X-Git-Url: http://andersk.mit.edu/gitweb/gssapi-openssh.git/blobdiff_plain/9108f8d92b8e2b4b5fe61eb8e419bf94ba216d44..b5afdff53b51d529e596da3b4c2aa5ee14cc8b08:/openssh/sshd.c diff --git a/openssh/sshd.c b/openssh/sshd.c index 6159a5b..12000b1 100644 --- a/openssh/sshd.c +++ b/openssh/sshd.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.347 2006/08/18 09:15:20 markus Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.367 2009/05/28 16:50:16 andreas Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland @@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ # include #endif #include "openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h" +#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" #include #include @@ -75,6 +76,8 @@ #include #include #include +#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" + #ifdef HAVE_SECUREWARE #include #include @@ -114,14 +117,18 @@ #include "ssh-gss.h" #endif #include "monitor_wrap.h" -#include "monitor_fdpass.h" +#include "roaming.h" #include "version.h" +#ifdef USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API +#include +#endif + #ifdef LIBWRAP #include #include -int allow_severity = LOG_INFO; -int deny_severity = LOG_WARNING; +int allow_severity; +int deny_severity; #endif /* LIBWRAP */ #ifndef O_NOCTTY @@ -134,6 +141,9 @@ int deny_severity = LOG_WARNING; #define REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 3) #define REEXEC_MIN_FREE_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 4) +int myflag = 0; + + extern char *__progname; /* Server configuration options. */ @@ -305,6 +315,7 @@ sighup_restart(void) logit("Received SIGHUP; restarting."); close_listen_socks(); close_startup_pipes(); + alarm(0); /* alarm timer persists across exec */ execv(saved_argv[0], saved_argv); logit("RESTART FAILED: av[0]='%.100s', error: %.100s.", saved_argv[0], strerror(errno)); @@ -365,9 +376,6 @@ grace_alarm_handler(int sig) static void generate_ephemeral_server_key(void) { - u_int32_t rnd = 0; - int i; - verbose("Generating %s%d bit RSA key.", sensitive_data.server_key ? "new " : "", options.server_key_bits); if (sensitive_data.server_key != NULL) @@ -376,12 +384,7 @@ generate_ephemeral_server_key(void) options.server_key_bits); verbose("RSA key generation complete."); - for (i = 0; i < SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH; i++) { - if (i % 4 == 0) - rnd = arc4random(); - sensitive_data.ssh1_cookie[i] = rnd & 0xff; - rnd >>= 8; - } + arc4random_buf(sensitive_data.ssh1_cookie, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH); arc4random_stir(); } @@ -403,7 +406,7 @@ sshd_exchange_identification(int sock_in, int sock_out) int mismatch; int remote_major, remote_minor; int major, minor; - char *s; + char *s, *newline = "\n"; char buf[256]; /* Must not be larger than remote_version. */ char remote_version[256]; /* Must be at least as big as buf. */ @@ -414,15 +417,17 @@ sshd_exchange_identification(int sock_in, int sock_out) } else if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) { major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2; minor = PROTOCOL_MINOR_2; + newline = "\r\n"; } else { major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1; minor = PROTOCOL_MINOR_1; } - snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s\n", major, minor, SSH_VERSION); + snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s%s", major, minor, + SSH_RELEASE, newline); server_version_string = xstrdup(buf); /* Send our protocol version identification. */ - if (atomicio(vwrite, sock_out, server_version_string, + if (roaming_atomicio(vwrite, sock_out, server_version_string, strlen(server_version_string)) != strlen(server_version_string)) { logit("Could not write ident string to %s", get_remote_ipaddr()); @@ -432,7 +437,7 @@ sshd_exchange_identification(int sock_in, int sock_out) /* Read other sides version identification. */ memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); for (i = 0; i < sizeof(buf) - 1; i++) { - if (atomicio(read, sock_in, &buf[i], 1) != 1) { + if (roaming_atomicio(read, sock_in, &buf[i], 1) != 1) { logit("Did not receive identification string from %s", get_remote_ipaddr()); cleanup_exit(255); @@ -469,6 +474,9 @@ sshd_exchange_identification(int sock_in, int sock_out) } debug("Client protocol version %d.%d; client software version %.100s", remote_major, remote_minor, remote_version); + logit("SSH: Server;Ltype: Version;Remote: %s-%d;Protocol: %d.%d;Client: %.100s", + get_remote_ipaddr(), get_remote_port(), + remote_major, remote_minor, remote_version); compat_datafellows(remote_version); @@ -582,13 +590,12 @@ privsep_preauth_child(void) { u_int32_t rnd[256]; gid_t gidset[1]; - int i; /* Enable challenge-response authentication for privilege separation */ privsep_challenge_enable(); - for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) - rnd[i] = arc4random(); + arc4random_stir(); + arc4random_buf(rnd, sizeof(rnd)); RAND_seed(rnd, sizeof(rnd)); /* Demote the private keys to public keys. */ @@ -661,6 +668,8 @@ privsep_preauth(Authctxt *authctxt) static void privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt) { + u_int32_t rnd[256]; + #ifdef DISABLE_FD_PASSING if (1) { #else @@ -678,7 +687,7 @@ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt) if (pmonitor->m_pid == -1) fatal("fork of unprivileged child failed"); else if (pmonitor->m_pid != 0) { - debug2("User child is on pid %ld", (long)pmonitor->m_pid); + verbose("User child is on pid %ld", (long)pmonitor->m_pid); close(pmonitor->m_recvfd); buffer_clear(&loginmsg); monitor_child_postauth(pmonitor); @@ -692,6 +701,10 @@ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt) /* Demote the private keys to public keys. */ demote_sensitive_data(); + arc4random_stir(); + arc4random_buf(rnd, sizeof(rnd)); + RAND_seed(rnd, sizeof(rnd)); + /* Drop privileges */ do_setusercontext(authctxt->pw); @@ -791,7 +804,7 @@ drop_connection(int startups) p *= startups - options.max_startups_begin; p /= options.max_startups - options.max_startups_begin; p += options.max_startups_rate; - r = arc4random() % 100; + r = arc4random_uniform(100); debug("drop_connection: p %d, r %d", p, r); return (r < p) ? 1 : 0; @@ -803,8 +816,9 @@ usage(void) fprintf(stderr, "%s, %s\n", SSH_RELEASE, SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION)); fprintf(stderr, -"usage: sshd [-46Ddeiqt] [-b bits] [-f config_file] [-g login_grace_time]\n" -" [-h host_key_file] [-k key_gen_time] [-o option] [-p port] [-u len]\n" +"usage: sshd [-46DdeiqTt] [-b bits] [-C connection_spec] [-f config_file]\n" +" [-g login_grace_time] [-h host_key_file] [-k key_gen_time]\n" +" [-o option] [-p port] [-u len]\n" ); exit(1); } @@ -941,6 +955,8 @@ server_listen(void) int ret, listen_sock, on = 1; struct addrinfo *ai; char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV]; + int socksize; + int socksizelen = sizeof(int); for (ai = options.listen_addrs; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) { if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET && ai->ai_family != AF_INET6) @@ -952,8 +968,7 @@ server_listen(void) ntop, sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport), NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV)) != 0) { error("getnameinfo failed: %.100s", - (ret != EAI_SYSTEM) ? gai_strerror(ret) : - strerror(errno)); + ssh_gai_strerror(ret)); continue; } /* Create socket for listening. */ @@ -976,8 +991,23 @@ server_listen(void) &on, sizeof(on)) == -1) error("setsockopt SO_REUSEADDR: %s", strerror(errno)); +#ifdef IPV6_V6ONLY + /* Only communicate in IPv6 over AF_INET6 sockets. */ + if (ai->ai_family == AF_INET6) { + if (setsockopt(listen_sock, IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_V6ONLY, + &on, sizeof(on)) == -1) + error("setsockopt IPV6_V6ONLY: %s", + strerror(errno)); + } +#endif + debug("Bind to port %s on %s.", strport, ntop); + getsockopt(listen_sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVBUF, + &socksize, &socksizelen); + debug("Server TCP RWIN socket size: %d", socksize); + debug("HPN Buffer Size: %d", options.hpn_buffer_size); + /* Bind the socket to the desired port. */ if (bind(listen_sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) { error("Bind to port %s on %s failed: %.200s.", @@ -1083,7 +1113,8 @@ server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *sock_out, int *newsock, int *config_s) *newsock = accept(listen_socks[i], (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen); if (*newsock < 0) { - if (errno != EINTR && errno != EWOULDBLOCK) + if (errno != EINTR && errno != EAGAIN && + errno != EWOULDBLOCK) error("accept: %.100s", strerror(errno)); continue; } @@ -1230,9 +1261,12 @@ main(int ac, char **av) int opt, i, on = 1; int sock_in = -1, sock_out = -1, newsock = -1; const char *remote_ip; + char *test_user = NULL, *test_host = NULL, *test_addr = NULL; int remote_port; - char *line; + char *line, *p, *cp; int config_s[2] = { -1 , -1 }; + u_int64_t ibytes, obytes; + mode_t new_umask; Key *key; Authctxt *authctxt; @@ -1266,7 +1300,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av) initialize_server_options(&options); /* Parse command-line arguments. */ - while ((opt = getopt(ac, av, "f:p:b:k:h:g:u:o:dDeiqrtQR46")) != -1) { + while ((opt = getopt(ac, av, "f:p:b:k:h:g:u:o:C:dDeiqrtQRT46")) != -1) { switch (opt) { case '4': options.address_family = AF_INET; @@ -1317,7 +1351,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av) exit(1); } options.ports[options.num_ports++] = a2port(optarg); - if (options.ports[options.num_ports-1] == 0) { + if (options.ports[options.num_ports-1] <= 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Bad port number.\n"); exit(1); } @@ -1344,6 +1378,25 @@ main(int ac, char **av) case 't': test_flag = 1; break; + case 'T': + test_flag = 2; + break; + case 'C': + cp = optarg; + while ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")) && *p != '\0') { + if (strncmp(p, "addr=", 5) == 0) + test_addr = xstrdup(p + 5); + else if (strncmp(p, "host=", 5) == 0) + test_host = xstrdup(p + 5); + else if (strncmp(p, "user=", 5) == 0) + test_user = xstrdup(p + 5); + else { + fprintf(stderr, "Invalid test " + "mode specification %s\n", p); + exit(1); + } + } + break; case 'u': utmp_len = (u_int)strtonum(optarg, 0, MAXHOSTNAMELEN+1, NULL); if (utmp_len > MAXHOSTNAMELEN) { @@ -1366,7 +1419,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av) } if (rexeced_flag || inetd_flag) rexec_flag = 0; - if (rexec_flag && (av[0] == NULL || *av[0] != '/')) + if (!test_flag && (rexec_flag && (av[0] == NULL || *av[0] != '/'))) fatal("sshd re-exec requires execution with an absolute path"); if (rexeced_flag) closefrom(REEXEC_MIN_FREE_FD); @@ -1405,6 +1458,21 @@ main(int ac, char **av) sensitive_data.have_ssh1_key = 0; sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key = 0; + /* + * If we're doing an extended config test, make sure we have all of + * the parameters we need. If we're not doing an extended test, + * do not silently ignore connection test params. + */ + if (test_flag >= 2 && + (test_user != NULL || test_host != NULL || test_addr != NULL) + && (test_user == NULL || test_host == NULL || test_addr == NULL)) + fatal("user, host and addr are all required when testing " + "Match configs"); + if (test_flag < 2 && (test_user != NULL || test_host != NULL || + test_addr != NULL)) + fatal("Config test connection parameter (-C) provided without " + "test mode (-T)"); + /* Fetch our configuration */ buffer_init(&cfg); if (rexeced_flag) @@ -1420,6 +1488,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av) /* Fill in default values for those options not explicitly set. */ fill_default_server_options(&options); + /* challenge-response is implemented via keyboard interactive */ + if (options.challenge_response_authentication) + options.kbd_interactive_authentication = 1; + /* set default channel AF */ channel_set_af(options.address_family); @@ -1431,13 +1503,17 @@ main(int ac, char **av) debug("sshd version %.100s", SSH_RELEASE); - /* Store privilege separation user for later use */ - if ((privsep_pw = getpwnam(SSH_PRIVSEP_USER)) == NULL) - fatal("Privilege separation user %s does not exist", - SSH_PRIVSEP_USER); - memset(privsep_pw->pw_passwd, 0, strlen(privsep_pw->pw_passwd)); - privsep_pw->pw_passwd = "*"; - privsep_pw = pwcopy(privsep_pw); + /* Store privilege separation user for later use if required. */ + if ((privsep_pw = getpwnam(SSH_PRIVSEP_USER)) == NULL) { + if (use_privsep || options.kerberos_authentication) + fatal("Privilege separation user %s does not exist", + SSH_PRIVSEP_USER); + } else { + memset(privsep_pw->pw_passwd, 0, strlen(privsep_pw->pw_passwd)); + privsep_pw = pwcopy(privsep_pw); + xfree(privsep_pw->pw_passwd); + privsep_pw->pw_passwd = xstrdup("*"); + } endpwent(); /* load private host keys */ @@ -1472,10 +1548,13 @@ main(int ac, char **av) logit("Disabling protocol version 1. Could not load host key"); options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_1; } +#ifndef GSSAPI + /* The GSSAPI key exchange can run without a host key */ if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) && !sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key) { logit("Disabling protocol version 2. Could not load host key"); options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_2; } +#endif if (!(options.protocol & (SSH_PROTO_1|SSH_PROTO_2))) { logit("sshd: no hostkeys available -- exiting."); exit(1); @@ -1525,6 +1604,13 @@ main(int ac, char **av) "world-writable.", _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR); } + if (test_flag > 1) { + if (test_user != NULL && test_addr != NULL && test_host != NULL) + parse_server_match_config(&options, test_user, + test_host, test_addr); + dump_config(&options); + } + /* Configuration looks good, so exit if in test mode. */ if (test_flag) exit(0); @@ -1549,6 +1635,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av) rexec_argv[rexec_argc + 1] = NULL; } + /* Ensure that umask disallows at least group and world write */ + new_umask = umask(0077) | 0022; + (void) umask(new_umask); + /* Initialize the log (it is reinitialized below in case we forked). */ if (debug_flag && (!inetd_flag || rexeced_flag)) log_stderr = 1; @@ -1591,10 +1681,6 @@ main(int ac, char **av) /* Get a connection, either from inetd or a listening TCP socket */ if (inetd_flag) { server_accept_inetd(&sock_in, &sock_out); - - if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) && - sensitive_data.server_key == NULL) - generate_ephemeral_server_key(); } else { server_listen(); @@ -1715,6 +1801,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av) cleanup_exit(255); } + /* set the HPN options for the child */ + channel_set_hpn(options.hpn_disabled, options.hpn_buffer_size); + /* * We use get_canonical_hostname with usedns = 0 instead of * get_remote_ipaddr here so IP options will be checked. @@ -1731,6 +1820,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av) audit_connection_from(remote_ip, remote_port); #endif #ifdef LIBWRAP + allow_severity = options.log_facility|LOG_INFO; + deny_severity = options.log_facility|LOG_WARNING; /* Check whether logins are denied from this host. */ if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) { struct request_info req; @@ -1750,6 +1841,60 @@ main(int ac, char **av) /* Log the connection. */ verbose("Connection from %.500s port %d", remote_ip, remote_port); +#ifdef USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API + /* + * Create a new security session for use by the new user login if + * the current session is the root session or we are not launched + * by inetd (eg: debugging mode or server mode). We do not + * necessarily need to create a session if we are launched from + * inetd because Panther xinetd will create a session for us. + * + * The only case where this logic will fail is if there is an + * inetd running in a non-root session which is not creating + * new sessions for us. Then all the users will end up in the + * same session (bad). + * + * When the client exits, the session will be destroyed for us + * automatically. + * + * We must create the session before any credentials are stored + * (including AFS pags, which happens a few lines below). + */ + { + OSStatus err = 0; + SecuritySessionId sid = 0; + SessionAttributeBits sattrs = 0; + + err = SessionGetInfo(callerSecuritySession, &sid, &sattrs); + if (err) + error("SessionGetInfo() failed with error %.8X", + (unsigned) err); + else + debug("Current Session ID is %.8X / Session Attributes are %.8X", + (unsigned) sid, (unsigned) sattrs); + + if (inetd_flag && !(sattrs & sessionIsRoot)) + debug("Running in inetd mode in a non-root session... " + "assuming inetd created the session for us."); + else { + debug("Creating new security session..."); + err = SessionCreate(0, sessionHasTTY | sessionIsRemote); + if (err) + error("SessionCreate() failed with error %.8X", + (unsigned) err); + + err = SessionGetInfo(callerSecuritySession, &sid, + &sattrs); + if (err) + error("SessionGetInfo() failed with error %.8X", + (unsigned) err); + else + debug("New Session ID is %.8X / Session Attributes are %.8X", + (unsigned) sid, (unsigned) sattrs); + } + } +#endif + /* * We don't want to listen forever unless the other side * successfully authenticates itself. So we set up an alarm which is @@ -1763,6 +1908,17 @@ main(int ac, char **av) alarm(options.login_grace_time); sshd_exchange_identification(sock_in, sock_out); +#if defined(AFS_KRB5) + /* If machine has AFS, set process authentication group. */ + if (k_hasafs()) { + k_setpag(); + k_unlog(); + } +#endif /* AFS || AFS_KRB5 */ + + /* In inetd mode, generate ephemeral key only for proto 1 connections */ + if (!compat20 && inetd_flag && sensitive_data.server_key == NULL) + generate_ephemeral_server_key(); packet_set_nonblocking(); @@ -1816,6 +1972,20 @@ main(int ac, char **av) audit_event(SSH_AUTH_SUCCESS); #endif +#ifdef GSSAPI + if (options.gss_authentication && options.gss_deleg_creds) { + temporarily_use_uid(authctxt->pw); + ssh_gssapi_storecreds(); + restore_uid(); + } +#endif +#ifdef USE_PAM + if (options.use_pam) { + do_pam_setcred(1); + do_pam_session(); + } +#endif + /* * In privilege separation, we fork another child and prepare * file descriptor passing. @@ -1827,11 +1997,18 @@ main(int ac, char **av) destroy_sensitive_data(); } + packet_set_timeout(options.client_alive_interval, + options.client_alive_count_max); + /* Start session. */ do_authenticated(authctxt); /* The connection has been terminated. */ - verbose("Closing connection to %.100s", remote_ip); + packet_get_state(MODE_IN, NULL, NULL, NULL, &ibytes); + packet_get_state(MODE_OUT, NULL, NULL, NULL, &obytes); + verbose("Transferred: sent %llu, received %llu bytes", obytes, ibytes); + + verbose("Closing connection to %.500s port %d", remote_ip, remote_port); #ifdef USE_PAM if (options.use_pam) @@ -1911,7 +2088,6 @@ do_ssh1_kex(void) u_char session_key[SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH]; u_char cookie[8]; u_int cipher_type, auth_mask, protocol_flags; - u_int32_t rnd = 0; /* * Generate check bytes that the client must send back in the user @@ -1922,12 +2098,7 @@ do_ssh1_kex(void) * cookie. This only affects rhosts authentication, and this is one * of the reasons why it is inherently insecure. */ - for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { - if (i % 4 == 0) - rnd = arc4random(); - cookie[i] = rnd & 0xff; - rnd >>= 8; - } + arc4random_buf(cookie, sizeof(cookie)); /* * Send our public key. We include in the packet 64 bits of random @@ -2009,10 +2180,10 @@ do_ssh1_kex(void) * key is in the highest bits. */ if (!rsafail) { - BN_mask_bits(session_key_int, sizeof(session_key) * 8); + (void) BN_mask_bits(session_key_int, sizeof(session_key) * 8); len = BN_num_bytes(session_key_int); if (len < 0 || (u_int)len > sizeof(session_key)) { - error("do_connection: bad session key len from %s: " + error("do_ssh1_kex: bad session key len from %s: " "session_key_int %d > sizeof(session_key) %lu", get_remote_ipaddr(), len, (u_long)sizeof(session_key)); rsafail++; @@ -2085,9 +2256,15 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void) { Kex *kex; + myflag++; + debug ("MYFLAG IS %d", myflag); if (options.ciphers != NULL) { myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] = myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = options.ciphers; + } else if (options.none_enabled == 1) { + debug ("WARNING: None cipher enabled"); + myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] = + myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = KEX_ENCRYPT_INCLUDE_NONE; } myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] = compat_cipher_proposal(myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS]); @@ -2108,12 +2285,61 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void) myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = list_hostkey_types(); +#ifdef GSSAPI + { + char *orig; + char *gss = NULL; + char *newstr = NULL; + orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]; + + /* + * If we don't have a host key, then there's no point advertising + * the other key exchange algorithms + */ + + if (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]) == 0) + orig = NULL; + + if (options.gss_keyex) + gss = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(); + else + gss = NULL; + + if (gss && orig) + xasprintf(&newstr, "%s,%s", gss, orig); + else if (gss) + newstr = gss; + else if (orig) + newstr = orig; + + /* + * If we've got GSSAPI mechanisms, then we've got the 'null' host + * key alg, but we can't tell people about it unless its the only + * host key algorithm we support + */ + if (gss && (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS])) == 0) + myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = "null"; + + if (newstr) + myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = newstr; + else + fatal("No supported key exchange algorithms"); + } +#endif + /* start key exchange */ kex = kex_setup(myproposal); kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_server; kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_server; kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server; kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server; +#ifdef GSSAPI + if (options.gss_keyex) { + kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server; + kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_server; + kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_server; + } +#endif kex->server = 1; kex->client_version_string=client_version_string; kex->server_version_string=server_version_string;