 0x84f87c7cU, 0x99ee7777U, 0x8df67b7bU, + 0x0dfff2f2U, 0xbdd66b6bU, 0xb1de6f6fU, 0x5491c5c5U, + 0x50603030U, 0x03020101U, 0xa9ce6767U, 0x7d562b2bU, + 0x19e7fefeU, 0x62b5d7d7U, 0xe64dababU, 0x9aec7676U, + 0x458fcacaU, 0x9d1f8282U, 0x4089c9c9U, 0x87fa7d7dU, + 0x15effafaU, 0xebb25959U, 0xc98e4747U, 0x0bfbf0f0U, + 0xec41adadU, 0x67b3d4d4U, 0xfd5fa2a2U, 0xea45afafU, + 0xbf239c9cU, 0xf753a4a4U, 0x96e47272U, 0x5b9bc0c0U, + 0xc275b7b7U, 0x1ce1fdfdU, 0xae3d9393U, 0x6a4c2626U, + 0x5a6c3636U, 0x417e3f3fU, 0x02f5f7f7U, 0x4f83ccccU, + 0x5c683434U, 0xf451a5a5U, 0x34d1e5e5U, 0x08f9f1f1U, + 0x93e27171U, 0x73abd8d8U, 0x53623131U, 0x3f2a1515U, + 0x0c080404U, 0x5295c7c7U, 0x65462323U, 0x5e9dc3c3U, + 0x28301818U, 0xa1379696U, 0x0f0a0505U, 0xb52f9a9aU, + 0x090e0707U, 0x36241212U, 0x9b1b8080U, 0x3ddfe2e2U, + 0x26cdebebU, 0x694e2727U, 0xcd7fb2b2U, 0x9fea7575U, + 0x1b120909U, 0x9e1d8383U, 0x74582c2cU, 0x2e341a1aU, + 0x2d361b1bU, 0xb2dc6e6eU, 0xeeb45a5aU, 0xfb5ba0a0U, + 0xf6a45252U, 0x4d763b3bU, 0x61b7d6d6U, 0xce7db3b3U, + 0x7b522929U, 0x3edde3e3U, 0x715e2f2fU, 0x97138484U, + 0xf5a65353U, 0x68b9d1d1U, 0x00000000U, 0x2cc1ededU, + 0x60402020U, 0x1fe3fcfcU, 0xc879b1b1U, 0xedb65b5bU, + 0xbed46a6aU, 0x468dcbcbU, 0xd967bebeU, 0x4b723939U, + 0xde944a4aU, 0xd4984c4cU, 0xe8b05858U, 0x4a85cfcfU, + 0x6bbbd0d0U, 0x2ac5efefU, 0xe54faaaaU, 0x16edfbfbU, + 0xc5864343U, 0xd79a4d4dU, 0x55663333U, 0x94118585U, + 0xcf8a4545U, 0x10e9f9f9U, 0x06040202U, 0x81fe7f7fU, + 0xf0a05050U, 0x44783c3cU, 0xba259f9fU, 0xe34ba8a8U, + 0xf3a25151U, 0xfe5da3a3U, 0xc0804040U, 0x8a058f8fU, + 0xad3f9292U, 0xbc219d9dU, 0x48703838U, 0x04f1f5f5U, + 0xdf63bcbcU, 0xc177b6b6U, 0x75afdadaU, 0x63422121U, + 0x30201010U, 0x1ae5ffffU, 0x0efdf3f3U, 0x6dbfd2d2U, + 0x4c81cdcdU, 0x14180c0cU, 0x35261313U, 0x2fc3ececU, + 0xe1be5f5fU, 0xa2359797U, 0xcc884444U, 0x392e1717U, + 0x5793c4c4U, 0xf255a7a7U, 0x82fc7e7eU, 0x477a3d3dU, + 0xacc86464U, 0xe7ba5d5dU, 0x2b321919U, 0x95e67373U, + 0xa0c06060U, 0x98198181U, 0xd19e4f4fU, 0x7fa3dcdcU, + 0x66442222U, 0x7e542a2aU, 0xab3b9090U, 0x830b8888U, + 0xca8c4646U, 0x29c7eeeeU, 0xd36bb8b8U, 0x3c281414U, + 0x79a7dedeU, 0xe2bc5e5eU, 0x1d160b0bU, 0x76addbdbU, + 0x3bdbe0e0U, 0x56643232U, 0x4e743a3aU, 0x1e140a0aU, + 0xdb924949U, 0x0a0c0606U, 0x6c482424U, 0xe4b85c5cU, + 0x5d9fc2c2U, 0x6ebdd3d3U, 0xef43acacU, 0xa6c46262U, + 0xa8399191U, 0xa4319595U, 0x37d3e4e4U, 0x8bf27979U, + 0x32d5e7e7U, 0x438bc8c8U, 0x596e3737U, 0xb7da6d6dU, + 0x8c018d8dU, 0x64b1d5d5U, 0xd29c4e4eU, 0xe049a9a9U, + 0xb4d86c6cU, 0xfaac5656U, 0x07f3f4f4U, 0x25cfeaeaU, + 0xafca6565U, 0x8ef47a7aU, 0xe947aeaeU, 0x18100808U, + 0xd56fbabaU, 0x88f07878U, 0x6f4a2525U, 0x725c2e2eU, + 0x24381c1cU, 0xf157a6a6U, 0xc773b4b4U, 0x5197c6c6U, + 0x23cbe8e8U, 0x7ca1ddddU, 0x9ce87474U, 0x213e1f1fU, + 0xdd964b4bU, 0xdc61bdbdU, 0x860d8b8bU, 0x850f8a8aU, + 0x90e07070U, 0x427c3e3eU, 0xc471b5b5U, 0xaacc6666U, + 0xd8904848U, 0x05060303U, 0x01f7f6f6U, 0x121c0e0eU, + 0xa3c26161U, 0x5f6a3535U, 0xf9ae5757U, 0xd069b9b9U, + 0x91178686U, 0x5899c1c1U, 0x273a1d1dU, 0xb9279e9eU, + 0x38d9e1e1U, 0x13ebf8f8U, 0xb32b9898U, 0x33221111U, + 0xbbd26969U, 0x70a9d9d9U, 0x89078e8eU, 0xa7339494U, + 0xb62d9b9bU, 0x223c1e1eU, 0x92158787U, 0x20c9e9e9U, + 0x4987ceceU, 0xffaa5555U, 0x78502828U, 0x7aa5dfdfU, + 0x8f038c8cU, 0xf859a1a1U, 0x80098989U, 0x171a0d0dU, + 0xda65bfbfU, 0x31d7e6e6U, 0xc6844242U, 0xb8d06868U, + 0xc3824141U, 0xb0299999U, 0x775a2d2dU, 0x111e0f0fU, + 0xcb7bb0b0U, 0xfca85454U, 0xd66dbbbbU, 0x3a2c1616U, +}; +static const u32 Te2[256] = { + 0x63a5c663U, 0x7c84f87cU, 0x7799ee77U, 0x7b8df67bU, + 0xf20dfff2U, 0x6bbdd66bU, 0x6fb1de6fU, 0xc55491c5U, + 0x30506030U, 0x01030201U, 0x67a9ce67U, 0x2b7d562bU, + 0xfe19e7feU, 0xd762b5d7U, 0xabe64dabU, 0x769aec76U, + 0xca458fcaU, 0x829d1f82U, 0xc94089c9U, 0x7d87fa7dU, + 0xfa15effaU, 0x59ebb259U, 0x47c98e47U, 0xf00bfbf0U, + 0xadec41adU, 0xd467b3d4U, 0xa2fd5fa2U, 0xafea45afU, + 0x9cbf239cU, 0xa4f753a4U, 0x7296e472U, 0xc05b9bc0U, + 0xb7c275b7U, 0xfd1ce1fdU, 0x93ae3d93U, 0x266a4c26U, + 0x365a6c36U, 0x3f417e3fU, 0xf702f5f7U, 0xcc4f83ccU, + 0x345c6834U, 0xa5f451a5U, 0xe534d1e5U, 0xf108f9f1U, + 0x7193e271U, 0xd873abd8U, 0x31536231U, 0x153f2a15U, + 0x040c0804U, 0xc75295c7U, 0x23654623U, 0xc35e9dc3U, + 0x18283018U, 0x96a13796U, 0x050f0a05U, 0x9ab52f9aU, + 0x07090e07U, 0x12362412U, 0x809b1b80U, 0xe23ddfe2U, + 0xeb26cdebU, 0x27694e27U, 0xb2cd7fb2U, 0x759fea75U, + 0x091b1209U, 0x839e1d83U, 0x2c74582cU, 0x1a2e341aU, + 0x1b2d361bU, 0x6eb2dc6eU, 0x5aeeb45aU, 0xa0fb5ba0U, + 0x52f6a452U, 0x3b4d763bU, 0xd661b7d6U, 0xb3ce7db3U, + 0x297b5229U, 0xe33edde3U, 0x2f715e2fU, 0x84971384U, + 0x53f5a653U, 0xd168b9d1U, 0x00000000U, 0xed2cc1edU, + 0x20604020U, 0xfc1fe3fcU, 0xb1c879b1U, 0x5bedb65bU, + 0x6abed46aU, 0xcb468dcbU, 0xbed967beU, 0x394b7239U, + 0x4ade944aU, 0x4cd4984cU, 0x58e8b058U, 0xcf4a85cfU, + 0xd06bbbd0U, 0xef2ac5efU, 0xaae54faaU, 0xfb16edfbU, + 0x43c58643U, 0x4dd79a4dU, 0x33556633U, 0x85941185U, + 0x45cf8a45U, 0xf910e9f9U, 0x02060402U, 0x7f81fe7fU, + 0x50f0a050U, 0x3c44783cU, 0x9fba259fU, 0xa8e34ba8U, + 0x51f3a251U, 0xa3fe5da3U, 0x40c08040U, 0x8f8a058fU, + 0x92ad3f92U, 0x9dbc219dU, 0x38487038U, 0xf504f1f5U, + 0xbcdf63bcU, 0xb6c177b6U, 0xda75afdaU, 0x21634221U, + 0x10302010U, 0xff1ae5ffU, 0xf30efdf3U, 0xd26dbfd2U, + 0xcd4c81cdU, 0x0c14180cU, 0x13352613U, 0xec2fc3ecU, + 0x5fe1be5fU, 0x97a23597U, 0x44cc8844U, 0x17392e17U, + 0xc45793c4U, 0xa7f255a7U, 0x7e82fc7eU, 0x3d477a3dU, + 0x64acc864U, 0x5de7ba5dU, 0x192b3219U, 0x7395e673U, + 0x60a0c060U, 0x81981981U, 0x4fd19e4fU, 0xdc7fa3dcU, + 0x22664422U, 0x2a7e542aU, 0x90ab3b90U, 0x88830b88U, + 0x46ca8c46U, 0xee29c7eeU, 0xb8d36bb8U, 0x143c2814U, + 0xde79a7deU, 0x5ee2bc5eU, 0x0b1d160bU, 0xdb76addbU, + 0xe03bdbe0U, 0x32566432U, 0x3a4e743aU, 0x0a1e140aU, + 0x49db9249U, 0x060a0c06U, 0x246c4824U, 0x5ce4b85cU, + 0xc25d9fc2U, 0xd36ebdd3U, 0xacef43acU, 0x62a6c462U, + 0x91a83991U, 0x95a43195U, 0xe437d3e4U, 0x798bf279U, + 0xe732d5e7U, 0xc8438bc8U, 0x37596e37U, 0x6db7da6dU, + 0x8d8c018dU, 0xd564b1d5U, 0x4ed29c4eU, 0xa9e049a9U, + 0x6cb4d86cU, 0x56faac56U, 0xf407f3f4U, 0xea25cfeaU, + 0x65afca65U, 0x7a8ef47aU, 0xaee947aeU, 0x08181008U, + 0xbad56fbaU, 0x7888f078U, 0x256f4a25U, 0x2e725c2eU, + 0x1c24381cU, 0xa6f157a6U, 0xb4c773b4U, 0xc65197c6U, + 0xe823cbe8U, 0xdd7ca1ddU, 0x749ce874U, 0x1f213e1fU, + 0x4bdd964bU, 0xbddc61bdU, 0x8b860d8bU, 0x8a850f8aU, + 0x7090e070U, 0x3e427c3eU, 0xb5c471b5U, 0x66aacc66U, + 0x48d89048U, 0x03050603U, 0xf601f7f6U, 0x0e121c0eU, + 0x61a3c261U, 0x355f6a35U, 0x57f9ae57U, 0xb9d069b9U, + 0x86911786U, 0xc15899c1U, 0x1d273a1dU, 0x9eb9279eU, + 0xe138d9e1U, 0xf813ebf8U, 0x98b32b98U, 0x11332211U, + 0x69bbd269U, 0xd970a9d9U, 0x8e89078eU, 0x94a73394U, + 0x9bb62d9bU, 0x1e223c1eU, 0x87921587U, 0xe920c9e9U, + 0xce4987ceU, 0x55ffaa55U, 0x28785028U, 0xdf7aa5dfU, + 0x8c8f038cU, 0xa1f859a1U, 0x89800989U, 0x0d171a0dU, + 0xbfda65bfU, 0xe631d7e6U, 0x42c68442U, 0x68b8d068U, + 0x41c38241U, 0x99b02999U, 0x2d775a2dU, 0x0f111e0fU, + 0xb0cb7bb0U, 0x54fca854U, 0xbbd66dbbU, 0x163a2c16U, +}; +static const u32 Te3[256] = { + + 0x6363a5c6U, 0x7c7c84f8U, 0x777799eeU, 0x7b7b8df6U, + 0xf2f20dffU, 0x6b6bbdd6U, 0x6f6fb1deU, 0xc5c55491U, + 0x30305060U, 0x01010302U, 0x6767a9ceU, 0x2b2b7d56U, + 0xfefe19e7U, 0xd7d762b5U, 0xababe64dU, 0x76769aecU, + 0xcaca458fU, 0x82829d1fU, 0xc9c94089U, 0x7d7d87faU, + 0xfafa15efU, 0x5959ebb2U, 0x4747c98eU, 0xf0f00bfbU, + 0xadadec41U, 0xd4d467b3U, 0xa2a2fd5fU, 0xafafea45U, + 0x9c9cbf23U, 0xa4a4f753U, 0x727296e4U, 0xc0c05b9bU, + 0xb7b7c275U, 0xfdfd1ce1U, 0x9393ae3dU, 0x26266a4cU, + 0x36365a6cU, 0x3f3f417eU, 0xf7f702f5U, 0xcccc4f83U, + 0x34345c68U, 0xa5a5f451U, 0xe5e534d1U, 0xf1f108f9U, + 0x717193e2U, 0xd8d873abU, 0x31315362U, 0x15153f2aU, + 0x04040c08U, 0xc7c75295U, 0x23236546U, 0xc3c35e9dU, + 0x18182830U, 0x9696a137U, 0x05050f0aU, 0x9a9ab52fU, + 0x0707090eU, 0x12123624U, 0x80809b1bU, 0xe2e23ddfU, + 0xebeb26cdU, 0x2727694eU, 0xb2b2cd7fU, 0x75759feaU, + 0x09091b12U, 0x83839e1dU, 0x2c2c7458U, 0x1a1a2e34U, + 0x1b1b2d36U, 0x6e6eb2dcU, 0x5a5aeeb4U, 0xa0a0fb5bU, + 0x5252f6a4U, 0x3b3b4d76U, 0xd6d661b7U, 0xb3b3ce7dU, + 0x29297b52U, 0xe3e33eddU, 0x2f2f715eU, 0x84849713U, + 0x5353f5a6U, 0xd1d168b9U, 0x00000000U, 0xeded2cc1U, + 0x20206040U, 0xfcfc1fe3U, 0xb1b1c879U, 0x5b5bedb6U, + 0x6a6abed4U, 0xcbcb468dU, 0xbebed967U, 0x39394b72U, + 0x4a4ade94U, 0x4c4cd498U, 0x5858e8b0U, 0xcfcf4a85U, + 0xd0d06bbbU, 0xefef2ac5U, 0xaaaae54fU, 0xfbfb16edU, + 0x4343c586U, 0x4d4dd79aU, 0x33335566U, 0x85859411U, + 0x4545cf8aU, 0xf9f910e9U, 0x02020604U, 0x7f7f81feU, + 0x5050f0a0U, 0x3c3c4478U, 0x9f9fba25U, 0xa8a8e34bU, + 0x5151f3a2U, 0xa3a3fe5dU, 0x4040c080U, 0x8f8f8a05U, + 0x9292ad3fU, 0x9d9dbc21U, 0x38384870U, 0xf5f504f1U, + 0xbcbcdf63U, 0xb6b6c177U, 0xdada75afU, 0x21216342U, + 0x10103020U, 0xffff1ae5U, 0xf3f30efdU, 0xd2d26dbfU, + 0xcdcd4c81U, 0x0c0c1418U, 0x13133526U, 0xecec2fc3U, + 0x5f5fe1beU, 0x9797a235U, 0x4444cc88U, 0x1717392eU, + 0xc4c45793U, 0xa7a7f255U, 0x7e7e82fcU, 0x3d3d477aU, + 0x6464acc8U, 0x5d5de7baU, 0x19192b32U, 0x737395e6U, + 0x6060a0c0U, 0x81819819U, 0x4f4fd19eU, 0xdcdc7fa3U, + 0x22226644U, 0x2a2a7e54U, 0x9090ab3bU, 0x8888830bU, + 0x4646ca8cU, 0xeeee29c7U, 0xb8b8d36bU, 0x14143c28U, + 0xdede79a7U, 0x5e5ee2bcU, 0x0b0b1d16U, 0xdbdb76adU, + 0xe0e03bdbU, 0x32325664U, 0x3a3a4e74U, 0x0a0a1e14U, + 0x4949db92U, 0x06060a0cU, 0x24246c48U, 0x5c5ce4b8U, + 0xc2c25d9fU, 0xd3d36ebdU, 0xacacef43U, 0x6262a6c4U, + 0x9191a839U, 0x9595a431U, 0xe4e437d3U, 0x79798bf2U, + 0xe7e732d5U, 0xc8c8438bU, 0x3737596eU, 0x6d6db7daU, + 0x8d8d8c01U, 0xd5d564b1U, 0x4e4ed29cU, 0xa9a9e049U, + 0x6c6cb4d8U, 0x5656faacU, 0xf4f407f3U, 0xeaea25cfU, + 0x6565afcaU, 0x7a7a8ef4U, 0xaeaee947U, 0x08081810U, + 0xbabad56fU, 0x787888f0U, 0x25256f4aU, 0x2e2e725cU, + 0x1c1c2438U, 0xa6a6f157U, 0xb4b4c773U, 0xc6c65197U, + 0xe8e823cbU, 0xdddd7ca1U, 0x74749ce8U, 0x1f1f213eU, + 0x4b4bdd96U, 0xbdbddc61U, 0x8b8b860dU, 0x8a8a850fU, + 0x707090e0U, 0x3e3e427cU, 0xb5b5c471U, 0x6666aaccU, + 0x4848d890U, 0x03030506U, 0xf6f601f7U, 0x0e0e121cU, + 0x6161a3c2U, 0x35355f6aU, 0x5757f9aeU, 0xb9b9d069U, + 0x86869117U, 0xc1c15899U, 0x1d1d273aU, 0x9e9eb927U, + 0xe1e138d9U, 0xf8f813ebU, 0x9898b32bU, 0x11113322U, + 0x6969bbd2U, 0xd9d970a9U, 0x8e8e8907U, 0x9494a733U, + 0x9b9bb62dU, 0x1e1e223cU, 0x87879215U, 0xe9e920c9U, + 0xcece4987U, 0x5555ffaaU, 0x28287850U, 0xdfdf7aa5U, + 0x8c8c8f03U, 0xa1a1f859U, 0x89898009U, 0x0d0d171aU, + 0xbfbfda65U, 0xe6e631d7U, 0x4242c684U, 0x6868b8d0U, + 0x4141c382U, 0x9999b029U, 0x2d2d775aU, 0x0f0f111eU, + 0xb0b0cb7bU, 0x5454fca8U, 0xbbbbd66dU, 0x16163a2cU, +}; +static const u32 Te4[256] = { + 0x63636363U, 0x7c7c7c7cU, 0x77777777U, 0x7b7b7b7bU, + 0xf2f2f2f2U, 0x6b6b6b6bU, 0x6f6f6f6fU, 0xc5c5c5c5U, + 0x30303030U, 0x01010101U, 0x67676767U, 0x2b2b2b2bU, + 0xfefefefeU, 0xd7d7d7d7U, 0xababababU, 0x76767676U, + 0xcacacacaU, 0x82828282U, 0xc9c9c9c9U, 0x7d7d7d7dU, + 0xfafafafaU, 0x59595959U, 0x47474747U, 0xf0f0f0f0U, + 0xadadadadU, 0xd4d4d4d4U, 0xa2a2a2a2U, 0xafafafafU, + 0x9c9c9c9cU, 0xa4a4a4a4U, 0x72727272U, 0xc0c0c0c0U, + 0xb7b7b7b7U, 0xfdfdfdfdU, 0x93939393U, 0x26262626U, + 0x36363636U, 0x3f3f3f3fU, 0xf7f7f7f7U, 0xccccccccU, + 0x34343434U, 0xa5a5a5a5U, 0xe5e5e5e5U, 0xf1f1f1f1U, + 0x71717171U, 0xd8d8d8d8U, 0x31313131U, 0x15151515U, + 0x04040404U, 0xc7c7c7c7U, 0x23232323U, 0xc3c3c3c3U, + 0x18181818U, 0x96969696U, 0x05050505U, 0x9a9a9a9aU, + 0x07070707U, 0x12121212U, 0x80808080U, 0xe2e2e2e2U, + 0xebebebebU, 0x27272727U, 0xb2b2b2b2U, 0x75757575U, + 0x09090909U, 0x83838383U, 0x2c2c2c2cU, 0x1a1a1a1aU, + 0x1b1b1b1bU, 0x6e6e6e6eU, 0x5a5a5a5aU, 0xa0a0a0a0U, + 0x52525252U, 0x3b3b3b3bU, 0xd6d6d6d6U, 0xb3b3b3b3U, + 0x29292929U, 0xe3e3e3e3U, 0x2f2f2f2fU, 0x84848484U, + 0x53535353U, 0xd1d1d1d1U, 0x00000000U, 0xededededU, + 0x20202020U, 0xfcfcfcfcU, 0xb1b1b1b1U, 0x5b5b5b5bU, + 0x6a6a6a6aU, 0xcbcbcbcbU, 0xbebebebeU, 0x39393939U, + 0x4a4a4a4aU, 0x4c4c4c4cU, 0x58585858U, 0xcfcfcfcfU, + 0xd0d0d0d0U, 0xefefefefU, 0xaaaaaaaaU, 0xfbfbfbfbU, + 0x43434343U, 0x4d4d4d4dU, 0x33333333U, 0x85858585U, + 0x45454545U, 0xf9f9f9f9U, 0x02020202U, 0x7f7f7f7fU, + 0x50505050U, 0x3c3c3c3cU, 0x9f9f9f9fU, 0xa8a8a8a8U, + 0x51515151U, 0xa3a3a3a3U, 0x40404040U, 0x8f8f8f8fU, + 0x92929292U, 0x9d9d9d9dU, 0x38383838U, 0xf5f5f5f5U, + 0xbcbcbcbcU, 0xb6b6b6b6U, 0xdadadadaU, 0x21212121U, + 0x10101010U, 0xffffffffU, 0xf3f3f3f3U, 0xd2d2d2d2U, + 0xcdcdcdcdU, 0x0c0c0c0cU, 0x13131313U, 0xececececU, + 0x5f5f5f5fU, 0x97979797U, 0x44444444U, 0x17171717U, + 0xc4c4c4c4U, 0xa7a7a7a7U, 0x7e7e7e7eU, 0x3d3d3d3dU, + 0x64646464U, 0x5d5d5d5dU, 0x19191919U, 0x73737373U, + 0x60606060U, 0x81818181U, 0x4f4f4f4fU, 0xdcdcdcdcU, + 0x22222222U, 0x2a2a2a2aU, 0x90909090U, 0x88888888U, + 0x46464646U, 0xeeeeeeeeU, 0xb8b8b8b8U, 0x14141414U, + 0xdedededeU, 0x5e5e5e5eU, 0x0b0b0b0bU, 0xdbdbdbdbU, + 0xe0e0e0e0U, 0x32323232U, 0x3a3a3a3aU, 0x0a0a0a0aU, + 0x49494949U, 0x06060606U, 0x24242424U, 0x5c5c5c5cU, + 0xc2c2c2c2U, 0xd3d3d3d3U, 0xacacacacU, 0x62626262U, + 0x91919191U, 0x95959595U, 0xe4e4e4e4U, 0x79797979U, + 0xe7e7e7e7U, 0xc8c8c8c8U, 0x37373737U, 0x6d6d6d6dU, + 0x8d8d8d8dU, 0xd5d5d5d5U, 0x4e4e4e4eU, 0xa9a9a9a9U, + 0x6c6c6c6cU, 0x56565656U, 0xf4f4f4f4U, 0xeaeaeaeaU, + 0x65656565U, 0x7a7a7a7aU, 0xaeaeaeaeU, 0x08080808U, + 0xbabababaU, 0x78787878U, 0x25252525U, 0x2e2e2e2eU, + 0x1c1c1c1cU, 0xa6a6a6a6U, 0xb4b4b4b4U, 0xc6c6c6c6U, + 0xe8e8e8e8U, 0xddddddddU, 0x74747474U, 0x1f1f1f1fU, + 0x4b4b4b4bU, 0xbdbdbdbdU, 0x8b8b8b8bU, 0x8a8a8a8aU, + 0x70707070U, 0x3e3e3e3eU, 0xb5b5b5b5U, 0x66666666U, + 0x48484848U, 0x03030303U, 0xf6f6f6f6U, 0x0e0e0e0eU, + 0x61616161U, 0x35353535U, 0x57575757U, 0xb9b9b9b9U, + 0x86868686U, 0xc1c1c1c1U, 0x1d1d1d1dU, 0x9e9e9e9eU, + 0xe1e1e1e1U, 0xf8f8f8f8U, 0x98989898U, 0x11111111U, + 0x69696969U, 0xd9d9d9d9U, 0x8e8e8e8eU, 0x94949494U, + 0x9b9b9b9bU, 0x1e1e1e1eU, 0x87878787U, 0xe9e9e9e9U, + 0xcecececeU, 0x55555555U, 0x28282828U, 0xdfdfdfdfU, + 0x8c8c8c8cU, 0xa1a1a1a1U, 0x89898989U, 0x0d0d0d0dU, + 0xbfbfbfbfU, 0xe6e6e6e6U, 0x42424242U, 0x68686868U, + 0x41414141U, 0x99999999U, 0x2d2d2d2dU, 0x0f0f0f0fU, + 0xb0b0b0b0U, 0x54545454U, 0xbbbbbbbbU, 0x16161616U, +}; +static const u32 Td0[256] = { + 0x51f4a750U, 0x7e416553U, 0x1a17a4c3U, 0x3a275e96U, + 0x3bab6bcbU, 0x1f9d45f1U, 0xacfa58abU, 0x4be30393U, + 0x2030fa55U, 0xad766df6U, 0x88cc7691U, 0xf5024c25U, + 0x4fe5d7fcU, 0xc52acbd7U, 0x26354480U, 0xb562a38fU, + 0xdeb15a49U, 0x25ba1b67U, 0x45ea0e98U, 0x5dfec0e1U, + 0xc32f7502U, 0x814cf012U, 0x8d4697a3U, 0x6bd3f9c6U, + 0x038f5fe7U, 0x15929c95U, 0xbf6d7aebU, 0x955259daU, + 0xd4be832dU, 0x587421d3U, 0x49e06929U, 0x8ec9c844U, + 0x75c2896aU, 0xf48e7978U, 0x99583e6bU, 0x27b971ddU, + 0xbee14fb6U, 0xf088ad17U, 0xc920ac66U, 0x7dce3ab4U, + 0x63df4a18U, 0xe51a3182U, 0x97513360U, 0x62537f45U, + 0xb16477e0U, 0xbb6bae84U, 0xfe81a01cU, 0xf9082b94U, + 0x70486858U, 0x8f45fd19U, 0x94de6c87U, 0x527bf8b7U, + 0xab73d323U, 0x724b02e2U, 0xe31f8f57U, 0x6655ab2aU, + 0xb2eb2807U, 0x2fb5c203U, 0x86c57b9aU, 0xd33708a5U, + 0x302887f2U, 0x23bfa5b2U, 0x02036abaU, 0xed16825cU, + 0x8acf1c2bU, 0xa779b492U, 0xf307f2f0U, 0x4e69e2a1U, + 0x65daf4cdU, 0x0605bed5U, 0xd134621fU, 0xc4a6fe8aU, + 0x342e539dU, 0xa2f355a0U, 0x058ae132U, 0xa4f6eb75U, + 0x0b83ec39U, 0x4060efaaU, 0x5e719f06U, 0xbd6e1051U, + 0x3e218af9U, 0x96dd063dU, 0xdd3e05aeU, 0x4de6bd46U, + 0x91548db5U, 0x71c45d05U, 0x0406d46fU, 0x605015ffU, + 0x1998fb24U, 0xd6bde997U, 0x894043ccU, 0x67d99e77U, + 0xb0e842bdU, 0x07898b88U, 0xe7195b38U, 0x79c8eedbU, + 0xa17c0a47U, 0x7c420fe9U, 0xf8841ec9U, 0x00000000U, + 0x09808683U, 0x322bed48U, 0x1e1170acU, 0x6c5a724eU, + 0xfd0efffbU, 0x0f853856U, 0x3daed51eU, 0x362d3927U, + 0x0a0fd964U, 0x685ca621U, 0x9b5b54d1U, 0x24362e3aU, + 0x0c0a67b1U, 0x9357e70fU, 0xb4ee96d2U, 0x1b9b919eU, + 0x80c0c54fU, 0x61dc20a2U, 0x5a774b69U, 0x1c121a16U, + 0xe293ba0aU, 0xc0a02ae5U, 0x3c22e043U, 0x121b171dU, + 0x0e090d0bU, 0xf28bc7adU, 0x2db6a8b9U, 0x141ea9c8U, + 0x57f11985U, 0xaf75074cU, 0xee99ddbbU, 0xa37f60fdU, + 0xf701269fU, 0x5c72f5bcU, 0x44663bc5U, 0x5bfb7e34U, + 0x8b432976U, 0xcb23c6dcU, 0xb6edfc68U, 0xb8e4f163U, + 0xd731dccaU, 0x42638510U, 0x13972240U, 0x84c61120U, + 0x854a247dU, 0xd2bb3df8U, 0xaef93211U, 0xc729a16dU, + 0x1d9e2f4bU, 0xdcb230f3U, 0x0d8652ecU, 0x77c1e3d0U, + 0x2bb3166cU, 0xa970b999U, 0x119448faU, 0x47e96422U, + 0xa8fc8cc4U, 0xa0f03f1aU, 0x567d2cd8U, 0x223390efU, + 0x87494ec7U, 0xd938d1c1U, 0x8ccaa2feU, 0x98d40b36U, + 0xa6f581cfU, 0xa57ade28U, 0xdab78e26U, 0x3fadbfa4U, + 0x2c3a9de4U, 0x5078920dU, 0x6a5fcc9bU, 0x547e4662U, + 0xf68d13c2U, 0x90d8b8e8U, 0x2e39f75eU, 0x82c3aff5U, + 0x9f5d80beU, 0x69d0937cU, 0x6fd52da9U, 0xcf2512b3U, + 0xc8ac993bU, 0x10187da7U, 0xe89c636eU, 0xdb3bbb7bU, + 0xcd267809U, 0x6e5918f4U, 0xec9ab701U, 0x834f9aa8U, + 0xe6956e65U, 0xaaffe67eU, 0x21bccf08U, 0xef15e8e6U, + 0xbae79bd9U, 0x4a6f36ceU, 0xea9f09d4U, 0x29b07cd6U, + 0x31a4b2afU, 0x2a3f2331U, 0xc6a59430U, 0x35a266c0U, + 0x744ebc37U, 0xfc82caa6U, 0xe090d0b0U, 0x33a7d815U, + 0xf104984aU, 0x41ecdaf7U, 0x7fcd500eU, 0x1791f62fU, + 0x764dd68dU, 0x43efb04dU, 0xccaa4d54U, 0xe49604dfU, + 0x9ed1b5e3U, 0x4c6a881bU, 0xc12c1fb8U, 0x4665517fU, + 0x9d5eea04U, 0x018c355dU, 0xfa877473U, 0xfb0b412eU, + 0xb3671d5aU, 0x92dbd252U, 0xe9105633U, 0x6dd64713U, + 0x9ad7618cU, 0x37a10c7aU, 0x59f8148eU, 0xeb133c89U, + 0xcea927eeU, 0xb761c935U, 0xe11ce5edU, 0x7a47b13cU, + 0x9cd2df59U, 0x55f2733fU, 0x1814ce79U, 0x73c737bfU, + 0x53f7cdeaU, 0x5ffdaa5bU, 0xdf3d6f14U, 0x7844db86U, + 0xcaaff381U, 0xb968c43eU, 0x3824342cU, 0xc2a3405fU, + 0x161dc372U, 0xbce2250cU, 0x283c498bU, 0xff0d9541U, + 0x39a80171U, 0x080cb3deU, 0xd8b4e49cU, 0x6456c190U, + 0x7bcb8461U, 0xd532b670U, 0x486c5c74U, 0xd0b85742U, +}; +static const u32 Td1[256] = { + 0x5051f4a7U, 0x537e4165U, 0xc31a17a4U, 0x963a275eU, + 0xcb3bab6bU, 0xf11f9d45U, 0xabacfa58U, 0x934be303U, + 0x552030faU, 0xf6ad766dU, 0x9188cc76U, 0x25f5024cU, + 0xfc4fe5d7U, 0xd7c52acbU, 0x80263544U, 0x8fb562a3U, + 0x49deb15aU, 0x6725ba1bU, 0x9845ea0eU, 0xe15dfec0U, + 0x02c32f75U, 0x12814cf0U, 0xa38d4697U, 0xc66bd3f9U, + 0xe7038f5fU, 0x9515929cU, 0xebbf6d7aU, 0xda955259U, + 0x2dd4be83U, 0xd3587421U, 0x2949e069U, 0x448ec9c8U, + 0x6a75c289U, 0x78f48e79U, 0x6b99583eU, 0xdd27b971U, + 0xb6bee14fU, 0x17f088adU, 0x66c920acU, 0xb47dce3aU, + 0x1863df4aU, 0x82e51a31U, 0x60975133U, 0x4562537fU, + 0xe0b16477U, 0x84bb6baeU, 0x1cfe81a0U, 0x94f9082bU, + 0x58704868U, 0x198f45fdU, 0x8794de6cU, 0xb7527bf8U, + 0x23ab73d3U, 0xe2724b02U, 0x57e31f8fU, 0x2a6655abU, + 0x07b2eb28U, 0x032fb5c2U, 0x9a86c57bU, 0xa5d33708U, + 0xf2302887U, 0xb223bfa5U, 0xba02036aU, 0x5ced1682U, + 0x2b8acf1cU, 0x92a779b4U, 0xf0f307f2U, 0xa14e69e2U, + 0xcd65daf4U, 0xd50605beU, 0x1fd13462U, 0x8ac4a6feU, + 0x9d342e53U, 0xa0a2f355U, 0x32058ae1U, 0x75a4f6ebU, + 0x390b83ecU, 0xaa4060efU, 0x065e719fU, 0x51bd6e10U, + 0xf93e218aU, 0x3d96dd06U, 0xaedd3e05U, 0x464de6bdU, + 0xb591548dU, 0x0571c45dU, 0x6f0406d4U, 0xff605015U, + 0x241998fbU, 0x97d6bde9U, 0xcc894043U, 0x7767d99eU, + 0xbdb0e842U, 0x8807898bU, 0x38e7195bU, 0xdb79c8eeU, + 0x47a17c0aU, 0xe97c420fU, 0xc9f8841eU, 0x00000000U, + 0x83098086U, 0x48322bedU, 0xac1e1170U, 0x4e6c5a72U, + 0xfbfd0effU, 0x560f8538U, 0x1e3daed5U, 0x27362d39U, + 0x640a0fd9U, 0x21685ca6U, 0xd19b5b54U, 0x3a24362eU, + 0xb10c0a67U, 0x0f9357e7U, 0xd2b4ee96U, 0x9e1b9b91U, + 0x4f80c0c5U, 0xa261dc20U, 0x695a774bU, 0x161c121aU, + 0x0ae293baU, 0xe5c0a02aU, 0x433c22e0U, 0x1d121b17U, + 0x0b0e090dU, 0xadf28bc7U, 0xb92db6a8U, 0xc8141ea9U, + 0x8557f119U, 0x4caf7507U, 0xbbee99ddU, 0xfda37f60U, + 0x9ff70126U, 0xbc5c72f5U, 0xc544663bU, 0x345bfb7eU, + 0x768b4329U, 0xdccb23c6U, 0x68b6edfcU, 0x63b8e4f1U, + 0xcad731dcU, 0x10426385U, 0x40139722U, 0x2084c611U, + 0x7d854a24U, 0xf8d2bb3dU, 0x11aef932U, 0x6dc729a1U, + 0x4b1d9e2fU, 0xf3dcb230U, 0xec0d8652U, 0xd077c1e3U, + 0x6c2bb316U, 0x99a970b9U, 0xfa119448U, 0x2247e964U, + 0xc4a8fc8cU, 0x1aa0f03fU, 0xd8567d2cU, 0xef223390U, + 0xc787494eU, 0xc1d938d1U, 0xfe8ccaa2U, 0x3698d40bU, + 0xcfa6f581U, 0x28a57adeU, 0x26dab78eU, 0xa43fadbfU, + 0xe42c3a9dU, 0x0d507892U, 0x9b6a5fccU, 0x62547e46U, + 0xc2f68d13U, 0xe890d8b8U, 0x5e2e39f7U, 0xf582c3afU, + 0xbe9f5d80U, 0x7c69d093U, 0xa96fd52dU, 0xb3cf2512U, + 0x3bc8ac99U, 0xa710187dU, 0x6ee89c63U, 0x7bdb3bbbU, + 0x09cd2678U, 0xf46e5918U, 0x01ec9ab7U, 0xa8834f9aU, + 0x65e6956eU, 0x7eaaffe6U, 0x0821bccfU, 0xe6ef15e8U, + 0xd9bae79bU, 0xce4a6f36U, 0xd4ea9f09U, 0xd629b07cU, + 0xaf31a4b2U, 0x312a3f23U, 0x30c6a594U, 0xc035a266U, + 0x37744ebcU, 0xa6fc82caU, 0xb0e090d0U, 0x1533a7d8U, + 0x4af10498U, 0xf741ecdaU, 0x0e7fcd50U, 0x2f1791f6U, + 0x8d764dd6U, 0x4d43efb0U, 0x54ccaa4dU, 0xdfe49604U, + 0xe39ed1b5U, 0x1b4c6a88U, 0xb8c12c1fU, 0x7f466551U, + 0x049d5eeaU, 0x5d018c35U, 0x73fa8774U, 0x2efb0b41U, + 0x5ab3671dU, 0x5292dbd2U, 0x33e91056U, 0x136dd647U, + 0x8c9ad761U, 0x7a37a10cU, 0x8e59f814U, 0x89eb133cU, + 0xeecea927U, 0x35b761c9U, 0xede11ce5U, 0x3c7a47b1U, + 0x599cd2dfU, 0x3f55f273U, 0x791814ceU, 0xbf73c737U, + 0xea53f7cdU, 0x5b5ffdaaU, 0x14df3d6fU, 0x867844dbU, + 0x81caaff3U, 0x3eb968c4U, 0x2c382434U, 0x5fc2a340U, + 0x72161dc3U, 0x0cbce225U, 0x8b283c49U, 0x41ff0d95U, + 0x7139a801U, 0xde080cb3U, 0x9cd8b4e4U, 0x906456c1U, + 0x617bcb84U, 0x70d532b6U, 0x74486c5cU, 0x42d0b857U, +}; +static const u32 Td2[256] = { + 0xa75051f4U, 0x65537e41U, 0xa4c31a17U, 0x5e963a27U, + 0x6bcb3babU, 0x45f11f9dU, 0x58abacfaU, 0x03934be3U, + 0xfa552030U, 0x6df6ad76U, 0x769188ccU, 0x4c25f502U, + 0xd7fc4fe5U, 0xcbd7c52aU, 0x44802635U, 0xa38fb562U, + 0x5a49deb1U, 0x1b6725baU, 0x0e9845eaU, 0xc0e15dfeU, + 0x7502c32fU, 0xf012814cU, 0x97a38d46U, 0xf9c66bd3U, + 0x5fe7038fU, 0x9c951592U, 0x7aebbf6dU, 0x59da9552U, + 0x832dd4beU, 0x21d35874U, 0x692949e0U, 0xc8448ec9U, + 0x896a75c2U, 0x7978f48eU, 0x3e6b9958U, 0x71dd27b9U, + 0x4fb6bee1U, 0xad17f088U, 0xac66c920U, 0x3ab47dceU, + 0x4a1863dfU, 0x3182e51aU, 0x33609751U, 0x7f456253U, + 0x77e0b164U, 0xae84bb6bU, 0xa01cfe81U, 0x2b94f908U, + 0x68587048U, 0xfd198f45U, 0x6c8794deU, 0xf8b7527bU, + 0xd323ab73U, 0x02e2724bU, 0x8f57e31fU, 0xab2a6655U, + 0x2807b2ebU, 0xc2032fb5U, 0x7b9a86c5U, 0x08a5d337U, + 0x87f23028U, 0xa5b223bfU, 0x6aba0203U, 0x825ced16U, + 0x1c2b8acfU, 0xb492a779U, 0xf2f0f307U, 0xe2a14e69U, + 0xf4cd65daU, 0xbed50605U, 0x621fd134U, 0xfe8ac4a6U, + 0x539d342eU, 0x55a0a2f3U, 0xe132058aU, 0xeb75a4f6U, + 0xec390b83U, 0xefaa4060U, 0x9f065e71U, 0x1051bd6eU, + + 0x8af93e21U, 0x063d96ddU, 0x05aedd3eU, 0xbd464de6U, + 0x8db59154U, 0x5d0571c4U, 0xd46f0406U, 0x15ff6050U, + 0xfb241998U, 0xe997d6bdU, 0x43cc8940U, 0x9e7767d9U, + 0x42bdb0e8U, 0x8b880789U, 0x5b38e719U, 0xeedb79c8U, + 0x0a47a17cU, 0x0fe97c42U, 0x1ec9f884U, 0x00000000U, + 0x86830980U, 0xed48322bU, 0x70ac1e11U, 0x724e6c5aU, + 0xfffbfd0eU, 0x38560f85U, 0xd51e3daeU, 0x3927362dU, + 0xd9640a0fU, 0xa621685cU, 0x54d19b5bU, 0x2e3a2436U, + 0x67b10c0aU, 0xe70f9357U, 0x96d2b4eeU, 0x919e1b9bU, + 0xc54f80c0U, 0x20a261dcU, 0x4b695a77U, 0x1a161c12U, + 0xba0ae293U, 0x2ae5c0a0U, 0xe0433c22U, 0x171d121bU, + 0x0d0b0e09U, 0xc7adf28bU, 0xa8b92db6U, 0xa9c8141eU, + 0x198557f1U, 0x074caf75U, 0xddbbee99U, 0x60fda37fU, + 0x269ff701U, 0xf5bc5c72U, 0x3bc54466U, 0x7e345bfbU, + 0x29768b43U, 0xc6dccb23U, 0xfc68b6edU, 0xf163b8e4U, + 0xdccad731U, 0x85104263U, 0x22401397U, 0x112084c6U, + 0x247d854aU, 0x3df8d2bbU, 0x3211aef9U, 0xa16dc729U, + 0x2f4b1d9eU, 0x30f3dcb2U, 0x52ec0d86U, 0xe3d077c1U, + 0x166c2bb3U, 0xb999a970U, 0x48fa1194U, 0x642247e9U, + 0x8cc4a8fcU, 0x3f1aa0f0U, 0x2cd8567dU, 0x90ef2233U, + 0x4ec78749U, 0xd1c1d938U, 0xa2fe8ccaU, 0x0b3698d4U, + 0x81cfa6f5U, 0xde28a57aU, 0x8e26dab7U, 0xbfa43fadU, + 0x9de42c3aU, 0x920d5078U, 0xcc9b6a5fU, 0x4662547eU, + 0x13c2f68dU, 0xb8e890d8U, 0xf75e2e39U, 0xaff582c3U, + 0x80be9f5dU, 0x937c69d0U, 0x2da96fd5U, 0x12b3cf25U, + 0x993bc8acU, 0x7da71018U, 0x636ee89cU, 0xbb7bdb3bU, + 0x7809cd26U, 0x18f46e59U, 0xb701ec9aU, 0x9aa8834fU, + 0x6e65e695U, 0xe67eaaffU, 0xcf0821bcU, 0xe8e6ef15U, + 0x9bd9bae7U, 0x36ce4a6fU, 0x09d4ea9fU, 0x7cd629b0U, + 0xb2af31a4U, 0x23312a3fU, 0x9430c6a5U, 0x66c035a2U, + 0xbc37744eU, 0xcaa6fc82U, 0xd0b0e090U, 0xd81533a7U, + 0x984af104U, 0xdaf741ecU, 0x500e7fcdU, 0xf62f1791U, + 0xd68d764dU, 0xb04d43efU, 0x4d54ccaaU, 0x04dfe496U, + 0xb5e39ed1U, 0x881b4c6aU, 0x1fb8c12cU, 0x517f4665U, + 0xea049d5eU, 0x355d018cU, 0x7473fa87U, 0x412efb0bU, + 0x1d5ab367U, 0xd25292dbU, 0x5633e910U, 0x47136dd6U, + 0x618c9ad7U, 0x0c7a37a1U, 0x148e59f8U, 0x3c89eb13U, + 0x27eecea9U, 0xc935b761U, 0xe5ede11cU, 0xb13c7a47U, + 0xdf599cd2U, 0x733f55f2U, 0xce791814U, 0x37bf73c7U, + 0xcdea53f7U, 0xaa5b5ffdU, 0x6f14df3dU, 0xdb867844U, + 0xf381caafU, 0xc43eb968U, 0x342c3824U, 0x405fc2a3U, + 0xc372161dU, 0x250cbce2U, 0x498b283cU, 0x9541ff0dU, + 0x017139a8U, 0xb3de080cU, 0xe49cd8b4U, 0xc1906456U, + 0x84617bcbU, 0xb670d532U, 0x5c74486cU, 0x5742d0b8U, +}; +static const u32 Td3[256] = { + 0xf4a75051U, 0x4165537eU, 0x17a4c31aU, 0x275e963aU, + 0xab6bcb3bU, 0x9d45f11fU, 0xfa58abacU, 0xe303934bU, + 0x30fa5520U, 0x766df6adU, 0xcc769188U, 0x024c25f5U, + 0xe5d7fc4fU, 0x2acbd7c5U, 0x35448026U, 0x62a38fb5U, + 0xb15a49deU, 0xba1b6725U, 0xea0e9845U, 0xfec0e15dU, + 0x2f7502c3U, 0x4cf01281U, 0x4697a38dU, 0xd3f9c66bU, + 0x8f5fe703U, 0x929c9515U, 0x6d7aebbfU, 0x5259da95U, + 0xbe832dd4U, 0x7421d358U, 0xe0692949U, 0xc9c8448eU, + 0xc2896a75U, 0x8e7978f4U, 0x583e6b99U, 0xb971dd27U, + 0xe14fb6beU, 0x88ad17f0U, 0x20ac66c9U, 0xce3ab47dU, + 0xdf4a1863U, 0x1a3182e5U, 0x51336097U, 0x537f4562U, + 0x6477e0b1U, 0x6bae84bbU, 0x81a01cfeU, 0x082b94f9U, + 0x48685870U, 0x45fd198fU, 0xde6c8794U, 0x7bf8b752U, + 0x73d323abU, 0x4b02e272U, 0x1f8f57e3U, 0x55ab2a66U, + 0xeb2807b2U, 0xb5c2032fU, 0xc57b9a86U, 0x3708a5d3U, + 0x2887f230U, 0xbfa5b223U, 0x036aba02U, 0x16825cedU, + 0xcf1c2b8aU, 0x79b492a7U, 0x07f2f0f3U, 0x69e2a14eU, + 0xdaf4cd65U, 0x05bed506U, 0x34621fd1U, 0xa6fe8ac4U, + 0x2e539d34U, 0xf355a0a2U, 0x8ae13205U, 0xf6eb75a4U, + 0x83ec390bU, 0x60efaa40U, 0x719f065eU, 0x6e1051bdU, + 0x218af93eU, 0xdd063d96U, 0x3e05aeddU, 0xe6bd464dU, + 0x548db591U, 0xc45d0571U, 0x06d46f04U, 0x5015ff60U, + 0x98fb2419U, 0xbde997d6U, 0x4043cc89U, 0xd99e7767U, + 0xe842bdb0U, 0x898b8807U, 0x195b38e7U, 0xc8eedb79U, + 0x7c0a47a1U, 0x420fe97cU, 0x841ec9f8U, 0x00000000U, + 0x80868309U, 0x2bed4832U, 0x1170ac1eU, 0x5a724e6cU, + 0x0efffbfdU, 0x8538560fU, 0xaed51e3dU, 0x2d392736U, + 0x0fd9640aU, 0x5ca62168U, 0x5b54d19bU, 0x362e3a24U, + 0x0a67b10cU, 0x57e70f93U, 0xee96d2b4U, 0x9b919e1bU, + 0xc0c54f80U, 0xdc20a261U, 0x774b695aU, 0x121a161cU, + 0x93ba0ae2U, 0xa02ae5c0U, 0x22e0433cU, 0x1b171d12U, + 0x090d0b0eU, 0x8bc7adf2U, 0xb6a8b92dU, 0x1ea9c814U, + 0xf1198557U, 0x75074cafU, 0x99ddbbeeU, 0x7f60fda3U, + 0x01269ff7U, 0x72f5bc5cU, 0x663bc544U, 0xfb7e345bU, + 0x4329768bU, 0x23c6dccbU, 0xedfc68b6U, 0xe4f163b8U, + 0x31dccad7U, 0x63851042U, 0x97224013U, 0xc6112084U, + 0x4a247d85U, 0xbb3df8d2U, 0xf93211aeU, 0x29a16dc7U, + 0x9e2f4b1dU, 0xb230f3dcU, 0x8652ec0dU, 0xc1e3d077U, + 0xb3166c2bU, 0x70b999a9U, 0x9448fa11U, 0xe9642247U, + 0xfc8cc4a8U, 0xf03f1aa0U, 0x7d2cd856U, 0x3390ef22U, + 0x494ec787U, 0x38d1c1d9U, 0xcaa2fe8cU, 0xd40b3698U, + 0xf581cfa6U, 0x7ade28a5U, 0xb78e26daU, 0xadbfa43fU, + 0x3a9de42cU, 0x78920d50U, 0x5fcc9b6aU, 0x7e466254U, + 0x8d13c2f6U, 0xd8b8e890U, 0x39f75e2eU, 0xc3aff582U, + 0x5d80be9fU, 0xd0937c69U, 0xd52da96fU, 0x2512b3cfU, + 0xac993bc8U, 0x187da710U, 0x9c636ee8U, 0x3bbb7bdbU, + 0x267809cdU, 0x5918f46eU, 0x9ab701ecU, 0x4f9aa883U, + 0x956e65e6U, 0xffe67eaaU, 0xbccf0821U, 0x15e8e6efU, + 0xe79bd9baU, 0x6f36ce4aU, 0x9f09d4eaU, 0xb07cd629U, + 0xa4b2af31U, 0x3f23312aU, 0xa59430c6U, 0xa266c035U, + 0x4ebc3774U, 0x82caa6fcU, 0x90d0b0e0U, 0xa7d81533U, + 0x04984af1U, 0xecdaf741U, 0xcd500e7fU, 0x91f62f17U, + 0x4dd68d76U, 0xefb04d43U, 0xaa4d54ccU, 0x9604dfe4U, + 0xd1b5e39eU, 0x6a881b4cU, 0x2c1fb8c1U, 0x65517f46U, + 0x5eea049dU, 0x8c355d01U, 0x877473faU, 0x0b412efbU, + 0x671d5ab3U, 0xdbd25292U, 0x105633e9U, 0xd647136dU, + 0xd7618c9aU, 0xa10c7a37U, 0xf8148e59U, 0x133c89ebU, + 0xa927eeceU, 0x61c935b7U, 0x1ce5ede1U, 0x47b13c7aU, + 0xd2df599cU, 0xf2733f55U, 0x14ce7918U, 0xc737bf73U, + 0xf7cdea53U, 0xfdaa5b5fU, 0x3d6f14dfU, 0x44db8678U, + 0xaff381caU, 0x68c43eb9U, 0x24342c38U, 0xa3405fc2U, + 0x1dc37216U, 0xe2250cbcU, 0x3c498b28U, 0x0d9541ffU, + 0xa8017139U, 0x0cb3de08U, 0xb4e49cd8U, 0x56c19064U, + 0xcb84617bU, 0x32b670d5U, 0x6c5c7448U, 0xb85742d0U, +}; +static const u32 Td4[256] = { + 0x52525252U, 0x09090909U, 0x6a6a6a6aU, 0xd5d5d5d5U, + 0x30303030U, 0x36363636U, 0xa5a5a5a5U, 0x38383838U, + 0xbfbfbfbfU, 0x40404040U, 0xa3a3a3a3U, 0x9e9e9e9eU, + 0x81818181U, 0xf3f3f3f3U, 0xd7d7d7d7U, 0xfbfbfbfbU, + 0x7c7c7c7cU, 0xe3e3e3e3U, 0x39393939U, 0x82828282U, + 0x9b9b9b9bU, 0x2f2f2f2fU, 0xffffffffU, 0x87878787U, + 0x34343434U, 0x8e8e8e8eU, 0x43434343U, 0x44444444U, + 0xc4c4c4c4U, 0xdedededeU, 0xe9e9e9e9U, 0xcbcbcbcbU, + 0x54545454U, 0x7b7b7b7bU, 0x94949494U, 0x32323232U, + 0xa6a6a6a6U, 0xc2c2c2c2U, 0x23232323U, 0x3d3d3d3dU, + 0xeeeeeeeeU, 0x4c4c4c4cU, 0x95959595U, 0x0b0b0b0bU, + 0x42424242U, 0xfafafafaU, 0xc3c3c3c3U, 0x4e4e4e4eU, + 0x08080808U, 0x2e2e2e2eU, 0xa1a1a1a1U, 0x66666666U, + 0x28282828U, 0xd9d9d9d9U, 0x24242424U, 0xb2b2b2b2U, + 0x76767676U, 0x5b5b5b5bU, 0xa2a2a2a2U, 0x49494949U, + 0x6d6d6d6dU, 0x8b8b8b8bU, 0xd1d1d1d1U, 0x25252525U, + 0x72727272U, 0xf8f8f8f8U, 0xf6f6f6f6U, 0x64646464U, + 0x86868686U, 0x68686868U, 0x98989898U, 0x16161616U, + 0xd4d4d4d4U, 0xa4a4a4a4U, 0x5c5c5c5cU, 0xccccccccU, + 0x5d5d5d5dU, 0x65656565U, 0xb6b6b6b6U, 0x92929292U, + 0x6c6c6c6cU, 0x70707070U, 0x48484848U, 0x50505050U, + 0xfdfdfdfdU, 0xededededU, 0xb9b9b9b9U, 0xdadadadaU, + 0x5e5e5e5eU, 0x15151515U, 0x46464646U, 0x57575757U, + 0xa7a7a7a7U, 0x8d8d8d8dU, 0x9d9d9d9dU, 0x84848484U, + 0x90909090U, 0xd8d8d8d8U, 0xababababU, 0x00000000U, + 0x8c8c8c8cU, 0xbcbcbcbcU, 0xd3d3d3d3U, 0x0a0a0a0aU, + 0xf7f7f7f7U, 0xe4e4e4e4U, 0x58585858U, 0x05050505U, + 0xb8b8b8b8U, 0xb3b3b3b3U, 0x45454545U, 0x06060606U, + 0xd0d0d0d0U, 0x2c2c2c2cU, 0x1e1e1e1eU, 0x8f8f8f8fU, + 0xcacacacaU, 0x3f3f3f3fU, 0x0f0f0f0fU, 0x02020202U, + 0xc1c1c1c1U, 0xafafafafU, 0xbdbdbdbdU, 0x03030303U, + 0x01010101U, 0x13131313U, 0x8a8a8a8aU, 0x6b6b6b6bU, + 0x3a3a3a3aU, 0x91919191U, 0x11111111U, 0x41414141U, + 0x4f4f4f4fU, 0x67676767U, 0xdcdcdcdcU, 0xeaeaeaeaU, + 0x97979797U, 0xf2f2f2f2U, 0xcfcfcfcfU, 0xcecececeU, + 0xf0f0f0f0U, 0xb4b4b4b4U, 0xe6e6e6e6U, 0x73737373U, + 0x96969696U, 0xacacacacU, 0x74747474U, 0x22222222U, + 0xe7e7e7e7U, 0xadadadadU, 0x35353535U, 0x85858585U, + 0xe2e2e2e2U, 0xf9f9f9f9U, 0x37373737U, 0xe8e8e8e8U, + 0x1c1c1c1cU, 0x75757575U, 0xdfdfdfdfU, 0x6e6e6e6eU, + 0x47474747U, 0xf1f1f1f1U, 0x1a1a1a1aU, 0x71717171U, + 0x1d1d1d1dU, 0x29292929U, 0xc5c5c5c5U, 0x89898989U, + 0x6f6f6f6fU, 0xb7b7b7b7U, 0x62626262U, 0x0e0e0e0eU, + 0xaaaaaaaaU, 0x18181818U, 0xbebebebeU, 0x1b1b1b1bU, + 0xfcfcfcfcU, 0x56565656U, 0x3e3e3e3eU, 0x4b4b4b4bU, + 0xc6c6c6c6U, 0xd2d2d2d2U, 0x79797979U, 0x20202020U, + 0x9a9a9a9aU, 0xdbdbdbdbU, 0xc0c0c0c0U, 0xfefefefeU, + 0x78787878U, 0xcdcdcdcdU, 0x5a5a5a5aU, 0xf4f4f4f4U, + 0x1f1f1f1fU, 0xddddddddU, 0xa8a8a8a8U, 0x33333333U, + 0x88888888U, 0x07070707U, 0xc7c7c7c7U, 0x31313131U, + 0xb1b1b1b1U, 0x12121212U, 0x10101010U, 0x59595959U, + 0x27272727U, 0x80808080U, 0xececececU, 0x5f5f5f5fU, + 0x60606060U, 0x51515151U, 0x7f7f7f7fU, 0xa9a9a9a9U, + 0x19191919U, 0xb5b5b5b5U, 0x4a4a4a4aU, 0x0d0d0d0dU, + 0x2d2d2d2dU, 0xe5e5e5e5U, 0x7a7a7a7aU, 0x9f9f9f9fU, + 0x93939393U, 0xc9c9c9c9U, 0x9c9c9c9cU, 0xefefefefU, + 0xa0a0a0a0U, 0xe0e0e0e0U, 0x3b3b3b3bU, 0x4d4d4d4dU, + 0xaeaeaeaeU, 0x2a2a2a2aU, 0xf5f5f5f5U, 0xb0b0b0b0U, + 0xc8c8c8c8U, 0xebebebebU, 0xbbbbbbbbU, 0x3c3c3c3cU, + 0x83838383U, 0x53535353U, 0x99999999U, 0x61616161U, + 0x17171717U, 0x2b2b2b2bU, 0x04040404U, 0x7e7e7e7eU, + 0xbabababaU, 0x77777777U, 0xd6d6d6d6U, 0x26262626U, + 0xe1e1e1e1U, 0x69696969U, 0x14141414U, 0x63636363U, + 0x55555555U, 0x21212121U, 0x0c0c0c0cU, 0x7d7d7d7dU, +}; +static const u32 rcon[] = { + 0x01000000, 0x02000000, 0x04000000, 0x08000000, + 0x10000000, 0x20000000, 0x40000000, 0x80000000, + 0x1B000000, 0x36000000, /* for 128-bit blocks, Rijndael never uses more than 10 rcon values */ +}; + +#define GETU32(pt) (((u32)(pt)[0] << 24) ^ ((u32)(pt)[1] << 16) ^ ((u32)(pt)[2] << 8) ^ ((u32)(pt)[3])) +#define PUTU32(ct, st) { (ct)[0] = (u8)((st) >> 24); (ct)[1] = (u8)((st) >> 16); (ct)[2] = (u8)((st) >> 8); (ct)[3] = (u8)(st); } + +/** + * Expand the cipher key into the encryption key schedule. + * + * @return the number of rounds for the given cipher key size. + */ +static int rijndaelKeySetupEnc(u32 rk[/*4*(Nr + 1)*/], const u8 cipherKey[], int keyBits) { + int i = 0; + u32 temp; + + rk[0] = GETU32(cipherKey ); + rk[1] = GETU32(cipherKey + 4); + rk[2] = GETU32(cipherKey + 8); + rk[3] = GETU32(cipherKey + 12); + if (keyBits == 128) { + for (;;) { + temp = rk[3]; + rk[4] = rk[0] ^ + (Te4[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff000000) ^ + (Te4[(temp >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^ + (Te4[(temp ) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^ + (Te4[(temp >> 24) ] & 0x000000ff) ^ + rcon[i]; + rk[5] = rk[1] ^ rk[4]; + rk[6] = rk[2] ^ rk[5]; + rk[7] = rk[3] ^ rk[6]; + if (++i == 10) { + return 10; + } + rk += 4; + } + } + rk[4] = GETU32(cipherKey + 16); + rk[5] = GETU32(cipherKey + 20); + if (keyBits == 192) { + for (;;) { + temp = rk[ 5]; + rk[ 6] = rk[ 0] ^ + (Te4[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff000000) ^ + (Te4[(temp >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^ + (Te4[(temp ) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^ + (Te4[(temp >> 24) ] & 0x000000ff) ^ + rcon[i]; + rk[ 7] = rk[ 1] ^ rk[ 6]; + rk[ 8] = rk[ 2] ^ rk[ 7]; + rk[ 9] = rk[ 3] ^ rk[ 8]; + if (++i == 8) { + return 12; + } + rk[10] = rk[ 4] ^ rk[ 9]; + rk[11] = rk[ 5] ^ rk[10]; + rk += 6; + } + } + rk[6] = GETU32(cipherKey + 24); + rk[7] = GETU32(cipherKey + 28); + if (keyBits == 256) { + for (;;) { + temp = rk[ 7]; + rk[ 8] = rk[ 0] ^ + (Te4[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff000000) ^ + (Te4[(temp >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^ + (Te4[(temp ) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^ + (Te4[(temp >> 24) ] & 0x000000ff) ^ + rcon[i]; + rk[ 9] = rk[ 1] ^ rk[ 8]; + rk[10] = rk[ 2] ^ rk[ 9]; + rk[11] = rk[ 3] ^ rk[10]; + if (++i == 7) { + return 14; + } + temp = rk[11]; + rk[12] = rk[ 4] ^ + (Te4[(temp >> 24) ] & 0xff000000) ^ + (Te4[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^ + (Te4[(temp >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^ + (Te4[(temp ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff); + rk[13] = rk[ 5] ^ rk[12]; + rk[14] = rk[ 6] ^ rk[13]; + rk[15] = rk[ 7] ^ rk[14]; + + rk += 8; + } + } + return 0; +} + +/** + * Expand the cipher key into the decryption key schedule. + * + * @return the number of rounds for the given cipher key size. + */ +static int +rijndaelKeySetupDec(u32 rk[/*4*(Nr + 1)*/], const u8 cipherKey[], int keyBits, + int have_encrypt) { + int Nr, i, j; + u32 temp; + + if (have_encrypt) { + Nr = have_encrypt; + } else { + /* expand the cipher key: */ + Nr = rijndaelKeySetupEnc(rk, cipherKey, keyBits); + } + /* invert the order of the round keys: */ + for (i = 0, j = 4*Nr; i < j; i += 4, j -= 4) { + temp = rk[i ]; rk[i ] = rk[j ]; rk[j ] = temp; + temp = rk[i + 1]; rk[i + 1] = rk[j + 1]; rk[j + 1] = temp; + temp = rk[i + 2]; rk[i + 2] = rk[j + 2]; rk[j + 2] = temp; + temp = rk[i + 3]; rk[i + 3] = rk[j + 3]; rk[j + 3] = temp; + } + /* apply the inverse MixColumn transform to all round keys but the first and the last: */ + for (i = 1; i < Nr; i++) { + rk += 4; + rk[0] = + Td0[Te4[(rk[0] >> 24) ] & 0xff] ^ + Td1[Te4[(rk[0] >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^ + Td2[Te4[(rk[0] >> 8) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^ + Td3[Te4[(rk[0] ) & 0xff] & 0xff]; + rk[1] = + Td0[Te4[(rk[1] >> 24) ] & 0xff] ^ + Td1[Te4[(rk[1] >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^ + Td2[Te4[(rk[1] >> 8) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^ + Td3[Te4[(rk[1] ) & 0xff] & 0xff]; + rk[2] = + Td0[Te4[(rk[2] >> 24) ] & 0xff] ^ + Td1[Te4[(rk[2] >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^ + Td2[Te4[(rk[2] >> 8) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^ + Td3[Te4[(rk[2] ) & 0xff] & 0xff]; + rk[3] = + Td0[Te4[(rk[3] >> 24) ] & 0xff] ^ + Td1[Te4[(rk[3] >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^ + Td2[Te4[(rk[3] >> 8) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^ + Td3[Te4[(rk[3] ) & 0xff] & 0xff]; + } + return Nr; +} + +static void rijndaelEncrypt(const u32 rk[/*4*(Nr + 1)*/], int Nr, const u8 pt[16], u8 ct[16]) { + u32 s0, s1, s2, s3, t0, t1, t2, t3; +#ifndef FULL_UNROLL + int r; +#endif /* ?FULL_UNROLL */ + + /* + * map byte array block to cipher state + * and add initial round key: + */ + s0 = GETU32(pt ) ^ rk[0]; + s1 = GETU32(pt + 4) ^ rk[1]; + s2 = GETU32(pt + 8) ^ rk[2]; + s3 = GETU32(pt + 12) ^ rk[3]; +#ifdef FULL_UNROLL + /* round 1: */ + t0 = Te0[s0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 4]; + t1 = Te0[s1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 5]; + t2 = Te0[s2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 6]; + t3 = Te0[s3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 7]; + /* round 2: */ + s0 = Te0[t0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 8]; + s1 = Te0[t1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 9]; + s2 = Te0[t2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[10]; + s3 = Te0[t3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[11]; + /* round 3: */ + t0 = Te0[s0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[12]; + t1 = Te0[s1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[13]; + t2 = Te0[s2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[14]; + t3 = Te0[s3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[15]; + /* round 4: */ + s0 = Te0[t0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[16]; + s1 = Te0[t1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[17]; + s2 = Te0[t2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[18]; + s3 = Te0[t3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[19]; + /* round 5: */ + t0 = Te0[s0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[20]; + t1 = Te0[s1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[21]; + t2 = Te0[s2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[22]; + t3 = Te0[s3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[23]; + /* round 6: */ + s0 = Te0[t0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[24]; + s1 = Te0[t1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[25]; + s2 = Te0[t2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[26]; + s3 = Te0[t3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[27]; + /* round 7: */ + t0 = Te0[s0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[28]; + t1 = Te0[s1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[29]; + t2 = Te0[s2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[30]; + t3 = Te0[s3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[31]; + /* round 8: */ + s0 = Te0[t0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[32]; + s1 = Te0[t1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[33]; + s2 = Te0[t2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[34]; + s3 = Te0[t3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[35]; + /* round 9: */ + t0 = Te0[s0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[36]; + t1 = Te0[s1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[37]; + t2 = Te0[s2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[38]; + t3 = Te0[s3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[39]; + if (Nr > 10) { + /* round 10: */ + s0 = Te0[t0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[40]; + s1 = Te0[t1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[41]; + s2 = Te0[t2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[42]; + s3 = Te0[t3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[43]; + /* round 11: */ + t0 = Te0[s0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[44]; + t1 = Te0[s1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[45]; + t2 = Te0[s2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[46]; + t3 = Te0[s3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[47]; + if (Nr > 12) { + /* round 12: */ + s0 = Te0[t0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[48]; + s1 = Te0[t1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[49]; + s2 = Te0[t2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[50]; + s3 = Te0[t3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[51]; + /* round 13: */ + t0 = Te0[s0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[52]; + t1 = Te0[s1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[53]; + t2 = Te0[s2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[54]; + t3 = Te0[s3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[55]; + } + } + rk += Nr << 2; +#else /* !FULL_UNROLL */ + /* + * Nr - 1 full rounds: + */ + r = Nr >> 1; + for (;;) { + t0 = + Te0[(s0 >> 24) ] ^ + Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ + Te2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ + Te3[(s3 ) & 0xff] ^ + rk[4]; + t1 = + Te0[(s1 >> 24) ] ^ + Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ + Te2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ + Te3[(s0 ) & 0xff] ^ + rk[5]; + t2 = + Te0[(s2 >> 24) ] ^ + Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ + Te2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ + Te3[(s1 ) & 0xff] ^ + rk[6]; + t3 = + Te0[(s3 >> 24) ] ^ + Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ + Te2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ + Te3[(s2 ) & 0xff] ^ + rk[7]; + + rk += 8; + if (--r == 0) { + break; + } + + s0 = + Te0[(t0 >> 24) ] ^ + Te1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ + Te2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ + Te3[(t3 ) & 0xff] ^ + rk[0]; + s1 = + Te0[(t1 >> 24) ] ^ + Te1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ + Te2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ + Te3[(t0 ) & 0xff] ^ + rk[1]; + s2 = + Te0[(t2 >> 24) ] ^ + Te1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ + Te2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ + Te3[(t1 ) & 0xff] ^ + rk[2]; + s3 = + Te0[(t3 >> 24) ] ^ + Te1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ + Te2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ + Te3[(t2 ) & 0xff] ^ + rk[3]; + } +#endif /* ?FULL_UNROLL */ + /* + * apply last round and + * map cipher state to byte array block: + */ + s0 = + (Te4[(t0 >> 24) ] & 0xff000000) ^ + (Te4[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^ + (Te4[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^ + (Te4[(t3 ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff) ^ + rk[0]; + PUTU32(ct , s0); + s1 = + (Te4[(t1 >> 24) ] & 0xff000000) ^ + (Te4[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^ + (Te4[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^ + (Te4[(t0 ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff) ^ + rk[1]; + PUTU32(ct + 4, s1); + s2 = + (Te4[(t2 >> 24) ] & 0xff000000) ^ + (Te4[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^ + (Te4[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^ + (Te4[(t1 ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff) ^ + rk[2]; + PUTU32(ct + 8, s2); + s3 = + (Te4[(t3 >> 24) ] & 0xff000000) ^ + (Te4[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^ + (Te4[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^ + (Te4[(t2 ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff) ^ + rk[3]; + PUTU32(ct + 12, s3); +} + +static void rijndaelDecrypt(const u32 rk[/*4*(Nr + 1)*/], int Nr, const u8 ct[16], u8 pt[16]) { + u32 s0, s1, s2, s3, t0, t1, t2, t3; +#ifndef FULL_UNROLL + int r; +#endif /* ?FULL_UNROLL */ + + /* + * map byte array block to cipher state + * and add initial round key: + */ + s0 = GETU32(ct ) ^ rk[0]; + s1 = GETU32(ct + 4) ^ rk[1]; + s2 = GETU32(ct + 8) ^ rk[2]; + s3 = GETU32(ct + 12) ^ rk[3]; +#ifdef FULL_UNROLL + /* round 1: */ + t0 = Td0[s0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 4]; + t1 = Td0[s1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 5]; + t2 = Td0[s2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 6]; + t3 = Td0[s3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 7]; + /* round 2: */ + s0 = Td0[t0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 8]; + s1 = Td0[t1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 9]; + s2 = Td0[t2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[10]; + s3 = Td0[t3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[11]; + /* round 3: */ + t0 = Td0[s0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[12]; + t1 = Td0[s1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[13]; + t2 = Td0[s2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[14]; + t3 = Td0[s3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[15]; + /* round 4: */ + s0 = Td0[t0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[16]; + s1 = Td0[t1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[17]; + s2 = Td0[t2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[18]; + s3 = Td0[t3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[19]; + /* round 5: */ + t0 = Td0[s0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[20]; + t1 = Td0[s1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[21]; + t2 = Td0[s2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[22]; + t3 = Td0[s3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[23]; + /* round 6: */ + s0 = Td0[t0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[24]; + s1 = Td0[t1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[25]; + s2 = Td0[t2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[26]; + s3 = Td0[t3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[27]; + /* round 7: */ + t0 = Td0[s0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[28]; + t1 = Td0[s1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[29]; + t2 = Td0[s2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[30]; + t3 = Td0[s3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[31]; + /* round 8: */ + s0 = Td0[t0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[32]; + s1 = Td0[t1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[33]; + s2 = Td0[t2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[34]; + s3 = Td0[t3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[35]; + /* round 9: */ + t0 = Td0[s0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[36]; + t1 = Td0[s1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[37]; + t2 = Td0[s2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[38]; + t3 = Td0[s3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[39]; + if (Nr > 10) { + /* round 10: */ + s0 = Td0[t0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[40]; + s1 = Td0[t1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[41]; + s2 = Td0[t2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[42]; + s3 = Td0[t3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[43]; + /* round 11: */ + t0 = Td0[s0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[44]; + t1 = Td0[s1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[45]; + t2 = Td0[s2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[46]; + t3 = Td0[s3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[47]; + if (Nr > 12) { + /* round 12: */ + s0 = Td0[t0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[48]; + s1 = Td0[t1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[49]; + s2 = Td0[t2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[50]; + s3 = Td0[t3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[51]; + /* round 13: */ + t0 = Td0[s0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[52]; + t1 = Td0[s1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[53]; + t2 = Td0[s2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[54]; + t3 = Td0[s3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[55]; + } + } + rk += Nr << 2; +#else /* !FULL_UNROLL */ + /* + * Nr - 1 full rounds: + */ + r = Nr >> 1; + for (;;) { + t0 = + Td0[(s0 >> 24) ] ^ + Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ + Td2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ + Td3[(s1 ) & 0xff] ^ + rk[4]; + t1 = + Td0[(s1 >> 24) ] ^ + Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ + Td2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ + Td3[(s2 ) & 0xff] ^ + rk[5]; + t2 = + Td0[(s2 >> 24) ] ^ + Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ + Td2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ + Td3[(s3 ) & 0xff] ^ + rk[6]; + t3 = + Td0[(s3 >> 24) ] ^ + Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ + Td2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ + Td3[(s0 ) & 0xff] ^ + rk[7]; + + rk += 8; + if (--r == 0) { + break; + } + + s0 = + Td0[(t0 >> 24) ] ^ + Td1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ + Td2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ + Td3[(t1 ) & 0xff] ^ + rk[0]; + s1 = + Td0[(t1 >> 24) ] ^ + Td1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ + Td2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ + Td3[(t2 ) & 0xff] ^ + rk[1]; + s2 = + Td0[(t2 >> 24) ] ^ + Td1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ + Td2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ + Td3[(t3 ) & 0xff] ^ + rk[2]; + s3 = + Td0[(t3 >> 24) ] ^ + Td1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ + Td2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ + Td3[(t0 ) & 0xff] ^ + rk[3]; + } +#endif /* ?FULL_UNROLL */ + /* + * apply last round and + * map cipher state to byte array block: + */ + s0 = + (Td4[(t0 >> 24) ] & 0xff000000) ^ + (Td4[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^ + (Td4[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^ + (Td4[(t1 ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff) ^ + rk[0]; + PUTU32(pt , s0); + s1 = + (Td4[(t1 >> 24) ] & 0xff000000) ^ + (Td4[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^ + (Td4[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^ + (Td4[(t2 ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff) ^ + rk[1]; + PUTU32(pt + 4, s1); + s2 = + (Td4[(t2 >> 24) ] & 0xff000000) ^ + (Td4[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^ + (Td4[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^ + (Td4[(t3 ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff) ^ + rk[2]; + PUTU32(pt + 8, s2); + s3 = + (Td4[(t3 >> 24) ] & 0xff000000) ^ + (Td4[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^ + (Td4[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^ + (Td4[(t0 ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff) ^ + rk[3]; + PUTU32(pt + 12, s3); +} + +void +rijndael_set_key(rijndael_ctx *ctx, u_char *key, int bits, int encrypt) +{ + ctx->Nr = rijndaelKeySetupEnc(ctx->ek, key, bits); + if (encrypt) { + ctx->decrypt = 0; + memset(ctx->dk, 0, sizeof(ctx->dk)); + } else { + ctx->decrypt = 1; + memcpy(ctx->dk, ctx->ek, sizeof(ctx->ek)); + rijndaelKeySetupDec(ctx->dk, key, bits, ctx->Nr); + } +} + +void +rijndael_decrypt(rijndael_ctx *ctx, u_char *src, u_char *dst) +{ + rijndaelDecrypt(ctx->dk, ctx->Nr, src, dst); +} + +void +rijndael_encrypt(rijndael_ctx *ctx, u_char *src, u_char *dst) +{ + rijndaelEncrypt(ctx->ek, ctx->Nr, src, dst); +} diff --git a/openssh/rijndael.h b/openssh/rijndael.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..18a4d80 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/rijndael.h @@ -0,0 +1,51 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: rijndael.h,v 1.11 2001/09/13 09:48:39 markus Exp $ */ + +/** + * rijndael-alg-fst.h + * + * @version 3.0 (December 2000) + * + * Optimised ANSI C code for the Rijndael cipher (now AES) + * + * @author Vincent Rijmen + * @author Antoon Bosselaers + * @author Paulo Barreto + * + * This code is hereby placed in the public domain. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHORS ''AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS + * OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE + * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR + * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF + * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR + * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, + * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE + * OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, + * EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ +#ifndef __RIJNDAEL_H +#define __RIJNDAEL_H + +#define MAXKC (256/32) +#define MAXKB (256/8) +#define MAXNR 14 + +typedef unsigned char u8; +typedef unsigned short u16; +typedef unsigned int u32; + +/* The structure for key information */ +typedef struct { + int decrypt; + int Nr; /* key-length-dependent number of rounds */ + u32 ek[4*(MAXNR + 1)]; /* encrypt key schedule */ + u32 dk[4*(MAXNR + 1)]; /* decrypt key schedule */ +} rijndael_ctx; + +void rijndael_set_key(rijndael_ctx *, u_char *, int, int); +void rijndael_decrypt(rijndael_ctx *, u_char *, u_char *); +void rijndael_encrypt(rijndael_ctx *, u_char *, u_char *); + +#endif /* __RIJNDAEL_H */ diff --git a/openssh/rsa.c b/openssh/rsa.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..113ee7f --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/rsa.c @@ -0,0 +1,141 @@ +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + * + * + * Copyright (c) 1999 Niels Provos. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * + * Description of the RSA algorithm can be found e.g. from the following + * sources: + * + * Bruce Schneier: Applied Cryptography. John Wiley & Sons, 1994. + * + * Jennifer Seberry and Josed Pieprzyk: Cryptography: An Introduction to + * Computer Security. Prentice-Hall, 1989. + * + * Man Young Rhee: Cryptography and Secure Data Communications. McGraw-Hill, + * 1994. + * + * R. Rivest, A. Shamir, and L. M. Adleman: Cryptographic Communications + * System and Method. US Patent 4,405,829, 1983. + * + * Hans Riesel: Prime Numbers and Computer Methods for Factorization. + * Birkhauser, 1994. + * + * The RSA Frequently Asked Questions document by RSA Data Security, + * Inc., 1995. + * + * RSA in 3 lines of perl by Adam Back , 1995, as + * included below: + * + * [gone - had to be deleted - what a pity] + */ + +#include "includes.h" +RCSID("$OpenBSD: rsa.c,v 1.23 2001/06/27 05:42:24 markus Exp $"); + +#include "rsa.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "xmalloc.h" + +void +rsa_public_encrypt(BIGNUM *out, BIGNUM *in, RSA *key) +{ + u_char *inbuf, *outbuf; + int len, ilen, olen; + + if (BN_num_bits(key->e) < 2 || !BN_is_odd(key->e)) + fatal("rsa_public_encrypt() exponent too small or not odd"); + + olen = BN_num_bytes(key->n); + outbuf = xmalloc(olen); + + ilen = BN_num_bytes(in); + inbuf = xmalloc(ilen); + BN_bn2bin(in, inbuf); + + if ((len = RSA_public_encrypt(ilen, inbuf, outbuf, key, + RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)) <= 0) + fatal("rsa_public_encrypt() failed"); + + BN_bin2bn(outbuf, len, out); + + memset(outbuf, 0, olen); + memset(inbuf, 0, ilen); + xfree(outbuf); + xfree(inbuf); +} + +int +rsa_private_decrypt(BIGNUM *out, BIGNUM *in, RSA *key) +{ + u_char *inbuf, *outbuf; + int len, ilen, olen; + + olen = BN_num_bytes(key->n); + outbuf = xmalloc(olen); + + ilen = BN_num_bytes(in); + inbuf = xmalloc(ilen); + BN_bn2bin(in, inbuf); + + if ((len = RSA_private_decrypt(ilen, inbuf, outbuf, key, + RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)) <= 0) { + error("rsa_private_decrypt() failed"); + } else { + BN_bin2bn(outbuf, len, out); + } + memset(outbuf, 0, olen); + memset(inbuf, 0, ilen); + xfree(outbuf); + xfree(inbuf); + return len; +} + +void +rsa_generate_additional_parameters(RSA *rsa) +{ + BIGNUM *aux; + BN_CTX *ctx; + /* Generate additional parameters */ + aux = BN_new(); + ctx = BN_CTX_new(); + + BN_sub(aux, rsa->q, BN_value_one()); + BN_mod(rsa->dmq1, rsa->d, aux, ctx); + + BN_sub(aux, rsa->p, BN_value_one()); + BN_mod(rsa->dmp1, rsa->d, aux, ctx); + + BN_clear_free(aux); + BN_CTX_free(ctx); +} + diff --git a/openssh/rsa.h b/openssh/rsa.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2f596d4 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/rsa.h @@ -0,0 +1,26 @@ +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * RSA key generation, encryption and decryption. + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + */ + +/* RCSID("$OpenBSD: rsa.h,v 1.14 2001/06/27 05:42:24 markus Exp $"); */ + +#ifndef RSA_H +#define RSA_H + +#include +#include + +void rsa_public_encrypt(BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, RSA *); +int rsa_private_decrypt(BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, RSA *); +void rsa_generate_additional_parameters(RSA *); + +#endif /* RSA_H */ diff --git a/openssh/scard.c b/openssh/scard.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..251e5d3 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/scard.c @@ -0,0 +1,371 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" +#ifdef SMARTCARD +RCSID("$OpenBSD: scard.c,v 1.15 2001/09/28 09:49:31 djm Exp $"); + +#include +#include + +#include "key.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "scard.h" + +#define CLA_SSH 0x05 +#define INS_DECRYPT 0x10 +#define INS_GET_KEYLENGTH 0x20 +#define INS_GET_PUBKEY 0x30 +#define INS_GET_RESPONSE 0xc0 + +#define MAX_BUF_SIZE 256 + +static int sc_fd = -1; +static char *sc_reader_id = NULL; +static int cla = 0x00; /* class */ + +/* interface to libsectok */ + +static int +sc_open(void) +{ + int sw; + + if (sc_fd >= 0) + return sc_fd; + + sc_fd = sectok_friendly_open(sc_reader_id, STONOWAIT, &sw); + if (sc_fd < 0) { + error("sectok_open failed: %s", sectok_get_sw(sw)); + return SCARD_ERROR_FAIL; + } + if (! sectok_cardpresent(sc_fd)) { + debug("smartcard in reader %s not present, skipping", + sc_reader_id); + sc_close(); + return SCARD_ERROR_NOCARD; + } + if (sectok_reset(sc_fd, 0, NULL, &sw) <= 0) { + error("sectok_reset failed: %s", sectok_get_sw(sw)); + sc_fd = -1; + return SCARD_ERROR_FAIL; + } + if ((cla = cyberflex_inq_class(sc_fd)) < 0) + cla = 0; + + debug("sc_open ok %d", sc_fd); + return sc_fd; +} + +static int +sc_enable_applet(void) +{ + static u_char aid[] = {0xfc, 0x53, 0x73, 0x68, 0x2e, 0x62, 0x69, 0x6e}; + int sw = 0; + + /* select applet id */ + sectok_apdu(sc_fd, cla, 0xa4, 0x04, 0, sizeof aid, aid, 0, NULL, &sw); + if (!sectok_swOK(sw)) { + error("sectok_apdu failed: %s", sectok_get_sw(sw)); + sc_close(); + return -1; + } + return 0; +} + +static int +sc_init(void) +{ + int status; + + status = sc_open(); + if (status == SCARD_ERROR_NOCARD) { + return SCARD_ERROR_NOCARD; + } + if (status < 0 ) { + error("sc_open failed"); + return status; + } + if (sc_enable_applet() < 0) { + error("sc_enable_applet failed"); + return SCARD_ERROR_APPLET; + } + return 0; +} + +static int +sc_read_pubkey(Key * k) +{ + u_char buf[2], *n; + char *p; + int len, sw, status = -1; + + len = sw = 0; + n = NULL; + + if (sc_fd < 0) { + status = sc_init(); + if (status < 0 ) + goto err; + } + + /* get key size */ + sectok_apdu(sc_fd, CLA_SSH, INS_GET_KEYLENGTH, 0, 0, 0, NULL, + sizeof(buf), buf, &sw); + if (!sectok_swOK(sw)) { + error("could not obtain key length: %s", sectok_get_sw(sw)); + goto err; + } + len = (buf[0] << 8) | buf[1]; + len /= 8; + debug("INS_GET_KEYLENGTH: len %d sw %s", len, sectok_get_sw(sw)); + + n = xmalloc(len); + /* get n */ + sectok_apdu(sc_fd, CLA_SSH, INS_GET_PUBKEY, 0, 0, 0, NULL, len, n, &sw); + if (!sectok_swOK(sw)) { + error("could not obtain public key: %s", sectok_get_sw(sw)); + goto err; + } + + debug("INS_GET_KEYLENGTH: sw %s", sectok_get_sw(sw)); + + if (BN_bin2bn(n, len, k->rsa->n) == NULL) { + error("c_read_pubkey: BN_bin2bn failed"); + goto err; + } + + /* currently the java applet just stores 'n' */ + if (!BN_set_word(k->rsa->e, 35)) { + error("c_read_pubkey: BN_set_word(e, 35) failed"); + goto err; + } + + status = 0; + p = key_fingerprint(k, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); + debug("fingerprint %d %s", key_size(k), p); + xfree(p); + +err: + if (n != NULL) + xfree(n); + sc_close(); + return status; +} + +/* private key operations */ + +static int +sc_private_decrypt(int flen, u_char *from, u_char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) +{ + u_char *padded = NULL; + int sw, len, olen, status = -1; + + debug("sc_private_decrypt called"); + + olen = len = sw = 0; + if (sc_fd < 0) { + status = sc_init(); + if (status < 0 ) + goto err; + } + if (padding != RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) + goto err; + + len = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); + padded = xmalloc(len); + + sectok_apdu(sc_fd, CLA_SSH, INS_DECRYPT, 0, 0, len, from, 0, NULL, &sw); + if (!sectok_swOK(sw)) { + error("sc_private_decrypt: INS_DECRYPT failed: %s", + sectok_get_sw(sw)); + goto err; + } + sectok_apdu(sc_fd, CLA_SSH, INS_GET_RESPONSE, 0, 0, 0, NULL, + len, padded, &sw); + if (!sectok_swOK(sw)) { + error("sc_private_decrypt: INS_GET_RESPONSE failed: %s", + sectok_get_sw(sw)); + goto err; + } + olen = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to, len, padded + 1, len - 1, + len); +err: + if (padded) + xfree(padded); + sc_close(); + return (olen >= 0 ? olen : status); +} + +static int +sc_private_encrypt(int flen, u_char *from, u_char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) +{ + u_char *padded = NULL; + int sw, len, status = -1; + + len = sw = 0; + if (sc_fd < 0) { + status = sc_init(); + if (status < 0 ) + goto err; + } + if (padding != RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) + goto err; + + debug("sc_private_encrypt called"); + len = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); + padded = xmalloc(len); + + if (RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(padded, len, from, flen) <= 0) { + error("RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1 failed"); + goto err; + } + sectok_apdu(sc_fd, CLA_SSH, INS_DECRYPT, 0, 0, len, padded, 0, NULL, &sw); + if (!sectok_swOK(sw)) { + error("sc_private_decrypt: INS_DECRYPT failed: %s", + sectok_get_sw(sw)); + goto err; + } + sectok_apdu(sc_fd, CLA_SSH, INS_GET_RESPONSE, 0, 0, 0, NULL, + len, to, &sw); + if (!sectok_swOK(sw)) { + error("sc_private_decrypt: INS_GET_RESPONSE failed: %s", + sectok_get_sw(sw)); + goto err; + } +err: + if (padded) + xfree(padded); + sc_close(); + return (len >= 0 ? len : status); +} + +/* called on free */ + +static int (*orig_finish)(RSA *rsa) = NULL; + +static int +sc_finish(RSA *rsa) +{ + if (orig_finish) + orig_finish(rsa); + sc_close(); + return 1; +} + + +/* engine for overloading private key operations */ + +static ENGINE *smart_engine = NULL; +static RSA_METHOD smart_rsa = +{ + "sectok", + NULL, + NULL, + NULL, + NULL, + NULL, + NULL, + NULL, + NULL, + 0, + NULL, +}; + +ENGINE * +sc_get_engine(void) +{ + RSA_METHOD *def; + + def = RSA_get_default_openssl_method(); + + /* overload */ + smart_rsa.rsa_priv_enc = sc_private_encrypt; + smart_rsa.rsa_priv_dec = sc_private_decrypt; + + /* save original */ + orig_finish = def->finish; + smart_rsa.finish = sc_finish; + + /* just use the OpenSSL version */ + smart_rsa.rsa_pub_enc = def->rsa_pub_enc; + smart_rsa.rsa_pub_dec = def->rsa_pub_dec; + smart_rsa.rsa_mod_exp = def->rsa_mod_exp; + smart_rsa.bn_mod_exp = def->bn_mod_exp; + smart_rsa.init = def->init; + smart_rsa.flags = def->flags; + smart_rsa.app_data = def->app_data; + smart_rsa.rsa_sign = def->rsa_sign; + smart_rsa.rsa_verify = def->rsa_verify; + + smart_engine = ENGINE_new(); + + ENGINE_set_id(smart_engine, "sectok"); + ENGINE_set_name(smart_engine, "libsectok"); + ENGINE_set_RSA(smart_engine, &smart_rsa); + ENGINE_set_DSA(smart_engine, DSA_get_default_openssl_method()); + ENGINE_set_DH(smart_engine, DH_get_default_openssl_method()); + ENGINE_set_RAND(smart_engine, RAND_SSLeay()); + ENGINE_set_BN_mod_exp(smart_engine, BN_mod_exp); + + return smart_engine; +} + +void +sc_close(void) +{ + if (sc_fd >= 0) { + sectok_close(sc_fd); + sc_fd = -1; + } +} + +Key * +sc_get_key(const char *id) +{ + Key *k; + int status; + + if (sc_reader_id != NULL) + xfree(sc_reader_id); + sc_reader_id = xstrdup(id); + + k = key_new(KEY_RSA); + if (k == NULL) { + return NULL; + } + status = sc_read_pubkey(k); + if (status == SCARD_ERROR_NOCARD) { + key_free(k); + return NULL; + } + if (status < 0 ) { + error("sc_read_pubkey failed"); + key_free(k); + return NULL; + } + return k; +} +#endif /* SMARTCARD */ diff --git a/openssh/scard.h b/openssh/scard.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..57189df --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/scard.h @@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $OpenBSD: scard.h,v 1.6 2001/08/01 22:03:33 markus Exp $ */ + +#include + +#ifndef SCARD_H +#define SCARD_H + +#define SCARD_ERROR_FAIL -1 +#define SCARD_ERROR_NOCARD -2 +#define SCARD_ERROR_APPLET -3 + +Key *sc_get_key(const char*); +ENGINE *sc_get_engine(void); +void sc_close(void); + +#endif diff --git a/openssh/scard/Makefile.in b/openssh/scard/Makefile.in new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f2d596a --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/scard/Makefile.in @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +# $Id$ + +prefix=@prefix@ +datadir=@datadir@ +srcdir=@srcdir@ +top_srcdir=@top_srcdir@ + +INSTALL=@INSTALL@ + +VPATH=@srcdir@ + +all: + +Ssh.bin: Ssh.bin.uu + uudecode Ssh.bin.uu + +clean: + rm -rf Ssh.bin + +distprep: Ssh.bin + +distclean: clean + rm -f Makefile *~ + +install: $(srcdir)/Ssh.bin + $(top_srcdir)/mkinstalldirs $(DESTDIR)$(datadir) + $(INSTALL) -m 0644 $(srcdir)/Ssh.bin $(DESTDIR)$(datadir)/Ssh.bin diff --git a/openssh/scard/Ssh.bin b/openssh/scard/Ssh.bin new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..86453981ac01f404c8bf1bc4b91f647112faaddd GIT binary patch literal 568 zcmX|6!Df+pY-g)QT`>yLG9Xw2WID9Wk$NTSD^+%w)dKatC&rF?(_gn+=7G*U8-jkF4&P>5Z`8&9dTa zS72RAYMdxP$-BAsk%YM>Uo9G}YsD68uV?~!ttJRv*6)V? z9`hIf^7T-oe6g8fzh(6g_xgtQ`mIGB;lOWYI860RzP|12$wzxEy15!(GK~Axd6+K5 zdi66may=VM^||euB6rF{L<0CgwE?xZ)tmrJz-iKn#~AdvKJw-AkBBSia{ps&jPP^^ z4a+pHgXRd&)SH=Sv&zAMo-uK1rflF1p-Hbu8$+y+UdCEsjBv=b;$I%`{9kp1*p9/,! +M`4$701P!_G#S%P'^0],1`?Y@\!0`_G/S'0#^<]4``D$7L`4`_F'3``!!%T$9 +M`?YATP4`_G/5"P7^8=,'`OZAT`$!_J#0$@1!%T$8`0```$$7!`$&`/Y@`;@` +M`$$8\`H(`$$9\`H``$$:\@\``$$;\B$``$$<\A```/`&__(```0(`!8```9C +M""T#"<(H+00$*"T%""A;`&19``#P$/_R`P(&`0#(```38`!!70!&$UP`1@09 +M":1+``D*D`!@`"@37`!&!!E6`````*(````$____P````*$````0````*@`` +M`"````"-````,````&H37`!&`QD(2@`)"FX`8``H$UP`1@<9"@#_/2!@`$L1 +M2@`)"F<`8``H$UP`'A-<`$8($1-<`$8(7@!0"!%@`%59"C\`8`!:*PIS:&`` +M6BL37`!&`P,*`(!@`%\K`PH`@&``55D37`!&`P`"U9```````` +` +end diff --git a/openssh/scard/Ssh.java b/openssh/scard/Ssh.java new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a26ae01 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/scard/Ssh.java @@ -0,0 +1,143 @@ +// $Id$ +// +// Ssh.java +// SSH / smartcard integration project, smartcard side +// +// Tomoko Fukuzawa, created, Feb., 2000 +// +// Naomaru Itoi, modified, Apr., 2000 +// + +// copyright 2000 +// the regents of the university of michigan +// all rights reserved +// +// permission is granted to use, copy, create derivative works +// and redistribute this software and such derivative works +// for any purpose, so long as the name of the university of +// michigan is not used in any advertising or publicity +// pertaining to the use or distribution of this software +// without specific, written prior authorization. if the +// above copyright notice or any other identification of the +// university of michigan is included in any copy of any +// portion of this software, then the disclaimer below must +// also be included. +// +// this software is provided as is, without representation +// from the university of michigan as to its fitness for any +// purpose, and without warranty by the university of +// michigan of any kind, either express or implied, including +// without limitation the implied warranties of +// merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose. the +// regents of the university of michigan shall not be liable +// for any damages, including special, indirect, incidental, or +// consequential damages, with respect to any claim arising +// out of or in connection with the use of the software, even +// if it has been or is hereafter advised of the possibility of +// such damages. + +import javacard.framework.*; +import javacardx.framework.*; +import javacardx.crypto.*; + +public class Ssh extends javacard.framework.Applet +{ + /* constants declaration */ + // code of CLA byte in the command APDU header + static final byte Ssh_CLA =(byte)0x05; + + // codes of INS byte in the command APDU header + static final byte DECRYPT = (byte) 0x10; + static final byte GET_KEYLENGTH = (byte) 0x20; + static final byte GET_PUBKEY = (byte) 0x30; + static final byte GET_RESPONSE = (byte) 0xc0; + + /* instance variables declaration */ + static final short keysize = 1024; + + //RSA_CRT_PrivateKey rsakey; + AsymKey rsakey; + CyberflexFile file; + CyberflexOS os; + + byte buffer[]; + + static byte[] keyHdr = {(byte)0xC2, (byte)0x01, (byte)0x05}; + + private Ssh() + { + file = new CyberflexFile(); + os = new CyberflexOS(); + + rsakey = new RSA_CRT_PrivateKey (keysize); + + if ( ! rsakey.isSupportedLength (keysize) ) + ISOException.throwIt (ISO.SW_WRONG_LENGTH); + + register(); + } // end of the constructor + + public boolean select() { + if (!rsakey.isInitialized()) + rsakey.setKeyInstance ((short)0xc8, (short)0x10); + + return true; + } + + public static void install(APDU apdu) + { + new Ssh(); // create a Ssh applet instance (card) + } // end of install method + + public static void main(String args[]) { + ISOException.throwIt((short) 0x9000); + } + + public void process(APDU apdu) + { + // APDU object carries a byte array (buffer) to + // transfer incoming and outgoing APDU header + // and data bytes between card and CAD + buffer = apdu.getBuffer(); + + // verify that if the applet can accept this + // APDU message + // NI: change suggested by Wayne Dyksen, Purdue + if (buffer[ISO.OFFSET_INS] == ISO.INS_SELECT) + ISOException.throwIt(ISO.SW_NO_ERROR); + + switch (buffer[ISO.OFFSET_INS]) { + case DECRYPT: + if (buffer[ISO.OFFSET_CLA] != Ssh_CLA) + ISOException.throwIt(ISO.SW_CLA_NOT_SUPPORTED); + //decrypt (apdu); + short size = (short) (buffer[ISO.OFFSET_LC] & 0x00FF); + + if (apdu.setIncomingAndReceive() != size) + ISOException.throwIt (ISO.SW_WRONG_LENGTH); + + rsakey.cryptoUpdate (buffer, (short) ISO.OFFSET_CDATA, size, + buffer, (short) ISO.OFFSET_CDATA); + + apdu.setOutgoingAndSend ((short) ISO.OFFSET_CDATA, size); + return; + case GET_PUBKEY: + file.selectFile((short)(0x3f<<8)); // select root + file.selectFile((short)(('s'<<8)|'h')); // select public key file + os.readBinaryFile (buffer, (short)0, (short)0, (short)(keysize/8)); + apdu.setOutgoingAndSend((short)0, (short)(keysize/8)); + return; + case GET_KEYLENGTH: + buffer[0] = (byte)((keysize >> 8) & 0xff); + buffer[1] = (byte)(keysize & 0xff); + apdu.setOutgoingAndSend ((short)0, (short)2); + return; + case GET_RESPONSE: + return; + default: + ISOException.throwIt (ISO.SW_INS_NOT_SUPPORTED); + } + + } // end of process method + +} // end of class Ssh diff --git a/openssh/scp.1 b/openssh/scp.1 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d51e680 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/scp.1 @@ -0,0 +1,152 @@ +.\" -*- nroff -*- +.\" +.\" scp.1 +.\" +.\" Author: Tatu Ylonen +.\" +.\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland +.\" All rights reserved +.\" +.\" Created: Sun May 7 00:14:37 1995 ylo +.\" +.\" $OpenBSD: scp.1,v 1.20 2001/09/17 23:56:07 stevesk Exp $ +.\" +.Dd September 25, 1999 +.Dt SCP 1 +.Os +.Sh NAME +.Nm scp +.Nd secure copy (remote file copy program) +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.Nm scp +.Op Fl pqrvBC46 +.Op Fl F Ar ssh_config +.Op Fl S Ar program +.Op Fl P Ar port +.Op Fl c Ar cipher +.Op Fl i Ar identity_file +.Op Fl o Ar ssh_option +.Sm off +.Oo +.Op Ar user@ +.Ar host1 No : +.Oc Ns Ar file1 +.Sm on +.Op Ar ... +.Sm off +.Oo +.Op Ar user@ +.Ar host2 No : +.Oc Ar file2 +.Sm on +.Sh DESCRIPTION +.Nm +copies files between hosts on a network. +It uses +.Xr ssh 1 +for data transfer, and uses the same authentication and provides the +same security as +.Xr ssh 1 . +Unlike +.Xr rcp 1 , +.Nm +will ask for passwords or passphrases if they are needed for +authentication. +.Pp +Any file name may contain a host and user specification to indicate +that the file is to be copied to/from that host. +Copies between two remote hosts are permitted. +.Pp +The options are as follows: +.Bl -tag -width Ds +.It Fl c Ar cipher +Selects the cipher to use for encrypting the data transfer. +This option is directly passed to +.Xr ssh 1 . +.It Fl i Ar identity_file +Selects the file from which the identity (private key) for RSA +authentication is read. +This option is directly passed to +.Xr ssh 1 . +.It Fl p +Preserves modification times, access times, and modes from the +original file. +.It Fl r +Recursively copy entire directories. +.It Fl v +Verbose mode. +Causes +.Nm +and +.Xr ssh 1 +to print debugging messages about their progress. +This is helpful in +debugging connection, authentication, and configuration problems. +.It Fl B +Selects batch mode (prevents asking for passwords or passphrases). +.It Fl q +Disables the progress meter. +.It Fl C +Compression enable. +Passes the +.Fl C +flag to +.Xr ssh 1 +to enable compression. +.It Fl F Ar ssh_config +Specifies an alternative +per-user configuration file for +.Nm ssh . +This option is directly passed to +.Xr ssh 1 . +.It Fl P Ar port +Specifies the port to connect to on the remote host. +Note that this option is written with a capital +.Sq P , +because +.Fl p +is already reserved for preserving the times and modes of the file in +.Xr rcp 1 . +.It Fl S Ar program +Name of +.Ar program +to use for the encrypted connection. +The program must understand +.Xr ssh 1 +options. +.It Fl o Ar ssh_option +Can be used to pass options to +.Nm ssh +in the format used in the +.Xr ssh 1 +configuration file. This is useful for specifying options +for which there is no separate +.Nm scp +command-line flag. For example, forcing the use of protocol +version 1 is specified using +.Ic scp -oProtocol=1 . +.It Fl 4 +Forces +.Nm +to use IPv4 addresses only. +.It Fl 6 +Forces +.Nm +to use IPv6 addresses only. +.El +.Sh AUTHORS +Timo Rinne and Tatu Ylonen +.Sh HISTORY +.Nm +is based on the +.Xr rcp 1 +program in BSD source code from the Regents of the University of +California. +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr rcp 1 , +.Xr sftp 1 , +.Xr ssh 1 , +.Xr ssh-add 1 , +.Xr ssh-agent 1 , +.Xr ssh-keygen 1 , +.Xr sshd 8 diff --git a/openssh/scp.c b/openssh/scp.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fb4d309 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/scp.c @@ -0,0 +1,1218 @@ +/* + * scp - secure remote copy. This is basically patched BSD rcp which + * uses ssh to do the data transfer (instead of using rcmd). + * + * NOTE: This version should NOT be suid root. (This uses ssh to + * do the transfer and ssh has the necessary privileges.) + * + * 1995 Timo Rinne , Tatu Ylonen + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* + * Parts from: + * + * Copyright (c) 1983, 1990, 1992, 1993, 1995 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the University of + * California, Berkeley and its contributors. + * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + */ + +#include "includes.h" +RCSID("$OpenBSD: scp.c,v 1.85 2001/10/01 08:06:28 markus Exp $"); + +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "atomicio.h" +#include "pathnames.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "misc.h" + +#ifdef HAVE___PROGNAME +extern char *__progname; +#else +char *__progname; +#endif + +/* For progressmeter() -- number of seconds before xfer considered "stalled" */ +#define STALLTIME 5 +/* alarm() interval for updating progress meter */ +#define PROGRESSTIME 1 + +/* Progress meter bar */ +#define BAR \ + "************************************************************"\ + "************************************************************"\ + "************************************************************"\ + "************************************************************" +#define MAX_BARLENGTH (sizeof(BAR) - 1) + +/* Visual statistics about files as they are transferred. */ +void progressmeter(int); + +/* Returns width of the terminal (for progress meter calculations). */ +int getttywidth(void); +int do_cmd(char *host, char *remuser, char *cmd, int *fdin, int *fdout, int argc); + +/* Struct for addargs */ +arglist args; + +/* Time a transfer started. */ +static struct timeval start; + +/* Number of bytes of current file transferred so far. */ +volatile off_t statbytes; + +/* Total size of current file. */ +off_t totalbytes = 0; + +/* Name of current file being transferred. */ +char *curfile; + +/* This is set to non-zero to enable verbose mode. */ +int verbose_mode = 0; + +/* This is set to zero if the progressmeter is not desired. */ +int showprogress = 1; + +/* This is the program to execute for the secured connection. ("ssh" or -S) */ +char *ssh_program = _PATH_SSH_PROGRAM; + +/* + * This function executes the given command as the specified user on the + * given host. This returns < 0 if execution fails, and >= 0 otherwise. This + * assigns the input and output file descriptors on success. + */ + +int +do_cmd(char *host, char *remuser, char *cmd, int *fdin, int *fdout, int argc) +{ + int pin[2], pout[2], reserved[2]; + + if (verbose_mode) + fprintf(stderr, + "Executing: program %s host %s, user %s, command %s\n", + ssh_program, host, + remuser ? remuser : "(unspecified)", cmd); + + /* + * Reserve two descriptors so that the real pipes won't get + * descriptors 0 and 1 because that will screw up dup2 below. + */ + pipe(reserved); + + /* Create a socket pair for communicating with ssh. */ + if (pipe(pin) < 0) + fatal("pipe: %s", strerror(errno)); + if (pipe(pout) < 0) + fatal("pipe: %s", strerror(errno)); + + /* Free the reserved descriptors. */ + close(reserved[0]); + close(reserved[1]); + + /* For a child to execute the command on the remote host using ssh. */ + if (fork() == 0) { + /* Child. */ + close(pin[1]); + close(pout[0]); + dup2(pin[0], 0); + dup2(pout[1], 1); + close(pin[0]); + close(pout[1]); + + args.list[0] = ssh_program; + if (remuser != NULL) + addargs(&args, "-l%s", remuser); + addargs(&args, "%s", host); + addargs(&args, "%s", cmd); + + execvp(ssh_program, args.list); + perror(ssh_program); + exit(1); + } + /* Parent. Close the other side, and return the local side. */ + close(pin[0]); + *fdout = pin[1]; + close(pout[1]); + *fdin = pout[0]; + return 0; +} + +typedef struct { + int cnt; + char *buf; +} BUF; + +BUF *allocbuf(BUF *, int, int); +void lostconn(int); +void nospace(void); +int okname(char *); +void run_err(const char *,...); +void verifydir(char *); + +struct passwd *pwd; +uid_t userid; +int errs, remin, remout; +int pflag, iamremote, iamrecursive, targetshouldbedirectory; + +#define CMDNEEDS 64 +char cmd[CMDNEEDS]; /* must hold "rcp -r -p -d\0" */ + +int response(void); +void rsource(char *, struct stat *); +void sink(int, char *[]); +void source(int, char *[]); +void tolocal(int, char *[]); +void toremote(char *, int, char *[]); +void usage(void); + +int +main(argc, argv) + int argc; + char *argv[]; +{ + int ch, fflag, tflag; + char *targ; + extern char *optarg; + extern int optind; + + __progname = get_progname(argv[0]); + + args.list = NULL; + addargs(&args, "ssh"); /* overwritten with ssh_program */ + addargs(&args, "-x"); + addargs(&args, "-oForwardAgent no"); + addargs(&args, "-oFallBackToRsh no"); + addargs(&args, "-oClearAllForwardings yes"); + + fflag = tflag = 0; + while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "dfprtvBCc:i:P:q46S:o:F:")) != -1) + switch (ch) { + /* User-visible flags. */ + case '4': + case '6': + case 'C': + addargs(&args, "-%c", ch); + break; + case 'o': + case 'c': + case 'i': + case 'F': + addargs(&args, "-%c%s", ch, optarg); + break; + case 'P': + addargs(&args, "-p%s", optarg); + break; + case 'B': + addargs(&args, "-oBatchmode yes"); + break; + case 'p': + pflag = 1; + break; + case 'r': + iamrecursive = 1; + break; + case 'S': + ssh_program = xstrdup(optarg); + break; + case 'v': + addargs(&args, "-v"); + verbose_mode = 1; + break; + case 'q': + showprogress = 0; + break; + + /* Server options. */ + case 'd': + targetshouldbedirectory = 1; + break; + case 'f': /* "from" */ + iamremote = 1; + fflag = 1; + break; + case 't': /* "to" */ + iamremote = 1; + tflag = 1; +#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN + setmode(0, O_BINARY); +#endif + break; + default: + usage(); + } + argc -= optind; + argv += optind; + + if ((pwd = getpwuid(userid = getuid())) == NULL) + fatal("unknown user %d", (int) userid); + + if (!isatty(STDERR_FILENO)) + showprogress = 0; + + remin = STDIN_FILENO; + remout = STDOUT_FILENO; + + if (fflag) { + /* Follow "protocol", send data. */ + (void) response(); + source(argc, argv); + exit(errs != 0); + } + if (tflag) { + /* Receive data. */ + sink(argc, argv); + exit(errs != 0); + } + if (argc < 2) + usage(); + if (argc > 2) + targetshouldbedirectory = 1; + + remin = remout = -1; + /* Command to be executed on remote system using "ssh". */ + (void) snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "scp%s%s%s%s", + verbose_mode ? " -v" : "", + iamrecursive ? " -r" : "", pflag ? " -p" : "", + targetshouldbedirectory ? " -d" : ""); + + (void) signal(SIGPIPE, lostconn); + + if ((targ = colon(argv[argc - 1]))) /* Dest is remote host. */ + toremote(targ, argc, argv); + else { + tolocal(argc, argv); /* Dest is local host. */ + if (targetshouldbedirectory) + verifydir(argv[argc - 1]); + } + exit(errs != 0); +} + +void +toremote(targ, argc, argv) + char *targ, *argv[]; + int argc; +{ + int i, len; + char *bp, *host, *src, *suser, *thost, *tuser; + + *targ++ = 0; + if (*targ == 0) + targ = "."; + + if ((thost = strchr(argv[argc - 1], '@'))) { + /* user@host */ + *thost++ = 0; + tuser = argv[argc - 1]; + if (*tuser == '\0') + tuser = NULL; + else if (!okname(tuser)) + exit(1); + } else { + thost = argv[argc - 1]; + tuser = NULL; + } + + for (i = 0; i < argc - 1; i++) { + src = colon(argv[i]); + if (src) { /* remote to remote */ + static char *ssh_options = + "-x -o'FallBackToRsh no' " + "-o'ClearAllForwardings yes'"; + *src++ = 0; + if (*src == 0) + src = "."; + host = strchr(argv[i], '@'); + len = strlen(ssh_program) + strlen(argv[i]) + + strlen(src) + (tuser ? strlen(tuser) : 0) + + strlen(thost) + strlen(targ) + + strlen(ssh_options) + CMDNEEDS + 20; + bp = xmalloc(len); + if (host) { + *host++ = 0; + host = cleanhostname(host); + suser = argv[i]; + if (*suser == '\0') + suser = pwd->pw_name; + else if (!okname(suser)) + continue; + snprintf(bp, len, + "%s%s %s -n " + "-l %s %s %s %s '%s%s%s:%s'", + ssh_program, verbose_mode ? " -v" : "", + ssh_options, suser, host, cmd, src, + tuser ? tuser : "", tuser ? "@" : "", + thost, targ); + } else { + host = cleanhostname(argv[i]); + snprintf(bp, len, + "exec %s%s %s -n %s " + "%s %s '%s%s%s:%s'", + ssh_program, verbose_mode ? " -v" : "", + ssh_options, host, cmd, src, + tuser ? tuser : "", tuser ? "@" : "", + thost, targ); + } + if (verbose_mode) + fprintf(stderr, "Executing: %s\n", bp); + (void) system(bp); + (void) xfree(bp); + } else { /* local to remote */ + if (remin == -1) { + len = strlen(targ) + CMDNEEDS + 20; + bp = xmalloc(len); + (void) snprintf(bp, len, "%s -t %s", cmd, targ); + host = cleanhostname(thost); + if (do_cmd(host, tuser, bp, &remin, + &remout, argc) < 0) + exit(1); + if (response() < 0) + exit(1); + (void) xfree(bp); + } + source(1, argv + i); + } + } +} + +void +tolocal(argc, argv) + int argc; + char *argv[]; +{ + int i, len; + char *bp, *host, *src, *suser; + + for (i = 0; i < argc - 1; i++) { + if (!(src = colon(argv[i]))) { /* Local to local. */ + len = strlen(_PATH_CP) + strlen(argv[i]) + + strlen(argv[argc - 1]) + 20; + bp = xmalloc(len); + (void) snprintf(bp, len, "exec %s%s%s %s %s", _PATH_CP, + iamrecursive ? " -r" : "", pflag ? " -p" : "", + argv[i], argv[argc - 1]); + if (verbose_mode) + fprintf(stderr, "Executing: %s\n", bp); + if (system(bp)) + ++errs; + (void) xfree(bp); + continue; + } + *src++ = 0; + if (*src == 0) + src = "."; + if ((host = strchr(argv[i], '@')) == NULL) { + host = argv[i]; + suser = NULL; + } else { + *host++ = 0; + suser = argv[i]; + if (*suser == '\0') + suser = pwd->pw_name; + else if (!okname(suser)) + continue; + } + host = cleanhostname(host); + len = strlen(src) + CMDNEEDS + 20; + bp = xmalloc(len); + (void) snprintf(bp, len, "%s -f %s", cmd, src); + if (do_cmd(host, suser, bp, &remin, &remout, argc) < 0) { + (void) xfree(bp); + ++errs; + continue; + } + xfree(bp); + sink(1, argv + argc - 1); + (void) close(remin); + remin = remout = -1; + } +} + +void +source(argc, argv) + int argc; + char *argv[]; +{ + struct stat stb; + static BUF buffer; + BUF *bp; + off_t i, amt, result; + int fd, haderr, indx; + char *last, *name, buf[2048]; + int len; + + for (indx = 0; indx < argc; ++indx) { + name = argv[indx]; + statbytes = 0; + len = strlen(name); + while (len > 1 && name[len-1] == '/') + name[--len] = '\0'; + if (strchr(name, '\n') != NULL) { + run_err("%s: skipping, filename contains a newline", + name); + goto next; + } + if ((fd = open(name, O_RDONLY, 0)) < 0) + goto syserr; + if (fstat(fd, &stb) < 0) { +syserr: run_err("%s: %s", name, strerror(errno)); + goto next; + } + switch (stb.st_mode & S_IFMT) { + case S_IFREG: + break; + case S_IFDIR: + if (iamrecursive) { + rsource(name, &stb); + goto next; + } + /* FALLTHROUGH */ + default: + run_err("%s: not a regular file", name); + goto next; + } + if ((last = strrchr(name, '/')) == NULL) + last = name; + else + ++last; + curfile = last; + if (pflag) { + /* + * Make it compatible with possible future + * versions expecting microseconds. + */ + (void) snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "T%lu 0 %lu 0\n", + (u_long) stb.st_mtime, + (u_long) stb.st_atime); + (void) atomicio(write, remout, buf, strlen(buf)); + if (response() < 0) + goto next; + } +#define FILEMODEMASK (S_ISUID|S_ISGID|S_IRWXU|S_IRWXG|S_IRWXO) +#ifdef HAVE_LONG_LONG_INT + snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "C%04o %lld %s\n", + (u_int) (stb.st_mode & FILEMODEMASK), + (long long) stb.st_size, last); +#else + /* XXX: Handle integer overflow? */ + snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "C%04o %lu %s\n", + (u_int) (stb.st_mode & FILEMODEMASK), + (u_long) stb.st_size, last); +#endif + + if (verbose_mode) { + fprintf(stderr, "Sending file modes: %s", buf); + fflush(stderr); + } + (void) atomicio(write, remout, buf, strlen(buf)); + if (response() < 0) + goto next; + if ((bp = allocbuf(&buffer, fd, 2048)) == NULL) { +next: (void) close(fd); + continue; + } + if (showprogress) { + totalbytes = stb.st_size; + progressmeter(-1); + } + /* Keep writing after an error so that we stay sync'd up. */ + for (haderr = i = 0; i < stb.st_size; i += bp->cnt) { + amt = bp->cnt; + if (i + amt > stb.st_size) + amt = stb.st_size - i; + if (!haderr) { + result = atomicio(read, fd, bp->buf, amt); + if (result != amt) + haderr = result >= 0 ? EIO : errno; + } + if (haderr) + (void) atomicio(write, remout, bp->buf, amt); + else { + result = atomicio(write, remout, bp->buf, amt); + if (result != amt) + haderr = result >= 0 ? EIO : errno; + statbytes += result; + } + } + if (showprogress) + progressmeter(1); + + if (close(fd) < 0 && !haderr) + haderr = errno; + if (!haderr) + (void) atomicio(write, remout, "", 1); + else + run_err("%s: %s", name, strerror(haderr)); + (void) response(); + } +} + +void +rsource(name, statp) + char *name; + struct stat *statp; +{ + DIR *dirp; + struct dirent *dp; + char *last, *vect[1], path[1100]; + + if (!(dirp = opendir(name))) { + run_err("%s: %s", name, strerror(errno)); + return; + } + last = strrchr(name, '/'); + if (last == 0) + last = name; + else + last++; + if (pflag) { + (void) snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "T%lu 0 %lu 0\n", + (u_long) statp->st_mtime, + (u_long) statp->st_atime); + (void) atomicio(write, remout, path, strlen(path)); + if (response() < 0) { + closedir(dirp); + return; + } + } + (void) snprintf(path, sizeof path, "D%04o %d %.1024s\n", + (u_int) (statp->st_mode & FILEMODEMASK), 0, last); + if (verbose_mode) + fprintf(stderr, "Entering directory: %s", path); + (void) atomicio(write, remout, path, strlen(path)); + if (response() < 0) { + closedir(dirp); + return; + } + while ((dp = readdir(dirp)) != NULL) { + if (dp->d_ino == 0) + continue; + if (!strcmp(dp->d_name, ".") || !strcmp(dp->d_name, "..")) + continue; + if (strlen(name) + 1 + strlen(dp->d_name) >= sizeof(path) - 1) { + run_err("%s/%s: name too long", name, dp->d_name); + continue; + } + (void) snprintf(path, sizeof path, "%s/%s", name, dp->d_name); + vect[0] = path; + source(1, vect); + } + (void) closedir(dirp); + (void) atomicio(write, remout, "E\n", 2); + (void) response(); +} + +void +sink(argc, argv) + int argc; + char *argv[]; +{ + static BUF buffer; + struct stat stb; + enum { + YES, NO, DISPLAYED + } wrerr; + BUF *bp; + off_t i, j; + int amt, count, exists, first, mask, mode, ofd, omode; + off_t size; + int setimes, targisdir, wrerrno = 0; + char ch, *cp, *np, *targ, *why, *vect[1], buf[2048]; + struct timeval tv[2]; + +#define atime tv[0] +#define mtime tv[1] +#define SCREWUP(str) do { why = str; goto screwup; } while (0) + + setimes = targisdir = 0; + mask = umask(0); + if (!pflag) + (void) umask(mask); + if (argc != 1) { + run_err("ambiguous target"); + exit(1); + } + targ = *argv; + if (targetshouldbedirectory) + verifydir(targ); + + (void) atomicio(write, remout, "", 1); + if (stat(targ, &stb) == 0 && S_ISDIR(stb.st_mode)) + targisdir = 1; + for (first = 1;; first = 0) { + cp = buf; + if (atomicio(read, remin, cp, 1) <= 0) + return; + if (*cp++ == '\n') + SCREWUP("unexpected "); + do { + if (atomicio(read, remin, &ch, sizeof(ch)) != sizeof(ch)) + SCREWUP("lost connection"); + *cp++ = ch; + } while (cp < &buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] && ch != '\n'); + *cp = 0; + + if (buf[0] == '\01' || buf[0] == '\02') { + if (iamremote == 0) + (void) atomicio(write, STDERR_FILENO, + buf + 1, strlen(buf + 1)); + if (buf[0] == '\02') + exit(1); + ++errs; + continue; + } + if (buf[0] == 'E') { + (void) atomicio(write, remout, "", 1); + return; + } + if (ch == '\n') + *--cp = 0; + + cp = buf; + if (*cp == 'T') { + setimes++; + cp++; + mtime.tv_sec = strtol(cp, &cp, 10); + if (!cp || *cp++ != ' ') + SCREWUP("mtime.sec not delimited"); + mtime.tv_usec = strtol(cp, &cp, 10); + if (!cp || *cp++ != ' ') + SCREWUP("mtime.usec not delimited"); + atime.tv_sec = strtol(cp, &cp, 10); + if (!cp || *cp++ != ' ') + SCREWUP("atime.sec not delimited"); + atime.tv_usec = strtol(cp, &cp, 10); + if (!cp || *cp++ != '\0') + SCREWUP("atime.usec not delimited"); + (void) atomicio(write, remout, "", 1); + continue; + } + if (*cp != 'C' && *cp != 'D') { + /* + * Check for the case "rcp remote:foo\* local:bar". + * In this case, the line "No match." can be returned + * by the shell before the rcp command on the remote is + * executed so the ^Aerror_message convention isn't + * followed. + */ + if (first) { + run_err("%s", cp); + exit(1); + } + SCREWUP("expected control record"); + } + mode = 0; + for (++cp; cp < buf + 5; cp++) { + if (*cp < '0' || *cp > '7') + SCREWUP("bad mode"); + mode = (mode << 3) | (*cp - '0'); + } + if (*cp++ != ' ') + SCREWUP("mode not delimited"); + + for (size = 0; isdigit(*cp);) + size = size * 10 + (*cp++ - '0'); + if (*cp++ != ' ') + SCREWUP("size not delimited"); + if (targisdir) { + static char *namebuf; + static int cursize; + size_t need; + + need = strlen(targ) + strlen(cp) + 250; + if (need > cursize) { + if (namebuf) + xfree(namebuf); + namebuf = xmalloc(need); + cursize = need; + } + (void) snprintf(namebuf, need, "%s%s%s", targ, + *targ ? "/" : "", cp); + np = namebuf; + } else + np = targ; + curfile = cp; + exists = stat(np, &stb) == 0; + if (buf[0] == 'D') { + int mod_flag = pflag; + if (exists) { + if (!S_ISDIR(stb.st_mode)) { + errno = ENOTDIR; + goto bad; + } + if (pflag) + (void) chmod(np, mode); + } else { + /* Handle copying from a read-only + directory */ + mod_flag = 1; + if (mkdir(np, mode | S_IRWXU) < 0) + goto bad; + } + vect[0] = xstrdup(np); + sink(1, vect); + if (setimes) { + setimes = 0; + if (utimes(vect[0], tv) < 0) + run_err("%s: set times: %s", + vect[0], strerror(errno)); + } + if (mod_flag) + (void) chmod(vect[0], mode); + if (vect[0]) + xfree(vect[0]); + continue; + } + omode = mode; + mode |= S_IWRITE; + if ((ofd = open(np, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT, mode)) < 0) { +bad: run_err("%s: %s", np, strerror(errno)); + continue; + } + (void) atomicio(write, remout, "", 1); + if ((bp = allocbuf(&buffer, ofd, 4096)) == NULL) { + (void) close(ofd); + continue; + } + cp = bp->buf; + wrerr = NO; + + if (showprogress) { + totalbytes = size; + progressmeter(-1); + } + statbytes = 0; + for (count = i = 0; i < size; i += 4096) { + amt = 4096; + if (i + amt > size) + amt = size - i; + count += amt; + do { + j = read(remin, cp, amt); + if (j == -1 && (errno == EINTR || + errno == EAGAIN)) { + continue; + } else if (j <= 0) { + run_err("%s", j ? strerror(errno) : + "dropped connection"); + exit(1); + } + amt -= j; + cp += j; + statbytes += j; + } while (amt > 0); + if (count == bp->cnt) { + /* Keep reading so we stay sync'd up. */ + if (wrerr == NO) { + j = atomicio(write, ofd, bp->buf, count); + if (j != count) { + wrerr = YES; + wrerrno = j >= 0 ? EIO : errno; + } + } + count = 0; + cp = bp->buf; + } + } + if (showprogress) + progressmeter(1); + if (count != 0 && wrerr == NO && + (j = atomicio(write, ofd, bp->buf, count)) != count) { + wrerr = YES; + wrerrno = j >= 0 ? EIO : errno; + } + if (ftruncate(ofd, size)) { + run_err("%s: truncate: %s", np, strerror(errno)); + wrerr = DISPLAYED; + } + if (pflag) { + if (exists || omode != mode) +#ifdef HAVE_FCHMOD + if (fchmod(ofd, omode)) +#else /* HAVE_FCHMOD */ + if (chmod(np, omode)) +#endif /* HAVE_FCHMOD */ + run_err("%s: set mode: %s", + np, strerror(errno)); + } else { + if (!exists && omode != mode) +#ifdef HAVE_FCHMOD + if (fchmod(ofd, omode & ~mask)) +#else /* HAVE_FCHMOD */ + if (chmod(np, omode & ~mask)) +#endif /* HAVE_FCHMOD */ + run_err("%s: set mode: %s", + np, strerror(errno)); + } + if (close(ofd) == -1) { + wrerr = YES; + wrerrno = errno; + } + (void) response(); + if (setimes && wrerr == NO) { + setimes = 0; + if (utimes(np, tv) < 0) { + run_err("%s: set times: %s", + np, strerror(errno)); + wrerr = DISPLAYED; + } + } + switch (wrerr) { + case YES: + run_err("%s: %s", np, strerror(wrerrno)); + break; + case NO: + (void) atomicio(write, remout, "", 1); + break; + case DISPLAYED: + break; + } + } +screwup: + run_err("protocol error: %s", why); + exit(1); +} + +int +response() +{ + char ch, *cp, resp, rbuf[2048]; + + if (atomicio(read, remin, &resp, sizeof(resp)) != sizeof(resp)) + lostconn(0); + + cp = rbuf; + switch (resp) { + case 0: /* ok */ + return (0); + default: + *cp++ = resp; + /* FALLTHROUGH */ + case 1: /* error, followed by error msg */ + case 2: /* fatal error, "" */ + do { + if (atomicio(read, remin, &ch, sizeof(ch)) != sizeof(ch)) + lostconn(0); + *cp++ = ch; + } while (cp < &rbuf[sizeof(rbuf) - 1] && ch != '\n'); + + if (!iamremote) + (void) atomicio(write, STDERR_FILENO, rbuf, cp - rbuf); + ++errs; + if (resp == 1) + return (-1); + exit(1); + } + /* NOTREACHED */ +} + +void +usage() +{ + (void) fprintf(stderr, + "usage: scp [-pqrvBC46] [-F config] [-S ssh] [-P port] [-c cipher] [-i identity]\n" + " [-o option] f1 f2\n" + " or: scp [options] f1 ... fn directory\n"); + exit(1); +} + +void +run_err(const char *fmt,...) +{ + static FILE *fp; + va_list ap; + + ++errs; + if (fp == NULL && !(fp = fdopen(remout, "w"))) + return; + (void) fprintf(fp, "%c", 0x01); + (void) fprintf(fp, "scp: "); + va_start(ap, fmt); + (void) vfprintf(fp, fmt, ap); + va_end(ap); + (void) fprintf(fp, "\n"); + (void) fflush(fp); + + if (!iamremote) { + va_start(ap, fmt); + vfprintf(stderr, fmt, ap); + va_end(ap); + fprintf(stderr, "\n"); + } +} + +void +verifydir(cp) + char *cp; +{ + struct stat stb; + + if (!stat(cp, &stb)) { + if (S_ISDIR(stb.st_mode)) + return; + errno = ENOTDIR; + } + run_err("%s: %s", cp, strerror(errno)); + exit(1); +} + +int +okname(cp0) + char *cp0; +{ + int c; + char *cp; + + cp = cp0; + do { + c = (int)*cp; + if (c & 0200) + goto bad; + if (!isalpha(c) && !isdigit(c) && + c != '_' && c != '-' && c != '.' && c != '+') + goto bad; + } while (*++cp); + return (1); + +bad: fprintf(stderr, "%s: invalid user name\n", cp0); + return (0); +} + +BUF * +allocbuf(bp, fd, blksize) + BUF *bp; + int fd, blksize; +{ + size_t size; +#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_BLKSIZE + struct stat stb; + + if (fstat(fd, &stb) < 0) { + run_err("fstat: %s", strerror(errno)); + return (0); + } + if (stb.st_blksize == 0) + size = blksize; + else + size = blksize + (stb.st_blksize - blksize % stb.st_blksize) % + stb.st_blksize; +#else /* HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_BLKSIZE */ + size = blksize; +#endif /* HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_BLKSIZE */ + if (bp->cnt >= size) + return (bp); + if (bp->buf == NULL) + bp->buf = xmalloc(size); + else + bp->buf = xrealloc(bp->buf, size); + memset(bp->buf, 0, size); + bp->cnt = size; + return (bp); +} + +void +lostconn(signo) + int signo; +{ + if (!iamremote) + write(STDERR_FILENO, "lost connection\n", 16); + if (signo) + _exit(1); + else + exit(1); +} + +static void +updateprogressmeter(int ignore) +{ + int save_errno = errno; + + progressmeter(0); + signal(SIGALRM, updateprogressmeter); + alarm(PROGRESSTIME); + errno = save_errno; +} + +static int +foregroundproc(void) +{ + static pid_t pgrp = -1; + int ctty_pgrp; + + if (pgrp == -1) + pgrp = getpgrp(); + +#ifdef HAVE_TCGETPGRP + return ((ctty_pgrp = tcgetpgrp(STDOUT_FILENO)) != -1 && + ctty_pgrp == pgrp); +#else + return ((ioctl(STDOUT_FILENO, TIOCGPGRP, &ctty_pgrp) != -1 && + ctty_pgrp == pgrp)); +#endif +} + +void +progressmeter(int flag) +{ + static const char prefixes[] = " KMGTP"; + static struct timeval lastupdate; + static off_t lastsize; + struct timeval now, td, wait; + off_t cursize, abbrevsize; + double elapsed; + int ratio, barlength, i, remaining; + char buf[256]; + + if (flag == -1) { + (void) gettimeofday(&start, (struct timezone *) 0); + lastupdate = start; + lastsize = 0; + } + if (foregroundproc() == 0) + return; + + (void) gettimeofday(&now, (struct timezone *) 0); + cursize = statbytes; + if (totalbytes != 0) { + ratio = 100.0 * cursize / totalbytes; + ratio = MAX(ratio, 0); + ratio = MIN(ratio, 100); + } else + ratio = 100; + + snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "\r%-20.20s %3d%% ", curfile, ratio); + + barlength = getttywidth() - 51; + barlength = (barlength <= MAX_BARLENGTH)?barlength:MAX_BARLENGTH; + if (barlength > 0) { + i = barlength * ratio / 100; + snprintf(buf + strlen(buf), sizeof(buf) - strlen(buf), + "|%.*s%*s|", i, BAR, barlength - i, ""); + } + i = 0; + abbrevsize = cursize; + while (abbrevsize >= 100000 && i < sizeof(prefixes)) { + i++; + abbrevsize >>= 10; + } + snprintf(buf + strlen(buf), sizeof(buf) - strlen(buf), " %5lu %c%c ", + (unsigned long) abbrevsize, prefixes[i], + prefixes[i] == ' ' ? ' ' : 'B'); + + timersub(&now, &lastupdate, &wait); + if (cursize > lastsize) { + lastupdate = now; + lastsize = cursize; + if (wait.tv_sec >= STALLTIME) { + start.tv_sec += wait.tv_sec; + start.tv_usec += wait.tv_usec; + } + wait.tv_sec = 0; + } + timersub(&now, &start, &td); + elapsed = td.tv_sec + (td.tv_usec / 1000000.0); + + if (flag != 1 && + (statbytes <= 0 || elapsed <= 0.0 || cursize > totalbytes)) { + snprintf(buf + strlen(buf), sizeof(buf) - strlen(buf), + " --:-- ETA"); + } else if (wait.tv_sec >= STALLTIME) { + snprintf(buf + strlen(buf), sizeof(buf) - strlen(buf), + " - stalled -"); + } else { + if (flag != 1) + remaining = (int)(totalbytes / (statbytes / elapsed) - + elapsed); + else + remaining = elapsed; + + i = remaining / 3600; + if (i) + snprintf(buf + strlen(buf), sizeof(buf) - strlen(buf), + "%2d:", i); + else + snprintf(buf + strlen(buf), sizeof(buf) - strlen(buf), + " "); + i = remaining % 3600; + snprintf(buf + strlen(buf), sizeof(buf) - strlen(buf), + "%02d:%02d%s", i / 60, i % 60, + (flag != 1) ? " ETA" : " "); + } + atomicio(write, fileno(stdout), buf, strlen(buf)); + + if (flag == -1) { + mysignal(SIGALRM, updateprogressmeter); + alarm(PROGRESSTIME); + } else if (flag == 1) { + alarm(0); + atomicio(write, fileno(stdout), "\n", 1); + statbytes = 0; + } +} + +int +getttywidth(void) +{ + struct winsize winsize; + + if (ioctl(fileno(stdout), TIOCGWINSZ, &winsize) != -1) + return (winsize.ws_col ? winsize.ws_col : 80); + else + return (80); +} diff --git a/openssh/servconf.c b/openssh/servconf.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e914d4c --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/servconf.c @@ -0,0 +1,881 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + */ + +#include "includes.h" +RCSID("$OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.91 2001/11/12 18:17:07 markus Exp $"); + +#if defined(KRB4) || defined(KRB5) +#include +#endif +#ifdef AFS +#include +#endif + +#include "ssh.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "servconf.h" +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "compat.h" +#include "pathnames.h" +#include "tildexpand.h" +#include "misc.h" +#include "cipher.h" +#include "kex.h" +#include "mac.h" + +static void add_listen_addr(ServerOptions *, char *, u_short); +static void add_one_listen_addr(ServerOptions *, char *, u_short); + +/* AF_UNSPEC or AF_INET or AF_INET6 */ +extern int IPv4or6; + +/* Initializes the server options to their default values. */ + +void +initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options) +{ + memset(options, 0, sizeof(*options)); + + /* Portable-specific options */ + options->pam_authentication_via_kbd_int = -1; + + /* Standard Options */ + options->num_ports = 0; + options->ports_from_cmdline = 0; + options->listen_addrs = NULL; + options->num_host_key_files = 0; + options->pid_file = NULL; + options->server_key_bits = -1; + options->login_grace_time = -1; + options->key_regeneration_time = -1; + options->permit_root_login = PERMIT_NOT_SET; + options->ignore_rhosts = -1; + options->ignore_user_known_hosts = -1; + options->print_motd = -1; + options->print_lastlog = -1; + options->x11_forwarding = -1; + options->x11_display_offset = -1; + options->xauth_location = NULL; + options->strict_modes = -1; + options->keepalives = -1; + options->log_facility = (SyslogFacility) - 1; + options->log_level = (LogLevel) - 1; + options->rhosts_authentication = -1; + options->rhosts_rsa_authentication = -1; + options->hostbased_authentication = -1; + options->hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only = -1; + options->rsa_authentication = -1; + options->pubkey_authentication = -1; +#if defined(KRB4) || defined(KRB5) + options->kerberos_authentication = -1; + options->kerberos_or_local_passwd = -1; + options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = -1; +#endif +#if defined(AFS) || defined(KRB5) + options->kerberos_tgt_passing = -1; +#endif +#ifdef AFS + options->afs_token_passing = -1; +#endif + options->password_authentication = -1; + options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1; + options->challenge_response_authentication = -1; + options->permit_empty_passwd = -1; + options->use_login = -1; + options->allow_tcp_forwarding = -1; + options->num_allow_users = 0; + options->num_deny_users = 0; + options->num_allow_groups = 0; + options->num_deny_groups = 0; + options->ciphers = NULL; + options->macs = NULL; + options->protocol = SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN; + options->gateway_ports = -1; + options->num_subsystems = 0; + options->max_startups_begin = -1; + options->max_startups_rate = -1; + options->max_startups = -1; + options->banner = NULL; + options->reverse_mapping_check = -1; + options->client_alive_interval = -1; + options->client_alive_count_max = -1; + options->authorized_keys_file = NULL; + options->authorized_keys_file2 = NULL; +} + +void +fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options) +{ + /* Portable-specific options */ + if (options->pam_authentication_via_kbd_int == -1) + options->pam_authentication_via_kbd_int = 0; + + /* Standard Options */ + if (options->protocol == SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN) + options->protocol = SSH_PROTO_1|SSH_PROTO_2; + if (options->num_host_key_files == 0) { + /* fill default hostkeys for protocols */ + if (options->protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) + options->host_key_files[options->num_host_key_files++] = _PATH_HOST_KEY_FILE; + if (options->protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) + options->host_key_files[options->num_host_key_files++] = _PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE; + } + if (options->num_ports == 0) + options->ports[options->num_ports++] = SSH_DEFAULT_PORT; + if (options->listen_addrs == NULL) + add_listen_addr(options, NULL, 0); + if (options->pid_file == NULL) + options->pid_file = _PATH_SSH_DAEMON_PID_FILE; + if (options->server_key_bits == -1) + options->server_key_bits = 768; + if (options->login_grace_time == -1) + options->login_grace_time = 600; + if (options->key_regeneration_time == -1) + options->key_regeneration_time = 3600; + if (options->permit_root_login == PERMIT_NOT_SET) + options->permit_root_login = PERMIT_YES; + if (options->ignore_rhosts == -1) + options->ignore_rhosts = 1; + if (options->ignore_user_known_hosts == -1) + options->ignore_user_known_hosts = 0; + if (options->print_motd == -1) + options->print_motd = 1; + if (options->print_lastlog == -1) + options->print_lastlog = 1; + if (options->x11_forwarding == -1) + options->x11_forwarding = 0; + if (options->x11_display_offset == -1) + options->x11_display_offset = 10; +#ifdef _PATH_XAUTH + if (options->xauth_location == NULL) + options->xauth_location = _PATH_XAUTH; +#endif + if (options->strict_modes == -1) + options->strict_modes = 1; + if (options->keepalives == -1) + options->keepalives = 1; + if (options->log_facility == (SyslogFacility) (-1)) + options->log_facility = SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH; + if (options->log_level == (LogLevel) (-1)) + options->log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO; + if (options->rhosts_authentication == -1) + options->rhosts_authentication = 0; + if (options->rhosts_rsa_authentication == -1) + options->rhosts_rsa_authentication = 0; + if (options->hostbased_authentication == -1) + options->hostbased_authentication = 0; + if (options->hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only == -1) + options->hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only = 0; + if (options->rsa_authentication == -1) + options->rsa_authentication = 1; + if (options->pubkey_authentication == -1) + options->pubkey_authentication = 1; +#if defined(KRB4) || defined(KRB5) + if (options->kerberos_authentication == -1) + options->kerberos_authentication = (access(KEYFILE, R_OK) == 0); + if (options->kerberos_or_local_passwd == -1) + options->kerberos_or_local_passwd = 1; + if (options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup == -1) + options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = 1; +#endif +#if defined(AFS) || defined(KRB5) + if (options->kerberos_tgt_passing == -1) + options->kerberos_tgt_passing = 0; +#endif +#ifdef AFS + if (options->afs_token_passing == -1) + options->afs_token_passing = k_hasafs(); +#endif + if (options->password_authentication == -1) + options->password_authentication = 1; + if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1) + options->kbd_interactive_authentication = 0; + if (options->challenge_response_authentication == -1) + options->challenge_response_authentication = 1; + if (options->permit_empty_passwd == -1) + options->permit_empty_passwd = 0; + if (options->use_login == -1) + options->use_login = 0; + if (options->allow_tcp_forwarding == -1) + options->allow_tcp_forwarding = 1; + if (options->gateway_ports == -1) + options->gateway_ports = 0; + if (options->max_startups == -1) + options->max_startups = 10; + if (options->max_startups_rate == -1) + options->max_startups_rate = 100; /* 100% */ + if (options->max_startups_begin == -1) + options->max_startups_begin = options->max_startups; + if (options->reverse_mapping_check == -1) + options->reverse_mapping_check = 0; + if (options->client_alive_interval == -1) + options->client_alive_interval = 0; + if (options->client_alive_count_max == -1) + options->client_alive_count_max = 3; + if (options->authorized_keys_file2 == NULL) { + /* authorized_keys_file2 falls back to authorized_keys_file */ + if (options->authorized_keys_file != NULL) + options->authorized_keys_file2 = options->authorized_keys_file; + else + options->authorized_keys_file2 = _PATH_SSH_USER_PERMITTED_KEYS2; + } + if (options->authorized_keys_file == NULL) + options->authorized_keys_file = _PATH_SSH_USER_PERMITTED_KEYS; +} + +/* Keyword tokens. */ +typedef enum { + sBadOption, /* == unknown option */ + /* Portable-specific options */ + sPAMAuthenticationViaKbdInt, + /* Standard Options */ + sPort, sHostKeyFile, sServerKeyBits, sLoginGraceTime, sKeyRegenerationTime, + sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel, + sRhostsAuthentication, sRhostsRSAAuthentication, sRSAAuthentication, +#if defined(KRB4) || defined(KRB5) + sKerberosAuthentication, sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, sKerberosTicketCleanup, +#endif +#if defined(AFS) || defined(KRB5) + sKerberosTgtPassing, +#endif +#ifdef AFS + sAFSTokenPassing, +#endif + sChallengeResponseAuthentication, + sPasswordAuthentication, sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, sListenAddress, + sPrintMotd, sPrintLastLog, sIgnoreRhosts, + sX11Forwarding, sX11DisplayOffset, + sStrictModes, sEmptyPasswd, sKeepAlives, + sUseLogin, sAllowTcpForwarding, + sAllowUsers, sDenyUsers, sAllowGroups, sDenyGroups, + sIgnoreUserKnownHosts, sCiphers, sMacs, sProtocol, sPidFile, + sGatewayPorts, sPubkeyAuthentication, sXAuthLocation, sSubsystem, sMaxStartups, + sBanner, sReverseMappingCheck, sHostbasedAuthentication, + sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, sClientAliveInterval, + sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile, sAuthorizedKeysFile2, + sDeprecated +} ServerOpCodes; + +/* Textual representation of the tokens. */ +static struct { + const char *name; + ServerOpCodes opcode; +} keywords[] = { + /* Portable-specific options */ + { "PAMAuthenticationViaKbdInt", sPAMAuthenticationViaKbdInt }, + /* Standard Options */ + { "port", sPort }, + { "hostkey", sHostKeyFile }, + { "hostdsakey", sHostKeyFile }, /* alias */ + { "pidfile", sPidFile }, + { "serverkeybits", sServerKeyBits }, + { "logingracetime", sLoginGraceTime }, + { "keyregenerationinterval", sKeyRegenerationTime }, + { "permitrootlogin", sPermitRootLogin }, + { "syslogfacility", sLogFacility }, + { "loglevel", sLogLevel }, + { "rhostsauthentication", sRhostsAuthentication }, + { "rhostsrsaauthentication", sRhostsRSAAuthentication }, + { "hostbasedauthentication", sHostbasedAuthentication }, + { "hostbasedusesnamefrompacketonly", sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly }, + { "rsaauthentication", sRSAAuthentication }, + { "pubkeyauthentication", sPubkeyAuthentication }, + { "dsaauthentication", sPubkeyAuthentication }, /* alias */ +#if defined(KRB4) || defined(KRB5) + { "kerberosauthentication", sKerberosAuthentication }, + { "kerberosorlocalpasswd", sKerberosOrLocalPasswd }, + { "kerberosticketcleanup", sKerberosTicketCleanup }, +#endif +#if defined(AFS) || defined(KRB5) + { "kerberostgtpassing", sKerberosTgtPassing }, +#endif +#ifdef AFS + { "afstokenpassing", sAFSTokenPassing }, +#endif + { "passwordauthentication", sPasswordAuthentication }, + { "kbdinteractiveauthentication", sKbdInteractiveAuthentication }, + { "challengeresponseauthentication", sChallengeResponseAuthentication }, + { "skeyauthentication", sChallengeResponseAuthentication }, /* alias */ + { "checkmail", sDeprecated }, + { "listenaddress", sListenAddress }, + { "printmotd", sPrintMotd }, + { "printlastlog", sPrintLastLog }, + { "ignorerhosts", sIgnoreRhosts }, + { "ignoreuserknownhosts", sIgnoreUserKnownHosts }, + { "x11forwarding", sX11Forwarding }, + { "x11displayoffset", sX11DisplayOffset }, + { "xauthlocation", sXAuthLocation }, + { "strictmodes", sStrictModes }, + { "permitemptypasswords", sEmptyPasswd }, + { "uselogin", sUseLogin }, + { "keepalive", sKeepAlives }, + { "allowtcpforwarding", sAllowTcpForwarding }, + { "allowusers", sAllowUsers }, + { "denyusers", sDenyUsers }, + { "allowgroups", sAllowGroups }, + { "denygroups", sDenyGroups }, + { "ciphers", sCiphers }, + { "macs", sMacs }, + { "protocol", sProtocol }, + { "gatewayports", sGatewayPorts }, + { "subsystem", sSubsystem }, + { "maxstartups", sMaxStartups }, + { "banner", sBanner }, + { "reversemappingcheck", sReverseMappingCheck }, + { "clientaliveinterval", sClientAliveInterval }, + { "clientalivecountmax", sClientAliveCountMax }, + { "authorizedkeysfile", sAuthorizedKeysFile }, + { "authorizedkeysfile2", sAuthorizedKeysFile2 }, + { NULL, 0 } +}; + +/* + * Returns the number of the token pointed to by cp or sBadOption. + */ + +static ServerOpCodes +parse_token(const char *cp, const char *filename, + int linenum) +{ + u_int i; + + for (i = 0; keywords[i].name; i++) + if (strcasecmp(cp, keywords[i].name) == 0) + return keywords[i].opcode; + + error("%s: line %d: Bad configuration option: %s", + filename, linenum, cp); + return sBadOption; +} + +static void +add_listen_addr(ServerOptions *options, char *addr, u_short port) +{ + int i; + + if (options->num_ports == 0) + options->ports[options->num_ports++] = SSH_DEFAULT_PORT; + if (port == 0) + for (i = 0; i < options->num_ports; i++) + add_one_listen_addr(options, addr, options->ports[i]); + else + add_one_listen_addr(options, addr, port); +} + +static void +add_one_listen_addr(ServerOptions *options, char *addr, u_short port) +{ + struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop; + char strport[NI_MAXSERV]; + int gaierr; + + memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); + hints.ai_family = IPv4or6; + hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; + hints.ai_flags = (addr == NULL) ? AI_PASSIVE : 0; + snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", port); + if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(addr, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0) + fatal("bad addr or host: %s (%s)", + addr ? addr : "", + gai_strerror(gaierr)); + for (ai = aitop; ai->ai_next; ai = ai->ai_next) + ; + ai->ai_next = options->listen_addrs; + options->listen_addrs = aitop; +} + +/* Reads the server configuration file. */ + +void +read_server_config(ServerOptions *options, const char *filename) +{ + FILE *f; + char line[1024]; + char *cp, **charptr, *arg, *p; + int linenum, *intptr, value; + int bad_options = 0; + ServerOpCodes opcode; + int i, n; + + f = fopen(filename, "r"); + if (!f) { + perror(filename); + exit(1); + } + linenum = 0; + while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), f)) { + linenum++; + cp = line; + arg = strdelim(&cp); + /* Ignore leading whitespace */ + if (*arg == '\0') + arg = strdelim(&cp); + if (!arg || !*arg || *arg == '#') + continue; + intptr = NULL; + charptr = NULL; + opcode = parse_token(arg, filename, linenum); + switch (opcode) { + case sBadOption: + bad_options++; + continue; + + /* Portable-specific options */ + case sPAMAuthenticationViaKbdInt: + intptr = &options->pam_authentication_via_kbd_int; + goto parse_flag; + + /* Standard Options */ + case sPort: + /* ignore ports from configfile if cmdline specifies ports */ + if (options->ports_from_cmdline) + continue; + if (options->listen_addrs != NULL) + fatal("%s line %d: ports must be specified before " + "ListenAdress.", filename, linenum); + if (options->num_ports >= MAX_PORTS) + fatal("%s line %d: too many ports.", + filename, linenum); + arg = strdelim(&cp); + if (!arg || *arg == '\0') + fatal("%s line %d: missing port number.", + filename, linenum); + options->ports[options->num_ports++] = a2port(arg); + if (options->ports[options->num_ports-1] == 0) + fatal("%s line %d: Badly formatted port number.", + filename, linenum); + break; + + case sServerKeyBits: + intptr = &options->server_key_bits; +parse_int: + arg = strdelim(&cp); + if (!arg || *arg == '\0') + fatal("%s line %d: missing integer value.", + filename, linenum); + value = atoi(arg); + if (*intptr == -1) + *intptr = value; + break; + + case sLoginGraceTime: + intptr = &options->login_grace_time; +parse_time: + arg = strdelim(&cp); + if (!arg || *arg == '\0') + fatal("%s line %d: missing time value.", + filename, linenum); + if ((value = convtime(arg)) == -1) + fatal("%s line %d: invalid time value.", + filename, linenum); + if (*intptr == -1) + *intptr = value; + break; + + case sKeyRegenerationTime: + intptr = &options->key_regeneration_time; + goto parse_time; + + case sListenAddress: + arg = strdelim(&cp); + if (!arg || *arg == '\0' || strncmp(arg, "[]", 2) == 0) + fatal("%s line %d: missing inet addr.", + filename, linenum); + if (*arg == '[') { + if ((p = strchr(arg, ']')) == NULL) + fatal("%s line %d: bad ipv6 inet addr usage.", + filename, linenum); + arg++; + memmove(p, p+1, strlen(p+1)+1); + } else if (((p = strchr(arg, ':')) == NULL) || + (strchr(p+1, ':') != NULL)) { + add_listen_addr(options, arg, 0); + break; + } + if (*p == ':') { + u_short port; + + p++; + if (*p == '\0') + fatal("%s line %d: bad inet addr:port usage.", + filename, linenum); + else { + *(p-1) = '\0'; + if ((port = a2port(p)) == 0) + fatal("%s line %d: bad port number.", + filename, linenum); + add_listen_addr(options, arg, port); + } + } else if (*p == '\0') + add_listen_addr(options, arg, 0); + else + fatal("%s line %d: bad inet addr usage.", + filename, linenum); + break; + + case sHostKeyFile: + intptr = &options->num_host_key_files; + if (*intptr >= MAX_HOSTKEYS) + fatal("%s line %d: too many host keys specified (max %d).", + filename, linenum, MAX_HOSTKEYS); + charptr = &options->host_key_files[*intptr]; +parse_filename: + arg = strdelim(&cp); + if (!arg || *arg == '\0') + fatal("%s line %d: missing file name.", + filename, linenum); + if (*charptr == NULL) { + *charptr = tilde_expand_filename(arg, getuid()); + /* increase optional counter */ + if (intptr != NULL) + *intptr = *intptr + 1; + } + break; + + case sPidFile: + charptr = &options->pid_file; + goto parse_filename; + + case sPermitRootLogin: + intptr = &options->permit_root_login; + arg = strdelim(&cp); + if (!arg || *arg == '\0') + fatal("%s line %d: missing yes/" + "without-password/forced-commands-only/no " + "argument.", filename, linenum); + value = 0; /* silence compiler */ + if (strcmp(arg, "without-password") == 0) + value = PERMIT_NO_PASSWD; + else if (strcmp(arg, "forced-commands-only") == 0) + value = PERMIT_FORCED_ONLY; + else if (strcmp(arg, "yes") == 0) + value = PERMIT_YES; + else if (strcmp(arg, "no") == 0) + value = PERMIT_NO; + else + fatal("%s line %d: Bad yes/" + "without-password/forced-commands-only/no " + "argument: %s", filename, linenum, arg); + if (*intptr == -1) + *intptr = value; + break; + + case sIgnoreRhosts: + intptr = &options->ignore_rhosts; +parse_flag: + arg = strdelim(&cp); + if (!arg || *arg == '\0') + fatal("%s line %d: missing yes/no argument.", + filename, linenum); + value = 0; /* silence compiler */ + if (strcmp(arg, "yes") == 0) + value = 1; + else if (strcmp(arg, "no") == 0) + value = 0; + else + fatal("%s line %d: Bad yes/no argument: %s", + filename, linenum, arg); + if (*intptr == -1) + *intptr = value; + break; + + case sIgnoreUserKnownHosts: + intptr = &options->ignore_user_known_hosts; + goto parse_flag; + + case sRhostsAuthentication: + intptr = &options->rhosts_authentication; + goto parse_flag; + + case sRhostsRSAAuthentication: + intptr = &options->rhosts_rsa_authentication; + goto parse_flag; + + case sHostbasedAuthentication: + intptr = &options->hostbased_authentication; + goto parse_flag; + + case sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly: + intptr = &options->hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only; + goto parse_flag; + + case sRSAAuthentication: + intptr = &options->rsa_authentication; + goto parse_flag; + + case sPubkeyAuthentication: + intptr = &options->pubkey_authentication; + goto parse_flag; +#if defined(KRB4) || defined(KRB5) + case sKerberosAuthentication: + intptr = &options->kerberos_authentication; + goto parse_flag; + + case sKerberosOrLocalPasswd: + intptr = &options->kerberos_or_local_passwd; + goto parse_flag; + + case sKerberosTicketCleanup: + intptr = &options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup; + goto parse_flag; +#endif +#if defined(AFS) || defined(KRB5) + case sKerberosTgtPassing: + intptr = &options->kerberos_tgt_passing; + goto parse_flag; +#endif +#ifdef AFS + case sAFSTokenPassing: + intptr = &options->afs_token_passing; + goto parse_flag; +#endif + + case sPasswordAuthentication: + intptr = &options->password_authentication; + goto parse_flag; + + case sKbdInteractiveAuthentication: + intptr = &options->kbd_interactive_authentication; + goto parse_flag; + + case sChallengeResponseAuthentication: + intptr = &options->challenge_response_authentication; + goto parse_flag; + + case sPrintMotd: + intptr = &options->print_motd; + goto parse_flag; + + case sPrintLastLog: + intptr = &options->print_lastlog; + goto parse_flag; + + case sX11Forwarding: + intptr = &options->x11_forwarding; + goto parse_flag; + + case sX11DisplayOffset: + intptr = &options->x11_display_offset; + goto parse_int; + + case sXAuthLocation: + charptr = &options->xauth_location; + goto parse_filename; + + case sStrictModes: + intptr = &options->strict_modes; + goto parse_flag; + + case sKeepAlives: + intptr = &options->keepalives; + goto parse_flag; + + case sEmptyPasswd: + intptr = &options->permit_empty_passwd; + goto parse_flag; + + case sUseLogin: + intptr = &options->use_login; + goto parse_flag; + + case sGatewayPorts: + intptr = &options->gateway_ports; + goto parse_flag; + + case sReverseMappingCheck: + intptr = &options->reverse_mapping_check; + goto parse_flag; + + case sLogFacility: + intptr = (int *) &options->log_facility; + arg = strdelim(&cp); + value = log_facility_number(arg); + if (value == (SyslogFacility) - 1) + fatal("%.200s line %d: unsupported log facility '%s'", + filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); + if (*intptr == -1) + *intptr = (SyslogFacility) value; + break; + + case sLogLevel: + intptr = (int *) &options->log_level; + arg = strdelim(&cp); + value = log_level_number(arg); + if (value == (LogLevel) - 1) + fatal("%.200s line %d: unsupported log level '%s'", + filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); + if (*intptr == -1) + *intptr = (LogLevel) value; + break; + + case sAllowTcpForwarding: + intptr = &options->allow_tcp_forwarding; + goto parse_flag; + + case sAllowUsers: + while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') { + if (options->num_allow_users >= MAX_ALLOW_USERS) + fatal("%s line %d: too many allow users.", + filename, linenum); + options->allow_users[options->num_allow_users++] = xstrdup(arg); + } + break; + + case sDenyUsers: + while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') { + if (options->num_deny_users >= MAX_DENY_USERS) + fatal( "%s line %d: too many deny users.", + filename, linenum); + options->deny_users[options->num_deny_users++] = xstrdup(arg); + } + break; + + case sAllowGroups: + while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') { + if (options->num_allow_groups >= MAX_ALLOW_GROUPS) + fatal("%s line %d: too many allow groups.", + filename, linenum); + options->allow_groups[options->num_allow_groups++] = xstrdup(arg); + } + break; + + case sDenyGroups: + while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') { + if (options->num_deny_groups >= MAX_DENY_GROUPS) + fatal("%s line %d: too many deny groups.", + filename, linenum); + options->deny_groups[options->num_deny_groups++] = xstrdup(arg); + } + break; + + case sCiphers: + arg = strdelim(&cp); + if (!arg || *arg == '\0') + fatal("%s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); + if (!ciphers_valid(arg)) + fatal("%s line %d: Bad SSH2 cipher spec '%s'.", + filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); + if (options->ciphers == NULL) + options->ciphers = xstrdup(arg); + break; + + case sMacs: + arg = strdelim(&cp); + if (!arg || *arg == '\0') + fatal("%s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); + if (!mac_valid(arg)) + fatal("%s line %d: Bad SSH2 mac spec '%s'.", + filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); + if (options->macs == NULL) + options->macs = xstrdup(arg); + break; + + case sProtocol: + intptr = &options->protocol; + arg = strdelim(&cp); + if (!arg || *arg == '\0') + fatal("%s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); + value = proto_spec(arg); + if (value == SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN) + fatal("%s line %d: Bad protocol spec '%s'.", + filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); + if (*intptr == SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN) + *intptr = value; + break; + + case sSubsystem: + if(options->num_subsystems >= MAX_SUBSYSTEMS) { + fatal("%s line %d: too many subsystems defined.", + filename, linenum); + } + arg = strdelim(&cp); + if (!arg || *arg == '\0') + fatal("%s line %d: Missing subsystem name.", + filename, linenum); + for (i = 0; i < options->num_subsystems; i++) + if(strcmp(arg, options->subsystem_name[i]) == 0) + fatal("%s line %d: Subsystem '%s' already defined.", + filename, linenum, arg); + options->subsystem_name[options->num_subsystems] = xstrdup(arg); + arg = strdelim(&cp); + if (!arg || *arg == '\0') + fatal("%s line %d: Missing subsystem command.", + filename, linenum); + options->subsystem_command[options->num_subsystems] = xstrdup(arg); + options->num_subsystems++; + break; + + case sMaxStartups: + arg = strdelim(&cp); + if (!arg || *arg == '\0') + fatal("%s line %d: Missing MaxStartups spec.", + filename, linenum); + if ((n = sscanf(arg, "%d:%d:%d", + &options->max_startups_begin, + &options->max_startups_rate, + &options->max_startups)) == 3) { + if (options->max_startups_begin > + options->max_startups || + options->max_startups_rate > 100 || + options->max_startups_rate < 1) + fatal("%s line %d: Illegal MaxStartups spec.", + filename, linenum); + } else if (n != 1) + fatal("%s line %d: Illegal MaxStartups spec.", + filename, linenum); + else + options->max_startups = options->max_startups_begin; + break; + + case sBanner: + charptr = &options->banner; + goto parse_filename; + /* + * These options can contain %X options expanded at + * connect time, so that you can specify paths like: + * + * AuthorizedKeysFile /etc/ssh_keys/%u + */ + case sAuthorizedKeysFile: + case sAuthorizedKeysFile2: + charptr = (opcode == sAuthorizedKeysFile ) ? + &options->authorized_keys_file : + &options->authorized_keys_file2; + goto parse_filename; + + case sClientAliveInterval: + intptr = &options->client_alive_interval; + goto parse_time; + + case sClientAliveCountMax: + intptr = &options->client_alive_count_max; + goto parse_int; + + case sDeprecated: + log("%s line %d: Deprecated option %s", + filename, linenum, arg); + while(arg) + arg = strdelim(&cp); + break; + + default: + fatal("%s line %d: Missing handler for opcode %s (%d)", + filename, linenum, arg, opcode); + } + if ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) != NULL && *arg != '\0') + fatal("%s line %d: garbage at end of line; \"%.200s\".", + filename, linenum, arg); + } + fclose(f); + if (bad_options > 0) + fatal("%s: terminating, %d bad configuration options", + filename, bad_options); +} diff --git a/openssh/servconf.h b/openssh/servconf.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2e10b1c --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/servconf.h @@ -0,0 +1,139 @@ +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * Definitions for server configuration data and for the functions reading it. + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + */ + +/* RCSID("$OpenBSD: servconf.h,v 1.49 2001/08/17 18:59:47 stevesk Exp $"); */ + +#ifndef SERVCONF_H +#define SERVCONF_H + +#define MAX_PORTS 256 /* Max # ports. */ + +#define MAX_ALLOW_USERS 256 /* Max # users on allow list. */ +#define MAX_DENY_USERS 256 /* Max # users on deny list. */ +#define MAX_ALLOW_GROUPS 256 /* Max # groups on allow list. */ +#define MAX_DENY_GROUPS 256 /* Max # groups on deny list. */ +#define MAX_SUBSYSTEMS 256 /* Max # subsystems. */ +#define MAX_HOSTKEYS 256 /* Max # hostkeys. */ + +/* permit_root_login */ +#define PERMIT_NOT_SET -1 +#define PERMIT_NO 0 +#define PERMIT_FORCED_ONLY 1 +#define PERMIT_NO_PASSWD 2 +#define PERMIT_YES 3 + + +typedef struct { + u_int num_ports; + u_int ports_from_cmdline; + u_short ports[MAX_PORTS]; /* Port number to listen on. */ + char *listen_addr; /* Address on which the server listens. */ + struct addrinfo *listen_addrs; /* Addresses on which the server listens. */ + char *host_key_files[MAX_HOSTKEYS]; /* Files containing host keys. */ + int num_host_key_files; /* Number of files for host keys. */ + char *pid_file; /* Where to put our pid */ + int server_key_bits;/* Size of the server key. */ + int login_grace_time; /* Disconnect if no auth in this time + * (sec). */ + int key_regeneration_time; /* Server key lifetime (seconds). */ + int permit_root_login; /* PERMIT_*, see above */ + int ignore_rhosts; /* Ignore .rhosts and .shosts. */ + int ignore_user_known_hosts; /* Ignore ~/.ssh/known_hosts + * for RhostsRsaAuth */ + int print_motd; /* If true, print /etc/motd. */ + int print_lastlog; /* If true, print lastlog */ + int x11_forwarding; /* If true, permit inet (spoofing) X11 fwd. */ + int x11_display_offset; /* What DISPLAY number to start + * searching at */ + char *xauth_location; /* Location of xauth program */ + int strict_modes; /* If true, require string home dir modes. */ + int keepalives; /* If true, set SO_KEEPALIVE. */ + char *ciphers; /* Supported SSH2 ciphers. */ + char *macs; /* Supported SSH2 macs. */ + int protocol; /* Supported protocol versions. */ + int gateway_ports; /* If true, allow remote connects to forwarded ports. */ + SyslogFacility log_facility; /* Facility for system logging. */ + LogLevel log_level; /* Level for system logging. */ + int rhosts_authentication; /* If true, permit rhosts + * authentication. */ + int rhosts_rsa_authentication; /* If true, permit rhosts RSA + * authentication. */ + int hostbased_authentication; /* If true, permit ssh2 hostbased auth */ + int hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only; /* experimental */ + int rsa_authentication; /* If true, permit RSA authentication. */ + int pubkey_authentication; /* If true, permit ssh2 pubkey authentication. */ +#if defined(KRB4) || defined(KRB5) + int kerberos_authentication; /* If true, permit Kerberos + * authentication. */ + int kerberos_or_local_passwd; /* If true, permit kerberos + * and any other password + * authentication mechanism, + * such as SecurID or + * /etc/passwd */ + int kerberos_ticket_cleanup; /* If true, destroy ticket + * file on logout. */ +#endif +#if defined(AFS) || defined(KRB5) + int kerberos_tgt_passing; /* If true, permit Kerberos TGT + * passing. */ +#endif +#ifdef AFS + int afs_token_passing; /* If true, permit AFS token passing. */ +#endif + int password_authentication; /* If true, permit password + * authentication. */ + int kbd_interactive_authentication; /* If true, permit */ + int challenge_response_authentication; + int permit_empty_passwd; /* If false, do not permit empty + * passwords. */ + int use_login; /* If true, login(1) is used */ + int allow_tcp_forwarding; + u_int num_allow_users; + char *allow_users[MAX_ALLOW_USERS]; + u_int num_deny_users; + char *deny_users[MAX_DENY_USERS]; + u_int num_allow_groups; + char *allow_groups[MAX_ALLOW_GROUPS]; + u_int num_deny_groups; + char *deny_groups[MAX_DENY_GROUPS]; + + u_int num_subsystems; + char *subsystem_name[MAX_SUBSYSTEMS]; + char *subsystem_command[MAX_SUBSYSTEMS]; + + int max_startups_begin; + int max_startups_rate; + int max_startups; + char *banner; /* SSH-2 banner message */ + int reverse_mapping_check; /* cross-check ip and dns */ + int client_alive_interval; /* + * poke the client this often to + * see if it's still there + */ + int client_alive_count_max; /* + * If the client is unresponsive + * for this many intervals above, + * disconnect the session + */ + + char *authorized_keys_file; /* File containing public keys */ + char *authorized_keys_file2; + int pam_authentication_via_kbd_int; + +} ServerOptions; + +void initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *); +void read_server_config(ServerOptions *, const char *); +void fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *); + +#endif /* SERVCONF_H */ diff --git a/openssh/serverloop.c b/openssh/serverloop.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0da805f --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/serverloop.c @@ -0,0 +1,1009 @@ +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * Server main loop for handling the interactive session. + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + * + * SSH2 support by Markus Friedl. + * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" +RCSID("$OpenBSD: serverloop.c,v 1.83 2001/11/09 18:59:23 markus Exp $"); + +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "packet.h" +#include "buffer.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "servconf.h" +#include "sshpty.h" +#include "channels.h" +#include "compat.h" +#include "ssh1.h" +#include "ssh2.h" +#include "auth.h" +#include "session.h" +#include "dispatch.h" +#include "auth-options.h" +#include "serverloop.h" +#include "misc.h" +#include "kex.h" + +extern ServerOptions options; + +/* XXX */ +extern Kex *xxx_kex; +static Authctxt *xxx_authctxt; + +static Buffer stdin_buffer; /* Buffer for stdin data. */ +static Buffer stdout_buffer; /* Buffer for stdout data. */ +static Buffer stderr_buffer; /* Buffer for stderr data. */ +static int fdin; /* Descriptor for stdin (for writing) */ +static int fdout; /* Descriptor for stdout (for reading); + May be same number as fdin. */ +static int fderr; /* Descriptor for stderr. May be -1. */ +static long stdin_bytes = 0; /* Number of bytes written to stdin. */ +static long stdout_bytes = 0; /* Number of stdout bytes sent to client. */ +static long stderr_bytes = 0; /* Number of stderr bytes sent to client. */ +static long fdout_bytes = 0; /* Number of stdout bytes read from program. */ +static int stdin_eof = 0; /* EOF message received from client. */ +static int fdout_eof = 0; /* EOF encountered reading from fdout. */ +static int fderr_eof = 0; /* EOF encountered readung from fderr. */ +static int fdin_is_tty = 0; /* fdin points to a tty. */ +static int connection_in; /* Connection to client (input). */ +static int connection_out; /* Connection to client (output). */ +static int connection_closed = 0; /* Connection to client closed. */ +static u_int buffer_high; /* "Soft" max buffer size. */ +static int client_alive_timeouts = 0; + +/* + * This SIGCHLD kludge is used to detect when the child exits. The server + * will exit after that, as soon as forwarded connections have terminated. + */ + +static volatile int child_terminated; /* The child has terminated. */ + +/* prototypes */ +static void server_init_dispatch(void); + +static void +sigchld_handler(int sig) +{ + int save_errno = errno; + debug("Received SIGCHLD."); + child_terminated = 1; + mysignal(SIGCHLD, sigchld_handler); + errno = save_errno; +} + +/* + * Make packets from buffered stderr data, and buffer it for sending + * to the client. + */ +static void +make_packets_from_stderr_data(void) +{ + int len; + + /* Send buffered stderr data to the client. */ + while (buffer_len(&stderr_buffer) > 0 && + packet_not_very_much_data_to_write()) { + len = buffer_len(&stderr_buffer); + if (packet_is_interactive()) { + if (len > 512) + len = 512; + } else { + /* Keep the packets at reasonable size. */ + if (len > packet_get_maxsize()) + len = packet_get_maxsize(); + } + packet_start(SSH_SMSG_STDERR_DATA); + packet_put_string(buffer_ptr(&stderr_buffer), len); + packet_send(); + buffer_consume(&stderr_buffer, len); + stderr_bytes += len; + } +} + +/* + * Make packets from buffered stdout data, and buffer it for sending to the + * client. + */ +static void +make_packets_from_stdout_data(void) +{ + int len; + + /* Send buffered stdout data to the client. */ + while (buffer_len(&stdout_buffer) > 0 && + packet_not_very_much_data_to_write()) { + len = buffer_len(&stdout_buffer); + if (packet_is_interactive()) { + if (len > 512) + len = 512; + } else { + /* Keep the packets at reasonable size. */ + if (len > packet_get_maxsize()) + len = packet_get_maxsize(); + } + packet_start(SSH_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA); + packet_put_string(buffer_ptr(&stdout_buffer), len); + packet_send(); + buffer_consume(&stdout_buffer, len); + stdout_bytes += len; + } +} + +static void +client_alive_check(void) +{ + int id; + + /* timeout, check to see how many we have had */ + if (++client_alive_timeouts > options.client_alive_count_max) + packet_disconnect("Timeout, your session not responding."); + + id = channel_find_open(); + if (id == -1) + packet_disconnect("No open channels after timeout!"); + /* + * send a bogus channel request with "wantreply", + * we should get back a failure + */ + channel_request_start(id, "keepalive@openssh.com", 1); + packet_send(); +} + +/* + * Sleep in select() until we can do something. This will initialize the + * select masks. Upon return, the masks will indicate which descriptors + * have data or can accept data. Optionally, a maximum time can be specified + * for the duration of the wait (0 = infinite). + */ +static void +wait_until_can_do_something(fd_set **readsetp, fd_set **writesetp, int *maxfdp, + int *nallocp, u_int max_time_milliseconds) +{ + struct timeval tv, *tvp; + int ret; + int client_alive_scheduled = 0; + + /* + * if using client_alive, set the max timeout accordingly, + * and indicate that this particular timeout was for client + * alive by setting the client_alive_scheduled flag. + * + * this could be randomized somewhat to make traffic + * analysis more difficult, but we're not doing it yet. + */ + if (compat20 && + max_time_milliseconds == 0 && options.client_alive_interval) { + client_alive_scheduled = 1; + max_time_milliseconds = options.client_alive_interval * 1000; + } + + /* Allocate and update select() masks for channel descriptors. */ + channel_prepare_select(readsetp, writesetp, maxfdp, nallocp, 0); + + if (compat20) { +#if 0 + /* wrong: bad condition XXX */ + if (channel_not_very_much_buffered_data()) +#endif + FD_SET(connection_in, *readsetp); + } else { + /* + * Read packets from the client unless we have too much + * buffered stdin or channel data. + */ + if (buffer_len(&stdin_buffer) < buffer_high && + channel_not_very_much_buffered_data()) + FD_SET(connection_in, *readsetp); + /* + * If there is not too much data already buffered going to + * the client, try to get some more data from the program. + */ + if (packet_not_very_much_data_to_write()) { + if (!fdout_eof) + FD_SET(fdout, *readsetp); + if (!fderr_eof) + FD_SET(fderr, *readsetp); + } + /* + * If we have buffered data, try to write some of that data + * to the program. + */ + if (fdin != -1 && buffer_len(&stdin_buffer) > 0) + FD_SET(fdin, *writesetp); + } + + /* + * If we have buffered packet data going to the client, mark that + * descriptor. + */ + if (packet_have_data_to_write()) + FD_SET(connection_out, *writesetp); + + /* + * If child has terminated and there is enough buffer space to read + * from it, then read as much as is available and exit. + */ + if (child_terminated && packet_not_very_much_data_to_write()) + if (max_time_milliseconds == 0 || client_alive_scheduled) + max_time_milliseconds = 100; + + if (max_time_milliseconds == 0) + tvp = NULL; + else { + tv.tv_sec = max_time_milliseconds / 1000; + tv.tv_usec = 1000 * (max_time_milliseconds % 1000); + tvp = &tv; + } + if (tvp!=NULL) + debug3("tvp!=NULL kid %d mili %d", child_terminated, max_time_milliseconds); + + /* Wait for something to happen, or the timeout to expire. */ + ret = select((*maxfdp)+1, *readsetp, *writesetp, NULL, tvp); + + if (ret == -1) { + memset(*readsetp, 0, *nallocp); + memset(*writesetp, 0, *nallocp); + if (errno != EINTR) + error("select: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + } else if (ret == 0 && client_alive_scheduled) + client_alive_check(); +} + +/* + * Processes input from the client and the program. Input data is stored + * in buffers and processed later. + */ +static void +process_input(fd_set * readset) +{ + int len; + char buf[16384]; + + /* Read and buffer any input data from the client. */ + if (FD_ISSET(connection_in, readset)) { + len = read(connection_in, buf, sizeof(buf)); + if (len == 0) { + verbose("Connection closed by remote host."); + connection_closed = 1; + if (compat20) + return; + fatal_cleanup(); + } else if (len < 0) { + if (errno != EINTR && errno != EAGAIN) { + verbose("Read error from remote host: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + fatal_cleanup(); + } + } else { + /* Buffer any received data. */ + packet_process_incoming(buf, len); + } + } + if (compat20) + return; + + /* Read and buffer any available stdout data from the program. */ + if (!fdout_eof && FD_ISSET(fdout, readset)) { + len = read(fdout, buf, sizeof(buf)); + if (len < 0 && (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN)) { + /* do nothing */ + } else if (len <= 0) { + fdout_eof = 1; + } else { + buffer_append(&stdout_buffer, buf, len); + fdout_bytes += len; + } + } + /* Read and buffer any available stderr data from the program. */ + if (!fderr_eof && FD_ISSET(fderr, readset)) { + len = read(fderr, buf, sizeof(buf)); + if (len < 0 && (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN)) { + /* do nothing */ + } else if (len <= 0) { + fderr_eof = 1; + } else { + buffer_append(&stderr_buffer, buf, len); + } + } +} + +/* + * Sends data from internal buffers to client program stdin. + */ +static void +process_output(fd_set * writeset) +{ + struct termios tio; + u_char *data; + u_int dlen; + int len; + + /* Write buffered data to program stdin. */ + if (!compat20 && fdin != -1 && FD_ISSET(fdin, writeset)) { + data = buffer_ptr(&stdin_buffer); + dlen = buffer_len(&stdin_buffer); + len = write(fdin, data, dlen); + if (len < 0 && (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN)) { + /* do nothing */ + } else if (len <= 0) { +#ifdef USE_PIPES + close(fdin); +#else + if (fdin != fdout) + close(fdin); + else + shutdown(fdin, SHUT_WR); /* We will no longer send. */ +#endif + fdin = -1; + } else { + /* Successful write. */ + if (fdin_is_tty && dlen >= 1 && data[0] != '\r' && + tcgetattr(fdin, &tio) == 0 && + !(tio.c_lflag & ECHO) && (tio.c_lflag & ICANON)) { + /* + * Simulate echo to reduce the impact of + * traffic analysis + */ + packet_send_ignore(len); + packet_send(); + } + /* Consume the data from the buffer. */ + buffer_consume(&stdin_buffer, len); + /* Update the count of bytes written to the program. */ + stdin_bytes += len; + } + } + /* Send any buffered packet data to the client. */ + if (FD_ISSET(connection_out, writeset)) + packet_write_poll(); +} + +/* + * Wait until all buffered output has been sent to the client. + * This is used when the program terminates. + */ +static void +drain_output(void) +{ + /* Send any buffered stdout data to the client. */ + if (buffer_len(&stdout_buffer) > 0) { + packet_start(SSH_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA); + packet_put_string(buffer_ptr(&stdout_buffer), + buffer_len(&stdout_buffer)); + packet_send(); + /* Update the count of sent bytes. */ + stdout_bytes += buffer_len(&stdout_buffer); + } + /* Send any buffered stderr data to the client. */ + if (buffer_len(&stderr_buffer) > 0) { + packet_start(SSH_SMSG_STDERR_DATA); + packet_put_string(buffer_ptr(&stderr_buffer), + buffer_len(&stderr_buffer)); + packet_send(); + /* Update the count of sent bytes. */ + stderr_bytes += buffer_len(&stderr_buffer); + } + /* Wait until all buffered data has been written to the client. */ + packet_write_wait(); +} + +static void +process_buffered_input_packets(void) +{ + dispatch_run(DISPATCH_NONBLOCK, NULL, compat20 ? xxx_kex : NULL); +} + +/* + * Performs the interactive session. This handles data transmission between + * the client and the program. Note that the notion of stdin, stdout, and + * stderr in this function is sort of reversed: this function writes to + * stdin (of the child program), and reads from stdout and stderr (of the + * child program). + */ +void +server_loop(pid_t pid, int fdin_arg, int fdout_arg, int fderr_arg) +{ + fd_set *readset = NULL, *writeset = NULL; + int max_fd = 0, nalloc = 0; + int wait_status; /* Status returned by wait(). */ + pid_t wait_pid; /* pid returned by wait(). */ + int waiting_termination = 0; /* Have displayed waiting close message. */ + u_int max_time_milliseconds; + u_int previous_stdout_buffer_bytes; + u_int stdout_buffer_bytes; + int type; + + debug("Entering interactive session."); + + /* Initialize the SIGCHLD kludge. */ + child_terminated = 0; + mysignal(SIGCHLD, sigchld_handler); + + /* Initialize our global variables. */ + fdin = fdin_arg; + fdout = fdout_arg; + fderr = fderr_arg; + + /* nonblocking IO */ + set_nonblock(fdin); + set_nonblock(fdout); + /* we don't have stderr for interactive terminal sessions, see below */ + if (fderr != -1) + set_nonblock(fderr); + + if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_IGNOREMSG) && isatty(fdin)) + fdin_is_tty = 1; + + connection_in = packet_get_connection_in(); + connection_out = packet_get_connection_out(); + + previous_stdout_buffer_bytes = 0; + + /* Set approximate I/O buffer size. */ + if (packet_is_interactive()) + buffer_high = 4096; + else + buffer_high = 64 * 1024; + +#if 0 + /* Initialize max_fd to the maximum of the known file descriptors. */ + max_fd = MAX(connection_in, connection_out); + max_fd = MAX(max_fd, fdin); + max_fd = MAX(max_fd, fdout); + if (fderr != -1) + max_fd = MAX(max_fd, fderr); +#endif + + /* Initialize Initialize buffers. */ + buffer_init(&stdin_buffer); + buffer_init(&stdout_buffer); + buffer_init(&stderr_buffer); + + /* + * If we have no separate fderr (which is the case when we have a pty + * - there we cannot make difference between data sent to stdout and + * stderr), indicate that we have seen an EOF from stderr. This way + * we don\'t need to check the descriptor everywhere. + */ + if (fderr == -1) + fderr_eof = 1; + + server_init_dispatch(); + + /* Main loop of the server for the interactive session mode. */ + for (;;) { + + /* Process buffered packets from the client. */ + process_buffered_input_packets(); + + /* + * If we have received eof, and there is no more pending + * input data, cause a real eof by closing fdin. + */ + if (stdin_eof && fdin != -1 && buffer_len(&stdin_buffer) == 0) { +#ifdef USE_PIPES + close(fdin); +#else + if (fdin != fdout) + close(fdin); + else + shutdown(fdin, SHUT_WR); /* We will no longer send. */ +#endif + fdin = -1; + } + /* Make packets from buffered stderr data to send to the client. */ + make_packets_from_stderr_data(); + + /* + * Make packets from buffered stdout data to send to the + * client. If there is very little to send, this arranges to + * not send them now, but to wait a short while to see if we + * are getting more data. This is necessary, as some systems + * wake up readers from a pty after each separate character. + */ + max_time_milliseconds = 0; + stdout_buffer_bytes = buffer_len(&stdout_buffer); + if (stdout_buffer_bytes != 0 && stdout_buffer_bytes < 256 && + stdout_buffer_bytes != previous_stdout_buffer_bytes) { + /* try again after a while */ + max_time_milliseconds = 10; + } else { + /* Send it now. */ + make_packets_from_stdout_data(); + } + previous_stdout_buffer_bytes = buffer_len(&stdout_buffer); + + /* Send channel data to the client. */ + if (packet_not_very_much_data_to_write()) + channel_output_poll(); + + /* + * Bail out of the loop if the program has closed its output + * descriptors, and we have no more data to send to the + * client, and there is no pending buffered data. + */ + if (fdout_eof && fderr_eof && !packet_have_data_to_write() && + buffer_len(&stdout_buffer) == 0 && buffer_len(&stderr_buffer) == 0) { + if (!channel_still_open()) + break; + if (!waiting_termination) { + const char *s = "Waiting for forwarded connections to terminate...\r\n"; + char *cp; + waiting_termination = 1; + buffer_append(&stderr_buffer, s, strlen(s)); + + /* Display list of open channels. */ + cp = channel_open_message(); + buffer_append(&stderr_buffer, cp, strlen(cp)); + xfree(cp); + } + } + max_fd = MAX(connection_in, connection_out); + max_fd = MAX(max_fd, fdin); + max_fd = MAX(max_fd, fdout); + max_fd = MAX(max_fd, fderr); + + /* Sleep in select() until we can do something. */ + wait_until_can_do_something(&readset, &writeset, &max_fd, + &nalloc, max_time_milliseconds); + + /* Process any channel events. */ + channel_after_select(readset, writeset); + + /* Process input from the client and from program stdout/stderr. */ + process_input(readset); + + /* Process output to the client and to program stdin. */ + process_output(writeset); + } + if (readset) + xfree(readset); + if (writeset) + xfree(writeset); + + /* Cleanup and termination code. */ + + /* Wait until all output has been sent to the client. */ + drain_output(); + + debug("End of interactive session; stdin %ld, stdout (read %ld, sent %ld), stderr %ld bytes.", + stdin_bytes, fdout_bytes, stdout_bytes, stderr_bytes); + + /* Free and clear the buffers. */ + buffer_free(&stdin_buffer); + buffer_free(&stdout_buffer); + buffer_free(&stderr_buffer); + + /* Close the file descriptors. */ + if (fdout != -1) + close(fdout); + fdout = -1; + fdout_eof = 1; + if (fderr != -1) + close(fderr); + fderr = -1; + fderr_eof = 1; + if (fdin != -1) + close(fdin); + fdin = -1; + + channel_free_all(); + + /* We no longer want our SIGCHLD handler to be called. */ + mysignal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL); + + wait_pid = waitpid(-1, &wait_status, child_terminated ? WNOHANG : 0); + if (wait_pid == -1) + packet_disconnect("wait: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + else if (wait_pid != pid) + error("Strange, wait returned pid %d, expected %d", + wait_pid, pid); + + /* Check if it exited normally. */ + if (WIFEXITED(wait_status)) { + /* Yes, normal exit. Get exit status and send it to the client. */ + debug("Command exited with status %d.", WEXITSTATUS(wait_status)); + packet_start(SSH_SMSG_EXITSTATUS); + packet_put_int(WEXITSTATUS(wait_status)); + packet_send(); + packet_write_wait(); + + /* + * Wait for exit confirmation. Note that there might be + * other packets coming before it; however, the program has + * already died so we just ignore them. The client is + * supposed to respond with the confirmation when it receives + * the exit status. + */ + do { + int plen; + type = packet_read(&plen); + } + while (type != SSH_CMSG_EXIT_CONFIRMATION); + + debug("Received exit confirmation."); + return; + } + /* Check if the program terminated due to a signal. */ + if (WIFSIGNALED(wait_status)) + packet_disconnect("Command terminated on signal %d.", + WTERMSIG(wait_status)); + + /* Some weird exit cause. Just exit. */ + packet_disconnect("wait returned status %04x.", wait_status); + /* NOTREACHED */ +} + +static void +collect_children(void) +{ + pid_t pid; + sigset_t oset, nset; + int status; + + /* block SIGCHLD while we check for dead children */ + sigemptyset(&nset); + sigaddset(&nset, SIGCHLD); + sigprocmask(SIG_BLOCK, &nset, &oset); + if (child_terminated) { + while ((pid = waitpid(-1, &status, WNOHANG)) > 0) + session_close_by_pid(pid, status); + child_terminated = 0; + } + sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &oset, NULL); +} + +void +server_loop2(Authctxt *authctxt) +{ + fd_set *readset = NULL, *writeset = NULL; + int rekeying = 0, max_fd, nalloc = 0; + + debug("Entering interactive session for SSH2."); + + mysignal(SIGCHLD, sigchld_handler); + child_terminated = 0; + connection_in = packet_get_connection_in(); + connection_out = packet_get_connection_out(); + + max_fd = MAX(connection_in, connection_out); + xxx_authctxt = authctxt; + + server_init_dispatch(); + + for (;;) { + process_buffered_input_packets(); + + rekeying = (xxx_kex != NULL && !xxx_kex->done); + + if (!rekeying && packet_not_very_much_data_to_write()) + channel_output_poll(); + wait_until_can_do_something(&readset, &writeset, &max_fd, + &nalloc, 0); + + collect_children(); + if (!rekeying) + channel_after_select(readset, writeset); + process_input(readset); + if (connection_closed) + break; + process_output(writeset); + } + collect_children(); + + if (readset) + xfree(readset); + if (writeset) + xfree(writeset); + + /* free all channels, no more reads and writes */ + channel_free_all(); + + /* free remaining sessions, e.g. remove wtmp entries */ + session_destroy_all(); +} + +static void +server_input_channel_failure(int type, int plen, void *ctxt) +{ + debug("Got CHANNEL_FAILURE for keepalive"); + /* + * reset timeout, since we got a sane answer from the client. + * even if this was generated by something other than + * the bogus CHANNEL_REQUEST we send for keepalives. + */ + client_alive_timeouts = 0; +} + + +static void +server_input_stdin_data(int type, int plen, void *ctxt) +{ + char *data; + u_int data_len; + + /* Stdin data from the client. Append it to the buffer. */ + /* Ignore any data if the client has closed stdin. */ + if (fdin == -1) + return; + data = packet_get_string(&data_len); + packet_integrity_check(plen, (4 + data_len), type); + buffer_append(&stdin_buffer, data, data_len); + memset(data, 0, data_len); + xfree(data); +} + +static void +server_input_eof(int type, int plen, void *ctxt) +{ + /* + * Eof from the client. The stdin descriptor to the + * program will be closed when all buffered data has + * drained. + */ + debug("EOF received for stdin."); + packet_integrity_check(plen, 0, type); + stdin_eof = 1; +} + +static void +server_input_window_size(int type, int plen, void *ctxt) +{ + int row = packet_get_int(); + int col = packet_get_int(); + int xpixel = packet_get_int(); + int ypixel = packet_get_int(); + + debug("Window change received."); + packet_integrity_check(plen, 4 * 4, type); + if (fdin != -1) + pty_change_window_size(fdin, row, col, xpixel, ypixel); +} + +static Channel * +server_request_direct_tcpip(char *ctype) +{ + Channel *c; + int sock; + char *target, *originator; + int target_port, originator_port; + + target = packet_get_string(NULL); + target_port = packet_get_int(); + originator = packet_get_string(NULL); + originator_port = packet_get_int(); + packet_done(); + + debug("server_request_direct_tcpip: originator %s port %d, target %s port %d", + originator, originator_port, target, target_port); + + /* XXX check permission */ + sock = channel_connect_to(target, target_port); + xfree(target); + xfree(originator); + if (sock < 0) + return NULL; + c = channel_new(ctype, SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING, + sock, sock, -1, CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, + CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, xstrdup("direct-tcpip"), 1); + if (c == NULL) { + error("server_request_direct_tcpip: channel_new failed"); + close(sock); + } + return c; +} + +static Channel * +server_request_session(char *ctype) +{ + Channel *c; + + debug("input_session_request"); + packet_done(); + /* + * A server session has no fd to read or write until a + * CHANNEL_REQUEST for a shell is made, so we set the type to + * SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL. Additionally, a callback for handling all + * CHANNEL_REQUEST messages is registered. + */ + c = channel_new(ctype, SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL, + -1, -1, -1, /*window size*/0, CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT, + 0, xstrdup("server-session"), 1); + if (c == NULL) { + error("server_request_session: channel_new failed"); + return NULL; + } + if (session_open(xxx_authctxt, c->self) != 1) { + debug("session open failed, free channel %d", c->self); + channel_free(c); + return NULL; + } + channel_register_callback(c->self, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST, + session_input_channel_req, (void *)0); + channel_register_cleanup(c->self, session_close_by_channel); + return c; +} + +static void +server_input_channel_open(int type, int plen, void *ctxt) +{ + Channel *c = NULL; + char *ctype; + u_int len; + int rchan; + int rmaxpack; + int rwindow; + + ctype = packet_get_string(&len); + rchan = packet_get_int(); + rwindow = packet_get_int(); + rmaxpack = packet_get_int(); + + debug("server_input_channel_open: ctype %s rchan %d win %d max %d", + ctype, rchan, rwindow, rmaxpack); + + if (strcmp(ctype, "session") == 0) { + c = server_request_session(ctype); + } else if (strcmp(ctype, "direct-tcpip") == 0) { + c = server_request_direct_tcpip(ctype); + } + if (c != NULL) { + debug("server_input_channel_open: confirm %s", ctype); + c->remote_id = rchan; + c->remote_window = rwindow; + c->remote_maxpacket = rmaxpack; + if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING) { + packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION); + packet_put_int(c->remote_id); + packet_put_int(c->self); + packet_put_int(c->local_window); + packet_put_int(c->local_maxpacket); + packet_send(); + } + } else { + debug("server_input_channel_open: failure %s", ctype); + packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE); + packet_put_int(rchan); + packet_put_int(SSH2_OPEN_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED); + if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_OPENFAILURE)) { + packet_put_cstring("open failed"); + packet_put_cstring(""); + } + packet_send(); + } + xfree(ctype); +} + +static void +server_input_global_request(int type, int plen, void *ctxt) +{ + char *rtype; + int want_reply; + int success = 0; + + rtype = packet_get_string(NULL); + want_reply = packet_get_char(); + debug("server_input_global_request: rtype %s want_reply %d", rtype, want_reply); + + /* -R style forwarding */ + if (strcmp(rtype, "tcpip-forward") == 0) { + struct passwd *pw; + char *listen_address; + u_short listen_port; + + pw = auth_get_user(); + if (pw == NULL) + fatal("server_input_global_request: no user"); + listen_address = packet_get_string(NULL); /* XXX currently ignored */ + listen_port = (u_short)packet_get_int(); + debug("server_input_global_request: tcpip-forward listen %s port %d", + listen_address, listen_port); + + /* check permissions */ + if (!options.allow_tcp_forwarding || + no_port_forwarding_flag || + (listen_port < IPPORT_RESERVED && pw->pw_uid != 0)) { + success = 0; + packet_send_debug("Server has disabled port forwarding."); + } else { + /* Start listening on the port */ + success = channel_request_forwarding( + listen_address, listen_port, + /*unspec host_to_connect*/ "", + /*unspec port_to_connect*/ 0, + options.gateway_ports, /*remote*/ 1); + } + xfree(listen_address); + } + if (want_reply) { + packet_start(success ? + SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS : SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE); + packet_send(); + packet_write_wait(); + } + xfree(rtype); +} + +static void +server_init_dispatch_20(void) +{ + debug("server_init_dispatch_20"); + dispatch_init(&dispatch_protocol_error); + dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE, &channel_input_oclose); + dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA, &channel_input_data); + dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF, &channel_input_ieof); + dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA, &channel_input_extended_data); + dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN, &server_input_channel_open); + dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION, &channel_input_open_confirmation); + dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE, &channel_input_open_failure); + dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST, &channel_input_channel_request); + dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST, &channel_input_window_adjust); + dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST, &server_input_global_request); + /* client_alive */ + dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE, &server_input_channel_failure); + /* rekeying */ + dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, &kex_input_kexinit); +} +static void +server_init_dispatch_13(void) +{ + debug("server_init_dispatch_13"); + dispatch_init(NULL); + dispatch_set(SSH_CMSG_EOF, &server_input_eof); + dispatch_set(SSH_CMSG_STDIN_DATA, &server_input_stdin_data); + dispatch_set(SSH_CMSG_WINDOW_SIZE, &server_input_window_size); + dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE, &channel_input_close); + dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION, &channel_input_close_confirmation); + dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA, &channel_input_data); + dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION, &channel_input_open_confirmation); + dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE, &channel_input_open_failure); + dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_PORT_OPEN, &channel_input_port_open); +} +static void +server_init_dispatch_15(void) +{ + server_init_dispatch_13(); + debug("server_init_dispatch_15"); + dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE, &channel_input_ieof); + dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION, &channel_input_oclose); +} +static void +server_init_dispatch(void) +{ + if (compat20) + server_init_dispatch_20(); + else if (compat13) + server_init_dispatch_13(); + else + server_init_dispatch_15(); +} diff --git a/openssh/serverloop.h b/openssh/serverloop.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f419198 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/serverloop.h @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: serverloop.h,v 1.5 2001/06/27 02:12:53 markus Exp $ */ + +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + */ +/* + * Performs the interactive session. This handles data transmission between + * the client and the program. Note that the notion of stdin, stdout, and + * stderr in this function is sort of reversed: this function writes to stdin + * (of the child program), and reads from stdout and stderr (of the child + * program). + */ +#ifndef SERVERLOOP_H +#define SERVERLOOP_H + +void server_loop(pid_t, int, int, int); +void server_loop2(Authctxt *); + +#endif diff --git a/openssh/session.c b/openssh/session.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..02c0c52 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/session.c @@ -0,0 +1,2077 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + * + * SSH2 support by Markus Friedl. + * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" +RCSID("$OpenBSD: session.c,v 1.108 2001/10/11 13:45:21 markus Exp $"); + +#include "ssh.h" +#include "ssh1.h" +#include "ssh2.h" +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "sshpty.h" +#include "packet.h" +#include "buffer.h" +#include "mpaux.h" +#include "uidswap.h" +#include "compat.h" +#include "channels.h" +#include "bufaux.h" +#include "auth.h" +#include "auth-options.h" +#include "pathnames.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "servconf.h" +#include "sshlogin.h" +#include "serverloop.h" +#include "canohost.h" +#include "session.h" + +#ifdef WITH_IRIX_PROJECT +#include +#endif /* WITH_IRIX_PROJECT */ +#ifdef WITH_IRIX_JOBS +#include +#endif +#ifdef WITH_IRIX_AUDIT +#include +#endif /* WITH_IRIX_AUDIT */ + +#if defined(HAVE_USERSEC_H) +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN +#include +#include +#define is_winnt (GetVersion() < 0x80000000) +#endif + +/* AIX limits */ +#if defined(HAVE_GETUSERATTR) && !defined(S_UFSIZE_HARD) && defined(S_UFSIZE) +# define S_UFSIZE_HARD S_UFSIZE "_hard" +# define S_UCPU_HARD S_UCPU "_hard" +# define S_UDATA_HARD S_UDATA "_hard" +# define S_USTACK_HARD S_USTACK "_hard" +# define S_URSS_HARD S_URSS "_hard" +# define S_UCORE_HARD S_UCORE "_hard" +# define S_UNOFILE_HARD S_UNOFILE "_hard" +#endif + +#ifdef _AIX +# include +#endif + +/* types */ + +#define TTYSZ 64 +typedef struct Session Session; +struct Session { + int used; + int self; + struct passwd *pw; + Authctxt *authctxt; + pid_t pid; + /* tty */ + char *term; + int ptyfd, ttyfd, ptymaster; + int row, col, xpixel, ypixel; + char tty[TTYSZ]; + /* X11 */ + char *display; + int screen; + char *auth_proto; + char *auth_data; + int single_connection; + /* proto 2 */ + int chanid; + int is_subsystem; +}; + +/* func */ + +Session *session_new(void); +void session_set_fds(Session *, int, int, int); +static void session_pty_cleanup(void *); +void session_proctitle(Session *); +int session_setup_x11fwd(Session *); +void do_exec_pty(Session *, const char *); +void do_exec_no_pty(Session *, const char *); +void do_exec(Session *, const char *); +void do_login(Session *, const char *); +#ifdef LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX +static void do_pre_login(Session *s); +#endif +void do_child(Session *, const char *); +void do_motd(void); +int check_quietlogin(Session *, const char *); + +static void do_authenticated1(Authctxt *); +static void do_authenticated2(Authctxt *); + +static void session_close(Session *); +static int session_pty_req(Session *); + +/* import */ +extern ServerOptions options; +extern char *__progname; +extern int log_stderr; +extern int debug_flag; +extern u_int utmp_len; +extern int startup_pipe; +extern void destroy_sensitive_data(void); + +/* original command from peer. */ +const char *original_command = NULL; + +/* data */ +#define MAX_SESSIONS 10 +Session sessions[MAX_SESSIONS]; + +#ifdef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE +char *aixloginmsg; +#endif /* WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE */ + +#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP +static login_cap_t *lc; +#endif + +void +do_authenticated(Authctxt *authctxt) +{ + /* + * Cancel the alarm we set to limit the time taken for + * authentication. + */ + alarm(0); + if (startup_pipe != -1) { + close(startup_pipe); + startup_pipe = -1; + } +#if defined(HAVE_LOGIN_CAP) && defined(HAVE_PW_CLASS_IN_PASSWD) + if ((lc = login_getclass(authctxt->pw->pw_class)) == NULL) { + error("unable to get login class"); + return; + } +#ifdef BSD_AUTH + if (auth_approval(NULL, lc, authctxt->pw->pw_name, "ssh") <= 0) { + packet_disconnect("Approval failure for %s", + authctxt->pw->pw_name); + } +#endif +#endif +#ifdef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE + /* We don't have a pty yet, so just label the line as "ssh" */ + if (loginsuccess(authctxt->user, + get_canonical_hostname(options.reverse_mapping_check), + "ssh", &aixloginmsg) < 0) + aixloginmsg = NULL; +#endif /* WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE */ + + /* setup the channel layer */ + if (!no_port_forwarding_flag && options.allow_tcp_forwarding) + channel_permit_all_opens(); + + if (compat20) + do_authenticated2(authctxt); + else + do_authenticated1(authctxt); + + /* remove agent socket */ + if (auth_get_socket_name()) + auth_sock_cleanup_proc(authctxt->pw); +#ifdef KRB4 + if (options.kerberos_ticket_cleanup) + krb4_cleanup_proc(authctxt); +#endif +#ifdef KRB5 + if (options.kerberos_ticket_cleanup) + krb5_cleanup_proc(authctxt); +#endif +} + +/* + * Prepares for an interactive session. This is called after the user has + * been successfully authenticated. During this message exchange, pseudo + * terminals are allocated, X11, TCP/IP, and authentication agent forwardings + * are requested, etc. + */ +static void +do_authenticated1(Authctxt *authctxt) +{ + Session *s; + char *command; + int success, type, plen, screen_flag; + int compression_level = 0, enable_compression_after_reply = 0; + u_int proto_len, data_len, dlen; + + s = session_new(); + s->authctxt = authctxt; + s->pw = authctxt->pw; + + /* + * We stay in this loop until the client requests to execute a shell + * or a command. + */ + for (;;) { + success = 0; + + /* Get a packet from the client. */ + type = packet_read(&plen); + + /* Process the packet. */ + switch (type) { + case SSH_CMSG_REQUEST_COMPRESSION: + packet_integrity_check(plen, 4, type); + compression_level = packet_get_int(); + if (compression_level < 1 || compression_level > 9) { + packet_send_debug("Received illegal compression level %d.", + compression_level); + break; + } + /* Enable compression after we have responded with SUCCESS. */ + enable_compression_after_reply = 1; + success = 1; + break; + + case SSH_CMSG_REQUEST_PTY: + success = session_pty_req(s); + break; + + case SSH_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING: + s->auth_proto = packet_get_string(&proto_len); + s->auth_data = packet_get_string(&data_len); + + screen_flag = packet_get_protocol_flags() & + SSH_PROTOFLAG_SCREEN_NUMBER; + debug2("SSH_PROTOFLAG_SCREEN_NUMBER: %d", screen_flag); + + if (packet_remaining() == 4) { + if (!screen_flag) + debug2("Buggy client: " + "X11 screen flag missing"); + s->screen = packet_get_int(); + } else { + s->screen = 0; + } + packet_done(); + success = session_setup_x11fwd(s); + if (!success) { + xfree(s->auth_proto); + xfree(s->auth_data); + s->auth_proto = NULL; + s->auth_data = NULL; + } + break; + + case SSH_CMSG_AGENT_REQUEST_FORWARDING: + if (no_agent_forwarding_flag || compat13) { + debug("Authentication agent forwarding not permitted for this authentication."); + break; + } + debug("Received authentication agent forwarding request."); + success = auth_input_request_forwarding(s->pw); + break; + + case SSH_CMSG_PORT_FORWARD_REQUEST: + if (no_port_forwarding_flag) { + debug("Port forwarding not permitted for this authentication."); + break; + } + if (!options.allow_tcp_forwarding) { + debug("Port forwarding not permitted."); + break; + } + debug("Received TCP/IP port forwarding request."); + channel_input_port_forward_request(s->pw->pw_uid == 0, options.gateway_ports); + success = 1; + break; + + case SSH_CMSG_MAX_PACKET_SIZE: + if (packet_set_maxsize(packet_get_int()) > 0) + success = 1; + break; + +#if defined(AFS) || defined(KRB5) + case SSH_CMSG_HAVE_KERBEROS_TGT: + if (!options.kerberos_tgt_passing) { + verbose("Kerberos TGT passing disabled."); + } else { + char *kdata = packet_get_string(&dlen); + packet_integrity_check(plen, 4 + dlen, type); + + /* XXX - 0x41, see creds_to_radix version */ + if (kdata[0] != 0x41) { +#ifdef KRB5 + krb5_data tgt; + tgt.data = kdata; + tgt.length = dlen; + + if (auth_krb5_tgt(s->authctxt, &tgt)) + success = 1; + else + verbose("Kerberos v5 TGT refused for %.100s", s->authctxt->user); +#endif /* KRB5 */ + } else { +#ifdef AFS + if (auth_krb4_tgt(s->authctxt, kdata)) + success = 1; + else + verbose("Kerberos v4 TGT refused for %.100s", s->authctxt->user); +#endif /* AFS */ + } + xfree(kdata); + } + break; +#endif /* AFS || KRB5 */ + +#ifdef AFS + case SSH_CMSG_HAVE_AFS_TOKEN: + if (!options.afs_token_passing || !k_hasafs()) { + verbose("AFS token passing disabled."); + } else { + /* Accept AFS token. */ + char *token = packet_get_string(&dlen); + packet_integrity_check(plen, 4 + dlen, type); + + if (auth_afs_token(s->authctxt, token)) + success = 1; + else + verbose("AFS token refused for %.100s", + s->authctxt->user); + xfree(token); + } + break; +#endif /* AFS */ + + case SSH_CMSG_EXEC_SHELL: + case SSH_CMSG_EXEC_CMD: + if (type == SSH_CMSG_EXEC_CMD) { + command = packet_get_string(&dlen); + debug("Exec command '%.500s'", command); + do_exec(s, command); + xfree(command); + } else { + do_exec(s, NULL); + } + packet_done(); + session_close(s); + return; + + default: + /* + * Any unknown messages in this phase are ignored, + * and a failure message is returned. + */ + log("Unknown packet type received after authentication: %d", type); + } + packet_start(success ? SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS : SSH_SMSG_FAILURE); + packet_send(); + packet_write_wait(); + + /* Enable compression now that we have replied if appropriate. */ + if (enable_compression_after_reply) { + enable_compression_after_reply = 0; + packet_start_compression(compression_level); + } + } +} + +/* + * This is called to fork and execute a command when we have no tty. This + * will call do_child from the child, and server_loop from the parent after + * setting up file descriptors and such. + */ +void +do_exec_no_pty(Session *s, const char *command) +{ + int pid; + +#ifdef USE_PIPES + int pin[2], pout[2], perr[2]; + /* Allocate pipes for communicating with the program. */ + if (pipe(pin) < 0 || pipe(pout) < 0 || pipe(perr) < 0) + packet_disconnect("Could not create pipes: %.100s", + strerror(errno)); +#else /* USE_PIPES */ + int inout[2], err[2]; + /* Uses socket pairs to communicate with the program. */ + if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, inout) < 0 || + socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, err) < 0) + packet_disconnect("Could not create socket pairs: %.100s", + strerror(errno)); +#endif /* USE_PIPES */ + if (s == NULL) + fatal("do_exec_no_pty: no session"); + + session_proctitle(s); + +#if defined(USE_PAM) + do_pam_session(s->pw->pw_name, NULL); + do_pam_setcred(1); + if (is_pam_password_change_required()) + packet_disconnect("Password change required but no " + "TTY available"); +#endif /* USE_PAM */ + + /* Fork the child. */ + if ((pid = fork()) == 0) { + /* Child. Reinitialize the log since the pid has changed. */ + log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr); + + /* + * Create a new session and process group since the 4.4BSD + * setlogin() affects the entire process group. + */ + if (setsid() < 0) + error("setsid failed: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + +#ifdef USE_PIPES + /* + * Redirect stdin. We close the parent side of the socket + * pair, and make the child side the standard input. + */ + close(pin[1]); + if (dup2(pin[0], 0) < 0) + perror("dup2 stdin"); + close(pin[0]); + + /* Redirect stdout. */ + close(pout[0]); + if (dup2(pout[1], 1) < 0) + perror("dup2 stdout"); + close(pout[1]); + + /* Redirect stderr. */ + close(perr[0]); + if (dup2(perr[1], 2) < 0) + perror("dup2 stderr"); + close(perr[1]); +#else /* USE_PIPES */ + /* + * Redirect stdin, stdout, and stderr. Stdin and stdout will + * use the same socket, as some programs (particularly rdist) + * seem to depend on it. + */ + close(inout[1]); + close(err[1]); + if (dup2(inout[0], 0) < 0) /* stdin */ + perror("dup2 stdin"); + if (dup2(inout[0], 1) < 0) /* stdout. Note: same socket as stdin. */ + perror("dup2 stdout"); + if (dup2(err[0], 2) < 0) /* stderr */ + perror("dup2 stderr"); +#endif /* USE_PIPES */ + + /* Do processing for the child (exec command etc). */ + do_child(s, command); + /* NOTREACHED */ + } +#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN + if (is_winnt) + cygwin_set_impersonation_token(INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE); +#endif + if (pid < 0) + packet_disconnect("fork failed: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + s->pid = pid; + /* Set interactive/non-interactive mode. */ + packet_set_interactive(s->display != NULL); +#ifdef USE_PIPES + /* We are the parent. Close the child sides of the pipes. */ + close(pin[0]); + close(pout[1]); + close(perr[1]); + + if (compat20) { + session_set_fds(s, pin[1], pout[0], s->is_subsystem ? -1 : perr[0]); + } else { + /* Enter the interactive session. */ + server_loop(pid, pin[1], pout[0], perr[0]); + /* server_loop has closed pin[1], pout[0], and perr[0]. */ + } +#else /* USE_PIPES */ + /* We are the parent. Close the child sides of the socket pairs. */ + close(inout[0]); + close(err[0]); + + /* + * Enter the interactive session. Note: server_loop must be able to + * handle the case that fdin and fdout are the same. + */ + if (compat20) { + session_set_fds(s, inout[1], inout[1], s->is_subsystem ? -1 : err[1]); + } else { + server_loop(pid, inout[1], inout[1], err[1]); + /* server_loop has closed inout[1] and err[1]. */ + } +#endif /* USE_PIPES */ +} + +/* + * This is called to fork and execute a command when we have a tty. This + * will call do_child from the child, and server_loop from the parent after + * setting up file descriptors, controlling tty, updating wtmp, utmp, + * lastlog, and other such operations. + */ +void +do_exec_pty(Session *s, const char *command) +{ + int fdout, ptyfd, ttyfd, ptymaster; + pid_t pid; + + if (s == NULL) + fatal("do_exec_pty: no session"); + ptyfd = s->ptyfd; + ttyfd = s->ttyfd; + +#if defined(USE_PAM) + do_pam_session(s->pw->pw_name, s->tty); + do_pam_setcred(1); +#endif + + /* Fork the child. */ + if ((pid = fork()) == 0) { + + /* Child. Reinitialize the log because the pid has changed. */ + log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr); + /* Close the master side of the pseudo tty. */ + close(ptyfd); + + /* Make the pseudo tty our controlling tty. */ + pty_make_controlling_tty(&ttyfd, s->tty); + + /* Redirect stdin/stdout/stderr from the pseudo tty. */ + if (dup2(ttyfd, 0) < 0) + error("dup2 stdin: %s", strerror(errno)); + if (dup2(ttyfd, 1) < 0) + error("dup2 stdout: %s", strerror(errno)); + if (dup2(ttyfd, 2) < 0) + error("dup2 stderr: %s", strerror(errno)); + + /* Close the extra descriptor for the pseudo tty. */ + close(ttyfd); + + /* record login, etc. similar to login(1) */ +#ifndef HAVE_OSF_SIA + if (!(options.use_login && command == NULL)) + do_login(s, command); +# ifdef LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX + else + do_pre_login(s); +# endif +#endif + + /* Do common processing for the child, such as execing the command. */ + do_child(s, command); + /* NOTREACHED */ + } +#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN + if (is_winnt) + cygwin_set_impersonation_token(INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE); +#endif + if (pid < 0) + packet_disconnect("fork failed: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + s->pid = pid; + + /* Parent. Close the slave side of the pseudo tty. */ + close(ttyfd); + + /* + * Create another descriptor of the pty master side for use as the + * standard input. We could use the original descriptor, but this + * simplifies code in server_loop. The descriptor is bidirectional. + */ + fdout = dup(ptyfd); + if (fdout < 0) + packet_disconnect("dup #1 failed: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + + /* we keep a reference to the pty master */ + ptymaster = dup(ptyfd); + if (ptymaster < 0) + packet_disconnect("dup #2 failed: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + s->ptymaster = ptymaster; + + /* Enter interactive session. */ + packet_set_interactive(1); + if (compat20) { + session_set_fds(s, ptyfd, fdout, -1); + } else { + server_loop(pid, ptyfd, fdout, -1); + /* server_loop _has_ closed ptyfd and fdout. */ + } +} + +#ifdef LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX +static void +do_pre_login(Session *s) +{ + socklen_t fromlen; + struct sockaddr_storage from; + pid_t pid = getpid(); + + /* + * Get IP address of client. If the connection is not a socket, let + * the address be 0.0.0.0. + */ + memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from)); + if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) { + fromlen = sizeof(from); + if (getpeername(packet_get_connection_in(), + (struct sockaddr *) & from, &fromlen) < 0) { + debug("getpeername: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + fatal_cleanup(); + } + } + + record_utmp_only(pid, s->tty, s->pw->pw_name, + get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.reverse_mapping_check), + (struct sockaddr *)&from); +} +#endif + +/* + * This is called to fork and execute a command. If another command is + * to be forced, execute that instead. + */ +void +do_exec(Session *s, const char *command) +{ + if (forced_command) { + original_command = command; + command = forced_command; + debug("Forced command '%.900s'", command); + } + + if (s->ttyfd != -1) + do_exec_pty(s, command); + else + do_exec_no_pty(s, command); + + original_command = NULL; +} + +/* administrative, login(1)-like work */ +void +do_login(Session *s, const char *command) +{ + char *time_string; + char hostname[MAXHOSTNAMELEN]; + socklen_t fromlen; + struct sockaddr_storage from; + time_t last_login_time; + struct passwd * pw = s->pw; + pid_t pid = getpid(); + + /* + * Get IP address of client. If the connection is not a socket, let + * the address be 0.0.0.0. + */ + memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from)); + if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) { + fromlen = sizeof(from); + if (getpeername(packet_get_connection_in(), + (struct sockaddr *) & from, &fromlen) < 0) { + debug("getpeername: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + fatal_cleanup(); + } + } + + /* Get the time and hostname when the user last logged in. */ + if (options.print_lastlog) { + hostname[0] = '\0'; + last_login_time = get_last_login_time(pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_name, + hostname, sizeof(hostname)); + } + + /* Record that there was a login on that tty from the remote host. */ + record_login(pid, s->tty, pw->pw_name, pw->pw_uid, + get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.reverse_mapping_check), + (struct sockaddr *)&from); + +#ifdef USE_PAM + /* + * If password change is needed, do it now. + * This needs to occur before the ~/.hushlogin check. + */ + if (is_pam_password_change_required()) { + print_pam_messages(); + do_pam_chauthtok(); + } +#endif + + if (check_quietlogin(s, command)) + return; + +#ifdef USE_PAM + if (!is_pam_password_change_required()) + print_pam_messages(); +#endif /* USE_PAM */ +#ifdef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE + if (aixloginmsg && *aixloginmsg) + printf("%s\n", aixloginmsg); +#endif /* WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE */ + + if (options.print_lastlog && last_login_time != 0) { + time_string = ctime(&last_login_time); + if (strchr(time_string, '\n')) + *strchr(time_string, '\n') = 0; + if (strcmp(hostname, "") == 0) + printf("Last login: %s\r\n", time_string); + else + printf("Last login: %s from %s\r\n", time_string, hostname); + } + + do_motd(); +} + +/* + * Display the message of the day. + */ +void +do_motd(void) +{ + FILE *f; + char buf[256]; + + if (options.print_motd) { +#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP + f = fopen(login_getcapstr(lc, "welcome", "/etc/motd", + "/etc/motd"), "r"); +#else + f = fopen("/etc/motd", "r"); +#endif + if (f) { + while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f)) + fputs(buf, stdout); + fclose(f); + } + } +} + + +/* + * Check for quiet login, either .hushlogin or command given. + */ +int +check_quietlogin(Session *s, const char *command) +{ + char buf[256]; + struct passwd *pw = s->pw; + struct stat st; + + /* Return 1 if .hushlogin exists or a command given. */ + if (command != NULL) + return 1; + snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%.200s/.hushlogin", pw->pw_dir); +#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP + if (login_getcapbool(lc, "hushlogin", 0) || stat(buf, &st) >= 0) + return 1; +#else + if (stat(buf, &st) >= 0) + return 1; +#endif + return 0; +} + +/* + * Sets the value of the given variable in the environment. If the variable + * already exists, its value is overriden. + */ +static void +child_set_env(char ***envp, u_int *envsizep, const char *name, + const char *value) +{ + u_int i, namelen; + char **env; + + /* + * Find the slot where the value should be stored. If the variable + * already exists, we reuse the slot; otherwise we append a new slot + * at the end of the array, expanding if necessary. + */ + env = *envp; + namelen = strlen(name); + for (i = 0; env[i]; i++) + if (strncmp(env[i], name, namelen) == 0 && env[i][namelen] == '=') + break; + if (env[i]) { + /* Reuse the slot. */ + xfree(env[i]); + } else { + /* New variable. Expand if necessary. */ + if (i >= (*envsizep) - 1) { + (*envsizep) += 50; + env = (*envp) = xrealloc(env, (*envsizep) * sizeof(char *)); + } + /* Need to set the NULL pointer at end of array beyond the new slot. */ + env[i + 1] = NULL; + } + + /* Allocate space and format the variable in the appropriate slot. */ + env[i] = xmalloc(strlen(name) + 1 + strlen(value) + 1); + snprintf(env[i], strlen(name) + 1 + strlen(value) + 1, "%s=%s", name, value); +} + +/* + * Reads environment variables from the given file and adds/overrides them + * into the environment. If the file does not exist, this does nothing. + * Otherwise, it must consist of empty lines, comments (line starts with '#') + * and assignments of the form name=value. No other forms are allowed. + */ +static void +read_environment_file(char ***env, u_int *envsize, + const char *filename) +{ + FILE *f; + char buf[4096]; + char *cp, *value; + + f = fopen(filename, "r"); + if (!f) + return; + + while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f)) { + for (cp = buf; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++) + ; + if (!*cp || *cp == '#' || *cp == '\n') + continue; + if (strchr(cp, '\n')) + *strchr(cp, '\n') = '\0'; + value = strchr(cp, '='); + if (value == NULL) { + fprintf(stderr, "Bad line in %.100s: %.200s\n", filename, buf); + continue; + } + /* + * Replace the equals sign by nul, and advance value to + * the value string. + */ + *value = '\0'; + value++; + child_set_env(env, envsize, cp, value); + } + fclose(f); +} + +#ifdef USE_PAM +/* + * Sets any environment variables which have been specified by PAM + */ +void do_pam_environment(char ***env, u_int *envsize) +{ + char *equals, var_name[512], var_val[512]; + char **pam_env; + int i; + + if ((pam_env = fetch_pam_environment()) == NULL) + return; + + for(i = 0; pam_env[i] != NULL; i++) { + if ((equals = strstr(pam_env[i], "=")) == NULL) + continue; + + if (strlen(pam_env[i]) < (sizeof(var_name) - 1)) { + memset(var_name, '\0', sizeof(var_name)); + memset(var_val, '\0', sizeof(var_val)); + + strncpy(var_name, pam_env[i], equals - pam_env[i]); + strcpy(var_val, equals + 1); + + debug3("PAM environment: %s=%s", var_name, var_val); + + child_set_env(env, envsize, var_name, var_val); + } + } +} +#endif /* USE_PAM */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN +void copy_environment(char ***env, u_int *envsize) +{ + char *equals, var_name[512], var_val[512]; + int i; + + for(i = 0; environ[i] != NULL; i++) { + if ((equals = strstr(environ[i], "=")) == NULL) + continue; + + if (strlen(environ[i]) < (sizeof(var_name) - 1)) { + memset(var_name, '\0', sizeof(var_name)); + memset(var_val, '\0', sizeof(var_val)); + + strncpy(var_name, environ[i], equals - environ[i]); + strcpy(var_val, equals + 1); + + debug3("Copy environment: %s=%s", var_name, var_val); + + child_set_env(env, envsize, var_name, var_val); + } + } +} +#endif + +#if defined(HAVE_GETUSERATTR) +/* + * AIX-specific login initialisation + */ +void set_limit(char *user, char *soft, char *hard, int resource, int mult) +{ + struct rlimit rlim; + int slim, hlim; + + getrlimit(resource, &rlim); + + slim = 0; + if (getuserattr(user, soft, &slim, SEC_INT) != -1) { + if (slim < 0) { + rlim.rlim_cur = RLIM_INFINITY; + } else if (slim != 0) { + /* See the wackiness below */ + if (rlim.rlim_cur == slim * mult) + slim = 0; + else + rlim.rlim_cur = slim * mult; + } + } + + hlim = 0; + if (getuserattr(user, hard, &hlim, SEC_INT) != -1) { + if (hlim < 0) { + rlim.rlim_max = RLIM_INFINITY; + } else if (hlim != 0) { + rlim.rlim_max = hlim * mult; + } + } + + /* + * XXX For cpu and fsize the soft limit is set to the hard limit + * if the hard limit is left at its default value and the soft limit + * is changed from its default value, either by requesting it + * (slim == 0) or by setting it to the current default. At least + * that's how rlogind does it. If you're confused you're not alone. + * Bug or feature? AIX 4.3.1.2 + */ + if ((!strcmp(soft, "fsize") || !strcmp(soft, "cpu")) + && hlim == 0 && slim != 0) + rlim.rlim_max = rlim.rlim_cur; + /* A specified hard limit limits the soft limit */ + else if (hlim > 0 && rlim.rlim_cur > rlim.rlim_max) + rlim.rlim_cur = rlim.rlim_max; + /* A soft limit can increase a hard limit */ + else if (rlim.rlim_cur > rlim.rlim_max) + rlim.rlim_max = rlim.rlim_cur; + + if (setrlimit(resource, &rlim) != 0) + error("setrlimit(%.10s) failed: %.100s", soft, strerror(errno)); +} + +void set_limits_from_userattr(char *user) +{ + int mask; + char buf[16]; + + set_limit(user, S_UFSIZE, S_UFSIZE_HARD, RLIMIT_FSIZE, 512); + set_limit(user, S_UCPU, S_UCPU_HARD, RLIMIT_CPU, 1); + set_limit(user, S_UDATA, S_UDATA_HARD, RLIMIT_DATA, 512); + set_limit(user, S_USTACK, S_USTACK_HARD, RLIMIT_STACK, 512); + set_limit(user, S_URSS, S_URSS_HARD, RLIMIT_RSS, 512); + set_limit(user, S_UCORE, S_UCORE_HARD, RLIMIT_CORE, 512); +#if defined(S_UNOFILE) + set_limit(user, S_UNOFILE, S_UNOFILE_HARD, RLIMIT_NOFILE, 1); +#endif + + if (getuserattr(user, S_UMASK, &mask, SEC_INT) != -1) { + /* Convert decimal to octal */ + (void) snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%d", mask); + if (sscanf(buf, "%o", &mask) == 1) + umask(mask); + } +} +#endif /* defined(HAVE_GETUSERATTR) */ + +/* + * Performs common processing for the child, such as setting up the + * environment, closing extra file descriptors, setting the user and group + * ids, and executing the command or shell. + */ +void +do_child(Session *s, const char *command) +{ + const char *shell, *hostname = NULL, *cp = NULL; + struct passwd *pw = s->pw; + char buf[256]; + char cmd[1024]; + FILE *f = NULL; + u_int envsize, i; + char **env; + extern char **environ; + struct stat st; + char *argv[10]; + int do_xauth; +#ifdef WITH_IRIX_PROJECT + prid_t projid; +#endif /* WITH_IRIX_PROJECT */ +#ifdef WITH_IRIX_JOBS + jid_t jid = 0; +#else +#ifdef WITH_IRIX_ARRAY + int jid = 0; +#endif /* WITH_IRIX_ARRAY */ +#endif /* WITH_IRIX_JOBS */ + + do_xauth = + s->display != NULL && s->auth_proto != NULL && s->auth_data != NULL; + + /* remove hostkey from the child's memory */ + destroy_sensitive_data(); + + /* login(1) is only called if we execute the login shell */ + if (options.use_login && command != NULL) + options.use_login = 0; + +#if !defined(HAVE_OSF_SIA) + if (!options.use_login) { +# ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP + if (!login_getcapbool(lc, "ignorenologin", 0) && pw->pw_uid) + f = fopen(login_getcapstr(lc, "nologin", _PATH_NOLOGIN, + _PATH_NOLOGIN), "r"); +# else /* HAVE_LOGIN_CAP */ + if (pw->pw_uid) + f = fopen(_PATH_NOLOGIN, "r"); +# endif /* HAVE_LOGIN_CAP */ + if (f) { + /* /etc/nologin exists. Print its contents and exit. */ + while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f)) + fputs(buf, stderr); + fclose(f); + exit(254); + } + } +#endif /* HAVE_OSF_SIA */ + + /* Set login name, uid, gid, and groups. */ + /* Login(1) does this as well, and it needs uid 0 for the "-h" + switch, so we let login(1) to this for us. */ + if (!options.use_login) { +#ifdef HAVE_OSF_SIA + session_setup_sia(pw->pw_name, s->ttyfd == -1 ? NULL : s->tty); + if (!check_quietlogin(s, command)) + do_motd(); +#else /* HAVE_OSF_SIA */ +#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN + if (is_winnt) { +#else + if (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0) { +#endif +# ifdef HAVE_GETUSERATTR + set_limits_from_userattr(pw->pw_name); +# endif /* HAVE_GETUSERATTR */ +# ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP + if (setusercontext(lc, pw, pw->pw_uid, + (LOGIN_SETALL & ~LOGIN_SETPATH)) < 0) { + perror("unable to set user context"); + exit(1); + } +# else /* HAVE_LOGIN_CAP */ +#if defined(HAVE_GETLUID) && defined(HAVE_SETLUID) + /* Sets login uid for accounting */ + if (getluid() == -1 && setluid(pw->pw_uid) == -1) + error("setluid: %s", strerror(errno)); +#endif /* defined(HAVE_GETLUID) && defined(HAVE_SETLUID) */ + + if (setlogin(pw->pw_name) < 0) + error("setlogin failed: %s", strerror(errno)); + if (setgid(pw->pw_gid) < 0) { + perror("setgid"); + exit(1); + } + /* Initialize the group list. */ + if (initgroups(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) < 0) { + perror("initgroups"); + exit(1); + } + endgrent(); +# ifdef USE_PAM + /* + * PAM credentials may take the form of + * supplementary groups. These will have been + * wiped by the above initgroups() call. + * Reestablish them here. + */ + do_pam_setcred(0); +# endif /* USE_PAM */ +# ifdef WITH_IRIX_JOBS + jid = jlimit_startjob(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_uid, "interactive"); + if (jid == -1) { + fatal("Failed to create job container: %.100s", + strerror(errno)); + } +# endif /* WITH_IRIX_JOBS */ +# ifdef WITH_IRIX_ARRAY + /* initialize array session */ + if (jid == 0) { + if (newarraysess() != 0) + fatal("Failed to set up new array session: %.100s", + strerror(errno)); + } +# endif /* WITH_IRIX_ARRAY */ +# ifdef WITH_IRIX_PROJECT + /* initialize irix project info */ + if ((projid = getdfltprojuser(pw->pw_name)) == -1) { + debug("Failed to get project id, using projid 0"); + projid = 0; + } + if (setprid(projid)) + fatal("Failed to initialize project %d for %s: %.100s", + (int)projid, pw->pw_name, strerror(errno)); +# endif /* WITH_IRIX_PROJECT */ +#ifdef WITH_IRIX_AUDIT + if (sysconf(_SC_AUDIT)) { + debug("Setting sat id to %d", (int) pw->pw_uid); + if (satsetid(pw->pw_uid)) + debug("error setting satid: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + } +#endif /* WITH_IRIX_AUDIT */ + +#ifdef _AIX + /* + * AIX has a "usrinfo" area where logname and + * other stuff is stored - a few applications + * actually use this and die if it's not set + */ + if (s->ttyfd == -1) + s->tty[0] = '\0'; + cp = xmalloc(22 + strlen(s->tty) + + 2 * strlen(pw->pw_name)); + i = sprintf(cp, "LOGNAME=%s%cNAME=%s%cTTY=%s%c%c", + pw->pw_name, 0, pw->pw_name, 0, s->tty, 0, 0); + if (usrinfo(SETUINFO, cp, i) == -1) + fatal("Couldn't set usrinfo: %s", + strerror(errno)); + debug3("AIX/UsrInfo: set len %d", i); + xfree(cp); +#endif + + /* Permanently switch to the desired uid. */ + permanently_set_uid(pw); +# endif /* HAVE_LOGIN_CAP */ + } +#endif /* HAVE_OSF_SIA */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN + if (is_winnt) +#endif + if (getuid() != pw->pw_uid || geteuid() != pw->pw_uid) + fatal("Failed to set uids to %u.", (u_int) pw->pw_uid); + } + /* + * Get the shell from the password data. An empty shell field is + * legal, and means /bin/sh. + */ + shell = (pw->pw_shell[0] == '\0') ? _PATH_BSHELL : pw->pw_shell; +#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP + shell = login_getcapstr(lc, "shell", (char *)shell, (char *)shell); +#endif + + /* Initialize the environment. */ + envsize = 100; + env = xmalloc(envsize * sizeof(char *)); + env[0] = NULL; + +#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN + /* + * The Windows environment contains some setting which are + * important for a running system. They must not be dropped. + */ + copy_environment(&env, &envsize); +#endif + + if (!options.use_login) { + /* Set basic environment. */ + child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "USER", pw->pw_name); + child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "LOGNAME", pw->pw_name); + child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "HOME", pw->pw_dir); +#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP + (void) setusercontext(lc, pw, pw->pw_uid, LOGIN_SETPATH); + child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "PATH", getenv("PATH")); +#else /* HAVE_LOGIN_CAP */ +# ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN + /* + * There's no standard path on Windows. The path contains + * important components pointing to the system directories, + * needed for loading shared libraries. So the path better + * remains intact here. + */ + child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "PATH", _PATH_STDPATH); +# endif /* HAVE_CYGWIN */ +#endif /* HAVE_LOGIN_CAP */ + + snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.200s/%.50s", + _PATH_MAILDIR, pw->pw_name); + child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "MAIL", buf); + + /* Normal systems set SHELL by default. */ + child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SHELL", shell); + } + if (getenv("TZ")) + child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "TZ", getenv("TZ")); + + /* Set custom environment options from RSA authentication. */ + if (!options.use_login) { + while (custom_environment) { + struct envstring *ce = custom_environment; + char *s = ce->s; + int i; + for (i = 0; s[i] != '=' && s[i]; i++) + ; + if (s[i] == '=') { + s[i] = 0; + child_set_env(&env, &envsize, s, s + i + 1); + } + custom_environment = ce->next; + xfree(ce->s); + xfree(ce); + } + } + + snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.50s %d %d", + get_remote_ipaddr(), get_remote_port(), get_local_port()); + child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_CLIENT", buf); + + if (s->ttyfd != -1) + child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_TTY", s->tty); + if (s->term) + child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "TERM", s->term); + if (s->display) + child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "DISPLAY", s->display); + if (original_command) + child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND", + original_command); + +#ifdef _AIX + if ((cp = getenv("AUTHSTATE")) != NULL) + child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "AUTHSTATE", cp); + if ((cp = getenv("KRB5CCNAME")) != NULL) + child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "KRB5CCNAME", cp); + read_environment_file(&env, &envsize, "/etc/environment"); +#endif +#ifdef KRB4 + if (s->authctxt->krb4_ticket_file) + child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "KRBTKFILE", + s->authctxt->krb4_ticket_file); +#endif +#ifdef KRB5 + if (s->authctxt->krb5_ticket_file) + child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "KRB5CCNAME", + s->authctxt->krb5_ticket_file); +#endif +#ifdef USE_PAM + /* Pull in any environment variables that may have been set by PAM. */ + do_pam_environment(&env, &envsize); +#endif /* USE_PAM */ + + if (auth_get_socket_name() != NULL) + child_set_env(&env, &envsize, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME, + auth_get_socket_name()); + + /* read $HOME/.ssh/environment. */ + if (!options.use_login) { + snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.200s/.ssh/environment", + pw->pw_dir); + read_environment_file(&env, &envsize, buf); + } + if (debug_flag) { + /* dump the environment */ + fprintf(stderr, "Environment:\n"); + for (i = 0; env[i]; i++) + fprintf(stderr, " %.200s\n", env[i]); + } + /* we have to stash the hostname before we close our socket. */ + if (options.use_login) + hostname = get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, + options.reverse_mapping_check); + /* + * Close the connection descriptors; note that this is the child, and + * the server will still have the socket open, and it is important + * that we do not shutdown it. Note that the descriptors cannot be + * closed before building the environment, as we call + * get_remote_ipaddr there. + */ + if (packet_get_connection_in() == packet_get_connection_out()) + close(packet_get_connection_in()); + else { + close(packet_get_connection_in()); + close(packet_get_connection_out()); + } + /* + * Close all descriptors related to channels. They will still remain + * open in the parent. + */ + /* XXX better use close-on-exec? -markus */ + channel_close_all(); + + /* + * Close any extra file descriptors. Note that there may still be + * descriptors left by system functions. They will be closed later. + */ + endpwent(); + + /* + * Close any extra open file descriptors so that we don\'t have them + * hanging around in clients. Note that we want to do this after + * initgroups, because at least on Solaris 2.3 it leaves file + * descriptors open. + */ + for (i = 3; i < 64; i++) + close(i); + + /* + * Must take new environment into use so that .ssh/rc, /etc/sshrc and + * xauth are run in the proper environment. + */ + environ = env; + +#ifdef AFS + /* Try to get AFS tokens for the local cell. */ + if (k_hasafs()) { + char cell[64]; + + if (k_afs_cell_of_file(pw->pw_dir, cell, sizeof(cell)) == 0) + krb_afslog(cell, 0); + + krb_afslog(0, 0); + } +#endif /* AFS */ + + /* Change current directory to the user\'s home directory. */ + if (chdir(pw->pw_dir) < 0) { + fprintf(stderr, "Could not chdir to home directory %s: %s\n", + pw->pw_dir, strerror(errno)); +#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP + if (login_getcapbool(lc, "requirehome", 0)) + exit(1); +#endif + } + + /* + * Run $HOME/.ssh/rc, /etc/sshrc, or xauth (whichever is found first + * in this order). + */ + if (!options.use_login) { + /* ignore _PATH_SSH_USER_RC for subsystems */ + if (!s->is_subsystem && (stat(_PATH_SSH_USER_RC, &st) >= 0)) { + snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "%s -c '%s %s'", + shell, _PATH_BSHELL, _PATH_SSH_USER_RC); + if (debug_flag) + fprintf(stderr, "Running %s\n", cmd); + f = popen(cmd, "w"); + if (f) { + if (do_xauth) + fprintf(f, "%s %s\n", s->auth_proto, + s->auth_data); + pclose(f); + } else + fprintf(stderr, "Could not run %s\n", + _PATH_SSH_USER_RC); + } else if (stat(_PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_RC, &st) >= 0) { + if (debug_flag) + fprintf(stderr, "Running %s %s\n", _PATH_BSHELL, + _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_RC); + f = popen(_PATH_BSHELL " " _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_RC, "w"); + if (f) { + if (do_xauth) + fprintf(f, "%s %s\n", s->auth_proto, + s->auth_data); + pclose(f); + } else + fprintf(stderr, "Could not run %s\n", + _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_RC); + } else if (do_xauth && options.xauth_location != NULL) { + /* Add authority data to .Xauthority if appropriate. */ + char *screen = strchr(s->display, ':'); + + if (debug_flag) { + fprintf(stderr, + "Running %.100s add " + "%.100s %.100s %.100s\n", + options.xauth_location, s->display, + s->auth_proto, s->auth_data); + if (screen != NULL) + fprintf(stderr, + "Adding %.*s/unix%s %s %s\n", + (int)(screen - s->display), + s->display, screen, + s->auth_proto, s->auth_data); + } + snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "%s -q -", + options.xauth_location); + f = popen(cmd, "w"); + if (f) { + fprintf(f, "add %s %s %s\n", s->display, + s->auth_proto, s->auth_data); + if (screen != NULL) + fprintf(f, "add %.*s/unix%s %s %s\n", + (int)(screen - s->display), + s->display, screen, + s->auth_proto, + s->auth_data); + pclose(f); + } else { + fprintf(stderr, "Could not run %s\n", + cmd); + } + } + /* Get the last component of the shell name. */ + cp = strrchr(shell, '/'); + if (cp) + cp++; + else + cp = shell; + } + + /* restore SIGPIPE for child */ + signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_DFL); + + /* + * If we have no command, execute the shell. In this case, the shell + * name to be passed in argv[0] is preceded by '-' to indicate that + * this is a login shell. + */ + if (!command) { + if (!options.use_login) { + char buf[256]; + + /* Start the shell. Set initial character to '-'. */ + buf[0] = '-'; + strncpy(buf + 1, cp, sizeof(buf) - 1); + buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = 0; + + /* Execute the shell. */ + argv[0] = buf; + argv[1] = NULL; + execve(shell, argv, env); + + /* Executing the shell failed. */ + perror(shell); + exit(1); + + } else { + /* Launch login(1). */ + + execl(LOGIN_PROGRAM, "login", "-h", hostname, +#ifdef LOGIN_NEEDS_TERM + s->term? s->term : "unknown", +#endif + "-p", "-f", "--", pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL); + + /* Login couldn't be executed, die. */ + + perror("login"); + exit(1); + } + } + /* + * Execute the command using the user's shell. This uses the -c + * option to execute the command. + */ + argv[0] = (char *) cp; + argv[1] = "-c"; + argv[2] = (char *) command; + argv[3] = NULL; + execve(shell, argv, env); + perror(shell); + exit(1); +} + +Session * +session_new(void) +{ + int i; + static int did_init = 0; + if (!did_init) { + debug("session_new: init"); + for(i = 0; i < MAX_SESSIONS; i++) { + sessions[i].used = 0; + } + did_init = 1; + } + for(i = 0; i < MAX_SESSIONS; i++) { + Session *s = &sessions[i]; + if (! s->used) { + memset(s, 0, sizeof(*s)); + s->chanid = -1; + s->ptyfd = -1; + s->ttyfd = -1; + s->used = 1; + s->self = i; + debug("session_new: session %d", i); + return s; + } + } + return NULL; +} + +static void +session_dump(void) +{ + int i; + for(i = 0; i < MAX_SESSIONS; i++) { + Session *s = &sessions[i]; + debug("dump: used %d session %d %p channel %d pid %d", + s->used, + s->self, + s, + s->chanid, + s->pid); + } +} + +int +session_open(Authctxt *authctxt, int chanid) +{ + Session *s = session_new(); + debug("session_open: channel %d", chanid); + if (s == NULL) { + error("no more sessions"); + return 0; + } + s->authctxt = authctxt; + s->pw = authctxt->pw; + if (s->pw == NULL) + fatal("no user for session %d", s->self); + debug("session_open: session %d: link with channel %d", s->self, chanid); + s->chanid = chanid; + return 1; +} + +static Session * +session_by_channel(int id) +{ + int i; + for(i = 0; i < MAX_SESSIONS; i++) { + Session *s = &sessions[i]; + if (s->used && s->chanid == id) { + debug("session_by_channel: session %d channel %d", i, id); + return s; + } + } + debug("session_by_channel: unknown channel %d", id); + session_dump(); + return NULL; +} + +static Session * +session_by_pid(pid_t pid) +{ + int i; + debug("session_by_pid: pid %d", pid); + for(i = 0; i < MAX_SESSIONS; i++) { + Session *s = &sessions[i]; + if (s->used && s->pid == pid) + return s; + } + error("session_by_pid: unknown pid %d", pid); + session_dump(); + return NULL; +} + +static int +session_window_change_req(Session *s) +{ + s->col = packet_get_int(); + s->row = packet_get_int(); + s->xpixel = packet_get_int(); + s->ypixel = packet_get_int(); + packet_done(); + pty_change_window_size(s->ptyfd, s->row, s->col, s->xpixel, s->ypixel); + return 1; +} + +static int +session_pty_req(Session *s) +{ + u_int len; + int n_bytes; + + if (no_pty_flag) { + debug("Allocating a pty not permitted for this authentication."); + return 0; + } + if (s->ttyfd != -1) { + packet_disconnect("Protocol error: you already have a pty."); + return 0; + } + + s->term = packet_get_string(&len); + + if (compat20) { + s->col = packet_get_int(); + s->row = packet_get_int(); + } else { + s->row = packet_get_int(); + s->col = packet_get_int(); + } + s->xpixel = packet_get_int(); + s->ypixel = packet_get_int(); + + if (strcmp(s->term, "") == 0) { + xfree(s->term); + s->term = NULL; + } + + /* Allocate a pty and open it. */ + debug("Allocating pty."); + if (!pty_allocate(&s->ptyfd, &s->ttyfd, s->tty, sizeof(s->tty))) { + if (s->term) + xfree(s->term); + s->term = NULL; + s->ptyfd = -1; + s->ttyfd = -1; + error("session_pty_req: session %d alloc failed", s->self); + return 0; + } + debug("session_pty_req: session %d alloc %s", s->self, s->tty); + + /* for SSH1 the tty modes length is not given */ + if (!compat20) + n_bytes = packet_remaining(); + tty_parse_modes(s->ttyfd, &n_bytes); + + /* + * Add a cleanup function to clear the utmp entry and record logout + * time in case we call fatal() (e.g., the connection gets closed). + */ + fatal_add_cleanup(session_pty_cleanup, (void *)s); + pty_setowner(s->pw, s->tty); + + /* Set window size from the packet. */ + pty_change_window_size(s->ptyfd, s->row, s->col, s->xpixel, s->ypixel); + + packet_done(); + session_proctitle(s); + return 1; +} + +static int +session_subsystem_req(Session *s) +{ + struct stat st; + u_int len; + int success = 0; + char *cmd, *subsys = packet_get_string(&len); + int i; + + packet_done(); + log("subsystem request for %s", subsys); + + for (i = 0; i < options.num_subsystems; i++) { + if (strcmp(subsys, options.subsystem_name[i]) == 0) { + cmd = options.subsystem_command[i]; + if (stat(cmd, &st) < 0) { + error("subsystem: cannot stat %s: %s", cmd, + strerror(errno)); + break; + } + debug("subsystem: exec() %s", cmd); + s->is_subsystem = 1; + do_exec(s, cmd); + success = 1; + } + } + + if (!success) + log("subsystem request for %s failed, subsystem not found", + subsys); + + xfree(subsys); + return success; +} + +static int +session_x11_req(Session *s) +{ + int success; + + s->single_connection = packet_get_char(); + s->auth_proto = packet_get_string(NULL); + s->auth_data = packet_get_string(NULL); + s->screen = packet_get_int(); + packet_done(); + + success = session_setup_x11fwd(s); + if (!success) { + xfree(s->auth_proto); + xfree(s->auth_data); + s->auth_proto = NULL; + s->auth_data = NULL; + } + return success; +} + +static int +session_shell_req(Session *s) +{ + packet_done(); + do_exec(s, NULL); + return 1; +} + +static int +session_exec_req(Session *s) +{ + u_int len; + char *command = packet_get_string(&len); + packet_done(); + do_exec(s, command); + xfree(command); + return 1; +} + +static int +session_auth_agent_req(Session *s) +{ + static int called = 0; + packet_done(); + if (no_agent_forwarding_flag) { + debug("session_auth_agent_req: no_agent_forwarding_flag"); + return 0; + } + if (called) { + return 0; + } else { + called = 1; + return auth_input_request_forwarding(s->pw); + } +} + +void +session_input_channel_req(int id, void *arg) +{ + u_int len; + int reply; + int success = 0; + char *rtype; + Session *s; + Channel *c; + + rtype = packet_get_string(&len); + reply = packet_get_char(); + + s = session_by_channel(id); + if (s == NULL) + fatal("session_input_channel_req: channel %d: no session", id); + c = channel_lookup(id); + if (c == NULL) + fatal("session_input_channel_req: channel %d: bad channel", id); + + debug("session_input_channel_req: session %d channel %d request %s reply %d", + s->self, id, rtype, reply); + + /* + * a session is in LARVAL state until a shell, a command + * or a subsystem is executed + */ + if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL) { + if (strcmp(rtype, "shell") == 0) { + success = session_shell_req(s); + } else if (strcmp(rtype, "exec") == 0) { + success = session_exec_req(s); + } else if (strcmp(rtype, "pty-req") == 0) { + success = session_pty_req(s); + } else if (strcmp(rtype, "x11-req") == 0) { + success = session_x11_req(s); + } else if (strcmp(rtype, "auth-agent-req@openssh.com") == 0) { + success = session_auth_agent_req(s); + } else if (strcmp(rtype, "subsystem") == 0) { + success = session_subsystem_req(s); + } + } + if (strcmp(rtype, "window-change") == 0) { + success = session_window_change_req(s); + } + + if (reply) { + packet_start(success ? + SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS : SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE); + packet_put_int(c->remote_id); + packet_send(); + } + xfree(rtype); +} + +void +session_set_fds(Session *s, int fdin, int fdout, int fderr) +{ + if (!compat20) + fatal("session_set_fds: called for proto != 2.0"); + /* + * now that have a child and a pipe to the child, + * we can activate our channel and register the fd's + */ + if (s->chanid == -1) + fatal("no channel for session %d", s->self); + channel_set_fds(s->chanid, + fdout, fdin, fderr, + fderr == -1 ? CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE : CHAN_EXTENDED_READ, + 1); +} + +/* + * Function to perform pty cleanup. Also called if we get aborted abnormally + * (e.g., due to a dropped connection). + */ +static void +session_pty_cleanup(void *session) +{ + Session *s = session; + + if (s == NULL) { + error("session_pty_cleanup: no session"); + return; + } + if (s->ttyfd == -1) + return; + + debug("session_pty_cleanup: session %d release %s", s->self, s->tty); + + /* Record that the user has logged out. */ + if (s->pid != 0) + record_logout(s->pid, s->tty); + + /* Release the pseudo-tty. */ + pty_release(s->tty); + + /* + * Close the server side of the socket pairs. We must do this after + * the pty cleanup, so that another process doesn't get this pty + * while we're still cleaning up. + */ + if (close(s->ptymaster) < 0) + error("close(s->ptymaster): %s", strerror(errno)); + + /* unlink pty from session */ + s->ttyfd = -1; +} + +static void +session_exit_message(Session *s, int status) +{ + Channel *c; + if (s == NULL) + fatal("session_close: no session"); + c = channel_lookup(s->chanid); + if (c == NULL) + fatal("session_exit_message: session %d: no channel %d", + s->self, s->chanid); + debug("session_exit_message: session %d channel %d pid %d", + s->self, s->chanid, s->pid); + + if (WIFEXITED(status)) { + channel_request_start(s->chanid, + "exit-status", 0); + packet_put_int(WEXITSTATUS(status)); + packet_send(); + } else if (WIFSIGNALED(status)) { + channel_request_start(s->chanid, + "exit-signal", 0); + packet_put_int(WTERMSIG(status)); +#ifdef WCOREDUMP + packet_put_char(WCOREDUMP(status)); +#else /* WCOREDUMP */ + packet_put_char(0); +#endif /* WCOREDUMP */ + packet_put_cstring(""); + packet_put_cstring(""); + packet_send(); + } else { + /* Some weird exit cause. Just exit. */ + packet_disconnect("wait returned status %04x.", status); + } + + /* disconnect channel */ + debug("session_exit_message: release channel %d", s->chanid); + channel_cancel_cleanup(s->chanid); + /* + * emulate a write failure with 'chan_write_failed', nobody will be + * interested in data we write. + * Note that we must not call 'chan_read_failed', since there could + * be some more data waiting in the pipe. + */ + if (c->ostate != CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED) + chan_write_failed(c); + s->chanid = -1; +} + +static void +session_close(Session *s) +{ + debug("session_close: session %d pid %d", s->self, s->pid); + if (s->ttyfd != -1) { + fatal_remove_cleanup(session_pty_cleanup, (void *)s); + session_pty_cleanup(s); + } + if (s->term) + xfree(s->term); + if (s->display) + xfree(s->display); + if (s->auth_data) + xfree(s->auth_data); + if (s->auth_proto) + xfree(s->auth_proto); + s->used = 0; + session_proctitle(s); +} + +void +session_close_by_pid(pid_t pid, int status) +{ + Session *s = session_by_pid(pid); + if (s == NULL) { + debug("session_close_by_pid: no session for pid %d", pid); + return; + } + if (s->chanid != -1) + session_exit_message(s, status); + session_close(s); +} + +/* + * this is called when a channel dies before + * the session 'child' itself dies + */ +void +session_close_by_channel(int id, void *arg) +{ + Session *s = session_by_channel(id); + if (s == NULL) { + debug("session_close_by_channel: no session for id %d", id); + return; + } + debug("session_close_by_channel: channel %d child %d", id, s->pid); + if (s->pid != 0) { + debug("session_close_by_channel: channel %d: has child", id); + /* + * delay detach of session, but release pty, since + * the fd's to the child are already closed + */ + if (s->ttyfd != -1) { + fatal_remove_cleanup(session_pty_cleanup, (void *)s); + session_pty_cleanup(s); + } + return; + } + /* detach by removing callback */ + channel_cancel_cleanup(s->chanid); + s->chanid = -1; + session_close(s); +} + +void +session_destroy_all(void) +{ + int i; + for(i = 0; i < MAX_SESSIONS; i++) { + Session *s = &sessions[i]; + if (s->used) + session_close(s); + } +} + +static char * +session_tty_list(void) +{ + static char buf[1024]; + int i; + buf[0] = '\0'; + for(i = 0; i < MAX_SESSIONS; i++) { + Session *s = &sessions[i]; + if (s->used && s->ttyfd != -1) { + if (buf[0] != '\0') + strlcat(buf, ",", sizeof buf); + strlcat(buf, strrchr(s->tty, '/') + 1, sizeof buf); + } + } + if (buf[0] == '\0') + strlcpy(buf, "notty", sizeof buf); + return buf; +} + +void +session_proctitle(Session *s) +{ + if (s->pw == NULL) + error("no user for session %d", s->self); + else + setproctitle("%s@%s", s->pw->pw_name, session_tty_list()); +} + +int +session_setup_x11fwd(Session *s) +{ + struct stat st; + + if (no_x11_forwarding_flag) { + packet_send_debug("X11 forwarding disabled in user configuration file."); + return 0; + } + if (!options.x11_forwarding) { + debug("X11 forwarding disabled in server configuration file."); + return 0; + } + if (!options.xauth_location || + (stat(options.xauth_location, &st) == -1)) { + packet_send_debug("No xauth program; cannot forward with spoofing."); + return 0; + } + if (options.use_login) { + packet_send_debug("X11 forwarding disabled; " + "not compatible with UseLogin=yes."); + return 0; + } + if (s->display != NULL) { + debug("X11 display already set."); + return 0; + } + s->display = x11_create_display_inet(s->screen, options.x11_display_offset); + if (s->display == NULL) { + debug("x11_create_display_inet failed."); + return 0; + } + return 1; +} + +static void +do_authenticated2(Authctxt *authctxt) +{ + server_loop2(authctxt); +} diff --git a/openssh/session.h b/openssh/session.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6d5b8e6 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/session.h @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: session.h,v 1.13 2001/10/10 22:18:47 markus Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ +#ifndef SESSION_H +#define SESSION_H + +void do_authenticated(Authctxt *); + +int session_open(Authctxt*, int); +void session_input_channel_req(int, void *); +void session_close_by_pid(pid_t, int); +void session_close_by_channel(int, void *); +void session_destroy_all(void); + +#endif diff --git a/openssh/sftp-client.c b/openssh/sftp-client.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4f2a1e2 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/sftp-client.c @@ -0,0 +1,932 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* XXX: memleaks */ +/* XXX: signed vs unsigned */ +/* XXX: redesign to allow concurrent overlapped operations */ +/* XXX: we use fatal too much, error may be more appropriate in places */ +/* XXX: copy between two remote sites */ + +#include "includes.h" +RCSID("$OpenBSD: sftp-client.c,v 1.18 2001/07/14 15:10:16 stevesk Exp $"); + +#include "buffer.h" +#include "bufaux.h" +#include "getput.h" +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "atomicio.h" + +#include "sftp.h" +#include "sftp-common.h" +#include "sftp-client.h" + +/* How much data to read/write at at time during copies */ +/* XXX: what should this be? */ +#define COPY_SIZE 8192 + +/* Message ID */ +static u_int msg_id = 1; + +static void +send_msg(int fd, Buffer *m) +{ + int mlen = buffer_len(m); + int len; + Buffer oqueue; + + buffer_init(&oqueue); + buffer_put_int(&oqueue, mlen); + buffer_append(&oqueue, buffer_ptr(m), mlen); + buffer_consume(m, mlen); + + len = atomicio(write, fd, buffer_ptr(&oqueue), buffer_len(&oqueue)); + if (len <= 0) + fatal("Couldn't send packet: %s", strerror(errno)); + + buffer_free(&oqueue); +} + +static void +get_msg(int fd, Buffer *m) +{ + u_int len, msg_len; + unsigned char buf[4096]; + + len = atomicio(read, fd, buf, 4); + if (len == 0) + fatal("Connection closed"); + else if (len == -1) + fatal("Couldn't read packet: %s", strerror(errno)); + + msg_len = GET_32BIT(buf); + if (msg_len > 256 * 1024) + fatal("Received message too long %d", msg_len); + + while (msg_len) { + len = atomicio(read, fd, buf, MIN(msg_len, sizeof(buf))); + if (len == 0) + fatal("Connection closed"); + else if (len == -1) + fatal("Couldn't read packet: %s", strerror(errno)); + + msg_len -= len; + buffer_append(m, buf, len); + } +} + +static void +send_string_request(int fd, u_int id, u_int code, char *s, + u_int len) +{ + Buffer msg; + + buffer_init(&msg); + buffer_put_char(&msg, code); + buffer_put_int(&msg, id); + buffer_put_string(&msg, s, len); + send_msg(fd, &msg); + debug3("Sent message fd %d T:%d I:%d", fd, code, id); + buffer_free(&msg); +} + +static void +send_string_attrs_request(int fd, u_int id, u_int code, char *s, + u_int len, Attrib *a) +{ + Buffer msg; + + buffer_init(&msg); + buffer_put_char(&msg, code); + buffer_put_int(&msg, id); + buffer_put_string(&msg, s, len); + encode_attrib(&msg, a); + send_msg(fd, &msg); + debug3("Sent message fd %d T:%d I:%d", fd, code, id); + buffer_free(&msg); +} + +static u_int +get_status(int fd, int expected_id) +{ + Buffer msg; + u_int type, id, status; + + buffer_init(&msg); + get_msg(fd, &msg); + type = buffer_get_char(&msg); + id = buffer_get_int(&msg); + + if (id != expected_id) + fatal("ID mismatch (%d != %d)", id, expected_id); + if (type != SSH2_FXP_STATUS) + fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_STATUS(%d) packet, got %d", + SSH2_FXP_STATUS, type); + + status = buffer_get_int(&msg); + buffer_free(&msg); + + debug3("SSH2_FXP_STATUS %d", status); + + return(status); +} + +static char * +get_handle(int fd, u_int expected_id, u_int *len) +{ + Buffer msg; + u_int type, id; + char *handle; + + buffer_init(&msg); + get_msg(fd, &msg); + type = buffer_get_char(&msg); + id = buffer_get_int(&msg); + + if (id != expected_id) + fatal("ID mismatch (%d != %d)", id, expected_id); + if (type == SSH2_FXP_STATUS) { + int status = buffer_get_int(&msg); + + error("Couldn't get handle: %s", fx2txt(status)); + return(NULL); + } else if (type != SSH2_FXP_HANDLE) + fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_HANDLE(%d) packet, got %d", + SSH2_FXP_HANDLE, type); + + handle = buffer_get_string(&msg, len); + buffer_free(&msg); + + return(handle); +} + +static Attrib * +get_decode_stat(int fd, u_int expected_id, int quiet) +{ + Buffer msg; + u_int type, id; + Attrib *a; + + buffer_init(&msg); + get_msg(fd, &msg); + + type = buffer_get_char(&msg); + id = buffer_get_int(&msg); + + debug3("Received stat reply T:%d I:%d", type, id); + if (id != expected_id) + fatal("ID mismatch (%d != %d)", id, expected_id); + if (type == SSH2_FXP_STATUS) { + int status = buffer_get_int(&msg); + + if (quiet) + debug("Couldn't stat remote file: %s", fx2txt(status)); + else + error("Couldn't stat remote file: %s", fx2txt(status)); + return(NULL); + } else if (type != SSH2_FXP_ATTRS) { + fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_ATTRS(%d) packet, got %d", + SSH2_FXP_ATTRS, type); + } + a = decode_attrib(&msg); + buffer_free(&msg); + + return(a); +} + +int +do_init(int fd_in, int fd_out) +{ + int type, version; + Buffer msg; + + buffer_init(&msg); + buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_FXP_INIT); + buffer_put_int(&msg, SSH2_FILEXFER_VERSION); + send_msg(fd_out, &msg); + + buffer_clear(&msg); + + get_msg(fd_in, &msg); + + /* Expecting a VERSION reply */ + if ((type = buffer_get_char(&msg)) != SSH2_FXP_VERSION) { + error("Invalid packet back from SSH2_FXP_INIT (type %d)", + type); + buffer_free(&msg); + return(-1); + } + version = buffer_get_int(&msg); + + debug2("Remote version: %d", version); + + /* Check for extensions */ + while (buffer_len(&msg) > 0) { + char *name = buffer_get_string(&msg, NULL); + char *value = buffer_get_string(&msg, NULL); + + debug2("Init extension: \"%s\"", name); + xfree(name); + xfree(value); + } + + buffer_free(&msg); + + return(version); +} + +int +do_close(int fd_in, int fd_out, char *handle, u_int handle_len) +{ + u_int id, status; + Buffer msg; + + buffer_init(&msg); + + id = msg_id++; + buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_FXP_CLOSE); + buffer_put_int(&msg, id); + buffer_put_string(&msg, handle, handle_len); + send_msg(fd_out, &msg); + debug3("Sent message SSH2_FXP_CLOSE I:%d", id); + + status = get_status(fd_in, id); + if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) + error("Couldn't close file: %s", fx2txt(status)); + + buffer_free(&msg); + + return(status); +} + + +static int +do_lsreaddir(int fd_in, int fd_out, char *path, int printflag, + SFTP_DIRENT ***dir) +{ + Buffer msg; + u_int type, id, handle_len, i, expected_id, ents = 0; + char *handle; + + id = msg_id++; + + buffer_init(&msg); + buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_FXP_OPENDIR); + buffer_put_int(&msg, id); + buffer_put_cstring(&msg, path); + send_msg(fd_out, &msg); + + buffer_clear(&msg); + + handle = get_handle(fd_in, id, &handle_len); + if (handle == NULL) + return(-1); + + if (dir) { + ents = 0; + *dir = xmalloc(sizeof(**dir)); + (*dir)[0] = NULL; + } + + + for(;;) { + int count; + + id = expected_id = msg_id++; + + debug3("Sending SSH2_FXP_READDIR I:%d", id); + + buffer_clear(&msg); + buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_FXP_READDIR); + buffer_put_int(&msg, id); + buffer_put_string(&msg, handle, handle_len); + send_msg(fd_out, &msg); + + buffer_clear(&msg); + + get_msg(fd_in, &msg); + + type = buffer_get_char(&msg); + id = buffer_get_int(&msg); + + debug3("Received reply T:%d I:%d", type, id); + + if (id != expected_id) + fatal("ID mismatch (%d != %d)", id, expected_id); + + if (type == SSH2_FXP_STATUS) { + int status = buffer_get_int(&msg); + + debug3("Received SSH2_FXP_STATUS %d", status); + + if (status == SSH2_FX_EOF) { + break; + } else { + error("Couldn't read directory: %s", + fx2txt(status)); + do_close(fd_in, fd_out, handle, handle_len); + return(status); + } + } else if (type != SSH2_FXP_NAME) + fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_NAME(%d) packet, got %d", + SSH2_FXP_NAME, type); + + count = buffer_get_int(&msg); + if (count == 0) + break; + debug3("Received %d SSH2_FXP_NAME responses", count); + for(i = 0; i < count; i++) { + char *filename, *longname; + Attrib *a; + + filename = buffer_get_string(&msg, NULL); + longname = buffer_get_string(&msg, NULL); + a = decode_attrib(&msg); + + if (printflag) + printf("%s\n", longname); + + if (dir) { + *dir = xrealloc(*dir, sizeof(**dir) * + (ents + 2)); + (*dir)[ents] = xmalloc(sizeof(***dir)); + (*dir)[ents]->filename = xstrdup(filename); + (*dir)[ents]->longname = xstrdup(longname); + memcpy(&(*dir)[ents]->a, a, sizeof(*a)); + (*dir)[++ents] = NULL; + } + + xfree(filename); + xfree(longname); + } + } + + buffer_free(&msg); + do_close(fd_in, fd_out, handle, handle_len); + xfree(handle); + + return(0); +} + +int +do_ls(int fd_in, int fd_out, char *path) +{ + return(do_lsreaddir(fd_in, fd_out, path, 1, NULL)); +} + +int +do_readdir(int fd_in, int fd_out, char *path, SFTP_DIRENT ***dir) +{ + return(do_lsreaddir(fd_in, fd_out, path, 0, dir)); +} + +void free_sftp_dirents(SFTP_DIRENT **s) +{ + int i; + + for(i = 0; s[i]; i++) { + xfree(s[i]->filename); + xfree(s[i]->longname); + xfree(s[i]); + } + xfree(s); +} + +int +do_rm(int fd_in, int fd_out, char *path) +{ + u_int status, id; + + debug2("Sending SSH2_FXP_REMOVE \"%s\"", path); + + id = msg_id++; + send_string_request(fd_out, id, SSH2_FXP_REMOVE, path, strlen(path)); + status = get_status(fd_in, id); + if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) + error("Couldn't delete file: %s", fx2txt(status)); + return(status); +} + +int +do_mkdir(int fd_in, int fd_out, char *path, Attrib *a) +{ + u_int status, id; + + id = msg_id++; + send_string_attrs_request(fd_out, id, SSH2_FXP_MKDIR, path, + strlen(path), a); + + status = get_status(fd_in, id); + if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) + error("Couldn't create directory: %s", fx2txt(status)); + + return(status); +} + +int +do_rmdir(int fd_in, int fd_out, char *path) +{ + u_int status, id; + + id = msg_id++; + send_string_request(fd_out, id, SSH2_FXP_RMDIR, path, strlen(path)); + + status = get_status(fd_in, id); + if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) + error("Couldn't remove directory: %s", fx2txt(status)); + + return(status); +} + +Attrib * +do_stat(int fd_in, int fd_out, char *path, int quiet) +{ + u_int id; + + id = msg_id++; + send_string_request(fd_out, id, SSH2_FXP_STAT, path, strlen(path)); + return(get_decode_stat(fd_in, id, quiet)); +} + +Attrib * +do_lstat(int fd_in, int fd_out, char *path, int quiet) +{ + u_int id; + + id = msg_id++; + send_string_request(fd_out, id, SSH2_FXP_LSTAT, path, strlen(path)); + return(get_decode_stat(fd_in, id, quiet)); +} + +Attrib * +do_fstat(int fd_in, int fd_out, char *handle, u_int handle_len, int quiet) +{ + u_int id; + + id = msg_id++; + send_string_request(fd_out, id, SSH2_FXP_FSTAT, handle, handle_len); + return(get_decode_stat(fd_in, id, quiet)); +} + +int +do_setstat(int fd_in, int fd_out, char *path, Attrib *a) +{ + u_int status, id; + + id = msg_id++; + send_string_attrs_request(fd_out, id, SSH2_FXP_SETSTAT, path, + strlen(path), a); + + status = get_status(fd_in, id); + if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) + error("Couldn't setstat on \"%s\": %s", path, + fx2txt(status)); + + return(status); +} + +int +do_fsetstat(int fd_in, int fd_out, char *handle, u_int handle_len, + Attrib *a) +{ + u_int status, id; + + id = msg_id++; + send_string_attrs_request(fd_out, id, SSH2_FXP_FSETSTAT, handle, + handle_len, a); + + status = get_status(fd_in, id); + if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) + error("Couldn't fsetstat: %s", fx2txt(status)); + + return(status); +} + +char * +do_realpath(int fd_in, int fd_out, char *path) +{ + Buffer msg; + u_int type, expected_id, count, id; + char *filename, *longname; + Attrib *a; + + expected_id = id = msg_id++; + send_string_request(fd_out, id, SSH2_FXP_REALPATH, path, strlen(path)); + + buffer_init(&msg); + + get_msg(fd_in, &msg); + type = buffer_get_char(&msg); + id = buffer_get_int(&msg); + + if (id != expected_id) + fatal("ID mismatch (%d != %d)", id, expected_id); + + if (type == SSH2_FXP_STATUS) { + u_int status = buffer_get_int(&msg); + + error("Couldn't canonicalise: %s", fx2txt(status)); + return(NULL); + } else if (type != SSH2_FXP_NAME) + fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_NAME(%d) packet, got %d", + SSH2_FXP_NAME, type); + + count = buffer_get_int(&msg); + if (count != 1) + fatal("Got multiple names (%d) from SSH_FXP_REALPATH", count); + + filename = buffer_get_string(&msg, NULL); + longname = buffer_get_string(&msg, NULL); + a = decode_attrib(&msg); + + debug3("SSH_FXP_REALPATH %s -> %s", path, filename); + + xfree(longname); + + buffer_free(&msg); + + return(filename); +} + +int +do_rename(int fd_in, int fd_out, char *oldpath, char *newpath) +{ + Buffer msg; + u_int status, id; + + buffer_init(&msg); + + /* Send rename request */ + id = msg_id++; + buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_FXP_RENAME); + buffer_put_int(&msg, id); + buffer_put_cstring(&msg, oldpath); + buffer_put_cstring(&msg, newpath); + send_msg(fd_out, &msg); + debug3("Sent message SSH2_FXP_RENAME \"%s\" -> \"%s\"", oldpath, + newpath); + buffer_free(&msg); + + status = get_status(fd_in, id); + if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) + error("Couldn't rename file \"%s\" to \"%s\": %s", oldpath, newpath, + fx2txt(status)); + + return(status); +} + +int +do_symlink(int fd_in, int fd_out, char *oldpath, char *newpath) +{ + Buffer msg; + u_int status, id; + + buffer_init(&msg); + + /* Send rename request */ + id = msg_id++; + buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_FXP_SYMLINK); + buffer_put_int(&msg, id); + buffer_put_cstring(&msg, oldpath); + buffer_put_cstring(&msg, newpath); + send_msg(fd_out, &msg); + debug3("Sent message SSH2_FXP_SYMLINK \"%s\" -> \"%s\"", oldpath, + newpath); + buffer_free(&msg); + + status = get_status(fd_in, id); + if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) + error("Couldn't rename file \"%s\" to \"%s\": %s", oldpath, newpath, + fx2txt(status)); + + return(status); +} + +char * +do_readlink(int fd_in, int fd_out, char *path) +{ + Buffer msg; + u_int type, expected_id, count, id; + char *filename, *longname; + Attrib *a; + + expected_id = id = msg_id++; + send_string_request(fd_out, id, SSH2_FXP_READLINK, path, strlen(path)); + + buffer_init(&msg); + + get_msg(fd_in, &msg); + type = buffer_get_char(&msg); + id = buffer_get_int(&msg); + + if (id != expected_id) + fatal("ID mismatch (%d != %d)", id, expected_id); + + if (type == SSH2_FXP_STATUS) { + u_int status = buffer_get_int(&msg); + + error("Couldn't readlink: %s", fx2txt(status)); + return(NULL); + } else if (type != SSH2_FXP_NAME) + fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_NAME(%d) packet, got %d", + SSH2_FXP_NAME, type); + + count = buffer_get_int(&msg); + if (count != 1) + fatal("Got multiple names (%d) from SSH_FXP_READLINK", count); + + filename = buffer_get_string(&msg, NULL); + longname = buffer_get_string(&msg, NULL); + a = decode_attrib(&msg); + + debug3("SSH_FXP_READLINK %s -> %s", path, filename); + + xfree(longname); + + buffer_free(&msg); + + return(filename); +} + +int +do_download(int fd_in, int fd_out, char *remote_path, char *local_path, + int pflag) +{ + int local_fd; + u_int expected_id, handle_len, mode, type, id; + u_int64_t offset; + char *handle; + Buffer msg; + Attrib junk, *a; + int status; + + a = do_stat(fd_in, fd_out, remote_path, 0); + if (a == NULL) + return(-1); + + /* XXX: should we preserve set[ug]id? */ + if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) + mode = S_IWRITE | (a->perm & 0777); + else + mode = 0666; + + if ((a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) && + (a->perm & S_IFDIR)) { + error("Cannot download a directory: %s", remote_path); + return(-1); + } + + local_fd = open(local_path, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, mode); + if (local_fd == -1) { + error("Couldn't open local file \"%s\" for writing: %s", + local_path, strerror(errno)); + return(-1); + } + + buffer_init(&msg); + + /* Send open request */ + id = msg_id++; + buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_FXP_OPEN); + buffer_put_int(&msg, id); + buffer_put_cstring(&msg, remote_path); + buffer_put_int(&msg, SSH2_FXF_READ); + attrib_clear(&junk); /* Send empty attributes */ + encode_attrib(&msg, &junk); + send_msg(fd_out, &msg); + debug3("Sent message SSH2_FXP_OPEN I:%d P:%s", id, remote_path); + + handle = get_handle(fd_in, id, &handle_len); + if (handle == NULL) { + buffer_free(&msg); + close(local_fd); + return(-1); + } + + /* Read from remote and write to local */ + offset = 0; + for(;;) { + u_int len; + char *data; + + id = expected_id = msg_id++; + + buffer_clear(&msg); + buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_FXP_READ); + buffer_put_int(&msg, id); + buffer_put_string(&msg, handle, handle_len); + buffer_put_int64(&msg, offset); + buffer_put_int(&msg, COPY_SIZE); + send_msg(fd_out, &msg); + debug3("Sent message SSH2_FXP_READ I:%d O:%llu S:%u", + id, (u_int64_t)offset, COPY_SIZE); + + buffer_clear(&msg); + + get_msg(fd_in, &msg); + type = buffer_get_char(&msg); + id = buffer_get_int(&msg); + debug3("Received reply T:%d I:%d", type, id); + if (id != expected_id) + fatal("ID mismatch (%d != %d)", id, expected_id); + if (type == SSH2_FXP_STATUS) { + status = buffer_get_int(&msg); + + if (status == SSH2_FX_EOF) + break; + else { + error("Couldn't read from remote " + "file \"%s\" : %s", remote_path, + fx2txt(status)); + do_close(fd_in, fd_out, handle, handle_len); + goto done; + } + } else if (type != SSH2_FXP_DATA) { + fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_DATA(%d) packet, got %d", + SSH2_FXP_DATA, type); + } + + data = buffer_get_string(&msg, &len); + if (len > COPY_SIZE) + fatal("Received more data than asked for %d > %d", + len, COPY_SIZE); + + debug3("In read loop, got %d offset %llu", len, + (u_int64_t)offset); + if (atomicio(write, local_fd, data, len) != len) { + error("Couldn't write to \"%s\": %s", local_path, + strerror(errno)); + do_close(fd_in, fd_out, handle, handle_len); + status = -1; + xfree(data); + goto done; + } + + offset += len; + xfree(data); + } + status = do_close(fd_in, fd_out, handle, handle_len); + + /* Override umask and utimes if asked */ +#ifdef HAVE_FCHMOD + if (pflag && fchmod(local_fd, mode) == -1) +#else + if (pflag && chmod(local_path, mode) == -1) +#endif /* HAVE_FCHMOD */ + error("Couldn't set mode on \"%s\": %s", local_path, + strerror(errno)); + if (pflag && (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME)) { + struct timeval tv[2]; + tv[0].tv_sec = a->atime; + tv[1].tv_sec = a->mtime; + tv[0].tv_usec = tv[1].tv_usec = 0; + if (utimes(local_path, tv) == -1) + error("Can't set times on \"%s\": %s", local_path, + strerror(errno)); + } + +done: + close(local_fd); + buffer_free(&msg); + xfree(handle); + return status; +} + +int +do_upload(int fd_in, int fd_out, char *local_path, char *remote_path, + int pflag) +{ + int local_fd; + u_int handle_len, id; + u_int64_t offset; + char *handle; + Buffer msg; + struct stat sb; + Attrib a; + int status; + + if ((local_fd = open(local_path, O_RDONLY, 0)) == -1) { + error("Couldn't open local file \"%s\" for reading: %s", + local_path, strerror(errno)); + return(-1); + } + if (fstat(local_fd, &sb) == -1) { + error("Couldn't fstat local file \"%s\": %s", + local_path, strerror(errno)); + close(local_fd); + return(-1); + } + stat_to_attrib(&sb, &a); + + a.flags &= ~SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE; + a.flags &= ~SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID; + a.perm &= 0777; + if (!pflag) + a.flags &= ~SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME; + + buffer_init(&msg); + + /* Send open request */ + id = msg_id++; + buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_FXP_OPEN); + buffer_put_int(&msg, id); + buffer_put_cstring(&msg, remote_path); + buffer_put_int(&msg, SSH2_FXF_WRITE|SSH2_FXF_CREAT|SSH2_FXF_TRUNC); + encode_attrib(&msg, &a); + send_msg(fd_out, &msg); + debug3("Sent message SSH2_FXP_OPEN I:%d P:%s", id, remote_path); + + buffer_clear(&msg); + + handle = get_handle(fd_in, id, &handle_len); + if (handle == NULL) { + close(local_fd); + buffer_free(&msg); + return(-1); + } + + /* Read from local and write to remote */ + offset = 0; + for(;;) { + int len; + char data[COPY_SIZE]; + + /* + * Can't use atomicio here because it returns 0 on EOF, thus losing + * the last block of the file + */ + do + len = read(local_fd, data, COPY_SIZE); + while ((len == -1) && (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN)); + + if (len == -1) + fatal("Couldn't read from \"%s\": %s", local_path, + strerror(errno)); + if (len == 0) + break; + + buffer_clear(&msg); + buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_FXP_WRITE); + buffer_put_int(&msg, ++id); + buffer_put_string(&msg, handle, handle_len); + buffer_put_int64(&msg, offset); + buffer_put_string(&msg, data, len); + send_msg(fd_out, &msg); + debug3("Sent message SSH2_FXP_WRITE I:%d O:%llu S:%u", + id, (u_int64_t)offset, len); + + status = get_status(fd_in, id); + if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) { + error("Couldn't write to remote file \"%s\": %s", + remote_path, fx2txt(status)); + do_close(fd_in, fd_out, handle, handle_len); + close(local_fd); + goto done; + } + debug3("In write loop, got %d offset %llu", len, + (u_int64_t)offset); + + offset += len; + } + + if (close(local_fd) == -1) { + error("Couldn't close local file \"%s\": %s", local_path, + strerror(errno)); + do_close(fd_in, fd_out, handle, handle_len); + status = -1; + goto done; + } + + /* Override umask and utimes if asked */ + if (pflag) + do_fsetstat(fd_in, fd_out, handle, handle_len, &a); + + status = do_close(fd_in, fd_out, handle, handle_len); + +done: + xfree(handle); + buffer_free(&msg); + return status; +} + diff --git a/openssh/sftp-client.h b/openssh/sftp-client.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a322b25 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/sftp-client.h @@ -0,0 +1,103 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: sftp-client.h,v 1.6 2001/06/26 06:33:01 itojun Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* Client side of SSH2 filexfer protocol */ + +typedef struct SFTP_DIRENT SFTP_DIRENT; + +struct SFTP_DIRENT { + char *filename; + char *longname; + Attrib a; +}; + +/* + * Initialiase a SSH filexfer connection. Returns -1 on error or + * protocol version on success. + */ +int do_init(int, int); + +/* Close file referred to by 'handle' */ +int do_close(int, int, char *, u_int); + +/* List contents of directory 'path' to stdout */ +int do_ls(int, int, char *); + +/* Read contents of 'path' to NULL-terminated array 'dir' */ +int do_readdir(int, int, char *, SFTP_DIRENT ***); + +/* Frees a NULL-terminated array of SFTP_DIRENTs (eg. from do_readdir) */ +void free_sftp_dirents(SFTP_DIRENT **); + +/* Delete file 'path' */ +int do_rm(int, int, char *); + +/* Create directory 'path' */ +int do_mkdir(int, int, char *, Attrib *); + +/* Remove directory 'path' */ +int do_rmdir(int, int, char *); + +/* Get file attributes of 'path' (follows symlinks) */ +Attrib *do_stat(int, int, char *, int); + +/* Get file attributes of 'path' (does not follow symlinks) */ +Attrib *do_lstat(int, int, char *, int); + +/* Get file attributes of open file 'handle' */ +Attrib *do_fstat(int, int, char *, u_int, int); + +/* Set file attributes of 'path' */ +int do_setstat(int, int, char *, Attrib *); + +/* Set file attributes of open file 'handle' */ +int do_fsetstat(int, int, char *, u_int, Attrib *); + +/* Canonicalise 'path' - caller must free result */ +char *do_realpath(int, int, char *); + +/* Rename 'oldpath' to 'newpath' */ +int do_rename(int, int, char *, char *); + +/* Rename 'oldpath' to 'newpath' */ +int do_symlink(int, int, char *, char *); + +/* Return target of symlink 'path' - caller must free result */ +char *do_readlink(int, int, char *); + +/* XXX: add callbacks to do_download/do_upload so we can do progress meter */ + +/* + * Download 'remote_path' to 'local_path'. Preserve permissions and times + * if 'pflag' is set + */ +int do_download(int, int, char *, char *, int); + +/* + * Upload 'local_path' to 'remote_path'. Preserve permissions and times + * if 'pflag' is set + */ +int do_upload(int, int, char *, char *, int); diff --git a/openssh/sftp-common.c b/openssh/sftp-common.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9235048 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/sftp-common.c @@ -0,0 +1,149 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2001 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" +RCSID("$OpenBSD: sftp-common.c,v 1.4 2001/07/14 15:10:17 stevesk Exp $"); + +#include "buffer.h" +#include "bufaux.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "xmalloc.h" + +#include "sftp.h" +#include "sftp-common.h" + +/* Clear contents of attributes structure */ +void +attrib_clear(Attrib *a) +{ + a->flags = 0; + a->size = 0; + a->uid = 0; + a->gid = 0; + a->perm = 0; + a->atime = 0; + a->mtime = 0; +} + +/* Convert from struct stat to filexfer attribs */ +void +stat_to_attrib(struct stat *st, Attrib *a) +{ + attrib_clear(a); + a->flags = 0; + a->flags |= SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE; + a->size = st->st_size; + a->flags |= SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID; + a->uid = st->st_uid; + a->gid = st->st_gid; + a->flags |= SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS; + a->perm = st->st_mode; + a->flags |= SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME; + a->atime = st->st_atime; + a->mtime = st->st_mtime; +} + +/* Decode attributes in buffer */ +Attrib * +decode_attrib(Buffer *b) +{ + static Attrib a; + attrib_clear(&a); + a.flags = buffer_get_int(b); + if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE) + a.size = buffer_get_int64(b); + if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID) { + a.uid = buffer_get_int(b); + a.gid = buffer_get_int(b); + } + if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) + a.perm = buffer_get_int(b); + if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME) { + a.atime = buffer_get_int(b); + a.mtime = buffer_get_int(b); + } + /* vendor-specific extensions */ + if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_EXTENDED) { + char *type, *data; + int i, count; + count = buffer_get_int(b); + for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { + type = buffer_get_string(b, NULL); + data = buffer_get_string(b, NULL); + debug3("Got file attribute \"%s\"", type); + xfree(type); + xfree(data); + } + } + return &a; +} + +/* Encode attributes to buffer */ +void +encode_attrib(Buffer *b, Attrib *a) +{ + buffer_put_int(b, a->flags); + if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE) + buffer_put_int64(b, a->size); + if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID) { + buffer_put_int(b, a->uid); + buffer_put_int(b, a->gid); + } + if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) + buffer_put_int(b, a->perm); + if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME) { + buffer_put_int(b, a->atime); + buffer_put_int(b, a->mtime); + } +} + +/* Convert from SSH2_FX_ status to text error message */ +const char * +fx2txt(int status) +{ + switch (status) { + case SSH2_FX_OK: + return("No error"); + case SSH2_FX_EOF: + return("End of file"); + case SSH2_FX_NO_SUCH_FILE: + return("No such file or directory"); + case SSH2_FX_PERMISSION_DENIED: + return("Permission denied"); + case SSH2_FX_FAILURE: + return("Failure"); + case SSH2_FX_BAD_MESSAGE: + return("Bad message"); + case SSH2_FX_NO_CONNECTION: + return("No connection"); + case SSH2_FX_CONNECTION_LOST: + return("Connection lost"); + case SSH2_FX_OP_UNSUPPORTED: + return("Operation unsupported"); + default: + return("Unknown status"); + }; + /* NOTREACHED */ +} diff --git a/openssh/sftp-common.h b/openssh/sftp-common.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4c126bf --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/sftp-common.h @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: sftp-common.h,v 1.3 2001/06/26 17:27:24 markus Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2001 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +typedef struct Attrib Attrib; + +/* File attributes */ +struct Attrib { + u_int32_t flags; + u_int64_t size; + u_int32_t uid; + u_int32_t gid; + u_int32_t perm; + u_int32_t atime; + u_int32_t mtime; +}; + +void attrib_clear(Attrib *); +void stat_to_attrib(struct stat *, Attrib *); +Attrib *decode_attrib(Buffer *); +void encode_attrib(Buffer *, Attrib *); + +const char *fx2txt(int); diff --git a/openssh/sftp-glob.c b/openssh/sftp-glob.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a432bdf --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/sftp-glob.c @@ -0,0 +1,170 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" +RCSID("$OpenBSD: sftp-glob.c,v 1.8 2001/07/14 15:10:17 stevesk Exp $"); + +#include "buffer.h" +#include "bufaux.h" +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "log.h" + +#include "sftp.h" +#include "sftp-common.h" +#include "sftp-client.h" +#include "sftp-glob.h" + +struct SFTP_OPENDIR { + SFTP_DIRENT **dir; + int offset; +}; + +static struct { + int fd_in; + int fd_out; +} cur; + +static void * +fudge_opendir(const char *path) +{ + struct SFTP_OPENDIR *r; + + r = xmalloc(sizeof(*r)); + + if (do_readdir(cur.fd_in, cur.fd_out, (char*)path, &r->dir)) + return(NULL); + + r->offset = 0; + + return((void*)r); +} + +static struct dirent * +fudge_readdir(struct SFTP_OPENDIR *od) +{ + /* Solaris needs sizeof(dirent) + path length (see below) */ + static char buf[sizeof(struct dirent) + MAXPATHLEN]; + struct dirent *ret = (struct dirent *)buf; +#ifdef __GNU_LIBRARY__ + static int inum = 1; +#endif /* __GNU_LIBRARY__ */ + + if (od->dir[od->offset] == NULL) + return(NULL); + + memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); + + /* + * Solaris defines dirent->d_name as a one byte array and expects + * you to hack around it. + */ +#ifdef BROKEN_ONE_BYTE_DIRENT_D_NAME + strlcpy(ret->d_name, od->dir[od->offset++]->filename, MAXPATHLEN); +#else + strlcpy(ret->d_name, od->dir[od->offset++]->filename, + sizeof(ret->d_name)); +#endif +#ifdef __GNU_LIBRARY__ + /* + * Idiot glibc uses extensions to struct dirent for readdir with + * ALTDIRFUNCs. Not that this is documented anywhere but the + * source... Fake an inode number to appease it. + */ + ret->d_ino = inum++; + if (!inum) + inum = 1; +#endif /* __GNU_LIBRARY__ */ + + return(ret); +} + +static void +fudge_closedir(struct SFTP_OPENDIR *od) +{ + free_sftp_dirents(od->dir); + xfree(od); +} + +static void +attrib_to_stat(Attrib *a, struct stat *st) +{ + memset(st, 0, sizeof(*st)); + + if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE) + st->st_size = a->size; + if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID) { + st->st_uid = a->uid; + st->st_gid = a->gid; + } + if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) + st->st_mode = a->perm; + if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME) { + st->st_atime = a->atime; + st->st_mtime = a->mtime; + } +} + +static int +fudge_lstat(const char *path, struct stat *st) +{ + Attrib *a; + + if (!(a = do_lstat(cur.fd_in, cur.fd_out, (char*)path, 0))) + return(-1); + + attrib_to_stat(a, st); + + return(0); +} + +static int +fudge_stat(const char *path, struct stat *st) +{ + Attrib *a; + + if (!(a = do_stat(cur.fd_in, cur.fd_out, (char*)path, 0))) + return(-1); + + attrib_to_stat(a, st); + + return(0); +} + +int +remote_glob(int fd_in, int fd_out, const char *pattern, int flags, + int (*errfunc)(const char *, int), glob_t *pglob) +{ + pglob->gl_opendir = fudge_opendir; + pglob->gl_readdir = (struct dirent *(*)(void *))fudge_readdir; + pglob->gl_closedir = (void (*)(void *))fudge_closedir; + pglob->gl_lstat = fudge_lstat; + pglob->gl_stat = fudge_stat; + + memset(&cur, 0, sizeof(cur)); + cur.fd_in = fd_in; + cur.fd_out = fd_out; + + return(glob(pattern, flags | GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC, errfunc, + pglob)); +} diff --git a/openssh/sftp-glob.h b/openssh/sftp-glob.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2885044 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/sftp-glob.h @@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: sftp-glob.h,v 1.5 2001/06/26 17:27:24 markus Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* Remote sftp filename globbing */ + +int +remote_glob(int, int, const char *, int, int (*)(const char *, int), glob_t *); diff --git a/openssh/sftp-int.c b/openssh/sftp-int.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..841e562 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/sftp-int.c @@ -0,0 +1,922 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* XXX: globbed ls */ +/* XXX: recursive operations */ + +#include "includes.h" +RCSID("$OpenBSD: sftp-int.c,v 1.40 2001/08/14 09:23:02 markus Exp $"); + +#include "buffer.h" +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "pathnames.h" + +#include "sftp.h" +#include "sftp-common.h" +#include "sftp-glob.h" +#include "sftp-client.h" +#include "sftp-int.h" + +/* File to read commands from */ +extern FILE *infile; + +/* Version of server we are speaking to */ +int version; + +/* Seperators for interactive commands */ +#define WHITESPACE " \t\r\n" + +/* Commands for interactive mode */ +#define I_CHDIR 1 +#define I_CHGRP 2 +#define I_CHMOD 3 +#define I_CHOWN 4 +#define I_GET 5 +#define I_HELP 6 +#define I_LCHDIR 7 +#define I_LLS 8 +#define I_LMKDIR 9 +#define I_LPWD 10 +#define I_LS 11 +#define I_LUMASK 12 +#define I_MKDIR 13 +#define I_PUT 14 +#define I_PWD 15 +#define I_QUIT 16 +#define I_RENAME 17 +#define I_RM 18 +#define I_RMDIR 19 +#define I_SHELL 20 +#define I_SYMLINK 21 +#define I_VERSION 22 + +struct CMD { + const char *c; + const int n; +}; + +const struct CMD cmds[] = { + { "bye", I_QUIT }, + { "cd", I_CHDIR }, + { "chdir", I_CHDIR }, + { "chgrp", I_CHGRP }, + { "chmod", I_CHMOD }, + { "chown", I_CHOWN }, + { "dir", I_LS }, + { "exit", I_QUIT }, + { "get", I_GET }, + { "mget", I_GET }, + { "help", I_HELP }, + { "lcd", I_LCHDIR }, + { "lchdir", I_LCHDIR }, + { "lls", I_LLS }, + { "lmkdir", I_LMKDIR }, + { "ln", I_SYMLINK }, + { "lpwd", I_LPWD }, + { "ls", I_LS }, + { "lumask", I_LUMASK }, + { "mkdir", I_MKDIR }, + { "put", I_PUT }, + { "mput", I_PUT }, + { "pwd", I_PWD }, + { "quit", I_QUIT }, + { "rename", I_RENAME }, + { "rm", I_RM }, + { "rmdir", I_RMDIR }, + { "symlink", I_SYMLINK }, + { "version", I_VERSION }, + { "!", I_SHELL }, + { "?", I_HELP }, + { NULL, -1} +}; + +static void +help(void) +{ + printf("Available commands:\n"); + printf("cd path Change remote directory to 'path'\n"); + printf("lcd path Change local directory to 'path'\n"); + printf("chgrp grp path Change group of file 'path' to 'grp'\n"); + printf("chmod mode path Change permissions of file 'path' to 'mode'\n"); + printf("chown own path Change owner of file 'path' to 'own'\n"); + printf("help Display this help text\n"); + printf("get remote-path [local-path] Download file\n"); + printf("lls [ls-options [path]] Display local directory listing\n"); + printf("ln oldpath newpath Symlink remote file\n"); + printf("lmkdir path Create local directory\n"); + printf("lpwd Print local working directory\n"); + printf("ls [path] Display remote directory listing\n"); + printf("lumask umask Set local umask to 'umask'\n"); + printf("mkdir path Create remote directory\n"); + printf("put local-path [remote-path] Upload file\n"); + printf("pwd Display remote working directory\n"); + printf("exit Quit sftp\n"); + printf("quit Quit sftp\n"); + printf("rename oldpath newpath Rename remote file\n"); + printf("rmdir path Remove remote directory\n"); + printf("rm path Delete remote file\n"); + printf("symlink oldpath newpath Symlink remote file\n"); + printf("version Show SFTP version\n"); + printf("!command Execute 'command' in local shell\n"); + printf("! Escape to local shell\n"); + printf("? Synonym for help\n"); +} + +static void +local_do_shell(const char *args) +{ + int status; + char *shell; + pid_t pid; + + if (!*args) + args = NULL; + + if ((shell = getenv("SHELL")) == NULL) + shell = _PATH_BSHELL; + + if ((pid = fork()) == -1) + fatal("Couldn't fork: %s", strerror(errno)); + + if (pid == 0) { + /* XXX: child has pipe fds to ssh subproc open - issue? */ + if (args) { + debug3("Executing %s -c \"%s\"", shell, args); + execl(shell, shell, "-c", args, (char *)NULL); + } else { + debug3("Executing %s", shell); + execl(shell, shell, (char *)NULL); + } + fprintf(stderr, "Couldn't execute \"%s\": %s\n", shell, + strerror(errno)); + _exit(1); + } + if (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) + fatal("Couldn't wait for child: %s", strerror(errno)); + if (!WIFEXITED(status)) + error("Shell exited abormally"); + else if (WEXITSTATUS(status)) + error("Shell exited with status %d", WEXITSTATUS(status)); +} + +static void +local_do_ls(const char *args) +{ + if (!args || !*args) + local_do_shell(_PATH_LS); + else { + int len = strlen(_PATH_LS " ") + strlen(args) + 1; + char *buf = xmalloc(len); + + /* XXX: quoting - rip quoting code from ftp? */ + snprintf(buf, len, _PATH_LS " %s", args); + local_do_shell(buf); + xfree(buf); + } +} + +static char * +path_append(char *p1, char *p2) +{ + char *ret; + int len = strlen(p1) + strlen(p2) + 2; + + ret = xmalloc(len); + strlcpy(ret, p1, len); + if (strcmp(p1, "/") != 0) + strlcat(ret, "/", len); + strlcat(ret, p2, len); + + return(ret); +} + +static char * +make_absolute(char *p, char *pwd) +{ + char *abs; + + /* Derelativise */ + if (p && p[0] != '/') { + abs = path_append(pwd, p); + xfree(p); + return(abs); + } else + return(p); +} + +static int +infer_path(const char *p, char **ifp) +{ + char *cp; + + cp = strrchr(p, '/'); + if (cp == NULL) { + *ifp = xstrdup(p); + return(0); + } + + if (!cp[1]) { + error("Invalid path"); + return(-1); + } + + *ifp = xstrdup(cp + 1); + return(0); +} + +static int +parse_getput_flags(const char **cpp, int *pflag) +{ + const char *cp = *cpp; + + /* Check for flags */ + if (cp[0] == '-' && cp[1] && strchr(WHITESPACE, cp[2])) { + switch (cp[1]) { + case 'p': + case 'P': + *pflag = 1; + break; + default: + error("Invalid flag -%c", cp[1]); + return(-1); + } + cp += 2; + *cpp = cp + strspn(cp, WHITESPACE); + } + + return(0); +} + +static int +get_pathname(const char **cpp, char **path) +{ + const char *cp = *cpp, *end; + char quot; + int i; + + cp += strspn(cp, WHITESPACE); + if (!*cp) { + *cpp = cp; + *path = NULL; + return (0); + } + + /* Check for quoted filenames */ + if (*cp == '\"' || *cp == '\'') { + quot = *cp++; + + end = strchr(cp, quot); + if (end == NULL) { + error("Unterminated quote"); + goto fail; + } + if (cp == end) { + error("Empty quotes"); + goto fail; + } + *cpp = end + 1 + strspn(end + 1, WHITESPACE); + } else { + /* Read to end of filename */ + end = strpbrk(cp, WHITESPACE); + if (end == NULL) + end = strchr(cp, '\0'); + *cpp = end + strspn(end, WHITESPACE); + } + + i = end - cp; + + *path = xmalloc(i + 1); + memcpy(*path, cp, i); + (*path)[i] = '\0'; + return(0); + + fail: + *path = NULL; + return (-1); +} + +static int +is_dir(char *path) +{ + struct stat sb; + + /* XXX: report errors? */ + if (stat(path, &sb) == -1) + return(0); + + return(sb.st_mode & S_IFDIR); +} + +static int +remote_is_dir(int in, int out, char *path) +{ + Attrib *a; + + /* XXX: report errors? */ + if ((a = do_stat(in, out, path, 1)) == NULL) + return(0); + if (!(a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS)) + return(0); + return(a->perm & S_IFDIR); +} + +static int +process_get(int in, int out, char *src, char *dst, char *pwd, int pflag) +{ + char *abs_src = NULL; + char *abs_dst = NULL; + char *tmp; + glob_t g; + int err = 0; + int i; + + abs_src = xstrdup(src); + abs_src = make_absolute(abs_src, pwd); + + memset(&g, 0, sizeof(g)); + debug3("Looking up %s", abs_src); + if (remote_glob(in, out, abs_src, 0, NULL, &g)) { + error("File \"%s\" not found.", abs_src); + err = -1; + goto out; + } + + /* Only one match, dst may be file, directory or unspecified */ + if (g.gl_pathv[0] && g.gl_matchc == 1) { + if (dst) { + /* If directory specified, append filename */ + if (is_dir(dst)) { + if (infer_path(g.gl_pathv[0], &tmp)) { + err = 1; + goto out; + } + abs_dst = path_append(dst, tmp); + xfree(tmp); + } else + abs_dst = xstrdup(dst); + } else if (infer_path(g.gl_pathv[0], &abs_dst)) { + err = -1; + goto out; + } + printf("Fetching %s to %s\n", g.gl_pathv[0], abs_dst); + err = do_download(in, out, g.gl_pathv[0], abs_dst, pflag); + goto out; + } + + /* Multiple matches, dst may be directory or unspecified */ + if (dst && !is_dir(dst)) { + error("Multiple files match, but \"%s\" is not a directory", + dst); + err = -1; + goto out; + } + + for(i = 0; g.gl_pathv[i]; i++) { + if (infer_path(g.gl_pathv[i], &tmp)) { + err = -1; + goto out; + } + if (dst) { + abs_dst = path_append(dst, tmp); + xfree(tmp); + } else + abs_dst = tmp; + + printf("Fetching %s to %s\n", g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst); + if (do_download(in, out, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst, pflag) == -1) + err = -1; + xfree(abs_dst); + abs_dst = NULL; + } + +out: + xfree(abs_src); + if (abs_dst) + xfree(abs_dst); + globfree(&g); + return(err); +} + +static int +process_put(int in, int out, char *src, char *dst, char *pwd, int pflag) +{ + char *tmp_dst = NULL; + char *abs_dst = NULL; + char *tmp; + glob_t g; + int err = 0; + int i; + + if (dst) { + tmp_dst = xstrdup(dst); + tmp_dst = make_absolute(tmp_dst, pwd); + } + + memset(&g, 0, sizeof(g)); + debug3("Looking up %s", src); + if (glob(src, 0, NULL, &g)) { + error("File \"%s\" not found.", src); + err = -1; + goto out; + } + + /* Only one match, dst may be file, directory or unspecified */ + if (g.gl_pathv[0] && g.gl_matchc == 1) { + if (tmp_dst) { + /* If directory specified, append filename */ + if (remote_is_dir(in, out, tmp_dst)) { + if (infer_path(g.gl_pathv[0], &tmp)) { + err = 1; + goto out; + } + abs_dst = path_append(tmp_dst, tmp); + xfree(tmp); + } else + abs_dst = xstrdup(tmp_dst); + } else { + if (infer_path(g.gl_pathv[0], &abs_dst)) { + err = -1; + goto out; + } + abs_dst = make_absolute(abs_dst, pwd); + } + printf("Uploading %s to %s\n", g.gl_pathv[0], abs_dst); + err = do_upload(in, out, g.gl_pathv[0], abs_dst, pflag); + goto out; + } + + /* Multiple matches, dst may be directory or unspecified */ + if (tmp_dst && !remote_is_dir(in, out, tmp_dst)) { + error("Multiple files match, but \"%s\" is not a directory", + tmp_dst); + err = -1; + goto out; + } + + for(i = 0; g.gl_pathv[i]; i++) { + if (infer_path(g.gl_pathv[i], &tmp)) { + err = -1; + goto out; + } + if (tmp_dst) { + abs_dst = path_append(tmp_dst, tmp); + xfree(tmp); + } else + abs_dst = make_absolute(tmp, pwd); + + printf("Uploading %s to %s\n", g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst); + if (do_upload(in, out, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst, pflag) == -1) + err = -1; + } + +out: + if (abs_dst) + xfree(abs_dst); + if (tmp_dst) + xfree(tmp_dst); + return(err); +} + +static int +parse_args(const char **cpp, int *pflag, unsigned long *n_arg, + char **path1, char **path2) +{ + const char *cmd, *cp = *cpp; + char *cp2; + int base = 0; + long l; + int i, cmdnum; + + /* Skip leading whitespace */ + cp = cp + strspn(cp, WHITESPACE); + + /* Ignore blank lines */ + if (!*cp) + return(-1); + + /* Figure out which command we have */ + for(i = 0; cmds[i].c; i++) { + int cmdlen = strlen(cmds[i].c); + + /* Check for command followed by whitespace */ + if (!strncasecmp(cp, cmds[i].c, cmdlen) && + strchr(WHITESPACE, cp[cmdlen])) { + cp += cmdlen; + cp = cp + strspn(cp, WHITESPACE); + break; + } + } + cmdnum = cmds[i].n; + cmd = cmds[i].c; + + /* Special case */ + if (*cp == '!') { + cp++; + cmdnum = I_SHELL; + } else if (cmdnum == -1) { + error("Invalid command."); + return(-1); + } + + /* Get arguments and parse flags */ + *pflag = *n_arg = 0; + *path1 = *path2 = NULL; + switch (cmdnum) { + case I_GET: + case I_PUT: + if (parse_getput_flags(&cp, pflag)) + return(-1); + /* Get first pathname (mandatory) */ + if (get_pathname(&cp, path1)) + return(-1); + if (*path1 == NULL) { + error("You must specify at least one path after a " + "%s command.", cmd); + return(-1); + } + /* Try to get second pathname (optional) */ + if (get_pathname(&cp, path2)) + return(-1); + break; + case I_RENAME: + case I_SYMLINK: + if (get_pathname(&cp, path1)) + return(-1); + if (get_pathname(&cp, path2)) + return(-1); + if (!*path1 || !*path2) { + error("You must specify two paths after a %s " + "command.", cmd); + return(-1); + } + break; + case I_RM: + case I_MKDIR: + case I_RMDIR: + case I_CHDIR: + case I_LCHDIR: + case I_LMKDIR: + /* Get pathname (mandatory) */ + if (get_pathname(&cp, path1)) + return(-1); + if (*path1 == NULL) { + error("You must specify a path after a %s command.", + cmd); + return(-1); + } + break; + case I_LS: + /* Path is optional */ + if (get_pathname(&cp, path1)) + return(-1); + break; + case I_LLS: + case I_SHELL: + /* Uses the rest of the line */ + break; + case I_LUMASK: + base = 8; + case I_CHMOD: + base = 8; + case I_CHOWN: + case I_CHGRP: + /* Get numeric arg (mandatory) */ + l = strtol(cp, &cp2, base); + if (cp2 == cp || ((l == LONG_MIN || l == LONG_MAX) && + errno == ERANGE) || l < 0) { + error("You must supply a numeric argument " + "to the %s command.", cmd); + return(-1); + } + cp = cp2; + *n_arg = l; + if (cmdnum == I_LUMASK && strchr(WHITESPACE, *cp)) + break; + if (cmdnum == I_LUMASK || !strchr(WHITESPACE, *cp)) { + error("You must supply a numeric argument " + "to the %s command.", cmd); + return(-1); + } + cp += strspn(cp, WHITESPACE); + + /* Get pathname (mandatory) */ + if (get_pathname(&cp, path1)) + return(-1); + if (*path1 == NULL) { + error("You must specify a path after a %s command.", + cmd); + return(-1); + } + break; + case I_QUIT: + case I_PWD: + case I_LPWD: + case I_HELP: + case I_VERSION: + break; + default: + fatal("Command not implemented"); + } + + *cpp = cp; + return(cmdnum); +} + +static int +parse_dispatch_command(int in, int out, const char *cmd, char **pwd) +{ + char *path1, *path2, *tmp; + int pflag, cmdnum, i; + unsigned long n_arg; + Attrib a, *aa; + char path_buf[MAXPATHLEN]; + int err = 0; + glob_t g; + + path1 = path2 = NULL; + cmdnum = parse_args(&cmd, &pflag, &n_arg, &path1, &path2); + + memset(&g, 0, sizeof(g)); + + /* Perform command */ + switch (cmdnum) { + case -1: + break; + case I_GET: + err = process_get(in, out, path1, path2, *pwd, pflag); + break; + case I_PUT: + err = process_put(in, out, path1, path2, *pwd, pflag); + break; + case I_RENAME: + path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd); + path2 = make_absolute(path2, *pwd); + err = do_rename(in, out, path1, path2); + break; + case I_SYMLINK: + if (version < 3) { + error("The server (version %d) does not support " + "this operation", version); + err = -1; + } else { + path2 = make_absolute(path2, *pwd); + err = do_symlink(in, out, path1, path2); + } + break; + case I_RM: + path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd); + remote_glob(in, out, path1, GLOB_NOCHECK, NULL, &g); + for(i = 0; g.gl_pathv[i]; i++) { + printf("Removing %s\n", g.gl_pathv[i]); + if (do_rm(in, out, g.gl_pathv[i]) == -1) + err = -1; + } + break; + case I_MKDIR: + path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd); + attrib_clear(&a); + a.flags |= SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS; + a.perm = 0777; + err = do_mkdir(in, out, path1, &a); + break; + case I_RMDIR: + path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd); + err = do_rmdir(in, out, path1); + break; + case I_CHDIR: + path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd); + if ((tmp = do_realpath(in, out, path1)) == NULL) { + err = 1; + break; + } + if ((aa = do_stat(in, out, tmp, 0)) == NULL) { + xfree(tmp); + err = 1; + break; + } + if (!(aa->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS)) { + error("Can't change directory: Can't check target"); + xfree(tmp); + err = 1; + break; + } + if (!S_ISDIR(aa->perm)) { + error("Can't change directory: \"%s\" is not " + "a directory", tmp); + xfree(tmp); + err = 1; + break; + } + xfree(*pwd); + *pwd = tmp; + break; + case I_LS: + if (!path1) { + do_ls(in, out, *pwd); + break; + } + path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd); + if ((tmp = do_realpath(in, out, path1)) == NULL) + break; + xfree(path1); + path1 = tmp; + if ((aa = do_stat(in, out, path1, 0)) == NULL) + break; + if ((aa->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) && + !S_ISDIR(aa->perm)) { + error("Can't ls: \"%s\" is not a directory", path1); + break; + } + do_ls(in, out, path1); + break; + case I_LCHDIR: + if (chdir(path1) == -1) { + error("Couldn't change local directory to " + "\"%s\": %s", path1, strerror(errno)); + err = 1; + } + break; + case I_LMKDIR: + if (mkdir(path1, 0777) == -1) { + error("Couldn't create local directory " + "\"%s\": %s", path1, strerror(errno)); + err = 1; + } + break; + case I_LLS: + local_do_ls(cmd); + break; + case I_SHELL: + local_do_shell(cmd); + break; + case I_LUMASK: + umask(n_arg); + printf("Local umask: %03lo\n", n_arg); + break; + case I_CHMOD: + path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd); + attrib_clear(&a); + a.flags |= SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS; + a.perm = n_arg; + remote_glob(in, out, path1, GLOB_NOCHECK, NULL, &g); + for(i = 0; g.gl_pathv[i]; i++) { + printf("Changing mode on %s\n", g.gl_pathv[i]); + do_setstat(in, out, g.gl_pathv[i], &a); + } + break; + case I_CHOWN: + path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd); + remote_glob(in, out, path1, GLOB_NOCHECK, NULL, &g); + for(i = 0; g.gl_pathv[i]; i++) { + if (!(aa = do_stat(in, out, g.gl_pathv[i], 0))) + continue; + if (!(aa->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID)) { + error("Can't get current ownership of " + "remote file \"%s\"", g.gl_pathv[i]); + continue; + } + printf("Changing owner on %s\n", g.gl_pathv[i]); + aa->flags &= SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID; + aa->uid = n_arg; + do_setstat(in, out, g.gl_pathv[i], aa); + } + break; + case I_CHGRP: + path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd); + remote_glob(in, out, path1, GLOB_NOCHECK, NULL, &g); + for(i = 0; g.gl_pathv[i]; i++) { + if (!(aa = do_stat(in, out, g.gl_pathv[i], 0))) + continue; + if (!(aa->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID)) { + error("Can't get current ownership of " + "remote file \"%s\"", g.gl_pathv[i]); + continue; + } + printf("Changing group on %s\n", g.gl_pathv[i]); + aa->flags &= SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID; + aa->gid = n_arg; + do_setstat(in, out, g.gl_pathv[i], aa); + } + break; + case I_PWD: + printf("Remote working directory: %s\n", *pwd); + break; + case I_LPWD: + if (!getcwd(path_buf, sizeof(path_buf))) + error("Couldn't get local cwd: %s", + strerror(errno)); + else + printf("Local working directory: %s\n", + path_buf); + break; + case I_QUIT: + return(-1); + case I_HELP: + help(); + break; + case I_VERSION: + printf("SFTP protocol version %d\n", version); + break; + default: + fatal("%d is not implemented", cmdnum); + } + + if (g.gl_pathc) + globfree(&g); + if (path1) + xfree(path1); + if (path2) + xfree(path2); + + /* If an error occurs in batch mode we should abort. */ + if (infile != stdin && err > 0) + return -1; + + return(0); +} + +void +interactive_loop(int fd_in, int fd_out, char *file1, char *file2) +{ + char *pwd; + char *dir = NULL; + char cmd[2048]; + + version = do_init(fd_in, fd_out); + if (version == -1) + fatal("Couldn't initialise connection to server"); + + pwd = do_realpath(fd_in, fd_out, "."); + if (pwd == NULL) + fatal("Need cwd"); + + if (file1 != NULL) { + dir = xstrdup(file1); + dir = make_absolute(dir, pwd); + + if (remote_is_dir(fd_in, fd_out, dir) && file2 == NULL) { + printf("Changing to: %s\n", dir); + snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "cd \"%s\"", dir); + parse_dispatch_command(fd_in, fd_out, cmd, &pwd); + } else { + if (file2 == NULL) + snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "get %s", dir); + else + snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "get %s %s", dir, + file2); + + parse_dispatch_command(fd_in, fd_out, cmd, &pwd); + return; + } + } +#if HAVE_SETVBUF + setvbuf(stdout, NULL, _IOLBF, 0); + setvbuf(infile, NULL, _IOLBF, 0); +#else + setlinebuf(stdout); + setlinebuf(infile); +#endif + + for(;;) { + char *cp; + + printf("sftp> "); + + /* XXX: use libedit */ + if (fgets(cmd, sizeof(cmd), infile) == NULL) { + printf("\n"); + break; + } else if (infile != stdin) /* Bluff typing */ + printf("%s", cmd); + + cp = strrchr(cmd, '\n'); + if (cp) + *cp = '\0'; + + if (parse_dispatch_command(fd_in, fd_out, cmd, &pwd)) + break; + } + xfree(pwd); +} diff --git a/openssh/sftp-int.h b/openssh/sftp-int.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..699e758 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/sftp-int.h @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: sftp-int.h,v 1.4 2001/06/26 17:27:25 markus Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +void interactive_loop(int, int, char *, char *); diff --git a/openssh/sftp-server.8 b/openssh/sftp-server.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0a0210a --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/sftp-server.8 @@ -0,0 +1,62 @@ +.\" $OpenBSD: sftp-server.8,v 1.8 2001/06/23 05:57:08 deraadt Exp $ +.\" +.\" Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. +.\" +.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +.\" are met: +.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +.\" +.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR +.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES +.\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. +.\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, +.\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT +.\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, +.\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY +.\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT +.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF +.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. +.\" +.Dd August 30, 2000 +.Dt SFTP-SERVER 8 +.Os +.Sh NAME +.Nm sftp-server +.Nd SFTP server subsystem +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.Nm sftp-server +.Sh DESCRIPTION +.Nm +is a program that speaks the server side of SFTP protocol +to stdout and expects client requests from stdin. +.Nm +is not intended to be called directly, but from +.Xr sshd 8 +using the +.Cm Subsystem +option. +See +.Xr sshd 8 +for more information. +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr sftp 1 , +.Xr ssh 1 , +.Xr sshd 8 +.Rs +.%A T. Ylonen +.%A S. Lehtinen +.%T "SSH File Transfer Protocol" +.%N draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-00.txt +.%D January 2001 +.%O work in progress material +.Re +.Sh AUTHORS +Markus Friedl +.Sh HISTORY +.Nm +first appeared in OpenBSD 2.8 . diff --git a/openssh/sftp-server.c b/openssh/sftp-server.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2ef9753 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/sftp-server.c @@ -0,0 +1,1110 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ +#include "includes.h" +RCSID("$OpenBSD: sftp-server.c,v 1.30 2001/07/31 12:42:50 jakob Exp $"); + +#include "buffer.h" +#include "bufaux.h" +#include "getput.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "xmalloc.h" + +#include "sftp.h" +#include "sftp-common.h" + +/* helper */ +#define get_int64() buffer_get_int64(&iqueue); +#define get_int() buffer_get_int(&iqueue); +#define get_string(lenp) buffer_get_string(&iqueue, lenp); +#define TRACE debug + +#ifdef HAVE___PROGNAME +extern char *__progname; +#else +char *__progname; +#endif + +/* input and output queue */ +Buffer iqueue; +Buffer oqueue; + +/* Version of client */ +int version; + +/* portable attibutes, etc. */ + +typedef struct Stat Stat; + +struct Stat { + char *name; + char *long_name; + Attrib attrib; +}; + +static int +errno_to_portable(int unixerrno) +{ + int ret = 0; + + switch (unixerrno) { + case 0: + ret = SSH2_FX_OK; + break; + case ENOENT: + case ENOTDIR: + case EBADF: + case ELOOP: + ret = SSH2_FX_NO_SUCH_FILE; + break; + case EPERM: + case EACCES: + case EFAULT: + ret = SSH2_FX_PERMISSION_DENIED; + break; + case ENAMETOOLONG: + case EINVAL: + ret = SSH2_FX_BAD_MESSAGE; + break; + default: + ret = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; + break; + } + return ret; +} + +static int +flags_from_portable(int pflags) +{ + int flags = 0; + + if ((pflags & SSH2_FXF_READ) && + (pflags & SSH2_FXF_WRITE)) { + flags = O_RDWR; + } else if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_READ) { + flags = O_RDONLY; + } else if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_WRITE) { + flags = O_WRONLY; + } + if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_CREAT) + flags |= O_CREAT; + if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_TRUNC) + flags |= O_TRUNC; + if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_EXCL) + flags |= O_EXCL; + return flags; +} + +static Attrib * +get_attrib(void) +{ + return decode_attrib(&iqueue); +} + +/* handle handles */ + +typedef struct Handle Handle; +struct Handle { + int use; + DIR *dirp; + int fd; + char *name; +}; + +enum { + HANDLE_UNUSED, + HANDLE_DIR, + HANDLE_FILE +}; + +Handle handles[100]; + +static void +handle_init(void) +{ + int i; + + for(i = 0; i < sizeof(handles)/sizeof(Handle); i++) + handles[i].use = HANDLE_UNUSED; +} + +static int +handle_new(int use, char *name, int fd, DIR *dirp) +{ + int i; + + for(i = 0; i < sizeof(handles)/sizeof(Handle); i++) { + if (handles[i].use == HANDLE_UNUSED) { + handles[i].use = use; + handles[i].dirp = dirp; + handles[i].fd = fd; + handles[i].name = name; + return i; + } + } + return -1; +} + +static int +handle_is_ok(int i, int type) +{ + return i >= 0 && i < sizeof(handles)/sizeof(Handle) && + handles[i].use == type; +} + +static int +handle_to_string(int handle, char **stringp, int *hlenp) +{ + if (stringp == NULL || hlenp == NULL) + return -1; + *stringp = xmalloc(sizeof(int32_t)); + PUT_32BIT(*stringp, handle); + *hlenp = sizeof(int32_t); + return 0; +} + +static int +handle_from_string(char *handle, u_int hlen) +{ + int val; + + if (hlen != sizeof(int32_t)) + return -1; + val = GET_32BIT(handle); + if (handle_is_ok(val, HANDLE_FILE) || + handle_is_ok(val, HANDLE_DIR)) + return val; + return -1; +} + +static char * +handle_to_name(int handle) +{ + if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_DIR)|| + handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE)) + return handles[handle].name; + return NULL; +} + +static DIR * +handle_to_dir(int handle) +{ + if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_DIR)) + return handles[handle].dirp; + return NULL; +} + +static int +handle_to_fd(int handle) +{ + if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE)) + return handles[handle].fd; + return -1; +} + +static int +handle_close(int handle) +{ + int ret = -1; + + if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE)) { + ret = close(handles[handle].fd); + handles[handle].use = HANDLE_UNUSED; + } else if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_DIR)) { + ret = closedir(handles[handle].dirp); + handles[handle].use = HANDLE_UNUSED; + } else { + errno = ENOENT; + } + return ret; +} + +static int +get_handle(void) +{ + char *handle; + int val = -1; + u_int hlen; + + handle = get_string(&hlen); + if (hlen < 256) + val = handle_from_string(handle, hlen); + xfree(handle); + return val; +} + +/* send replies */ + +static void +send_msg(Buffer *m) +{ + int mlen = buffer_len(m); + + buffer_put_int(&oqueue, mlen); + buffer_append(&oqueue, buffer_ptr(m), mlen); + buffer_consume(m, mlen); +} + +static void +send_status(u_int32_t id, u_int32_t error) +{ + Buffer msg; + const char *status_messages[] = { + "Success", /* SSH_FX_OK */ + "End of file", /* SSH_FX_EOF */ + "No such file", /* SSH_FX_NO_SUCH_FILE */ + "Permission denied", /* SSH_FX_PERMISSION_DENIED */ + "Failure", /* SSH_FX_FAILURE */ + "Bad message", /* SSH_FX_BAD_MESSAGE */ + "No connection", /* SSH_FX_NO_CONNECTION */ + "Connection lost", /* SSH_FX_CONNECTION_LOST */ + "Operation unsupported", /* SSH_FX_OP_UNSUPPORTED */ + "Unknown error" /* Others */ + }; + + TRACE("sent status id %d error %d", id, error); + buffer_init(&msg); + buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_FXP_STATUS); + buffer_put_int(&msg, id); + buffer_put_int(&msg, error); + if (version >= 3) { + buffer_put_cstring(&msg, + status_messages[MIN(error,SSH2_FX_MAX)]); + buffer_put_cstring(&msg, ""); + } + send_msg(&msg); + buffer_free(&msg); +} +static void +send_data_or_handle(char type, u_int32_t id, char *data, int dlen) +{ + Buffer msg; + + buffer_init(&msg); + buffer_put_char(&msg, type); + buffer_put_int(&msg, id); + buffer_put_string(&msg, data, dlen); + send_msg(&msg); + buffer_free(&msg); +} + +static void +send_data(u_int32_t id, char *data, int dlen) +{ + TRACE("sent data id %d len %d", id, dlen); + send_data_or_handle(SSH2_FXP_DATA, id, data, dlen); +} + +static void +send_handle(u_int32_t id, int handle) +{ + char *string; + int hlen; + + handle_to_string(handle, &string, &hlen); + TRACE("sent handle id %d handle %d", id, handle); + send_data_or_handle(SSH2_FXP_HANDLE, id, string, hlen); + xfree(string); +} + +static void +send_names(u_int32_t id, int count, Stat *stats) +{ + Buffer msg; + int i; + + buffer_init(&msg); + buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_FXP_NAME); + buffer_put_int(&msg, id); + buffer_put_int(&msg, count); + TRACE("sent names id %d count %d", id, count); + for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { + buffer_put_cstring(&msg, stats[i].name); + buffer_put_cstring(&msg, stats[i].long_name); + encode_attrib(&msg, &stats[i].attrib); + } + send_msg(&msg); + buffer_free(&msg); +} + +static void +send_attrib(u_int32_t id, Attrib *a) +{ + Buffer msg; + + TRACE("sent attrib id %d have 0x%x", id, a->flags); + buffer_init(&msg); + buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_FXP_ATTRS); + buffer_put_int(&msg, id); + encode_attrib(&msg, a); + send_msg(&msg); + buffer_free(&msg); +} + +/* parse incoming */ + +static void +process_init(void) +{ + Buffer msg; + + version = buffer_get_int(&iqueue); + TRACE("client version %d", version); + buffer_init(&msg); + buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_FXP_VERSION); + buffer_put_int(&msg, SSH2_FILEXFER_VERSION); + send_msg(&msg); + buffer_free(&msg); +} + +static void +process_open(void) +{ + u_int32_t id, pflags; + Attrib *a; + char *name; + int handle, fd, flags, mode, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; + + id = get_int(); + name = get_string(NULL); + pflags = get_int(); /* portable flags */ + a = get_attrib(); + flags = flags_from_portable(pflags); + mode = (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) ? a->perm : 0666; + TRACE("open id %d name %s flags %d mode 0%o", id, name, pflags, mode); + fd = open(name, flags, mode); + if (fd < 0) { + status = errno_to_portable(errno); + } else { + handle = handle_new(HANDLE_FILE, xstrdup(name), fd, NULL); + if (handle < 0) { + close(fd); + } else { + send_handle(id, handle); + status = SSH2_FX_OK; + } + } + if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) + send_status(id, status); + xfree(name); +} + +static void +process_close(void) +{ + u_int32_t id; + int handle, ret, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; + + id = get_int(); + handle = get_handle(); + TRACE("close id %d handle %d", id, handle); + ret = handle_close(handle); + status = (ret == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK; + send_status(id, status); +} + +static void +process_read(void) +{ + char buf[64*1024]; + u_int32_t id, len; + int handle, fd, ret, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; + u_int64_t off; + + id = get_int(); + handle = get_handle(); + off = get_int64(); + len = get_int(); + + TRACE("read id %d handle %d off %llu len %d", id, handle, + (u_int64_t)off, len); + if (len > sizeof buf) { + len = sizeof buf; + log("read change len %d", len); + } + fd = handle_to_fd(handle); + if (fd >= 0) { + if (lseek(fd, off, SEEK_SET) < 0) { + error("process_read: seek failed"); + status = errno_to_portable(errno); + } else { + ret = read(fd, buf, len); + if (ret < 0) { + status = errno_to_portable(errno); + } else if (ret == 0) { + status = SSH2_FX_EOF; + } else { + send_data(id, buf, ret); + status = SSH2_FX_OK; + } + } + } + if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) + send_status(id, status); +} + +static void +process_write(void) +{ + u_int32_t id; + u_int64_t off; + u_int len; + int handle, fd, ret, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; + char *data; + + id = get_int(); + handle = get_handle(); + off = get_int64(); + data = get_string(&len); + + TRACE("write id %d handle %d off %llu len %d", id, handle, + (u_int64_t)off, len); + fd = handle_to_fd(handle); + if (fd >= 0) { + if (lseek(fd, off, SEEK_SET) < 0) { + status = errno_to_portable(errno); + error("process_write: seek failed"); + } else { +/* XXX ATOMICIO ? */ + ret = write(fd, data, len); + if (ret == -1) { + error("process_write: write failed"); + status = errno_to_portable(errno); + } else if (ret == len) { + status = SSH2_FX_OK; + } else { + log("nothing at all written"); + } + } + } + send_status(id, status); + xfree(data); +} + +static void +process_do_stat(int do_lstat) +{ + Attrib a; + struct stat st; + u_int32_t id; + char *name; + int ret, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; + + id = get_int(); + name = get_string(NULL); + TRACE("%sstat id %d name %s", do_lstat ? "l" : "", id, name); + ret = do_lstat ? lstat(name, &st) : stat(name, &st); + if (ret < 0) { + status = errno_to_portable(errno); + } else { + stat_to_attrib(&st, &a); + send_attrib(id, &a); + status = SSH2_FX_OK; + } + if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) + send_status(id, status); + xfree(name); +} + +static void +process_stat(void) +{ + process_do_stat(0); +} + +static void +process_lstat(void) +{ + process_do_stat(1); +} + +static void +process_fstat(void) +{ + Attrib a; + struct stat st; + u_int32_t id; + int fd, ret, handle, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; + + id = get_int(); + handle = get_handle(); + TRACE("fstat id %d handle %d", id, handle); + fd = handle_to_fd(handle); + if (fd >= 0) { + ret = fstat(fd, &st); + if (ret < 0) { + status = errno_to_portable(errno); + } else { + stat_to_attrib(&st, &a); + send_attrib(id, &a); + status = SSH2_FX_OK; + } + } + if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) + send_status(id, status); +} + +static struct timeval * +attrib_to_tv(Attrib *a) +{ + static struct timeval tv[2]; + + tv[0].tv_sec = a->atime; + tv[0].tv_usec = 0; + tv[1].tv_sec = a->mtime; + tv[1].tv_usec = 0; + return tv; +} + +static void +process_setstat(void) +{ + Attrib *a; + u_int32_t id; + char *name; + int ret; + int status = SSH2_FX_OK; + + id = get_int(); + name = get_string(NULL); + a = get_attrib(); + TRACE("setstat id %d name %s", id, name); + if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) { + ret = chmod(name, a->perm & 0777); + if (ret == -1) + status = errno_to_portable(errno); + } + if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME) { + ret = utimes(name, attrib_to_tv(a)); + if (ret == -1) + status = errno_to_portable(errno); + } + if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID) { + ret = chown(name, a->uid, a->gid); + if (ret == -1) + status = errno_to_portable(errno); + } + send_status(id, status); + xfree(name); +} + +static void +process_fsetstat(void) +{ + Attrib *a; + u_int32_t id; + int handle, fd, ret; + int status = SSH2_FX_OK; + char *name; + + id = get_int(); + handle = get_handle(); + a = get_attrib(); + TRACE("fsetstat id %d handle %d", id, handle); + fd = handle_to_fd(handle); + name = handle_to_name(handle); + if (fd < 0 || name == NULL) { + status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; + } else { + if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) { +#ifdef HAVE_FCHMOD + ret = fchmod(fd, a->perm & 0777); +#else + ret = chmod(name, a->perm & 0777); +#endif + if (ret == -1) + status = errno_to_portable(errno); + } + if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME) { +#ifdef HAVE_FUTIMES + ret = futimes(fd, attrib_to_tv(a)); +#else + ret = utimes(name, attrib_to_tv(a)); +#endif + if (ret == -1) + status = errno_to_portable(errno); + } + if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID) { +#ifdef HAVE_FCHOWN + ret = fchown(fd, a->uid, a->gid); +#else + ret = chown(name, a->uid, a->gid); +#endif + if (ret == -1) + status = errno_to_portable(errno); + } + } + send_status(id, status); +} + +static void +process_opendir(void) +{ + DIR *dirp = NULL; + char *path; + int handle, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; + u_int32_t id; + + id = get_int(); + path = get_string(NULL); + TRACE("opendir id %d path %s", id, path); + dirp = opendir(path); + if (dirp == NULL) { + status = errno_to_portable(errno); + } else { + handle = handle_new(HANDLE_DIR, xstrdup(path), 0, dirp); + if (handle < 0) { + closedir(dirp); + } else { + send_handle(id, handle); + status = SSH2_FX_OK; + } + + } + if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) + send_status(id, status); + xfree(path); +} + +/* + * drwxr-xr-x 5 markus markus 1024 Jan 13 18:39 .ssh + */ +static char * +ls_file(char *name, struct stat *st) +{ + int ulen, glen, sz = 0; + struct passwd *pw; + struct group *gr; + struct tm *ltime = localtime(&st->st_mtime); + char *user, *group; + char buf[1024], mode[11+1], tbuf[12+1], ubuf[11+1], gbuf[11+1]; + + strmode(st->st_mode, mode); + if ((pw = getpwuid(st->st_uid)) != NULL) { + user = pw->pw_name; + } else { + snprintf(ubuf, sizeof ubuf, "%d", st->st_uid); + user = ubuf; + } + if ((gr = getgrgid(st->st_gid)) != NULL) { + group = gr->gr_name; + } else { + snprintf(gbuf, sizeof gbuf, "%d", st->st_gid); + group = gbuf; + } + if (ltime != NULL) { + if (time(NULL) - st->st_mtime < (365*24*60*60)/2) + sz = strftime(tbuf, sizeof tbuf, "%b %e %H:%M", ltime); + else + sz = strftime(tbuf, sizeof tbuf, "%b %e %Y", ltime); + } + if (sz == 0) + tbuf[0] = '\0'; + ulen = MAX(strlen(user), 8); + glen = MAX(strlen(group), 8); + snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s %3d %-*s %-*s %8llu %s %s", mode, + st->st_nlink, ulen, user, glen, group, + (u_int64_t)st->st_size, tbuf, name); + return xstrdup(buf); +} + +static void +process_readdir(void) +{ + DIR *dirp; + struct dirent *dp; + char *path; + int handle; + u_int32_t id; + + id = get_int(); + handle = get_handle(); + TRACE("readdir id %d handle %d", id, handle); + dirp = handle_to_dir(handle); + path = handle_to_name(handle); + if (dirp == NULL || path == NULL) { + send_status(id, SSH2_FX_FAILURE); + } else { + struct stat st; + char pathname[1024]; + Stat *stats; + int nstats = 10, count = 0, i; + stats = xmalloc(nstats * sizeof(Stat)); + while ((dp = readdir(dirp)) != NULL) { + if (count >= nstats) { + nstats *= 2; + stats = xrealloc(stats, nstats * sizeof(Stat)); + } +/* XXX OVERFLOW ? */ + snprintf(pathname, sizeof pathname, "%s%s%s", path, + strcmp(path, "/") ? "/" : "", dp->d_name); + if (lstat(pathname, &st) < 0) + continue; + stat_to_attrib(&st, &(stats[count].attrib)); + stats[count].name = xstrdup(dp->d_name); + stats[count].long_name = ls_file(dp->d_name, &st); + count++; + /* send up to 100 entries in one message */ + /* XXX check packet size instead */ + if (count == 100) + break; + } + if (count > 0) { + send_names(id, count, stats); + for(i = 0; i < count; i++) { + xfree(stats[i].name); + xfree(stats[i].long_name); + } + } else { + send_status(id, SSH2_FX_EOF); + } + xfree(stats); + } +} + +static void +process_remove(void) +{ + char *name; + u_int32_t id; + int status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; + int ret; + + id = get_int(); + name = get_string(NULL); + TRACE("remove id %d name %s", id, name); + ret = unlink(name); + status = (ret == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK; + send_status(id, status); + xfree(name); +} + +static void +process_mkdir(void) +{ + Attrib *a; + u_int32_t id; + char *name; + int ret, mode, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; + + id = get_int(); + name = get_string(NULL); + a = get_attrib(); + mode = (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) ? + a->perm & 0777 : 0777; + TRACE("mkdir id %d name %s mode 0%o", id, name, mode); + ret = mkdir(name, mode); + status = (ret == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK; + send_status(id, status); + xfree(name); +} + +static void +process_rmdir(void) +{ + u_int32_t id; + char *name; + int ret, status; + + id = get_int(); + name = get_string(NULL); + TRACE("rmdir id %d name %s", id, name); + ret = rmdir(name); + status = (ret == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK; + send_status(id, status); + xfree(name); +} + +static void +process_realpath(void) +{ + char resolvedname[MAXPATHLEN]; + u_int32_t id; + char *path; + + id = get_int(); + path = get_string(NULL); + if (path[0] == '\0') { + xfree(path); + path = xstrdup("."); + } + TRACE("realpath id %d path %s", id, path); + if (realpath(path, resolvedname) == NULL) { + send_status(id, errno_to_portable(errno)); + } else { + Stat s; + attrib_clear(&s.attrib); + s.name = s.long_name = resolvedname; + send_names(id, 1, &s); + } + xfree(path); +} + +static void +process_rename(void) +{ + u_int32_t id; + struct stat st; + char *oldpath, *newpath; + int ret, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; + + id = get_int(); + oldpath = get_string(NULL); + newpath = get_string(NULL); + TRACE("rename id %d old %s new %s", id, oldpath, newpath); + /* fail if 'newpath' exists */ + if (stat(newpath, &st) == -1) { + ret = rename(oldpath, newpath); + status = (ret == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK; + } + send_status(id, status); + xfree(oldpath); + xfree(newpath); +} + +static void +process_readlink(void) +{ + u_int32_t id; + int len; + char link[MAXPATHLEN]; + char *path; + + id = get_int(); + path = get_string(NULL); + TRACE("readlink id %d path %s", id, path); + if ((len = readlink(path, link, sizeof(link) - 1)) == -1) + send_status(id, errno_to_portable(errno)); + else { + Stat s; + + link[len] = '\0'; + attrib_clear(&s.attrib); + s.name = s.long_name = link; + send_names(id, 1, &s); + } + xfree(path); +} + +static void +process_symlink(void) +{ + u_int32_t id; + struct stat st; + char *oldpath, *newpath; + int ret, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; + + id = get_int(); + oldpath = get_string(NULL); + newpath = get_string(NULL); + TRACE("symlink id %d old %s new %s", id, oldpath, newpath); + /* fail if 'newpath' exists */ + if (stat(newpath, &st) == -1) { + ret = symlink(oldpath, newpath); + status = (ret == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK; + } + send_status(id, status); + xfree(oldpath); + xfree(newpath); +} + +static void +process_extended(void) +{ + u_int32_t id; + char *request; + + id = get_int(); + request = get_string(NULL); + send_status(id, SSH2_FX_OP_UNSUPPORTED); /* MUST */ + xfree(request); +} + +/* stolen from ssh-agent */ + +static void +process(void) +{ + u_int msg_len; + u_int type; + u_char *cp; + + if (buffer_len(&iqueue) < 5) + return; /* Incomplete message. */ + cp = (u_char *) buffer_ptr(&iqueue); + msg_len = GET_32BIT(cp); + if (msg_len > 256 * 1024) { + error("bad message "); + exit(11); + } + if (buffer_len(&iqueue) < msg_len + 4) + return; + buffer_consume(&iqueue, 4); + type = buffer_get_char(&iqueue); + switch (type) { + case SSH2_FXP_INIT: + process_init(); + break; + case SSH2_FXP_OPEN: + process_open(); + break; + case SSH2_FXP_CLOSE: + process_close(); + break; + case SSH2_FXP_READ: + process_read(); + break; + case SSH2_FXP_WRITE: + process_write(); + break; + case SSH2_FXP_LSTAT: + process_lstat(); + break; + case SSH2_FXP_FSTAT: + process_fstat(); + break; + case SSH2_FXP_SETSTAT: + process_setstat(); + break; + case SSH2_FXP_FSETSTAT: + process_fsetstat(); + break; + case SSH2_FXP_OPENDIR: + process_opendir(); + break; + case SSH2_FXP_READDIR: + process_readdir(); + break; + case SSH2_FXP_REMOVE: + process_remove(); + break; + case SSH2_FXP_MKDIR: + process_mkdir(); + break; + case SSH2_FXP_RMDIR: + process_rmdir(); + break; + case SSH2_FXP_REALPATH: + process_realpath(); + break; + case SSH2_FXP_STAT: + process_stat(); + break; + case SSH2_FXP_RENAME: + process_rename(); + break; + case SSH2_FXP_READLINK: + process_readlink(); + break; + case SSH2_FXP_SYMLINK: + process_symlink(); + break; + case SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED: + process_extended(); + break; + default: + error("Unknown message %d", type); + break; + } +} + +int +main(int ac, char **av) +{ + fd_set *rset, *wset; + int in, out, max; + ssize_t len, olen, set_size; + + /* XXX should use getopt */ + + __progname = get_progname(av[0]); + handle_init(); + +#ifdef DEBUG_SFTP_SERVER + log_init("sftp-server", SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1, SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH, 0); +#endif + + in = dup(STDIN_FILENO); + out = dup(STDOUT_FILENO); + +#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN + setmode(in, O_BINARY); + setmode(out, O_BINARY); +#endif + + max = 0; + if (in > max) + max = in; + if (out > max) + max = out; + + buffer_init(&iqueue); + buffer_init(&oqueue); + + set_size = howmany(max + 1, NFDBITS) * sizeof(fd_mask); + rset = (fd_set *)xmalloc(set_size); + wset = (fd_set *)xmalloc(set_size); + + for (;;) { + memset(rset, 0, set_size); + memset(wset, 0, set_size); + + FD_SET(in, rset); + olen = buffer_len(&oqueue); + if (olen > 0) + FD_SET(out, wset); + + if (select(max+1, rset, wset, NULL, NULL) < 0) { + if (errno == EINTR) + continue; + exit(2); + } + + /* copy stdin to iqueue */ + if (FD_ISSET(in, rset)) { + char buf[4*4096]; + len = read(in, buf, sizeof buf); + if (len == 0) { + debug("read eof"); + exit(0); + } else if (len < 0) { + error("read error"); + exit(1); + } else { + buffer_append(&iqueue, buf, len); + } + } + /* send oqueue to stdout */ + if (FD_ISSET(out, wset)) { + len = write(out, buffer_ptr(&oqueue), olen); + if (len < 0) { + error("write error"); + exit(1); + } else { + buffer_consume(&oqueue, len); + } + } + /* process requests from client */ + process(); + } +} diff --git a/openssh/sftp.1 b/openssh/sftp.1 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0cc4e2b --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/sftp.1 @@ -0,0 +1,256 @@ +.\" $OpenBSD: sftp.1,v 1.26 2001/09/17 20:38:09 stevesk Exp $ +.\" +.\" Copyright (c) 2001 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. +.\" +.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +.\" are met: +.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +.\" +.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR +.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES +.\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. +.\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, +.\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT +.\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, +.\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY +.\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT +.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF +.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. +.\" +.Dd February 4, 2001 +.Dt SFTP 1 +.Os +.Sh NAME +.Nm sftp +.Nd Secure file transfer program +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.Nm sftp +.Op Fl 1Cv +.Op Fl b Ar batchfile +.Op Fl F Ar ssh_config +.Op Fl o Ar ssh_option +.Op Fl s Ar subsystem | sftp_server +.Op Fl S Ar program +.Ar host +.Nm sftp +.Op [\fIuser\fR@]\fIhost\fR[:\fIfile\fR [\fIfile\fR]] +.Nm sftp +.Op [\fIuser\fR@]\fIhost\fR[:\fIdir\fR[\fI/\fR]] +.Sh DESCRIPTION +.Nm +is an interactive file transfer program, similar to +.Xr ftp 1 , +which performs all operations over an encrypted +.Xr ssh 1 +transport. +It may also use many features of ssh, such as public key authentication and +compression. +.Nm +connects and logs into the specified +.Ar host , +then enters an interactive command mode. +.Pp +The second usage format will retrieve files automatically if a non-interactive +authentication method is used; otherwise it will do so after +successful interactive authentication. +.Pp +The last usage format allows the sftp client to start in a remote directory. +.Pp +The options are as follows: +.Bl -tag -width Ds +.It Fl 1 +Specify the use of protocol version 1. +.It Fl b Ar batchfile +Batch mode reads a series of commands from an input +.Ar batchfile +instead of +.Em stdin . +Since it lacks user interaction it should be used in conjunction with +non-interactive authentication. +.Nm +will abort if any of the following +commands fail: +.Ic get , put , rename , ln , rm , mkdir , chdir , lchdir +and +.Ic lmkdir . +.It Fl C +Enables compression (via ssh's +.Fl C +flag). +.It Fl F Ar ssh_config +Specifies an alternative +per-user configuration file for +.Nm ssh . +This option is directly passed to +.Xr ssh 1 . +.It Fl o Ar ssh_option +Can be used to pass options to +.Nm ssh +in the format used in the +.Xr ssh 1 +configuration file. This is useful for specifying options +for which there is no separate +.Nm sftp +command-line flag. For example, to specify an alternate +port use: +.Ic sftp -oPort=24 . +.It Fl s Ar subsystem | sftp_server +Specifies the SSH2 subsystem or the path for an sftp server +on the remote host. A path is useful for using sftp over +protocol version 1, or when the remote +.Nm sshd +does not have an sftp subsystem configured. +.It Fl S Ar program +Name of the +.Ar program +to use for the encrypted connection. +The program must understand +.Xr ssh 1 +options. +.It Fl v +Raise logging level. This option is also passed to ssh. +.El +.Sh INTERACTIVE COMMANDS +Once in interactive mode, +.Nm +understands a set of commands similar to those of +.Xr ftp 1 . +Commands are case insensitive and pathnames may be enclosed in quotes if they +contain spaces. +.Bl -tag -width Ds +.It Ic bye +Quit sftp. +.It Ic cd Ar path +Change remote directory to +.Ar path . +.It Ic lcd Ar path +Change local directory to +.Ar path . +.It Ic chgrp Ar grp Ar path +Change group of file +.Ar path +to +.Ar grp . +.Ar grp +must be a numeric GID. +.It Ic chmod Ar mode Ar path +Change permissions of file +.Ar path +to +.Ar mode . +.It Ic chown Ar own Ar path +Change owner of file +.Ar path +to +.Ar own . +.Ar own +must be a numeric UID. +.It Ic exit +Quit sftp. +.It Xo Ic get +.Op Ar flags +.Ar remote-path +.Op Ar local-path +.Xc +Retrieve the +.Ar remote-path +and store it on the local machine. +If the local +path name is not specified, it is given the same name it has on the +remote machine. If the +.Fl P +flag is specified, then the file's full permission and access time are +copied too. +.It Ic help +Display help text. +.It Ic lls Op Ar ls-options Op Ar path +Display local directory listing of either +.Ar path +or current directory if +.Ar path +is not specified. +.It Ic lmkdir Ar path +Create local directory specified by +.Ar path . +.It Ic ln Ar oldpath Ar newpath +Create a symbolic link from +.Ar oldpath +to +.Ar newpath . +.It Ic lpwd +Print local working directory. +.It Ic ls Op Ar path +Display remote directory listing of either +.Ar path +or current directory if +.Ar path +is not specified. +.It Ic lumask Ar umask +Set local umask to +.Ar umask . +.It Ic mkdir Ar path +Create remote directory specified by +.Ar path . +.It Xo Ic put +.Op Ar flags +.Ar local-path +.Op Ar local-path +.Xc +Upload +.Ar local-path +and store it on the remote machine. If the remote path name is not +specified, it is given the same name it has on the local machine. If the +.Fl P +flag is specified, then the file's full permission and access time are +copied too. +.It Ic pwd +Display remote working directory. +.It Ic quit +Quit sftp. +.It Ic rename Ar oldpath Ar newpath +Rename remote file from +.Ar oldpath +to +.Ar newpath . +.It Ic rmdir Ar path +Remove remote directory specified by +.Ar path . +.It Ic rm Ar path +Delete remote file specified by +.Ar path . +.It Ic symlink Ar oldpath Ar newpath +Create a symbolic link from +.Ar oldpath +to +.Ar newpath . +.It Ic ! Ar command +Execute +.Ar command +in local shell. +.It Ic ! +Escape to local shell. +.It Ic ? +Synonym for help. +.El +.Sh AUTHORS +Damien Miller +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr scp 1 , +.Xr ssh 1 , +.Xr ssh-add 1 , +.Xr ssh-keygen 1 , +.Xr sftp-server 8 , +.Xr sshd 8 +.Rs +.%A T. Ylonen +.%A S. Lehtinen +.%T "SSH File Transfer Protocol" +.%N draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-00.txt +.%D January 2001 +.%O work in progress material +.Re diff --git a/openssh/sftp.c b/openssh/sftp.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..06110f9 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/sftp.c @@ -0,0 +1,225 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +RCSID("$OpenBSD: sftp.c,v 1.21 2001/09/19 19:24:19 stevesk Exp $"); + +/* XXX: commandline mode */ +/* XXX: short-form remote directory listings (like 'ls -C') */ + +#include "buffer.h" +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "pathnames.h" +#include "misc.h" + +#include "sftp.h" +#include "sftp-common.h" +#include "sftp-client.h" +#include "sftp-int.h" + +#ifdef HAVE___PROGNAME +extern char *__progname; +#else +char *__progname; +#endif + +char *ssh_program = _PATH_SSH_PROGRAM; +FILE* infile; + +static void +connect_to_server(char **args, int *in, int *out, pid_t *sshpid) +{ + int c_in, c_out; +#ifdef USE_PIPES + int pin[2], pout[2]; + if ((pipe(pin) == -1) || (pipe(pout) == -1)) + fatal("pipe: %s", strerror(errno)); + *in = pin[0]; + *out = pout[1]; + c_in = pout[0]; + c_out = pin[1]; +#else /* USE_PIPES */ + int inout[2]; + if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, inout) == -1) + fatal("socketpair: %s", strerror(errno)); + *in = *out = inout[0]; + c_in = c_out = inout[1]; +#endif /* USE_PIPES */ + + if ((*sshpid = fork()) == -1) + fatal("fork: %s", strerror(errno)); + else if (*sshpid == 0) { + if ((dup2(c_in, STDIN_FILENO) == -1) || + (dup2(c_out, STDOUT_FILENO) == -1)) { + fprintf(stderr, "dup2: %s\n", strerror(errno)); + exit(1); + } + close(*in); + close(*out); + close(c_in); + close(c_out); + execv(ssh_program, args); + fprintf(stderr, "exec: %s: %s\n", ssh_program, strerror(errno)); + exit(1); + } + + close(c_in); + close(c_out); +} + +static void +usage(void) +{ + fprintf(stderr, + "usage: sftp [-1Cv] [-b batchfile] [-F config] [-o option] [-s subsystem|path]\n" + " [-S program] [user@]host[:file [file]]\n"); + exit(1); +} + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int in, out, ch; + pid_t sshpid; + char *host, *userhost, *cp, *file2; + int debug_level = 0, sshver = 2; + char *file1 = NULL, *sftp_server = NULL; + LogLevel ll = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO; + arglist args; + extern int optind; + extern char *optarg; + + __progname = get_progname(argv[0]); + args.list = NULL; + addargs(&args, "ssh"); /* overwritten with ssh_program */ + addargs(&args, "-oFallBackToRsh no"); + addargs(&args, "-oForwardX11 no"); + addargs(&args, "-oForwardAgent no"); + addargs(&args, "-oClearAllForwardings yes"); + ll = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO; + infile = stdin; /* Read from STDIN unless changed by -b */ + + while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "1hvCo:s:S:b:F:")) != -1) { + switch (ch) { + case 'C': + addargs(&args, "-C"); + break; + case 'v': + if (debug_level < 3) { + addargs(&args, "-v"); + ll = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1 + debug_level; + } + debug_level++; + break; + case 'F': + case 'o': + addargs(&args, "-%c%s", ch, optarg); + break; + case '1': + sshver = 1; + if (sftp_server == NULL) + sftp_server = _PATH_SFTP_SERVER; + break; + case 's': + sftp_server = optarg; + break; + case 'S': + ssh_program = optarg; + break; + case 'b': + if (infile == stdin) { + infile = fopen(optarg, "r"); + if (infile == NULL) + fatal("%s (%s).", strerror(errno), optarg); + } else + fatal("Filename already specified."); + break; + case 'h': + default: + usage(); + } + } + + if (optind == argc || argc > (optind + 2)) + usage(); + + userhost = xstrdup(argv[optind]); + file2 = argv[optind+1]; + + if ((cp = colon(userhost)) != NULL) { + *cp++ = '\0'; + file1 = cp; + } + + if ((host = strchr(userhost, '@')) == NULL) + host = userhost; + else { + *host++ = '\0'; + if (!userhost[0]) { + fprintf(stderr, "Missing username\n"); + usage(); + } + addargs(&args, "-l%s",userhost); + } + + host = cleanhostname(host); + if (!*host) { + fprintf(stderr, "Missing hostname\n"); + usage(); + } + + log_init(argv[0], ll, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, 1); + addargs(&args, "-oProtocol %d", sshver); + + /* no subsystem if the server-spec contains a '/' */ + if (sftp_server == NULL || strchr(sftp_server, '/') == NULL) + addargs(&args, "-s"); + + addargs(&args, "%s", host); + addargs(&args, "%s", (sftp_server != NULL ? sftp_server : "sftp")); + args.list[0] = ssh_program; + + fprintf(stderr, "Connecting to %s...\n", host); + + connect_to_server(args.list, &in, &out, &sshpid); + + interactive_loop(in, out, file1, file2); + +#if !defined(USE_PIPES) + shutdown(in, SHUT_RDWR); + shutdown(out, SHUT_RDWR); +#endif + + close(in); + close(out); + if (infile != stdin) + fclose(infile); + + if (waitpid(sshpid, NULL, 0) == -1) + fatal("Couldn't wait for ssh process: %s", strerror(errno)); + + exit(0); +} diff --git a/openssh/sftp.h b/openssh/sftp.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2ad9586 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/sftp.h @@ -0,0 +1,91 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: sftp.h,v 1.3 2001/03/07 10:11:23 djm Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* + * draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-01.txt + */ + +/* version */ +#define SSH2_FILEXFER_VERSION 3 + +/* client to server */ +#define SSH2_FXP_INIT 1 +#define SSH2_FXP_OPEN 3 +#define SSH2_FXP_CLOSE 4 +#define SSH2_FXP_READ 5 +#define SSH2_FXP_WRITE 6 +#define SSH2_FXP_LSTAT 7 +#define SSH2_FXP_FSTAT 8 +#define SSH2_FXP_SETSTAT 9 +#define SSH2_FXP_FSETSTAT 10 +#define SSH2_FXP_OPENDIR 11 +#define SSH2_FXP_READDIR 12 +#define SSH2_FXP_REMOVE 13 +#define SSH2_FXP_MKDIR 14 +#define SSH2_FXP_RMDIR 15 +#define SSH2_FXP_REALPATH 16 +#define SSH2_FXP_STAT 17 +#define SSH2_FXP_RENAME 18 +#define SSH2_FXP_READLINK 19 +#define SSH2_FXP_SYMLINK 20 + +/* server to client */ +#define SSH2_FXP_VERSION 2 +#define SSH2_FXP_STATUS 101 +#define SSH2_FXP_HANDLE 102 +#define SSH2_FXP_DATA 103 +#define SSH2_FXP_NAME 104 +#define SSH2_FXP_ATTRS 105 + +#define SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED 200 +#define SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY 201 + +/* attributes */ +#define SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE 0x00000001 +#define SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID 0x00000002 +#define SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS 0x00000004 +#define SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME 0x00000008 +#define SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_EXTENDED 0x80000000 + +/* portable open modes */ +#define SSH2_FXF_READ 0x00000001 +#define SSH2_FXF_WRITE 0x00000002 +#define SSH2_FXF_APPEND 0x00000004 +#define SSH2_FXF_CREAT 0x00000008 +#define SSH2_FXF_TRUNC 0x00000010 +#define SSH2_FXF_EXCL 0x00000020 + +/* status messages */ +#define SSH2_FX_OK 0 +#define SSH2_FX_EOF 1 +#define SSH2_FX_NO_SUCH_FILE 2 +#define SSH2_FX_PERMISSION_DENIED 3 +#define SSH2_FX_FAILURE 4 +#define SSH2_FX_BAD_MESSAGE 5 +#define SSH2_FX_NO_CONNECTION 6 +#define SSH2_FX_CONNECTION_LOST 7 +#define SSH2_FX_OP_UNSUPPORTED 8 +#define SSH2_FX_MAX 8 diff --git a/openssh/ssh-add.1 b/openssh/ssh-add.1 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b842080 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/ssh-add.1 @@ -0,0 +1,148 @@ +.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-add.1,v 1.27 2001/08/23 18:08:59 stevesk Exp $ +.\" +.\" -*- nroff -*- +.\" +.\" Author: Tatu Ylonen +.\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland +.\" All rights reserved +.\" +.\" As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software +.\" can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this +.\" software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is +.\" incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be +.\" called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". +.\" +.\" +.\" Copyright (c) 1999,2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. +.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell. All rights reserved. +.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved. +.\" +.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +.\" are met: +.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +.\" +.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR +.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES +.\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. +.\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, +.\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT +.\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, +.\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY +.\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT +.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF +.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. +.\" +.Dd September 25, 1999 +.Dt SSH-ADD 1 +.Os +.Sh NAME +.Nm ssh-add +.Nd adds RSA or DSA identities to the authentication agent +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.Nm ssh-add +.Op Fl lLdD +.Op Ar +.Nm ssh-add +.Fl s Ar reader +.Nm ssh-add +.Fl e Ar reader +.Sh DESCRIPTION +.Nm +adds RSA or DSA identities to the authentication agent, +.Xr ssh-agent 1 . +When run without arguments, it adds the file +.Pa $HOME/.ssh/identity . +Alternative file names can be given on the command line. +If any file requires a passphrase, +.Nm +asks for the passphrase from the user. +The passphrase is read from the user's tty. +.Nm +retries the last passphrase if multiple identity files are given. +.Pp +The authentication agent must be running and must be an ancestor of +the current process for +.Nm +to work. +.Pp +The options are as follows: +.Bl -tag -width Ds +.It Fl l +Lists fingerprints of all identities currently represented by the agent. +.It Fl L +Lists public key parameters of all identities currently represented by the agent. +.It Fl d +Instead of adding the identity, removes the identity from the agent. +.It Fl D +Deletes all identities from the agent. +.It Fl s Ar reader +Add key in smartcard +.Ar reader . +.It Fl e Ar reader +Remove key in smartcard +.Ar reader . +.El +.Sh FILES +.Bl -tag -width Ds +.It Pa $HOME/.ssh/identity +Contains the protocol version 1 RSA authentication identity of the user. +This file should not be readable by anyone but the user. +Note that +.Nm +ignores this file if it is accessible by others. +It is possible to +specify a passphrase when generating the key; that passphrase will be +used to encrypt the private part of this file. +This is the default file added by +.Nm +when no other files have been specified. +.It Pa $HOME/.ssh/id_dsa +Contains the protocol version 2 DSA authentication identity of the user. +.It Pa $HOME/.ssh/id_rsa +Contains the protocol version 2 RSA authentication identity of the user. +.El +.Sh ENVIRONMENT +.Bl -tag -width Ds +.It Ev "DISPLAY" and "SSH_ASKPASS" +If +.Nm +needs a passphrase, it will read the passphrase from the current +terminal if it was run from a terminal. +If +.Nm +does not have a terminal associated with it but +.Ev DISPLAY +and +.Ev SSH_ASKPASS +are set, it will execute the program specified by +.Ev SSH_ASKPASS +and open an X11 window to read the passphrase. +This is particularly useful when calling +.Nm +from a +.Pa .Xsession +or related script. +(Note that on some machines it +may be necessary to redirect the input from +.Pa /dev/null +to make this work.) +.El +.Sh AUTHORS +OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free +ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen. +Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, +Theo de Raadt and Dug Song +removed many bugs, re-added newer features and +created OpenSSH. +Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH +protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0. +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr ssh 1 , +.Xr ssh-agent 1 , +.Xr ssh-keygen 1 , +.Xr sshd 8 diff --git a/openssh/ssh-add.c b/openssh/ssh-add.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..585b714 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/ssh-add.c @@ -0,0 +1,318 @@ +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * Adds an identity to the authentication server, or removes an identity. + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + * + * SSH2 implementation, + * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" +RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh-add.c,v 1.46 2001/10/02 08:38:50 djm Exp $"); + +#include + +#include "ssh.h" +#include "rsa.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "key.h" +#include "authfd.h" +#include "authfile.h" +#include "pathnames.h" +#include "readpass.h" + +#ifdef HAVE___PROGNAME +extern char *__progname; +#else +char *__progname; +#endif + +/* argv0 */ +extern char *__progname; + +/* we keep a cache of one passphrases */ +static char *pass = NULL; +static void +clear_pass(void) +{ + if (pass) { + memset(pass, 0, strlen(pass)); + xfree(pass); + pass = NULL; + } +} + +static int +delete_file(AuthenticationConnection *ac, const char *filename) +{ + Key *public; + char *comment = NULL; + int ret = -1; + + public = key_load_public(filename, &comment); + if (public == NULL) { + printf("Bad key file %s\n", filename); + return -1; + } + if (ssh_remove_identity(ac, public)) { + fprintf(stderr, "Identity removed: %s (%s)\n", filename, comment); + ret = 0; + } else + fprintf(stderr, "Could not remove identity: %s\n", filename); + + key_free(public); + xfree(comment); + + return ret; +} + +/* Send a request to remove all identities. */ +static int +delete_all(AuthenticationConnection *ac) +{ + int ret = -1; + + if (ssh_remove_all_identities(ac, 1)) + ret = 0; + /* ignore error-code for ssh2 */ + ssh_remove_all_identities(ac, 2); + + if (ret == 0) + fprintf(stderr, "All identities removed.\n"); + else + fprintf(stderr, "Failed to remove all identities.\n"); + + return ret; +} + +static int +add_file(AuthenticationConnection *ac, const char *filename) +{ + struct stat st; + Key *private; + char *comment = NULL; + char msg[1024]; + int ret = -1; + + if (stat(filename, &st) < 0) { + perror(filename); + return -1; + } + /* At first, try empty passphrase */ + private = key_load_private(filename, "", &comment); + if (comment == NULL) + comment = xstrdup(filename); + /* try last */ + if (private == NULL && pass != NULL) + private = key_load_private(filename, pass, NULL); + if (private == NULL) { + /* clear passphrase since it did not work */ + clear_pass(); + snprintf(msg, sizeof msg, "Enter passphrase for %.200s: ", + comment); + for (;;) { + pass = read_passphrase(msg, RP_ALLOW_STDIN); + if (strcmp(pass, "") == 0) { + clear_pass(); + xfree(comment); + return -1; + } + private = key_load_private(filename, pass, &comment); + if (private != NULL) + break; + clear_pass(); + strlcpy(msg, "Bad passphrase, try again: ", sizeof msg); + } + } + if (ssh_add_identity(ac, private, comment)) { + fprintf(stderr, "Identity added: %s (%s)\n", filename, comment); + ret = 0; + } else + fprintf(stderr, "Could not add identity: %s\n", filename); + + xfree(comment); + key_free(private); + + return ret; +} + +static int +update_card(AuthenticationConnection *ac, int add, const char *id) +{ + if (ssh_update_card(ac, add, id)) { + fprintf(stderr, "Card %s: %s\n", + add ? "added" : "removed", id); + return 0; + } else { + fprintf(stderr, "Could not %s card: %s\n", + add ? "add" : "remove", id); + return -1; + } +} + +static void +list_identities(AuthenticationConnection *ac, int do_fp) +{ + Key *key; + char *comment, *fp; + int had_identities = 0; + int version; + + for (version = 1; version <= 2; version++) { + for (key = ssh_get_first_identity(ac, &comment, version); + key != NULL; + key = ssh_get_next_identity(ac, &comment, version)) { + had_identities = 1; + if (do_fp) { + fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, + SSH_FP_HEX); + printf("%d %s %s (%s)\n", + key_size(key), fp, comment, key_type(key)); + xfree(fp); + } else { + if (!key_write(key, stdout)) + fprintf(stderr, "key_write failed"); + fprintf(stdout, " %s\n", comment); + } + key_free(key); + xfree(comment); + } + } + if (!had_identities) + printf("The agent has no identities.\n"); +} + +static void +usage(void) +{ + fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s [options]\n", __progname); + fprintf(stderr, "Options:\n"); + fprintf(stderr, " -l List fingerprints of all identities.\n"); + fprintf(stderr, " -L List public key parameters of all identities.\n"); + fprintf(stderr, " -d Delete identity.\n"); + fprintf(stderr, " -D Delete all identities.\n"); +#ifdef SMARTCARD + fprintf(stderr, " -s reader Add key in smartcard reader.\n"); + fprintf(stderr, " -e reader Remove key in smartcard reader.\n"); +#endif +} + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + extern char *optarg; + extern int optind; + AuthenticationConnection *ac = NULL; + struct passwd *pw; + char buf[1024]; + char *sc_reader_id = NULL; + int i, ch, deleting = 0, ret = 0; + + __progname = get_progname(argv[0]); + init_rng(); + seed_rng(); + + SSLeay_add_all_algorithms(); + + /* At first, get a connection to the authentication agent. */ + ac = ssh_get_authentication_connection(); + if (ac == NULL) { + fprintf(stderr, "Could not open a connection to your authentication agent.\n"); + exit(1); + } + while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "lLdDe:s:")) != -1) { + switch (ch) { + case 'l': + case 'L': + list_identities(ac, ch == 'l' ? 1 : 0); + goto done; + break; + case 'd': + deleting = 1; + break; + case 'D': + if (delete_all(ac) == -1) + ret = 1; + goto done; + break; + case 's': + sc_reader_id = optarg; + break; + case 'e': + deleting = 1; + sc_reader_id = optarg; + break; + default: + usage(); + ret = 1; + goto done; + } + } + argc -= optind; + argv += optind; + if (sc_reader_id != NULL) { + if (update_card(ac, !deleting, sc_reader_id) == -1) + ret = 1; + goto done; + } + if (argc == 0) { + pw = getpwuid(getuid()); + if (!pw) { + fprintf(stderr, "No user found with uid %u\n", + (u_int)getuid()); + ret = 1; + goto done; + } + snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir, _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_IDENTITY); + if (deleting) { + if (delete_file(ac, buf) == -1) + ret = 1; + } else { + if (add_file(ac, buf) == -1) + ret = 1; + } + } else { + for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) { + if (deleting) { + if (delete_file(ac, argv[i]) == -1) + ret = 1; + } else { + if (add_file(ac, argv[i]) == -1) + ret = 1; + } + } + } + clear_pass(); + +done: + ssh_close_authentication_connection(ac); + return ret; +} diff --git a/openssh/ssh-agent.1 b/openssh/ssh-agent.1 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..00c1992 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/ssh-agent.1 @@ -0,0 +1,182 @@ +.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.1,v 1.28 2001/09/05 06:23:07 deraadt Exp $ +.\" +.\" Author: Tatu Ylonen +.\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland +.\" All rights reserved +.\" +.\" As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software +.\" can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this +.\" software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is +.\" incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be +.\" called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". +.\" +.\" Copyright (c) 1999,2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. +.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell. All rights reserved. +.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved. +.\" +.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +.\" are met: +.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +.\" +.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR +.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES +.\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. +.\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, +.\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT +.\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, +.\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY +.\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT +.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF +.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. +.\" +.Dd September 25, 1999 +.Dt SSH-AGENT 1 +.Os +.Sh NAME +.Nm ssh-agent +.Nd authentication agent +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.Nm ssh-agent +.Op Fl c Li | Fl s +.Op Fl d +.Op Ar command Op Ar args ... +.Nm ssh-agent +.Op Fl c Li | Fl s +.Fl k +.Sh DESCRIPTION +.Nm +is a program to hold private keys used for public key authentication +(RSA, DSA). +The idea is that +.Nm +is started in the beginning of an X-session or a login session, and +all other windows or programs are started as clients to the ssh-agent +program. +Through use of environment variables the agent can be located +and automatically used for authentication when logging in to other +machines using +.Xr ssh 1 . +.Pp +The options are as follows: +.Bl -tag -width Ds +.It Fl c +Generate C-shell commands on +.Dv stdout . +This is the default if +.Ev SHELL +looks like it's a csh style of shell. +.It Fl s +Generate Bourne shell commands on +.Dv stdout . +This is the default if +.Ev SHELL +does not look like it's a csh style of shell. +.It Fl k +Kill the current agent (given by the +.Ev SSH_AGENT_PID +environment variable). +.It Fl d +Debug mode. When this option is specified +.Nm +will not fork. +.El +.Pp +If a commandline is given, this is executed as a subprocess of the agent. +When the command dies, so does the agent. +.Pp +The agent initially does not have any private keys. +Keys are added using +.Xr ssh-add 1 . +When executed without arguments, +.Xr ssh-add 1 +adds the +.Pa $HOME/.ssh/identity +file. +If the identity has a passphrase, +.Xr ssh-add 1 +asks for the passphrase (using a small X11 application if running +under X11, or from the terminal if running without X). +It then sends the identity to the agent. +Several identities can be stored in the +agent; the agent can automatically use any of these identities. +.Ic ssh-add -l +displays the identities currently held by the agent. +.Pp +The idea is that the agent is run in the user's local PC, laptop, or +terminal. +Authentication data need not be stored on any other +machine, and authentication passphrases never go over the network. +However, the connection to the agent is forwarded over SSH +remote logins, and the user can thus use the privileges given by the +identities anywhere in the network in a secure way. +.Pp +There are two main ways to get an agent setup: +Either the agent starts a new subcommand into which some environment +variables are exported, or the agent prints the needed shell commands +(either +.Xr sh 1 +or +.Xr csh 1 +syntax can be generated) which can be evalled in the calling shell. +Later +.Xr ssh 1 +looks at these variables and uses them to establish a connection to the agent. +.Pp +A unix-domain socket is created +.Pq Pa /tmp/ssh-XXXXXXXX/agent. , +and the name of this socket is stored in the +.Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK +environment +variable. +The socket is made accessible only to the current user. +This method is easily abused by root or another instance of the same +user. +.Pp +The +.Ev SSH_AGENT_PID +environment variable holds the agent's PID. +.Pp +The agent exits automatically when the command given on the command +line terminates. +.Sh FILES +.Bl -tag -width Ds +.It Pa $HOME/.ssh/identity +Contains the protocol version 1 RSA authentication identity of the user. +This file should not be readable by anyone but the user. +It is possible to +specify a passphrase when generating the key; that passphrase will be +used to encrypt the private part of this file. +This file is not used by +.Nm +but is normally added to the agent using +.Xr ssh-add 1 +at login time. +.It Pa $HOME/.ssh/id_dsa +Contains the protocol version 2 DSA authentication identity of the user. +.It Pa $HOME/.ssh/id_rsa +Contains the protocol version 2 RSA authentication identity of the user. +.It Pa /tmp/ssh-XXXXXXXX/agent. +Unix-domain sockets used to contain the connection to the +authentication agent. +These sockets should only be readable by the owner. +The sockets should get automatically removed when the agent exits. +.El +.Sh AUTHORS +OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free +ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen. +Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, +Theo de Raadt and Dug Song +removed many bugs, re-added newer features and +created OpenSSH. +Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH +protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0. +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr ssh 1 , +.Xr ssh-add 1 , +.Xr ssh-keygen 1 , +.Xr sshd 8 diff --git a/openssh/ssh-agent.c b/openssh/ssh-agent.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a004e32 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/ssh-agent.c @@ -0,0 +1,1045 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.72 2001/08/03 10:31:30 jakob Exp $ */ + +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * The authentication agent program. + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + * + * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" +RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.72 2001/08/03 10:31:30 jakob Exp $"); + +#include +#include + +#include "ssh.h" +#include "rsa.h" +#include "buffer.h" +#include "bufaux.h" +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "packet.h" +#include "getput.h" +#include "mpaux.h" +#include "key.h" +#include "authfd.h" +#include "cipher.h" +#include "kex.h" +#include "compat.h" +#include "log.h" + +#ifdef SMARTCARD +#include +#include "scard.h" +#endif + +typedef struct { + int fd; + enum { + AUTH_UNUSED, AUTH_SOCKET, AUTH_CONNECTION + } type; + Buffer input; + Buffer output; +} SocketEntry; + +u_int sockets_alloc = 0; +SocketEntry *sockets = NULL; + +typedef struct { + Key *key; + char *comment; +} Identity; + +typedef struct { + int nentries; + Identity *identities; +} Idtab; + +/* private key table, one per protocol version */ +Idtab idtable[3]; + +int max_fd = 0; + +/* pid of shell == parent of agent */ +pid_t parent_pid = -1; + +/* pathname and directory for AUTH_SOCKET */ +char socket_name[1024]; +char socket_dir[1024]; + +#ifdef HAVE___PROGNAME +extern char *__progname; +#else +char *__progname; +#endif + +static void +idtab_init(void) +{ + int i; + for (i = 0; i <=2; i++){ + idtable[i].identities = NULL; + idtable[i].nentries = 0; + } +} + +/* return private key table for requested protocol version */ +static Idtab * +idtab_lookup(int version) +{ + if (version < 1 || version > 2) + fatal("internal error, bad protocol version %d", version); + return &idtable[version]; +} + +/* return matching private key for given public key */ +static Key * +lookup_private_key(Key *key, int *idx, int version) +{ + int i; + Idtab *tab = idtab_lookup(version); + for (i = 0; i < tab->nentries; i++) { + if (key_equal(key, tab->identities[i].key)) { + if (idx != NULL) + *idx = i; + return tab->identities[i].key; + } + } + return NULL; +} + +/* send list of supported public keys to 'client' */ +static void +process_request_identities(SocketEntry *e, int version) +{ + Idtab *tab = idtab_lookup(version); + Buffer msg; + int i; + + buffer_init(&msg); + buffer_put_char(&msg, (version == 1) ? + SSH_AGENT_RSA_IDENTITIES_ANSWER : SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER); + buffer_put_int(&msg, tab->nentries); + for (i = 0; i < tab->nentries; i++) { + Identity *id = &tab->identities[i]; + if (id->key->type == KEY_RSA1) { + buffer_put_int(&msg, BN_num_bits(id->key->rsa->n)); + buffer_put_bignum(&msg, id->key->rsa->e); + buffer_put_bignum(&msg, id->key->rsa->n); + } else { + u_char *blob; + u_int blen; + key_to_blob(id->key, &blob, &blen); + buffer_put_string(&msg, blob, blen); + xfree(blob); + } + buffer_put_cstring(&msg, id->comment); + } + buffer_put_int(&e->output, buffer_len(&msg)); + buffer_append(&e->output, buffer_ptr(&msg), buffer_len(&msg)); + buffer_free(&msg); +} + +/* ssh1 only */ +static void +process_authentication_challenge1(SocketEntry *e) +{ + Key *key, *private; + BIGNUM *challenge; + int i, len; + Buffer msg; + MD5_CTX md; + u_char buf[32], mdbuf[16], session_id[16]; + u_int response_type; + + buffer_init(&msg); + key = key_new(KEY_RSA1); + challenge = BN_new(); + + buffer_get_int(&e->input); /* ignored */ + buffer_get_bignum(&e->input, key->rsa->e); + buffer_get_bignum(&e->input, key->rsa->n); + buffer_get_bignum(&e->input, challenge); + + /* Only protocol 1.1 is supported */ + if (buffer_len(&e->input) == 0) + goto failure; + buffer_get(&e->input, (char *) session_id, 16); + response_type = buffer_get_int(&e->input); + if (response_type != 1) + goto failure; + + private = lookup_private_key(key, NULL, 1); + if (private != NULL) { + /* Decrypt the challenge using the private key. */ + if (rsa_private_decrypt(challenge, challenge, private->rsa) <= 0) + goto failure; + + /* The response is MD5 of decrypted challenge plus session id. */ + len = BN_num_bytes(challenge); + if (len <= 0 || len > 32) { + log("process_authentication_challenge: bad challenge length %d", len); + goto failure; + } + memset(buf, 0, 32); + BN_bn2bin(challenge, buf + 32 - len); + MD5_Init(&md); + MD5_Update(&md, buf, 32); + MD5_Update(&md, session_id, 16); + MD5_Final(mdbuf, &md); + + /* Send the response. */ + buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENT_RSA_RESPONSE); + for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) + buffer_put_char(&msg, mdbuf[i]); + goto send; + } + +failure: + /* Unknown identity or protocol error. Send failure. */ + buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENT_FAILURE); +send: + buffer_put_int(&e->output, buffer_len(&msg)); + buffer_append(&e->output, buffer_ptr(&msg), buffer_len(&msg)); + key_free(key); + BN_clear_free(challenge); + buffer_free(&msg); +} + +/* ssh2 only */ +static void +process_sign_request2(SocketEntry *e) +{ + extern int datafellows; + Key *key, *private; + u_char *blob, *data, *signature = NULL; + u_int blen, dlen, slen = 0; + int flags; + Buffer msg; + int ok = -1; + + datafellows = 0; + + blob = buffer_get_string(&e->input, &blen); + data = buffer_get_string(&e->input, &dlen); + + flags = buffer_get_int(&e->input); + if (flags & SSH_AGENT_OLD_SIGNATURE) + datafellows = SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB; + + key = key_from_blob(blob, blen); + if (key != NULL) { + private = lookup_private_key(key, NULL, 2); + if (private != NULL) + ok = key_sign(private, &signature, &slen, data, dlen); + } + key_free(key); + buffer_init(&msg); + if (ok == 0) { + buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE); + buffer_put_string(&msg, signature, slen); + } else { + buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENT_FAILURE); + } + buffer_put_int(&e->output, buffer_len(&msg)); + buffer_append(&e->output, buffer_ptr(&msg), + buffer_len(&msg)); + buffer_free(&msg); + xfree(data); + xfree(blob); + if (signature != NULL) + xfree(signature); +} + +/* shared */ +static void +process_remove_identity(SocketEntry *e, int version) +{ + Key *key = NULL, *private; + u_char *blob; + u_int blen; + u_int bits; + int success = 0; + + switch(version){ + case 1: + key = key_new(KEY_RSA1); + bits = buffer_get_int(&e->input); + buffer_get_bignum(&e->input, key->rsa->e); + buffer_get_bignum(&e->input, key->rsa->n); + + if (bits != key_size(key)) + log("Warning: identity keysize mismatch: actual %d, announced %d", + key_size(key), bits); + break; + case 2: + blob = buffer_get_string(&e->input, &blen); + key = key_from_blob(blob, blen); + xfree(blob); + break; + } + if (key != NULL) { + int idx; + private = lookup_private_key(key, &idx, version); + if (private != NULL) { + /* + * We have this key. Free the old key. Since we + * don\'t want to leave empty slots in the middle of + * the array, we actually free the key there and move + * all the entries between the empty slot and the end + * of the array. + */ + Idtab *tab = idtab_lookup(version); + key_free(tab->identities[idx].key); + xfree(tab->identities[idx].comment); + if (tab->nentries < 1) + fatal("process_remove_identity: " + "internal error: tab->nentries %d", + tab->nentries); + if (idx != tab->nentries - 1) { + int i; + for (i = idx; i < tab->nentries - 1; i++) + tab->identities[i] = tab->identities[i+1]; + } + tab->identities[tab->nentries - 1].key = NULL; + tab->identities[tab->nentries - 1].comment = NULL; + tab->nentries--; + success = 1; + } + key_free(key); + } + buffer_put_int(&e->output, 1); + buffer_put_char(&e->output, + success ? SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS : SSH_AGENT_FAILURE); +} + +static void +process_remove_all_identities(SocketEntry *e, int version) +{ + u_int i; + Idtab *tab = idtab_lookup(version); + + /* Loop over all identities and clear the keys. */ + for (i = 0; i < tab->nentries; i++) { + key_free(tab->identities[i].key); + xfree(tab->identities[i].comment); + } + + /* Mark that there are no identities. */ + tab->nentries = 0; + + /* Send success. */ + buffer_put_int(&e->output, 1); + buffer_put_char(&e->output, SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS); + return; +} + +static void +process_add_identity(SocketEntry *e, int version) +{ + Key *k = NULL; + char *type_name; + char *comment; + int type, success = 0; + Idtab *tab = idtab_lookup(version); + + switch (version) { + case 1: + k = key_new_private(KEY_RSA1); + buffer_get_int(&e->input); /* ignored */ + buffer_get_bignum(&e->input, k->rsa->n); + buffer_get_bignum(&e->input, k->rsa->e); + buffer_get_bignum(&e->input, k->rsa->d); + buffer_get_bignum(&e->input, k->rsa->iqmp); + + /* SSH and SSL have p and q swapped */ + buffer_get_bignum(&e->input, k->rsa->q); /* p */ + buffer_get_bignum(&e->input, k->rsa->p); /* q */ + + /* Generate additional parameters */ + rsa_generate_additional_parameters(k->rsa); + break; + case 2: + type_name = buffer_get_string(&e->input, NULL); + type = key_type_from_name(type_name); + xfree(type_name); + switch(type) { + case KEY_DSA: + k = key_new_private(type); + buffer_get_bignum2(&e->input, k->dsa->p); + buffer_get_bignum2(&e->input, k->dsa->q); + buffer_get_bignum2(&e->input, k->dsa->g); + buffer_get_bignum2(&e->input, k->dsa->pub_key); + buffer_get_bignum2(&e->input, k->dsa->priv_key); + break; + case KEY_RSA: + k = key_new_private(type); + buffer_get_bignum2(&e->input, k->rsa->n); + buffer_get_bignum2(&e->input, k->rsa->e); + buffer_get_bignum2(&e->input, k->rsa->d); + buffer_get_bignum2(&e->input, k->rsa->iqmp); + buffer_get_bignum2(&e->input, k->rsa->p); + buffer_get_bignum2(&e->input, k->rsa->q); + + /* Generate additional parameters */ + rsa_generate_additional_parameters(k->rsa); + break; + default: + buffer_clear(&e->input); + goto send; + } + break; + } + comment = buffer_get_string(&e->input, NULL); + if (k == NULL) { + xfree(comment); + goto send; + } + success = 1; + if (lookup_private_key(k, NULL, version) == NULL) { + if (tab->nentries == 0) + tab->identities = xmalloc(sizeof(Identity)); + else + tab->identities = xrealloc(tab->identities, + (tab->nentries + 1) * sizeof(Identity)); + tab->identities[tab->nentries].key = k; + tab->identities[tab->nentries].comment = comment; + /* Increment the number of identities. */ + tab->nentries++; + } else { + key_free(k); + xfree(comment); + } +send: + buffer_put_int(&e->output, 1); + buffer_put_char(&e->output, + success ? SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS : SSH_AGENT_FAILURE); +} + + +#ifdef SMARTCARD +static void +process_add_smartcard_key (SocketEntry *e) +{ + Idtab *tab; + Key *n = NULL, *k = NULL; + char *sc_reader_id = NULL; + int success = 0; + + sc_reader_id = buffer_get_string(&e->input, NULL); + k = sc_get_key(sc_reader_id); + xfree(sc_reader_id); + + if (k == NULL) { + error("sc_get_pubkey failed"); + goto send; + } + success = 1; + + tab = idtab_lookup(1); + k->type = KEY_RSA1; + if (lookup_private_key(k, NULL, 1) == NULL) { + if (tab->nentries == 0) + tab->identities = xmalloc(sizeof(Identity)); + else + tab->identities = xrealloc(tab->identities, + (tab->nentries + 1) * sizeof(Identity)); + n = key_new(KEY_RSA1); + BN_copy(n->rsa->n, k->rsa->n); + BN_copy(n->rsa->e, k->rsa->e); + RSA_set_method(n->rsa, sc_get_engine()); + tab->identities[tab->nentries].key = n; + tab->identities[tab->nentries].comment = + xstrdup("rsa1 smartcard"); + tab->nentries++; + } + k->type = KEY_RSA; + tab = idtab_lookup(2); + if (lookup_private_key(k, NULL, 2) == NULL) { + if (tab->nentries == 0) + tab->identities = xmalloc(sizeof(Identity)); + else + tab->identities = xrealloc(tab->identities, + (tab->nentries + 1) * sizeof(Identity)); + n = key_new(KEY_RSA); + BN_copy(n->rsa->n, k->rsa->n); + BN_copy(n->rsa->e, k->rsa->e); + RSA_set_method(n->rsa, sc_get_engine()); + tab->identities[tab->nentries].key = n; + tab->identities[tab->nentries].comment = + xstrdup("rsa smartcard"); + tab->nentries++; + } + key_free(k); +send: + buffer_put_int(&e->output, 1); + buffer_put_char(&e->output, + success ? SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS : SSH_AGENT_FAILURE); +} + +static void +process_remove_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e) +{ + Key *k = NULL, *private; + int idx; + int success = 0; + char *sc_reader_id = NULL; + + sc_reader_id = buffer_get_string(&e->input, NULL); + k = sc_get_key(sc_reader_id); + xfree(sc_reader_id); + + if (k == NULL) { + error("sc_get_pubkey failed"); + } else { + k->type = KEY_RSA1; + private = lookup_private_key(k, &idx, 1); + if (private != NULL) { + Idtab *tab = idtab_lookup(1); + key_free(tab->identities[idx].key); + xfree(tab->identities[idx].comment); + if (idx != tab->nentries) + tab->identities[idx] = tab->identities[tab->nentries]; + tab->nentries--; + success = 1; + } + k->type = KEY_RSA; + private = lookup_private_key(k, &idx, 2); + if (private != NULL) { + Idtab *tab = idtab_lookup(2); + key_free(tab->identities[idx].key); + xfree(tab->identities[idx].comment); + if (idx != tab->nentries) + tab->identities[idx] = tab->identities[tab->nentries]; + tab->nentries--; + success = 1; + } + key_free(k); + } + + buffer_put_int(&e->output, 1); + buffer_put_char(&e->output, + success ? SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS : SSH_AGENT_FAILURE); +} +#endif /* SMARTCARD */ + +/* dispatch incoming messages */ + +static void +process_message(SocketEntry *e) +{ + u_int msg_len; + u_int type; + u_char *cp; + if (buffer_len(&e->input) < 5) + return; /* Incomplete message. */ + cp = (u_char *) buffer_ptr(&e->input); + msg_len = GET_32BIT(cp); + if (msg_len > 256 * 1024) { + shutdown(e->fd, SHUT_RDWR); + close(e->fd); + e->type = AUTH_UNUSED; + return; + } + if (buffer_len(&e->input) < msg_len + 4) + return; + buffer_consume(&e->input, 4); + type = buffer_get_char(&e->input); + + debug("type %d", type); + switch (type) { + /* ssh1 */ + case SSH_AGENTC_RSA_CHALLENGE: + process_authentication_challenge1(e); + break; + case SSH_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES: + process_request_identities(e, 1); + break; + case SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_IDENTITY: + process_add_identity(e, 1); + break; + case SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_RSA_IDENTITY: + process_remove_identity(e, 1); + break; + case SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_RSA_IDENTITIES: + process_remove_all_identities(e, 1); + break; + /* ssh2 */ + case SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST: + process_sign_request2(e); + break; + case SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES: + process_request_identities(e, 2); + break; + case SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY: + process_add_identity(e, 2); + break; + case SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_IDENTITY: + process_remove_identity(e, 2); + break; + case SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_IDENTITIES: + process_remove_all_identities(e, 2); + break; +#ifdef SMARTCARD + case SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY: + process_add_smartcard_key(e); + break; + case SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_SMARTCARD_KEY: + process_remove_smartcard_key(e); + break; +#endif /* SMARTCARD */ + default: + /* Unknown message. Respond with failure. */ + error("Unknown message %d", type); + buffer_clear(&e->input); + buffer_put_int(&e->output, 1); + buffer_put_char(&e->output, SSH_AGENT_FAILURE); + break; + } +} + +static void +new_socket(int type, int fd) +{ + u_int i, old_alloc; + if (fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, O_NONBLOCK) < 0) + error("fcntl O_NONBLOCK: %s", strerror(errno)); + + if (fd > max_fd) + max_fd = fd; + + for (i = 0; i < sockets_alloc; i++) + if (sockets[i].type == AUTH_UNUSED) { + sockets[i].fd = fd; + sockets[i].type = type; + buffer_init(&sockets[i].input); + buffer_init(&sockets[i].output); + return; + } + old_alloc = sockets_alloc; + sockets_alloc += 10; + if (sockets) + sockets = xrealloc(sockets, sockets_alloc * sizeof(sockets[0])); + else + sockets = xmalloc(sockets_alloc * sizeof(sockets[0])); + for (i = old_alloc; i < sockets_alloc; i++) + sockets[i].type = AUTH_UNUSED; + sockets[old_alloc].type = type; + sockets[old_alloc].fd = fd; + buffer_init(&sockets[old_alloc].input); + buffer_init(&sockets[old_alloc].output); +} + +static int +prepare_select(fd_set **fdrp, fd_set **fdwp, int *fdl, int *nallocp) +{ + u_int i, sz; + int n = 0; + + for (i = 0; i < sockets_alloc; i++) { + switch (sockets[i].type) { + case AUTH_SOCKET: + case AUTH_CONNECTION: + n = MAX(n, sockets[i].fd); + break; + case AUTH_UNUSED: + break; + default: + fatal("Unknown socket type %d", sockets[i].type); + break; + } + } + + sz = howmany(n+1, NFDBITS) * sizeof(fd_mask); + if (*fdrp == NULL || sz > *nallocp) { + if (*fdrp) + xfree(*fdrp); + if (*fdwp) + xfree(*fdwp); + *fdrp = xmalloc(sz); + *fdwp = xmalloc(sz); + *nallocp = sz; + } + if (n < *fdl) + debug("XXX shrink: %d < %d", n, *fdl); + *fdl = n; + memset(*fdrp, 0, sz); + memset(*fdwp, 0, sz); + + for (i = 0; i < sockets_alloc; i++) { + switch (sockets[i].type) { + case AUTH_SOCKET: + case AUTH_CONNECTION: + FD_SET(sockets[i].fd, *fdrp); + if (buffer_len(&sockets[i].output) > 0) + FD_SET(sockets[i].fd, *fdwp); + break; + default: + break; + } + } + return (1); +} + +static void +after_select(fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) +{ + u_int i; + int len, sock; + socklen_t slen; + char buf[1024]; + struct sockaddr_un sunaddr; + + for (i = 0; i < sockets_alloc; i++) + switch (sockets[i].type) { + case AUTH_UNUSED: + break; + case AUTH_SOCKET: + if (FD_ISSET(sockets[i].fd, readset)) { + slen = sizeof(sunaddr); + sock = accept(sockets[i].fd, + (struct sockaddr *) &sunaddr, &slen); + if (sock < 0) { + perror("accept from AUTH_SOCKET"); + break; + } + new_socket(AUTH_CONNECTION, sock); + } + break; + case AUTH_CONNECTION: + if (buffer_len(&sockets[i].output) > 0 && + FD_ISSET(sockets[i].fd, writeset)) { + do { + len = write(sockets[i].fd, + buffer_ptr(&sockets[i].output), + buffer_len(&sockets[i].output)); + if (len == -1 && (errno == EAGAIN || + errno == EINTR)) + continue; + break; + } while (1); + if (len <= 0) { + shutdown(sockets[i].fd, SHUT_RDWR); + close(sockets[i].fd); + sockets[i].type = AUTH_UNUSED; + buffer_free(&sockets[i].input); + buffer_free(&sockets[i].output); + break; + } + buffer_consume(&sockets[i].output, len); + } + if (FD_ISSET(sockets[i].fd, readset)) { + do { + len = read(sockets[i].fd, buf, sizeof(buf)); + if (len == -1 && (errno == EAGAIN || + errno == EINTR)) + continue; + break; + } while (1); + if (len <= 0) { + shutdown(sockets[i].fd, SHUT_RDWR); + close(sockets[i].fd); + sockets[i].type = AUTH_UNUSED; + buffer_free(&sockets[i].input); + buffer_free(&sockets[i].output); + break; + } + buffer_append(&sockets[i].input, buf, len); + process_message(&sockets[i]); + } + break; + default: + fatal("Unknown type %d", sockets[i].type); + } +} + +static void +cleanup_socket(void) +{ + if (socket_name[0]) + unlink(socket_name); + if (socket_dir[0]) + rmdir(socket_dir); +} + +static void +cleanup_exit(int i) +{ + cleanup_socket(); + exit(i); +} + +static void +cleanup_handler(int sig) +{ + cleanup_socket(); + _exit(2); +} + +static void +check_parent_exists(int sig) +{ + int save_errno = errno; + + if (parent_pid != -1 && kill(parent_pid, 0) < 0) { + /* printf("Parent has died - Authentication agent exiting.\n"); */ + cleanup_handler(sig); /* safe */ + } + signal(SIGALRM, check_parent_exists); + alarm(10); + errno = save_errno; +} + +static void +usage(void) +{ + fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s [options] [command [args ...]]\n", + __progname); + fprintf(stderr, "Options:\n"); + fprintf(stderr, " -c Generate C-shell commands on stdout.\n"); + fprintf(stderr, " -s Generate Bourne shell commands on stdout.\n"); + fprintf(stderr, " -k Kill the current agent.\n"); + fprintf(stderr, " -d Debug mode.\n"); + exit(1); +} + +int +main(int ac, char **av) +{ + int sock, c_flag = 0, d_flag = 0, k_flag = 0, s_flag = 0, ch, nalloc; + struct sockaddr_un sunaddr; +#ifdef HAVE_SETRLIMIT + struct rlimit rlim; +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN + int prev_mask; +#endif + pid_t pid; + char *shell, *format, *pidstr, pidstrbuf[1 + 3 * sizeof pid]; + extern int optind; + fd_set *readsetp = NULL, *writesetp = NULL; + + SSLeay_add_all_algorithms(); + + __progname = get_progname(av[0]); + init_rng(); + seed_rng(); + +#ifdef __GNU_LIBRARY__ + while ((ch = getopt(ac, av, "+cdks")) != -1) { +#else /* __GNU_LIBRARY__ */ + while ((ch = getopt(ac, av, "cdks")) != -1) { +#endif /* __GNU_LIBRARY__ */ + switch (ch) { + case 'c': + if (s_flag) + usage(); + c_flag++; + break; + case 'k': + k_flag++; + break; + case 's': + if (c_flag) + usage(); + s_flag++; + break; + case 'd': + if (d_flag) + usage(); + d_flag++; + break; + default: + usage(); + } + } + ac -= optind; + av += optind; + + if (ac > 0 && (c_flag || k_flag || s_flag || d_flag)) + usage(); + + if (ac == 0 && !c_flag && !k_flag && !s_flag && !d_flag) { + shell = getenv("SHELL"); + if (shell != NULL && strncmp(shell + strlen(shell) - 3, "csh", 3) == 0) + c_flag = 1; + } + if (k_flag) { + pidstr = getenv(SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME); + if (pidstr == NULL) { + fprintf(stderr, "%s not set, cannot kill agent\n", + SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME); + exit(1); + } + pid = atoi(pidstr); + if (pid < 1) { + fprintf(stderr, "%s=\"%s\", which is not a good PID\n", + SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME, pidstr); + exit(1); + } + if (kill(pid, SIGTERM) == -1) { + perror("kill"); + exit(1); + } + format = c_flag ? "unsetenv %s;\n" : "unset %s;\n"; + printf(format, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME); + printf(format, SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME); + printf("echo Agent pid %d killed;\n", pid); + exit(0); + } + parent_pid = getpid(); + + /* Create private directory for agent socket */ + strlcpy(socket_dir, "/tmp/ssh-XXXXXXXX", sizeof socket_dir); + if (mkdtemp(socket_dir) == NULL) { + perror("mkdtemp: private socket dir"); + exit(1); + } + snprintf(socket_name, sizeof socket_name, "%s/agent.%d", socket_dir, + parent_pid); + + /* + * Create socket early so it will exist before command gets run from + * the parent. + */ + sock = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0); + if (sock < 0) { + perror("socket"); + cleanup_exit(1); + } + memset(&sunaddr, 0, sizeof(sunaddr)); + sunaddr.sun_family = AF_UNIX; + strlcpy(sunaddr.sun_path, socket_name, sizeof(sunaddr.sun_path)); +#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN + prev_mask = umask(0177); +#endif + if (bind(sock, (struct sockaddr *) & sunaddr, sizeof(sunaddr)) < 0) { + perror("bind"); +#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN + umask(prev_mask); +#endif + cleanup_exit(1); + } +#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN + umask(prev_mask); +#endif + if (listen(sock, 5) < 0) { + perror("listen"); + cleanup_exit(1); + } + + /* + * Fork, and have the parent execute the command, if any, or present + * the socket data. The child continues as the authentication agent. + */ + if (d_flag) { + log_init(__progname, SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1, SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH, 1); + format = c_flag ? "setenv %s %s;\n" : "%s=%s; export %s;\n"; + printf(format, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME, socket_name, + SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME); + printf("echo Agent pid %d;\n", parent_pid); + goto skip; + } + pid = fork(); + if (pid == -1) { + perror("fork"); + exit(1); + } + if (pid != 0) { /* Parent - execute the given command. */ + close(sock); + snprintf(pidstrbuf, sizeof pidstrbuf, "%d", pid); + if (ac == 0) { + format = c_flag ? "setenv %s %s;\n" : "%s=%s; export %s;\n"; + printf(format, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME, socket_name, + SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME); + printf(format, SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME, pidstrbuf, + SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME); + printf("echo Agent pid %d;\n", pid); + exit(0); + } + if (setenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME, socket_name, 1) == -1 || + setenv(SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME, pidstrbuf, 1) == -1) { + perror("setenv"); + exit(1); + } + execvp(av[0], av); + perror(av[0]); + exit(1); + } + + if (setsid() == -1) { + perror("setsid"); + cleanup_exit(1); + } + + (void)chdir("/"); + close(0); + close(1); + close(2); + +#ifdef HAVE_SETRLIMIT + /* deny core dumps, since memory contains unencrypted private keys */ + rlim.rlim_cur = rlim.rlim_max = 0; + if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_CORE, &rlim) < 0) { + perror("setrlimit rlimit_core failed"); + cleanup_exit(1); + } +#endif + +skip: + if (atexit(cleanup_socket) < 0) { + perror("atexit"); + cleanup_exit(1); + } + new_socket(AUTH_SOCKET, sock); + if (ac > 0) { + signal(SIGALRM, check_parent_exists); + alarm(10); + } + idtab_init(); + if (!d_flag) + signal(SIGINT, SIG_IGN); + signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); + signal(SIGHUP, cleanup_handler); + signal(SIGTERM, cleanup_handler); + nalloc = 0; + + while (1) { + prepare_select(&readsetp, &writesetp, &max_fd, &nalloc); + if (select(max_fd + 1, readsetp, writesetp, NULL, NULL) < 0) { + if (errno == EINTR) + continue; + exit(1); + } + after_select(readsetp, writesetp); + } + /* NOTREACHED */ +} diff --git a/openssh/ssh-dss.c b/openssh/ssh-dss.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9f3a287 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/ssh-dss.c @@ -0,0 +1,188 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" +RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh-dss.c,v 1.9 2001/11/07 22:10:28 markus Exp $"); + +#include +#include + +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "buffer.h" +#include "bufaux.h" +#include "compat.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "key.h" +#include "ssh-dss.h" + +#define INTBLOB_LEN 20 +#define SIGBLOB_LEN (2*INTBLOB_LEN) + +int +ssh_dss_sign( + Key *key, + u_char **sigp, int *lenp, + u_char *data, int datalen) +{ + DSA_SIG *sig; + EVP_MD *evp_md = EVP_sha1(); + EVP_MD_CTX md; + u_char *digest, *ret, sigblob[SIGBLOB_LEN]; + u_int rlen, slen, len, dlen; + Buffer b; + + if (key == NULL || key->type != KEY_DSA || key->dsa == NULL) { + error("ssh_dss_sign: no DSA key"); + return -1; + } + dlen = evp_md->md_size; + digest = xmalloc(dlen); + EVP_DigestInit(&md, evp_md); + EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, data, datalen); + EVP_DigestFinal(&md, digest, NULL); + + sig = DSA_do_sign(digest, dlen, key->dsa); + + memset(digest, 0, dlen); + xfree(digest); + if (sig == NULL) { + error("ssh_dss_sign: sign failed"); + return -1; + } + + rlen = BN_num_bytes(sig->r); + slen = BN_num_bytes(sig->s); + if (rlen > INTBLOB_LEN || slen > INTBLOB_LEN) { + error("bad sig size %d %d", rlen, slen); + DSA_SIG_free(sig); + return -1; + } + memset(sigblob, 0, SIGBLOB_LEN); + BN_bn2bin(sig->r, sigblob+ SIGBLOB_LEN - INTBLOB_LEN - rlen); + BN_bn2bin(sig->s, sigblob+ SIGBLOB_LEN - slen); + DSA_SIG_free(sig); + + if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB) { + ret = xmalloc(SIGBLOB_LEN); + memcpy(ret, sigblob, SIGBLOB_LEN); + if (lenp != NULL) + *lenp = SIGBLOB_LEN; + if (sigp != NULL) + *sigp = ret; + } else { + /* ietf-drafts */ + buffer_init(&b); + buffer_put_cstring(&b, "ssh-dss"); + buffer_put_string(&b, sigblob, SIGBLOB_LEN); + len = buffer_len(&b); + ret = xmalloc(len); + memcpy(ret, buffer_ptr(&b), len); + buffer_free(&b); + if (lenp != NULL) + *lenp = len; + if (sigp != NULL) + *sigp = ret; + } + return 0; +} +int +ssh_dss_verify( + Key *key, + u_char *signature, int signaturelen, + u_char *data, int datalen) +{ + DSA_SIG *sig; + EVP_MD *evp_md = EVP_sha1(); + EVP_MD_CTX md; + u_char *digest, *sigblob; + u_int len, dlen; + int rlen, ret; + Buffer b; + + if (key == NULL || key->type != KEY_DSA || key->dsa == NULL) { + error("ssh_dss_verify: no DSA key"); + return -1; + } + + /* fetch signature */ + if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB) { + sigblob = signature; + len = signaturelen; + } else { + /* ietf-drafts */ + char *ktype; + buffer_init(&b); + buffer_append(&b, signature, signaturelen); + ktype = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL); + if (strcmp("ssh-dss", ktype) != 0) { + error("ssh_dss_verify: cannot handle type %s", ktype); + buffer_free(&b); + xfree(ktype); + return -1; + } + xfree(ktype); + sigblob = buffer_get_string(&b, &len); + rlen = buffer_len(&b); + buffer_free(&b); + if(rlen != 0) { + error("ssh_dss_verify: " + "remaining bytes in signature %d", rlen); + xfree(sigblob); + return -1; + } + } + + if (len != SIGBLOB_LEN) { + fatal("bad sigbloblen %d != SIGBLOB_LEN", len); + } + + /* parse signature */ + sig = DSA_SIG_new(); + sig->r = BN_new(); + sig->s = BN_new(); + BN_bin2bn(sigblob, INTBLOB_LEN, sig->r); + BN_bin2bn(sigblob+ INTBLOB_LEN, INTBLOB_LEN, sig->s); + + if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB)) { + memset(sigblob, 0, len); + xfree(sigblob); + } + + /* sha1 the data */ + dlen = evp_md->md_size; + digest = xmalloc(dlen); + EVP_DigestInit(&md, evp_md); + EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, data, datalen); + EVP_DigestFinal(&md, digest, NULL); + + ret = DSA_do_verify(digest, dlen, sig, key->dsa); + + memset(digest, 0, dlen); + xfree(digest); + DSA_SIG_free(sig); + + debug("ssh_dss_verify: signature %s", + ret == 1 ? "correct" : ret == 0 ? "incorrect" : "error"); + return ret; +} diff --git a/openssh/ssh-dss.h b/openssh/ssh-dss.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0613acb --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/ssh-dss.h @@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh-dss.h,v 1.5 2001/06/26 17:27:25 markus Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ +#ifndef DSA_H +#define DSA_H + +int ssh_dss_sign(Key *, u_char **, int *, u_char *, int); +int ssh_dss_verify(Key *, u_char *, int, u_char *, int); + +#endif diff --git a/openssh/ssh-keygen.1 b/openssh/ssh-keygen.1 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..622cb5c --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/ssh-keygen.1 @@ -0,0 +1,296 @@ +.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.1,v 1.50 2001/10/25 21:14:32 markus Exp $ +.\" +.\" -*- nroff -*- +.\" +.\" Author: Tatu Ylonen +.\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland +.\" All rights reserved +.\" +.\" As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software +.\" can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this +.\" software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is +.\" incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be +.\" called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". +.\" +.\" +.\" Copyright (c) 1999,2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. +.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell. All rights reserved. +.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved. +.\" +.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +.\" are met: +.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +.\" +.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR +.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES +.\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. +.\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, +.\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT +.\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, +.\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY +.\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT +.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF +.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. +.\" +.Dd September 25, 1999 +.Dt SSH-KEYGEN 1 +.Os +.Sh NAME +.Nm ssh-keygen +.Nd authentication key generation, management and conversion +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.Nm ssh-keygen +.Op Fl q +.Op Fl b Ar bits +.Op Fl t Ar type +.Op Fl N Ar new_passphrase +.Op Fl C Ar comment +.Op Fl f Ar output_keyfile +.Nm ssh-keygen +.Fl p +.Op Fl P Ar old_passphrase +.Op Fl N Ar new_passphrase +.Op Fl f Ar keyfile +.Nm ssh-keygen +.Fl i +.Op Fl f Ar input_keyfile +.Nm ssh-keygen +.Fl e +.Op Fl f Ar input_keyfile +.Nm ssh-keygen +.Fl y +.Op Fl f Ar input_keyfile +.Nm ssh-keygen +.Fl c +.Op Fl P Ar passphrase +.Op Fl C Ar comment +.Op Fl f Ar keyfile +.Nm ssh-keygen +.Fl l +.Op Fl f Ar input_keyfile +.Nm ssh-keygen +.Fl B +.Op Fl f Ar input_keyfile +.Nm ssh-keygen +.Fl D Ar reader +.Nm ssh-keygen +.Fl U Ar reader +.Op Fl f Ar input_keyfile +.Sh DESCRIPTION +.Nm +generates, manages and converts authentication keys for +.Xr ssh 1 . +.Nm +defaults to generating a RSA1 key for use by SSH protocol version 1. +Specifying the +.Fl t +option instead creates a key for use by SSH protocol version 2. +.Pp +Normally each user wishing to use SSH +with RSA or DSA authentication runs this once to create the authentication +key in +.Pa $HOME/.ssh/identity , +.Pa $HOME/.ssh/id_dsa +or +.Pa $HOME/.ssh/id_rsa . +Additionally, the system administrator may use this to generate host keys, +as seen in +.Pa /etc/rc . +.Pp +Normally this program generates the key and asks for a file in which +to store the private key. +The public key is stored in a file with the same name but +.Dq .pub +appended. +The program also asks for a passphrase. +The passphrase may be empty to indicate no passphrase +(host keys must have an empty passphrase), or it may be a string of +arbitrary length. +Good passphrases are 10-30 characters long and are +not simple sentences or otherwise easily guessable (English +prose has only 1-2 bits of entropy per character, and provides very bad +passphrases). +The passphrase can be changed later by using the +.Fl p +option. +.Pp +There is no way to recover a lost passphrase. +If the passphrase is +lost or forgotten, a new key must be generated and copied to the +corresponding public key to other machines. +.Pp +For RSA1 keys, +there is also a comment field in the key file that is only for +convenience to the user to help identify the key. +The comment can tell what the key is for, or whatever is useful. +The comment is initialized to +.Dq user@host +when the key is created, but can be changed using the +.Fl c +option. +.Pp +After a key is generated, instructions below detail where the keys +should be placed to be activated. +.Pp +The options are as follows: +.Bl -tag -width Ds +.It Fl b Ar bits +Specifies the number of bits in the key to create. +Minimum is 512 bits. +Generally 1024 bits is considered sufficient, and key sizes +above that no longer improve security but make things slower. +The default is 1024 bits. +.It Fl c +Requests changing the comment in the private and public key files. +This operation is only supported for RSA1 keys. +The program will prompt for the file containing the private keys, for +the passphrase if the key has one, and for the new comment. +.It Fl e +This option will read a private or public OpenSSH key file and +print the key in a +.Sq SECSH Public Key File Format +to stdout. +This option allows exporting keys for use by several commercial +SSH implementations. +.It Fl f Ar filename +Specifies the filename of the key file. +.It Fl i +This option will read an unencrypted private (or public) key file +in SSH2-compatible format and print an OpenSSH compatible private +(or public) key to stdout. +.Nm +also reads the +.Sq SECSH Public Key File Format . +This option allows importing keys from several commercial +SSH implementations. +.It Fl l +Show fingerprint of specified public key file. +Private RSA1 keys are also supported. +For RSA and DSA keys +.Nm +tries to find the matching public key file and prints its fingerprint. +.It Fl p +Requests changing the passphrase of a private key file instead of +creating a new private key. +The program will prompt for the file +containing the private key, for the old passphrase, and twice for the +new passphrase. +.It Fl q +Silence +.Nm ssh-keygen . +Used by +.Pa /etc/rc +when creating a new key. +.It Fl y +This option will read a private +OpenSSH format file and print an OpenSSH public key to stdout. +.It Fl t Ar type +Specifies the type of the key to create. +The possible values are +.Dq rsa1 +for protocol version 1 and +.Dq rsa +or +.Dq dsa +for protocol version 2. +The default is +.Dq rsa1 . +.It Fl B +Show the bubblebabble digest of specified private or public key file. +.It Fl C Ar comment +Provides the new comment. +.It Fl D Ar reader +Download the RSA public key stored in the smartcard in +.Ar reader . +.It Fl N Ar new_passphrase +Provides the new passphrase. +.It Fl P Ar passphrase +Provides the (old) passphrase. +.It Fl U Ar reader +Upload an existing RSA private key into the smartcard in +.Ar reader . +.El +.Sh FILES +.Bl -tag -width Ds +.It Pa $HOME/.ssh/identity +Contains the protocol version 1 RSA authentication identity of the user. +This file should not be readable by anyone but the user. +It is possible to +specify a passphrase when generating the key; that passphrase will be +used to encrypt the private part of this file using 3DES. +This file is not automatically accessed by +.Nm +but it is offered as the default file for the private key. +.Xr ssh 1 +will read this file when a login attempt is made. +.It Pa $HOME/.ssh/identity.pub +Contains the protocol version 1 RSA public key for authentication. +The contents of this file should be added to +.Pa $HOME/.ssh/authorized_keys +on all machines +where the user wishes to log in using RSA authentication. +There is no need to keep the contents of this file secret. +.It Pa $HOME/.ssh/id_dsa +Contains the protocol version 2 DSA authentication identity of the user. +This file should not be readable by anyone but the user. +It is possible to +specify a passphrase when generating the key; that passphrase will be +used to encrypt the private part of this file using 3DES. +This file is not automatically accessed by +.Nm +but it is offered as the default file for the private key. +.Xr ssh 1 +will read this file when a login attempt is made. +.It Pa $HOME/.ssh/id_dsa.pub +Contains the protocol version 2 DSA public key for authentication. +The contents of this file should be added to +.Pa $HOME/.ssh/authorized_keys +on all machines +where the user wishes to log in using public key authentication. +There is no need to keep the contents of this file secret. +.It Pa $HOME/.ssh/id_rsa +Contains the protocol version 2 RSA authentication identity of the user. +This file should not be readable by anyone but the user. +It is possible to +specify a passphrase when generating the key; that passphrase will be +used to encrypt the private part of this file using 3DES. +This file is not automatically accessed by +.Nm +but it is offered as the default file for the private key. +.Xr ssh 1 +will read this file when a login attempt is made. +.It Pa $HOME/.ssh/id_rsa.pub +Contains the protocol version 2 RSA public key for authentication. +The contents of this file should be added to +.Pa $HOME/.ssh/authorized_keys +on all machines +where the user wishes to log in using public key authentication. +There is no need to keep the contents of this file secret. +.El +.Sh AUTHORS +OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free +ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen. +Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, +Theo de Raadt and Dug Song +removed many bugs, re-added newer features and +created OpenSSH. +Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH +protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0. +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr ssh 1 , +.Xr ssh-add 1 , +.Xr ssh-agent 1 , +.Xr sshd 8 +.Rs +.%A J. Galbraith +.%A R. Thayer +.%T "SECSH Public Key File Format" +.%N draft-ietf-secsh-publickeyfile-01.txt +.%D March 2001 +.%O work in progress material +.Re diff --git a/openssh/ssh-keygen.c b/openssh/ssh-keygen.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6d50997 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/ssh-keygen.c @@ -0,0 +1,1085 @@ +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1994 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * Identity and host key generation and maintenance. + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + */ + +#include "includes.h" +RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.c,v 1.83 2001/10/25 21:14:32 markus Exp $"); + +#include +#include + +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "key.h" +#include "rsa.h" +#include "authfile.h" +#include "uuencode.h" +#include "buffer.h" +#include "bufaux.h" +#include "pathnames.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "readpass.h" + +#ifdef SMARTCARD +#include +#include +#include "scard.h" +#endif + +/* Number of bits in the RSA/DSA key. This value can be changed on the command line. */ +int bits = 1024; + +/* + * Flag indicating that we just want to change the passphrase. This can be + * set on the command line. + */ +int change_passphrase = 0; + +/* + * Flag indicating that we just want to change the comment. This can be set + * on the command line. + */ +int change_comment = 0; + +int quiet = 0; + +/* Flag indicating that we just want to see the key fingerprint */ +int print_fingerprint = 0; +int print_bubblebabble = 0; + +/* The identity file name, given on the command line or entered by the user. */ +char identity_file[1024]; +int have_identity = 0; + +/* This is set to the passphrase if given on the command line. */ +char *identity_passphrase = NULL; + +/* This is set to the new passphrase if given on the command line. */ +char *identity_new_passphrase = NULL; + +/* This is set to the new comment if given on the command line. */ +char *identity_comment = NULL; + +/* Dump public key file in format used by real and the original SSH 2 */ +int convert_to_ssh2 = 0; +int convert_from_ssh2 = 0; +int print_public = 0; + +/* default to RSA for SSH-1 */ +char *key_type_name = "rsa1"; + +/* argv0 */ +#ifdef HAVE___PROGNAME +extern char *__progname; +#else +char *__progname; +#endif + +char hostname[MAXHOSTNAMELEN]; + +static void +ask_filename(struct passwd *pw, const char *prompt) +{ + char buf[1024]; + char *name = NULL; + + switch (key_type_from_name(key_type_name)) { + case KEY_RSA1: + name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_IDENTITY; + break; + case KEY_DSA: + name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_DSA; + break; + case KEY_RSA: + name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_RSA; + break; + default: + fprintf(stderr, "bad key type"); + exit(1); + break; + } + snprintf(identity_file, sizeof(identity_file), "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir, name); + fprintf(stderr, "%s (%s): ", prompt, identity_file); + fflush(stderr); + if (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), stdin) == NULL) + exit(1); + if (strchr(buf, '\n')) + *strchr(buf, '\n') = 0; + if (strcmp(buf, "") != 0) + strlcpy(identity_file, buf, sizeof(identity_file)); + have_identity = 1; +} + +static Key * +load_identity(char *filename) +{ + char *pass; + Key *prv; + + prv = key_load_private(filename, "", NULL); + if (prv == NULL) { + if (identity_passphrase) + pass = xstrdup(identity_passphrase); + else + pass = read_passphrase("Enter passphrase: ", + RP_ALLOW_STDIN); + prv = key_load_private(filename, pass, NULL); + memset(pass, 0, strlen(pass)); + xfree(pass); + } + return prv; +} + +#define SSH_COM_PUBLIC_BEGIN "---- BEGIN SSH2 PUBLIC KEY ----" +#define SSH_COM_PUBLIC_END "---- END SSH2 PUBLIC KEY ----" +#define SSH_COM_PRIVATE_BEGIN "---- BEGIN SSH2 ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY ----" +#define SSH_COM_PRIVATE_KEY_MAGIC 0x3f6ff9eb + +static void +do_convert_to_ssh2(struct passwd *pw) +{ + Key *k; + int len; + u_char *blob; + struct stat st; + + if (!have_identity) + ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is"); + if (stat(identity_file, &st) < 0) { + perror(identity_file); + exit(1); + } + if ((k = key_load_public(identity_file, NULL)) == NULL) { + if ((k = load_identity(identity_file)) == NULL) { + fprintf(stderr, "load failed\n"); + exit(1); + } + } + if (key_to_blob(k, &blob, &len) <= 0) { + fprintf(stderr, "key_to_blob failed\n"); + exit(1); + } + fprintf(stdout, "%s\n", SSH_COM_PUBLIC_BEGIN); + fprintf(stdout, + "Comment: \"%d-bit %s, converted from OpenSSH by %s@%s\"\n", + key_size(k), key_type(k), + pw->pw_name, hostname); + dump_base64(stdout, blob, len); + fprintf(stdout, "%s\n", SSH_COM_PUBLIC_END); + key_free(k); + xfree(blob); + exit(0); +} + +static void +buffer_get_bignum_bits(Buffer *b, BIGNUM *value) +{ + int bits = buffer_get_int(b); + int bytes = (bits + 7) / 8; + + if (buffer_len(b) < bytes) + fatal("buffer_get_bignum_bits: input buffer too small: " + "need %d have %d", bytes, buffer_len(b)); + BN_bin2bn((u_char *)buffer_ptr(b), bytes, value); + buffer_consume(b, bytes); +} + +static Key * +do_convert_private_ssh2_from_blob(u_char *blob, int blen) +{ + Buffer b; + Key *key = NULL; + char *type, *cipher; + u_char *sig, data[] = "abcde12345"; + int magic, rlen, ktype, i1, i2, i3, i4; + u_int slen; + u_long e; + + buffer_init(&b); + buffer_append(&b, blob, blen); + + magic = buffer_get_int(&b); + if (magic != SSH_COM_PRIVATE_KEY_MAGIC) { + error("bad magic 0x%x != 0x%x", magic, SSH_COM_PRIVATE_KEY_MAGIC); + buffer_free(&b); + return NULL; + } + i1 = buffer_get_int(&b); + type = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL); + cipher = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL); + i2 = buffer_get_int(&b); + i3 = buffer_get_int(&b); + i4 = buffer_get_int(&b); + debug("ignore (%d %d %d %d)", i1,i2,i3,i4); + if (strcmp(cipher, "none") != 0) { + error("unsupported cipher %s", cipher); + xfree(cipher); + buffer_free(&b); + xfree(type); + return NULL; + } + xfree(cipher); + + if (strstr(type, "dsa")) { + ktype = KEY_DSA; + } else if (strstr(type, "rsa")) { + ktype = KEY_RSA; + } else { + xfree(type); + return NULL; + } + key = key_new_private(ktype); + xfree(type); + + switch (key->type) { + case KEY_DSA: + buffer_get_bignum_bits(&b, key->dsa->p); + buffer_get_bignum_bits(&b, key->dsa->g); + buffer_get_bignum_bits(&b, key->dsa->q); + buffer_get_bignum_bits(&b, key->dsa->pub_key); + buffer_get_bignum_bits(&b, key->dsa->priv_key); + break; + case KEY_RSA: + e = buffer_get_char(&b); + debug("e %lx", e); + if (e < 30) { + e <<= 8; + e += buffer_get_char(&b); + debug("e %lx", e); + e <<= 8; + e += buffer_get_char(&b); + debug("e %lx", e); + } + if (!BN_set_word(key->rsa->e, e)) { + buffer_free(&b); + key_free(key); + return NULL; + } + buffer_get_bignum_bits(&b, key->rsa->d); + buffer_get_bignum_bits(&b, key->rsa->n); + buffer_get_bignum_bits(&b, key->rsa->iqmp); + buffer_get_bignum_bits(&b, key->rsa->q); + buffer_get_bignum_bits(&b, key->rsa->p); + rsa_generate_additional_parameters(key->rsa); + break; + } + rlen = buffer_len(&b); + if(rlen != 0) + error("do_convert_private_ssh2_from_blob: " + "remaining bytes in key blob %d", rlen); + buffer_free(&b); + + /* try the key */ + key_sign(key, &sig, &slen, data, sizeof(data)); + key_verify(key, sig, slen, data, sizeof(data)); + xfree(sig); + return key; +} + +static void +do_convert_from_ssh2(struct passwd *pw) +{ + Key *k; + int blen; + char line[1024], *p; + u_char blob[8096]; + char encoded[8096]; + struct stat st; + int escaped = 0, private = 0, ok; + FILE *fp; + + if (!have_identity) + ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is"); + if (stat(identity_file, &st) < 0) { + perror(identity_file); + exit(1); + } + fp = fopen(identity_file, "r"); + if (fp == NULL) { + perror(identity_file); + exit(1); + } + encoded[0] = '\0'; + while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), fp)) { + if (!(p = strchr(line, '\n'))) { + fprintf(stderr, "input line too long.\n"); + exit(1); + } + if (p > line && p[-1] == '\\') + escaped++; + if (strncmp(line, "----", 4) == 0 || + strstr(line, ": ") != NULL) { + if (strstr(line, SSH_COM_PRIVATE_BEGIN) != NULL) + private = 1; + if (strstr(line, " END ") != NULL) { + break; + } + /* fprintf(stderr, "ignore: %s", line); */ + continue; + } + if (escaped) { + escaped--; + /* fprintf(stderr, "escaped: %s", line); */ + continue; + } + *p = '\0'; + strlcat(encoded, line, sizeof(encoded)); + } + blen = uudecode(encoded, (u_char *)blob, sizeof(blob)); + if (blen < 0) { + fprintf(stderr, "uudecode failed.\n"); + exit(1); + } + k = private ? + do_convert_private_ssh2_from_blob(blob, blen) : + key_from_blob(blob, blen); + if (k == NULL) { + fprintf(stderr, "decode blob failed.\n"); + exit(1); + } + ok = private ? + (k->type == KEY_DSA ? + PEM_write_DSAPrivateKey(stdout, k->dsa, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL) : + PEM_write_RSAPrivateKey(stdout, k->rsa, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL)) : + key_write(k, stdout); + if (!ok) { + fprintf(stderr, "key write failed"); + exit(1); + } + key_free(k); + fprintf(stdout, "\n"); + fclose(fp); + exit(0); +} + +static void +do_print_public(struct passwd *pw) +{ + Key *prv; + struct stat st; + + if (!have_identity) + ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is"); + if (stat(identity_file, &st) < 0) { + perror(identity_file); + exit(1); + } + prv = load_identity(identity_file); + if (prv == NULL) { + fprintf(stderr, "load failed\n"); + exit(1); + } + if (!key_write(prv, stdout)) + fprintf(stderr, "key_write failed"); + key_free(prv); + fprintf(stdout, "\n"); + exit(0); +} + +#ifdef SMARTCARD +#define NUM_RSA_KEY_ELEMENTS 5+1 +#define COPY_RSA_KEY(x, i) \ + do { \ + len = BN_num_bytes(prv->rsa->x); \ + elements[i] = xmalloc(len); \ + debug("#bytes %d", len); \ + if (BN_bn2bin(prv->rsa->x, elements[i]) < 0) \ + goto done; \ + } while(0) + +static int +get_AUT0(char *aut0) +{ + EVP_MD *evp_md = EVP_sha1(); + EVP_MD_CTX md; + char *pass; + + pass = read_passphrase("Enter passphrase for smartcard: ", RP_ALLOW_STDIN); + if (pass == NULL) + return -1; + EVP_DigestInit(&md, evp_md); + EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, pass, strlen(pass)); + EVP_DigestFinal(&md, aut0, NULL); + memset(pass, 0, strlen(pass)); + xfree(pass); + return 0; +} + +static void +do_upload(struct passwd *pw, const char *sc_reader_id) +{ + Key *prv = NULL; + struct stat st; + u_char *elements[NUM_RSA_KEY_ELEMENTS]; + u_char key_fid[2]; + u_char DEFAUT0[] = {0xad, 0x9f, 0x61, 0xfe, 0xfa, 0x20, 0xce, 0x63}; + u_char AUT0[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; + int len, status = 1, i, fd = -1, ret; + int sw = 0, cla = 0x00; + + for (i = 0; i < NUM_RSA_KEY_ELEMENTS; i++) + elements[i] = NULL; + if (!have_identity) + ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is"); + if (stat(identity_file, &st) < 0) { + perror(identity_file); + goto done; + } + prv = load_identity(identity_file); + if (prv == NULL) { + error("load failed"); + goto done; + } + COPY_RSA_KEY(q, 0); + COPY_RSA_KEY(p, 1); + COPY_RSA_KEY(iqmp, 2); + COPY_RSA_KEY(dmq1, 3); + COPY_RSA_KEY(dmp1, 4); + COPY_RSA_KEY(n, 5); + len = BN_num_bytes(prv->rsa->n); + fd = sectok_friendly_open(sc_reader_id, STONOWAIT, &sw); + if (fd < 0) { + error("sectok_open failed: %s", sectok_get_sw(sw)); + goto done; + } + if (! sectok_cardpresent(fd)) { + error("smartcard in reader %s not present", + sc_reader_id); + goto done; + } + ret = sectok_reset(fd, 0, NULL, &sw); + if (ret <= 0) { + error("sectok_reset failed: %s", sectok_get_sw(sw)); + goto done; + } + if ((cla = cyberflex_inq_class(fd)) < 0) { + error("cyberflex_inq_class failed"); + goto done; + } + memcpy(AUT0, DEFAUT0, sizeof(DEFAUT0)); + if (cyberflex_verify_AUT0(fd, cla, AUT0, sizeof(DEFAUT0)) < 0) { + if (get_AUT0(AUT0) < 0 || + cyberflex_verify_AUT0(fd, cla, AUT0, sizeof(DEFAUT0)) < 0) { + error("cyberflex_verify_AUT0 failed"); + goto done; + } + } + key_fid[0] = 0x00; + key_fid[1] = 0x12; + if (cyberflex_load_rsa_priv(fd, cla, key_fid, 5, 8*len, elements, + &sw) < 0) { + error("cyberflex_load_rsa_priv failed: %s", sectok_get_sw(sw)); + goto done; + } + if (!sectok_swOK(sw)) + goto done; + log("cyberflex_load_rsa_priv done"); + key_fid[0] = 0x73; + key_fid[1] = 0x68; + if (cyberflex_load_rsa_pub(fd, cla, key_fid, len, elements[5], + &sw) < 0) { + error("cyberflex_load_rsa_pub failed: %s", sectok_get_sw(sw)); + goto done; + } + if (!sectok_swOK(sw)) + goto done; + log("cyberflex_load_rsa_pub done"); + status = 0; + log("loading key done"); +done: + + memset(elements[0], '\0', BN_num_bytes(prv->rsa->q)); + memset(elements[1], '\0', BN_num_bytes(prv->rsa->p)); + memset(elements[2], '\0', BN_num_bytes(prv->rsa->iqmp)); + memset(elements[3], '\0', BN_num_bytes(prv->rsa->dmq1)); + memset(elements[4], '\0', BN_num_bytes(prv->rsa->dmp1)); + memset(elements[5], '\0', BN_num_bytes(prv->rsa->n)); + + if (prv) + key_free(prv); + for (i = 0; i < NUM_RSA_KEY_ELEMENTS; i++) + if (elements[i]) + xfree(elements[i]); + if (fd != -1) + sectok_close(fd); + exit(status); +} + +static void +do_download(struct passwd *pw, const char *sc_reader_id) +{ + Key *pub = NULL; + + pub = sc_get_key(sc_reader_id); + if (pub == NULL) + fatal("cannot read public key from smartcard"); + key_write(pub, stdout); + key_free(pub); + fprintf(stdout, "\n"); + exit(0); +} +#endif /* SMARTCARD */ + +static void +do_fingerprint(struct passwd *pw) +{ + FILE *f; + Key *public; + char *comment = NULL, *cp, *ep, line[16*1024], *fp; + int i, skip = 0, num = 1, invalid = 1, rep, fptype; + struct stat st; + + fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5; + rep = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE : SSH_FP_HEX; + + if (!have_identity) + ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is"); + if (stat(identity_file, &st) < 0) { + perror(identity_file); + exit(1); + } + public = key_load_public(identity_file, &comment); + if (public != NULL) { + fp = key_fingerprint(public, fptype, rep); + printf("%d %s %s\n", key_size(public), fp, comment); + key_free(public); + xfree(comment); + xfree(fp); + exit(0); + } + if (comment) + xfree(comment); + + f = fopen(identity_file, "r"); + if (f != NULL) { + while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), f)) { + i = strlen(line) - 1; + if (line[i] != '\n') { + error("line %d too long: %.40s...", num, line); + skip = 1; + continue; + } + num++; + if (skip) { + skip = 0; + continue; + } + line[i] = '\0'; + + /* Skip leading whitespace, empty and comment lines. */ + for (cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++) + ; + if (!*cp || *cp == '\n' || *cp == '#') + continue ; + i = strtol(cp, &ep, 10); + if (i == 0 || ep == NULL || (*ep != ' ' && *ep != '\t')) { + int quoted = 0; + comment = cp; + for (; *cp && (quoted || (*cp != ' ' && *cp != '\t')); cp++) { + if (*cp == '\\' && cp[1] == '"') + cp++; /* Skip both */ + else if (*cp == '"') + quoted = !quoted; + } + if (!*cp) + continue; + *cp++ = '\0'; + } + ep = cp; + public = key_new(KEY_RSA1); + if (key_read(public, &cp) != 1) { + cp = ep; + key_free(public); + public = key_new(KEY_UNSPEC); + if (key_read(public, &cp) != 1) { + key_free(public); + continue; + } + } + comment = *cp ? cp : comment; + fp = key_fingerprint(public, fptype, rep); + printf("%d %s %s\n", key_size(public), fp, + comment ? comment : "no comment"); + xfree(fp); + key_free(public); + invalid = 0; + } + fclose(f); + } + if (invalid) { + printf("%s is not a public key file.\n", identity_file); + exit(1); + } + exit(0); +} + +/* + * Perform changing a passphrase. The argument is the passwd structure + * for the current user. + */ +static void +do_change_passphrase(struct passwd *pw) +{ + char *comment; + char *old_passphrase, *passphrase1, *passphrase2; + struct stat st; + Key *private; + + if (!have_identity) + ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is"); + if (stat(identity_file, &st) < 0) { + perror(identity_file); + exit(1); + } + /* Try to load the file with empty passphrase. */ + private = key_load_private(identity_file, "", &comment); + if (private == NULL) { + if (identity_passphrase) + old_passphrase = xstrdup(identity_passphrase); + else + old_passphrase = + read_passphrase("Enter old passphrase: ", + RP_ALLOW_STDIN); + private = key_load_private(identity_file, old_passphrase, + &comment); + memset(old_passphrase, 0, strlen(old_passphrase)); + xfree(old_passphrase); + if (private == NULL) { + printf("Bad passphrase.\n"); + exit(1); + } + } + printf("Key has comment '%s'\n", comment); + + /* Ask the new passphrase (twice). */ + if (identity_new_passphrase) { + passphrase1 = xstrdup(identity_new_passphrase); + passphrase2 = NULL; + } else { + passphrase1 = + read_passphrase("Enter new passphrase (empty for no " + "passphrase): ", RP_ALLOW_STDIN); + passphrase2 = read_passphrase("Enter same passphrase again: ", + RP_ALLOW_STDIN); + + /* Verify that they are the same. */ + if (strcmp(passphrase1, passphrase2) != 0) { + memset(passphrase1, 0, strlen(passphrase1)); + memset(passphrase2, 0, strlen(passphrase2)); + xfree(passphrase1); + xfree(passphrase2); + printf("Pass phrases do not match. Try again.\n"); + exit(1); + } + /* Destroy the other copy. */ + memset(passphrase2, 0, strlen(passphrase2)); + xfree(passphrase2); + } + + /* Save the file using the new passphrase. */ + if (!key_save_private(private, identity_file, passphrase1, comment)) { + printf("Saving the key failed: %s.\n", identity_file); + memset(passphrase1, 0, strlen(passphrase1)); + xfree(passphrase1); + key_free(private); + xfree(comment); + exit(1); + } + /* Destroy the passphrase and the copy of the key in memory. */ + memset(passphrase1, 0, strlen(passphrase1)); + xfree(passphrase1); + key_free(private); /* Destroys contents */ + xfree(comment); + + printf("Your identification has been saved with the new passphrase.\n"); + exit(0); +} + +/* + * Change the comment of a private key file. + */ +static void +do_change_comment(struct passwd *pw) +{ + char new_comment[1024], *comment, *passphrase; + Key *private; + Key *public; + struct stat st; + FILE *f; + int fd; + + if (!have_identity) + ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is"); + if (stat(identity_file, &st) < 0) { + perror(identity_file); + exit(1); + } + private = key_load_private(identity_file, "", &comment); + if (private == NULL) { + if (identity_passphrase) + passphrase = xstrdup(identity_passphrase); + else if (identity_new_passphrase) + passphrase = xstrdup(identity_new_passphrase); + else + passphrase = read_passphrase("Enter passphrase: ", + RP_ALLOW_STDIN); + /* Try to load using the passphrase. */ + private = key_load_private(identity_file, passphrase, &comment); + if (private == NULL) { + memset(passphrase, 0, strlen(passphrase)); + xfree(passphrase); + printf("Bad passphrase.\n"); + exit(1); + } + } else { + passphrase = xstrdup(""); + } + if (private->type != KEY_RSA1) { + fprintf(stderr, "Comments are only supported for RSA1 keys.\n"); + key_free(private); + exit(1); + } + printf("Key now has comment '%s'\n", comment); + + if (identity_comment) { + strlcpy(new_comment, identity_comment, sizeof(new_comment)); + } else { + printf("Enter new comment: "); + fflush(stdout); + if (!fgets(new_comment, sizeof(new_comment), stdin)) { + memset(passphrase, 0, strlen(passphrase)); + key_free(private); + exit(1); + } + if (strchr(new_comment, '\n')) + *strchr(new_comment, '\n') = 0; + } + + /* Save the file using the new passphrase. */ + if (!key_save_private(private, identity_file, passphrase, new_comment)) { + printf("Saving the key failed: %s.\n", identity_file); + memset(passphrase, 0, strlen(passphrase)); + xfree(passphrase); + key_free(private); + xfree(comment); + exit(1); + } + memset(passphrase, 0, strlen(passphrase)); + xfree(passphrase); + public = key_from_private(private); + key_free(private); + + strlcat(identity_file, ".pub", sizeof(identity_file)); + fd = open(identity_file, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0644); + if (fd == -1) { + printf("Could not save your public key in %s\n", identity_file); + exit(1); + } + f = fdopen(fd, "w"); + if (f == NULL) { + printf("fdopen %s failed", identity_file); + exit(1); + } + if (!key_write(public, f)) + fprintf(stderr, "write key failed"); + key_free(public); + fprintf(f, " %s\n", new_comment); + fclose(f); + + xfree(comment); + + printf("The comment in your key file has been changed.\n"); + exit(0); +} + +static void +usage(void) +{ + fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s [options]\n", __progname); + fprintf(stderr, "Options:\n"); + fprintf(stderr, " -b bits Number of bits in the key to create.\n"); + fprintf(stderr, " -c Change comment in private and public key files.\n"); + fprintf(stderr, " -e Convert OpenSSH to IETF SECSH key file.\n"); + fprintf(stderr, " -f filename Filename of the key file.\n"); + fprintf(stderr, " -i Convert IETF SECSH to OpenSSH key file.\n"); + fprintf(stderr, " -l Show fingerprint of key file.\n"); + fprintf(stderr, " -p Change passphrase of private key file.\n"); + fprintf(stderr, " -q Quiet.\n"); + fprintf(stderr, " -y Read private key file and print public key.\n"); + fprintf(stderr, " -t type Specify type of key to create.\n"); + fprintf(stderr, " -B Show bubblebabble digest of key file.\n"); + fprintf(stderr, " -C comment Provide new comment.\n"); + fprintf(stderr, " -N phrase Provide new passphrase.\n"); + fprintf(stderr, " -P phrase Provide old passphrase.\n"); +#ifdef SMARTCARD + fprintf(stderr, " -D reader Download public key from smartcard.\n"); + fprintf(stderr, " -U reader Upload private key to smartcard.\n"); +#endif /* SMARTCARD */ + + exit(1); +} + +/* + * Main program for key management. + */ +int +main(int ac, char **av) +{ + char dotsshdir[16 * 1024], comment[1024], *passphrase1, *passphrase2; + char *reader_id = NULL; + Key *private, *public; + struct passwd *pw; + struct stat st; + int opt, type, fd, download = 0; + FILE *f; + + extern int optind; + extern char *optarg; + + __progname = get_progname(av[0]); + init_rng(); + seed_rng(); + + SSLeay_add_all_algorithms(); + + /* we need this for the home * directory. */ + pw = getpwuid(getuid()); + if (!pw) { + printf("You don't exist, go away!\n"); + exit(1); + } + if (gethostname(hostname, sizeof(hostname)) < 0) { + perror("gethostname"); + exit(1); + } + + while ((opt = getopt(ac, av, "deiqpclBRxXyb:f:t:U:D:P:N:C:")) != -1) { + switch (opt) { + case 'b': + bits = atoi(optarg); + if (bits < 512 || bits > 32768) { + printf("Bits has bad value.\n"); + exit(1); + } + break; + case 'l': + print_fingerprint = 1; + break; + case 'B': + print_bubblebabble = 1; + break; + case 'p': + change_passphrase = 1; + break; + case 'c': + change_comment = 1; + break; + case 'f': + strlcpy(identity_file, optarg, sizeof(identity_file)); + have_identity = 1; + break; + case 'P': + identity_passphrase = optarg; + break; + case 'N': + identity_new_passphrase = optarg; + break; + case 'C': + identity_comment = optarg; + break; + case 'q': + quiet = 1; + break; + case 'R': + /* unused */ + exit(0); + break; + case 'e': + case 'x': + /* export key */ + convert_to_ssh2 = 1; + break; + case 'i': + case 'X': + /* import key */ + convert_from_ssh2 = 1; + break; + case 'y': + print_public = 1; + break; + case 'd': + key_type_name = "dsa"; + break; + case 't': + key_type_name = optarg; + break; + case 'D': + download = 1; + case 'U': + reader_id = optarg; + break; + case '?': + default: + usage(); + } + } + if (optind < ac) { + printf("Too many arguments.\n"); + usage(); + } + if (change_passphrase && change_comment) { + printf("Can only have one of -p and -c.\n"); + usage(); + } + if (print_fingerprint || print_bubblebabble) + do_fingerprint(pw); + if (change_passphrase) + do_change_passphrase(pw); + if (change_comment) + do_change_comment(pw); + if (convert_to_ssh2) + do_convert_to_ssh2(pw); + if (convert_from_ssh2) + do_convert_from_ssh2(pw); + if (print_public) + do_print_public(pw); + if (reader_id != NULL) { +#ifdef SMARTCARD + if (download) + do_download(pw, reader_id); + else + do_upload(pw, reader_id); +#else /* SMARTCARD */ + fatal("no support for smartcards."); +#endif /* SMARTCARD */ + } + + arc4random_stir(); + + type = key_type_from_name(key_type_name); + if (type == KEY_UNSPEC) { + fprintf(stderr, "unknown key type %s\n", key_type_name); + exit(1); + } + if (!quiet) + printf("Generating public/private %s key pair.\n", key_type_name); + private = key_generate(type, bits); + if (private == NULL) { + fprintf(stderr, "key_generate failed"); + exit(1); + } + public = key_from_private(private); + + if (!have_identity) + ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which to save the key"); + + /* Create ~/.ssh directory if it doesn\'t already exist. */ + snprintf(dotsshdir, sizeof dotsshdir, "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir, _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR); + if (strstr(identity_file, dotsshdir) != NULL && + stat(dotsshdir, &st) < 0) { + if (mkdir(dotsshdir, 0700) < 0) + error("Could not create directory '%s'.", dotsshdir); + else if (!quiet) + printf("Created directory '%s'.\n", dotsshdir); + } + /* If the file already exists, ask the user to confirm. */ + if (stat(identity_file, &st) >= 0) { + char yesno[3]; + printf("%s already exists.\n", identity_file); + printf("Overwrite (y/n)? "); + fflush(stdout); + if (fgets(yesno, sizeof(yesno), stdin) == NULL) + exit(1); + if (yesno[0] != 'y' && yesno[0] != 'Y') + exit(1); + } + /* Ask for a passphrase (twice). */ + if (identity_passphrase) + passphrase1 = xstrdup(identity_passphrase); + else if (identity_new_passphrase) + passphrase1 = xstrdup(identity_new_passphrase); + else { +passphrase_again: + passphrase1 = + read_passphrase("Enter passphrase (empty for no " + "passphrase): ", RP_ALLOW_STDIN); + passphrase2 = read_passphrase("Enter same passphrase again: ", + RP_ALLOW_STDIN); + if (strcmp(passphrase1, passphrase2) != 0) { + /* + * The passphrases do not match. Clear them and + * retry. + */ + memset(passphrase1, 0, strlen(passphrase1)); + memset(passphrase2, 0, strlen(passphrase2)); + xfree(passphrase1); + xfree(passphrase2); + printf("Passphrases do not match. Try again.\n"); + goto passphrase_again; + } + /* Clear the other copy of the passphrase. */ + memset(passphrase2, 0, strlen(passphrase2)); + xfree(passphrase2); + } + + if (identity_comment) { + strlcpy(comment, identity_comment, sizeof(comment)); + } else { + /* Create default commend field for the passphrase. */ + snprintf(comment, sizeof comment, "%s@%s", pw->pw_name, hostname); + } + + /* Save the key with the given passphrase and comment. */ + if (!key_save_private(private, identity_file, passphrase1, comment)) { + printf("Saving the key failed: %s.\n", identity_file); + memset(passphrase1, 0, strlen(passphrase1)); + xfree(passphrase1); + exit(1); + } + /* Clear the passphrase. */ + memset(passphrase1, 0, strlen(passphrase1)); + xfree(passphrase1); + + /* Clear the private key and the random number generator. */ + key_free(private); + arc4random_stir(); + + if (!quiet) + printf("Your identification has been saved in %s.\n", identity_file); + + strlcat(identity_file, ".pub", sizeof(identity_file)); + fd = open(identity_file, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0644); + if (fd == -1) { + printf("Could not save your public key in %s\n", identity_file); + exit(1); + } + f = fdopen(fd, "w"); + if (f == NULL) { + printf("fdopen %s failed", identity_file); + exit(1); + } + if (!key_write(public, f)) + fprintf(stderr, "write key failed"); + fprintf(f, " %s\n", comment); + fclose(f); + + if (!quiet) { + char *fp = key_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); + printf("Your public key has been saved in %s.\n", + identity_file); + printf("The key fingerprint is:\n"); + printf("%s %s\n", fp, comment); + xfree(fp); + } + + key_free(public); + exit(0); +} diff --git a/openssh/ssh-keyscan.1 b/openssh/ssh-keyscan.1 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..17f7340 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/ssh-keyscan.1 @@ -0,0 +1,154 @@ +.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-keyscan.1,v 1.12 2001/09/05 06:23:07 deraadt Exp $ +.\" +.\" Copyright 1995, 1996 by David Mazieres . +.\" +.\" Modification and redistribution in source and binary forms is +.\" permitted provided that due credit is given to the author and the +.\" OpenBSD project by leaving this copyright notice intact. +.\" +.Dd January 1, 1996 +.Dt SSH-KEYSCAN 1 +.Os +.Sh NAME +.Nm ssh-keyscan +.Nd gather ssh public keys +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.Nm ssh-keyscan +.Op Fl v46 +.Op Fl p Ar port +.Op Fl T Ar timeout +.Op Fl t Ar type +.Op Fl f Ar file +.Op Ar host | addrlist namelist +.Op Ar ... +.Sh DESCRIPTION +.Nm +is a utility for gathering the public ssh host keys of a number of +hosts. It was designed to aid in building and verifying +.Pa ssh_known_hosts +files. +.Nm +provides a minimal interface suitable for use by shell and perl +scripts. +.Pp +.Nm +uses non-blocking socket I/O to contact as many hosts as possible in +parallel, so it is very efficient. The keys from a domain of 1,000 +hosts can be collected in tens of seconds, even when some of those +hosts are down or do not run ssh. For scanning, one does not need +login access to the machines that are being scanned, nor does the +scanning process involve any encryption. +.Pp +The options are as follows: +.Bl -tag -width Ds +.It Fl p Ar port +Port to connect to on the remote host. +.It Fl T Ar timeout +Set the timeout for connection attempts. If +.Pa timeout +seconds have elapsed since a connection was initiated to a host or since the +last time anything was read from that host, then the connection is +closed and the host in question considered unavailable. Default is 5 +seconds. +.It Fl t Ar type +Specifies the type of the key to fetch from the scanned hosts. +The possible values are +.Dq rsa1 +for protocol version 1 and +.Dq rsa +or +.Dq dsa +for protocol version 2. +Multiple values may be specified by separating them with commas. +The default is +.Dq rsa1 . +.It Fl f Ar filename +Read hosts or +.Pa addrlist namelist +pairs from this file, one per line. +If +.Pa - +is supplied instead of a filename, +.Nm +will read hosts or +.Pa addrlist namelist +pairs from the standard input. +.It Fl v +Verbose mode. +Causes +.Nm +to print debugging messages about its progress. +.It Fl 4 +Forces +.Nm +to use IPv4 addresses only. +.It Fl 6 +Forces +.Nm +to use IPv6 addresses only. +.El +.Sh SECURITY +If a ssh_known_hosts file is constructed using +.Nm +without verifying the keys, users will be vulnerable to +.I man in the middle +attacks. +On the other hand, if the security model allows such a risk, +.Nm +can help in the detection of tampered keyfiles or man in the middle +attacks which have begun after the ssh_known_hosts file was created. +.Sh EXAMPLES +.Pp +Print the +.Pa rsa1 +host key for machine +.Pa hostname : +.Bd -literal +ssh-keyscan hostname +.Ed +.Pp +Find all hosts from the file +.Pa ssh_hosts +which have new or different keys from those in the sorted file +.Pa ssh_known_hosts : +.Bd -literal +ssh-keyscan -t rsa,dsa -f ssh_hosts | \e\ + sort -u - ssh_known_hosts | diff ssh_known_hosts - +.Ed +.Sh FILES +.Pa Input format: +.Bd -literal +1.2.3.4,1.2.4.4 name.my.domain,name,n.my.domain,n,1.2.3.4,1.2.4.4 +.Ed +.Pp +.Pa Output format for rsa1 keys: +.Bd -literal +host-or-namelist bits exponent modulus +.Ed +.Pp +.Pa Output format for rsa and dsa keys: +.Bd -literal +host-or-namelist keytype base64-encoded-key +.Ed +.Pp +Where +.Pa keytype +is either +.Dq ssh-rsa +or +.Dq ssh-dsa . +.Pp +.Pa /etc/ssh_known_hosts +.Sh BUGS +It generates "Connection closed by remote host" messages on the consoles +of all the machines it scans if the server is older than version 2.9. +This is because it opens a connection to the ssh port, reads the public +key, and drops the connection as soon as it gets the key. +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr ssh 1 , +.Xr sshd 8 +.Sh AUTHORS +David Mazieres +wrote the initial version, and +Wayne Davison +added support for protocol version 2. diff --git a/openssh/ssh-keyscan.c b/openssh/ssh-keyscan.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3fbe88d --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/ssh-keyscan.c @@ -0,0 +1,805 @@ +/* + * Copyright 1995, 1996 by David Mazieres . + * + * Modification and redistribution in source and binary forms is + * permitted provided that due credit is given to the author and the + * OpenBSD project by leaving this copyright notice intact. + */ + +#include "includes.h" +RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh-keyscan.c,v 1.30 2001/10/08 19:05:05 markus Exp $"); + +#if defined(HAVE_SYS_QUEUE_H) && !defined(HAVE_BOGUS_SYS_QUEUE_H) +#include +#else +#include "openbsd-compat/fake-queue.h" +#endif +#include + +#include + +#include +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "ssh.h" +#include "ssh1.h" +#include "key.h" +#include "kex.h" +#include "compat.h" +#include "myproposal.h" +#include "packet.h" +#include "dispatch.h" +#include "buffer.h" +#include "bufaux.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "atomicio.h" +#include "misc.h" + +/* Flag indicating whether IPv4 or IPv6. This can be set on the command line. + Default value is AF_UNSPEC means both IPv4 and IPv6. */ +#ifdef IPV4_DEFAULT +int IPv4or6 = AF_INET; +#else +int IPv4or6 = AF_UNSPEC; +#endif + +int ssh_port = SSH_DEFAULT_PORT; + +#define KT_RSA1 1 +#define KT_DSA 2 +#define KT_RSA 4 + +int get_keytypes = KT_RSA1; /* Get only RSA1 keys by default */ + +#define MAXMAXFD 256 + +/* The number of seconds after which to give up on a TCP connection */ +int timeout = 5; + +int maxfd; +#define MAXCON (maxfd - 10) + +#ifdef HAVE___PROGNAME +extern char *__progname; +#else +char *__progname; +#endif +fd_set *read_wait; +size_t read_wait_size; +int ncon; +int nonfatal_fatal = 0; +jmp_buf kexjmp; +Key *kexjmp_key; + +/* + * Keep a connection structure for each file descriptor. The state + * associated with file descriptor n is held in fdcon[n]. + */ +typedef struct Connection { + u_char c_status; /* State of connection on this file desc. */ +#define CS_UNUSED 0 /* File descriptor unused */ +#define CS_CON 1 /* Waiting to connect/read greeting */ +#define CS_SIZE 2 /* Waiting to read initial packet size */ +#define CS_KEYS 3 /* Waiting to read public key packet */ + int c_fd; /* Quick lookup: c->c_fd == c - fdcon */ + int c_plen; /* Packet length field for ssh packet */ + int c_len; /* Total bytes which must be read. */ + int c_off; /* Length of data read so far. */ + int c_keytype; /* Only one of KT_RSA1, KT_DSA, or KT_RSA */ + char *c_namebase; /* Address to free for c_name and c_namelist */ + char *c_name; /* Hostname of connection for errors */ + char *c_namelist; /* Pointer to other possible addresses */ + char *c_output_name; /* Hostname of connection for output */ + char *c_data; /* Data read from this fd */ + Kex *c_kex; /* The key-exchange struct for ssh2 */ + struct timeval c_tv; /* Time at which connection gets aborted */ + TAILQ_ENTRY(Connection) c_link; /* List of connections in timeout order. */ +} con; + +TAILQ_HEAD(conlist, Connection) tq; /* Timeout Queue */ +con *fdcon; + +/* + * This is just a wrapper around fgets() to make it usable. + */ + +/* Stress-test. Increase this later. */ +#define LINEBUF_SIZE 16 + +typedef struct { + char *buf; + u_int size; + int lineno; + const char *filename; + FILE *stream; + void (*errfun) (const char *,...); +} Linebuf; + +static Linebuf * +Linebuf_alloc(const char *filename, void (*errfun) (const char *,...)) +{ + Linebuf *lb; + + if (!(lb = malloc(sizeof(*lb)))) { + if (errfun) + (*errfun) ("linebuf (%s): malloc failed\n", lb->filename); + return (NULL); + } + if (filename) { + lb->filename = filename; + if (!(lb->stream = fopen(filename, "r"))) { + xfree(lb); + if (errfun) + (*errfun) ("%s: %s\n", filename, strerror(errno)); + return (NULL); + } + } else { + lb->filename = "(stdin)"; + lb->stream = stdin; + } + + if (!(lb->buf = malloc(lb->size = LINEBUF_SIZE))) { + if (errfun) + (*errfun) ("linebuf (%s): malloc failed\n", lb->filename); + xfree(lb); + return (NULL); + } + lb->errfun = errfun; + lb->lineno = 0; + return (lb); +} + +static void +Linebuf_free(Linebuf * lb) +{ + fclose(lb->stream); + xfree(lb->buf); + xfree(lb); +} + +#if 0 +static void +Linebuf_restart(Linebuf * lb) +{ + clearerr(lb->stream); + rewind(lb->stream); + lb->lineno = 0; +} + +static int +Linebuf_lineno(Linebuf * lb) +{ + return (lb->lineno); +} +#endif + +static char * +Linebuf_getline(Linebuf * lb) +{ + int n = 0; + + lb->lineno++; + for (;;) { + /* Read a line */ + if (!fgets(&lb->buf[n], lb->size - n, lb->stream)) { + if (ferror(lb->stream) && lb->errfun) + (*lb->errfun) ("%s: %s\n", lb->filename, + strerror(errno)); + return (NULL); + } + n = strlen(lb->buf); + + /* Return it or an error if it fits */ + if (n > 0 && lb->buf[n - 1] == '\n') { + lb->buf[n - 1] = '\0'; + return (lb->buf); + } + if (n != lb->size - 1) { + if (lb->errfun) + (*lb->errfun) ("%s: skipping incomplete last line\n", + lb->filename); + return (NULL); + } + /* Double the buffer if we need more space */ + if (!(lb->buf = realloc(lb->buf, (lb->size *= 2)))) { + if (lb->errfun) + (*lb->errfun) ("linebuf (%s): realloc failed\n", + lb->filename); + return (NULL); + } + } +} + +static int +fdlim_get(int hard) +{ +#if defined(HAVE_GETRLIMIT) && defined(RLIMIT_NOFILE) + struct rlimit rlfd; + + if (getrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rlfd) < 0) + return (-1); + if ((hard ? rlfd.rlim_max : rlfd.rlim_cur) == RLIM_INFINITY) + return 10000; + else + return hard ? rlfd.rlim_max : rlfd.rlim_cur; +#elif defined (HAVE_SYSCONF) + return sysconf (_SC_OPEN_MAX); +#else + return 10000; +#endif +} + +static int +fdlim_set(int lim) +{ +#if defined(HAVE_SETRLIMIT) && defined(RLIMIT_NOFILE) + struct rlimit rlfd; +#endif + if (lim <= 0) + return (-1); +#if defined(HAVE_SETRLIMIT) && defined(RLIMIT_NOFILE) + if (getrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rlfd) < 0) + return (-1); + rlfd.rlim_cur = lim; + if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rlfd) < 0) + return (-1); +#elif defined (HAVE_SETDTABLESIZE) + setdtablesize(lim); +#endif + return (0); +} + +/* + * This is an strsep function that returns a null field for adjacent + * separators. This is the same as the 4.4BSD strsep, but different from the + * one in the GNU libc. + */ +static char * +xstrsep(char **str, const char *delim) +{ + char *s, *e; + + if (!**str) + return (NULL); + + s = *str; + e = s + strcspn(s, delim); + + if (*e != '\0') + *e++ = '\0'; + *str = e; + + return (s); +} + +/* + * Get the next non-null token (like GNU strsep). Strsep() will return a + * null token for two adjacent separators, so we may have to loop. + */ +static char * +strnnsep(char **stringp, char *delim) +{ + char *tok; + + do { + tok = xstrsep(stringp, delim); + } while (tok && *tok == '\0'); + return (tok); +} + +static Key * +keygrab_ssh1(con *c) +{ + static Key *rsa; + static Buffer msg; + + if (rsa == NULL) { + buffer_init(&msg); + rsa = key_new(KEY_RSA1); + } + buffer_append(&msg, c->c_data, c->c_plen); + buffer_consume(&msg, 8 - (c->c_plen & 7)); /* padding */ + if (buffer_get_char(&msg) != (int) SSH_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY) { + error("%s: invalid packet type", c->c_name); + buffer_clear(&msg); + return NULL; + } + buffer_consume(&msg, 8); /* cookie */ + + /* server key */ + (void) buffer_get_int(&msg); + buffer_get_bignum(&msg, rsa->rsa->e); + buffer_get_bignum(&msg, rsa->rsa->n); + + /* host key */ + (void) buffer_get_int(&msg); + buffer_get_bignum(&msg, rsa->rsa->e); + buffer_get_bignum(&msg, rsa->rsa->n); + + buffer_clear(&msg); + + return (rsa); +} + +static int +hostjump(Key *hostkey) +{ + kexjmp_key = hostkey; + longjmp(kexjmp, 1); +} + +static int +ssh2_capable(int remote_major, int remote_minor) +{ + switch (remote_major) { + case 1: + if (remote_minor == 99) + return 1; + break; + case 2: + return 1; + default: + break; + } + return 0; +} + +static Key * +keygrab_ssh2(con *c) +{ + int j; + + packet_set_connection(c->c_fd, c->c_fd); + enable_compat20(); + myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = c->c_keytype == KT_DSA? + "ssh-dss": "ssh-rsa"; + c->c_kex = kex_setup(myproposal); + c->c_kex->verify_host_key = hostjump; + + if (!(j = setjmp(kexjmp))) { + nonfatal_fatal = 1; + dispatch_run(DISPATCH_BLOCK, &c->c_kex->done, c->c_kex); + fprintf(stderr, "Impossible! dispatch_run() returned!\n"); + exit(1); + } + nonfatal_fatal = 0; + xfree(c->c_kex); + c->c_kex = NULL; + packet_close(); + + return j < 0? NULL : kexjmp_key; +} + +static void +keyprint(con *c, Key *key) +{ + if (!key) + return; + + fprintf(stdout, "%s ", c->c_output_name ? c->c_output_name : c->c_name); + key_write(key, stdout); + fputs("\n", stdout); +} + +static int +tcpconnect(char *host) +{ + struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop; + char strport[NI_MAXSERV]; + int gaierr, s = -1; + + snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", ssh_port); + memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); + hints.ai_family = IPv4or6; + hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; + if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(host, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0) + fatal("getaddrinfo %s: %s", host, gai_strerror(gaierr)); + for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) { + s = socket(ai->ai_family, SOCK_STREAM, 0); + if (s < 0) { + error("socket: %s", strerror(errno)); + continue; + } + if (fcntl(s, F_SETFL, O_NONBLOCK) < 0) + fatal("F_SETFL: %s", strerror(errno)); + if (connect(s, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0 && + errno != EINPROGRESS) + error("connect (`%s'): %s", host, strerror(errno)); + else + break; + close(s); + s = -1; + } + freeaddrinfo(aitop); + return s; +} + +static int +conalloc(char *iname, char *oname, int keytype) +{ + int s; + char *namebase, *name, *namelist; + + namebase = namelist = xstrdup(iname); + + do { + name = xstrsep(&namelist, ","); + if (!name) { + xfree(namebase); + return (-1); + } + } while ((s = tcpconnect(name)) < 0); + + if (s >= maxfd) + fatal("conalloc: fdno %d too high", s); + if (fdcon[s].c_status) + fatal("conalloc: attempt to reuse fdno %d", s); + + fdcon[s].c_fd = s; + fdcon[s].c_status = CS_CON; + fdcon[s].c_namebase = namebase; + fdcon[s].c_name = name; + fdcon[s].c_namelist = namelist; + fdcon[s].c_output_name = xstrdup(oname); + fdcon[s].c_data = (char *) &fdcon[s].c_plen; + fdcon[s].c_len = 4; + fdcon[s].c_off = 0; + fdcon[s].c_keytype = keytype; + gettimeofday(&fdcon[s].c_tv, NULL); + fdcon[s].c_tv.tv_sec += timeout; + TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&tq, &fdcon[s], c_link); + FD_SET(s, read_wait); + ncon++; + return (s); +} + +static void +confree(int s) +{ + if (s >= maxfd || fdcon[s].c_status == CS_UNUSED) + fatal("confree: attempt to free bad fdno %d", s); + close(s); + xfree(fdcon[s].c_namebase); + xfree(fdcon[s].c_output_name); + if (fdcon[s].c_status == CS_KEYS) + xfree(fdcon[s].c_data); + fdcon[s].c_status = CS_UNUSED; + fdcon[s].c_keytype = 0; + TAILQ_REMOVE(&tq, &fdcon[s], c_link); + FD_CLR(s, read_wait); + ncon--; +} + +static void +contouch(int s) +{ + TAILQ_REMOVE(&tq, &fdcon[s], c_link); + gettimeofday(&fdcon[s].c_tv, NULL); + fdcon[s].c_tv.tv_sec += timeout; + TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&tq, &fdcon[s], c_link); +} + +static int +conrecycle(int s) +{ + int ret; + con *c = &fdcon[s]; + + ret = conalloc(c->c_namelist, c->c_output_name, c->c_keytype); + confree(s); + return (ret); +} + +static void +congreet(int s) +{ + char buf[256], *cp; + size_t bufsiz; + int n = 0; + con *c = &fdcon[s]; + + bufsiz = sizeof(buf); + cp = buf; + while (bufsiz-- && (n = read(s, cp, 1)) == 1 && *cp != '\n') { + if (*cp == '\r') + *cp = '\n'; + cp++; + } + if (n < 0) { + if (errno != ECONNREFUSED) + error("read (%s): %s", c->c_name, strerror(errno)); + conrecycle(s); + return; + } + if (*cp != '\n' && *cp != '\r') { + error("%s: bad greeting", c->c_name); + confree(s); + return; + } + *cp = '\0'; + if (c->c_keytype != KT_RSA1) { + int remote_major, remote_minor; + char remote_version[sizeof buf]; + + if (sscanf(buf, "SSH-%d.%d-%[^\n]\n", + &remote_major, &remote_minor, remote_version) == 3) + compat_datafellows(remote_version); + else + datafellows = 0; + if (!ssh2_capable(remote_major, remote_minor)) { + debug("%s doesn't support ssh2", c->c_name); + confree(s); + return; + } + } + fprintf(stderr, "# %s %s\n", c->c_name, chop(buf)); + n = snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "SSH-%d.%d-OpenSSH-keyscan\r\n", + c->c_keytype == KT_RSA1? PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1 : PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, + c->c_keytype == KT_RSA1? PROTOCOL_MINOR_1 : PROTOCOL_MINOR_2); + if (atomicio(write, s, buf, n) != n) { + error("write (%s): %s", c->c_name, strerror(errno)); + confree(s); + return; + } + if (c->c_keytype != KT_RSA1) { + keyprint(c, keygrab_ssh2(c)); + confree(s); + return; + } + c->c_status = CS_SIZE; + contouch(s); +} + +static void +conread(int s) +{ + int n; + con *c = &fdcon[s]; + + if (c->c_status == CS_CON) { + congreet(s); + return; + } + n = read(s, c->c_data + c->c_off, c->c_len - c->c_off); + if (n < 0) { + error("read (%s): %s", c->c_name, strerror(errno)); + confree(s); + return; + } + c->c_off += n; + + if (c->c_off == c->c_len) + switch (c->c_status) { + case CS_SIZE: + c->c_plen = htonl(c->c_plen); + c->c_len = c->c_plen + 8 - (c->c_plen & 7); + c->c_off = 0; + c->c_data = xmalloc(c->c_len); + c->c_status = CS_KEYS; + break; + case CS_KEYS: + keyprint(c, keygrab_ssh1(c)); + confree(s); + return; + break; + default: + fatal("conread: invalid status %d", c->c_status); + break; + } + + contouch(s); +} + +static void +conloop(void) +{ + fd_set *r, *e; + struct timeval seltime, now; + int i; + con *c; + + gettimeofday(&now, NULL); + c = tq.tqh_first; + + if (c && (c->c_tv.tv_sec > now.tv_sec || + (c->c_tv.tv_sec == now.tv_sec && c->c_tv.tv_usec > now.tv_usec))) { + seltime = c->c_tv; + seltime.tv_sec -= now.tv_sec; + seltime.tv_usec -= now.tv_usec; + if (seltime.tv_usec < 0) { + seltime.tv_usec += 1000000; + seltime.tv_sec--; + } + } else + seltime.tv_sec = seltime.tv_usec = 0; + + r = xmalloc(read_wait_size); + memcpy(r, read_wait, read_wait_size); + e = xmalloc(read_wait_size); + memcpy(e, read_wait, read_wait_size); + + while (select(maxfd, r, NULL, e, &seltime) == -1 && + (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR)) + ; + + for (i = 0; i < maxfd; i++) { + if (FD_ISSET(i, e)) { + error("%s: exception!", fdcon[i].c_name); + confree(i); + } else if (FD_ISSET(i, r)) + conread(i); + } + xfree(r); + xfree(e); + + c = tq.tqh_first; + while (c && (c->c_tv.tv_sec < now.tv_sec || + (c->c_tv.tv_sec == now.tv_sec && c->c_tv.tv_usec < now.tv_usec))) { + int s = c->c_fd; + + c = c->c_link.tqe_next; + conrecycle(s); + } +} + +static void +do_host(char *host) +{ + char *name = strnnsep(&host, " \t\n"); + int j; + + for (j = KT_RSA1; j <= KT_RSA; j *= 2) { + if (get_keytypes & j) { + while (ncon >= MAXCON) + conloop(); + conalloc(name, *host ? host : name, j); + } + } +} + +static void +fatal_callback(void *arg) +{ + if (nonfatal_fatal) + longjmp(kexjmp, -1); +} + +static void +usage(void) +{ + fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s [options] host ...\n", + __progname); + fprintf(stderr, "Options:\n"); + fprintf(stderr, " -f file Read hosts or addresses from file.\n"); + fprintf(stderr, " -p port Connect to the specified port.\n"); + fprintf(stderr, " -t keytype Specify the host key type.\n"); + fprintf(stderr, " -T timeout Set connection timeout.\n"); + fprintf(stderr, " -v Verbose; display verbose debugging messages.\n"); + fprintf(stderr, " -4 Use IPv4 only.\n"); + fprintf(stderr, " -6 Use IPv6 only.\n"); + exit(1); +} + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int debug_flag = 0, log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO; + int opt, fopt_count = 0; + char *tname; + + extern int optind; + extern char *optarg; + + __progname = get_progname(argv[0]); + init_rng(); + seed_rng(); + TAILQ_INIT(&tq); + + if (argc <= 1) + usage(); + + while ((opt = getopt(argc, argv, "v46p:T:t:f:")) != -1) { + switch (opt) { + case 'p': + ssh_port = a2port(optarg); + if (ssh_port == 0) { + fprintf(stderr, "Bad port '%s'\n", optarg); + exit(1); + } + break; + case 'T': + timeout = atoi(optarg); + if (timeout <= 0) + usage(); + break; + case 'v': + if (!debug_flag) { + debug_flag = 1; + log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1; + } + else if (log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3) + log_level++; + else + fatal("Too high debugging level."); + break; + case 'f': + if (strcmp(optarg, "-") == 0) + optarg = NULL; + argv[fopt_count++] = optarg; + break; + case 't': + get_keytypes = 0; + tname = strtok(optarg, ","); + while (tname) { + int type = key_type_from_name(tname); + switch (type) { + case KEY_RSA1: + get_keytypes |= KT_RSA1; + break; + case KEY_DSA: + get_keytypes |= KT_DSA; + break; + case KEY_RSA: + get_keytypes |= KT_RSA; + break; + case KEY_UNSPEC: + fatal("unknown key type %s\n", tname); + } + tname = strtok(NULL, ","); + } + break; + case '4': + IPv4or6 = AF_INET; + break; + case '6': + IPv4or6 = AF_INET6; + break; + case '?': + default: + usage(); + } + } + if (optind == argc && !fopt_count) + usage(); + + log_init("ssh-keyscan", log_level, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, 1); + fatal_add_cleanup(fatal_callback, NULL); + + maxfd = fdlim_get(1); + if (maxfd < 0) + fatal("%s: fdlim_get: bad value", __progname); + if (maxfd > MAXMAXFD) + maxfd = MAXMAXFD; + if (MAXCON <= 0) + fatal("%s: not enough file descriptors", __progname); + if (maxfd > fdlim_get(0)) + fdlim_set(maxfd); + fdcon = xmalloc(maxfd * sizeof(con)); + memset(fdcon, 0, maxfd * sizeof(con)); + + read_wait_size = howmany(maxfd, NFDBITS) * sizeof(fd_mask); + read_wait = xmalloc(read_wait_size); + memset(read_wait, 0, read_wait_size); + + if (fopt_count) { + Linebuf *lb; + char *line; + int j; + + for (j = 0; j < fopt_count; j++) { + lb = Linebuf_alloc(argv[j], error); + if (!lb) + continue; + while ((line = Linebuf_getline(lb)) != NULL) + do_host(line); + Linebuf_free(lb); + } + } + + while (optind < argc) + do_host(argv[optind++]); + + while (ncon > 0) + conloop(); + + return (0); +} diff --git a/openssh/ssh-rsa.c b/openssh/ssh-rsa.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a6a703b --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/ssh-rsa.c @@ -0,0 +1,181 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" +RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh-rsa.c,v 1.13 2001/11/10 13:22:42 markus Exp $"); + +#include +#include + +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "buffer.h" +#include "bufaux.h" +#include "key.h" +#include "ssh-rsa.h" +#include "compat.h" + +/* RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 (PKCS #1 v2.0 signature) with SHA1 */ +int +ssh_rsa_sign( + Key *key, + u_char **sigp, int *lenp, + u_char *data, int datalen) +{ + const EVP_MD *evp_md; + EVP_MD_CTX md; + u_char *digest, *sig, *ret; + u_int slen, dlen, len; + int ok, nid; + Buffer b; + + if (key == NULL || key->type != KEY_RSA || key->rsa == NULL) { + error("ssh_rsa_sign: no RSA key"); + return -1; + } + if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB) { + error("ssh_rsa_sign: SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB not supported"); + return -1; + } + nid = (datafellows & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) ? NID_md5 : NID_sha1; + if ((evp_md = EVP_get_digestbynid(nid)) == NULL) { + error("ssh_rsa_sign: EVP_get_digestbynid %d failed", nid); + return -1; + } + dlen = evp_md->md_size; + digest = xmalloc(dlen); + EVP_DigestInit(&md, evp_md); + EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, data, datalen); + EVP_DigestFinal(&md, digest, NULL); + + slen = RSA_size(key->rsa); + sig = xmalloc(slen); + + ok = RSA_sign(nid, digest, dlen, sig, &len, key->rsa); + memset(digest, 'd', dlen); + xfree(digest); + + if (ok != 1) { + int ecode = ERR_get_error(); + error("ssh_rsa_sign: RSA_sign failed: %s", ERR_error_string(ecode, NULL)); + xfree(sig); + return -1; + } + if (len < slen) { + int diff = slen - len; + debug("slen %d > len %d", slen, len); + memmove(sig + diff, sig, len); + memset(sig, 0, diff); + } else if (len > slen) { + error("ssh_rsa_sign: slen %d slen2 %d", slen, len); + xfree(sig); + return -1; + } + /* encode signature */ + buffer_init(&b); + buffer_put_cstring(&b, "ssh-rsa"); + buffer_put_string(&b, sig, slen); + len = buffer_len(&b); + ret = xmalloc(len); + memcpy(ret, buffer_ptr(&b), len); + buffer_free(&b); + memset(sig, 's', slen); + xfree(sig); + + if (lenp != NULL) + *lenp = len; + if (sigp != NULL) + *sigp = ret; + return 0; +} + +int +ssh_rsa_verify( + Key *key, + u_char *signature, int signaturelen, + u_char *data, int datalen) +{ + Buffer b; + const EVP_MD *evp_md; + EVP_MD_CTX md; + char *ktype; + u_char *sigblob, *digest; + u_int len, dlen; + int rlen, ret, nid; + + if (key == NULL || key->type != KEY_RSA || key->rsa == NULL) { + error("ssh_rsa_verify: no RSA key"); + return -1; + } + if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB) { + error("ssh_rsa_verify: SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB not supported"); + return -1; + } + if (BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n) < 768) { + error("ssh_rsa_verify: n too small: %d bits", + BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n)); + return -1; + } + buffer_init(&b); + buffer_append(&b, signature, signaturelen); + ktype = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL); + if (strcmp("ssh-rsa", ktype) != 0) { + error("ssh_rsa_verify: cannot handle type %s", ktype); + buffer_free(&b); + xfree(ktype); + return -1; + } + xfree(ktype); + sigblob = buffer_get_string(&b, &len); + rlen = buffer_len(&b); + buffer_free(&b); + if(rlen != 0) { + error("ssh_rsa_verify: remaining bytes in signature %d", rlen); + xfree(sigblob); + return -1; + } + nid = (datafellows & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) ? NID_md5 : NID_sha1; + if ((evp_md = EVP_get_digestbynid(nid)) == NULL) { + error("ssh_rsa_verify: EVP_get_digestbynid %d failed", nid); + xfree(sigblob); + return -1; + } + dlen = evp_md->md_size; + digest = xmalloc(dlen); + EVP_DigestInit(&md, evp_md); + EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, data, datalen); + EVP_DigestFinal(&md, digest, NULL); + + ret = RSA_verify(nid, digest, dlen, sigblob, len, key->rsa); + memset(digest, 'd', dlen); + xfree(digest); + memset(sigblob, 's', len); + xfree(sigblob); + if (ret == 0) { + int ecode = ERR_get_error(); + error("ssh_rsa_verify: RSA_verify failed: %s", ERR_error_string(ecode, NULL)); + } + debug("ssh_rsa_verify: signature %scorrect", (ret==0) ? "in" : ""); + return ret; +} diff --git a/openssh/ssh-rsa.h b/openssh/ssh-rsa.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..11d355d --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/ssh-rsa.h @@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh-rsa.h,v 1.5 2001/06/26 17:27:25 markus Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ +#ifndef SSH_RSA_H +#define SSH_RSA_H + +int ssh_rsa_sign(Key *, u_char **, int *, u_char *, int); +int ssh_rsa_verify(Key *, u_char *, int, u_char *, int); + +#endif diff --git a/openssh/ssh.1 b/openssh/ssh.1 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ad3c960 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/ssh.1 @@ -0,0 +1,1513 @@ +.\" -*- nroff -*- +.\" +.\" Author: Tatu Ylonen +.\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland +.\" All rights reserved +.\" +.\" As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software +.\" can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this +.\" software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is +.\" incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be +.\" called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". +.\" +.\" Copyright (c) 1999,2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. +.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell. All rights reserved. +.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved. +.\" +.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +.\" are met: +.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +.\" +.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR +.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES +.\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. +.\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, +.\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT +.\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, +.\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY +.\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT +.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF +.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. +.\" +.\" $OpenBSD: ssh.1,v 1.141 2001/11/08 17:49:53 markus Exp $ +.Dd September 25, 1999 +.Dt SSH 1 +.Os +.Sh NAME +.Nm ssh +.Nd OpenSSH SSH client (remote login program) +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.Nm ssh +.Op Fl l Ar login_name +.Ar hostname | user@hostname +.Op Ar command +.Pp +.Nm ssh +.Op Fl afgknqstvxACNPTX1246 +.Op Fl b Ar bind_address +.Op Fl c Ar cipher_spec +.Op Fl e Ar escape_char +.Op Fl i Ar identity_file +.Op Fl l Ar login_name +.Op Fl m Ar mac_spec +.Op Fl o Ar option +.Op Fl p Ar port +.Op Fl F Ar configfile +.Oo Fl L Xo +.Sm off +.Ar port : +.Ar host : +.Ar hostport +.Sm on +.Xc +.Oc +.Oo Fl R Xo +.Sm off +.Ar port : +.Ar host : +.Ar hostport +.Sm on +.Xc +.Oc +.Op Fl D Ar port +.Ar hostname | user@hostname +.Op Ar command +.Sh DESCRIPTION +.Nm +(SSH client) is a program for logging into a remote machine and for +executing commands on a remote machine. +It is intended to replace +rlogin and rsh, and provide secure encrypted communications between +two untrusted hosts over an insecure network. +X11 connections and +arbitrary TCP/IP ports can also be forwarded over the secure channel. +.Pp +.Nm +connects and logs into the specified +.Ar hostname . +The user must prove +his/her identity to the remote machine using one of several methods +depending on the protocol version used: +.Pp +.Ss SSH protocol version 1 +.Pp +First, if the machine the user logs in from is listed in +.Pa /etc/hosts.equiv +or +.Pa /etc/shosts.equiv +on the remote machine, and the user names are +the same on both sides, the user is immediately permitted to log in. +Second, if +.Pa \&.rhosts +or +.Pa \&.shosts +exists in the user's home directory on the +remote machine and contains a line containing the name of the client +machine and the name of the user on that machine, the user is +permitted to log in. +This form of authentication alone is normally not +allowed by the server because it is not secure. +.Pp +The second authentication method is the +.Pa rhosts +or +.Pa hosts.equiv +method combined with RSA-based host authentication. +It means that if the login would be permitted by +.Pa $HOME/.rhosts , +.Pa $HOME/.shosts , +.Pa /etc/hosts.equiv , +or +.Pa /etc/shosts.equiv , +and if additionally the server can verify the client's +host key (see +.Pa /etc/ssh_known_hosts +and +.Pa $HOME/.ssh/known_hosts +in the +.Sx FILES +section), only then login is permitted. +This authentication method closes security holes due to IP +spoofing, DNS spoofing and routing spoofing. +[Note to the administrator: +.Pa /etc/hosts.equiv , +.Pa $HOME/.rhosts , +and the rlogin/rsh protocol in general, are inherently insecure and should be +disabled if security is desired.] +.Pp +As a third authentication method, +.Nm +supports RSA based authentication. +The scheme is based on public-key cryptography: there are cryptosystems +where encryption and decryption are done using separate keys, and it +is not possible to derive the decryption key from the encryption key. +RSA is one such system. +The idea is that each user creates a public/private +key pair for authentication purposes. +The server knows the public key, and only the user knows the private key. +The file +.Pa $HOME/.ssh/authorized_keys +lists the public keys that are permitted for logging +in. +When the user logs in, the +.Nm +program tells the server which key pair it would like to use for +authentication. +The server checks if this key is permitted, and if +so, sends the user (actually the +.Nm +program running on behalf of the user) a challenge, a random number, +encrypted by the user's public key. +The challenge can only be +decrypted using the proper private key. +The user's client then decrypts the +challenge using the private key, proving that he/she knows the private +key but without disclosing it to the server. +.Pp +.Nm +implements the RSA authentication protocol automatically. +The user creates his/her RSA key pair by running +.Xr ssh-keygen 1 . +This stores the private key in +.Pa $HOME/.ssh/identity +and the public key in +.Pa $HOME/.ssh/identity.pub +in the user's home directory. +The user should then copy the +.Pa identity.pub +to +.Pa $HOME/.ssh/authorized_keys +in his/her home directory on the remote machine (the +.Pa authorized_keys +file corresponds to the conventional +.Pa $HOME/.rhosts +file, and has one key +per line, though the lines can be very long). +After this, the user can log in without giving the password. +RSA authentication is much +more secure than rhosts authentication. +.Pp +The most convenient way to use RSA authentication may be with an +authentication agent. +See +.Xr ssh-agent 1 +for more information. +.Pp +If other authentication methods fail, +.Nm +prompts the user for a password. +The password is sent to the remote +host for checking; however, since all communications are encrypted, +the password cannot be seen by someone listening on the network. +.Pp +.Ss SSH protocol version 2 +.Pp +When a user connects using the protocol version 2 +different authentication methods are available. +Using the default values for +.Cm PreferredAuthentications , +the client will try to authenticate first using the hostbased method; +if this method fails public key authentication is attempted, +and finally if this method fails keyboard-interactive and +password authentication are tried. +.Pp +The public key method is similar to RSA authentication described +in the previous section and allows the RSA or DSA algorithm to be used: +The client uses his private key, +.Pa $HOME/.ssh/id_dsa +or +.Pa $HOME/.ssh/id_rsa , +to sign the session identifier and sends the result to the server. +The server checks whether the matching public key is listed in +.Pa $HOME/.ssh/authorized_keys +and grants access if both the key is found and the signature is correct. +The session identifier is derived from a shared Diffie-Hellman value +and is only known to the client and the server. +.Pp +If public key authentication fails or is not available a password +can be sent encrypted to the remote host for proving the user's identity. +.Pp +Additionally, +.Nm +supports hostbased or challenge response authentication. +.Pp +Protocol 2 provides additional mechanisms for confidentiality +(the traffic is encrypted using 3DES, Blowfish, CAST128 or Arcfour) +and integrity (hmac-md5, hmac-sha1). +Note that protocol 1 lacks a strong mechanism for ensuring the +integrity of the connection. +.Pp +.Ss Login session and remote execution +.Pp +When the user's identity has been accepted by the server, the server +either executes the given command, or logs into the machine and gives +the user a normal shell on the remote machine. +All communication with +the remote command or shell will be automatically encrypted. +.Pp +If a pseudo-terminal has been allocated (normal login session), the +user may use the escape characters noted below. +.Pp +If no pseudo tty has been allocated, the +session is transparent and can be used to reliably transfer binary +data. +On most systems, setting the escape character to +.Dq none +will also make the session transparent even if a tty is used. +.Pp +The session terminates when the command or shell on the remote +machine exits and all X11 and TCP/IP connections have been closed. +The exit status of the remote program is returned as the exit status +of +.Nm ssh . +.Pp +.Ss Escape Characters +.Pp +When a pseudo terminal has been requested, ssh supports a number of functions +through the use of an escape character. +.Pp +A single tilde character can be sent as +.Ic ~~ +or by following the tilde by a character other than those described below. +The escape character must always follow a newline to be interpreted as +special. +The escape character can be changed in configuration files using the +.Cm EscapeChar +configuration directive or on the command line by the +.Fl e +option. +.Pp +The supported escapes (assuming the default +.Ql ~ ) +are: +.Bl -tag -width Ds +.It Cm ~. +Disconnect +.It Cm ~^Z +Background ssh +.It Cm ~# +List forwarded connections +.It Cm ~& +Background ssh at logout when waiting for forwarded connection / X11 sessions +to terminate +.It Cm ~? +Display a list of escape characters +.It Cm ~R +Request rekeying of the connection (only useful for SSH protocol version 2 +and if the peer supports it) +.El +.Pp +.Ss X11 and TCP forwarding +.Pp +If the +.Cm ForwardX11 +variable is set to +.Dq yes +(or, see the description of the +.Fl X +and +.Fl x +options described later) +and the user is using X11 (the +.Ev DISPLAY +environment variable is set), the connection to the X11 display is +automatically forwarded to the remote side in such a way that any X11 +programs started from the shell (or command) will go through the +encrypted channel, and the connection to the real X server will be made +from the local machine. +The user should not manually set +.Ev DISPLAY . +Forwarding of X11 connections can be +configured on the command line or in configuration files. +.Pp +The +.Ev DISPLAY +value set by +.Nm +will point to the server machine, but with a display number greater +than zero. +This is normal, and happens because +.Nm +creates a +.Dq proxy +X server on the server machine for forwarding the +connections over the encrypted channel. +.Pp +.Nm +will also automatically set up Xauthority data on the server machine. +For this purpose, it will generate a random authorization cookie, +store it in Xauthority on the server, and verify that any forwarded +connections carry this cookie and replace it by the real cookie when +the connection is opened. +The real authentication cookie is never +sent to the server machine (and no cookies are sent in the plain). +.Pp +If the user is using an authentication agent, the connection to the agent +is automatically forwarded to the remote side unless disabled on +the command line or in a configuration file. +.Pp +Forwarding of arbitrary TCP/IP connections over the secure channel can +be specified either on the command line or in a configuration file. +One possible application of TCP/IP forwarding is a secure connection to an +electronic purse; another is going through firewalls. +.Pp +.Ss Server authentication +.Pp +.Nm +automatically maintains and checks a database containing +identifications for all hosts it has ever been used with. +Host keys are stored in +.Pa $HOME/.ssh/known_hosts +in the user's home directory. +Additionally, the file +.Pa /etc/ssh_known_hosts +is automatically checked for known hosts. +Any new hosts are automatically added to the user's file. +If a host's identification +ever changes, +.Nm +warns about this and disables password authentication to prevent a +trojan horse from getting the user's password. +Another purpose of +this mechanism is to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks which could +otherwise be used to circumvent the encryption. +The +.Cm StrictHostKeyChecking +option (see below) can be used to prevent logins to machines whose +host key is not known or has changed. +.Pp +The options are as follows: +.Bl -tag -width Ds +.It Fl a +Disables forwarding of the authentication agent connection. +.It Fl A +Enables forwarding of the authentication agent connection. +This can also be specified on a per-host basis in a configuration file. +.It Fl b Ar bind_address +Specify the interface to transmit from on machines with multiple +interfaces or aliased addresses. +.It Fl c Ar blowfish|3des|des +Selects the cipher to use for encrypting the session. +.Ar 3des +is used by default. +It is believed to be secure. +.Ar 3des +(triple-des) is an encrypt-decrypt-encrypt triple with three different keys. +.Ar blowfish +is a fast block cipher, it appears very secure and is much faster than +.Ar 3des . +.Ar des +is only supported in the +.Nm +client for interoperability with legacy protocol 1 implementations +that do not support the +.Ar 3des +cipher. Its use is strongly discouraged due to cryptographic +weaknesses. +.It Fl c Ar cipher_spec +Additionally, for protocol version 2 a comma-separated list of ciphers can +be specified in order of preference. +See +.Cm Ciphers +for more information. +.It Fl e Ar ch|^ch|none +Sets the escape character for sessions with a pty (default: +.Ql ~ ) . +The escape character is only recognized at the beginning of a line. +The escape character followed by a dot +.Pq Ql \&. +closes the connection, followed +by control-Z suspends the connection, and followed by itself sends the +escape character once. +Setting the character to +.Dq none +disables any escapes and makes the session fully transparent. +.It Fl f +Requests +.Nm +to go to background just before command execution. +This is useful if +.Nm +is going to ask for passwords or passphrases, but the user +wants it in the background. +This implies +.Fl n . +The recommended way to start X11 programs at a remote site is with +something like +.Ic ssh -f host xterm . +.It Fl g +Allows remote hosts to connect to local forwarded ports. +.It Fl i Ar identity_file +Selects the file from which the identity (private key) for +RSA or DSA authentication is read. +Default is +.Pa $HOME/.ssh/identity +in the user's home directory. +Identity files may also be specified on +a per-host basis in the configuration file. +It is possible to have multiple +.Fl i +options (and multiple identities specified in +configuration files). +.It Fl I Ar smartcard_device +Specifies which smartcard device to use. The argument is +the device +.Nm +should use to communicate with a smartcard used for storing the user's +private RSA key. +.It Fl k +Disables forwarding of Kerberos tickets and AFS tokens. +This may also be specified on a per-host basis in the configuration file. +.It Fl l Ar login_name +Specifies the user to log in as on the remote machine. +This also may be specified on a per-host basis in the configuration file. +.It Fl m Ar mac_spec +Additionally, for protocol version 2 a comma-separated list of MAC +(message authentication code) algorithms can +be specified in order of preference. +See the +.Cm MACs +keyword for more information. +.It Fl n +Redirects stdin from +.Pa /dev/null +(actually, prevents reading from stdin). +This must be used when +.Nm +is run in the background. +A common trick is to use this to run X11 programs on a remote machine. +For example, +.Ic ssh -n shadows.cs.hut.fi emacs & +will start an emacs on shadows.cs.hut.fi, and the X11 +connection will be automatically forwarded over an encrypted channel. +The +.Nm +program will be put in the background. +(This does not work if +.Nm +needs to ask for a password or passphrase; see also the +.Fl f +option.) +.It Fl N +Do not execute a remote command. +This is useful for just forwarding ports +(protocol version 2 only). +.It Fl o Ar option +Can be used to give options in the format used in the configuration file. +This is useful for specifying options for which there is no separate +command-line flag. +.It Fl p Ar port +Port to connect to on the remote host. +This can be specified on a +per-host basis in the configuration file. +.It Fl P +Use a non-privileged port for outgoing connections. +This can be used if a firewall does +not permit connections from privileged ports. +Note that this option turns off +.Cm RhostsAuthentication +and +.Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication +for older servers. +.It Fl q +Quiet mode. +Causes all warning and diagnostic messages to be suppressed. +Only fatal errors are displayed. +.It Fl s +May be used to request invocation of a subsystem on the remote system. Subsystems are a feature of the SSH2 protocol which facilitate the use +of SSH as a secure transport for other applications (eg. sftp). The +subsystem is specified as the remote command. +.It Fl t +Force pseudo-tty allocation. +This can be used to execute arbitrary +screen-based programs on a remote machine, which can be very useful, +e.g., when implementing menu services. +Multiple +.Fl t +options force tty allocation, even if +.Nm +has no local tty. +.It Fl T +Disable pseudo-tty allocation. +.It Fl v +Verbose mode. +Causes +.Nm +to print debugging messages about its progress. +This is helpful in +debugging connection, authentication, and configuration problems. +Multiple +.Fl v +options increases the verbosity. +Maximum is 3. +.It Fl x +Disables X11 forwarding. +.It Fl X +Enables X11 forwarding. +This can also be specified on a per-host basis in a configuration file. +.It Fl C +Requests compression of all data (including stdin, stdout, stderr, and +data for forwarded X11 and TCP/IP connections). +The compression algorithm is the same used by +.Xr gzip 1 , +and the +.Dq level +can be controlled by the +.Cm CompressionLevel +option (see below). +Compression is desirable on modem lines and other +slow connections, but will only slow down things on fast networks. +The default value can be set on a host-by-host basis in the +configuration files; see the +.Cm Compression +option below. +.It Fl F Ar configfile +Specifies an alternative per-user configuration file. +If a configuration file is given on the command line, +the system-wide configuration file +.Pq Pa /etc/ssh_config +will be ignored. +The default for the per-user configuration file is +.Pa $HOME/.ssh/config . +.It Fl L Ar port:host:hostport +Specifies that the given port on the local (client) host is to be +forwarded to the given host and port on the remote side. +This works by allocating a socket to listen to +.Ar port +on the local side, and whenever a connection is made to this port, the +connection is forwarded over the secure channel, and a connection is +made to +.Ar host +port +.Ar hostport +from the remote machine. +Port forwardings can also be specified in the configuration file. +Only root can forward privileged ports. +IPv6 addresses can be specified with an alternative syntax: +.Ar port/host/hostport +.It Fl R Ar port:host:hostport +Specifies that the given port on the remote (server) host is to be +forwarded to the given host and port on the local side. +This works by allocating a socket to listen to +.Ar port +on the remote side, and whenever a connection is made to this port, the +connection is forwarded over the secure channel, and a connection is +made to +.Ar host +port +.Ar hostport +from the local machine. +Port forwardings can also be specified in the configuration file. +Privileged ports can be forwarded only when +logging in as root on the remote machine. +IPv6 addresses can be specified with an alternative syntax: +.Ar port/host/hostport +.It Fl D Ar port +Specifies a local +.Dq dynamic +application-level port forwarding. +This works by allocating a socket to listen to +.Ar port +on the local side, and whenever a connection is made to this port, the +connection is forwarded over the secure channel, and the application +protocol is then used to determine where to connect to from the +remote machine. Currently the SOCKS4 protocol is supported, and +.Nm +will act as a SOCKS4 server. +Only root can forward privileged ports. +Dynamic port forwardings can also be specified in the configuration file. +.It Fl 1 +Forces +.Nm +to try protocol version 1 only. +.It Fl 2 +Forces +.Nm +to try protocol version 2 only. +.It Fl 4 +Forces +.Nm +to use IPv4 addresses only. +.It Fl 6 +Forces +.Nm +to use IPv6 addresses only. +.El +.Sh CONFIGURATION FILES +.Nm +obtains configuration data from the following sources in +the following order: +command line options, user's configuration file +.Pq Pa $HOME/.ssh/config , +and system-wide configuration file +.Pq Pa /etc/ssh_config . +For each parameter, the first obtained value +will be used. +The configuration files contain sections bracketed by +.Dq Host +specifications, and that section is only applied for hosts that +match one of the patterns given in the specification. +The matched host name is the one given on the command line. +.Pp +Since the first obtained value for each parameter is used, more +host-specific declarations should be given near the beginning of the +file, and general defaults at the end. +.Pp +The configuration file has the following format: +.Pp +Empty lines and lines starting with +.Ql # +are comments. +.Pp +Otherwise a line is of the format +.Dq keyword arguments . +Configuration options may be separated by whitespace or +optional whitespace and exactly one +.Ql = ; +the latter format is useful to avoid the need to quote whitespace +when specifying configuration options using the +.Nm ssh , +.Nm scp +and +.Nm sftp +.Fl o +option. +.Pp +The possible +keywords and their meanings are as follows (note that +keywords are case-insensitive and arguments are case-sensitive): +.Bl -tag -width Ds +.It Cm Host +Restricts the following declarations (up to the next +.Cm Host +keyword) to be only for those hosts that match one of the patterns +given after the keyword. +.Ql \&* +and +.Ql ? +can be used as wildcards in the +patterns. +A single +.Ql \&* +as a pattern can be used to provide global +defaults for all hosts. +The host is the +.Ar hostname +argument given on the command line (i.e., the name is not converted to +a canonicalized host name before matching). +.It Cm AFSTokenPassing +Specifies whether to pass AFS tokens to remote host. +The argument to this keyword must be +.Dq yes +or +.Dq no . +This option applies to protocol version 1 only. +.It Cm BatchMode +If set to +.Dq yes , +passphrase/password querying will be disabled. +This option is useful in scripts and other batch jobs where no user +is present to supply the password. +The argument must be +.Dq yes +or +.Dq no . +The default is +.Dq no . +.It Cm BindAddress +Specify the interface to transmit from on machines with multiple +interfaces or aliased addresses. +Note that this option does not work if +.Cm UsePrivilegedPort +is set to +.Dq yes . +.It Cm CheckHostIP +If this flag is set to +.Dq yes , +ssh will additionally check the host IP address in the +.Pa known_hosts +file. +This allows ssh to detect if a host key changed due to DNS spoofing. +If the option is set to +.Dq no , +the check will not be executed. +The default is +.Dq yes . +.It Cm Cipher +Specifies the cipher to use for encrypting the session +in protocol version 1. +Currently, +.Dq blowfish , +.Dq 3des , +and +.Dq des +are supported. +.Ar des +is only supported in the +.Nm +client for interoperability with legacy protocol 1 implementations +that do not support the +.Ar 3des +cipher. Its use is strongly discouraged due to cryptographic +weaknesses. +The default is +.Dq 3des . +.It Cm Ciphers +Specifies the ciphers allowed for protocol version 2 +in order of preference. +Multiple ciphers must be comma-separated. +The default is +.Pp +.Bd -literal + ``aes128-cbc,3des-cbc,blowfish-cbc,cast128-cbc,arcfour, + aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc'' +.Ed +.It Cm ClearAllForwardings +Specifies that all local, remote and dynamic port forwardings +specified in the configuration files or on the command line be +cleared. This option is primarily useful when used from the +.Nm +command line to clear port forwardings set in +configuration files, and is automatically set by +.Xr scp 1 +and +.Xr sftp 1 . +The argument must be +.Dq yes +or +.Dq no . +The default is +.Dq no . +.It Cm Compression +Specifies whether to use compression. +The argument must be +.Dq yes +or +.Dq no . +The default is +.Dq no . +.It Cm CompressionLevel +Specifies the compression level to use if compression is enabled. +The argument must be an integer from 1 (fast) to 9 (slow, best). +The default level is 6, which is good for most applications. +The meaning of the values is the same as in +.Xr gzip 1 . +Note that this option applies to protocol version 1 only. +.It Cm ConnectionAttempts +Specifies the number of tries (one per second) to make before falling +back to rsh or exiting. +The argument must be an integer. +This may be useful in scripts if the connection sometimes fails. +The default is 1. +.It Cm DynamicForward +Specifies that a TCP/IP port on the local machine be forwarded +over the secure channel, and the application +protocol is then used to determine where to connect to from the +remote machine. The argument must be a port number. +Currently the SOCKS4 protocol is supported, and +.Nm +will act as a SOCKS4 server. +Multiple forwardings may be specified, and +additional forwardings can be given on the command line. Only +the superuser can forward privileged ports. +.It Cm EscapeChar +Sets the escape character (default: +.Ql ~ ) . +The escape character can also +be set on the command line. +The argument should be a single character, +.Ql ^ +followed by a letter, or +.Dq none +to disable the escape +character entirely (making the connection transparent for binary +data). +.It Cm FallBackToRsh +Specifies that if connecting via +.Nm +fails due to a connection refused error (there is no +.Xr sshd 8 +listening on the remote host), +.Xr rsh 1 +should automatically be used instead (after a suitable warning about +the session being unencrypted). +The argument must be +.Dq yes +or +.Dq no . +The default is +.Dq no . +.It Cm ForwardAgent +Specifies whether the connection to the authentication agent (if any) +will be forwarded to the remote machine. +The argument must be +.Dq yes +or +.Dq no . +The default is +.Dq no . +.It Cm ForwardX11 +Specifies whether X11 connections will be automatically redirected +over the secure channel and +.Ev DISPLAY +set. +The argument must be +.Dq yes +or +.Dq no . +The default is +.Dq no . +.It Cm GatewayPorts +Specifies whether remote hosts are allowed to connect to local +forwarded ports. +By default, +.Nm +binds local port forwardings to the loopback addresss. This +prevents other remote hosts from connecting to forwarded ports. +.Cm GatewayPorts +can be used to specify that +.Nm +should bind local port forwardings to the wildcard address, +thus allowing remote hosts to connect to forwarded ports. +The argument must be +.Dq yes +or +.Dq no . +The default is +.Dq no . +.It Cm GlobalKnownHostsFile +Specifies a file to use for the global +host key database instead of +.Pa /etc/ssh_known_hosts . +.It Cm HostbasedAuthentication +Specifies whether to try rhosts based authentication with public key +authentication. +The argument must be +.Dq yes +or +.Dq no . +The default is +.Dq no . +This option applies to protocol version 2 only and +is similar to +.Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication . +.It Cm HostKeyAlgorithms +Specifies the protocol version 2 host key algorithms +that the client wants to use in order of preference. +The default for this option is: +.Dq ssh-rsa,ssh-dss +.It Cm HostKeyAlias +Specifies an alias that should be used instead of the +real host name when looking up or saving the host key +in the host key database files. +This option is useful for tunneling ssh connections +or for multiple servers running on a single host. +.It Cm HostName +Specifies the real host name to log into. +This can be used to specify nicknames or abbreviations for hosts. +Default is the name given on the command line. +Numeric IP addresses are also permitted (both on the command line and in +.Cm HostName +specifications). +.It Cm IdentityFile +Specifies the file from which the user's RSA or DSA authentication identity +is read (default +.Pa $HOME/.ssh/identity +in the user's home directory). +Additionally, any identities represented by the authentication agent +will be used for authentication. +The file name may use the tilde +syntax to refer to a user's home directory. +It is possible to have +multiple identity files specified in configuration files; all these +identities will be tried in sequence. +.It Cm KeepAlive +Specifies whether the system should send keepalive messages to the +other side. +If they are sent, death of the connection or crash of one +of the machines will be properly noticed. +However, this means that +connections will die if the route is down temporarily, and some people +find it annoying. +.Pp +The default is +.Dq yes +(to send keepalives), and the client will notice +if the network goes down or the remote host dies. +This is important in scripts, and many users want it too. +.Pp +To disable keepalives, the value should be set to +.Dq no +in both the server and the client configuration files. +.It Cm KerberosAuthentication +Specifies whether Kerberos authentication will be used. +The argument to this keyword must be +.Dq yes +or +.Dq no . +.It Cm KerberosTgtPassing +Specifies whether a Kerberos TGT will be forwarded to the server. +This will only work if the Kerberos server is actually an AFS kaserver. +The argument to this keyword must be +.Dq yes +or +.Dq no . +.It Cm LocalForward +Specifies that a TCP/IP port on the local machine be forwarded over +the secure channel to the specified host and port from the remote machine. +The first argument must be a port number, and the second must be +.Ar host:port . +IPv6 addresses can be specified with an alternative syntax: +.Ar host/port . +Multiple forwardings may be specified, and additional +forwardings can be given on the command line. +Only the superuser can forward privileged ports. +.It Cm LogLevel +Gives the verbosity level that is used when logging messages from +.Nm ssh . +The possible values are: +QUIET, FATAL, ERROR, INFO, VERBOSE and DEBUG. +The default is INFO. +.It Cm MACs +Specifies the MAC (message authentication code) algorithms +in order of preference. +The MAC algorithm is used in protocol version 2 +for data integrity protection. +Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated. +The default is +.Dq hmac-md5,hmac-sha1,hmac-ripemd160,hmac-sha1-96,hmac-md5-96 . +.It Cm NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost +This option can be used if the home directory is shared across machines. +In this case localhost will refer to a different machine on each of +the machines and the user will get many warnings about changed host keys. +However, this option disables host authentication for localhost. +The argument to this keyword must be +.Dq yes +or +.Dq no . +The default is to check the host key for localhost. +.It Cm NumberOfPasswordPrompts +Specifies the number of password prompts before giving up. +The argument to this keyword must be an integer. +Default is 3. +.It Cm PasswordAuthentication +Specifies whether to use password authentication. +The argument to this keyword must be +.Dq yes +or +.Dq no . +The default is +.Dq yes . +.It Cm Port +Specifies the port number to connect on the remote host. +Default is 22. +.It Cm PreferredAuthentications +Specifies the order in which the client should try protocol 2 +authentication methods. This allows a client to prefer one method (e.g. +.Cm keyboard-interactive ) +over another method (e.g. +.Cm password ) +The default for this option is: +.Dq hostbased,publickey,keyboard-interactive,password +.It Cm Protocol +Specifies the protocol versions +.Nm +should support in order of preference. +The possible values are +.Dq 1 +and +.Dq 2 . +Multiple versions must be comma-separated. +The default is +.Dq 2,1 . +This means that +.Nm +tries version 2 and falls back to version 1 +if version 2 is not available. +.It Cm ProxyCommand +Specifies the command to use to connect to the server. +The command +string extends to the end of the line, and is executed with +.Pa /bin/sh . +In the command string, +.Ql %h +will be substituted by the host name to +connect and +.Ql %p +by the port. +The command can be basically anything, +and should read from its standard input and write to its standard output. +It should eventually connect an +.Xr sshd 8 +server running on some machine, or execute +.Ic sshd -i +somewhere. +Host key management will be done using the +HostName of the host being connected (defaulting to the name typed by +the user). +Note that +.Cm CheckHostIP +is not available for connects with a proxy command. +.Pp +.It Cm PubkeyAuthentication +Specifies whether to try public key authentication. +The argument to this keyword must be +.Dq yes +or +.Dq no . +The default is +.Dq yes . +This option applies to protocol version 2 only. +.It Cm RemoteForward +Specifies that a TCP/IP port on the remote machine be forwarded over +the secure channel to the specified host and port from the local machine. +The first argument must be a port number, and the second must be +.Ar host:port . +IPv6 addresses can be specified with an alternative syntax: +.Ar host/port . +Multiple forwardings may be specified, and additional +forwardings can be given on the command line. +Only the superuser can forward privileged ports. +.It Cm RhostsAuthentication +Specifies whether to try rhosts based authentication. +Note that this +declaration only affects the client side and has no effect whatsoever +on security. +Disabling rhosts authentication may reduce +authentication time on slow connections when rhosts authentication is +not used. +Most servers do not permit RhostsAuthentication because it +is not secure (see +.Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication ) . +The argument to this keyword must be +.Dq yes +or +.Dq no . +The default is +.Dq yes . +This option applies to protocol version 1 only. +.It Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication +Specifies whether to try rhosts based authentication with RSA host +authentication. +The argument must be +.Dq yes +or +.Dq no . +The default is +.Dq yes . +This option applies to protocol version 1 only. +.It Cm RSAAuthentication +Specifies whether to try RSA authentication. +The argument to this keyword must be +.Dq yes +or +.Dq no . +RSA authentication will only be +attempted if the identity file exists, or an authentication agent is +running. +The default is +.Dq yes . +Note that this option applies to protocol version 1 only. +.It Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication +Specifies whether to use challenge response authentication. +The argument to this keyword must be +.Dq yes +or +.Dq no . +The default is +.Dq yes . +.It Cm SmartcardDevice +Specifies which smartcard device to use. The argument to this keyword is +the device +.Nm +should use to communicate with a smartcard used for storing the user's +private RSA key. By default, no device is specified and smartcard support +is not activated. +.It Cm StrictHostKeyChecking +If this flag is set to +.Dq yes , +.Nm +will never automatically add host keys to the +.Pa $HOME/.ssh/known_hosts +file, and refuses to connect to hosts whose host key has changed. +This provides maximum protection against trojan horse attacks, +however, can be annoying when the +.Pa /etc/ssh_known_hosts +file is poorly maintained, or connections to new hosts are +frequently made. +This option forces the user to manually +add all new hosts. +If this flag is set to +.Dq no , +.Nm +will automatically add new host keys to the +user known hosts files. +If this flag is set to +.Dq ask , +new host keys +will be added to the user known host files only after the user +has confirmed that is what they really want to do, and +.Nm +will refuse to connect to hosts whose host key has changed. +The host keys of +known hosts will be verified automatically in all cases. +The argument must be +.Dq yes , +.Dq no +or +.Dq ask . +The default is +.Dq ask . +.It Cm UsePrivilegedPort +Specifies whether to use a privileged port for outgoing connections. +The argument must be +.Dq yes +or +.Dq no . +The default is +.Dq no . +Note that this option must be set to +.Dq yes +if +.Cm RhostsAuthentication +and +.Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication +authentications are needed with older servers. +.It Cm User +Specifies the user to log in as. +This can be useful when a different user name is used on different machines. +This saves the trouble of +having to remember to give the user name on the command line. +.It Cm UserKnownHostsFile +Specifies a file to use for the user +host key database instead of +.Pa $HOME/.ssh/known_hosts . +.It Cm UseRsh +Specifies that rlogin/rsh should be used for this host. +It is possible that the host does not at all support the +.Nm +protocol. +This causes +.Nm +to immediately execute +.Xr rsh 1 . +All other options (except +.Cm HostName ) +are ignored if this has been specified. +The argument must be +.Dq yes +or +.Dq no . +.It Cm XAuthLocation +Specifies the location of the +.Xr xauth 1 +program. +The default is +.Pa /usr/X11R6/bin/xauth . +.El +.Sh ENVIRONMENT +.Nm +will normally set the following environment variables: +.Bl -tag -width Ds +.It Ev DISPLAY +The +.Ev DISPLAY +variable indicates the location of the X11 server. +It is automatically set by +.Nm +to point to a value of the form +.Dq hostname:n +where hostname indicates +the host where the shell runs, and n is an integer >= 1. +.Nm +uses this special value to forward X11 connections over the secure +channel. +The user should normally not set +.Ev DISPLAY +explicitly, as that +will render the X11 connection insecure (and will require the user to +manually copy any required authorization cookies). +.It Ev HOME +Set to the path of the user's home directory. +.It Ev LOGNAME +Synonym for +.Ev USER ; +set for compatibility with systems that use this variable. +.It Ev MAIL +Set to the path of the user's mailbox. +.It Ev PATH +Set to the default +.Ev PATH , +as specified when compiling +.Nm ssh . +.It Ev SSH_ASKPASS +If +.Nm +needs a passphrase, it will read the passphrase from the current +terminal if it was run from a terminal. +If +.Nm +does not have a terminal associated with it but +.Ev DISPLAY +and +.Ev SSH_ASKPASS +are set, it will execute the program specified by +.Ev SSH_ASKPASS +and open an X11 window to read the passphrase. +This is particularly useful when calling +.Nm +from a +.Pa .Xsession +or related script. +(Note that on some machines it +may be necessary to redirect the input from +.Pa /dev/null +to make this work.) +.It Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK +Identifies the path of a unix-domain socket used to communicate with the +agent. +.It Ev SSH_CLIENT +Identifies the client end of the connection. +The variable contains +three space-separated values: client ip-address, client port number, +and server port number. +.It Ev SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND +The variable contains the original command line if a forced command +is executed. +It can be used to extract the original arguments. +.It Ev SSH_TTY +This is set to the name of the tty (path to the device) associated +with the current shell or command. +If the current session has no tty, +this variable is not set. +.It Ev TZ +The timezone variable is set to indicate the present timezone if it +was set when the daemon was started (i.e., the daemon passes the value +on to new connections). +.It Ev USER +Set to the name of the user logging in. +.El +.Pp +Additionally, +.Nm +reads +.Pa $HOME/.ssh/environment , +and adds lines of the format +.Dq VARNAME=value +to the environment. +.Sh FILES +.Bl -tag -width Ds +.It Pa $HOME/.ssh/known_hosts +Records host keys for all hosts the user has logged into that are not +in +.Pa /etc/ssh_known_hosts . +See +.Xr sshd 8 . +.It Pa $HOME/.ssh/identity, $HOME/.ssh/id_dsa, $HOME/.ssh/id_rsa +Contains the authentication identity of the user. +They are for protocol 1 RSA, protocol 2 DSA, and protocol 2 RSA, respectively. +These files +contain sensitive data and should be readable by the user but not +accessible by others (read/write/execute). +Note that +.Nm +ignores a private key file if it is accessible by others. +It is possible to specify a passphrase when +generating the key; the passphrase will be used to encrypt the +sensitive part of this file using 3DES. +.It Pa $HOME/.ssh/identity.pub, $HOME/.ssh/id_dsa.pub, $HOME/.ssh/id_rsa.pub +Contains the public key for authentication (public part of the +identity file in human-readable form). +The contents of the +.Pa $HOME/.ssh/identity.pub +file should be added to +.Pa $HOME/.ssh/authorized_keys +on all machines +where the user wishes to log in using protocol version 1 RSA authentication. +The contents of the +.Pa $HOME/.ssh/id_dsa.pub +and +.Pa $HOME/.ssh/id_rsa.pub +file should be added to +.Pa $HOME/.ssh/authorized_keys +on all machines +where the user wishes to log in using protocol version 2 DSA/RSA authentication. +These files are not +sensitive and can (but need not) be readable by anyone. +These files are +never used automatically and are not necessary; they are only provided for +the convenience of the user. +.It Pa $HOME/.ssh/config +This is the per-user configuration file. +The format of this file is described above. +This file is used by the +.Nm +client. +This file does not usually contain any sensitive information, +but the recommended permissions are read/write for the user, and not +accessible by others. +.It Pa $HOME/.ssh/authorized_keys +Lists the public keys (RSA/DSA) that can be used for logging in as this user. +The format of this file is described in the +.Xr sshd 8 +manual page. +In the simplest form the format is the same as the .pub +identity files. +This file is not highly sensitive, but the recommended +permissions are read/write for the user, and not accessible by others. +.It Pa /etc/ssh_known_hosts +Systemwide list of known host keys. +This file should be prepared by the +system administrator to contain the public host keys of all machines in the +organization. +This file should be world-readable. +This file contains +public keys, one per line, in the following format (fields separated +by spaces): system name, public key and optional comment field. +When different names are used +for the same machine, all such names should be listed, separated by +commas. +The format is described on the +.Xr sshd 8 +manual page. +.Pp +The canonical system name (as returned by name servers) is used by +.Xr sshd 8 +to verify the client host when logging in; other names are needed because +.Nm +does not convert the user-supplied name to a canonical name before +checking the key, because someone with access to the name servers +would then be able to fool host authentication. +.It Pa /etc/ssh_config +Systemwide configuration file. +This file provides defaults for those +values that are not specified in the user's configuration file, and +for those users who do not have a configuration file. +This file must be world-readable. +.It Pa /etc/ssh_host_key, /etc/ssh_host_dsa_key, /etc/ssh_host_rsa_key +These three files contain the private parts of the host keys +and are used for +.Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication +and +.Cm HostbasedAuthentication . +Since they are readable only by root +.Nm +must be setuid root if these authentication methods are desired. +.It Pa $HOME/.rhosts +This file is used in +.Pa \&.rhosts +authentication to list the +host/user pairs that are permitted to log in. +(Note that this file is +also used by rlogin and rsh, which makes using this file insecure.) +Each line of the file contains a host name (in the canonical form +returned by name servers), and then a user name on that host, +separated by a space. +On some machines this file may need to be +world-readable if the user's home directory is on a NFS partition, +because +.Xr sshd 8 +reads it as root. +Additionally, this file must be owned by the user, +and must not have write permissions for anyone else. +The recommended +permission for most machines is read/write for the user, and not +accessible by others. +.Pp +Note that by default +.Xr sshd 8 +will be installed so that it requires successful RSA host +authentication before permitting \s+2.\s0rhosts authentication. +If the server machine does not have the client's host key in +.Pa /etc/ssh_known_hosts , +it can be stored in +.Pa $HOME/.ssh/known_hosts . +The easiest way to do this is to +connect back to the client from the server machine using ssh; this +will automatically add the host key to +.Pa $HOME/.ssh/known_hosts . +.It Pa $HOME/.shosts +This file is used exactly the same way as +.Pa \&.rhosts . +The purpose for +having this file is to be able to use rhosts authentication with +.Nm +without permitting login with +.Xr rlogin 1 +or +.Xr rsh 1 . +.It Pa /etc/hosts.equiv +This file is used during +.Pa \&.rhosts authentication. +It contains +canonical hosts names, one per line (the full format is described on +the +.Xr sshd 8 +manual page). +If the client host is found in this file, login is +automatically permitted provided client and server user names are the +same. +Additionally, successful RSA host authentication is normally +required. +This file should only be writable by root. +.It Pa /etc/shosts.equiv +This file is processed exactly as +.Pa /etc/hosts.equiv . +This file may be useful to permit logins using +.Nm +but not using rsh/rlogin. +.It Pa /etc/sshrc +Commands in this file are executed by +.Nm +when the user logs in just before the user's shell (or command) is started. +See the +.Xr sshd 8 +manual page for more information. +.It Pa $HOME/.ssh/rc +Commands in this file are executed by +.Nm +when the user logs in just before the user's shell (or command) is +started. +See the +.Xr sshd 8 +manual page for more information. +.It Pa $HOME/.ssh/environment +Contains additional definitions for environment variables, see section +.Sx ENVIRONMENT +above. +.El +.Sh AUTHORS +OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free +ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen. +Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, +Theo de Raadt and Dug Song +removed many bugs, re-added newer features and +created OpenSSH. +Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH +protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0. +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr rlogin 1 , +.Xr rsh 1 , +.Xr scp 1 , +.Xr sftp 1 , +.Xr ssh-add 1 , +.Xr ssh-agent 1 , +.Xr ssh-keygen 1 , +.Xr telnet 1 , +.Xr sshd 8 +.Rs +.%A T. Ylonen +.%A T. Kivinen +.%A M. Saarinen +.%A T. Rinne +.%A S. Lehtinen +.%T "SSH Protocol Architecture" +.%N draft-ietf-secsh-architecture-09.txt +.%D July 2001 +.%O work in progress material +.Re diff --git a/openssh/ssh.c b/openssh/ssh.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2984a59 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/ssh.c @@ -0,0 +1,1225 @@ +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * Ssh client program. This program can be used to log into a remote machine. + * The software supports strong authentication, encryption, and forwarding + * of X11, TCP/IP, and authentication connections. + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + * + * Copyright (c) 1999 Niels Provos. All rights reserved. + * + * Modified to work with SSL by Niels Provos + * in Canada (German citizen). + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" +RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.149 2001/10/24 08:51:35 markus Exp $"); + +#include +#include + +#include "ssh.h" +#include "ssh1.h" +#include "ssh2.h" +#include "compat.h" +#include "cipher.h" +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "packet.h" +#include "buffer.h" +#include "uidswap.h" +#include "channels.h" +#include "key.h" +#include "authfd.h" +#include "authfile.h" +#include "pathnames.h" +#include "clientloop.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "readconf.h" +#include "sshconnect.h" +#include "tildexpand.h" +#include "dispatch.h" +#include "misc.h" +#include "kex.h" +#include "mac.h" +#include "sshtty.h" + +#ifdef SMARTCARD +#include +#include "scard.h" +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE___PROGNAME +extern char *__progname; +#else +char *__progname; +#endif + +/* Flag indicating whether IPv4 or IPv6. This can be set on the command line. + Default value is AF_UNSPEC means both IPv4 and IPv6. */ +#ifdef IPV4_DEFAULT +int IPv4or6 = AF_INET; +#else +int IPv4or6 = AF_UNSPEC; +#endif + +/* Flag indicating whether debug mode is on. This can be set on the command line. */ +int debug_flag = 0; + +/* Flag indicating whether a tty should be allocated */ +int tty_flag = 0; +int no_tty_flag = 0; +int force_tty_flag = 0; + +/* don't exec a shell */ +int no_shell_flag = 0; + +/* + * Flag indicating that nothing should be read from stdin. This can be set + * on the command line. + */ +int stdin_null_flag = 0; + +/* + * Flag indicating that ssh should fork after authentication. This is useful + * so that the pasphrase can be entered manually, and then ssh goes to the + * background. + */ +int fork_after_authentication_flag = 0; + +/* + * General data structure for command line options and options configurable + * in configuration files. See readconf.h. + */ +Options options; + +/* optional user configfile */ +char *config = NULL; + +/* + * Name of the host we are connecting to. This is the name given on the + * command line, or the HostName specified for the user-supplied name in a + * configuration file. + */ +char *host; + +/* socket address the host resolves to */ +struct sockaddr_storage hostaddr; + +/* Private host keys. */ +struct { + Key **keys; + int nkeys; +} sensitive_data; + +/* Original real UID. */ +uid_t original_real_uid; + +/* command to be executed */ +Buffer command; + +/* Should we execute a command or invoke a subsystem? */ +int subsystem_flag = 0; + +/* Prints a help message to the user. This function never returns. */ + +static void +usage(void) +{ + fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s [options] host [command]\n", __progname); + fprintf(stderr, "Options:\n"); + fprintf(stderr, " -l user Log in using this user name.\n"); + fprintf(stderr, " -n Redirect input from " _PATH_DEVNULL ".\n"); + fprintf(stderr, " -F config Config file (default: ~/%s).\n", + _PATH_SSH_USER_CONFFILE); + fprintf(stderr, " -A Enable authentication agent forwarding.\n"); + fprintf(stderr, " -a Disable authentication agent forwarding (default).\n"); +#ifdef AFS + fprintf(stderr, " -k Disable Kerberos ticket and AFS token forwarding.\n"); +#endif /* AFS */ + fprintf(stderr, " -X Enable X11 connection forwarding.\n"); + fprintf(stderr, " -x Disable X11 connection forwarding (default).\n"); + fprintf(stderr, " -i file Identity for public key authentication " + "(default: ~/.ssh/identity)\n"); +#ifdef SMARTCARD + fprintf(stderr, " -I reader Set smartcard reader.\n"); +#endif + fprintf(stderr, " -t Tty; allocate a tty even if command is given.\n"); + fprintf(stderr, " -T Do not allocate a tty.\n"); + fprintf(stderr, " -v Verbose; display verbose debugging messages.\n"); + fprintf(stderr, " Multiple -v increases verbosity.\n"); + fprintf(stderr, " -V Display version number only.\n"); + fprintf(stderr, " -P Don't allocate a privileged port.\n"); + fprintf(stderr, " -q Quiet; don't display any warning messages.\n"); + fprintf(stderr, " -f Fork into background after authentication.\n"); + fprintf(stderr, " -e char Set escape character; ``none'' = disable (default: ~).\n"); + + fprintf(stderr, " -c cipher Select encryption algorithm\n"); + fprintf(stderr, " -m macs Specify MAC algorithms for protocol version 2.\n"); + fprintf(stderr, " -p port Connect to this port. Server must be on the same port.\n"); + fprintf(stderr, " -L listen-port:host:port Forward local port to remote address\n"); + fprintf(stderr, " -R listen-port:host:port Forward remote port to local address\n"); + fprintf(stderr, " These cause %s to listen for connections on a port, and\n", __progname); + fprintf(stderr, " forward them to the other side by connecting to host:port.\n"); + fprintf(stderr, " -D port Enable dynamic application-level port forwarding.\n"); + fprintf(stderr, " -C Enable compression.\n"); + fprintf(stderr, " -N Do not execute a shell or command.\n"); + fprintf(stderr, " -g Allow remote hosts to connect to forwarded ports.\n"); + fprintf(stderr, " -1 Force protocol version 1.\n"); + fprintf(stderr, " -2 Force protocol version 2.\n"); + fprintf(stderr, " -4 Use IPv4 only.\n"); + fprintf(stderr, " -6 Use IPv6 only.\n"); + fprintf(stderr, " -o 'option' Process the option as if it was read from a configuration file.\n"); + fprintf(stderr, " -s Invoke command (mandatory) as SSH2 subsystem.\n"); + fprintf(stderr, " -b addr Local IP address.\n"); + exit(1); +} + +/* + * Connects to the given host using rsh (or prints an error message and exits + * if rsh is not available). This function never returns. + */ +static void +rsh_connect(char *host, char *user, Buffer * command) +{ + char *args[10]; + int i; + + log("Using rsh. WARNING: Connection will not be encrypted."); + /* Build argument list for rsh. */ + i = 0; + args[i++] = _PATH_RSH; + /* host may have to come after user on some systems */ + args[i++] = host; + if (user) { + args[i++] = "-l"; + args[i++] = user; + } + if (buffer_len(command) > 0) { + buffer_append(command, "\0", 1); + args[i++] = buffer_ptr(command); + } + args[i++] = NULL; + if (debug_flag) { + for (i = 0; args[i]; i++) { + if (i != 0) + fprintf(stderr, " "); + fprintf(stderr, "%s", args[i]); + } + fprintf(stderr, "\n"); + } + execv(_PATH_RSH, args); + perror(_PATH_RSH); + exit(1); +} + +static int ssh_session(void); +static int ssh_session2(void); +static void load_public_identity_files(void); + +/* + * Main program for the ssh client. + */ +int +main(int ac, char **av) +{ + int i, opt, exit_status, cerr; + u_short fwd_port, fwd_host_port; + char sfwd_port[6], sfwd_host_port[6]; + char *p, *cp, buf[256]; + struct stat st; + struct passwd *pw; + int dummy; + uid_t original_effective_uid; + extern int optind, optreset; + extern char *optarg; + + __progname = get_progname(av[0]); + init_rng(); + + /* + * Save the original real uid. It will be needed later (uid-swapping + * may clobber the real uid). + */ + original_real_uid = getuid(); + original_effective_uid = geteuid(); + +#ifdef HAVE_SETRLIMIT + /* If we are installed setuid root be careful to not drop core. */ + if (original_real_uid != original_effective_uid) { + struct rlimit rlim; + rlim.rlim_cur = rlim.rlim_max = 0; + if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_CORE, &rlim) < 0) + fatal("setrlimit failed: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + } +#endif + /* Get user data. */ + pw = getpwuid(original_real_uid); + if (!pw) { + log("You don't exist, go away!"); + exit(1); + } + /* Take a copy of the returned structure. */ + pw = pwcopy(pw); + + /* + * Use uid-swapping to give up root privileges for the duration of + * option processing. We will re-instantiate the rights when we are + * ready to create the privileged port, and will permanently drop + * them when the port has been created (actually, when the connection + * has been made, as we may need to create the port several times). + */ + temporarily_use_uid(pw); + + /* + * Set our umask to something reasonable, as some files are created + * with the default umask. This will make them world-readable but + * writable only by the owner, which is ok for all files for which we + * don't set the modes explicitly. + */ + umask(022); + + /* Initialize option structure to indicate that no values have been set. */ + initialize_options(&options); + + /* Parse command-line arguments. */ + host = NULL; + +again: + while ((opt = getopt(ac, av, + "1246ab:c:e:fgi:kl:m:no:p:qstvxACD:F:I:L:NPR:TVX")) != -1) { + switch (opt) { + case '1': + options.protocol = SSH_PROTO_1; + break; + case '2': + options.protocol = SSH_PROTO_2; + break; + case '4': + IPv4or6 = AF_INET; + break; + case '6': + IPv4or6 = AF_INET6; + break; + case 'n': + stdin_null_flag = 1; + break; + case 'f': + fork_after_authentication_flag = 1; + stdin_null_flag = 1; + break; + case 'x': + options.forward_x11 = 0; + break; + case 'X': + options.forward_x11 = 1; + break; + case 'g': + options.gateway_ports = 1; + break; + case 'P': + options.use_privileged_port = 0; + break; + case 'a': + options.forward_agent = 0; + break; + case 'A': + options.forward_agent = 1; + break; +#ifdef AFS + case 'k': + options.kerberos_tgt_passing = 0; + options.afs_token_passing = 0; + break; +#endif + case 'i': + if (stat(optarg, &st) < 0) { + fprintf(stderr, "Warning: Identity file %s " + "does not exist.\n", optarg); + break; + } + if (options.num_identity_files >= + SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES) + fatal("Too many identity files specified " + "(max %d)", SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES); + options.identity_files[options.num_identity_files++] = + xstrdup(optarg); + break; + case 'I': +#ifdef SMARTCARD + options.smartcard_device = xstrdup(optarg); +#else + fprintf(stderr, "no support for smartcards.\n"); +#endif + break; + case 't': + if (tty_flag) + force_tty_flag = 1; + tty_flag = 1; + break; + case 'v': + if (0 == debug_flag) { + debug_flag = 1; + options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1; + } else if (options.log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3) { + options.log_level++; + break; + } else + fatal("Too high debugging level."); + /* fallthrough */ + case 'V': + fprintf(stderr, + "%s, SSH protocols %d.%d/%d.%d, OpenSSL 0x%8.8lx\n", + SSH_VERSION, + PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1, PROTOCOL_MINOR_1, + PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, + SSLeay()); + if (opt == 'V') + exit(0); + break; + case 'q': + options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET; + break; + case 'e': + if (optarg[0] == '^' && optarg[2] == 0 && + (u_char) optarg[1] >= 64 && + (u_char) optarg[1] < 128) + options.escape_char = (u_char) optarg[1] & 31; + else if (strlen(optarg) == 1) + options.escape_char = (u_char) optarg[0]; + else if (strcmp(optarg, "none") == 0) + options.escape_char = SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE; + else { + fprintf(stderr, "Bad escape character '%s'.\n", + optarg); + exit(1); + } + break; + case 'c': + if (ciphers_valid(optarg)) { + /* SSH2 only */ + options.ciphers = xstrdup(optarg); + options.cipher = SSH_CIPHER_ILLEGAL; + } else { + /* SSH1 only */ + options.cipher = cipher_number(optarg); + if (options.cipher == -1) { + fprintf(stderr, + "Unknown cipher type '%s'\n", + optarg); + exit(1); + } + if (options.cipher == SSH_CIPHER_3DES) + options.ciphers = "3des-cbc"; + else if (options.cipher == SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH) + options.ciphers = "blowfish-cbc"; + else + options.ciphers = (char *)-1; + } + break; + case 'm': + if (mac_valid(optarg)) + options.macs = xstrdup(optarg); + else { + fprintf(stderr, "Unknown mac type '%s'\n", + optarg); + exit(1); + } + break; + case 'p': + options.port = a2port(optarg); + if (options.port == 0) { + fprintf(stderr, "Bad port '%s'\n", optarg); + exit(1); + } + break; + case 'l': + options.user = optarg; + break; + + case 'L': + case 'R': + if (sscanf(optarg, "%5[0-9]:%255[^:]:%5[0-9]", + sfwd_port, buf, sfwd_host_port) != 3 && + sscanf(optarg, "%5[0-9]/%255[^/]/%5[0-9]", + sfwd_port, buf, sfwd_host_port) != 3) { + fprintf(stderr, + "Bad forwarding specification '%s'\n", + optarg); + usage(); + /* NOTREACHED */ + } + if ((fwd_port = a2port(sfwd_port)) == 0 || + (fwd_host_port = a2port(sfwd_host_port)) == 0) { + fprintf(stderr, + "Bad forwarding port(s) '%s'\n", optarg); + exit(1); + } + if (opt == 'L') + add_local_forward(&options, fwd_port, buf, + fwd_host_port); + else if (opt == 'R') + add_remote_forward(&options, fwd_port, buf, + fwd_host_port); + break; + + case 'D': + fwd_port = a2port(optarg); + if (fwd_port == 0) { + fprintf(stderr, "Bad dynamic port '%s'\n", + optarg); + exit(1); + } + add_local_forward(&options, fwd_port, "socks4", 0); + break; + + case 'C': + options.compression = 1; + break; + case 'N': + no_shell_flag = 1; + no_tty_flag = 1; + break; + case 'T': + no_tty_flag = 1; + break; + case 'o': + dummy = 1; + if (process_config_line(&options, host ? host : "", + optarg, "command-line", 0, &dummy) != 0) + exit(1); + break; + case 's': + subsystem_flag = 1; + break; + case 'b': + options.bind_address = optarg; + break; + case 'F': + config = optarg; + break; + default: + usage(); + } + } + + ac -= optind; + av += optind; + + if (ac > 0 && !host && **av != '-') { + if (strchr(*av, '@')) { + p = xstrdup(*av); + cp = strchr(p, '@'); + if (cp == NULL || cp == p) + usage(); + options.user = p; + *cp = '\0'; + host = ++cp; + } else + host = *av; + ac--, av++; + if (ac > 0) { + optind = 0; + optreset = 1; + goto again; + } + } + + /* Check that we got a host name. */ + if (!host) + usage(); + + SSLeay_add_all_algorithms(); + ERR_load_crypto_strings(); + channel_set_af(IPv4or6); + + /* Initialize the command to execute on remote host. */ + buffer_init(&command); + + /* + * Save the command to execute on the remote host in a buffer. There + * is no limit on the length of the command, except by the maximum + * packet size. Also sets the tty flag if there is no command. + */ + if (!ac) { + /* No command specified - execute shell on a tty. */ + tty_flag = 1; + if (subsystem_flag) { + fprintf(stderr, + "You must specify a subsystem to invoke.\n"); + usage(); + } + } else { + /* A command has been specified. Store it into the buffer. */ + for (i = 0; i < ac; i++) { + if (i) + buffer_append(&command, " ", 1); + buffer_append(&command, av[i], strlen(av[i])); + } + } + + /* Cannot fork to background if no command. */ + if (fork_after_authentication_flag && buffer_len(&command) == 0 && !no_shell_flag) + fatal("Cannot fork into background without a command to execute."); + + /* Allocate a tty by default if no command specified. */ + if (buffer_len(&command) == 0) + tty_flag = 1; + + /* Force no tty*/ + if (no_tty_flag) + tty_flag = 0; + /* Do not allocate a tty if stdin is not a tty. */ + if (!isatty(fileno(stdin)) && !force_tty_flag) { + if (tty_flag) + log("Pseudo-terminal will not be allocated because stdin is not a terminal."); + tty_flag = 0; + } + + /* + * Initialize "log" output. Since we are the client all output + * actually goes to stderr. + */ + log_init(av[0], options.log_level == -1 ? SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : options.log_level, + SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, 1); + + /* + * Read per-user configuration file. Ignore the system wide config + * file if the user specifies a config file on the command line. + */ + if (config != NULL) { + if (!read_config_file(config, host, &options)) + fatal("Can't open user config file %.100s: " + "%.100s", config, strerror(errno)); + } else { + snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.100s/%.100s", pw->pw_dir, + _PATH_SSH_USER_CONFFILE); + (void)read_config_file(buf, host, &options); + + /* Read systemwide configuration file after use config. */ + (void)read_config_file(_PATH_HOST_CONFIG_FILE, host, &options); + } + + /* Fill configuration defaults. */ + fill_default_options(&options); + + /* reinit */ + log_init(av[0], options.log_level, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, 1); + + seed_rng(); + + if (options.user == NULL) + options.user = xstrdup(pw->pw_name); + + if (options.hostname != NULL) + host = options.hostname; + + /* Disable rhosts authentication if not running as root. */ +#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN + /* Ignore uid if running under Windows */ + if (!options.use_privileged_port) { +#else + if (original_effective_uid != 0 || !options.use_privileged_port) { +#endif + debug("Rhosts Authentication disabled, " + "originating port will not be trusted."); + options.rhosts_authentication = 0; + } + /* + * If using rsh has been selected, exec it now (without trying + * anything else). Note that we must release privileges first. + */ + if (options.use_rsh) { + /* + * Restore our superuser privileges. This must be done + * before permanently setting the uid. + */ + restore_uid(); + + /* Switch to the original uid permanently. */ + permanently_set_uid(pw); + + /* Execute rsh. */ + rsh_connect(host, options.user, &command); + fatal("rsh_connect returned"); + } + /* Restore our superuser privileges. */ + restore_uid(); + + /* Open a connection to the remote host. */ + + cerr = ssh_connect(host, &hostaddr, options.port, IPv4or6, + options.connection_attempts, + original_effective_uid != 0 || !options.use_privileged_port, + pw, options.proxy_command); + + /* + * If we successfully made the connection, load the host private key + * in case we will need it later for combined rsa-rhosts + * authentication. This must be done before releasing extra + * privileges, because the file is only readable by root. + */ + sensitive_data.nkeys = 0; + sensitive_data.keys = NULL; + if (!cerr && (options.rhosts_rsa_authentication || + options.hostbased_authentication)) { + sensitive_data.nkeys = 3; + sensitive_data.keys = xmalloc(sensitive_data.nkeys*sizeof(Key)); + sensitive_data.keys[0] = key_load_private_type(KEY_RSA1, + _PATH_HOST_KEY_FILE, "", NULL); + sensitive_data.keys[1] = key_load_private_type(KEY_DSA, + _PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE, "", NULL); + sensitive_data.keys[2] = key_load_private_type(KEY_RSA, + _PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE, "", NULL); + } + /* + * Get rid of any extra privileges that we may have. We will no + * longer need them. Also, extra privileges could make it very hard + * to read identity files and other non-world-readable files from the + * user's home directory if it happens to be on a NFS volume where + * root is mapped to nobody. + */ + + /* + * Note that some legacy systems need to postpone the following call + * to permanently_set_uid() until the private hostkey is destroyed + * with RSA_free(). Otherwise the calling user could ptrace() the + * process, read the private hostkey and impersonate the host. + * OpenBSD does not allow ptracing of setuid processes. + */ + permanently_set_uid(pw); + + /* + * Now that we are back to our own permissions, create ~/.ssh + * directory if it doesn\'t already exist. + */ + snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.100s%s%.100s", pw->pw_dir, strcmp(pw->pw_dir, "/") ? "/" : "", _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR); + if (stat(buf, &st) < 0) + if (mkdir(buf, 0700) < 0) + error("Could not create directory '%.200s'.", buf); + + /* Check if the connection failed, and try "rsh" if appropriate. */ + if (cerr) { + if (!options.fallback_to_rsh) + exit(1); + if (options.port != 0) + log("Secure connection to %.100s on port %hu refused; " + "reverting to insecure method", + host, options.port); + else + log("Secure connection to %.100s refused; " + "reverting to insecure method.", host); + + rsh_connect(host, options.user, &command); + fatal("rsh_connect returned"); + } + /* load options.identity_files */ + load_public_identity_files(); + + /* Expand ~ in known host file names. */ + /* XXX mem-leaks: */ + options.system_hostfile = + tilde_expand_filename(options.system_hostfile, original_real_uid); + options.user_hostfile = + tilde_expand_filename(options.user_hostfile, original_real_uid); + options.system_hostfile2 = + tilde_expand_filename(options.system_hostfile2, original_real_uid); + options.user_hostfile2 = + tilde_expand_filename(options.user_hostfile2, original_real_uid); + + signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); /* ignore SIGPIPE early */ + + /* Log into the remote system. This never returns if the login fails. */ + ssh_login(sensitive_data.keys, sensitive_data.nkeys, + host, (struct sockaddr *)&hostaddr, pw); + + /* We no longer need the private host keys. Clear them now. */ + if (sensitive_data.nkeys != 0) { + for (i = 0; i < sensitive_data.nkeys; i++) { + if (sensitive_data.keys[i] != NULL) { + /* Destroys contents safely */ + debug3("clear hostkey %d", i); + key_free(sensitive_data.keys[i]); + sensitive_data.keys[i] = NULL; + } + } + xfree(sensitive_data.keys); + } + for (i = 0; i < options.num_identity_files; i++) { + if (options.identity_files[i]) { + xfree(options.identity_files[i]); + options.identity_files[i] = NULL; + } + if (options.identity_keys[i]) { + key_free(options.identity_keys[i]); + options.identity_keys[i] = NULL; + } + } + + exit_status = compat20 ? ssh_session2() : ssh_session(); + packet_close(); + return exit_status; +} + +static void +x11_get_proto(char *proto, int proto_len, char *data, int data_len) +{ + char line[512]; + FILE *f; + int got_data = 0, i; + + if (options.xauth_location) { + /* Try to get Xauthority information for the display. */ + snprintf(line, sizeof line, "%.100s list %.200s 2>" _PATH_DEVNULL, + options.xauth_location, getenv("DISPLAY")); + f = popen(line, "r"); + if (f && fgets(line, sizeof(line), f) && + sscanf(line, "%*s %s %s", proto, data) == 2) + got_data = 1; + if (f) + pclose(f); + } + /* + * If we didn't get authentication data, just make up some + * data. The forwarding code will check the validity of the + * response anyway, and substitute this data. The X11 + * server, however, will ignore this fake data and use + * whatever authentication mechanisms it was using otherwise + * for the local connection. + */ + if (!got_data) { + u_int32_t rand = 0; + + strlcpy(proto, "MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1", proto_len); + for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) { + if (i % 4 == 0) + rand = arc4random(); + snprintf(data + 2 * i, data_len - 2 * i, "%02x", rand & 0xff); + rand >>= 8; + } + } +} + +static void +ssh_init_forwarding(void) +{ + int success = 0; + int i; + + /* Initiate local TCP/IP port forwardings. */ + for (i = 0; i < options.num_local_forwards; i++) { + debug("Connections to local port %d forwarded to remote address %.200s:%d", + options.local_forwards[i].port, + options.local_forwards[i].host, + options.local_forwards[i].host_port); + success += channel_request_local_forwarding( + options.local_forwards[i].port, + options.local_forwards[i].host, + options.local_forwards[i].host_port, + options.gateway_ports); + } + if (i > 0 && success == 0) + error("Could not request local forwarding."); + + /* Initiate remote TCP/IP port forwardings. */ + for (i = 0; i < options.num_remote_forwards; i++) { + debug("Connections to remote port %d forwarded to local address %.200s:%d", + options.remote_forwards[i].port, + options.remote_forwards[i].host, + options.remote_forwards[i].host_port); + channel_request_remote_forwarding( + options.remote_forwards[i].port, + options.remote_forwards[i].host, + options.remote_forwards[i].host_port); + } +} + +static void +check_agent_present(void) +{ + if (options.forward_agent) { + /* Clear agent forwarding if we don\'t have an agent. */ + int authfd = ssh_get_authentication_socket(); + if (authfd < 0) + options.forward_agent = 0; + else + ssh_close_authentication_socket(authfd); + } +} + +static int +ssh_session(void) +{ + int type; + int plen; + int interactive = 0; + int have_tty = 0; + struct winsize ws; + char *cp; + + /* Enable compression if requested. */ + if (options.compression) { + debug("Requesting compression at level %d.", options.compression_level); + + if (options.compression_level < 1 || options.compression_level > 9) + fatal("Compression level must be from 1 (fast) to 9 (slow, best)."); + + /* Send the request. */ + packet_start(SSH_CMSG_REQUEST_COMPRESSION); + packet_put_int(options.compression_level); + packet_send(); + packet_write_wait(); + type = packet_read(&plen); + if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS) + packet_start_compression(options.compression_level); + else if (type == SSH_SMSG_FAILURE) + log("Warning: Remote host refused compression."); + else + packet_disconnect("Protocol error waiting for compression response."); + } + /* Allocate a pseudo tty if appropriate. */ + if (tty_flag) { + debug("Requesting pty."); + + /* Start the packet. */ + packet_start(SSH_CMSG_REQUEST_PTY); + + /* Store TERM in the packet. There is no limit on the + length of the string. */ + cp = getenv("TERM"); + if (!cp) + cp = ""; + packet_put_cstring(cp); + + /* Store window size in the packet. */ + if (ioctl(fileno(stdin), TIOCGWINSZ, &ws) < 0) + memset(&ws, 0, sizeof(ws)); + packet_put_int(ws.ws_row); + packet_put_int(ws.ws_col); + packet_put_int(ws.ws_xpixel); + packet_put_int(ws.ws_ypixel); + + /* Store tty modes in the packet. */ + tty_make_modes(fileno(stdin), NULL); + + /* Send the packet, and wait for it to leave. */ + packet_send(); + packet_write_wait(); + + /* Read response from the server. */ + type = packet_read(&plen); + if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS) { + interactive = 1; + have_tty = 1; + } else if (type == SSH_SMSG_FAILURE) + log("Warning: Remote host failed or refused to allocate a pseudo tty."); + else + packet_disconnect("Protocol error waiting for pty request response."); + } + /* Request X11 forwarding if enabled and DISPLAY is set. */ + if (options.forward_x11 && getenv("DISPLAY") != NULL) { + char proto[512], data[512]; + /* Get reasonable local authentication information. */ + x11_get_proto(proto, sizeof proto, data, sizeof data); + /* Request forwarding with authentication spoofing. */ + debug("Requesting X11 forwarding with authentication spoofing."); + x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(0, proto, data); + + /* Read response from the server. */ + type = packet_read(&plen); + if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS) { + interactive = 1; + } else if (type == SSH_SMSG_FAILURE) { + log("Warning: Remote host denied X11 forwarding."); + } else { + packet_disconnect("Protocol error waiting for X11 forwarding"); + } + } + /* Tell the packet module whether this is an interactive session. */ + packet_set_interactive(interactive); + + /* Request authentication agent forwarding if appropriate. */ + check_agent_present(); + + if (options.forward_agent) { + debug("Requesting authentication agent forwarding."); + auth_request_forwarding(); + + /* Read response from the server. */ + type = packet_read(&plen); + packet_integrity_check(plen, 0, type); + if (type != SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS) + log("Warning: Remote host denied authentication agent forwarding."); + } + + /* Initiate port forwardings. */ + ssh_init_forwarding(); + + /* If requested, let ssh continue in the background. */ + if (fork_after_authentication_flag) + if (daemon(1, 1) < 0) + fatal("daemon() failed: %.200s", strerror(errno)); + + /* + * If a command was specified on the command line, execute the + * command now. Otherwise request the server to start a shell. + */ + if (buffer_len(&command) > 0) { + int len = buffer_len(&command); + if (len > 900) + len = 900; + debug("Sending command: %.*s", len, buffer_ptr(&command)); + packet_start(SSH_CMSG_EXEC_CMD); + packet_put_string(buffer_ptr(&command), buffer_len(&command)); + packet_send(); + packet_write_wait(); + } else { + debug("Requesting shell."); + packet_start(SSH_CMSG_EXEC_SHELL); + packet_send(); + packet_write_wait(); + } + + /* Enter the interactive session. */ + return client_loop(have_tty, tty_flag ? + options.escape_char : SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE, 0); +} + +static void +client_subsystem_reply(int type, int plen, void *ctxt) +{ + int id, len; + + id = packet_get_int(); + len = buffer_len(&command); + if (len > 900) + len = 900; + packet_done(); + if (type == SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE) + fatal("Request for subsystem '%.*s' failed on channel %d", + len, buffer_ptr(&command), id); +} + +/* request pty/x11/agent/tcpfwd/shell for channel */ +static void +ssh_session2_setup(int id, void *arg) +{ + int len; + int interactive = 0; + struct termios tio; + + debug("ssh_session2_setup: id %d", id); + + if (tty_flag) { + struct winsize ws; + char *cp; + cp = getenv("TERM"); + if (!cp) + cp = ""; + /* Store window size in the packet. */ + if (ioctl(fileno(stdin), TIOCGWINSZ, &ws) < 0) + memset(&ws, 0, sizeof(ws)); + + channel_request_start(id, "pty-req", 0); + packet_put_cstring(cp); + packet_put_int(ws.ws_col); + packet_put_int(ws.ws_row); + packet_put_int(ws.ws_xpixel); + packet_put_int(ws.ws_ypixel); + tio = get_saved_tio(); + tty_make_modes(/*ignored*/ 0, &tio); + packet_send(); + interactive = 1; + /* XXX wait for reply */ + } + if (options.forward_x11 && + getenv("DISPLAY") != NULL) { + char proto[512], data[512]; + /* Get reasonable local authentication information. */ + x11_get_proto(proto, sizeof proto, data, sizeof data); + /* Request forwarding with authentication spoofing. */ + debug("Requesting X11 forwarding with authentication spoofing."); + x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(id, proto, data); + interactive = 1; + /* XXX wait for reply */ + } + + check_agent_present(); + if (options.forward_agent) { + debug("Requesting authentication agent forwarding."); + channel_request_start(id, "auth-agent-req@openssh.com", 0); + packet_send(); + } + + len = buffer_len(&command); + if (len > 0) { + if (len > 900) + len = 900; + if (subsystem_flag) { + debug("Sending subsystem: %.*s", len, buffer_ptr(&command)); + channel_request_start(id, "subsystem", /*want reply*/ 1); + /* register callback for reply */ + /* XXX we asume that client_loop has already been called */ + dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE, &client_subsystem_reply); + dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS, &client_subsystem_reply); + } else { + debug("Sending command: %.*s", len, buffer_ptr(&command)); + channel_request_start(id, "exec", 0); + } + packet_put_string(buffer_ptr(&command), buffer_len(&command)); + packet_send(); + } else { + channel_request(id, "shell", 0); + } + /* channel_callback(id, SSH2_MSG_OPEN_CONFIGMATION, client_init, 0); */ + + /* register different callback, etc. XXX */ + packet_set_interactive(interactive); +} + +/* open new channel for a session */ +static int +ssh_session2_open(void) +{ + Channel *c; + int window, packetmax, in, out, err; + + if (stdin_null_flag) { + in = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDONLY); + } else { + in = dup(STDIN_FILENO); + } + out = dup(STDOUT_FILENO); + err = dup(STDERR_FILENO); + + if (in < 0 || out < 0 || err < 0) + fatal("dup() in/out/err failed"); + + /* enable nonblocking unless tty */ + if (!isatty(in)) + set_nonblock(in); + if (!isatty(out)) + set_nonblock(out); + if (!isatty(err)) + set_nonblock(err); + + window = CHAN_SES_WINDOW_DEFAULT; + packetmax = CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT; + if (!tty_flag) { + window *= 2; + packetmax *=2; + } + c = channel_new( + "session", SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, in, out, err, + window, packetmax, CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE, + xstrdup("client-session"), /*nonblock*/0); + if (c == NULL) + fatal("ssh_session2_open: channel_new failed"); + + debug3("ssh_session2_open: channel_new: %d", c->self); + + channel_send_open(c->self); + if (!no_shell_flag) + channel_register_callback(c->self, + SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION, + ssh_session2_setup, (void *)0); + + return c->self; +} + +static int +ssh_session2(void) +{ + int id = -1; + + /* XXX should be pre-session */ + ssh_init_forwarding(); + + if (!no_shell_flag || (datafellows & SSH_BUG_DUMMYCHAN)) + id = ssh_session2_open(); + + /* If requested, let ssh continue in the background. */ + if (fork_after_authentication_flag) + if (daemon(1, 1) < 0) + fatal("daemon() failed: %.200s", strerror(errno)); + + return client_loop(tty_flag, tty_flag ? + options.escape_char : SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE, id); +} + +static void +load_public_identity_files(void) +{ + char *filename; + Key *public; + int i = 0; + +#ifdef SMARTCARD + if (options.smartcard_device != NULL && + options.num_identity_files + 1 < SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES && + (public = sc_get_key(options.smartcard_device)) != NULL ) { + Key *new; + + if (options.num_identity_files + 2 > SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES) + options.num_identity_files = SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES - 2; + memmove(&options.identity_files[2], &options.identity_files[0], + sizeof(char *) * options.num_identity_files); + options.num_identity_files += 2; + i = 2; + + /* XXX ssh1 vs ssh2 */ + new = key_new(KEY_RSA); + new->flags = KEY_FLAG_EXT; + BN_copy(new->rsa->n, public->rsa->n); + BN_copy(new->rsa->e, public->rsa->e); + RSA_set_method(new->rsa, sc_get_engine()); + options.identity_keys[0] = new; + options.identity_files[0] = xstrdup("smartcard rsa key");; + + new = key_new(KEY_RSA1); + new->flags = KEY_FLAG_EXT; + BN_copy(new->rsa->n, public->rsa->n); + BN_copy(new->rsa->e, public->rsa->e); + RSA_set_method(new->rsa, sc_get_engine()); + options.identity_keys[1] = new; + options.identity_files[1] = xstrdup("smartcard rsa1 key"); + + key_free(public); + } +#endif /* SMARTCARD */ + for (; i < options.num_identity_files; i++) { + filename = tilde_expand_filename(options.identity_files[i], + original_real_uid); + public = key_load_public(filename, NULL); + debug("identity file %s type %d", filename, + public ? public->type : -1); + xfree(options.identity_files[i]); + options.identity_files[i] = filename; + options.identity_keys[i] = public; + } +} diff --git a/openssh/ssh.h b/openssh/ssh.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..383c7fe --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/ssh.h @@ -0,0 +1,102 @@ +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + */ + +/* RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh.h,v 1.63 2001/05/24 18:57:53 stevesk Exp $"); */ + +#ifndef SSH_H +#define SSH_H + +#include /* For struct sockaddr_in */ +#include /* For struct pw */ +#include /* For va_list */ +#include /* For LOG_AUTH and friends */ +#include /* For struct sockaddr_storage */ +#include "openbsd-compat/fake-socket.h" /* For struct sockaddr_storage */ +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H +# include +#endif + +/* Cipher used for encrypting authentication files. */ +#define SSH_AUTHFILE_CIPHER SSH_CIPHER_3DES + +/* Default port number. */ +#define SSH_DEFAULT_PORT 22 + +/* Maximum number of TCP/IP ports forwarded per direction. */ +#define SSH_MAX_FORWARDS_PER_DIRECTION 100 + +/* + * Maximum number of RSA authentication identity files that can be specified + * in configuration files or on the command line. + */ +#define SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES 100 + +/* + * Major protocol version. Different version indicates major incompatiblity + * that prevents communication. + * + * Minor protocol version. Different version indicates minor incompatibility + * that does not prevent interoperation. + */ +#define PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1 1 +#define PROTOCOL_MINOR_1 5 + +/* We support both SSH1 and SSH2 */ +#define PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2 2 +#define PROTOCOL_MINOR_2 0 + +/* + * Name for the service. The port named by this service overrides the + * default port if present. + */ +#define SSH_SERVICE_NAME "ssh" + +#if defined(USE_PAM) && !defined(SSHD_PAM_SERVICE) +# define SSHD_PAM_SERVICE __progname +#endif + +/* + * Name of the environment variable containing the pathname of the + * authentication socket. + */ +#define SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME "SSH_AGENT_PID" + +/* + * Name of the environment variable containing the pathname of the + * authentication socket. + */ +#define SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME "SSH_AUTH_SOCK" + +/* + * Environment variable for overwriting the default location of askpass + */ +#define SSH_ASKPASS_ENV "SSH_ASKPASS" + +/* + * Force host key length and server key length to differ by at least this + * many bits. This is to make double encryption with rsaref work. + */ +#define SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED 128 + +/* + * Length of the session key in bytes. (Specified as 256 bits in the + * protocol.) + */ +#define SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH 32 + +/* Name of Kerberos service for SSH to use. */ +#define KRB4_SERVICE_NAME "rcmd" + +/* Used to identify ``EscapeChar none'' */ +#define SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE -2 + +#endif /* SSH_H */ diff --git a/openssh/ssh1.h b/openssh/ssh1.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..98d1dc9 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/ssh1.h @@ -0,0 +1,89 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh1.h,v 1.3 2001/05/30 12:55:13 markus Exp $ */ + +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + */ + +/* + * Definition of message types. New values can be added, but old values + * should not be removed or without careful consideration of the consequences + * for compatibility. The maximum value is 254; value 255 is reserved for + * future extension. + */ +/* Message name */ /* msg code */ /* arguments */ +#define SSH_MSG_NONE 0 /* no message */ +#define SSH_MSG_DISCONNECT 1 /* cause (string) */ +#define SSH_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY 2 /* ck,msk,srvk,hostk */ +#define SSH_CMSG_SESSION_KEY 3 /* key (BIGNUM) */ +#define SSH_CMSG_USER 4 /* user (string) */ +#define SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS 5 /* user (string) */ +#define SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA 6 /* modulus (BIGNUM) */ +#define SSH_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE 7 /* int (BIGNUM) */ +#define SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE 8 /* int (BIGNUM) */ +#define SSH_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD 9 /* pass (string) */ +#define SSH_CMSG_REQUEST_PTY 10 /* TERM, tty modes */ +#define SSH_CMSG_WINDOW_SIZE 11 /* row,col,xpix,ypix */ +#define SSH_CMSG_EXEC_SHELL 12 /* */ +#define SSH_CMSG_EXEC_CMD 13 /* cmd (string) */ +#define SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS 14 /* */ +#define SSH_SMSG_FAILURE 15 /* */ +#define SSH_CMSG_STDIN_DATA 16 /* data (string) */ +#define SSH_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA 17 /* data (string) */ +#define SSH_SMSG_STDERR_DATA 18 /* data (string) */ +#define SSH_CMSG_EOF 19 /* */ +#define SSH_SMSG_EXITSTATUS 20 /* status (int) */ +#define SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION 21 /* channel (int) */ +#define SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE 22 /* channel (int) */ +#define SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA 23 /* ch,data (int,str) */ +#define SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE 24 /* channel (int) */ +#define SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION 25 /* channel (int) */ +/* SSH_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING 26 OBSOLETE */ +#define SSH_SMSG_X11_OPEN 27 /* channel (int) */ +#define SSH_CMSG_PORT_FORWARD_REQUEST 28 /* p,host,hp (i,s,i) */ +#define SSH_MSG_PORT_OPEN 29 /* ch,h,p (i,s,i) */ +#define SSH_CMSG_AGENT_REQUEST_FORWARDING 30 /* */ +#define SSH_SMSG_AGENT_OPEN 31 /* port (int) */ +#define SSH_MSG_IGNORE 32 /* string */ +#define SSH_CMSG_EXIT_CONFIRMATION 33 /* */ +#define SSH_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING 34 /* proto,data (s,s) */ +#define SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA 35 /* user,mod (s,mpi) */ +#define SSH_MSG_DEBUG 36 /* string */ +#define SSH_CMSG_REQUEST_COMPRESSION 37 /* level 1-9 (int) */ +#define SSH_CMSG_MAX_PACKET_SIZE 38 /* size 4k-1024k (int) */ +#define SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS 39 /* we use this for s/key */ +#define SSH_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE 40 /* challenge (string) */ +#define SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE 41 /* response (string) */ +#define SSH_CMSG_AUTH_KERBEROS 42 /* (KTEXT) */ +#define SSH_SMSG_AUTH_KERBEROS_RESPONSE 43 /* (KTEXT) */ +#define SSH_CMSG_HAVE_KERBEROS_TGT 44 /* credentials (s) */ +#define SSH_CMSG_HAVE_AFS_TOKEN 65 /* token (s) */ + +/* protocol version 1.5 overloads some version 1.3 message types */ +#define SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_INPUT_EOF SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE +#define SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OUTPUT_CLOSE SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION + +/* + * Authentication methods. New types can be added, but old types should not + * be removed for compatibility. The maximum allowed value is 31. + */ +#define SSH_AUTH_RHOSTS 1 +#define SSH_AUTH_RSA 2 +#define SSH_AUTH_PASSWORD 3 +#define SSH_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA 4 +#define SSH_AUTH_TIS 5 +#define SSH_AUTH_KERBEROS 6 +#define SSH_PASS_KERBEROS_TGT 7 + /* 8 to 15 are reserved */ +#define SSH_PASS_AFS_TOKEN 21 + +/* Protocol flags. These are bit masks. */ +#define SSH_PROTOFLAG_SCREEN_NUMBER 1 /* X11 forwarding includes screen */ +#define SSH_PROTOFLAG_HOST_IN_FWD_OPEN 2 /* forwarding opens contain host */ diff --git a/openssh/ssh2.h b/openssh/ssh2.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e45aef2 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/ssh2.h @@ -0,0 +1,143 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* + * draft-ietf-secsh-architecture-05.txt + * + * Transport layer protocol: + * + * 1-19 Transport layer generic (e.g. disconnect, ignore, debug, + * etc) + * 20-29 Algorithm negotiation + * 30-49 Key exchange method specific (numbers can be reused for + * different authentication methods) + * + * User authentication protocol: + * + * 50-59 User authentication generic + * 60-79 User authentication method specific (numbers can be reused + * for different authentication methods) + * + * Connection protocol: + * + * 80-89 Connection protocol generic + * 90-127 Channel related messages + * + * Reserved for client protocols: + * + * 128-191 Reserved + * + * Local extensions: + * + * 192-255 Local extensions + */ +/* RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh2.h,v 1.6 2001/03/27 17:46:49 provos Exp $"); */ + +/* transport layer: generic */ + +#define SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT 1 +#define SSH2_MSG_IGNORE 2 +#define SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED 3 +#define SSH2_MSG_DEBUG 4 +#define SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST 5 +#define SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT 6 + +/* transport layer: alg negotiation */ + +#define SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT 20 +#define SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS 21 + +/* transport layer: kex specific messages, can be reused */ + +#define SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT 30 +#define SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY 31 + +/* dh-group-exchange */ +#define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST_OLD 30 +#define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP 31 +#define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT 32 +#define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY 33 +#define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST 34 + +/* user authentication: generic */ + +#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST 50 +#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE 51 +#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS 52 +#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER 53 + +/* user authentication: method specific, can be reused */ + +#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK 60 +#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ 60 +#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST 60 +#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE 61 + +/* connection protocol: generic */ + +#define SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST 80 +#define SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS 81 +#define SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE 82 + +/* channel related messages */ + +#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN 90 +#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION 91 +#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE 92 +#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST 93 +#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA 94 +#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA 95 +#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF 96 +#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE 97 +#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST 98 +#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS 99 +#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE 100 + +/* disconnect reason code */ + +#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_HOST_NOT_ALLOWED_TO_CONNECT 1 +#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR 2 +#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILED 3 +#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_HOST_AUTHENTICATION_FAILED 4 +#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_RESERVED 4 +#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_MAC_ERROR 5 +#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_COMPRESSION_ERROR 6 +#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_SERVICE_NOT_AVAILABLE 7 +#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NOT_SUPPORTED 8 +#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_HOST_KEY_NOT_VERIFIABLE 9 +#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_CONNECTION_LOST 10 +#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION 11 +#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_TOO_MANY_CONNECTIONS 12 +#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_AUTH_CANCELLED_BY_USER 13 +#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_NO_MORE_AUTH_METHODS_AVAILABLE 14 +#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_ILLEGAL_USER_NAME 15 + +/* misc */ + +#define SSH2_OPEN_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED 1 +#define SSH2_OPEN_CONNECT_FAILED 2 +#define SSH2_OPEN_UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_TYPE 3 +#define SSH2_OPEN_RESOURCE_SHORTAGE 4 + +#define SSH2_EXTENDED_DATA_STDERR 1 diff --git a/openssh/ssh_config b/openssh/ssh_config new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6209354 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/ssh_config @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +# $OpenBSD: ssh_config,v 1.10 2001/04/03 21:19:38 todd Exp $ + +# This is ssh client systemwide configuration file. See ssh(1) for more +# information. This file provides defaults for users, and the values can +# be changed in per-user configuration files or on the command line. + +# Configuration data is parsed as follows: +# 1. command line options +# 2. user-specific file +# 3. system-wide file +# Any configuration value is only changed the first time it is set. +# Thus, host-specific definitions should be at the beginning of the +# configuration file, and defaults at the end. + +# Site-wide defaults for various options + +# Host * +# ForwardAgent no +# ForwardX11 no +# RhostsAuthentication no +# RhostsRSAAuthentication yes +# RSAAuthentication yes +# PasswordAuthentication yes +# FallBackToRsh no +# UseRsh no +# BatchMode no +# CheckHostIP yes +# StrictHostKeyChecking yes +# IdentityFile ~/.ssh/identity +# IdentityFile ~/.ssh/id_dsa +# IdentityFile ~/.ssh/id_rsa +# Port 22 +# Protocol 2,1 +# Cipher blowfish +# EscapeChar ~ diff --git a/openssh/ssh_prng_cmds.in b/openssh/ssh_prng_cmds.in new file mode 100644 index 0000000..003e0e0 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/ssh_prng_cmds.in @@ -0,0 +1,75 @@ +# entropy gathering commands + +# Format is: "program-name args" path rate + +# The "rate" represents the number of bits of usuable entropy per +# byte of command output. Be conservative. +# +# $Id$ + +"ls -alni /var/log" @PROG_LS@ 0.02 +"ls -alni /var/adm" @PROG_LS@ 0.02 +"ls -alni /usr/adm" @PROG_LS@ 0.02 +"ls -alni /var/mail" @PROG_LS@ 0.02 +"ls -alni /usr/mail" @PROG_LS@ 0.02 +"ls -alni /var/adm/syslog" @PROG_LS@ 0.02 +"ls -alni /usr/adm/syslog" @PROG_LS@ 0.02 +"ls -alni /var/spool/mail" @PROG_LS@ 0.02 +"ls -alni /proc" @PROG_LS@ 0.02 +"ls -alni /tmp" @PROG_LS@ 0.02 +"ls -alni /var/tmp" @PROG_LS@ 0.02 +"ls -alni /usr/tmp" @PROG_LS@ 0.02 +"ls -alTi /var/log" @PROG_LS@ 0.02 +"ls -alTi /var/adm" @PROG_LS@ 0.02 +"ls -alTi /var/mail" @PROG_LS@ 0.02 +"ls -alTi /var/adm/syslog" @PROG_LS@ 0.02 +"ls -alTi /var/spool/mail" @PROG_LS@ 0.02 +"ls -alTi /proc" @PROG_LS@ 0.02 +"ls -alTi /tmp" @PROG_LS@ 0.02 +"ls -alTi /var/tmp" @PROG_LS@ 0.02 +"ls -alTi /usr/tmp" @PROG_LS@ 0.02 + +"netstat -an" @PROG_NETSTAT@ 0.05 +"netstat -in" @PROG_NETSTAT@ 0.05 +"netstat -rn" @PROG_NETSTAT@ 0.02 +"netstat -pn" @PROG_NETSTAT@ 0.02 +"netstat -ia" @PROG_NETSTAT@ 0.05 +"netstat -s" @PROG_NETSTAT@ 0.02 +"netstat -is" @PROG_NETSTAT@ 0.07 + +"arp -a -n" @PROG_ARP@ 0.02 + +"ifconfig -a" @PROG_IFCONFIG@ 0.02 + +"ps laxww" @PROG_PS@ 0.03 +"ps -al" @PROG_PS@ 0.03 +"ps -efl" @PROG_PS@ 0.03 +"jstat" @PROG_JSTAT@ 0.07 + +"w" @PROG_W@ 0.05 + +"who -i" @PROG_WHO@ 0.01 + +"last" @PROG_LAST@ 0.01 + +"lastlog" @PROG_LASTLOG@ 0.01 + +"df" @PROG_DF@ 0.01 +"df -i" @PROG_DF@ 0.01 + +"sar -d" @PROG_SAR@ 0.04 + +"vmstat" @PROG_VMSTAT@ 0.01 +"uptime" @PROG_UPTIME@ 0.01 + +"ipcs -a" @PROG_IPCS@ 0.01 + +"tail -200 /var/log/messages" @PROG_TAIL@ 0.01 +"tail -200 /var/log/syslog" @PROG_TAIL@ 0.01 +"tail -200 /var/adm/messages" @PROG_TAIL@ 0.01 +"tail -200 /var/adm/syslog" @PROG_TAIL@ 0.01 +"tail -200 /var/adm/syslog/syslog.log" @PROG_TAIL@ 0.01 +"tail -200 /var/log/maillog" @PROG_TAIL@ 0.01 +"tail -200 /var/adm/maillog" @PROG_TAIL@ 0.01 +"tail -200 /var/adm/syslog/mail.log" @PROG_TAIL@ 0.01 + diff --git a/openssh/sshconnect.c b/openssh/sshconnect.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..de6cc22 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/sshconnect.c @@ -0,0 +1,905 @@ +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * Code to connect to a remote host, and to perform the client side of the + * login (authentication) dialog. + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + */ + +#include "includes.h" +RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.115 2001/10/08 19:05:05 markus Exp $"); + +#include + +#include "ssh.h" +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "rsa.h" +#include "buffer.h" +#include "packet.h" +#include "uidswap.h" +#include "compat.h" +#include "key.h" +#include "sshconnect.h" +#include "hostfile.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "readconf.h" +#include "atomicio.h" +#include "misc.h" + +char *client_version_string = NULL; +char *server_version_string = NULL; + +extern Options options; +extern char *__progname; + +#ifndef INET6_ADDRSTRLEN /* for non IPv6 machines */ +#define INET6_ADDRSTRLEN 46 +#endif + +static const char * +sockaddr_ntop(struct sockaddr *sa) +{ + void *addr; + static char addrbuf[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN]; + + switch (sa->sa_family) { + case AF_INET: + addr = &((struct sockaddr_in *)sa)->sin_addr; + break; + case AF_INET6: + addr = &((struct sockaddr_in6 *)sa)->sin6_addr; + break; + default: + /* This case should be protected against elsewhere */ + abort(); + } + inet_ntop(sa->sa_family, addr, addrbuf, sizeof(addrbuf)); + return addrbuf; +} + +/* + * Connect to the given ssh server using a proxy command. + */ +static int +ssh_proxy_connect(const char *host, u_short port, struct passwd *pw, + const char *proxy_command) +{ + Buffer command; + const char *cp; + char *command_string; + int pin[2], pout[2]; + pid_t pid; + char strport[NI_MAXSERV]; + + /* Convert the port number into a string. */ + snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%hu", port); + + /* Build the final command string in the buffer by making the + appropriate substitutions to the given proxy command. */ + buffer_init(&command); + for (cp = proxy_command; *cp; cp++) { + if (cp[0] == '%' && cp[1] == '%') { + buffer_append(&command, "%", 1); + cp++; + continue; + } + if (cp[0] == '%' && cp[1] == 'h') { + buffer_append(&command, host, strlen(host)); + cp++; + continue; + } + if (cp[0] == '%' && cp[1] == 'p') { + buffer_append(&command, strport, strlen(strport)); + cp++; + continue; + } + buffer_append(&command, cp, 1); + } + buffer_append(&command, "\0", 1); + + /* Get the final command string. */ + command_string = buffer_ptr(&command); + + /* Create pipes for communicating with the proxy. */ + if (pipe(pin) < 0 || pipe(pout) < 0) + fatal("Could not create pipes to communicate with the proxy: %.100s", + strerror(errno)); + + debug("Executing proxy command: %.500s", command_string); + + /* Fork and execute the proxy command. */ + if ((pid = fork()) == 0) { + char *argv[10]; + + /* Child. Permanently give up superuser privileges. */ + permanently_set_uid(pw); + + /* Redirect stdin and stdout. */ + close(pin[1]); + if (pin[0] != 0) { + if (dup2(pin[0], 0) < 0) + perror("dup2 stdin"); + close(pin[0]); + } + close(pout[0]); + if (dup2(pout[1], 1) < 0) + perror("dup2 stdout"); + /* Cannot be 1 because pin allocated two descriptors. */ + close(pout[1]); + + /* Stderr is left as it is so that error messages get + printed on the user's terminal. */ + argv[0] = _PATH_BSHELL; + argv[1] = "-c"; + argv[2] = command_string; + argv[3] = NULL; + + /* Execute the proxy command. Note that we gave up any + extra privileges above. */ + execv(argv[0], argv); + perror(argv[0]); + exit(1); + } + /* Parent. */ + if (pid < 0) + fatal("fork failed: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + + /* Close child side of the descriptors. */ + close(pin[0]); + close(pout[1]); + + /* Free the command name. */ + buffer_free(&command); + + /* Set the connection file descriptors. */ + packet_set_connection(pout[0], pin[1]); + + /* Indicate OK return */ + return 0; +} + +/* + * Creates a (possibly privileged) socket for use as the ssh connection. + */ +static int +ssh_create_socket(struct passwd *pw, int privileged, int family) +{ + int sock, gaierr; + struct addrinfo hints, *res; + + /* + * If we are running as root and want to connect to a privileged + * port, bind our own socket to a privileged port. + */ + if (privileged) { + int p = IPPORT_RESERVED - 1; + sock = rresvport_af(&p, family); + if (sock < 0) + error("rresvport: af=%d %.100s", family, strerror(errno)); + else + debug("Allocated local port %d.", p); + return sock; + } + /* + * Just create an ordinary socket on arbitrary port. We use + * the user's uid to create the socket. + */ + temporarily_use_uid(pw); + sock = socket(family, SOCK_STREAM, 0); + if (sock < 0) + error("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + restore_uid(); + + /* Bind the socket to an alternative local IP address */ + if (options.bind_address == NULL) + return sock; + + memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); + hints.ai_family = family; + hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; + hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE; + gaierr = getaddrinfo(options.bind_address, "0", &hints, &res); + if (gaierr) { + error("getaddrinfo: %s: %s", options.bind_address, + gai_strerror(gaierr)); + close(sock); + return -1; + } + if (bind(sock, res->ai_addr, res->ai_addrlen) < 0) { + error("bind: %s: %s", options.bind_address, strerror(errno)); + close(sock); + freeaddrinfo(res); + return -1; + } + freeaddrinfo(res); + return sock; +} + +/* + * Opens a TCP/IP connection to the remote server on the given host. + * The address of the remote host will be returned in hostaddr. + * If port is 0, the default port will be used. If anonymous is zero, + * a privileged port will be allocated to make the connection. + * This requires super-user privileges if anonymous is false. + * Connection_attempts specifies the maximum number of tries (one per + * second). If proxy_command is non-NULL, it specifies the command (with %h + * and %p substituted for host and port, respectively) to use to contact + * the daemon. + * Return values: + * 0 for OK + * ECONNREFUSED if we got a "Connection Refused" by the peer on any address + * ECONNABORTED if we failed without a "Connection refused" + * Suitable error messages for the connection failure will already have been + * printed. + */ +int +ssh_connect(const char *host, struct sockaddr_storage * hostaddr, + u_short port, int family, int connection_attempts, + int anonymous, struct passwd *pw, const char *proxy_command) +{ + int gaierr; + int on = 1; + int sock = -1, attempt; + char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV]; + struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop; + struct linger linger; + struct servent *sp; + /* + * Did we get only other errors than "Connection refused" (which + * should block fallback to rsh and similar), or did we get at least + * one "Connection refused"? + */ + int full_failure = 1; + + debug("ssh_connect: getuid %u geteuid %u anon %d", + (u_int) getuid(), (u_int) geteuid(), anonymous); + + /* Get default port if port has not been set. */ + if (port == 0) { + sp = getservbyname(SSH_SERVICE_NAME, "tcp"); + if (sp) + port = ntohs(sp->s_port); + else + port = SSH_DEFAULT_PORT; + } + /* If a proxy command is given, connect using it. */ + if (proxy_command != NULL) + return ssh_proxy_connect(host, port, pw, proxy_command); + + /* No proxy command. */ + + memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); + hints.ai_family = family; + hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; + snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", port); + if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(host, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0) + fatal("%s: %.100s: %s", __progname, host, + gai_strerror(gaierr)); + + /* + * Try to connect several times. On some machines, the first time + * will sometimes fail. In general socket code appears to behave + * quite magically on many machines. + */ + for (attempt = 0; ;) { + if (attempt > 0) + debug("Trying again..."); + + /* Loop through addresses for this host, and try each one in + sequence until the connection succeeds. */ + for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) { + if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET && ai->ai_family != AF_INET6) + continue; + if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, + ntop, sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport), + NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV) != 0) { + error("ssh_connect: getnameinfo failed"); + continue; + } + debug("Connecting to %.200s [%.100s] port %s.", + host, ntop, strport); + + /* Create a socket for connecting. */ + sock = ssh_create_socket(pw, +#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN + !anonymous, +#else + !anonymous && geteuid() == 0, +#endif + ai->ai_family); + if (sock < 0) + /* Any error is already output */ + continue; + + /* Connect to the host. We use the user's uid in the + * hope that it will help with tcp_wrappers showing + * the remote uid as root. + */ + temporarily_use_uid(pw); + if (connect(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) >= 0) { + /* Successful connection. */ + memcpy(hostaddr, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen); + restore_uid(); + break; + } else { + if (errno == ECONNREFUSED) + full_failure = 0; + log("ssh: connect to address %s port %s: %s", + sockaddr_ntop(ai->ai_addr), strport, + strerror(errno)); + restore_uid(); + /* + * Close the failed socket; there appear to + * be some problems when reusing a socket for + * which connect() has already returned an + * error. + */ + shutdown(sock, SHUT_RDWR); + close(sock); + } + } + if (ai) + break; /* Successful connection. */ + + attempt++; + if (attempt >= connection_attempts) + break; + /* Sleep a moment before retrying. */ + sleep(1); + } + + freeaddrinfo(aitop); + + /* Return failure if we didn't get a successful connection. */ + if (attempt >= connection_attempts) + return full_failure ? ECONNABORTED : ECONNREFUSED; + + debug("Connection established."); + + /* + * Set socket options. We would like the socket to disappear as soon + * as it has been closed for whatever reason. + */ + /* setsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, (void *)&on, sizeof(on)); */ + linger.l_onoff = 1; + linger.l_linger = 5; + setsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_LINGER, (void *)&linger, sizeof(linger)); + + /* Set keepalives if requested. */ + if (options.keepalives && + setsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_KEEPALIVE, (void *)&on, + sizeof(on)) < 0) + error("setsockopt SO_KEEPALIVE: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + + /* Set the connection. */ + packet_set_connection(sock, sock); + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Waits for the server identification string, and sends our own + * identification string. + */ +static void +ssh_exchange_identification(void) +{ + char buf[256], remote_version[256]; /* must be same size! */ + int remote_major, remote_minor, i, mismatch; + int connection_in = packet_get_connection_in(); + int connection_out = packet_get_connection_out(); + int minor1 = PROTOCOL_MINOR_1; + + /* Read other side\'s version identification. */ + for (;;) { + for (i = 0; i < sizeof(buf) - 1; i++) { + int len = atomicio(read, connection_in, &buf[i], 1); + if (len < 0) + fatal("ssh_exchange_identification: read: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + if (len != 1) + fatal("ssh_exchange_identification: Connection closed by remote host"); + if (buf[i] == '\r') { + buf[i] = '\n'; + buf[i + 1] = 0; + continue; /**XXX wait for \n */ + } + if (buf[i] == '\n') { + buf[i + 1] = 0; + break; + } + } + buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = 0; + if (strncmp(buf, "SSH-", 4) == 0) + break; + debug("ssh_exchange_identification: %s", buf); + } + server_version_string = xstrdup(buf); + + /* + * Check that the versions match. In future this might accept + * several versions and set appropriate flags to handle them. + */ + if (sscanf(server_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%[^\n]\n", + &remote_major, &remote_minor, remote_version) != 3) + fatal("Bad remote protocol version identification: '%.100s'", buf); + debug("Remote protocol version %d.%d, remote software version %.100s", + remote_major, remote_minor, remote_version); + + compat_datafellows(remote_version); + mismatch = 0; + + switch(remote_major) { + case 1: + if (remote_minor == 99 && + (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) && + !(options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1_PREFERRED)) { + enable_compat20(); + break; + } + if (!(options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1)) { + mismatch = 1; + break; + } + if (remote_minor < 3) { + fatal("Remote machine has too old SSH software version."); + } else if (remote_minor == 3 || remote_minor == 4) { + /* We speak 1.3, too. */ + enable_compat13(); + minor1 = 3; + if (options.forward_agent) { + log("Agent forwarding disabled for protocol 1.3"); + options.forward_agent = 0; + } + } + break; + case 2: + if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) { + enable_compat20(); + break; + } + /* FALLTHROUGH */ + default: + mismatch = 1; + break; + } + if (mismatch) + fatal("Protocol major versions differ: %d vs. %d", + (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) ? PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2 : PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1, + remote_major); + /* Send our own protocol version identification. */ + snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s\n", + compat20 ? PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2 : PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1, + compat20 ? PROTOCOL_MINOR_2 : minor1, + SSH_VERSION); + if (atomicio(write, connection_out, buf, strlen(buf)) != strlen(buf)) + fatal("write: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + client_version_string = xstrdup(buf); + chop(client_version_string); + chop(server_version_string); + debug("Local version string %.100s", client_version_string); +} + +/* defaults to 'no' */ +static int +confirm(const char *prompt) +{ + char buf[1024]; + FILE *f; + int retval = -1; + + if (options.batch_mode) + return 0; + if (isatty(STDIN_FILENO)) + f = stdin; + else + f = fopen(_PATH_TTY, "rw"); + if (f == NULL) + return 0; + fflush(stdout); + fprintf(stderr, "%s", prompt); + while (1) { + if (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f) == NULL) { + fprintf(stderr, "\n"); + strlcpy(buf, "no", sizeof buf); + } + /* Remove newline from response. */ + if (strchr(buf, '\n')) + *strchr(buf, '\n') = 0; + if (strcmp(buf, "yes") == 0) + retval = 1; + else if (strcmp(buf, "no") == 0) + retval = 0; + else + fprintf(stderr, "Please type 'yes' or 'no': "); + + if (retval != -1) { + if (f != stdin) + fclose(f); + return retval; + } + } +} + +/* + * check whether the supplied host key is valid, return -1 if the key + * is not valid. the user_hostfile will not be updated if 'readonly' is true. + */ + +static int +check_host_key(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, Key *host_key, + int readonly, const char *user_hostfile, const char *system_hostfile) +{ + Key *file_key; + char *type = key_type(host_key); + char *ip = NULL; + char hostline[1000], *hostp, *fp; + HostStatus host_status; + HostStatus ip_status; + int local = 0, host_ip_differ = 0; + int salen; + char ntop[NI_MAXHOST]; + int host_line, ip_line; + const char *host_file = NULL, *ip_file = NULL; + + /* + * Force accepting of the host key for loopback/localhost. The + * problem is that if the home directory is NFS-mounted to multiple + * machines, localhost will refer to a different machine in each of + * them, and the user will get bogus HOST_CHANGED warnings. This + * essentially disables host authentication for localhost; however, + * this is probably not a real problem. + */ + /** hostaddr == 0! */ + switch (hostaddr->sa_family) { + case AF_INET: + local = (ntohl(((struct sockaddr_in *)hostaddr)-> + sin_addr.s_addr) >> 24) == IN_LOOPBACKNET; + salen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in); + break; + case AF_INET6: + local = IN6_IS_ADDR_LOOPBACK( + &(((struct sockaddr_in6 *)hostaddr)->sin6_addr)); + salen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6); + break; + default: + local = 0; + salen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage); + break; + } + if (options.no_host_authentication_for_localhost == 1 && local && + options.host_key_alias == NULL) { + debug("Forcing accepting of host key for " + "loopback/localhost."); + return 0; + } + + /* + * We don't have the remote ip-address for connections + * using a proxy command + */ + if (options.proxy_command == NULL) { + if (getnameinfo(hostaddr, salen, ntop, sizeof(ntop), + NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) != 0) + fatal("check_host_key: getnameinfo failed"); + ip = xstrdup(ntop); + } else { + ip = xstrdup(""); + } + /* + * Turn off check_host_ip if the connection is to localhost, via proxy + * command or if we don't have a hostname to compare with + */ + if (options.check_host_ip && + (local || strcmp(host, ip) == 0 || options.proxy_command != NULL)) + options.check_host_ip = 0; + + /* + * Allow the user to record the key under a different name. This is + * useful for ssh tunneling over forwarded connections or if you run + * multiple sshd's on different ports on the same machine. + */ + if (options.host_key_alias != NULL) { + host = options.host_key_alias; + debug("using hostkeyalias: %s", host); + } + + /* + * Store the host key from the known host file in here so that we can + * compare it with the key for the IP address. + */ + file_key = key_new(host_key->type); + + /* + * Check if the host key is present in the user\'s list of known + * hosts or in the systemwide list. + */ + host_file = user_hostfile; + host_status = check_host_in_hostfile(host_file, host, host_key, + file_key, &host_line); + if (host_status == HOST_NEW) { + host_file = system_hostfile; + host_status = check_host_in_hostfile(host_file, host, host_key, + file_key, &host_line); + } + /* + * Also perform check for the ip address, skip the check if we are + * localhost or the hostname was an ip address to begin with + */ + if (options.check_host_ip) { + Key *ip_key = key_new(host_key->type); + + ip_file = user_hostfile; + ip_status = check_host_in_hostfile(ip_file, ip, host_key, + ip_key, &ip_line); + if (ip_status == HOST_NEW) { + ip_file = system_hostfile; + ip_status = check_host_in_hostfile(ip_file, ip, + host_key, ip_key, &ip_line); + } + if (host_status == HOST_CHANGED && + (ip_status != HOST_CHANGED || !key_equal(ip_key, file_key))) + host_ip_differ = 1; + + key_free(ip_key); + } else + ip_status = host_status; + + key_free(file_key); + + switch (host_status) { + case HOST_OK: + /* The host is known and the key matches. */ + debug("Host '%.200s' is known and matches the %s host key.", + host, type); + debug("Found key in %s:%d", host_file, host_line); + if (options.check_host_ip && ip_status == HOST_NEW) { + if (readonly) + log("%s host key for IP address " + "'%.128s' not in list of known hosts.", + type, ip); + else if (!add_host_to_hostfile(user_hostfile, ip, + host_key)) + log("Failed to add the %s host key for IP " + "address '%.128s' to the list of known " + "hosts (%.30s).", type, ip, user_hostfile); + else + log("Warning: Permanently added the %s host " + "key for IP address '%.128s' to the list " + "of known hosts.", type, ip); + } + break; + case HOST_NEW: + if (readonly) + goto fail; + /* The host is new. */ + if (options.strict_host_key_checking == 1) { + /* + * User has requested strict host key checking. We + * will not add the host key automatically. The only + * alternative left is to abort. + */ + error("No %s host key is known for %.200s and you " + "have requested strict checking.", type, host); + goto fail; + } else if (options.strict_host_key_checking == 2) { + /* The default */ + char prompt[1024]; + fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); + snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), + "The authenticity of host '%.200s (%s)' can't be " + "established.\n" + "%s key fingerprint is %s.\n" + "Are you sure you want to continue connecting " + "(yes/no)? ", host, ip, type, fp); + xfree(fp); + if (!confirm(prompt)) { + goto fail; + } + } + if (options.check_host_ip && ip_status == HOST_NEW) { + snprintf(hostline, sizeof(hostline), "%s,%s", host, ip); + hostp = hostline; + } else + hostp = host; + + /* + * If not in strict mode, add the key automatically to the + * local known_hosts file. + */ + if (!add_host_to_hostfile(user_hostfile, hostp, host_key)) + log("Failed to add the host to the list of known " + "hosts (%.500s).", user_hostfile); + else + log("Warning: Permanently added '%.200s' (%s) to the " + "list of known hosts.", hostp, type); + break; + case HOST_CHANGED: + if (options.check_host_ip && host_ip_differ) { + char *msg; + if (ip_status == HOST_NEW) + msg = "is unknown"; + else if (ip_status == HOST_OK) + msg = "is unchanged"; + else + msg = "has a different value"; + error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@"); + error("@ WARNING: POSSIBLE DNS SPOOFING DETECTED! @"); + error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@"); + error("The %s host key for %s has changed,", type, host); + error("and the key for the according IP address %s", ip); + error("%s. This could either mean that", msg); + error("DNS SPOOFING is happening or the IP address for the host"); + error("and its host key have changed at the same time."); + if (ip_status != HOST_NEW) + error("Offending key for IP in %s:%d", ip_file, ip_line); + } + /* The host key has changed. */ + fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); + error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@"); + error("@ WARNING: REMOTE HOST IDENTIFICATION HAS CHANGED! @"); + error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@"); + error("IT IS POSSIBLE THAT SOMEONE IS DOING SOMETHING NASTY!"); + error("Someone could be eavesdropping on you right now (man-in-the-middle attack)!"); + error("It is also possible that the %s host key has just been changed.", type); + error("The fingerprint for the %s key sent by the remote host is\n%s.", + type, fp); + error("Please contact your system administrator."); + error("Add correct host key in %.100s to get rid of this message.", + user_hostfile); + error("Offending key in %s:%d", host_file, host_line); + xfree(fp); + + /* + * If strict host key checking is in use, the user will have + * to edit the key manually and we can only abort. + */ + if (options.strict_host_key_checking) { + error("%s host key for %.200s has changed and you have " + "requested strict checking.", type, host); + goto fail; + } + + /* + * If strict host key checking has not been requested, allow + * the connection but without password authentication or + * agent forwarding. + */ + if (options.password_authentication) { + error("Password authentication is disabled to avoid " + "man-in-the-middle attacks."); + options.password_authentication = 0; + } + if (options.forward_agent) { + error("Agent forwarding is disabled to avoid " + "man-in-the-middle attacks."); + options.forward_agent = 0; + } + if (options.forward_x11) { + error("X11 forwarding is disabled to avoid " + "man-in-the-middle attacks."); + options.forward_x11 = 0; + } + if (options.num_local_forwards > 0 || + options.num_remote_forwards > 0) { + error("Port forwarding is disabled to avoid " + "man-in-the-middle attacks."); + options.num_local_forwards = + options.num_remote_forwards = 0; + } + /* + * XXX Should permit the user to change to use the new id. + * This could be done by converting the host key to an + * identifying sentence, tell that the host identifies itself + * by that sentence, and ask the user if he/she whishes to + * accept the authentication. + */ + break; + } + + if (options.check_host_ip && host_status != HOST_CHANGED && + ip_status == HOST_CHANGED) { + log("Warning: the %s host key for '%.200s' " + "differs from the key for the IP address '%.128s'", + type, host, ip); + if (host_status == HOST_OK) + log("Matching host key in %s:%d", host_file, host_line); + log("Offending key for IP in %s:%d", ip_file, ip_line); + if (options.strict_host_key_checking == 1) { + error("Exiting, you have requested strict checking."); + goto fail; + } else if (options.strict_host_key_checking == 2) { + if (!confirm("Are you sure you want " + "to continue connecting (yes/no)? ")) { + goto fail; + } + } + } + + xfree(ip); + return 0; + +fail: + xfree(ip); + return -1; +} + +int +verify_host_key(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, Key *host_key) +{ + struct stat st; + + /* return ok if the key can be found in an old keyfile */ + if (stat(options.system_hostfile2, &st) == 0 || + stat(options.user_hostfile2, &st) == 0) { + if (check_host_key(host, hostaddr, host_key, /*readonly*/ 1, + options.user_hostfile2, options.system_hostfile2) == 0) + return 0; + } + return check_host_key(host, hostaddr, host_key, /*readonly*/ 0, + options.user_hostfile, options.system_hostfile); +} + +/* + * Starts a dialog with the server, and authenticates the current user on the + * server. This does not need any extra privileges. The basic connection + * to the server must already have been established before this is called. + * If login fails, this function prints an error and never returns. + * This function does not require super-user privileges. + */ +void +ssh_login(Key **keys, int nkeys, const char *orighost, + struct sockaddr *hostaddr, struct passwd *pw) +{ + char *host, *cp; + char *server_user, *local_user; + + local_user = xstrdup(pw->pw_name); + server_user = options.user ? options.user : local_user; + + /* Convert the user-supplied hostname into all lowercase. */ + host = xstrdup(orighost); + for (cp = host; *cp; cp++) + if (isupper(*cp)) + *cp = tolower(*cp); + + /* Exchange protocol version identification strings with the server. */ + ssh_exchange_identification(); + + /* Put the connection into non-blocking mode. */ + packet_set_nonblocking(); + + /* key exchange */ + /* authenticate user */ + if (compat20) { + ssh_kex2(host, hostaddr); + ssh_userauth2(local_user, server_user, host, keys, nkeys); + } else { + ssh_kex(host, hostaddr); + ssh_userauth1(local_user, server_user, host, keys, nkeys); + } +} + +void +ssh_put_password(char *password) +{ + int size; + char *padded; + + if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PASSWORDPAD) { + packet_put_cstring(password); + return; + } + size = roundup(strlen(password) + 1, 32); + padded = xmalloc(size); + memset(padded, 0, size); + strlcpy(padded, password, size); + packet_put_string(padded, size); + memset(padded, 0, size); + xfree(padded); +} diff --git a/openssh/sshconnect.h b/openssh/sshconnect.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b475add --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/sshconnect.h @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.h,v 1.13 2001/10/08 19:05:05 markus Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ +#ifndef SSHCONNECT_H +#define SSHCONNECT_H + +int +ssh_connect(const char *, struct sockaddr_storage *, u_short, int, int, + int, struct passwd *, const char *); + +void +ssh_login(Key **, int, const char *, struct sockaddr *, struct passwd *); + +int verify_host_key(char *, struct sockaddr *, Key *); + +void ssh_kex(char *, struct sockaddr *); +void ssh_kex2(char *, struct sockaddr *); + +void ssh_userauth1(const char *, const char *, char *, Key **, int); +void ssh_userauth2(const char *, const char *, char *, Key **, int); + +void ssh_put_password(char *); + +#endif diff --git a/openssh/sshconnect1.c b/openssh/sshconnect1.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d6b8623 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/sshconnect1.c @@ -0,0 +1,1276 @@ +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * Code to connect to a remote host, and to perform the client side of the + * login (authentication) dialog. + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + */ + +#include "includes.h" +RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshconnect1.c,v 1.41 2001/10/06 11:18:19 markus Exp $"); + +#include +#include + +#ifdef KRB4 +#include +#endif +#ifdef KRB5 +#include +#endif +#ifdef AFS +#include +#include "radix.h" +#endif + +#include "ssh.h" +#include "ssh1.h" +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "rsa.h" +#include "buffer.h" +#include "packet.h" +#include "mpaux.h" +#include "uidswap.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "readconf.h" +#include "key.h" +#include "authfd.h" +#include "sshconnect.h" +#include "authfile.h" +#include "readpass.h" +#include "cipher.h" +#include "canohost.h" +#include "auth.h" + +/* Session id for the current session. */ +u_char session_id[16]; +u_int supported_authentications = 0; + +extern Options options; +extern char *__progname; + +/* + * Checks if the user has an authentication agent, and if so, tries to + * authenticate using the agent. + */ +static int +try_agent_authentication(void) +{ + int type; + char *comment; + AuthenticationConnection *auth; + u_char response[16]; + u_int i; + int plen, clen; + Key *key; + BIGNUM *challenge; + + /* Get connection to the agent. */ + auth = ssh_get_authentication_connection(); + if (!auth) + return 0; + + challenge = BN_new(); + + /* Loop through identities served by the agent. */ + for (key = ssh_get_first_identity(auth, &comment, 1); + key != NULL; + key = ssh_get_next_identity(auth, &comment, 1)) { + + /* Try this identity. */ + debug("Trying RSA authentication via agent with '%.100s'", comment); + xfree(comment); + + /* Tell the server that we are willing to authenticate using this key. */ + packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA); + packet_put_bignum(key->rsa->n); + packet_send(); + packet_write_wait(); + + /* Wait for server's response. */ + type = packet_read(&plen); + + /* The server sends failure if it doesn\'t like our key or + does not support RSA authentication. */ + if (type == SSH_SMSG_FAILURE) { + debug("Server refused our key."); + key_free(key); + continue; + } + /* Otherwise it should have sent a challenge. */ + if (type != SSH_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE) + packet_disconnect("Protocol error during RSA authentication: %d", + type); + + packet_get_bignum(challenge, &clen); + + packet_integrity_check(plen, clen, type); + + debug("Received RSA challenge from server."); + + /* Ask the agent to decrypt the challenge. */ + if (!ssh_decrypt_challenge(auth, key, challenge, session_id, 1, response)) { + /* + * The agent failed to authenticate this identifier + * although it advertised it supports this. Just + * return a wrong value. + */ + log("Authentication agent failed to decrypt challenge."); + memset(response, 0, sizeof(response)); + } + key_free(key); + debug("Sending response to RSA challenge."); + + /* Send the decrypted challenge back to the server. */ + packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE); + for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) + packet_put_char(response[i]); + packet_send(); + packet_write_wait(); + + /* Wait for response from the server. */ + type = packet_read(&plen); + + /* The server returns success if it accepted the authentication. */ + if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS) { + ssh_close_authentication_connection(auth); + BN_clear_free(challenge); + debug("RSA authentication accepted by server."); + return 1; + } + /* Otherwise it should return failure. */ + if (type != SSH_SMSG_FAILURE) + packet_disconnect("Protocol error waiting RSA auth response: %d", + type); + } + ssh_close_authentication_connection(auth); + BN_clear_free(challenge); + debug("RSA authentication using agent refused."); + return 0; +} + +/* + * Computes the proper response to a RSA challenge, and sends the response to + * the server. + */ +static void +respond_to_rsa_challenge(BIGNUM * challenge, RSA * prv) +{ + u_char buf[32], response[16]; + MD5_CTX md; + int i, len; + + /* Decrypt the challenge using the private key. */ + /* XXX think about Bleichenbacher, too */ + if (rsa_private_decrypt(challenge, challenge, prv) <= 0) + packet_disconnect( + "respond_to_rsa_challenge: rsa_private_decrypt failed"); + + /* Compute the response. */ + /* The response is MD5 of decrypted challenge plus session id. */ + len = BN_num_bytes(challenge); + if (len <= 0 || len > sizeof(buf)) + packet_disconnect( + "respond_to_rsa_challenge: bad challenge length %d", len); + + memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); + BN_bn2bin(challenge, buf + sizeof(buf) - len); + MD5_Init(&md); + MD5_Update(&md, buf, 32); + MD5_Update(&md, session_id, 16); + MD5_Final(response, &md); + + debug("Sending response to host key RSA challenge."); + + /* Send the response back to the server. */ + packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE); + for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) + packet_put_char(response[i]); + packet_send(); + packet_write_wait(); + + memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); + memset(response, 0, sizeof(response)); + memset(&md, 0, sizeof(md)); +} + +/* + * Checks if the user has authentication file, and if so, tries to authenticate + * the user using it. + */ +static int +try_rsa_authentication(int idx) +{ + BIGNUM *challenge; + Key *public, *private; + char buf[300], *passphrase, *comment, *authfile; + int i, type, quit, plen, clen; + + public = options.identity_keys[idx]; + authfile = options.identity_files[idx]; + comment = xstrdup(authfile); + + debug("Trying RSA authentication with key '%.100s'", comment); + + /* Tell the server that we are willing to authenticate using this key. */ + packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA); + packet_put_bignum(public->rsa->n); + packet_send(); + packet_write_wait(); + + /* Wait for server's response. */ + type = packet_read(&plen); + + /* + * The server responds with failure if it doesn\'t like our key or + * doesn\'t support RSA authentication. + */ + if (type == SSH_SMSG_FAILURE) { + debug("Server refused our key."); + xfree(comment); + return 0; + } + /* Otherwise, the server should respond with a challenge. */ + if (type != SSH_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE) + packet_disconnect("Protocol error during RSA authentication: %d", type); + + /* Get the challenge from the packet. */ + challenge = BN_new(); + packet_get_bignum(challenge, &clen); + + packet_integrity_check(plen, clen, type); + + debug("Received RSA challenge from server."); + + /* + * If the key is not stored in external hardware, we have to + * load the private key. Try first with empty passphrase; if it + * fails, ask for a passphrase. + */ + if (public->flags && KEY_FLAG_EXT) + private = public; + else + private = key_load_private_type(KEY_RSA1, authfile, "", NULL); + if (private == NULL && !options.batch_mode) { + snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), + "Enter passphrase for RSA key '%.100s': ", comment); + for (i = 0; i < options.number_of_password_prompts; i++) { + passphrase = read_passphrase(buf, 0); + if (strcmp(passphrase, "") != 0) { + private = key_load_private_type(KEY_RSA1, + authfile, passphrase, NULL); + quit = 0; + } else { + debug2("no passphrase given, try next key"); + quit = 1; + } + memset(passphrase, 0, strlen(passphrase)); + xfree(passphrase); + if (private != NULL || quit) + break; + debug2("bad passphrase given, try again..."); + } + } + /* We no longer need the comment. */ + xfree(comment); + + if (private == NULL) { + if (!options.batch_mode) + error("Bad passphrase."); + + /* Send a dummy response packet to avoid protocol error. */ + packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE); + for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) + packet_put_char(0); + packet_send(); + packet_write_wait(); + + /* Expect the server to reject it... */ + packet_read_expect(&plen, SSH_SMSG_FAILURE); + BN_clear_free(challenge); + return 0; + } + + /* Compute and send a response to the challenge. */ + respond_to_rsa_challenge(challenge, private->rsa); + + /* Destroy the private key unless it in external hardware. */ + if (!(private->flags & KEY_FLAG_EXT)) + key_free(private); + + /* We no longer need the challenge. */ + BN_clear_free(challenge); + + /* Wait for response from the server. */ + type = packet_read(&plen); + if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS) { + debug("RSA authentication accepted by server."); + return 1; + } + if (type != SSH_SMSG_FAILURE) + packet_disconnect("Protocol error waiting RSA auth response: %d", type); + debug("RSA authentication refused."); + return 0; +} + +/* + * Tries to authenticate the user using combined rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv + * authentication and RSA host authentication. + */ +static int +try_rhosts_rsa_authentication(const char *local_user, Key * host_key) +{ + int type; + BIGNUM *challenge; + int plen, clen; + + debug("Trying rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv with RSA host authentication."); + + /* Tell the server that we are willing to authenticate using this key. */ + packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA); + packet_put_cstring(local_user); + packet_put_int(BN_num_bits(host_key->rsa->n)); + packet_put_bignum(host_key->rsa->e); + packet_put_bignum(host_key->rsa->n); + packet_send(); + packet_write_wait(); + + /* Wait for server's response. */ + type = packet_read(&plen); + + /* The server responds with failure if it doesn't admit our + .rhosts authentication or doesn't know our host key. */ + if (type == SSH_SMSG_FAILURE) { + debug("Server refused our rhosts authentication or host key."); + return 0; + } + /* Otherwise, the server should respond with a challenge. */ + if (type != SSH_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE) + packet_disconnect("Protocol error during RSA authentication: %d", type); + + /* Get the challenge from the packet. */ + challenge = BN_new(); + packet_get_bignum(challenge, &clen); + + packet_integrity_check(plen, clen, type); + + debug("Received RSA challenge for host key from server."); + + /* Compute a response to the challenge. */ + respond_to_rsa_challenge(challenge, host_key->rsa); + + /* We no longer need the challenge. */ + BN_clear_free(challenge); + + /* Wait for response from the server. */ + type = packet_read(&plen); + if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS) { + debug("Rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv with RSA host authentication accepted by server."); + return 1; + } + if (type != SSH_SMSG_FAILURE) + packet_disconnect("Protocol error waiting RSA auth response: %d", type); + debug("Rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv with RSA host authentication refused."); + return 0; +} + +#ifdef KRB4 +static int +try_krb4_authentication(void) +{ + KTEXT_ST auth; /* Kerberos data */ + char *reply; + char inst[INST_SZ]; + char *realm; + CREDENTIALS cred; + int r, type, plen; + socklen_t slen; + Key_schedule schedule; + u_long checksum, cksum; + MSG_DAT msg_data; + struct sockaddr_in local, foreign; + struct stat st; + + /* Don't do anything if we don't have any tickets. */ + if (stat(tkt_string(), &st) < 0) + return 0; + + strlcpy(inst, (char *)krb_get_phost(get_canonical_hostname(1)), + INST_SZ); + + realm = (char *)krb_realmofhost(get_canonical_hostname(1)); + if (!realm) { + debug("Kerberos v4: no realm for %s", get_canonical_hostname(1)); + return 0; + } + /* This can really be anything. */ + checksum = (u_long)getpid(); + + r = krb_mk_req(&auth, KRB4_SERVICE_NAME, inst, realm, checksum); + if (r != KSUCCESS) { + debug("Kerberos v4 krb_mk_req failed: %s", krb_err_txt[r]); + return 0; + } + /* Get session key to decrypt the server's reply with. */ + r = krb_get_cred(KRB4_SERVICE_NAME, inst, realm, &cred); + if (r != KSUCCESS) { + debug("get_cred failed: %s", krb_err_txt[r]); + return 0; + } + des_key_sched((des_cblock *) cred.session, schedule); + + /* Send authentication info to server. */ + packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_KERBEROS); + packet_put_string((char *) auth.dat, auth.length); + packet_send(); + packet_write_wait(); + + /* Zero the buffer. */ + (void) memset(auth.dat, 0, MAX_KTXT_LEN); + + slen = sizeof(local); + memset(&local, 0, sizeof(local)); + if (getsockname(packet_get_connection_in(), + (struct sockaddr *)&local, &slen) < 0) + debug("getsockname failed: %s", strerror(errno)); + + slen = sizeof(foreign); + memset(&foreign, 0, sizeof(foreign)); + if (getpeername(packet_get_connection_in(), + (struct sockaddr *)&foreign, &slen) < 0) { + debug("getpeername failed: %s", strerror(errno)); + fatal_cleanup(); + } + /* Get server reply. */ + type = packet_read(&plen); + switch (type) { + case SSH_SMSG_FAILURE: + /* Should really be SSH_SMSG_AUTH_KERBEROS_FAILURE */ + debug("Kerberos v4 authentication failed."); + return 0; + break; + + case SSH_SMSG_AUTH_KERBEROS_RESPONSE: + /* SSH_SMSG_AUTH_KERBEROS_SUCCESS */ + debug("Kerberos v4 authentication accepted."); + + /* Get server's response. */ + reply = packet_get_string((u_int *) &auth.length); + memcpy(auth.dat, reply, auth.length); + xfree(reply); + + packet_integrity_check(plen, 4 + auth.length, type); + + /* + * If his response isn't properly encrypted with the session + * key, and the decrypted checksum fails to match, he's + * bogus. Bail out. + */ + r = krb_rd_priv(auth.dat, auth.length, schedule, &cred.session, + &foreign, &local, &msg_data); + if (r != KSUCCESS) { + debug("Kerberos v4 krb_rd_priv failed: %s", + krb_err_txt[r]); + packet_disconnect("Kerberos v4 challenge failed!"); + } + /* Fetch the (incremented) checksum that we supplied in the request. */ + memcpy((char *)&cksum, (char *)msg_data.app_data, + sizeof(cksum)); + cksum = ntohl(cksum); + + /* If it matches, we're golden. */ + if (cksum == checksum + 1) { + debug("Kerberos v4 challenge successful."); + return 1; + } else + packet_disconnect("Kerberos v4 challenge failed!"); + break; + + default: + packet_disconnect("Protocol error on Kerberos v4 response: %d", type); + } + return 0; +} + +#endif /* KRB4 */ + +#ifdef KRB5 +static int +try_krb5_authentication(krb5_context *context, krb5_auth_context *auth_context) +{ + krb5_error_code problem; + const char *tkfile; + struct stat buf; + krb5_ccache ccache = NULL; + const char *remotehost; + krb5_data ap; + int type, payload_len; + krb5_ap_rep_enc_part *reply = NULL; + int ret; + + memset(&ap, 0, sizeof(ap)); + + problem = krb5_init_context(context); + if (problem) { + debug("Kerberos v5: krb5_init_context failed"); + ret = 0; + goto out; + } + + tkfile = krb5_cc_default_name(*context); + if (strncmp(tkfile, "FILE:", 5) == 0) + tkfile += 5; + + if (stat(tkfile, &buf) == 0 && getuid() != buf.st_uid) { + debug("Kerberos v5: could not get default ccache (permission denied)."); + ret = 0; + goto out; + } + + problem = krb5_cc_default(*context, &ccache); + if (problem) { + debug("Kerberos v5: krb5_cc_default failed: %s", + krb5_get_err_text(*context, problem)); + ret = 0; + goto out; + } + + remotehost = get_canonical_hostname(1); + + problem = krb5_mk_req(*context, auth_context, AP_OPTS_MUTUAL_REQUIRED, + "host", remotehost, NULL, ccache, &ap); + if (problem) { + debug("Kerberos v5: krb5_mk_req failed: %s", + krb5_get_err_text(*context, problem)); + ret = 0; + goto out; + } + + packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_KERBEROS); + packet_put_string((char *) ap.data, ap.length); + packet_send(); + packet_write_wait(); + + xfree(ap.data); + ap.length = 0; + + type = packet_read(&payload_len); + switch (type) { + case SSH_SMSG_FAILURE: + /* Should really be SSH_SMSG_AUTH_KERBEROS_FAILURE */ + debug("Kerberos v5 authentication failed."); + ret = 0; + break; + + case SSH_SMSG_AUTH_KERBEROS_RESPONSE: + /* SSH_SMSG_AUTH_KERBEROS_SUCCESS */ + debug("Kerberos v5 authentication accepted."); + + /* Get server's response. */ + ap.data = packet_get_string((unsigned int *) &ap.length); + + packet_integrity_check(payload_len, 4 + ap.length, type); + /* XXX je to dobre? */ + + problem = krb5_rd_rep(*context, *auth_context, &ap, &reply); + if (problem) { + ret = 0; + } + ret = 1; + break; + + default: + packet_disconnect("Protocol error on Kerberos v5 response: %d", + type); + ret = 0; + break; + + } + + out: + if (ccache != NULL) + krb5_cc_close(*context, ccache); + if (reply != NULL) + krb5_free_ap_rep_enc_part(*context, reply); + if (ap.length > 0) + krb5_data_free(&ap); + + return (ret); +} + +static void +send_krb5_tgt(krb5_context context, krb5_auth_context auth_context) +{ + int fd, type, payload_len; + krb5_error_code problem; + krb5_data outbuf; + krb5_ccache ccache = NULL; + krb5_creds creds; + krb5_kdc_flags flags; + const char *remotehost; + + memset(&creds, 0, sizeof(creds)); + memset(&outbuf, 0, sizeof(outbuf)); + + fd = packet_get_connection_in(); + + problem = krb5_auth_con_setaddrs_from_fd(context, auth_context, &fd); + if (problem) + goto out; + + problem = krb5_cc_default(context, &ccache); + if (problem) + goto out; + + problem = krb5_cc_get_principal(context, ccache, &creds.client); + if (problem) + goto out; + + problem = krb5_build_principal(context, &creds.server, + strlen(creds.client->realm), creds.client->realm, + "krbtgt", creds.client->realm, NULL); + if (problem) + goto out; + + creds.times.endtime = 0; + + flags.i = 0; + flags.b.forwarded = 1; + flags.b.forwardable = krb5_config_get_bool(context, NULL, + "libdefaults", "forwardable", NULL); + + remotehost = get_canonical_hostname(1); + + problem = krb5_get_forwarded_creds(context, auth_context, + ccache, flags.i, remotehost, &creds, &outbuf); + if (problem) + goto out; + + packet_start(SSH_CMSG_HAVE_KERBEROS_TGT); + packet_put_string((char *)outbuf.data, outbuf.length); + packet_send(); + packet_write_wait(); + + type = packet_read(&payload_len); + + if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS) { + char *pname; + + krb5_unparse_name(context, creds.client, &pname); + debug("Kerberos v5 TGT forwarded (%s).", pname); + xfree(pname); + } else + debug("Kerberos v5 TGT forwarding failed."); + + return; + + out: + if (problem) + debug("Kerberos v5 TGT forwarding failed: %s", + krb5_get_err_text(context, problem)); + if (creds.client) + krb5_free_principal(context, creds.client); + if (creds.server) + krb5_free_principal(context, creds.server); + if (ccache) + krb5_cc_close(context, ccache); + if (outbuf.data) + xfree(outbuf.data); +} +#endif /* KRB5 */ + +#ifdef AFS +static void +send_krb4_tgt(void) +{ + CREDENTIALS *creds; + struct stat st; + char buffer[4096], pname[ANAME_SZ], pinst[INST_SZ], prealm[REALM_SZ]; + int problem, type, len; + + /* Don't do anything if we don't have any tickets. */ + if (stat(tkt_string(), &st) < 0) + return; + + creds = xmalloc(sizeof(*creds)); + + problem = krb_get_tf_fullname(TKT_FILE, pname, pinst, prealm); + if (problem) + goto out; + + problem = krb_get_cred("krbtgt", prealm, prealm, creds); + if (problem) + goto out; + + if (time(0) > krb_life_to_time(creds->issue_date, creds->lifetime)) { + problem = RD_AP_EXP; + goto out; + } + creds_to_radix(creds, (u_char *)buffer, sizeof(buffer)); + + packet_start(SSH_CMSG_HAVE_KERBEROS_TGT); + packet_put_cstring(buffer); + packet_send(); + packet_write_wait(); + + type = packet_read(&len); + + if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS) + debug("Kerberos v4 TGT forwarded (%s%s%s@%s).", + creds->pname, creds->pinst[0] ? "." : "", + creds->pinst, creds->realm); + else + debug("Kerberos v4 TGT rejected."); + + xfree(creds); + return; + + out: + debug("Kerberos v4 TGT passing failed: %s", krb_err_txt[problem]); + xfree(creds); +} + +static void +send_afs_tokens(void) +{ + CREDENTIALS creds; + struct ViceIoctl parms; + struct ClearToken ct; + int i, type, len; + char buf[2048], *p, *server_cell; + char buffer[8192]; + + /* Move over ktc_GetToken, here's something leaner. */ + for (i = 0; i < 100; i++) { /* just in case */ + parms.in = (char *) &i; + parms.in_size = sizeof(i); + parms.out = buf; + parms.out_size = sizeof(buf); + if (k_pioctl(0, VIOCGETTOK, &parms, 0) != 0) + break; + p = buf; + + /* Get secret token. */ + memcpy(&creds.ticket_st.length, p, sizeof(u_int)); + if (creds.ticket_st.length > MAX_KTXT_LEN) + break; + p += sizeof(u_int); + memcpy(creds.ticket_st.dat, p, creds.ticket_st.length); + p += creds.ticket_st.length; + + /* Get clear token. */ + memcpy(&len, p, sizeof(len)); + if (len != sizeof(struct ClearToken)) + break; + p += sizeof(len); + memcpy(&ct, p, len); + p += len; + p += sizeof(len); /* primary flag */ + server_cell = p; + + /* Flesh out our credentials. */ + strlcpy(creds.service, "afs", sizeof(creds.service)); + creds.instance[0] = '\0'; + strlcpy(creds.realm, server_cell, REALM_SZ); + memcpy(creds.session, ct.HandShakeKey, DES_KEY_SZ); + creds.issue_date = ct.BeginTimestamp; + creds.lifetime = krb_time_to_life(creds.issue_date, + ct.EndTimestamp); + creds.kvno = ct.AuthHandle; + snprintf(creds.pname, sizeof(creds.pname), "AFS ID %d", ct.ViceId); + creds.pinst[0] = '\0'; + + /* Encode token, ship it off. */ + if (creds_to_radix(&creds, (u_char *)buffer, + sizeof(buffer)) <= 0) + break; + packet_start(SSH_CMSG_HAVE_AFS_TOKEN); + packet_put_cstring(buffer); + packet_send(); + packet_write_wait(); + + /* Roger, Roger. Clearance, Clarence. What's your vector, + Victor? */ + type = packet_read(&len); + + if (type == SSH_SMSG_FAILURE) + debug("AFS token for cell %s rejected.", server_cell); + else if (type != SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS) + packet_disconnect("Protocol error on AFS token response: %d", type); + } +} + +#endif /* AFS */ + +/* + * Tries to authenticate with any string-based challenge/response system. + * Note that the client code is not tied to s/key or TIS. + */ +static int +try_challenge_response_authentication(void) +{ + int type, i; + int payload_len; + u_int clen; + char prompt[1024]; + char *challenge, *response; + + debug("Doing challenge response authentication."); + + for (i = 0; i < options.number_of_password_prompts; i++) { + /* request a challenge */ + packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS); + packet_send(); + packet_write_wait(); + + type = packet_read(&payload_len); + if (type != SSH_SMSG_FAILURE && + type != SSH_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE) { + packet_disconnect("Protocol error: got %d in response " + "to SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS", type); + } + if (type != SSH_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE) { + debug("No challenge."); + return 0; + } + challenge = packet_get_string(&clen); + packet_integrity_check(payload_len, (4 + clen), type); + snprintf(prompt, sizeof prompt, "%s%s", challenge, + strchr(challenge, '\n') ? "" : "\nResponse: "); + xfree(challenge); + if (i != 0) + error("Permission denied, please try again."); + if (options.cipher == SSH_CIPHER_NONE) + log("WARNING: Encryption is disabled! " + "Reponse will be transmitted in clear text."); + response = read_passphrase(prompt, 0); + if (strcmp(response, "") == 0) { + xfree(response); + break; + } + packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE); + ssh_put_password(response); + memset(response, 0, strlen(response)); + xfree(response); + packet_send(); + packet_write_wait(); + type = packet_read(&payload_len); + if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS) + return 1; + if (type != SSH_SMSG_FAILURE) + packet_disconnect("Protocol error: got %d in response " + "to SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE", type); + } + /* failure */ + return 0; +} + +/* + * Tries to authenticate with plain passwd authentication. + */ +static int +try_password_authentication(char *prompt) +{ + int type, i, payload_len; + char *password; + + debug("Doing password authentication."); + if (options.cipher == SSH_CIPHER_NONE) + log("WARNING: Encryption is disabled! Password will be transmitted in clear text."); + for (i = 0; i < options.number_of_password_prompts; i++) { + if (i != 0) + error("Permission denied, please try again."); + password = read_passphrase(prompt, 0); + packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD); + ssh_put_password(password); + memset(password, 0, strlen(password)); + xfree(password); + packet_send(); + packet_write_wait(); + + type = packet_read(&payload_len); + if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS) + return 1; + if (type != SSH_SMSG_FAILURE) + packet_disconnect("Protocol error: got %d in response to passwd auth", type); + } + /* failure */ + return 0; +} + +/* + * SSH1 key exchange + */ +void +ssh_kex(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr) +{ + int i; + BIGNUM *key; + RSA *host_key; + RSA *public_key; + Key k; + int bits, rbits; + int ssh_cipher_default = SSH_CIPHER_3DES; + u_char session_key[SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH]; + u_char cookie[8]; + u_int supported_ciphers; + u_int server_flags, client_flags; + int payload_len, clen, sum_len = 0; + u_int32_t rand = 0; + + debug("Waiting for server public key."); + + /* Wait for a public key packet from the server. */ + packet_read_expect(&payload_len, SSH_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY); + + /* Get cookie from the packet. */ + for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) + cookie[i] = packet_get_char(); + + /* Get the public key. */ + public_key = RSA_new(); + bits = packet_get_int();/* bits */ + public_key->e = BN_new(); + packet_get_bignum(public_key->e, &clen); + sum_len += clen; + public_key->n = BN_new(); + packet_get_bignum(public_key->n, &clen); + sum_len += clen; + + rbits = BN_num_bits(public_key->n); + if (bits != rbits) { + log("Warning: Server lies about size of server public key: " + "actual size is %d bits vs. announced %d.", rbits, bits); + log("Warning: This may be due to an old implementation of ssh."); + } + /* Get the host key. */ + host_key = RSA_new(); + bits = packet_get_int();/* bits */ + host_key->e = BN_new(); + packet_get_bignum(host_key->e, &clen); + sum_len += clen; + host_key->n = BN_new(); + packet_get_bignum(host_key->n, &clen); + sum_len += clen; + + rbits = BN_num_bits(host_key->n); + if (bits != rbits) { + log("Warning: Server lies about size of server host key: " + "actual size is %d bits vs. announced %d.", rbits, bits); + log("Warning: This may be due to an old implementation of ssh."); + } + + /* Get protocol flags. */ + server_flags = packet_get_int(); + packet_set_protocol_flags(server_flags); + + supported_ciphers = packet_get_int(); + supported_authentications = packet_get_int(); + + debug("Received server public key (%d bits) and host key (%d bits).", + BN_num_bits(public_key->n), BN_num_bits(host_key->n)); + + packet_integrity_check(payload_len, + 8 + 4 + sum_len + 0 + 4 + 0 + 0 + 4 + 4 + 4, + SSH_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY); + k.type = KEY_RSA1; + k.rsa = host_key; + if (verify_host_key(host, hostaddr, &k) == -1) + fatal("Host key verification failed."); + + client_flags = SSH_PROTOFLAG_SCREEN_NUMBER | SSH_PROTOFLAG_HOST_IN_FWD_OPEN; + + compute_session_id(session_id, cookie, host_key->n, public_key->n); + + /* Generate a session key. */ + arc4random_stir(); + + /* + * Generate an encryption key for the session. The key is a 256 bit + * random number, interpreted as a 32-byte key, with the least + * significant 8 bits being the first byte of the key. + */ + for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) { + if (i % 4 == 0) + rand = arc4random(); + session_key[i] = rand & 0xff; + rand >>= 8; + } + + /* + * According to the protocol spec, the first byte of the session key + * is the highest byte of the integer. The session key is xored with + * the first 16 bytes of the session id. + */ + key = BN_new(); + BN_set_word(key, 0); + for (i = 0; i < SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH; i++) { + BN_lshift(key, key, 8); + if (i < 16) + BN_add_word(key, session_key[i] ^ session_id[i]); + else + BN_add_word(key, session_key[i]); + } + + /* + * Encrypt the integer using the public key and host key of the + * server (key with smaller modulus first). + */ + if (BN_cmp(public_key->n, host_key->n) < 0) { + /* Public key has smaller modulus. */ + if (BN_num_bits(host_key->n) < + BN_num_bits(public_key->n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) { + fatal("respond_to_rsa_challenge: host_key %d < public_key %d + " + "SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED %d", + BN_num_bits(host_key->n), + BN_num_bits(public_key->n), + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED); + } + rsa_public_encrypt(key, key, public_key); + rsa_public_encrypt(key, key, host_key); + } else { + /* Host key has smaller modulus (or they are equal). */ + if (BN_num_bits(public_key->n) < + BN_num_bits(host_key->n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) { + fatal("respond_to_rsa_challenge: public_key %d < host_key %d + " + "SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED %d", + BN_num_bits(public_key->n), + BN_num_bits(host_key->n), + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED); + } + rsa_public_encrypt(key, key, host_key); + rsa_public_encrypt(key, key, public_key); + } + + /* Destroy the public keys since we no longer need them. */ + RSA_free(public_key); + RSA_free(host_key); + + if (options.cipher == SSH_CIPHER_NOT_SET) { + if (cipher_mask_ssh1(1) & supported_ciphers & (1 << ssh_cipher_default)) + options.cipher = ssh_cipher_default; + } else if (options.cipher == SSH_CIPHER_ILLEGAL || + !(cipher_mask_ssh1(1) & (1 << options.cipher))) { + log("No valid SSH1 cipher, using %.100s instead.", + cipher_name(ssh_cipher_default)); + options.cipher = ssh_cipher_default; + } + /* Check that the selected cipher is supported. */ + if (!(supported_ciphers & (1 << options.cipher))) + fatal("Selected cipher type %.100s not supported by server.", + cipher_name(options.cipher)); + + debug("Encryption type: %.100s", cipher_name(options.cipher)); + + /* Send the encrypted session key to the server. */ + packet_start(SSH_CMSG_SESSION_KEY); + packet_put_char(options.cipher); + + /* Send the cookie back to the server. */ + for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) + packet_put_char(cookie[i]); + + /* Send and destroy the encrypted encryption key integer. */ + packet_put_bignum(key); + BN_clear_free(key); + + /* Send protocol flags. */ + packet_put_int(client_flags); + + /* Send the packet now. */ + packet_send(); + packet_write_wait(); + + debug("Sent encrypted session key."); + + /* Set the encryption key. */ + packet_set_encryption_key(session_key, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH, options.cipher); + + /* We will no longer need the session key here. Destroy any extra copies. */ + memset(session_key, 0, sizeof(session_key)); + + /* + * Expect a success message from the server. Note that this message + * will be received in encrypted form. + */ + packet_read_expect(&payload_len, SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS); + + debug("Received encrypted confirmation."); +} + +/* + * Authenticate user + */ +void +ssh_userauth1(const char *local_user, const char *server_user, char *host, + Key **keys, int nkeys) +{ +#ifdef KRB5 + krb5_context context = NULL; + krb5_auth_context auth_context = NULL; +#endif + int i, type; + int payload_len; + + if (supported_authentications == 0) + fatal("ssh_userauth1: server supports no auth methods"); + + /* Send the name of the user to log in as on the server. */ + packet_start(SSH_CMSG_USER); + packet_put_cstring(server_user); + packet_send(); + packet_write_wait(); + + /* + * The server should respond with success if no authentication is + * needed (the user has no password). Otherwise the server responds + * with failure. + */ + type = packet_read(&payload_len); + + /* check whether the connection was accepted without authentication. */ + if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS) + goto success; + if (type != SSH_SMSG_FAILURE) + packet_disconnect("Protocol error: got %d in response to SSH_CMSG_USER", type); + +#ifdef KRB5 + if ((supported_authentications & (1 << SSH_AUTH_KERBEROS)) && + options.kerberos_authentication) { + debug("Trying Kerberos v5 authentication."); + + if (try_krb5_authentication(&context, &auth_context)) { + type = packet_read(&payload_len); + if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS) + goto success; + if (type != SSH_SMSG_FAILURE) + packet_disconnect("Protocol error: got %d in response to Kerberos v5 auth", type); + } + } +#endif /* KRB5 */ + +#ifdef KRB4 + if ((supported_authentications & (1 << SSH_AUTH_KERBEROS)) && + options.kerberos_authentication) { + debug("Trying Kerberos v4 authentication."); + + if (try_krb4_authentication()) { + type = packet_read(&payload_len); + if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS) + goto success; + if (type != SSH_SMSG_FAILURE) + packet_disconnect("Protocol error: got %d in response to Kerberos v4 auth", type); + } + } +#endif /* KRB4 */ + + /* + * Use rhosts authentication if running in privileged socket and we + * do not wish to remain anonymous. + */ + if ((supported_authentications & (1 << SSH_AUTH_RHOSTS)) && + options.rhosts_authentication) { + debug("Trying rhosts authentication."); + packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS); + packet_put_cstring(local_user); + packet_send(); + packet_write_wait(); + + /* The server should respond with success or failure. */ + type = packet_read(&payload_len); + if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS) + goto success; + if (type != SSH_SMSG_FAILURE) + packet_disconnect("Protocol error: got %d in response to rhosts auth", + type); + } + /* + * Try .rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication with RSA host + * authentication. + */ + if ((supported_authentications & (1 << SSH_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA)) && + options.rhosts_rsa_authentication) { + for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) { + if (keys[i] != NULL && keys[i]->type == KEY_RSA1 && + try_rhosts_rsa_authentication(local_user, keys[i])) + goto success; + } + } + /* Try RSA authentication if the server supports it. */ + if ((supported_authentications & (1 << SSH_AUTH_RSA)) && + options.rsa_authentication) { + /* + * Try RSA authentication using the authentication agent. The + * agent is tried first because no passphrase is needed for + * it, whereas identity files may require passphrases. + */ + if (try_agent_authentication()) + goto success; + + /* Try RSA authentication for each identity. */ + for (i = 0; i < options.num_identity_files; i++) + if (options.identity_keys[i] != NULL && + options.identity_keys[i]->type == KEY_RSA1 && + try_rsa_authentication(i)) + goto success; + } + /* Try challenge response authentication if the server supports it. */ + if ((supported_authentications & (1 << SSH_AUTH_TIS)) && + options.challenge_response_authentication && !options.batch_mode) { + if (try_challenge_response_authentication()) + goto success; + } + /* Try password authentication if the server supports it. */ + if ((supported_authentications & (1 << SSH_AUTH_PASSWORD)) && + options.password_authentication && !options.batch_mode) { + char prompt[80]; + + snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), "%.30s@%.128s's password: ", + server_user, host); + if (try_password_authentication(prompt)) + goto success; + } + /* All authentication methods have failed. Exit with an error message. */ + fatal("Permission denied."); + /* NOTREACHED */ + + success: +#ifdef KRB5 + /* Try Kerberos v5 TGT passing. */ + if ((supported_authentications & (1 << SSH_PASS_KERBEROS_TGT)) && + options.kerberos_tgt_passing && context && auth_context) { + if (options.cipher == SSH_CIPHER_NONE) + log("WARNING: Encryption is disabled! Ticket will be transmitted in the clear!"); + send_krb5_tgt(context, auth_context); + } + if (auth_context) + krb5_auth_con_free(context, auth_context); + if (context) + krb5_free_context(context); +#endif + +#ifdef AFS + /* Try Kerberos v4 TGT passing if the server supports it. */ + if ((supported_authentications & (1 << SSH_PASS_KERBEROS_TGT)) && + options.kerberos_tgt_passing) { + if (options.cipher == SSH_CIPHER_NONE) + log("WARNING: Encryption is disabled! Ticket will be transmitted in the clear!"); + send_krb4_tgt(); + } + /* Try AFS token passing if the server supports it. */ + if ((supported_authentications & (1 << SSH_PASS_AFS_TOKEN)) && + options.afs_token_passing && k_hasafs()) { + if (options.cipher == SSH_CIPHER_NONE) + log("WARNING: Encryption is disabled! Token will be transmitted in the clear!"); + send_afs_tokens(); + } +#endif /* AFS */ + + return; /* need statement after label */ +} diff --git a/openssh/sshconnect2.c b/openssh/sshconnect2.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3107885 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/sshconnect2.c @@ -0,0 +1,1013 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" +RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.85 2001/11/07 16:03:17 markus Exp $"); + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "ssh.h" +#include "ssh2.h" +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "rsa.h" +#include "buffer.h" +#include "packet.h" +#include "uidswap.h" +#include "compat.h" +#include "bufaux.h" +#include "cipher.h" +#include "kex.h" +#include "myproposal.h" +#include "key.h" +#include "sshconnect.h" +#include "authfile.h" +#include "dh.h" +#include "authfd.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "readconf.h" +#include "readpass.h" +#include "match.h" +#include "dispatch.h" +#include "canohost.h" + +/* import */ +extern char *client_version_string; +extern char *server_version_string; +extern Options options; + +/* + * SSH2 key exchange + */ + +u_char *session_id2 = NULL; +int session_id2_len = 0; + +char *xxx_host; +struct sockaddr *xxx_hostaddr; + +Kex *xxx_kex = NULL; + +static int +verify_host_key_callback(Key *hostkey) +{ + if (verify_host_key(xxx_host, xxx_hostaddr, hostkey) == -1) + fatal("Host key verification failed."); + return 0; +} + +void +ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr) +{ + Kex *kex; + + xxx_host = host; + xxx_hostaddr = hostaddr; + + if (options.ciphers == (char *)-1) { + log("No valid ciphers for protocol version 2 given, using defaults."); + options.ciphers = NULL; + } + if (options.ciphers != NULL) { + myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] = + myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = options.ciphers; + } + myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] = + compat_cipher_proposal(myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS]); + myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = + compat_cipher_proposal(myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC]); + if (options.compression) { + myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS] = + myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] = "zlib"; + } else { + myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS] = + myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] = "none"; + } + if (options.macs != NULL) { + myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] = + myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = options.macs; + } + if (options.hostkeyalgorithms != NULL) + myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = + options.hostkeyalgorithms; + + /* start key exchange */ + kex = kex_setup(myproposal); + kex->client_version_string=client_version_string; + kex->server_version_string=server_version_string; + kex->verify_host_key=&verify_host_key_callback; + + xxx_kex = kex; + + dispatch_run(DISPATCH_BLOCK, &kex->done, kex); + + session_id2 = kex->session_id; + session_id2_len = kex->session_id_len; + +#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH + /* send 1st encrypted/maced/compressed message */ + packet_start(SSH2_MSG_IGNORE); + packet_put_cstring("markus"); + packet_send(); + packet_write_wait(); +#endif + debug("done: ssh_kex2."); +} + +/* + * Authenticate user + */ + +typedef struct Authctxt Authctxt; +typedef struct Authmethod Authmethod; + +typedef int sign_cb_fn( + Authctxt *authctxt, Key *key, + u_char **sigp, int *lenp, u_char *data, int datalen); + +struct Authctxt { + const char *server_user; + const char *local_user; + const char *host; + const char *service; + Authmethod *method; + int success; + char *authlist; + /* pubkey */ + Key *last_key; + sign_cb_fn *last_key_sign; + int last_key_hint; + AuthenticationConnection *agent; + /* hostbased */ + Key **keys; + int nkeys; + /* kbd-interactive */ + int info_req_seen; +}; +struct Authmethod { + char *name; /* string to compare against server's list */ + int (*userauth)(Authctxt *authctxt); + int *enabled; /* flag in option struct that enables method */ + int *batch_flag; /* flag in option struct that disables method */ +}; + +void input_userauth_success(int type, int plen, void *ctxt); +void input_userauth_failure(int type, int plen, void *ctxt); +void input_userauth_banner(int type, int plen, void *ctxt); +void input_userauth_error(int type, int plen, void *ctxt); +void input_userauth_info_req(int type, int plen, void *ctxt); +void input_userauth_pk_ok(int type, int plen, void *ctxt); + +int userauth_none(Authctxt *authctxt); +int userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt); +int userauth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt); +int userauth_kbdint(Authctxt *authctxt); +int userauth_hostbased(Authctxt *authctxt); + +void userauth(Authctxt *authctxt, char *authlist); + +static int sign_and_send_pubkey(Authctxt *, Key *, sign_cb_fn *); +static void clear_auth_state(Authctxt *); + +static Authmethod *authmethod_get(char *authlist); +static Authmethod *authmethod_lookup(const char *name); +static char *authmethods_get(void); + +Authmethod authmethods[] = { + {"hostbased", + userauth_hostbased, + &options.hostbased_authentication, + NULL}, + {"publickey", + userauth_pubkey, + &options.pubkey_authentication, + NULL}, + {"keyboard-interactive", + userauth_kbdint, + &options.kbd_interactive_authentication, + &options.batch_mode}, + {"password", + userauth_passwd, + &options.password_authentication, + &options.batch_mode}, + {"none", + userauth_none, + NULL, + NULL}, + {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL} +}; + +void +ssh_userauth2(const char *local_user, const char *server_user, char *host, + Key **keys, int nkeys) +{ + Authctxt authctxt; + int type; + int plen; + + if (options.challenge_response_authentication) + options.kbd_interactive_authentication = 1; + + debug("send SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST"); + packet_start(SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST); + packet_put_cstring("ssh-userauth"); + packet_send(); + packet_write_wait(); + type = packet_read(&plen); + if (type != SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT) { + fatal("denied SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT: %d", type); + } + if (packet_remaining() > 0) { + char *reply = packet_get_string(&plen); + debug("service_accept: %s", reply); + xfree(reply); + } else { + debug("buggy server: service_accept w/o service"); + } + packet_done(); + debug("got SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT"); + + if (options.preferred_authentications == NULL) + options.preferred_authentications = authmethods_get(); + + /* setup authentication context */ + memset(&authctxt, 0, sizeof(authctxt)); + authctxt.agent = ssh_get_authentication_connection(); + authctxt.server_user = server_user; + authctxt.local_user = local_user; + authctxt.host = host; + authctxt.service = "ssh-connection"; /* service name */ + authctxt.success = 0; + authctxt.method = authmethod_lookup("none"); + authctxt.authlist = NULL; + authctxt.keys = keys; + authctxt.nkeys = nkeys; + authctxt.info_req_seen = 0; + if (authctxt.method == NULL) + fatal("ssh_userauth2: internal error: cannot send userauth none request"); + + /* initial userauth request */ + userauth_none(&authctxt); + + dispatch_init(&input_userauth_error); + dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS, &input_userauth_success); + dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE, &input_userauth_failure); + dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER, &input_userauth_banner); + dispatch_run(DISPATCH_BLOCK, &authctxt.success, &authctxt); /* loop until success */ + + if (authctxt.agent != NULL) + ssh_close_authentication_connection(authctxt.agent); + + debug("ssh-userauth2 successful: method %s", authctxt.method->name); +} +void +userauth(Authctxt *authctxt, char *authlist) +{ + if (authlist == NULL) { + authlist = authctxt->authlist; + } else { + if (authctxt->authlist) + xfree(authctxt->authlist); + authctxt->authlist = authlist; + } + for (;;) { + Authmethod *method = authmethod_get(authlist); + if (method == NULL) + fatal("Permission denied (%s).", authlist); + authctxt->method = method; + if (method->userauth(authctxt) != 0) { + debug2("we sent a %s packet, wait for reply", method->name); + break; + } else { + debug2("we did not send a packet, disable method"); + method->enabled = NULL; + } + } +} +void +input_userauth_error(int type, int plen, void *ctxt) +{ + fatal("input_userauth_error: bad message during authentication: " + "type %d", type); +} +void +input_userauth_banner(int type, int plen, void *ctxt) +{ + char *msg, *lang; + debug3("input_userauth_banner"); + msg = packet_get_string(NULL); + lang = packet_get_string(NULL); + fprintf(stderr, "%s", msg); + xfree(msg); + xfree(lang); +} +void +input_userauth_success(int type, int plen, void *ctxt) +{ + Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt; + if (authctxt == NULL) + fatal("input_userauth_success: no authentication context"); + if (authctxt->authlist) + xfree(authctxt->authlist); + clear_auth_state(authctxt); + authctxt->success = 1; /* break out */ +} +void +input_userauth_failure(int type, int plen, void *ctxt) +{ + Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt; + char *authlist = NULL; + int partial; + + if (authctxt == NULL) + fatal("input_userauth_failure: no authentication context"); + + authlist = packet_get_string(NULL); + partial = packet_get_char(); + packet_done(); + + if (partial != 0) + log("Authenticated with partial success."); + debug("authentications that can continue: %s", authlist); + + clear_auth_state(authctxt); + userauth(authctxt, authlist); +} +void +input_userauth_pk_ok(int type, int plen, void *ctxt) +{ + Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt; + Key *key = NULL; + Buffer b; + int alen, blen, sent = 0; + char *pkalg, *pkblob, *fp; + + if (authctxt == NULL) + fatal("input_userauth_pk_ok: no authentication context"); + if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKOK) { + /* this is similar to SSH_BUG_PKAUTH */ + debug2("input_userauth_pk_ok: SSH_BUG_PKOK"); + pkblob = packet_get_string(&blen); + buffer_init(&b); + buffer_append(&b, pkblob, blen); + pkalg = buffer_get_string(&b, &alen); + buffer_free(&b); + } else { + pkalg = packet_get_string(&alen); + pkblob = packet_get_string(&blen); + } + packet_done(); + + debug("input_userauth_pk_ok: pkalg %s blen %d lastkey %p hint %d", + pkalg, blen, authctxt->last_key, authctxt->last_key_hint); + + do { + if (authctxt->last_key == NULL || + authctxt->last_key_sign == NULL) { + debug("no last key or no sign cb"); + break; + } + if (key_type_from_name(pkalg) == KEY_UNSPEC) { + debug("unknown pkalg %s", pkalg); + break; + } + if ((key = key_from_blob(pkblob, blen)) == NULL) { + debug("no key from blob. pkalg %s", pkalg); + break; + } + fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); + debug2("input_userauth_pk_ok: fp %s", fp); + xfree(fp); + if (!key_equal(key, authctxt->last_key)) { + debug("key != last_key"); + break; + } + sent = sign_and_send_pubkey(authctxt, key, + authctxt->last_key_sign); + } while(0); + + if (key != NULL) + key_free(key); + xfree(pkalg); + xfree(pkblob); + + /* unregister */ + clear_auth_state(authctxt); + dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK, NULL); + + /* try another method if we did not send a packet*/ + if (sent == 0) + userauth(authctxt, NULL); + +} + +int +userauth_none(Authctxt *authctxt) +{ + /* initial userauth request */ + packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST); + packet_put_cstring(authctxt->server_user); + packet_put_cstring(authctxt->service); + packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name); + packet_send(); + return 1; +} + +int +userauth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt) +{ + static int attempt = 0; + char prompt[80]; + char *password; + + if (attempt++ >= options.number_of_password_prompts) + return 0; + + if(attempt != 1) + error("Permission denied, please try again."); + + snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), "%.30s@%.128s's password: ", + authctxt->server_user, authctxt->host); + password = read_passphrase(prompt, 0); + packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST); + packet_put_cstring(authctxt->server_user); + packet_put_cstring(authctxt->service); + packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name); + packet_put_char(0); + packet_put_cstring(password); + memset(password, 0, strlen(password)); + xfree(password); + packet_add_padding(64); + packet_send(); + return 1; +} + +static void +clear_auth_state(Authctxt *authctxt) +{ + /* XXX clear authentication state */ + if (authctxt->last_key != NULL && authctxt->last_key_hint == -1) { + debug3("clear_auth_state: key_free %p", authctxt->last_key); + key_free(authctxt->last_key); + } + authctxt->last_key = NULL; + authctxt->last_key_hint = -2; + authctxt->last_key_sign = NULL; +} + +static int +sign_and_send_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt, Key *k, sign_cb_fn *sign_callback) +{ + Buffer b; + u_char *blob, *signature; + int bloblen, slen; + int skip = 0; + int ret = -1; + int have_sig = 1; + + debug3("sign_and_send_pubkey"); + + if (key_to_blob(k, &blob, &bloblen) == 0) { + /* we cannot handle this key */ + debug3("sign_and_send_pubkey: cannot handle key"); + return 0; + } + /* data to be signed */ + buffer_init(&b); + if (datafellows & SSH_OLD_SESSIONID) { + buffer_append(&b, session_id2, session_id2_len); + skip = session_id2_len; + } else { + buffer_put_string(&b, session_id2, session_id2_len); + skip = buffer_len(&b); + } + buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST); + buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->server_user); + buffer_put_cstring(&b, + datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKSERVICE ? + "ssh-userauth" : + authctxt->service); + if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH) { + buffer_put_char(&b, have_sig); + } else { + buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->method->name); + buffer_put_char(&b, have_sig); + buffer_put_cstring(&b, key_ssh_name(k)); + } + buffer_put_string(&b, blob, bloblen); + + /* generate signature */ + ret = (*sign_callback)(authctxt, k, &signature, &slen, + buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b)); + if (ret == -1) { + xfree(blob); + buffer_free(&b); + return 0; + } +#ifdef DEBUG_PK + buffer_dump(&b); +#endif + if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKSERVICE) { + buffer_clear(&b); + buffer_append(&b, session_id2, session_id2_len); + skip = session_id2_len; + buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST); + buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->server_user); + buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->service); + buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->method->name); + buffer_put_char(&b, have_sig); + if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH)) + buffer_put_cstring(&b, key_ssh_name(k)); + buffer_put_string(&b, blob, bloblen); + } + xfree(blob); + + /* append signature */ + buffer_put_string(&b, signature, slen); + xfree(signature); + + /* skip session id and packet type */ + if (buffer_len(&b) < skip + 1) + fatal("userauth_pubkey: internal error"); + buffer_consume(&b, skip + 1); + + /* put remaining data from buffer into packet */ + packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST); + packet_put_raw(buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b)); + buffer_free(&b); + packet_send(); + + return 1; +} + +static int +send_pubkey_test(Authctxt *authctxt, Key *k, sign_cb_fn *sign_callback, + int hint) +{ + u_char *blob; + int bloblen, have_sig = 0; + + debug3("send_pubkey_test"); + + if (key_to_blob(k, &blob, &bloblen) == 0) { + /* we cannot handle this key */ + debug3("send_pubkey_test: cannot handle key"); + return 0; + } + /* register callback for USERAUTH_PK_OK message */ + authctxt->last_key_sign = sign_callback; + authctxt->last_key_hint = hint; + authctxt->last_key = k; + dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK, &input_userauth_pk_ok); + + packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST); + packet_put_cstring(authctxt->server_user); + packet_put_cstring(authctxt->service); + packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name); + packet_put_char(have_sig); + if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH)) + packet_put_cstring(key_ssh_name(k)); + packet_put_string(blob, bloblen); + xfree(blob); + packet_send(); + return 1; +} + +static Key * +load_identity_file(char *filename) +{ + Key *private; + char prompt[300], *passphrase; + int quit, i; + struct stat st; + + if (stat(filename, &st) < 0) { + debug3("no such identity: %s", filename); + return NULL; + } + private = key_load_private_type(KEY_UNSPEC, filename, "", NULL); + if (private == NULL) { + if (options.batch_mode) + return NULL; + snprintf(prompt, sizeof prompt, + "Enter passphrase for key '%.100s': ", filename); + for (i = 0; i < options.number_of_password_prompts; i++) { + passphrase = read_passphrase(prompt, 0); + if (strcmp(passphrase, "") != 0) { + private = key_load_private_type(KEY_UNSPEC, filename, + passphrase, NULL); + quit = 0; + } else { + debug2("no passphrase given, try next key"); + quit = 1; + } + memset(passphrase, 0, strlen(passphrase)); + xfree(passphrase); + if (private != NULL || quit) + break; + debug2("bad passphrase given, try again..."); + } + } + return private; +} + +static int +identity_sign_cb(Authctxt *authctxt, Key *key, u_char **sigp, int *lenp, + u_char *data, int datalen) +{ + Key *private; + int idx, ret; + + idx = authctxt->last_key_hint; + if (idx < 0) + return -1; + + /* private key is stored in external hardware */ + if (options.identity_keys[idx]->flags & KEY_FLAG_EXT) + return key_sign(options.identity_keys[idx], sigp, lenp, data, datalen); + + private = load_identity_file(options.identity_files[idx]); + if (private == NULL) + return -1; + ret = key_sign(private, sigp, lenp, data, datalen); + key_free(private); + return ret; +} + +static int +agent_sign_cb(Authctxt *authctxt, Key *key, u_char **sigp, int *lenp, + u_char *data, int datalen) +{ + return ssh_agent_sign(authctxt->agent, key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen); +} + +static int +key_sign_cb(Authctxt *authctxt, Key *key, u_char **sigp, int *lenp, + u_char *data, int datalen) +{ + return key_sign(key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen); +} + +static int +userauth_pubkey_agent(Authctxt *authctxt) +{ + static int called = 0; + int ret = 0; + char *comment; + Key *k; + + if (called == 0) { + if (ssh_get_num_identities(authctxt->agent, 2) == 0) + debug2("userauth_pubkey_agent: no keys at all"); + called = 1; + } + k = ssh_get_next_identity(authctxt->agent, &comment, 2); + if (k == NULL) { + debug2("userauth_pubkey_agent: no more keys"); + } else { + debug("userauth_pubkey_agent: testing agent key %s", comment); + xfree(comment); + ret = send_pubkey_test(authctxt, k, agent_sign_cb, -1); + if (ret == 0) + key_free(k); + } + if (ret == 0) + debug2("userauth_pubkey_agent: no message sent"); + return ret; +} + +int +userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt) +{ + static int idx = 0; + int sent = 0; + Key *key; + char *filename; + + if (authctxt->agent != NULL) { + do { + sent = userauth_pubkey_agent(authctxt); + } while(!sent && authctxt->agent->howmany > 0); + } + while (!sent && idx < options.num_identity_files) { + key = options.identity_keys[idx]; + filename = options.identity_files[idx]; + if (key == NULL) { + debug("try privkey: %s", filename); + key = load_identity_file(filename); + if (key != NULL) { + sent = sign_and_send_pubkey(authctxt, key, + key_sign_cb); + key_free(key); + } + } else if (key->type != KEY_RSA1) { + debug("try pubkey: %s", filename); + sent = send_pubkey_test(authctxt, key, + identity_sign_cb, idx); + } + idx++; + } + return sent; +} + +/* + * Send userauth request message specifying keyboard-interactive method. + */ +int +userauth_kbdint(Authctxt *authctxt) +{ + static int attempt = 0; + + if (attempt++ >= options.number_of_password_prompts) + return 0; + /* disable if no SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST has been seen */ + if (attempt > 1 && !authctxt->info_req_seen) { + debug3("userauth_kbdint: disable: no info_req_seen"); + dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST, NULL); + return 0; + } + + debug2("userauth_kbdint"); + packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST); + packet_put_cstring(authctxt->server_user); + packet_put_cstring(authctxt->service); + packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name); + packet_put_cstring(""); /* lang */ + packet_put_cstring(options.kbd_interactive_devices ? + options.kbd_interactive_devices : ""); + packet_send(); + + dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST, &input_userauth_info_req); + return 1; +} + +/* + * parse INFO_REQUEST, prompt user and send INFO_RESPONSE + */ +void +input_userauth_info_req(int type, int plen, void *ctxt) +{ + Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt; + char *name, *inst, *lang, *prompt, *response; + u_int num_prompts, i; + int echo = 0; + + debug2("input_userauth_info_req"); + + if (authctxt == NULL) + fatal("input_userauth_info_req: no authentication context"); + + authctxt->info_req_seen = 1; + + name = packet_get_string(NULL); + inst = packet_get_string(NULL); + lang = packet_get_string(NULL); + if (strlen(name) > 0) + log("%s", name); + if (strlen(inst) > 0) + log("%s", inst); + xfree(name); + xfree(inst); + xfree(lang); + + num_prompts = packet_get_int(); + /* + * Begin to build info response packet based on prompts requested. + * We commit to providing the correct number of responses, so if + * further on we run into a problem that prevents this, we have to + * be sure and clean this up and send a correct error response. + */ + packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE); + packet_put_int(num_prompts); + + debug2("input_userauth_info_req: num_prompts %d", num_prompts); + for (i = 0; i < num_prompts; i++) { + prompt = packet_get_string(NULL); + echo = packet_get_char(); + + response = read_passphrase(prompt, echo ? RP_ECHO : 0); + + packet_put_cstring(response); + memset(response, 0, strlen(response)); + xfree(response); + xfree(prompt); + } + packet_done(); /* done with parsing incoming message. */ + + packet_add_padding(64); + packet_send(); +} + +/* + * this will be move to an external program (ssh-keysign) ASAP. ssh-keysign + * will be setuid-root and the sbit can be removed from /usr/bin/ssh. + */ +int +userauth_hostbased(Authctxt *authctxt) +{ + Key *private = NULL; + Buffer b; + u_char *signature, *blob; + char *chost, *pkalg, *p; + const char *service; + u_int blen, slen; + int ok, i, len, found = 0; + + /* check for a useful key */ + for (i = 0; i < authctxt->nkeys; i++) { + private = authctxt->keys[i]; + if (private && private->type != KEY_RSA1) { + found = 1; + /* we take and free the key */ + authctxt->keys[i] = NULL; + break; + } + } + if (!found) { + debug("userauth_hostbased: no more client hostkeys"); + return 0; + } + if (key_to_blob(private, &blob, &blen) == 0) { + key_free(private); + return 0; + } + /* figure out a name for the client host */ + p = get_local_name(packet_get_connection_in()); + if (p == NULL) { + error("userauth_hostbased: cannot get local ipaddr/name"); + key_free(private); + return 0; + } + len = strlen(p) + 2; + chost = xmalloc(len); + strlcpy(chost, p, len); + strlcat(chost, ".", len); + debug2("userauth_hostbased: chost %s", chost); + + service = datafellows & SSH_BUG_HBSERVICE ? "ssh-userauth" : + authctxt->service; + pkalg = xstrdup(key_ssh_name(private)); + buffer_init(&b); + /* construct data */ + buffer_put_string(&b, session_id2, session_id2_len); + buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST); + buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->server_user); + buffer_put_cstring(&b, service); + buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->method->name); + buffer_put_cstring(&b, pkalg); + buffer_put_string(&b, blob, blen); + buffer_put_cstring(&b, chost); + buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->local_user); +#ifdef DEBUG_PK + buffer_dump(&b); +#endif + ok = key_sign(private, &signature, &slen, buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b)); + key_free(private); + buffer_free(&b); + if (ok != 0) { + error("key_sign failed"); + xfree(chost); + xfree(pkalg); + return 0; + } + packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST); + packet_put_cstring(authctxt->server_user); + packet_put_cstring(authctxt->service); + packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name); + packet_put_cstring(pkalg); + packet_put_string(blob, blen); + packet_put_cstring(chost); + packet_put_cstring(authctxt->local_user); + packet_put_string(signature, slen); + memset(signature, 's', slen); + xfree(signature); + xfree(chost); + xfree(pkalg); + + packet_send(); + return 1; +} + +/* find auth method */ + +/* + * given auth method name, if configurable options permit this method fill + * in auth_ident field and return true, otherwise return false. + */ +static int +authmethod_is_enabled(Authmethod *method) +{ + if (method == NULL) + return 0; + /* return false if options indicate this method is disabled */ + if (method->enabled == NULL || *method->enabled == 0) + return 0; + /* return false if batch mode is enabled but method needs interactive mode */ + if (method->batch_flag != NULL && *method->batch_flag != 0) + return 0; + return 1; +} + +static Authmethod * +authmethod_lookup(const char *name) +{ + Authmethod *method = NULL; + if (name != NULL) + for (method = authmethods; method->name != NULL; method++) + if (strcmp(name, method->name) == 0) + return method; + debug2("Unrecognized authentication method name: %s", name ? name : "NULL"); + return NULL; +} + +/* XXX internal state */ +static Authmethod *current = NULL; +static char *supported = NULL; +static char *preferred = NULL; +/* + * Given the authentication method list sent by the server, return the + * next method we should try. If the server initially sends a nil list, + * use a built-in default list. + */ +static Authmethod * +authmethod_get(char *authlist) +{ + + char *name = NULL; + int next; + + /* Use a suitable default if we're passed a nil list. */ + if (authlist == NULL || strlen(authlist) == 0) + authlist = options.preferred_authentications; + + if (supported == NULL || strcmp(authlist, supported) != 0) { + debug3("start over, passed a different list %s", authlist); + if (supported != NULL) + xfree(supported); + supported = xstrdup(authlist); + preferred = options.preferred_authentications; + debug3("preferred %s", preferred); + current = NULL; + } else if (current != NULL && authmethod_is_enabled(current)) + return current; + + for (;;) { + if ((name = match_list(preferred, supported, &next)) == NULL) { + debug("no more auth methods to try"); + current = NULL; + return NULL; + } + preferred += next; + debug3("authmethod_lookup %s", name); + debug3("remaining preferred: %s", preferred); + if ((current = authmethod_lookup(name)) != NULL && + authmethod_is_enabled(current)) { + debug3("authmethod_is_enabled %s", name); + debug("next auth method to try is %s", name); + return current; + } + } +} + + +#define DELIM "," + +static char * +authmethods_get(void) +{ + Authmethod *method = NULL; + char buf[1024]; + + buf[0] = '\0'; + for (method = authmethods; method->name != NULL; method++) { + if (authmethod_is_enabled(method)) { + if (buf[0] != '\0') + strlcat(buf, DELIM, sizeof buf); + strlcat(buf, method->name, sizeof buf); + } + } + return xstrdup(buf); +} diff --git a/openssh/sshd.8 b/openssh/sshd.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5a6624b --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/sshd.8 @@ -0,0 +1,1325 @@ +.\" -*- nroff -*- +.\" +.\" Author: Tatu Ylonen +.\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland +.\" All rights reserved +.\" +.\" As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software +.\" can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this +.\" software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is +.\" incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be +.\" called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". +.\" +.\" Copyright (c) 1999,2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. +.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell. All rights reserved. +.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved. +.\" +.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +.\" are met: +.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +.\" +.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR +.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES +.\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. +.\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, +.\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT +.\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, +.\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY +.\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT +.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF +.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. +.\" +.\" $OpenBSD: sshd.8,v 1.154 2001/11/07 22:12:01 markus Exp $ +.Dd September 25, 1999 +.Dt SSHD 8 +.Os +.Sh NAME +.Nm sshd +.Nd OpenSSH SSH daemon +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.Nm sshd +.Op Fl deiqtD46 +.Op Fl b Ar bits +.Op Fl f Ar config_file +.Op Fl g Ar login_grace_time +.Op Fl h Ar host_key_file +.Op Fl k Ar key_gen_time +.Op Fl p Ar port +.Op Fl u Ar len +.Sh DESCRIPTION +.Nm +(SSH Daemon) is the daemon program for +.Xr ssh 1 . +Together these programs replace rlogin and rsh, and +provide secure encrypted communications between two untrusted hosts +over an insecure network. +The programs are intended to be as easy to +install and use as possible. +.Pp +.Nm +is the daemon that listens for connections from clients. +It is normally started at boot from +.Pa /etc/rc . +It forks a new +daemon for each incoming connection. +The forked daemons handle +key exchange, encryption, authentication, command execution, +and data exchange. +This implementation of +.Nm +supports both SSH protocol version 1 and 2 simultaneously. +.Nm +works as follows. +.Pp +.Ss SSH protocol version 1 +.Pp +Each host has a host-specific RSA key +(normally 1024 bits) used to identify the host. +Additionally, when +the daemon starts, it generates a server RSA key (normally 768 bits). +This key is normally regenerated every hour if it has been used, and +is never stored on disk. +.Pp +Whenever a client connects the daemon responds with its public +host and server keys. +The client compares the +RSA host key against its own database to verify that it has not changed. +The client then generates a 256 bit random number. +It encrypts this +random number using both the host key and the server key, and sends +the encrypted number to the server. +Both sides then use this +random number as a session key which is used to encrypt all further +communications in the session. +The rest of the session is encrypted +using a conventional cipher, currently Blowfish or 3DES, with 3DES +being used by default. +The client selects the encryption algorithm +to use from those offered by the server. +.Pp +Next, the server and the client enter an authentication dialog. +The client tries to authenticate itself using +.Pa .rhosts +authentication, +.Pa .rhosts +authentication combined with RSA host +authentication, RSA challenge-response authentication, or password +based authentication. +.Pp +Rhosts authentication is normally disabled +because it is fundamentally insecure, but can be enabled in the server +configuration file if desired. +System security is not improved unless +.Xr rshd 8 , +.Xr rlogind 8 , +and +.Xr rexecd 8 +are disabled (thus completely disabling +.Xr rlogin 1 +and +.Xr rsh 1 +into the machine). +.Pp +.Ss SSH protocol version 2 +.Pp +Version 2 works similarly: +Each host has a host-specific key (RSA or DSA) used to identify the host. +However, when the daemon starts, it does not generate a server key. +Forward security is provided through a Diffie-Hellman key agreement. +This key agreement results in a shared session key. +.Pp +The rest of the session is encrypted using a symmetric cipher, currently +128 bit AES, Blowfish, 3DES, CAST128, Arcfour, 192 bit AES, or 256 bit AES. +The client selects the encryption algorithm +to use from those offered by the server. +Additionally, session integrity is provided +through a cryptographic message authentication code +(hmac-sha1 or hmac-md5). +.Pp +Protocol version 2 provides a public key based +user (PubkeyAuthentication) or +client host (HostbasedAuthentication) authentication method, +conventional password authentication and challenge response based methods. +.Pp +.Ss Command execution and data forwarding +.Pp +If the client successfully authenticates itself, a dialog for +preparing the session is entered. +At this time the client may request +things like allocating a pseudo-tty, forwarding X11 connections, +forwarding TCP/IP connections, or forwarding the authentication agent +connection over the secure channel. +.Pp +Finally, the client either requests a shell or execution of a command. +The sides then enter session mode. +In this mode, either side may send +data at any time, and such data is forwarded to/from the shell or +command on the server side, and the user terminal in the client side. +.Pp +When the user program terminates and all forwarded X11 and other +connections have been closed, the server sends command exit status to +the client, and both sides exit. +.Pp +.Nm +can be configured using command-line options or a configuration +file. +Command-line options override values specified in the +configuration file. +.Pp +.Nm +rereads its configuration file when it receives a hangup signal, +.Dv SIGHUP , +by executing itself with the name it was started as, i.e., +.Pa /usr/sbin/sshd . +.Pp +The options are as follows: +.Bl -tag -width Ds +.It Fl b Ar bits +Specifies the number of bits in the ephemeral protocol version 1 +server key (default 768). +.It Fl d +Debug mode. +The server sends verbose debug output to the system +log, and does not put itself in the background. +The server also will not fork and will only process one connection. +This option is only intended for debugging for the server. +Multiple -d options increase the debugging level. +Maximum is 3. +.It Fl e +When this option is specified, +.Nm +will send the output to the standard error instead of the system log. +.It Fl f Ar configuration_file +Specifies the name of the configuration file. +The default is +.Pa /etc/sshd_config . +.Nm +refuses to start if there is no configuration file. +.It Fl g Ar login_grace_time +Gives the grace time for clients to authenticate themselves (default +600 seconds). +If the client fails to authenticate the user within +this many seconds, the server disconnects and exits. +A value of zero indicates no limit. +.It Fl h Ar host_key_file +Specifies the file from which the host key is read (default +.Pa /etc/ssh_host_key ) . +This option must be given if +.Nm +is not run as root (as the normal +host file is normally not readable by anyone but root). +It is possible to have multiple host key files for +the different protocol versions and host key algorithms. +.It Fl i +Specifies that +.Nm +is being run from inetd. +.Nm +is normally not run +from inetd because it needs to generate the server key before it can +respond to the client, and this may take tens of seconds. +Clients would have to wait too long if the key was regenerated every time. +However, with small key sizes (e.g., 512) using +.Nm +from inetd may +be feasible. +.It Fl k Ar key_gen_time +Specifies how often the ephemeral protocol version 1 server key is +regenerated (default 3600 seconds, or one hour). +The motivation for regenerating the key fairly +often is that the key is not stored anywhere, and after about an hour, +it becomes impossible to recover the key for decrypting intercepted +communications even if the machine is cracked into or physically +seized. +A value of zero indicates that the key will never be regenerated. +.It Fl p Ar port +Specifies the port on which the server listens for connections +(default 22). +.It Fl q +Quiet mode. +Nothing is sent to the system log. +Normally the beginning, +authentication, and termination of each connection is logged. +.It Fl t +Test mode. +Only check the validity of the configuration file and sanity of the keys. +This is useful for updating +.Nm +reliably as configuration options may change. +.It Fl u Ar len +This option is used to specify the size of the field +in the +.Li utmp +structure that holds the remote host name. +If the resolved host name is longer than +.Ar len , +the dotted decimal value will be used instead. +This allows hosts with very long host names that +overflow this field to still be uniquely identified. +Specifying +.Fl u0 +indicates that only dotted decimal addresses +should be put into the +.Pa utmp +file. +.Fl u0 +is also be used to prevent +.Nm +from making DNS requests unless the authentication +mechanism or configuration requires it. +Authentication mechanisms that may require DNS include +.Cm RhostsAuthentication , +.Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication , +.Cm HostbasedAuthentication +and using a +.Cm from="pattern-list" +option in a key file. +.It Fl D +When this option is specified +.Nm +will not detach and does not become a daemon. +This allows easy monitoring of +.Nm sshd . +.It Fl 4 +Forces +.Nm +to use IPv4 addresses only. +.It Fl 6 +Forces +.Nm +to use IPv6 addresses only. +.El +.Sh CONFIGURATION FILE +.Nm +reads configuration data from +.Pa /etc/sshd_config +(or the file specified with +.Fl f +on the command line). +The file contains keyword-argument pairs, one per line. +Lines starting with +.Ql # +and empty lines are interpreted as comments. +.Pp +The possible +keywords and their meanings are as follows (note that +keywords are case-insensitive and arguments are case-sensitive): +.Bl -tag -width Ds +.It Cm AFSTokenPassing +Specifies whether an AFS token may be forwarded to the server. +Default is +.Dq yes . +.It Cm AllowGroups +This keyword can be followed by a list of group names, separated +by spaces. +If specified, login is allowed only for users whose primary +group or supplementary group list matches one of the patterns. +.Ql \&* +and +.Ql ? +can be used as +wildcards in the patterns. +Only group names are valid; a numerical group ID is not recognized. +By default login is allowed regardless of the group list. +.Pp +.It Cm AllowTcpForwarding +Specifies whether TCP forwarding is permitted. +The default is +.Dq yes . +Note that disabling TCP forwarding does not improve security unless +users are also denied shell access, as they can always install their +own forwarders. +.Pp +.It Cm AllowUsers +This keyword can be followed by a list of user names, separated +by spaces. +If specified, login is allowed only for users names that +match one of the patterns. +.Ql \&* +and +.Ql ? +can be used as +wildcards in the patterns. +Only user names are valid; a numerical user ID is not recognized. +By default login is allowed regardless of the user name. +If the pattern takes the form USER@HOST then USER and HOST +are separately checked, restricting logins to particular +users from particular hosts. +.Pp +.It Cm AuthorizedKeysFile +Specifies the file that contains the public keys that can be used +for user authentication. +.Cm AuthorizedKeysFile +may contain tokens of the form %T which are substituted during connection +set-up. The following tokens are defined: %% is replaced by a literal '%', +%h is replaced by the home directory of the user being authenticated and +%u is replaced by the username of that user. +After expansion, +.Cm AuthorizedKeysFile +is taken to be an absolute path or one relative to the user's home +directory. +The default is +.Dq .ssh/authorized_keys +.It Cm Banner +In some jurisdictions, sending a warning message before authentication +may be relevant for getting legal protection. +The contents of the specified file are sent to the remote user before +authentication is allowed. +This option is only available for protocol version 2. +.Pp +.It Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication +Specifies whether challenge response authentication is allowed. +All authentication styles from +.Xr login.conf 5 +are supported. +The default is +.Dq yes . +.It Cm Ciphers +Specifies the ciphers allowed for protocol version 2. +Multiple ciphers must be comma-separated. +The default is +.Dq aes128-cbc,3des-cbc,blowfish-cbc,cast128-cbc,arcfour. +.It Cm ClientAliveInterval +Sets a timeout interval in seconds after which if no data has been received +from the client, +.Nm +will send a message through the encrypted +channel to request a response from the client. +The default +is 0, indicating that these messages will not be sent to the client. +This option applies to protocol version 2 only. +.It Cm ClientAliveCountMax +Sets the number of client alive messages (see above) which may be +sent without +.Nm +receiving any messages back from the client. If this threshold is +reached while client alive messages are being sent, +.Nm +will disconnect the client, terminating the session. It is important +to note that the use of client alive messages is very different from +.Cm KeepAlive +(below). The client alive messages are sent through the +encrypted channel and therefore will not be spoofable. The TCP keepalive +option enabled by +.Cm KeepAlive +is spoofable. The client alive mechanism is valuable when the client or +server depend on knowing when a connection has become inactive. +.Pp +The default value is 3. If +.Cm ClientAliveInterval +(above) is set to 15, and +.Cm ClientAliveCountMax +is left at the default, unresponsive ssh clients +will be disconnected after approximately 45 seconds. +.It Cm DenyGroups +This keyword can be followed by a number of group names, separated +by spaces. +Users whose primary group or supplementary group list matches +one of the patterns aren't allowed to log in. +.Ql \&* +and +.Ql ? +can be used as +wildcards in the patterns. +Only group names are valid; a numerical group ID is not recognized. +By default login is allowed regardless of the group list. +.Pp +.It Cm DenyUsers +This keyword can be followed by a number of user names, separated +by spaces. +Login is disallowed for user names that match one of the patterns. +.Ql \&* +and +.Ql ? +can be used as wildcards in the patterns. +Only user names are valid; a numerical user ID is not recognized. +By default login is allowed regardless of the user name. +.It Cm GatewayPorts +Specifies whether remote hosts are allowed to connect to ports +forwarded for the client. +By default, +.Nm +binds remote port forwardings to the loopback addresss. This +prevents other remote hosts from connecting to forwarded ports. +.Cm GatewayPorts +can be used to specify that +.Nm +should bind remote port forwardings to the wildcard address, +thus allowing remote hosts to connect to forwarded ports. +The argument must be +.Dq yes +or +.Dq no . +The default is +.Dq no . +.It Cm HostbasedAuthentication +Specifies whether rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication together +with successful public key client host authentication is allowed +(hostbased authentication). +This option is similar to +.Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication +and applies to protocol version 2 only. +The default is +.Dq no . +.It Cm HostKey +Specifies the file containing the private host keys (default +.Pa /etc/ssh_host_key ) +used by SSH protocol versions 1 and 2. +Note that +.Nm +will refuse to use a file if it is group/world-accessible. +It is possible to have multiple host key files. +.Dq rsa1 +keys are used for version 1 and +.Dq dsa +or +.Dq rsa +are used for version 2 of the SSH protocol. +.It Cm IgnoreRhosts +Specifies that +.Pa .rhosts +and +.Pa .shosts +files will not be used in +.Cm RhostsAuthentication , +.Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication +or +.Cm HostbasedAuthentication . +.Pp +.Pa /etc/hosts.equiv +and +.Pa /etc/shosts.equiv +are still used. +The default is +.Dq yes . +.It Cm IgnoreUserKnownHosts +Specifies whether +.Nm +should ignore the user's +.Pa $HOME/.ssh/known_hosts +during +.Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication +or +.Cm HostbasedAuthentication . +The default is +.Dq no . +.It Cm KeepAlive +Specifies whether the system should send keepalive messages to the +other side. +If they are sent, death of the connection or crash of one +of the machines will be properly noticed. +However, this means that +connections will die if the route is down temporarily, and some people +find it annoying. +On the other hand, if keepalives are not sent, +sessions may hang indefinitely on the server, leaving +.Dq ghost +users and consuming server resources. +.Pp +The default is +.Dq yes +(to send keepalives), and the server will notice +if the network goes down or the client host reboots. +This avoids infinitely hanging sessions. +.Pp +To disable keepalives, the value should be set to +.Dq no +in both the server and the client configuration files. +.It Cm KerberosAuthentication +Specifies whether Kerberos authentication is allowed. +This can be in the form of a Kerberos ticket, or if +.Cm PasswordAuthentication +is yes, the password provided by the user will be validated through +the Kerberos KDC. +To use this option, the server needs a +Kerberos servtab which allows the verification of the KDC's identity. +Default is +.Dq yes . +.It Cm KerberosOrLocalPasswd +If set then if password authentication through Kerberos fails then +the password will be validated via any additional local mechanism +such as +.Pa /etc/passwd . +Default is +.Dq yes . +.It Cm KerberosTgtPassing +Specifies whether a Kerberos TGT may be forwarded to the server. +Default is +.Dq no , +as this only works when the Kerberos KDC is actually an AFS kaserver. +.It Cm KerberosTicketCleanup +Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's ticket cache +file on logout. +Default is +.Dq yes . +.It Cm KeyRegenerationInterval +In protocol version 1, the ephemeral server key is automatically regenerated +after this many seconds (if it has been used). +The purpose of regeneration is to prevent +decrypting captured sessions by later breaking into the machine and +stealing the keys. +The key is never stored anywhere. +If the value is 0, the key is never regenerated. +The default is 3600 (seconds). +.It Cm ListenAddress +Specifies the local addresses +.Nm +should listen on. +The following forms may be used: +.Pp +.Bl -item -offset indent -compact +.It +.Cm ListenAddress +.Sm off +.Ar host No | Ar IPv4_addr No | Ar IPv6_addr +.Sm on +.It +.Cm ListenAddress +.Sm off +.Ar host No | Ar IPv4_addr No : Ar port +.Sm on +.It +.Cm ListenAddress +.Sm off +.Oo +.Ar host No | Ar IPv6_addr Oc : Ar port +.Sm on +.El +.Pp +If +.Ar port +is not specified, +.Nm +will listen on the address and all prior +.Cm Port +options specified. The default is to listen on all local +addresses. Multiple +.Cm ListenAddress +options are permitted. Additionally, any +.Cm Port +options must precede this option for non port qualified addresses. +.It Cm LoginGraceTime +The server disconnects after this time if the user has not +successfully logged in. +If the value is 0, there is no time limit. +The default is 600 (seconds). +.It Cm LogLevel +Gives the verbosity level that is used when logging messages from +.Nm sshd . +The possible values are: +QUIET, FATAL, ERROR, INFO, VERBOSE and DEBUG. +The default is INFO. +Logging with level DEBUG violates the privacy of users +and is not recommended. +.It Cm MACs +Specifies the available MAC (message authentication code) algorithms. +The MAC algorithm is used in protocol version 2 +for data integrity protection. +Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated. +The default is +.Dq hmac-md5,hmac-sha1,hmac-ripemd160,hmac-sha1-96,hmac-md5-96 . +.It Cm MaxStartups +Specifies the maximum number of concurrent unauthenticated connections to the +.Nm +daemon. +Additional connections will be dropped until authentication succeeds or the +.Cm LoginGraceTime +expires for a connection. +The default is 10. +.Pp +Alternatively, random early drop can be enabled by specifying +the three colon separated values +.Dq start:rate:full +(e.g., "10:30:60"). +.Nm +will refuse connection attempts with a probability of +.Dq rate/100 +(30%) +if there are currently +.Dq start +(10) +unauthenticated connections. +The probability increases linearly and all connection attempts +are refused if the number of unauthenticated connections reaches +.Dq full +(60). +.It Cm PAMAuthenticationViaKbdInt +Specifies whether PAM challenge response authentication is allowed. This +allows the use of most PAM challenge response authentication modules, but +it will allow password authentication regardless of whether +.Cm PasswordAuthentication +is disabled. +The default is +.Dq no . +.It Cm PasswordAuthentication +Specifies whether password authentication is allowed. +The default is +.Dq yes . +.It Cm PermitEmptyPasswords +When password authentication is allowed, it specifies whether the +server allows login to accounts with empty password strings. +The default is +.Dq no . +.It Cm PermitRootLogin +Specifies whether root can login using +.Xr ssh 1 . +The argument must be +.Dq yes , +.Dq without-password , +.Dq forced-commands-only +or +.Dq no . +The default is +.Dq yes . +.Pp +If this option is set to +.Dq without-password +password authentication is disabled for root. +.Pp +If this option is set to +.Dq forced-commands-only +root login with public key authentication will be allowed, +but only if the +.Ar command +option has been specified +(which may be useful for taking remote backups even if root login is +normally not allowed). All other authentication methods are disabled +for root. +.Pp +If this option is set to +.Dq no +root is not allowed to login. +.It Cm PidFile +Specifies the file that contains the process identifier of the +.Nm +daemon. +The default is +.Pa /var/run/sshd.pid . +.It Cm Port +Specifies the port number that +.Nm +listens on. +The default is 22. +Multiple options of this type are permitted. +See also +.Cm ListenAddress . +.It Cm PrintLastLog +Specifies whether +.Nm +should print the date and time when the user last logged in. +The default is +.Dq yes . +.It Cm PrintMotd +Specifies whether +.Nm +should print +.Pa /etc/motd +when a user logs in interactively. +(On some systems it is also printed by the shell, +.Pa /etc/profile , +or equivalent.) +The default is +.Dq yes . +.It Cm Protocol +Specifies the protocol versions +.Nm +should support. +The possible values are +.Dq 1 +and +.Dq 2 . +Multiple versions must be comma-separated. +The default is +.Dq 2,1 . +.It Cm PubkeyAuthentication +Specifies whether public key authentication is allowed. +The default is +.Dq yes . +Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only. +.It Cm ReverseMappingCheck +Specifies whether +.Nm +should try to verify the remote host name and check that +the resolved host name for the remote IP address maps back to the +very same IP address. +The default is +.Dq no . +.It Cm RhostsAuthentication +Specifies whether authentication using rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv +files is sufficient. +Normally, this method should not be permitted because it is insecure. +.Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication +should be used +instead, because it performs RSA-based host authentication in addition +to normal rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication. +The default is +.Dq no . +This option applies to protocol version 1 only. +.It Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication +Specifies whether rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication together +with successful RSA host authentication is allowed. +The default is +.Dq no . +This option applies to protocol version 1 only. +.It Cm RSAAuthentication +Specifies whether pure RSA authentication is allowed. +The default is +.Dq yes . +This option applies to protocol version 1 only. +.It Cm ServerKeyBits +Defines the number of bits in the ephemeral protocol version 1 server key. +The minimum value is 512, and the default is 768. +.It Cm StrictModes +Specifies whether +.Nm +should check file modes and ownership of the +user's files and home directory before accepting login. +This is normally desirable because novices sometimes accidentally leave their +directory or files world-writable. +The default is +.Dq yes . +.It Cm Subsystem +Configures an external subsystem (e.g., file transfer daemon). +Arguments should be a subsystem name and a command to execute upon subsystem +request. +The command +.Xr sftp-server 8 +implements the +.Dq sftp +file transfer subsystem. +By default no subsystems are defined. +Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only. +.It Cm SyslogFacility +Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from +.Nm sshd . +The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2, +LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7. +The default is AUTH. +.It Cm UseLogin +Specifies whether +.Xr login 1 +is used for interactive login sessions. +The default is +.Dq no . +Note that +.Xr login 1 +is never used for remote command execution. +Note also, that if this is enabled, +.Cm X11Forwarding +will be disabled because +.Xr login 1 +does not know how to handle +.Xr xauth 1 +cookies. +.It Cm X11DisplayOffset +Specifies the first display number available for +.Nm sshd Ns 's +X11 forwarding. +This prevents +.Nm +from interfering with real X11 servers. +The default is 10. +.It Cm X11Forwarding +Specifies whether X11 forwarding is permitted. +The default is +.Dq no . +Note that disabling X11 forwarding does not improve security in any +way, as users can always install their own forwarders. +X11 forwarding is automatically disabled if +.Cm UseLogin +is enabled. +.It Cm XAuthLocation +Specifies the location of the +.Xr xauth 1 +program. +The default is +.Pa /usr/X11R6/bin/xauth . +.El +.Ss Time Formats +.Pp +.Nm +command-line arguments and configuration file options that specify time +may be expressed using a sequence of the form: +.Sm off +.Ar time Oo Ar qualifier Oc , +.Sm on +where +.Ar time +is a positive integer value and +.Ar qualifier +is one of the following: +.Pp +.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact -offset indent +.It Cm +seconds +.It Cm s | Cm S +seconds +.It Cm m | Cm M +minutes +.It Cm h | Cm H +hours +.It Cm d | Cm D +days +.It Cm w | Cm W +weeks +.El +.Pp +Each member of the sequence is added together to calculate +the total time value. +.Pp +Time format examples: +.Pp +.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact -offset indent +.It 600 +600 seconds (10 minutes) +.It 10m +10 minutes +.It 1h30m +1 hour 30 minutes (90 minutes) +.El +.Sh LOGIN PROCESS +When a user successfully logs in, +.Nm +does the following: +.Bl -enum -offset indent +.It +If the login is on a tty, and no command has been specified, +prints last login time and +.Pa /etc/motd +(unless prevented in the configuration file or by +.Pa $HOME/.hushlogin ; +see the +.Sx FILES +section). +.It +If the login is on a tty, records login time. +.It +Checks +.Pa /etc/nologin ; +if it exists, prints contents and quits +(unless root). +.It +Changes to run with normal user privileges. +.It +Sets up basic environment. +.It +Reads +.Pa $HOME/.ssh/environment +if it exists. +.It +Changes to user's home directory. +.It +If +.Pa $HOME/.ssh/rc +exists, runs it; else if +.Pa /etc/sshrc +exists, runs +it; otherwise runs xauth. +The +.Dq rc +files are given the X11 +authentication protocol and cookie in standard input. +.It +Runs user's shell or command. +.El +.Sh AUTHORIZED_KEYS FILE FORMAT +.Pa $HOME/.ssh/authorized_keys +is the default file that lists the public keys that are +permitted for RSA authentication in protocol version 1 +and for public key authentication (PubkeyAuthentication) +in protocol version 2. +.Cm AuthorizedKeysFile +may be used to specify an alternative file. +.Pp +Each line of the file contains one +key (empty lines and lines starting with a +.Ql # +are ignored as +comments). +Each RSA public key consists of the following fields, separated by +spaces: options, bits, exponent, modulus, comment. +Each protocol version 2 public key consists of: +options, keytype, base64 encoded key, comment. +The options fields +are optional; its presence is determined by whether the line starts +with a number or not (the option field never starts with a number). +The bits, exponent, modulus and comment fields give the RSA key for +protocol version 1; the +comment field is not used for anything (but may be convenient for the +user to identify the key). +For protocol version 2 the keytype is +.Dq ssh-dss +or +.Dq ssh-rsa . +.Pp +Note that lines in this file are usually several hundred bytes long +(because of the size of the RSA key modulus). +You don't want to type them in; instead, copy the +.Pa identity.pub , +.Pa id_dsa.pub +or the +.Pa id_rsa.pub +file and edit it. +.Pp +The options (if present) consist of comma-separated option +specifications. +No spaces are permitted, except within double quotes. +The following option specifications are supported (note +that option keywords are case-insensitive): +.Bl -tag -width Ds +.It Cm from="pattern-list" +Specifies that in addition to RSA authentication, the canonical name +of the remote host must be present in the comma-separated list of +patterns +.Pf ( Ql * +and +.Ql ? +serve as wildcards). +The list may also contain +patterns negated by prefixing them with +.Ql ! ; +if the canonical host name matches a negated pattern, the key is not accepted. +The purpose +of this option is to optionally increase security: RSA authentication +by itself does not trust the network or name servers or anything (but +the key); however, if somebody somehow steals the key, the key +permits an intruder to log in from anywhere in the world. +This additional option makes using a stolen key more difficult (name +servers and/or routers would have to be compromised in addition to +just the key). +.It Cm command="command" +Specifies that the command is executed whenever this key is used for +authentication. +The command supplied by the user (if any) is ignored. +The command is run on a pty if the client requests a pty; +otherwise it is run without a tty. +If a 8-bit clean channel is required, +one must not request a pty or should specify +.Cm no-pty . +A quote may be included in the command by quoting it with a backslash. +This option might be useful +to restrict certain RSA keys to perform just a specific operation. +An example might be a key that permits remote backups but nothing else. +Note that the client may specify TCP/IP and/or X11 +forwarding unless they are explicitly prohibited. +Note that this option applies to shell, command or subsystem execution. +.It Cm environment="NAME=value" +Specifies that the string is to be added to the environment when +logging in using this key. +Environment variables set this way +override other default environment values. +Multiple options of this type are permitted. +This option is automatically disabled if +.Cm UseLogin +is enabled. +.It Cm no-port-forwarding +Forbids TCP/IP forwarding when this key is used for authentication. +Any port forward requests by the client will return an error. +This might be used, e.g., in connection with the +.Cm command +option. +.It Cm no-X11-forwarding +Forbids X11 forwarding when this key is used for authentication. +Any X11 forward requests by the client will return an error. +.It Cm no-agent-forwarding +Forbids authentication agent forwarding when this key is used for +authentication. +.It Cm no-pty +Prevents tty allocation (a request to allocate a pty will fail). +.It Cm permitopen="host:port" +Limit local +.Li ``ssh -L'' +port forwarding such that it may only connect to the specified host and +port. +IPv6 addresses can be specified with an alternative syntax: +.Ar host/port . +Multiple +.Cm permitopen +options may be applied separated by commas. No pattern matching is +performed on the specified hostnames, they must be literal domains or +addresses. +.El +.Ss Examples +1024 33 12121.\|.\|.\|312314325 ylo@foo.bar +.Pp +from="*.niksula.hut.fi,!pc.niksula.hut.fi" 1024 35 23.\|.\|.\|2334 ylo@niksula +.Pp +command="dump /home",no-pty,no-port-forwarding 1024 33 23.\|.\|.\|2323 backup.hut.fi +.Pp +permitopen="10.2.1.55:80",permitopen="10.2.1.56:25" 1024 33 23.\|.\|.\|2323 +.Sh SSH_KNOWN_HOSTS FILE FORMAT +The +.Pa /etc/ssh_known_hosts , +and +.Pa $HOME/.ssh/known_hosts +files contain host public keys for all known hosts. +The global file should +be prepared by the administrator (optional), and the per-user file is +maintained automatically: whenever the user connects from an unknown host +its key is added to the per-user file. +.Pp +Each line in these files contains the following fields: hostnames, +bits, exponent, modulus, comment. +The fields are separated by spaces. +.Pp +Hostnames is a comma-separated list of patterns ('*' and '?' act as +wildcards); each pattern in turn is matched against the canonical host +name (when authenticating a client) or against the user-supplied +name (when authenticating a server). +A pattern may also be preceded by +.Ql ! +to indicate negation: if the host name matches a negated +pattern, it is not accepted (by that line) even if it matched another +pattern on the line. +.Pp +Bits, exponent, and modulus are taken directly from the RSA host key; they +can be obtained, e.g., from +.Pa /etc/ssh_host_key.pub . +The optional comment field continues to the end of the line, and is not used. +.Pp +Lines starting with +.Ql # +and empty lines are ignored as comments. +.Pp +When performing host authentication, authentication is accepted if any +matching line has the proper key. +It is thus permissible (but not +recommended) to have several lines or different host keys for the same +names. +This will inevitably happen when short forms of host names +from different domains are put in the file. +It is possible +that the files contain conflicting information; authentication is +accepted if valid information can be found from either file. +.Pp +Note that the lines in these files are typically hundreds of characters +long, and you definitely don't want to type in the host keys by hand. +Rather, generate them by a script +or by taking +.Pa /etc/ssh_host_key.pub +and adding the host names at the front. +.Ss Examples +.Bd -literal +closenet,.\|.\|.\|,130.233.208.41 1024 37 159.\|.\|.93 closenet.hut.fi +cvs.openbsd.org,199.185.137.3 ssh-rsa AAAA1234.....= +.Ed +.Sh FILES +.Bl -tag -width Ds +.It Pa /etc/sshd_config +Contains configuration data for +.Nm sshd . +This file should be writable by root only, but it is recommended +(though not necessary) that it be world-readable. +.It Pa /etc/ssh_host_key, /etc/ssh_host_dsa_key, /etc/ssh_host_rsa_key +These three files contain the private parts of the host keys. +These files should only be owned by root, readable only by root, and not +accessible to others. +Note that +.Nm +does not start if this file is group/world-accessible. +.It Pa /etc/ssh_host_key.pub, /etc/ssh_host_dsa_key.pub, /etc/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub +These three files contain the public parts of the host keys. +These files should be world-readable but writable only by +root. +Their contents should match the respective private parts. +These files are not +really used for anything; they are provided for the convenience of +the user so their contents can be copied to known hosts files. +These files are created using +.Xr ssh-keygen 1 . +.It Pa /etc/moduli +Contains Diffie-Hellman groups used for the "Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange". +.It Pa /var/run/sshd.pid +Contains the process ID of the +.Nm +listening for connections (if there are several daemons running +concurrently for different ports, this contains the pid of the one +started last). +The content of this file is not sensitive; it can be world-readable. +.It Pa $HOME/.ssh/authorized_keys +Lists the public keys (RSA or DSA) that can be used to log into the user's account. +This file must be readable by root (which may on some machines imply +it being world-readable if the user's home directory resides on an NFS +volume). +It is recommended that it not be accessible by others. +The format of this file is described above. +Users will place the contents of their +.Pa identity.pub , +.Pa id_dsa.pub +and/or +.Pa id_rsa.pub +files into this file, as described in +.Xr ssh-keygen 1 . +.It Pa "/etc/ssh_known_hosts" and "$HOME/.ssh/known_hosts" +These files are consulted when using rhosts with RSA host +authentication or protocol version 2 hostbased authentication +to check the public key of the host. +The key must be listed in one of these files to be accepted. +The client uses the same files +to verify that it is connecting to the correct remote host. +These files should be writable only by root/the owner. +.Pa /etc/ssh_known_hosts +should be world-readable, and +.Pa $HOME/.ssh/known_hosts +can but need not be world-readable. +.It Pa /etc/nologin +If this file exists, +.Nm +refuses to let anyone except root log in. +The contents of the file +are displayed to anyone trying to log in, and non-root connections are +refused. +The file should be world-readable. +.It Pa /etc/hosts.allow, /etc/hosts.deny +Access controls that should be enforced by tcp-wrappers are defined here. +Further details are described in +.Xr hosts_access 5 . +.It Pa $HOME/.rhosts +This file contains host-username pairs, separated by a space, one per +line. +The given user on the corresponding host is permitted to log in +without password. +The same file is used by rlogind and rshd. +The file must +be writable only by the user; it is recommended that it not be +accessible by others. +.Pp +If is also possible to use netgroups in the file. +Either host or user +name may be of the form +@groupname to specify all hosts or all users +in the group. +.It Pa $HOME/.shosts +For ssh, +this file is exactly the same as for +.Pa .rhosts . +However, this file is +not used by rlogin and rshd, so using this permits access using SSH only. +.It Pa /etc/hosts.equiv +This file is used during +.Pa .rhosts +authentication. +In the simplest form, this file contains host names, one per line. +Users on +those hosts are permitted to log in without a password, provided they +have the same user name on both machines. +The host name may also be +followed by a user name; such users are permitted to log in as +.Em any +user on this machine (except root). +Additionally, the syntax +.Dq +@group +can be used to specify netgroups. +Negated entries start with +.Ql \&- . +.Pp +If the client host/user is successfully matched in this file, login is +automatically permitted provided the client and server user names are the +same. +Additionally, successful RSA host authentication is normally required. +This file must be writable only by root; it is recommended +that it be world-readable. +.Pp +.Sy "Warning: It is almost never a good idea to use user names in" +.Pa hosts.equiv . +Beware that it really means that the named user(s) can log in as +.Em anybody , +which includes bin, daemon, adm, and other accounts that own critical +binaries and directories. +Using a user name practically grants the user root access. +The only valid use for user names that I can think +of is in negative entries. +.Pp +Note that this warning also applies to rsh/rlogin. +.It Pa /etc/shosts.equiv +This is processed exactly as +.Pa /etc/hosts.equiv . +However, this file may be useful in environments that want to run both +rsh/rlogin and ssh. +.It Pa $HOME/.ssh/environment +This file is read into the environment at login (if it exists). +It can only contain empty lines, comment lines (that start with +.Ql # ) , +and assignment lines of the form name=value. +The file should be writable +only by the user; it need not be readable by anyone else. +.It Pa $HOME/.ssh/rc +If this file exists, it is run with /bin/sh after reading the +environment files but before starting the user's shell or command. +If X11 spoofing is in use, this will receive the "proto cookie" pair in +standard input (and +.Ev DISPLAY +in environment). +This must call +.Xr xauth 1 +in that case. +.Pp +The primary purpose of this file is to run any initialization routines +which may be needed before the user's home directory becomes +accessible; AFS is a particular example of such an environment. +.Pp +This file will probably contain some initialization code followed by +something similar to: +.Bd -literal + if read proto cookie; then + echo add $DISPLAY $proto $cookie | xauth -q - + fi +.Ed +.Pp +If this file does not exist, +.Pa /etc/sshrc +is run, and if that +does not exist either, xauth is used to store the cookie. +.Pp +This file should be writable only by the user, and need not be +readable by anyone else. +.It Pa /etc/sshrc +Like +.Pa $HOME/.ssh/rc . +This can be used to specify +machine-specific login-time initializations globally. +This file should be writable only by root, and should be world-readable. +.El +.Sh AUTHORS +OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free +ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen. +Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, +Theo de Raadt and Dug Song +removed many bugs, re-added newer features and +created OpenSSH. +Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH +protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0. +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr scp 1 , +.Xr sftp 1 , +.Xr ssh 1 , +.Xr ssh-add 1 , +.Xr ssh-agent 1 , +.Xr ssh-keygen 1 , +.Xr login.conf 5 , +.Xr moduli 5 , +.Xr sftp-server 8 +.Rs +.%A T. Ylonen +.%A T. Kivinen +.%A M. Saarinen +.%A T. Rinne +.%A S. Lehtinen +.%T "SSH Protocol Architecture" +.%N draft-ietf-secsh-architecture-09.txt +.%D July 2001 +.%O work in progress material +.Re +.Rs +.%A M. Friedl +.%A N. Provos +.%A W. A. Simpson +.%T "Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange for the SSH Transport Layer Protocol" +.%N draft-ietf-secsh-dh-group-exchange-01.txt +.%D April 2001 +.%O work in progress material +.Re diff --git a/openssh/sshd.c b/openssh/sshd.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..71a5c2c --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/sshd.c @@ -0,0 +1,1488 @@ +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * This program is the ssh daemon. It listens for connections from clients, + * and performs authentication, executes use commands or shell, and forwards + * information to/from the application to the user client over an encrypted + * connection. This can also handle forwarding of X11, TCP/IP, and + * authentication agent connections. + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + * + * SSH2 implementation: + * + * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" +RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.209 2001/11/10 13:19:45 markus Exp $"); + +#include +#include +#include + +#include "ssh.h" +#include "ssh1.h" +#include "ssh2.h" +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "rsa.h" +#include "sshpty.h" +#include "packet.h" +#include "mpaux.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "servconf.h" +#include "uidswap.h" +#include "compat.h" +#include "buffer.h" +#include "cipher.h" +#include "kex.h" +#include "key.h" +#include "dh.h" +#include "myproposal.h" +#include "authfile.h" +#include "pathnames.h" +#include "atomicio.h" +#include "canohost.h" +#include "auth.h" +#include "misc.h" +#include "dispatch.h" +#include "channels.h" + +#ifdef LIBWRAP +#include +#include +int allow_severity = LOG_INFO; +int deny_severity = LOG_WARNING; +#endif /* LIBWRAP */ + +#ifndef O_NOCTTY +#define O_NOCTTY 0 +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE___PROGNAME +extern char *__progname; +#else +char *__progname; +#endif + +/* Server configuration options. */ +ServerOptions options; + +/* Name of the server configuration file. */ +char *config_file_name = _PATH_SERVER_CONFIG_FILE; + +/* + * Flag indicating whether IPv4 or IPv6. This can be set on the command line. + * Default value is AF_UNSPEC means both IPv4 and IPv6. + */ +#ifdef IPV4_DEFAULT +int IPv4or6 = AF_INET; +#else +int IPv4or6 = AF_UNSPEC; +#endif + +/* + * Debug mode flag. This can be set on the command line. If debug + * mode is enabled, extra debugging output will be sent to the system + * log, the daemon will not go to background, and will exit after processing + * the first connection. + */ +int debug_flag = 0; + +/* Flag indicating that the daemon should only test the configuration and keys. */ +int test_flag = 0; + +/* Flag indicating that the daemon is being started from inetd. */ +int inetd_flag = 0; + +/* Flag indicating that sshd should not detach and become a daemon. */ +int no_daemon_flag = 0; + +/* debug goes to stderr unless inetd_flag is set */ +int log_stderr = 0; + +/* Saved arguments to main(). */ +char **saved_argv; +int saved_argc; + +/* + * The sockets that the server is listening; this is used in the SIGHUP + * signal handler. + */ +#define MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS 16 +int listen_socks[MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS]; +int num_listen_socks = 0; + +/* + * the client's version string, passed by sshd2 in compat mode. if != NULL, + * sshd will skip the version-number exchange + */ +char *client_version_string = NULL; +char *server_version_string = NULL; + +/* for rekeying XXX fixme */ +Kex *xxx_kex; + +/* + * Any really sensitive data in the application is contained in this + * structure. The idea is that this structure could be locked into memory so + * that the pages do not get written into swap. However, there are some + * problems. The private key contains BIGNUMs, and we do not (in principle) + * have access to the internals of them, and locking just the structure is + * not very useful. Currently, memory locking is not implemented. + */ +struct { + Key *server_key; /* ephemeral server key */ + Key *ssh1_host_key; /* ssh1 host key */ + Key **host_keys; /* all private host keys */ + int have_ssh1_key; + int have_ssh2_key; + u_char ssh1_cookie[SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH]; +} sensitive_data; + +/* + * Flag indicating whether the RSA server key needs to be regenerated. + * Is set in the SIGALRM handler and cleared when the key is regenerated. + */ +int key_do_regen = 0; + +/* This is set to true when a signal is received. */ +int received_sighup = 0; +int received_sigterm = 0; + +/* session identifier, used by RSA-auth */ +u_char session_id[16]; + +/* same for ssh2 */ +u_char *session_id2 = NULL; +int session_id2_len = 0; + +/* record remote hostname or ip */ +u_int utmp_len = MAXHOSTNAMELEN; + +/* Prototypes for various functions defined later in this file. */ +void destroy_sensitive_data(void); + +static void do_ssh1_kex(void); +static void do_ssh2_kex(void); + +/* + * Close all listening sockets + */ +static void +close_listen_socks(void) +{ + int i; + for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++) + close(listen_socks[i]); + num_listen_socks = -1; +} + +/* + * Signal handler for SIGHUP. Sshd execs itself when it receives SIGHUP; + * the effect is to reread the configuration file (and to regenerate + * the server key). + */ +static void +sighup_handler(int sig) +{ + received_sighup = 1; + signal(SIGHUP, sighup_handler); +} + +/* + * Called from the main program after receiving SIGHUP. + * Restarts the server. + */ +static void +sighup_restart(void) +{ + log("Received SIGHUP; restarting."); + close_listen_socks(); + execv(saved_argv[0], saved_argv); + log("RESTART FAILED: av[0]='%.100s', error: %.100s.", saved_argv[0], strerror(errno)); + exit(1); +} + +/* + * Generic signal handler for terminating signals in the master daemon. + */ +static void +sigterm_handler(int sig) +{ + received_sigterm = sig; +} + +/* + * SIGCHLD handler. This is called whenever a child dies. This will then + * reap any zombies left by exited children. + */ +static void +main_sigchld_handler(int sig) +{ + int save_errno = errno; + int status; + + while (waitpid(-1, &status, WNOHANG) > 0) + ; + + signal(SIGCHLD, main_sigchld_handler); + errno = save_errno; +} + +/* + * Signal handler for the alarm after the login grace period has expired. + */ +static void +grace_alarm_handler(int sig) +{ + /* XXX no idea how fix this signal handler */ + + /* Close the connection. */ + packet_close(); + + /* Log error and exit. */ + fatal("Timeout before authentication for %s.", get_remote_ipaddr()); +} + +/* + * Signal handler for the key regeneration alarm. Note that this + * alarm only occurs in the daemon waiting for connections, and it does not + * do anything with the private key or random state before forking. + * Thus there should be no concurrency control/asynchronous execution + * problems. + */ +static void +generate_ephemeral_server_key(void) +{ + u_int32_t rand = 0; + int i; + + verbose("Generating %s%d bit RSA key.", + sensitive_data.server_key ? "new " : "", options.server_key_bits); + if (sensitive_data.server_key != NULL) + key_free(sensitive_data.server_key); + sensitive_data.server_key = key_generate(KEY_RSA1, + options.server_key_bits); + verbose("RSA key generation complete."); + + for (i = 0; i < SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH; i++) { + if (i % 4 == 0) + rand = arc4random(); + sensitive_data.ssh1_cookie[i] = rand & 0xff; + rand >>= 8; + } + arc4random_stir(); +} + +static void +key_regeneration_alarm(int sig) +{ + int save_errno = errno; + signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL); + errno = save_errno; + key_do_regen = 1; +} + +static void +sshd_exchange_identification(int sock_in, int sock_out) +{ + int i, mismatch; + int remote_major, remote_minor; + int major, minor; + char *s; + char buf[256]; /* Must not be larger than remote_version. */ + char remote_version[256]; /* Must be at least as big as buf. */ + + if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) && + (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2)) { + major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1; + minor = 99; + } else if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) { + major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2; + minor = PROTOCOL_MINOR_2; + } else { + major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1; + minor = PROTOCOL_MINOR_1; + } + snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s\n", major, minor, SSH_VERSION); + server_version_string = xstrdup(buf); + + if (client_version_string == NULL) { + /* Send our protocol version identification. */ + if (atomicio(write, sock_out, server_version_string, strlen(server_version_string)) + != strlen(server_version_string)) { + log("Could not write ident string to %s", get_remote_ipaddr()); + fatal_cleanup(); + } + + /* Read other side's version identification. */ + memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); + for (i = 0; i < sizeof(buf) - 1; i++) { + if (atomicio(read, sock_in, &buf[i], 1) != 1) { + log("Did not receive identification string from %s", + get_remote_ipaddr()); + fatal_cleanup(); + } + if (buf[i] == '\r') { + buf[i] = 0; + /* Kludge for F-Secure Macintosh < 1.0.2 */ + if (i == 12 && + strncmp(buf, "SSH-1.5-W1.0", 12) == 0) + break; + continue; + } + if (buf[i] == '\n') { + buf[i] = 0; + break; + } + } + buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = 0; + client_version_string = xstrdup(buf); + } + + /* + * Check that the versions match. In future this might accept + * several versions and set appropriate flags to handle them. + */ + if (sscanf(client_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%[^\n]\n", + &remote_major, &remote_minor, remote_version) != 3) { + s = "Protocol mismatch.\n"; + (void) atomicio(write, sock_out, s, strlen(s)); + close(sock_in); + close(sock_out); + log("Bad protocol version identification '%.100s' from %s", + client_version_string, get_remote_ipaddr()); + fatal_cleanup(); + } + debug("Client protocol version %d.%d; client software version %.100s", + remote_major, remote_minor, remote_version); + + compat_datafellows(remote_version); + + if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_SCANNER) { + log("scanned from %s with %s. Don't panic.", + get_remote_ipaddr(), client_version_string); + fatal_cleanup(); + } + + mismatch = 0; + switch(remote_major) { + case 1: + if (remote_minor == 99) { + if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) + enable_compat20(); + else + mismatch = 1; + break; + } + if (!(options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1)) { + mismatch = 1; + break; + } + if (remote_minor < 3) { + packet_disconnect("Your ssh version is too old and " + "is no longer supported. Please install a newer version."); + } else if (remote_minor == 3) { + /* note that this disables agent-forwarding */ + enable_compat13(); + } + break; + case 2: + if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) { + enable_compat20(); + break; + } + /* FALLTHROUGH */ + default: + mismatch = 1; + break; + } + chop(server_version_string); + debug("Local version string %.200s", server_version_string); + + if (mismatch) { + s = "Protocol major versions differ.\n"; + (void) atomicio(write, sock_out, s, strlen(s)); + close(sock_in); + close(sock_out); + log("Protocol major versions differ for %s: %.200s vs. %.200s", + get_remote_ipaddr(), + server_version_string, client_version_string); + fatal_cleanup(); + } +} + + +/* Destroy the host and server keys. They will no longer be needed. */ +void +destroy_sensitive_data(void) +{ + int i; + + if (sensitive_data.server_key) { + key_free(sensitive_data.server_key); + sensitive_data.server_key = NULL; + } + for(i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) { + if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) { + key_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]); + sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL; + } + } + sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = NULL; + memset(sensitive_data.ssh1_cookie, 0, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH); +} + +static char * +list_hostkey_types(void) +{ + static char buf[1024]; + int i; + buf[0] = '\0'; + for(i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) { + Key *key = sensitive_data.host_keys[i]; + if (key == NULL) + continue; + switch(key->type) { + case KEY_RSA: + case KEY_DSA: + strlcat(buf, key_ssh_name(key), sizeof buf); + strlcat(buf, ",", sizeof buf); + break; + } + } + i = strlen(buf); + if (i > 0 && buf[i-1] == ',') + buf[i-1] = '\0'; + debug("list_hostkey_types: %s", buf); + return buf; +} + +static Key * +get_hostkey_by_type(int type) +{ + int i; + for(i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) { + Key *key = sensitive_data.host_keys[i]; + if (key != NULL && key->type == type) + return key; + } + return NULL; +} + +/* + * returns 1 if connection should be dropped, 0 otherwise. + * dropping starts at connection #max_startups_begin with a probability + * of (max_startups_rate/100). the probability increases linearly until + * all connections are dropped for startups > max_startups + */ +static int +drop_connection(int startups) +{ + double p, r; + + if (startups < options.max_startups_begin) + return 0; + if (startups >= options.max_startups) + return 1; + if (options.max_startups_rate == 100) + return 1; + + p = 100 - options.max_startups_rate; + p *= startups - options.max_startups_begin; + p /= (double) (options.max_startups - options.max_startups_begin); + p += options.max_startups_rate; + p /= 100.0; + r = arc4random() / (double) UINT_MAX; + + debug("drop_connection: p %g, r %g", p, r); + return (r < p) ? 1 : 0; +} + +int *startup_pipes = NULL; /* options.max_startup sized array of fd ints */ +int startup_pipe; /* in child */ + +/* + * Main program for the daemon. + */ +int +main(int ac, char **av) +{ + extern char *optarg; + extern int optind; + int opt, sock_in = 0, sock_out = 0, newsock, j, i, fdsetsz, on = 1; + pid_t pid; + socklen_t fromlen; + fd_set *fdset; + struct sockaddr_storage from; + const char *remote_ip; + int remote_port; + FILE *f; + struct linger linger; + struct addrinfo *ai; + char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV]; + int listen_sock, maxfd; + int startup_p[2]; + int startups = 0; + Key *key; + int ret, key_used = 0; + + __progname = get_progname(av[0]); + init_rng(); + + /* Save argv. */ + saved_argc = ac; + saved_argv = av; + + /* Initialize configuration options to their default values. */ + initialize_server_options(&options); + + /* Parse command-line arguments. */ + while ((opt = getopt(ac, av, "f:p:b:k:h:g:V:u:dDeiqtQ46")) != -1) { + switch (opt) { + case '4': + IPv4or6 = AF_INET; + break; + case '6': + IPv4or6 = AF_INET6; + break; + case 'f': + config_file_name = optarg; + break; + case 'd': + if (0 == debug_flag) { + debug_flag = 1; + options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1; + } else if (options.log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3) { + options.log_level++; + } else { + fprintf(stderr, "Too high debugging level.\n"); + exit(1); + } + break; + case 'D': + no_daemon_flag = 1; + break; + case 'e': + log_stderr = 1; + break; + case 'i': + inetd_flag = 1; + break; + case 'Q': + /* ignored */ + break; + case 'q': + options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET; + break; + case 'b': + options.server_key_bits = atoi(optarg); + break; + case 'p': + options.ports_from_cmdline = 1; + if (options.num_ports >= MAX_PORTS) { + fprintf(stderr, "too many ports.\n"); + exit(1); + } + options.ports[options.num_ports++] = a2port(optarg); + if (options.ports[options.num_ports-1] == 0) { + fprintf(stderr, "Bad port number.\n"); + exit(1); + } + break; + case 'g': + if ((options.login_grace_time = convtime(optarg)) == -1) { + fprintf(stderr, "Invalid login grace time.\n"); + exit(1); + } + break; + case 'k': + if ((options.key_regeneration_time = convtime(optarg)) == -1) { + fprintf(stderr, "Invalid key regeneration interval.\n"); + exit(1); + } + break; + case 'h': + if (options.num_host_key_files >= MAX_HOSTKEYS) { + fprintf(stderr, "too many host keys.\n"); + exit(1); + } + options.host_key_files[options.num_host_key_files++] = optarg; + break; + case 'V': + client_version_string = optarg; + /* only makes sense with inetd_flag, i.e. no listen() */ + inetd_flag = 1; + break; + case 't': + test_flag = 1; + break; + case 'u': + utmp_len = atoi(optarg); + break; + case '?': + default: + fprintf(stderr, "sshd version %s\n", SSH_VERSION); + fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s [options]\n", __progname); + fprintf(stderr, "Options:\n"); + fprintf(stderr, " -f file Configuration file (default %s)\n", _PATH_SERVER_CONFIG_FILE); + fprintf(stderr, " -d Debugging mode (multiple -d means more debugging)\n"); + fprintf(stderr, " -i Started from inetd\n"); + fprintf(stderr, " -D Do not fork into daemon mode\n"); + fprintf(stderr, " -t Only test configuration file and keys\n"); + fprintf(stderr, " -q Quiet (no logging)\n"); + fprintf(stderr, " -p port Listen on the specified port (default: 22)\n"); + fprintf(stderr, " -k seconds Regenerate server key every this many seconds (default: 3600)\n"); + fprintf(stderr, " -g seconds Grace period for authentication (default: 600)\n"); + fprintf(stderr, " -b bits Size of server RSA key (default: 768 bits)\n"); + fprintf(stderr, " -h file File from which to read host key (default: %s)\n", + _PATH_HOST_KEY_FILE); + fprintf(stderr, " -u len Maximum hostname length for utmp recording\n"); + fprintf(stderr, " -4 Use IPv4 only\n"); + fprintf(stderr, " -6 Use IPv6 only\n"); + exit(1); + } + } + SSLeay_add_all_algorithms(); + channel_set_af(IPv4or6); + + /* + * Force logging to stderr until we have loaded the private host + * key (unless started from inetd) + */ + log_init(__progname, + options.log_level == -1 ? SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : options.log_level, + options.log_facility == -1 ? SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH : options.log_facility, + !inetd_flag); + +#ifdef _CRAY + /* Cray can define user privs drop all prives now! + * Not needed on PRIV_SU systems! + */ + drop_cray_privs(); +#endif + + seed_rng(); + + /* Read server configuration options from the configuration file. */ + read_server_config(&options, config_file_name); + + /* Fill in default values for those options not explicitly set. */ + fill_default_server_options(&options); + + /* Check that there are no remaining arguments. */ + if (optind < ac) { + fprintf(stderr, "Extra argument %s.\n", av[optind]); + exit(1); + } + + debug("sshd version %.100s", SSH_VERSION); + + /* load private host keys */ + sensitive_data.host_keys = xmalloc(options.num_host_key_files*sizeof(Key*)); + for(i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) + sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL; + sensitive_data.server_key = NULL; + sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = NULL; + sensitive_data.have_ssh1_key = 0; + sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key = 0; + + for(i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) { + key = key_load_private(options.host_key_files[i], "", NULL); + sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = key; + if (key == NULL) { + error("Could not load host key: %s", + options.host_key_files[i]); + sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL; + continue; + } + switch(key->type){ + case KEY_RSA1: + sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = key; + sensitive_data.have_ssh1_key = 1; + break; + case KEY_RSA: + case KEY_DSA: + sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key = 1; + break; + } + debug("private host key: #%d type %d %s", i, key->type, + key_type(key)); + } + if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) && !sensitive_data.have_ssh1_key) { + log("Disabling protocol version 1. Could not load host key"); + options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_1; + } + if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) && !sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key) { + log("Disabling protocol version 2. Could not load host key"); + options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_2; + } + if (!(options.protocol & (SSH_PROTO_1|SSH_PROTO_2))) { + log("sshd: no hostkeys available -- exiting."); + exit(1); + } + + /* Check certain values for sanity. */ + if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) { + if (options.server_key_bits < 512 || + options.server_key_bits > 32768) { + fprintf(stderr, "Bad server key size.\n"); + exit(1); + } + /* + * Check that server and host key lengths differ sufficiently. This + * is necessary to make double encryption work with rsaref. Oh, I + * hate software patents. I dont know if this can go? Niels + */ + if (options.server_key_bits > + BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) - SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED && + options.server_key_bits < + BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) { + options.server_key_bits = + BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED; + debug("Forcing server key to %d bits to make it differ from host key.", + options.server_key_bits); + } + } + + /* Configuration looks good, so exit if in test mode. */ + if (test_flag) + exit(0); + +#ifdef HAVE_SCO_PROTECTED_PW + (void) set_auth_parameters(ac, av); +#endif + + /* Initialize the log (it is reinitialized below in case we forked). */ + if (debug_flag && !inetd_flag) + log_stderr = 1; + log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr); + + /* + * If not in debugging mode, and not started from inetd, disconnect + * from the controlling terminal, and fork. The original process + * exits. + */ + if (!(debug_flag || inetd_flag || no_daemon_flag)) { +#ifdef TIOCNOTTY + int fd; +#endif /* TIOCNOTTY */ + if (daemon(0, 0) < 0) + fatal("daemon() failed: %.200s", strerror(errno)); + + /* Disconnect from the controlling tty. */ +#ifdef TIOCNOTTY + fd = open(_PATH_TTY, O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY); + if (fd >= 0) { + (void) ioctl(fd, TIOCNOTTY, NULL); + close(fd); + } +#endif /* TIOCNOTTY */ + } + /* Reinitialize the log (because of the fork above). */ + log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr); + + /* Initialize the random number generator. */ + arc4random_stir(); + + /* Chdir to the root directory so that the current disk can be + unmounted if desired. */ + chdir("/"); + + /* ignore SIGPIPE */ + signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); + + /* Start listening for a socket, unless started from inetd. */ + if (inetd_flag) { + int s1; + s1 = dup(0); /* Make sure descriptors 0, 1, and 2 are in use. */ + dup(s1); + sock_in = dup(0); + sock_out = dup(1); + startup_pipe = -1; + /* + * We intentionally do not close the descriptors 0, 1, and 2 + * as our code for setting the descriptors won\'t work if + * ttyfd happens to be one of those. + */ + debug("inetd sockets after dupping: %d, %d", sock_in, sock_out); + if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) + generate_ephemeral_server_key(); + } else { + for (ai = options.listen_addrs; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) { + if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET && ai->ai_family != AF_INET6) + continue; + if (num_listen_socks >= MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS) + fatal("Too many listen sockets. " + "Enlarge MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS"); + if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, + ntop, sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport), + NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV) != 0) { + error("getnameinfo failed"); + continue; + } + /* Create socket for listening. */ + listen_sock = socket(ai->ai_family, SOCK_STREAM, 0); + if (listen_sock < 0) { + /* kernel may not support ipv6 */ + verbose("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + continue; + } + if (fcntl(listen_sock, F_SETFL, O_NONBLOCK) < 0) { + error("listen_sock O_NONBLOCK: %s", strerror(errno)); + close(listen_sock); + continue; + } + /* + * Set socket options. We try to make the port + * reusable and have it close as fast as possible + * without waiting in unnecessary wait states on + * close. + */ + setsockopt(listen_sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, + (void *) &on, sizeof(on)); + linger.l_onoff = 1; + linger.l_linger = 5; + setsockopt(listen_sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_LINGER, + (void *) &linger, sizeof(linger)); + + debug("Bind to port %s on %s.", strport, ntop); + + /* Bind the socket to the desired port. */ + if (bind(listen_sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) { + if (!ai->ai_next) + error("Bind to port %s on %s failed: %.200s.", + strport, ntop, strerror(errno)); + close(listen_sock); + continue; + } + listen_socks[num_listen_socks] = listen_sock; + num_listen_socks++; + + /* Start listening on the port. */ + log("Server listening on %s port %s.", ntop, strport); + if (listen(listen_sock, 5) < 0) + fatal("listen: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + + } + freeaddrinfo(options.listen_addrs); + + if (!num_listen_socks) + fatal("Cannot bind any address."); + + if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) + generate_ephemeral_server_key(); + + /* + * Arrange to restart on SIGHUP. The handler needs + * listen_sock. + */ + signal(SIGHUP, sighup_handler); + + signal(SIGTERM, sigterm_handler); + signal(SIGQUIT, sigterm_handler); + + /* Arrange SIGCHLD to be caught. */ + signal(SIGCHLD, main_sigchld_handler); + + /* Write out the pid file after the sigterm handler is setup */ + if (!debug_flag) { + /* + * Record our pid in /var/run/sshd.pid to make it + * easier to kill the correct sshd. We don't want to + * do this before the bind above because the bind will + * fail if there already is a daemon, and this will + * overwrite any old pid in the file. + */ + f = fopen(options.pid_file, "wb"); + if (f) { + fprintf(f, "%u\n", (u_int) getpid()); + fclose(f); + } + } + + /* setup fd set for listen */ + fdset = NULL; + maxfd = 0; + for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++) + if (listen_socks[i] > maxfd) + maxfd = listen_socks[i]; + /* pipes connected to unauthenticated childs */ + startup_pipes = xmalloc(options.max_startups * sizeof(int)); + for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++) + startup_pipes[i] = -1; + + /* + * Stay listening for connections until the system crashes or + * the daemon is killed with a signal. + */ + for (;;) { + if (received_sighup) + sighup_restart(); + if (fdset != NULL) + xfree(fdset); + fdsetsz = howmany(maxfd+1, NFDBITS) * sizeof(fd_mask); + fdset = (fd_set *)xmalloc(fdsetsz); + memset(fdset, 0, fdsetsz); + + for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++) + FD_SET(listen_socks[i], fdset); + for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++) + if (startup_pipes[i] != -1) + FD_SET(startup_pipes[i], fdset); + + /* Wait in select until there is a connection. */ + ret = select(maxfd+1, fdset, NULL, NULL, NULL); + if (ret < 0 && errno != EINTR) + error("select: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + if (received_sigterm) { + log("Received signal %d; terminating.", + received_sigterm); + close_listen_socks(); + unlink(options.pid_file); + exit(255); + } + if (key_used && key_do_regen) { + generate_ephemeral_server_key(); + key_used = 0; + key_do_regen = 0; + } + if (ret < 0) + continue; + + for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++) + if (startup_pipes[i] != -1 && + FD_ISSET(startup_pipes[i], fdset)) { + /* + * the read end of the pipe is ready + * if the child has closed the pipe + * after successful authentication + * or if the child has died + */ + close(startup_pipes[i]); + startup_pipes[i] = -1; + startups--; + } + for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++) { + if (!FD_ISSET(listen_socks[i], fdset)) + continue; + fromlen = sizeof(from); + newsock = accept(listen_socks[i], (struct sockaddr *)&from, + &fromlen); + if (newsock < 0) { + if (errno != EINTR && errno != EWOULDBLOCK) + error("accept: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + continue; + } + if (fcntl(newsock, F_SETFL, 0) < 0) { + error("newsock del O_NONBLOCK: %s", strerror(errno)); + continue; + } + if (drop_connection(startups) == 1) { + debug("drop connection #%d", startups); + close(newsock); + continue; + } + if (pipe(startup_p) == -1) { + close(newsock); + continue; + } + + for (j = 0; j < options.max_startups; j++) + if (startup_pipes[j] == -1) { + startup_pipes[j] = startup_p[0]; + if (maxfd < startup_p[0]) + maxfd = startup_p[0]; + startups++; + break; + } + + /* + * Got connection. Fork a child to handle it, unless + * we are in debugging mode. + */ + if (debug_flag) { + /* + * In debugging mode. Close the listening + * socket, and start processing the + * connection without forking. + */ + debug("Server will not fork when running in debugging mode."); + close_listen_socks(); + sock_in = newsock; + sock_out = newsock; + startup_pipe = -1; + pid = getpid(); + break; + } else { + /* + * Normal production daemon. Fork, and have + * the child process the connection. The + * parent continues listening. + */ + if ((pid = fork()) == 0) { + /* + * Child. Close the listening and max_startup + * sockets. Start using the accepted socket. + * Reinitialize logging (since our pid has + * changed). We break out of the loop to handle + * the connection. + */ + startup_pipe = startup_p[1]; + for (j = 0; j < options.max_startups; j++) + if (startup_pipes[j] != -1) + close(startup_pipes[j]); + close_listen_socks(); + sock_in = newsock; + sock_out = newsock; + log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr); + break; + } + } + + /* Parent. Stay in the loop. */ + if (pid < 0) + error("fork: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + else + debug("Forked child %d.", pid); + + close(startup_p[1]); + + /* Mark that the key has been used (it was "given" to the child). */ + if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) && + key_used == 0) { + /* Schedule server key regeneration alarm. */ + signal(SIGALRM, key_regeneration_alarm); + alarm(options.key_regeneration_time); + key_used = 1; + } + + arc4random_stir(); + + /* Close the new socket (the child is now taking care of it). */ + close(newsock); + } + /* child process check (or debug mode) */ + if (num_listen_socks < 0) + break; + } + } + + /* This is the child processing a new connection. */ + + /* + * Disable the key regeneration alarm. We will not regenerate the + * key since we are no longer in a position to give it to anyone. We + * will not restart on SIGHUP since it no longer makes sense. + */ + alarm(0); + signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL); + signal(SIGHUP, SIG_DFL); + signal(SIGTERM, SIG_DFL); + signal(SIGQUIT, SIG_DFL); + signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL); + signal(SIGINT, SIG_DFL); + + /* + * Set socket options for the connection. We want the socket to + * close as fast as possible without waiting for anything. If the + * connection is not a socket, these will do nothing. + */ + /* setsockopt(sock_in, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, (void *)&on, sizeof(on)); */ + linger.l_onoff = 1; + linger.l_linger = 5; + setsockopt(sock_in, SOL_SOCKET, SO_LINGER, (void *) &linger, sizeof(linger)); + + /* Set keepalives if requested. */ + if (options.keepalives && + setsockopt(sock_in, SOL_SOCKET, SO_KEEPALIVE, (void *)&on, + sizeof(on)) < 0) + error("setsockopt SO_KEEPALIVE: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + + /* + * Register our connection. This turns encryption off because we do + * not have a key. + */ + packet_set_connection(sock_in, sock_out); + + remote_port = get_remote_port(); + remote_ip = get_remote_ipaddr(); + +#ifdef LIBWRAP + /* Check whether logins are denied from this host. */ + { + struct request_info req; + + request_init(&req, RQ_DAEMON, __progname, RQ_FILE, sock_in, 0); + fromhost(&req); + + if (!hosts_access(&req)) { + debug("Connection refused by tcp wrapper"); + refuse(&req); + /* NOTREACHED */ + fatal("libwrap refuse returns"); + } + } +#endif /* LIBWRAP */ + + /* Log the connection. */ + verbose("Connection from %.500s port %d", remote_ip, remote_port); + + /* + * We don\'t want to listen forever unless the other side + * successfully authenticates itself. So we set up an alarm which is + * cleared after successful authentication. A limit of zero + * indicates no limit. Note that we don\'t set the alarm in debugging + * mode; it is just annoying to have the server exit just when you + * are about to discover the bug. + */ + signal(SIGALRM, grace_alarm_handler); + if (!debug_flag) + alarm(options.login_grace_time); + + sshd_exchange_identification(sock_in, sock_out); + /* + * Check that the connection comes from a privileged port. + * Rhosts-Authentication only makes sense from priviledged + * programs. Of course, if the intruder has root access on his local + * machine, he can connect from any port. So do not use these + * authentication methods from machines that you do not trust. + */ + if (remote_port >= IPPORT_RESERVED || + remote_port < IPPORT_RESERVED / 2) { + debug("Rhosts Authentication disabled, " + "originating port %d not trusted.", remote_port); + options.rhosts_authentication = 0; + } +#if defined(KRB4) && !defined(KRB5) + if (!packet_connection_is_ipv4() && + options.kerberos_authentication) { + debug("Kerberos Authentication disabled, only available for IPv4."); + options.kerberos_authentication = 0; + } +#endif /* KRB4 && !KRB5 */ +#ifdef AFS + /* If machine has AFS, set process authentication group. */ + if (k_hasafs()) { + k_setpag(); + k_unlog(); + } +#endif /* AFS */ + + packet_set_nonblocking(); + + /* perform the key exchange */ + /* authenticate user and start session */ + if (compat20) { + do_ssh2_kex(); + do_authentication2(); + } else { + do_ssh1_kex(); + do_authentication(); + } + /* The connection has been terminated. */ + verbose("Closing connection to %.100s", remote_ip); + +#ifdef USE_PAM + finish_pam(); +#endif /* USE_PAM */ + + packet_close(); + exit(0); +} + +/* + * SSH1 key exchange + */ +static void +do_ssh1_kex(void) +{ + int i, len; + int plen, slen; + int rsafail = 0; + BIGNUM *session_key_int; + u_char session_key[SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH]; + u_char cookie[8]; + u_int cipher_type, auth_mask, protocol_flags; + u_int32_t rand = 0; + + /* + * Generate check bytes that the client must send back in the user + * packet in order for it to be accepted; this is used to defy ip + * spoofing attacks. Note that this only works against somebody + * doing IP spoofing from a remote machine; any machine on the local + * network can still see outgoing packets and catch the random + * cookie. This only affects rhosts authentication, and this is one + * of the reasons why it is inherently insecure. + */ + for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { + if (i % 4 == 0) + rand = arc4random(); + cookie[i] = rand & 0xff; + rand >>= 8; + } + + /* + * Send our public key. We include in the packet 64 bits of random + * data that must be matched in the reply in order to prevent IP + * spoofing. + */ + packet_start(SSH_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY); + for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) + packet_put_char(cookie[i]); + + /* Store our public server RSA key. */ + packet_put_int(BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n)); + packet_put_bignum(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->e); + packet_put_bignum(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n); + + /* Store our public host RSA key. */ + packet_put_int(BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n)); + packet_put_bignum(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->e); + packet_put_bignum(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n); + + /* Put protocol flags. */ + packet_put_int(SSH_PROTOFLAG_HOST_IN_FWD_OPEN); + + /* Declare which ciphers we support. */ + packet_put_int(cipher_mask_ssh1(0)); + + /* Declare supported authentication types. */ + auth_mask = 0; + if (options.rhosts_authentication) + auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_RHOSTS; + if (options.rhosts_rsa_authentication) + auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA; + if (options.rsa_authentication) + auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_RSA; +#if defined(KRB4) || defined(KRB5) + if (options.kerberos_authentication) + auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_KERBEROS; +#endif +#if defined(AFS) || defined(KRB5) + if (options.kerberos_tgt_passing) + auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_PASS_KERBEROS_TGT; +#endif +#ifdef AFS + if (options.afs_token_passing) + auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_PASS_AFS_TOKEN; +#endif + if (options.challenge_response_authentication == 1) + auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_TIS; + if (options.password_authentication) + auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_PASSWORD; + packet_put_int(auth_mask); + + /* Send the packet and wait for it to be sent. */ + packet_send(); + packet_write_wait(); + + debug("Sent %d bit server key and %d bit host key.", + BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n), + BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n)); + + /* Read clients reply (cipher type and session key). */ + packet_read_expect(&plen, SSH_CMSG_SESSION_KEY); + + /* Get cipher type and check whether we accept this. */ + cipher_type = packet_get_char(); + + if (!(cipher_mask_ssh1(0) & (1 << cipher_type))) + packet_disconnect("Warning: client selects unsupported cipher."); + + /* Get check bytes from the packet. These must match those we + sent earlier with the public key packet. */ + for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) + if (cookie[i] != packet_get_char()) + packet_disconnect("IP Spoofing check bytes do not match."); + + debug("Encryption type: %.200s", cipher_name(cipher_type)); + + /* Get the encrypted integer. */ + session_key_int = BN_new(); + packet_get_bignum(session_key_int, &slen); + + protocol_flags = packet_get_int(); + packet_set_protocol_flags(protocol_flags); + + packet_integrity_check(plen, 1 + 8 + slen + 4, SSH_CMSG_SESSION_KEY); + + /* + * Decrypt it using our private server key and private host key (key + * with larger modulus first). + */ + if (BN_cmp(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n, sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) > 0) { + /* Server key has bigger modulus. */ + if (BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n) < + BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) { + fatal("do_connection: %s: server_key %d < host_key %d + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED %d", + get_remote_ipaddr(), + BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n), + BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n), + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED); + } + if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int, + sensitive_data.server_key->rsa) <= 0) + rsafail++; + if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int, + sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa) <= 0) + rsafail++; + } else { + /* Host key has bigger modulus (or they are equal). */ + if (BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) < + BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) { + fatal("do_connection: %s: host_key %d < server_key %d + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED %d", + get_remote_ipaddr(), + BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n), + BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n), + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED); + } + if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int, + sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa) < 0) + rsafail++; + if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int, + sensitive_data.server_key->rsa) < 0) + rsafail++; + } + /* + * Extract session key from the decrypted integer. The key is in the + * least significant 256 bits of the integer; the first byte of the + * key is in the highest bits. + */ + if (!rsafail) { + BN_mask_bits(session_key_int, sizeof(session_key) * 8); + len = BN_num_bytes(session_key_int); + if (len < 0 || len > sizeof(session_key)) { + error("do_connection: bad session key len from %s: " + "session_key_int %d > sizeof(session_key) %lu", + get_remote_ipaddr(), len, (u_long)sizeof(session_key)); + rsafail++; + } else { + memset(session_key, 0, sizeof(session_key)); + BN_bn2bin(session_key_int, + session_key + sizeof(session_key) - len); + + compute_session_id(session_id, cookie, + sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n, + sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n); + /* + * Xor the first 16 bytes of the session key with the + * session id. + */ + for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) + session_key[i] ^= session_id[i]; + } + } + if (rsafail) { + int bytes = BN_num_bytes(session_key_int); + char *buf = xmalloc(bytes); + MD5_CTX md; + + log("do_connection: generating a fake encryption key"); + BN_bn2bin(session_key_int, buf); + MD5_Init(&md); + MD5_Update(&md, buf, bytes); + MD5_Update(&md, sensitive_data.ssh1_cookie, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH); + MD5_Final(session_key, &md); + MD5_Init(&md); + MD5_Update(&md, session_key, 16); + MD5_Update(&md, buf, bytes); + MD5_Update(&md, sensitive_data.ssh1_cookie, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH); + MD5_Final(session_key + 16, &md); + memset(buf, 0, bytes); + xfree(buf); + for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) + session_id[i] = session_key[i] ^ session_key[i + 16]; + } + /* Destroy the private and public keys. They will no longer be needed. */ + destroy_sensitive_data(); + + /* Destroy the decrypted integer. It is no longer needed. */ + BN_clear_free(session_key_int); + + /* Set the session key. From this on all communications will be encrypted. */ + packet_set_encryption_key(session_key, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH, cipher_type); + + /* Destroy our copy of the session key. It is no longer needed. */ + memset(session_key, 0, sizeof(session_key)); + + debug("Received session key; encryption turned on."); + + /* Send an acknowledgement packet. Note that this packet is sent encrypted. */ + packet_start(SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS); + packet_send(); + packet_write_wait(); +} + +/* + * SSH2 key exchange: diffie-hellman-group1-sha1 + */ +static void +do_ssh2_kex(void) +{ + Kex *kex; + + if (options.ciphers != NULL) { + myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] = + myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = options.ciphers; + } + myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] = + compat_cipher_proposal(myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS]); + myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = + compat_cipher_proposal(myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC]); + + if (options.macs != NULL) { + myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] = + myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = options.macs; + } + myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = list_hostkey_types(); + + /* start key exchange */ + kex = kex_setup(myproposal); + kex->server = 1; + kex->client_version_string=client_version_string; + kex->server_version_string=server_version_string; + kex->load_host_key=&get_hostkey_by_type; + + xxx_kex = kex; + + dispatch_run(DISPATCH_BLOCK, &kex->done, kex); + + session_id2 = kex->session_id; + session_id2_len = kex->session_id_len; + +#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH + /* send 1st encrypted/maced/compressed message */ + packet_start(SSH2_MSG_IGNORE); + packet_put_cstring("markus"); + packet_send(); + packet_write_wait(); +#endif + debug("KEX done"); +} diff --git a/openssh/sshd_config b/openssh/sshd_config new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e1a052a --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/sshd_config @@ -0,0 +1,80 @@ +# $OpenBSD: sshd_config,v 1.42 2001/09/20 20:57:51 mouring Exp $ + +# This sshd was compiled with PATH=/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin + +# This is the sshd server system-wide configuration file. See sshd(8) +# for more information. + +Port 22 +#Protocol 2,1 +#ListenAddress 0.0.0.0 +#ListenAddress :: + +# HostKey for protocol version 1 +HostKey /etc/ssh_host_key +# HostKeys for protocol version 2 +HostKey /etc/ssh_host_rsa_key +HostKey /etc/ssh_host_dsa_key + +# Lifetime and size of ephemeral version 1 server key +KeyRegenerationInterval 3600 +ServerKeyBits 768 + +# Logging +SyslogFacility AUTH +LogLevel INFO +#obsoletes QuietMode and FascistLogging + +# Authentication: + +LoginGraceTime 600 +PermitRootLogin yes +StrictModes yes + +RSAAuthentication yes +PubkeyAuthentication yes +#AuthorizedKeysFile %h/.ssh/authorized_keys + +# rhosts authentication should not be used +RhostsAuthentication no +# Don't read the user's ~/.rhosts and ~/.shosts files +IgnoreRhosts yes +# For this to work you will also need host keys in /etc/ssh_known_hosts +RhostsRSAAuthentication no +# similar for protocol version 2 +HostbasedAuthentication no +# Uncomment if you don't trust ~/.ssh/known_hosts for RhostsRSAAuthentication +#IgnoreUserKnownHosts yes + +# To disable tunneled clear text passwords, change to no here! +PasswordAuthentication yes +PermitEmptyPasswords no + +# Uncomment to disable s/key passwords +#ChallengeResponseAuthentication no + +# Uncomment to enable PAM keyboard-interactive authentication +# Warning: enabling this may bypass the setting of 'PasswordAuthentication' +#PAMAuthenticationViaKbdInt yes + +# To change Kerberos options +#KerberosAuthentication no +#KerberosOrLocalPasswd yes +#AFSTokenPassing no +#KerberosTicketCleanup no + +# Kerberos TGT Passing does only work with the AFS kaserver +#KerberosTgtPassing yes + +X11Forwarding no +X11DisplayOffset 10 +PrintMotd yes +#PrintLastLog no +KeepAlive yes +#UseLogin no + +#MaxStartups 10:30:60 +#Banner /etc/issue.net +#ReverseMappingCheck yes + +Subsystem sftp /usr/libexec/sftp-server diff --git a/openssh/sshlogin.c b/openssh/sshlogin.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b7558b9 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/sshlogin.c @@ -0,0 +1,104 @@ +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * This file performs some of the things login(1) normally does. We cannot + * easily use something like login -p -h host -f user, because there are + * several different logins around, and it is hard to determined what kind of + * login the current system has. Also, we want to be able to execute commands + * on a tty. + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + * + * Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 1999 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" +RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshlogin.c,v 1.2 2001/03/24 16:43:27 stevesk Exp $"); + +#include "loginrec.h" + +/* + * Returns the time when the user last logged in. Returns 0 if the + * information is not available. This must be called before record_login. + * The host the user logged in from will be returned in buf. + */ + +u_long +get_last_login_time(uid_t uid, const char *logname, + char *buf, u_int bufsize) +{ + struct logininfo li; + + login_get_lastlog(&li, uid); + strlcpy(buf, li.hostname, bufsize); + return li.tv_sec; +} + +/* + * Records that the user has logged in. I these parts of operating systems + * were more standardized. + */ + +void +record_login(pid_t pid, const char *ttyname, const char *user, uid_t uid, + const char *host, struct sockaddr * addr) +{ + struct logininfo *li; + + li = login_alloc_entry(pid, user, host, ttyname); + login_set_addr(li, addr, sizeof(struct sockaddr)); + login_login(li); + login_free_entry(li); +} + +#ifdef LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX +void +record_utmp_only(pid_t pid, const char *ttyname, const char *user, + const char *host, struct sockaddr * addr) +{ + struct logininfo *li; + + li = login_alloc_entry(pid, user, host, ttyname); + login_set_addr(li, addr, sizeof(struct sockaddr)); + login_utmp_only(li); + login_free_entry(li); +} +#endif + +/* Records that the user has logged out. */ + +void +record_logout(pid_t pid, const char *ttyname) +{ + struct logininfo *li; + + li = login_alloc_entry(pid, NULL, NULL, ttyname); + login_logout(li); + login_free_entry(li); +} diff --git a/openssh/sshlogin.h b/openssh/sshlogin.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..79d42a9 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/sshlogin.h @@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: sshlogin.h,v 1.3 2001/06/26 17:27:25 markus Exp $ */ + +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + */ +#ifndef SSHLOGIN_H +#define SSHLOGIN_H + +void +record_login(pid_t, const char *, const char *, uid_t, + const char *, struct sockaddr *); +void record_logout(pid_t, const char *); +u_long get_last_login_time(uid_t, const char *, char *, u_int); + +#endif diff --git a/openssh/sshpty.c b/openssh/sshpty.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e1e6031 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/sshpty.c @@ -0,0 +1,404 @@ +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * Allocating a pseudo-terminal, and making it the controlling tty. + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + */ + +#include "includes.h" +RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshpty.c,v 1.3 2001/07/22 21:32:27 markus Exp $"); + +#ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H +# include +#endif /* HAVE_UTIL_H */ + +#include "sshpty.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "misc.h" + +/* Pty allocated with _getpty gets broken if we do I_PUSH:es to it. */ +#if defined(HAVE__GETPTY) || defined(HAVE_OPENPTY) +#undef HAVE_DEV_PTMX +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_PTY_H +# include +#endif +#if defined(HAVE_DEV_PTMX) && defined(HAVE_SYS_STROPTS_H) +# include +#endif + +#ifndef O_NOCTTY +#define O_NOCTTY 0 +#endif + +/* + * Allocates and opens a pty. Returns 0 if no pty could be allocated, or + * nonzero if a pty was successfully allocated. On success, open file + * descriptors for the pty and tty sides and the name of the tty side are + * returned (the buffer must be able to hold at least 64 characters). + */ + +int +pty_allocate(int *ptyfd, int *ttyfd, char *namebuf, int namebuflen) +{ +#if defined(HAVE_OPENPTY) || defined(BSD4_4) + /* openpty(3) exists in OSF/1 and some other os'es */ + char *name; + int i; + + i = openpty(ptyfd, ttyfd, NULL, NULL, NULL); + if (i < 0) { + error("openpty: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + return 0; + } + name = ttyname(*ttyfd); + if (!name) + fatal("openpty returns device for which ttyname fails."); + + strlcpy(namebuf, name, namebuflen); /* possible truncation */ + return 1; +#else /* HAVE_OPENPTY */ +#ifdef HAVE__GETPTY + /* + * _getpty(3) exists in SGI Irix 4.x, 5.x & 6.x -- it generates more + * pty's automagically when needed + */ + char *slave; + + slave = _getpty(ptyfd, O_RDWR, 0622, 0); + if (slave == NULL) { + error("_getpty: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + return 0; + } + strlcpy(namebuf, slave, namebuflen); + /* Open the slave side. */ + *ttyfd = open(namebuf, O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY); + if (*ttyfd < 0) { + error("%.200s: %.100s", namebuf, strerror(errno)); + close(*ptyfd); + return 0; + } + return 1; +#else /* HAVE__GETPTY */ +#if defined(HAVE_DEV_PTMX) + /* + * This code is used e.g. on Solaris 2.x. (Note that Solaris 2.3 + * also has bsd-style ptys, but they simply do not work.) + */ + int ptm; + char *pts; + mysig_t old_signal; + + ptm = open("/dev/ptmx", O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY); + if (ptm < 0) { + error("/dev/ptmx: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + return 0; + } + old_signal = mysignal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL); + if (grantpt(ptm) < 0) { + error("grantpt: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + return 0; + } + mysignal(SIGCHLD, old_signal); + if (unlockpt(ptm) < 0) { + error("unlockpt: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + return 0; + } + pts = ptsname(ptm); + if (pts == NULL) + error("Slave pty side name could not be obtained."); + strlcpy(namebuf, pts, namebuflen); + *ptyfd = ptm; + + /* Open the slave side. */ + *ttyfd = open(namebuf, O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY); + if (*ttyfd < 0) { + error("%.100s: %.100s", namebuf, strerror(errno)); + close(*ptyfd); + return 0; + } +#ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN + /* + * Push the appropriate streams modules, as described in Solaris pts(7). + * HP-UX pts(7) doesn't have ttcompat module. + */ + if (ioctl(*ttyfd, I_PUSH, "ptem") < 0) + error("ioctl I_PUSH ptem: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + if (ioctl(*ttyfd, I_PUSH, "ldterm") < 0) + error("ioctl I_PUSH ldterm: %.100s", strerror(errno)); +#ifndef __hpux + if (ioctl(*ttyfd, I_PUSH, "ttcompat") < 0) + error("ioctl I_PUSH ttcompat: %.100s", strerror(errno)); +#endif +#endif + return 1; +#else /* HAVE_DEV_PTMX */ +#ifdef HAVE_DEV_PTS_AND_PTC + /* AIX-style pty code. */ + const char *name; + + *ptyfd = open("/dev/ptc", O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY); + if (*ptyfd < 0) { + error("Could not open /dev/ptc: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + return 0; + } + name = ttyname(*ptyfd); + if (!name) + fatal("Open of /dev/ptc returns device for which ttyname fails."); + strlcpy(namebuf, name, namebuflen); + *ttyfd = open(name, O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY); + if (*ttyfd < 0) { + error("Could not open pty slave side %.100s: %.100s", + name, strerror(errno)); + close(*ptyfd); + return 0; + } + return 1; +#else /* HAVE_DEV_PTS_AND_PTC */ +#ifdef _CRAY + char buf[64]; + int i; + int highpty; + +#ifdef _SC_CRAY_NPTY + highpty = sysconf(_SC_CRAY_NPTY); + if (highpty == -1) + highpty = 128; +#else + highpty = 128; +#endif + + for (i = 0; i < highpty; i++) { + snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "/dev/pty/%03d", i); + *ptyfd = open(buf, O_RDWR|O_NOCTTY); + if (*ptyfd < 0) + continue; + snprintf(namebuf, namebuflen, "/dev/ttyp%03d", i); + /* Open the slave side. */ + *ttyfd = open(namebuf, O_RDWR|O_NOCTTY); + if (*ttyfd < 0) { + error("%.100s: %.100s", namebuf, strerror(errno)); + close(*ptyfd); + return 0; + } + return 1; + } + return 0; +#else + /* BSD-style pty code. */ + char buf[64]; + int i; + const char *ptymajors = "pqrstuvwxyzabcdefghijklmnoABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ"; + const char *ptyminors = "0123456789abcdef"; + int num_minors = strlen(ptyminors); + int num_ptys = strlen(ptymajors) * num_minors; + + for (i = 0; i < num_ptys; i++) { + snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "/dev/pty%c%c", ptymajors[i / num_minors], + ptyminors[i % num_minors]); + snprintf(namebuf, namebuflen, "/dev/tty%c%c", + ptymajors[i / num_minors], ptyminors[i % num_minors]); + + *ptyfd = open(buf, O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY); + if (*ptyfd < 0) { + /* Try SCO style naming */ + snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "/dev/ptyp%d", i); + snprintf(namebuf, namebuflen, "/dev/ttyp%d", i); + *ptyfd = open(buf, O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY); + if (*ptyfd < 0) + continue; + } + + /* Open the slave side. */ + *ttyfd = open(namebuf, O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY); + if (*ttyfd < 0) { + error("%.100s: %.100s", namebuf, strerror(errno)); + close(*ptyfd); + return 0; + } + return 1; + } + return 0; +#endif /* CRAY */ +#endif /* HAVE_DEV_PTS_AND_PTC */ +#endif /* HAVE_DEV_PTMX */ +#endif /* HAVE__GETPTY */ +#endif /* HAVE_OPENPTY */ +} + +/* Releases the tty. Its ownership is returned to root, and permissions to 0666. */ + +void +pty_release(const char *ttyname) +{ + if (chown(ttyname, (uid_t) 0, (gid_t) 0) < 0) + error("chown %.100s 0 0 failed: %.100s", ttyname, strerror(errno)); + if (chmod(ttyname, (mode_t) 0666) < 0) + error("chmod %.100s 0666 failed: %.100s", ttyname, strerror(errno)); +} + +/* Makes the tty the processes controlling tty and sets it to sane modes. */ + +void +pty_make_controlling_tty(int *ttyfd, const char *ttyname) +{ + int fd; +#ifdef USE_VHANGUP + void *old; +#endif /* USE_VHANGUP */ + +#ifdef _CRAY + if (setsid() < 0) + error("setsid: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + + fd = open(ttyname, O_RDWR|O_NOCTTY); + if (fd != -1) { + mysignal(SIGHUP, SIG_IGN); + ioctl(fd, TCVHUP, (char *)NULL); + mysignal(SIGHUP, SIG_DFL); + setpgid(0, 0); + close(fd); + } else { + error("Failed to disconnect from controlling tty."); + } + + debug("Setting controlling tty using TCSETCTTY."); + ioctl(*ttyfd, TCSETCTTY, NULL); + fd = open("/dev/tty", O_RDWR); + if (fd < 0) + error("%.100s: %.100s", ttyname, strerror(errno)); + close(*ttyfd); + *ttyfd = fd; +#else /* _CRAY */ + + /* First disconnect from the old controlling tty. */ +#ifdef TIOCNOTTY + fd = open(_PATH_TTY, O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY); + if (fd >= 0) { + (void) ioctl(fd, TIOCNOTTY, NULL); + close(fd); + } +#endif /* TIOCNOTTY */ + if (setsid() < 0) + error("setsid: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + + /* + * Verify that we are successfully disconnected from the controlling + * tty. + */ + fd = open(_PATH_TTY, O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY); + if (fd >= 0) { + error("Failed to disconnect from controlling tty."); + close(fd); + } + /* Make it our controlling tty. */ +#ifdef TIOCSCTTY + debug("Setting controlling tty using TIOCSCTTY."); + if (ioctl(*ttyfd, TIOCSCTTY, NULL) < 0) + error("ioctl(TIOCSCTTY): %.100s", strerror(errno)); +#endif /* TIOCSCTTY */ +#ifdef HAVE_NEWS4 + if (setpgrp(0,0) < 0) + error("SETPGRP %s",strerror(errno)); +#endif /* HAVE_NEWS4 */ +#ifdef USE_VHANGUP + old = mysignal(SIGHUP, SIG_IGN); + vhangup(); + mysignal(SIGHUP, old); +#endif /* USE_VHANGUP */ + fd = open(ttyname, O_RDWR); + if (fd < 0) { + error("%.100s: %.100s", ttyname, strerror(errno)); + } else { +#ifdef USE_VHANGUP + close(*ttyfd); + *ttyfd = fd; +#else /* USE_VHANGUP */ + close(fd); +#endif /* USE_VHANGUP */ + } + /* Verify that we now have a controlling tty. */ + fd = open(_PATH_TTY, O_WRONLY); + if (fd < 0) + error("open /dev/tty failed - could not set controlling tty: %.100s", + strerror(errno)); + else { + close(fd); + } +#endif /* _CRAY */ +} + +/* Changes the window size associated with the pty. */ + +void +pty_change_window_size(int ptyfd, int row, int col, + int xpixel, int ypixel) +{ + struct winsize w; + w.ws_row = row; + w.ws_col = col; + w.ws_xpixel = xpixel; + w.ws_ypixel = ypixel; + (void) ioctl(ptyfd, TIOCSWINSZ, &w); +} + +void +pty_setowner(struct passwd *pw, const char *ttyname) +{ + struct group *grp; + gid_t gid; + mode_t mode; + struct stat st; + + /* Determine the group to make the owner of the tty. */ + grp = getgrnam("tty"); + if (grp) { + gid = grp->gr_gid; + mode = S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR | S_IWGRP; + } else { + gid = pw->pw_gid; + mode = S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR | S_IWGRP | S_IWOTH; + } + + /* + * Change owner and mode of the tty as required. + * Warn but continue if filesystem is read-only and the uids match/ + * tty is owned by root. + */ + if (stat(ttyname, &st)) + fatal("stat(%.100s) failed: %.100s", ttyname, + strerror(errno)); + + if (st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid || st.st_gid != gid) { + if (chown(ttyname, pw->pw_uid, gid) < 0) { + if (errno == EROFS && + (st.st_uid == pw->pw_uid || st.st_uid == 0)) + error("chown(%.100s, %d, %d) failed: %.100s", + ttyname, pw->pw_uid, gid, + strerror(errno)); + else + fatal("chown(%.100s, %d, %d) failed: %.100s", + ttyname, pw->pw_uid, gid, + strerror(errno)); + } + } + + if ((st.st_mode & (S_IRWXU|S_IRWXG|S_IRWXO)) != mode) { + if (chmod(ttyname, mode) < 0) { + if (errno == EROFS && + (st.st_mode & (S_IRGRP | S_IROTH)) == 0) + error("chmod(%.100s, 0%o) failed: %.100s", + ttyname, mode, strerror(errno)); + else + fatal("chmod(%.100s, 0%o) failed: %.100s", + ttyname, mode, strerror(errno)); + } + } +} diff --git a/openssh/sshpty.h b/openssh/sshpty.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4eb479f --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/sshpty.h @@ -0,0 +1,26 @@ +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * Functions for allocating a pseudo-terminal and making it the controlling + * tty. + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + */ + +/* RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshpty.h,v 1.3 2001/06/26 17:27:25 markus Exp $"); */ + +#ifndef SSHPTY_H +#define SSHPTY_H + +int pty_allocate(int *, int *, char *, int); +void pty_release(const char *); +void pty_make_controlling_tty(int *, const char *); +void pty_change_window_size(int, int, int, int, int); +void pty_setowner(struct passwd *, const char *); + +#endif /* SSHPTY_H */ diff --git a/openssh/sshtty.c b/openssh/sshtty.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7849890 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/sshtty.c @@ -0,0 +1,96 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: sshtty.c,v 1.1 2001/04/14 16:33:20 stevesk Exp $ */ +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2001 Kevin Steves. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include "sshtty.h" +#include "log.h" + +static struct termios _saved_tio; +static int _in_raw_mode = 0; + +int +in_raw_mode(void) +{ + return _in_raw_mode; +} + +struct termios +get_saved_tio(void) +{ + return _saved_tio; +} + +void +leave_raw_mode(void) +{ + if (!_in_raw_mode) + return; + if (tcsetattr(fileno(stdin), TCSADRAIN, &_saved_tio) == -1) + perror("tcsetattr"); + else + _in_raw_mode = 0; + + fatal_remove_cleanup((void (*) (void *)) leave_raw_mode, NULL); +} + +void +enter_raw_mode(void) +{ + struct termios tio; + + if (tcgetattr(fileno(stdin), &tio) == -1) { + perror("tcgetattr"); + return; + } + _saved_tio = tio; + tio.c_iflag |= IGNPAR; + tio.c_iflag &= ~(ISTRIP | INLCR | IGNCR | ICRNL | IXON | IXANY | IXOFF); + tio.c_lflag &= ~(ISIG | ICANON | ECHO | ECHOE | ECHOK | ECHONL); +#ifdef IEXTEN + tio.c_lflag &= ~IEXTEN; +#endif + tio.c_oflag &= ~OPOST; + tio.c_cc[VMIN] = 1; + tio.c_cc[VTIME] = 0; + if (tcsetattr(fileno(stdin), TCSADRAIN, &tio) == -1) + perror("tcsetattr"); + else + _in_raw_mode = 1; + + fatal_add_cleanup((void (*) (void *)) leave_raw_mode, NULL); +} diff --git a/openssh/sshtty.h b/openssh/sshtty.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7ba4a26 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/sshtty.h @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: sshtty.h,v 1.2 2001/06/26 17:27:25 markus Exp $ */ +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2001 Kevin Steves. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifndef SSHTTY_H +#define SSHTTY_H + +#include + +int in_raw_mode(void); +struct termios get_saved_tio(void); +void leave_raw_mode(void); +void enter_raw_mode(void); + +#endif diff --git a/openssh/tildexpand.c b/openssh/tildexpand.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e89a7ad --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/tildexpand.c @@ -0,0 +1,72 @@ +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + */ + +#include "includes.h" +RCSID("$OpenBSD: tildexpand.c,v 1.12 2001/08/11 22:51:27 jakob Exp $"); + +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "tildexpand.h" + +/* + * Expands tildes in the file name. Returns data allocated by xmalloc. + * Warning: this calls getpw*. + */ +char * +tilde_expand_filename(const char *filename, uid_t my_uid) +{ + const char *cp; + u_int userlen; + char *expanded; + struct passwd *pw; + char user[100]; + int len; + + /* Return immediately if no tilde. */ + if (filename[0] != '~') + return xstrdup(filename); + + /* Skip the tilde. */ + filename++; + + /* Find where the username ends. */ + cp = strchr(filename, '/'); + if (cp) + userlen = cp - filename; /* Something after username. */ + else + userlen = strlen(filename); /* Nothing after username. */ + if (userlen == 0) + pw = getpwuid(my_uid); /* Own home directory. */ + else { + /* Tilde refers to someone elses home directory. */ + if (userlen > sizeof(user) - 1) + fatal("User name after tilde too long."); + memcpy(user, filename, userlen); + user[userlen] = 0; + pw = getpwnam(user); + } + if (!pw) + fatal("Unknown user %100s.", user); + + /* If referring to someones home directory, return it now. */ + if (!cp) { + /* Only home directory specified */ + return xstrdup(pw->pw_dir); + } + /* Build a path combining the specified directory and path. */ + len = strlen(pw->pw_dir) + strlen(cp + 1) + 2; + if (len > MAXPATHLEN) + fatal("Home directory too long (%d > %d", len-1, MAXPATHLEN-1); + expanded = xmalloc(len); + snprintf(expanded, len, "%s%s%s", pw->pw_dir, strcmp(pw->pw_dir, "/") ? "/" : "", cp + 1); + return expanded; +} diff --git a/openssh/tildexpand.h b/openssh/tildexpand.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f5e7e40 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/tildexpand.h @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: tildexpand.h,v 1.4 2001/06/26 17:27:25 markus Exp $ */ + +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + */ + +char *tilde_expand_filename(const char *, uid_t); diff --git a/openssh/ttymodes.c b/openssh/ttymodes.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c0bb0b1 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/ttymodes.c @@ -0,0 +1,462 @@ +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + */ + +/* + * SSH2 tty modes support by Kevin Steves. + * Copyright (c) 2001 Kevin Steves. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* + * Encoding and decoding of terminal modes in a portable way. + * Much of the format is defined in ttymodes.h; it is included multiple times + * into this file with the appropriate macro definitions to generate the + * suitable code. + */ + +#include "includes.h" +RCSID("$OpenBSD: ttymodes.c,v 1.14 2001/06/24 17:18:31 markus Exp $"); + +#include "packet.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "ssh1.h" +#include "compat.h" +#include "buffer.h" +#include "bufaux.h" + +#define TTY_OP_END 0 +/* + * uint32 (u_int) follows speed in SSH1 and SSH2 + */ +#define TTY_OP_ISPEED_PROTO1 192 +#define TTY_OP_OSPEED_PROTO1 193 +#define TTY_OP_ISPEED_PROTO2 128 +#define TTY_OP_OSPEED_PROTO2 129 + +/* + * Converts POSIX speed_t to a baud rate. The values of the + * constants for speed_t are not themselves portable. + */ +static int +speed_to_baud(speed_t speed) +{ + switch (speed) { + case B0: + return 0; + case B50: + return 50; + case B75: + return 75; + case B110: + return 110; + case B134: + return 134; + case B150: + return 150; + case B200: + return 200; + case B300: + return 300; + case B600: + return 600; + case B1200: + return 1200; + case B1800: + return 1800; + case B2400: + return 2400; + case B4800: + return 4800; + case B9600: + return 9600; + +#ifdef B19200 + case B19200: + return 19200; +#else /* B19200 */ +#ifdef EXTA + case EXTA: + return 19200; +#endif /* EXTA */ +#endif /* B19200 */ + +#ifdef B38400 + case B38400: + return 38400; +#else /* B38400 */ +#ifdef EXTB + case EXTB: + return 38400; +#endif /* EXTB */ +#endif /* B38400 */ + +#ifdef B7200 + case B7200: + return 7200; +#endif /* B7200 */ +#ifdef B14400 + case B14400: + return 14400; +#endif /* B14400 */ +#ifdef B28800 + case B28800: + return 28800; +#endif /* B28800 */ +#ifdef B57600 + case B57600: + return 57600; +#endif /* B57600 */ +#ifdef B76800 + case B76800: + return 76800; +#endif /* B76800 */ +#ifdef B115200 + case B115200: + return 115200; +#endif /* B115200 */ +#ifdef B230400 + case B230400: + return 230400; +#endif /* B230400 */ + default: + return 9600; + } +} + +/* + * Converts a numeric baud rate to a POSIX speed_t. + */ +static speed_t +baud_to_speed(int baud) +{ + switch (baud) { + case 0: + return B0; + case 50: + return B50; + case 75: + return B75; + case 110: + return B110; + case 134: + return B134; + case 150: + return B150; + case 200: + return B200; + case 300: + return B300; + case 600: + return B600; + case 1200: + return B1200; + case 1800: + return B1800; + case 2400: + return B2400; + case 4800: + return B4800; + case 9600: + return B9600; + +#ifdef B19200 + case 19200: + return B19200; +#else /* B19200 */ +#ifdef EXTA + case 19200: + return EXTA; +#endif /* EXTA */ +#endif /* B19200 */ + +#ifdef B38400 + case 38400: + return B38400; +#else /* B38400 */ +#ifdef EXTB + case 38400: + return EXTB; +#endif /* EXTB */ +#endif /* B38400 */ + +#ifdef B7200 + case 7200: + return B7200; +#endif /* B7200 */ +#ifdef B14400 + case 14400: + return B14400; +#endif /* B14400 */ +#ifdef B28800 + case 28800: + return B28800; +#endif /* B28800 */ +#ifdef B57600 + case 57600: + return B57600; +#endif /* B57600 */ +#ifdef B76800 + case 76800: + return B76800; +#endif /* B76800 */ +#ifdef B115200 + case 115200: + return B115200; +#endif /* B115200 */ +#ifdef B230400 + case 230400: + return B230400; +#endif /* B230400 */ + default: + return B9600; + } +} + +/* + * Encodes terminal modes for the terminal referenced by fd + * or tiop in a portable manner, and appends the modes to a packet + * being constructed. + */ +void +tty_make_modes(int fd, struct termios *tiop) +{ + struct termios tio; + int baud; + Buffer buf; + int tty_op_ospeed, tty_op_ispeed; + void (*put_arg)(Buffer *, u_int); + + buffer_init(&buf); + if (compat20) { + tty_op_ospeed = TTY_OP_OSPEED_PROTO2; + tty_op_ispeed = TTY_OP_ISPEED_PROTO2; + put_arg = buffer_put_int; + } else { + tty_op_ospeed = TTY_OP_OSPEED_PROTO1; + tty_op_ispeed = TTY_OP_ISPEED_PROTO1; + put_arg = (void (*)(Buffer *, u_int)) buffer_put_char; + } + + if (tiop == NULL) { + if (tcgetattr(fd, &tio) == -1) { + log("tcgetattr: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + goto end; + } + } else + tio = *tiop; + + /* Store input and output baud rates. */ + baud = speed_to_baud(cfgetospeed(&tio)); + debug3("tty_make_modes: ospeed %d", baud); + buffer_put_char(&buf, tty_op_ospeed); + buffer_put_int(&buf, baud); + baud = speed_to_baud(cfgetispeed(&tio)); + debug3("tty_make_modes: ispeed %d", baud); + buffer_put_char(&buf, tty_op_ispeed); + buffer_put_int(&buf, baud); + + /* Store values of mode flags. */ +#define TTYCHAR(NAME, OP) \ + debug3("tty_make_modes: %d %d", OP, tio.c_cc[NAME]); \ + buffer_put_char(&buf, OP); \ + put_arg(&buf, tio.c_cc[NAME]); + +#define TTYMODE(NAME, FIELD, OP) \ + debug3("tty_make_modes: %d %d", OP, ((tio.FIELD & NAME) != 0)); \ + buffer_put_char(&buf, OP); \ + put_arg(&buf, ((tio.FIELD & NAME) != 0)); + +#include "ttymodes.h" + +#undef TTYCHAR +#undef TTYMODE + +end: + /* Mark end of mode data. */ + buffer_put_char(&buf, TTY_OP_END); + if (compat20) + packet_put_string(buffer_ptr(&buf), buffer_len(&buf)); + else + packet_put_raw(buffer_ptr(&buf), buffer_len(&buf)); + buffer_free(&buf); + return; +} + +/* + * Decodes terminal modes for the terminal referenced by fd in a portable + * manner from a packet being read. + */ +void +tty_parse_modes(int fd, int *n_bytes_ptr) +{ + struct termios tio; + int opcode, baud; + int n_bytes = 0; + int failure = 0; + u_int (*get_arg)(void); + int arg, arg_size; + + if (compat20) { + *n_bytes_ptr = packet_get_int(); + debug3("tty_parse_modes: SSH2 n_bytes %d", *n_bytes_ptr); + if (*n_bytes_ptr == 0) + return; + get_arg = packet_get_int; + arg_size = 4; + } else { + get_arg = packet_get_char; + arg_size = 1; + } + + /* + * Get old attributes for the terminal. We will modify these + * flags. I am hoping that if there are any machine-specific + * modes, they will initially have reasonable values. + */ + if (tcgetattr(fd, &tio) == -1) { + log("tcgetattr: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + failure = -1; + } + + for (;;) { + n_bytes += 1; + opcode = packet_get_char(); + switch (opcode) { + case TTY_OP_END: + goto set; + + /* XXX: future conflict possible */ + case TTY_OP_ISPEED_PROTO1: + case TTY_OP_ISPEED_PROTO2: + n_bytes += 4; + baud = packet_get_int(); + debug3("tty_parse_modes: ispeed %d", baud); + if (failure != -1 && cfsetispeed(&tio, baud_to_speed(baud)) == -1) + error("cfsetispeed failed for %d", baud); + break; + + /* XXX: future conflict possible */ + case TTY_OP_OSPEED_PROTO1: + case TTY_OP_OSPEED_PROTO2: + n_bytes += 4; + baud = packet_get_int(); + debug3("tty_parse_modes: ospeed %d", baud); + if (failure != -1 && cfsetospeed(&tio, baud_to_speed(baud)) == -1) + error("cfsetospeed failed for %d", baud); + break; + +#define TTYCHAR(NAME, OP) \ + case OP: \ + n_bytes += arg_size; \ + tio.c_cc[NAME] = get_arg(); \ + debug3("tty_parse_modes: %d %d", OP, tio.c_cc[NAME]); \ + break; +#define TTYMODE(NAME, FIELD, OP) \ + case OP: \ + n_bytes += arg_size; \ + if ((arg = get_arg())) \ + tio.FIELD |= NAME; \ + else \ + tio.FIELD &= ~NAME; \ + debug3("tty_parse_modes: %d %d", OP, arg); \ + break; + +#include "ttymodes.h" + +#undef TTYCHAR +#undef TTYMODE + + default: + debug("Ignoring unsupported tty mode opcode %d (0x%x)", + opcode, opcode); + if (!compat20) { + /* + * SSH1: + * Opcodes 1 to 127 are defined to have + * a one-byte argument. + * Opcodes 128 to 159 are defined to have + * an integer argument. + */ + if (opcode > 0 && opcode < 128) { + n_bytes += 1; + (void) packet_get_char(); + break; + } else if (opcode >= 128 && opcode < 160) { + n_bytes += 4; + (void) packet_get_int(); + break; + } else { + /* + * It is a truly undefined opcode (160 to 255). + * We have no idea about its arguments. So we + * must stop parsing. Note that some data may be + * left in the packet; hopefully there is nothing + * more coming after the mode data. + */ + log("parse_tty_modes: unknown opcode %d", opcode); + packet_integrity_check(0, 1, SSH_CMSG_REQUEST_PTY); + goto set; + } + } else { + /* + * SSH2: + * Opcodes 1 to 159 are defined to have + * a uint32 argument. + * Opcodes 160 to 255 are undefined and + * cause parsing to stop. + */ + if (opcode > 0 && opcode < 160) { + n_bytes += 4; + (void) packet_get_int(); + break; + } else { + log("parse_tty_modes: unknown opcode %d", opcode); + goto set; + } + } + } + } + +set: + if (*n_bytes_ptr != n_bytes) { + *n_bytes_ptr = n_bytes; + log("parse_tty_modes: n_bytes_ptr != n_bytes: %d %d", + *n_bytes_ptr, n_bytes); + return; /* Don't process bytes passed */ + } + if (failure == -1) + return; /* Packet parsed ok but tcgetattr() failed */ + + /* Set the new modes for the terminal. */ + if (tcsetattr(fd, TCSANOW, &tio) == -1) + log("Setting tty modes failed: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + return; +} diff --git a/openssh/ttymodes.h b/openssh/ttymodes.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ad980e9 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/ttymodes.h @@ -0,0 +1,172 @@ +/* RCSID("$OpenBSD: ttymodes.h,v 1.11 2001/04/14 16:33:20 stevesk Exp $"); */ +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + */ + +/* + * SSH2 tty modes support by Kevin Steves. + * Copyright (c) 2001 Kevin Steves. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* + * SSH1: + * The tty mode description is a stream of bytes. The stream consists of + * opcode-arguments pairs. It is terminated by opcode TTY_OP_END (0). + * Opcodes 1-127 have one-byte arguments. Opcodes 128-159 have integer + * arguments. Opcodes 160-255 are not yet defined, and cause parsing to + * stop (they should only be used after any other data). + * + * SSH2: + * Differences between SSH1 and SSH2 terminal mode encoding include: + * 1. Encoded terminal modes are represented as a string, and a stream + * of bytes within that string. + * 2. Opcode arguments are uint32 (1-159); 160-255 remain undefined. + * 3. The values for TTY_OP_ISPEED and TTY_OP_OSPEED are different; + * 128 and 129 vs. 192 and 193 respectively. + * + * The client puts in the stream any modes it knows about, and the + * server ignores any modes it does not know about. This allows some degree + * of machine-independence, at least between systems that use a posix-like + * tty interface. The protocol can support other systems as well, but might + * require reimplementing as mode names would likely be different. + */ + +/* + * Some constants and prototypes are defined in packet.h; this file + * is only intended for including from ttymodes.c. + */ + +/* termios macro */ +/* name, op */ +TTYCHAR(VINTR, 1) +TTYCHAR(VQUIT, 2) +TTYCHAR(VERASE, 3) +#if defined(VKILL) +TTYCHAR(VKILL, 4) +#endif /* VKILL */ +TTYCHAR(VEOF, 5) +#if defined(VEOL) +TTYCHAR(VEOL, 6) +#endif /* VEOL */ +#ifdef VEOL2 +TTYCHAR(VEOL2, 7) +#endif /* VEOL2 */ +TTYCHAR(VSTART, 8) +TTYCHAR(VSTOP, 9) +#if defined(VSUSP) +TTYCHAR(VSUSP, 10) +#endif /* VSUSP */ +#if defined(VDSUSP) +TTYCHAR(VDSUSP, 11) +#endif /* VDSUSP */ +#if defined(VREPRINT) +TTYCHAR(VREPRINT, 12) +#endif /* VREPRINT */ +#if defined(VWERASE) +TTYCHAR(VWERASE, 13) +#endif /* VWERASE */ +#if defined(VLNEXT) +TTYCHAR(VLNEXT, 14) +#endif /* VLNEXT */ +#if defined(VFLUSH) +TTYCHAR(VFLUSH, 15) +#endif /* VFLUSH */ +#ifdef VSWTCH +TTYCHAR(VSWTCH, 16) +#endif /* VSWTCH */ +#if defined(VSTATUS) +TTYCHAR(VSTATUS, 17) +#endif /* VSTATUS */ +#ifdef VDISCARD +TTYCHAR(VDISCARD, 18) +#endif /* VDISCARD */ + +/* name, field, op */ +TTYMODE(IGNPAR, c_iflag, 30) +TTYMODE(PARMRK, c_iflag, 31) +TTYMODE(INPCK, c_iflag, 32) +TTYMODE(ISTRIP, c_iflag, 33) +TTYMODE(INLCR, c_iflag, 34) +TTYMODE(IGNCR, c_iflag, 35) +TTYMODE(ICRNL, c_iflag, 36) +#if defined(IUCLC) +TTYMODE(IUCLC, c_iflag, 37) +#endif +TTYMODE(IXON, c_iflag, 38) +TTYMODE(IXANY, c_iflag, 39) +TTYMODE(IXOFF, c_iflag, 40) +#ifdef IMAXBEL +TTYMODE(IMAXBEL,c_iflag, 41) +#endif /* IMAXBEL */ + +TTYMODE(ISIG, c_lflag, 50) +TTYMODE(ICANON, c_lflag, 51) +#ifdef XCASE +TTYMODE(XCASE, c_lflag, 52) +#endif +TTYMODE(ECHO, c_lflag, 53) +TTYMODE(ECHOE, c_lflag, 54) +TTYMODE(ECHOK, c_lflag, 55) +TTYMODE(ECHONL, c_lflag, 56) +TTYMODE(NOFLSH, c_lflag, 57) +TTYMODE(TOSTOP, c_lflag, 58) +#ifdef IEXTEN +TTYMODE(IEXTEN, c_lflag, 59) +#endif /* IEXTEN */ +#if defined(ECHOCTL) +TTYMODE(ECHOCTL,c_lflag, 60) +#endif /* ECHOCTL */ +#ifdef ECHOKE +TTYMODE(ECHOKE, c_lflag, 61) +#endif /* ECHOKE */ +#if defined(PENDIN) +TTYMODE(PENDIN, c_lflag, 62) +#endif /* PENDIN */ + +TTYMODE(OPOST, c_oflag, 70) +#if defined(OLCUC) +TTYMODE(OLCUC, c_oflag, 71) +#endif +TTYMODE(ONLCR, c_oflag, 72) +#ifdef OCRNL +TTYMODE(OCRNL, c_oflag, 73) +#endif +#ifdef ONOCR +TTYMODE(ONOCR, c_oflag, 74) +#endif +#ifdef ONLRET +TTYMODE(ONLRET, c_oflag, 75) +#endif + +TTYMODE(CS7, c_cflag, 90) +TTYMODE(CS8, c_cflag, 91) +TTYMODE(PARENB, c_cflag, 92) +TTYMODE(PARODD, c_cflag, 93) diff --git a/openssh/uidswap.c b/openssh/uidswap.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..cc91fcf --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/uidswap.c @@ -0,0 +1,154 @@ +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * Code for uid-swapping. + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + */ + +#include "includes.h" +RCSID("$OpenBSD: uidswap.c,v 1.18 2001/08/08 21:34:19 markus Exp $"); + +#include "log.h" +#include "uidswap.h" + +/* + * Note: all these functions must work in all of the following cases: + * 1. euid=0, ruid=0 + * 2. euid=0, ruid!=0 + * 3. euid!=0, ruid!=0 + * Additionally, they must work regardless of whether the system has + * POSIX saved uids or not. + */ + +#if defined(_POSIX_SAVED_IDS) && !defined(BROKEN_SAVED_UIDS) +/* Lets assume that posix saved ids also work with seteuid, even though that + is not part of the posix specification. */ +#define SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID +/* Saved effective uid. */ +static uid_t saved_euid = 0; +static gid_t saved_egid = 0; +#endif + +/* Saved effective uid. */ +static int privileged = 0; +static int temporarily_use_uid_effective = 0; +static gid_t saved_egroups[NGROUPS_MAX], user_groups[NGROUPS_MAX]; +static int saved_egroupslen = -1, user_groupslen = -1; + +/* + * Temporarily changes to the given uid. If the effective user + * id is not root, this does nothing. This call cannot be nested. + */ +void +temporarily_use_uid(struct passwd *pw) +{ + /* Save the current euid, and egroups. */ +#ifdef SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID + saved_euid = geteuid(); + saved_egid = getegid(); + debug("temporarily_use_uid: %d/%d (e=%d)", + pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_gid, saved_euid); + if (saved_euid != 0) { + privileged = 0; + return; + } +#else + if (geteuid() != 0) { + privileged = 0; + return; + } +#endif /* SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID */ + + privileged = 1; + temporarily_use_uid_effective = 1; + saved_egroupslen = getgroups(NGROUPS_MAX, saved_egroups); + if (saved_egroupslen < 0) + fatal("getgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + + /* set and save the user's groups */ + if (user_groupslen == -1) { + if (initgroups(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) < 0) + fatal("initgroups: %s: %.100s", pw->pw_name, + strerror(errno)); + user_groupslen = getgroups(NGROUPS_MAX, user_groups); + if (user_groupslen < 0) + fatal("getgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + } +#ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN + /* Set the effective uid to the given (unprivileged) uid. */ + if (setgroups(user_groupslen, user_groups) < 0) + fatal("setgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno)); +#endif /* !HAVE_CYWIN */ +#ifndef SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID + /* Propagate the privileged gid to all of our gids. */ + if (setgid(getegid()) < 0) + debug("setgid %u: %.100s", (u_int) getegid(), strerror(errno)); + /* Propagate the privileged uid to all of our uids. */ + if (setuid(geteuid()) < 0) + debug("setuid %u: %.100s", (u_int) geteuid(), strerror(errno)); +#endif /* SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID */ + if (setegid(pw->pw_gid) < 0) + fatal("setegid %u: %.100s", (u_int) pw->pw_gid, + strerror(errno)); + if (seteuid(pw->pw_uid) == -1) + fatal("seteuid %u: %.100s", (u_int) pw->pw_uid, + strerror(errno)); +} + +/* + * Restores to the original (privileged) uid. + */ +void +restore_uid(void) +{ + debug("restore_uid"); + /* it's a no-op unless privileged */ + if (!privileged) + return; + if (!temporarily_use_uid_effective) + fatal("restore_uid: temporarily_use_uid not effective"); + +#ifdef SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID + /* Set the effective uid back to the saved privileged uid. */ + if (seteuid(saved_euid) < 0) + fatal("seteuid %u: %.100s", (u_int) saved_euid, strerror(errno)); + if (setegid(saved_egid) < 0) + fatal("setegid %u: %.100s", (u_int) saved_egid, + strerror(errno)); +#else /* SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID */ + /* + * We are unable to restore the real uid to its unprivileged value. + * Propagate the real uid (usually more privileged) to effective uid + * as well. + */ + setuid(getuid()); + setgid(getgid()); +#endif /* SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID */ + +#ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN + if (setgroups(saved_egroupslen, saved_egroups) < 0) + fatal("setgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno)); +#endif /* !HAVE_CYGWIN */ + temporarily_use_uid_effective = 0; +} + +/* + * Permanently sets all uids to the given uid. This cannot be + * called while temporarily_use_uid is effective. + */ +void +permanently_set_uid(struct passwd *pw) +{ + if (temporarily_use_uid_effective) + fatal("restore_uid: temporarily_use_uid effective"); + if (setgid(pw->pw_gid) < 0) + fatal("setgid %u: %.100s", (u_int) pw->pw_gid, strerror(errno)); + if (setuid(pw->pw_uid) < 0) + fatal("setuid %u: %.100s", (u_int) pw->pw_uid, strerror(errno)); +} diff --git a/openssh/uidswap.h b/openssh/uidswap.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0726980 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/uidswap.h @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: uidswap.h,v 1.9 2001/06/26 17:27:25 markus Exp $ */ + +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + */ + +#ifndef UIDSWAP_H +#define UIDSWAP_H + +void temporarily_use_uid(struct passwd *); +void restore_uid(void); +void permanently_set_uid(struct passwd *); + +#endif /* UIDSWAP_H */ diff --git a/openssh/uuencode.c b/openssh/uuencode.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f3774f1 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/uuencode.c @@ -0,0 +1,75 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: uuencode.c,v 1.12 2001/03/01 02:27:18 deraadt Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "uuencode.h" + +RCSID("$OpenBSD: uuencode.c,v 1.12 2001/03/01 02:27:18 deraadt Exp $"); + +int +uuencode(u_char *src, u_int srclength, + char *target, size_t targsize) +{ + return __b64_ntop(src, srclength, target, targsize); +} + +int +uudecode(const char *src, u_char *target, size_t targsize) +{ + int len; + char *encoded, *p; + + /* copy the 'readonly' source */ + encoded = xstrdup(src); + /* skip whitespace and data */ + for (p = encoded; *p == ' ' || *p == '\t'; p++) + ; + for (; *p != '\0' && *p != ' ' && *p != '\t'; p++) + ; + /* and remote trailing whitespace because __b64_pton needs this */ + *p = '\0'; + len = __b64_pton(encoded, target, targsize); + xfree(encoded); + return len; +} + +void +dump_base64(FILE *fp, u_char *data, int len) +{ + u_char *buf = xmalloc(2*len); + int i, n; + + n = uuencode(data, len, buf, 2*len); + for (i = 0; i < n; i++) { + fprintf(fp, "%c", buf[i]); + if (i % 70 == 69) + fprintf(fp, "\n"); + } + if (i % 70 != 69) + fprintf(fp, "\n"); + xfree(buf); +} diff --git a/openssh/uuencode.h b/openssh/uuencode.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0067635 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/uuencode.h @@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: uuencode.h,v 1.8 2001/06/26 17:27:25 markus Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifndef UUENCODE_H +#define UUENCODE_H +int uuencode(u_char *, u_int, char *, size_t); +int uudecode(const char *, u_char *, size_t); +void dump_base64(FILE *, u_char *, int); +#endif diff --git a/openssh/version.h b/openssh/version.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..804e560 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/version.h @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: version.h,v 1.25 2001/10/15 16:10:50 deraadt Exp $ */ + +#define SSH_VERSION "OpenSSH_3.0.2p1" diff --git a/openssh/xmalloc.c b/openssh/xmalloc.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..99c6ac3 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/xmalloc.c @@ -0,0 +1,68 @@ +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * Versions of malloc and friends that check their results, and never return + * failure (they call fatal if they encounter an error). + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + */ + +#include "includes.h" +RCSID("$OpenBSD: xmalloc.c,v 1.16 2001/07/23 18:21:46 stevesk Exp $"); + +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "log.h" + +void * +xmalloc(size_t size) +{ + void *ptr; + + if (size == 0) + fatal("xmalloc: zero size"); + ptr = malloc(size); + if (ptr == NULL) + fatal("xmalloc: out of memory (allocating %lu bytes)", (u_long) size); + return ptr; +} + +void * +xrealloc(void *ptr, size_t new_size) +{ + void *new_ptr; + + if (new_size == 0) + fatal("xrealloc: zero size"); + if (ptr == NULL) + new_ptr = malloc(new_size); + else + new_ptr = realloc(ptr, new_size); + if (new_ptr == NULL) + fatal("xrealloc: out of memory (new_size %lu bytes)", (u_long) new_size); + return new_ptr; +} + +void +xfree(void *ptr) +{ + if (ptr == NULL) + fatal("xfree: NULL pointer given as argument"); + free(ptr); +} + +char * +xstrdup(const char *str) +{ + size_t len; + char *cp; + + len = strlen(str) + 1; + cp = xmalloc(len); + strlcpy(cp, str, len); + return cp; +} diff --git a/openssh/xmalloc.h b/openssh/xmalloc.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e14d014 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh/xmalloc.h @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * Created: Mon Mar 20 22:09:17 1995 ylo + * + * Versions of malloc and friends that check their results, and never return + * failure (they call fatal if they encounter an error). + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + */ + +/* RCSID("$OpenBSD: xmalloc.h,v 1.7 2001/06/26 17:27:25 markus Exp $"); */ + +#ifndef XMALLOC_H +#define XMALLOC_H + +void *xmalloc(size_t); +void *xrealloc(void *, size_t); +void xfree(void *); +char *xstrdup(const char *); + +#endif /* XMALLOC_H */ -- 2.45.1