]> andersk Git - gssapi-openssh.git/blobdiff - openssh/entropy.c
The man2html from jbasney on pkilab2 works whereas the standard one doesn't.
[gssapi-openssh.git] / openssh / entropy.c
index 5050a4f1f369a359f20e7656513df21c01f0ab99..9588f792946f413a7d7aba2aa2e28691acabe46f 100644 (file)
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /*
- * Copyright (c) 2001 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
 #include "includes.h"
 
 #include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/sha.h>
 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
 
+/* SunOS 4.4.4 needs this */
+#ifdef HAVE_FLOATINGPOINT_H
+# include <floatingpoint.h>
+#endif /* HAVE_FLOATINGPOINT_H */
+
 #include "ssh.h"
 #include "misc.h"
 #include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "pathnames.h"
 #include "log.h"
 
-/*
- * Portable OpenSSH PRNG seeding:
- * If OpenSSL has not "internally seeded" itself (e.g. pulled data from 
- * /dev/random), then we execute a "ssh-rand-helper" program which 
- * collects entropy and writes it to stdout. The child program must 
- * write at least RANDOM_SEED_SIZE bytes. The child is run with stderr
- * attached, so error/debugging output should be visible.
- *
- * XXX: we should tell the child how many bytes we need.
- */
-
 RCSID("$Id$");
 
-#ifndef OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY
-#define RANDOM_SEED_SIZE 48
-static uid_t original_uid, original_euid;
+#ifndef offsetof
+# define offsetof(type, member) ((size_t) &((type *)0)->member)
+#endif
+
+/* Number of times to pass through command list gathering entropy */
+#define NUM_ENTROPY_RUNS       1
+
+/* Scale entropy estimates back by this amount on subsequent runs */
+#define SCALE_PER_RUN          10.0
+
+/* Minimum number of commands to be considered valid */
+#define MIN_ENTROPY_SOURCES 16
+
+#define WHITESPACE " \t\n"
+
+#ifndef RUSAGE_SELF
+# define RUSAGE_SELF 0
+#endif
+#ifndef RUSAGE_CHILDREN
+# define RUSAGE_CHILDREN 0
+#endif
+
+#if defined(_POSIX_SAVED_IDS) && !defined(BROKEN_SAVED_UIDS)
+# define SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID
+#endif
+
+static void
+check_openssl_version(void) 
+{
+       if (SSLeay() != OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
+               fatal("OpenSSL version mismatch. Built against %lx, you "
+                   "have %lx", OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER, SSLeay());
+}
+
+#if defined(PRNGD_SOCKET) || defined(PRNGD_PORT)
+# define USE_PRNGD
+#endif
+
+#if defined(USE_PRNGD) || defined(RANDOM_POOL)
+
+#ifdef USE_PRNGD
+/* Collect entropy from PRNGD/EGD */
+int
+get_random_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int len)
+{
+       int fd;
+       char msg[2];
+#ifdef PRNGD_PORT
+       struct sockaddr_in addr;
+#else
+       struct sockaddr_un addr;
+#endif
+       int addr_len, rval, errors;
+       mysig_t old_sigpipe;
+
+       memset(&addr, '\0', sizeof(addr));
+
+#ifdef PRNGD_PORT
+       addr.sin_family = AF_INET;
+       addr.sin_addr.s_addr = htonl(INADDR_LOOPBACK);
+       addr.sin_port = htons(PRNGD_PORT);
+       addr_len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in);
+#else /* use IP socket PRNGD_SOCKET instead */
+       /* Sanity checks */
+       if (sizeof(PRNGD_SOCKET) > sizeof(addr.sun_path))
+               fatal("Random pool path is too long");
+       if (len > 255)
+               fatal("Too many bytes to read from PRNGD");
+
+       addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
+       strlcpy(addr.sun_path, PRNGD_SOCKET, sizeof(addr.sun_path));
+       addr_len = offsetof(struct sockaddr_un, sun_path) +
+           sizeof(PRNGD_SOCKET);
+#endif
+
+       old_sigpipe = mysignal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
+
+       errors = rval = 0;
+reopen:
+#ifdef PRNGD_PORT
+       fd = socket(addr.sin_family, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
+       if (fd == -1) {
+               error("Couldn't create AF_INET socket: %s", strerror(errno));
+               goto done;
+       }
+#else
+       fd = socket(addr.sun_family, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
+       if (fd == -1) {
+               error("Couldn't create AF_UNIX socket: %s", strerror(errno));
+               goto done;
+       }
+#endif
+
+       if (connect(fd, (struct sockaddr*)&addr, addr_len) == -1) {
+#ifdef PRNGD_PORT
+               error("Couldn't connect to PRNGD port %d: %s",
+                   PRNGD_PORT, strerror(errno));
+#else
+               error("Couldn't connect to PRNGD socket \"%s\": %s",
+                   addr.sun_path, strerror(errno));
 #endif
+               goto done;
+       }
+
+       /* Send blocking read request to PRNGD */
+       msg[0] = 0x02;
+       msg[1] = len;
+
+       if (atomicio(write, fd, msg, sizeof(msg)) != sizeof(msg)) {
+               if (errno == EPIPE && errors < 10) {
+                       close(fd);
+                       errors++;
+                       goto reopen;
+               }
+               error("Couldn't write to PRNGD socket: %s",
+                   strerror(errno));
+               goto done;
+       }
 
+       if (atomicio(read, fd, buf, len) != len) {
+               if (errno == EPIPE && errors < 10) {
+                       close(fd);
+                       errors++;
+                       goto reopen;
+               }
+               error("Couldn't read from PRNGD socket: %s",
+                   strerror(errno));
+               goto done;
+       }
+
+       rval = 1;
+done:
+       mysignal(SIGPIPE, old_sigpipe);
+       if (fd != -1)
+               close(fd);
+       return(rval);
+}
+#else /* !USE_PRNGD */
+#ifdef RANDOM_POOL
+/* Collect entropy from /dev/urandom or pipe */
+static int
+get_random_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int len)
+{
+       int random_pool;
+
+       random_pool = open(RANDOM_POOL, O_RDONLY);
+       if (random_pool == -1) {
+               error("Couldn't open random pool \"%s\": %s",
+                       RANDOM_POOL, strerror(errno));
+               return(0);
+       }
+
+       if (atomicio(read, random_pool, buf, len) != len) {
+               error("Couldn't read from random pool \"%s\": %s",
+                       RANDOM_POOL, strerror(errno));
+               close(random_pool);
+               return(0);
+       }
+
+       close(random_pool);
+
+       return(1);
+}
+#endif /* RANDOM_POOL */
+#endif /* USE_PRNGD */
+
+/*
+ * Seed OpenSSL's random number pool from Kernel random number generator
+ * or PRNGD/EGD
+ */
 void
 seed_rng(void)
 {
-#ifndef OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY
-       int devnull;
+       unsigned char buf[32];
+
+       debug("Seeding random number generator");
+
+       if (!get_random_bytes(buf, sizeof(buf))) {
+               if (!RAND_status())
+                       fatal("Entropy collection failed and entropy exhausted");
+       } else {
+               RAND_add(buf, sizeof(buf), sizeof(buf));
+       }
+
+       memset(buf, '\0', sizeof(buf));
+}
+
+void
+init_rng(void) 
+{
+       check_openssl_version();
+}
+
+#else /* defined(USE_PRNGD) || defined(RANDOM_POOL) */
+
+/*
+ * FIXME: proper entropy estimations. All current values are guesses
+ * FIXME: (ATL) do estimates at compile time?
+ * FIXME: More entropy sources
+ */
+
+/* slow command timeouts (all in milliseconds) */
+/* static int entropy_timeout_default = ENTROPY_TIMEOUT_MSEC; */
+static int entropy_timeout_current = ENTROPY_TIMEOUT_MSEC;
+
+static int prng_seed_saved = 0;
+static int prng_initialised = 0;
+uid_t original_uid;
+
+typedef struct
+{
+       /* Proportion of data that is entropy */
+       double rate;
+       /* Counter goes positive if this command times out */
+       unsigned int badness;
+       /* Increases by factor of two each timeout */
+       unsigned int sticky_badness;
+       /* Path to executable */
+       char *path;
+       /* argv to pass to executable */
+       char *args[5];
+       /* full command string (debug) */
+       char *cmdstring;
+} entropy_source_t;
+
+double stir_from_system(void);
+double stir_from_programs(void);
+double stir_gettimeofday(double entropy_estimate);
+double stir_clock(double entropy_estimate);
+double stir_rusage(int who, double entropy_estimate);
+double hash_output_from_command(entropy_source_t *src, char *hash);
+
+/* this is initialised from a file, by prng_read_commands() */
+entropy_source_t *entropy_sources = NULL;
+
+double
+stir_from_system(void)
+{
+       double total_entropy_estimate;
+       long int i;
+
+       total_entropy_estimate = 0;
+
+       i = getpid();
+       RAND_add(&i, sizeof(i), 0.5);
+       total_entropy_estimate += 0.1;
+
+       i = getppid();
+       RAND_add(&i, sizeof(i), 0.5);
+       total_entropy_estimate += 0.1;
+
+       i = getuid();
+       RAND_add(&i, sizeof(i), 0.0);
+       i = getgid();
+       RAND_add(&i, sizeof(i), 0.0);
+
+       total_entropy_estimate += stir_gettimeofday(1.0);
+       total_entropy_estimate += stir_clock(0.5);
+       total_entropy_estimate += stir_rusage(RUSAGE_SELF, 2.0);
+
+       return(total_entropy_estimate);
+}
+
+double
+stir_from_programs(void)
+{
+       int i;
+       int c;
+       double entropy_estimate;
+       double total_entropy_estimate;
+       char hash[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+
+       total_entropy_estimate = 0;
+       for(i = 0; i < NUM_ENTROPY_RUNS; i++) {
+               c = 0;
+               while (entropy_sources[c].path != NULL) {
+
+                       if (!entropy_sources[c].badness) {
+                               /* Hash output from command */
+                               entropy_estimate = hash_output_from_command(&entropy_sources[c], hash);
+
+                               /* Scale back entropy estimate according to command's rate */
+                               entropy_estimate *= entropy_sources[c].rate;
+
+                               /* Upper bound of entropy estimate is SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH */
+                               if (entropy_estimate > SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH)
+                                       entropy_estimate = SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+
+                               /* Scale back estimates for subsequent passes through list */
+                               entropy_estimate /= SCALE_PER_RUN * (i + 1.0);
+
+                               /* Stir it in */
+                               RAND_add(hash, sizeof(hash), entropy_estimate);
+
+                               debug3("Got %0.2f bytes of entropy from '%s'", entropy_estimate,
+                                       entropy_sources[c].cmdstring);
+
+                               total_entropy_estimate += entropy_estimate;
+
+                       /* Execution times should be a little unpredictable */
+                               total_entropy_estimate += stir_gettimeofday(0.05);
+                               total_entropy_estimate += stir_clock(0.05);
+                               total_entropy_estimate += stir_rusage(RUSAGE_SELF, 0.1);
+                               total_entropy_estimate += stir_rusage(RUSAGE_CHILDREN, 0.1);
+                       } else {
+                               debug2("Command '%s' disabled (badness %d)",
+                                       entropy_sources[c].cmdstring, entropy_sources[c].badness);
+
+                               if (entropy_sources[c].badness > 0)
+                                       entropy_sources[c].badness--;
+                       }
+
+                       c++;
+               }
+       }
+
+       return(total_entropy_estimate);
+}
+
+double
+stir_gettimeofday(double entropy_estimate)
+{
+       struct timeval tv;
+
+       if (gettimeofday(&tv, NULL) == -1)
+               fatal("Couldn't gettimeofday: %s", strerror(errno));
+
+       RAND_add(&tv, sizeof(tv), entropy_estimate);
+
+       return(entropy_estimate);
+}
+
+double
+stir_clock(double entropy_estimate)
+{
+#ifdef HAVE_CLOCK
+       clock_t c;
+
+       c = clock();
+       RAND_add(&c, sizeof(c), entropy_estimate);
+
+       return(entropy_estimate);
+#else /* _HAVE_CLOCK */
+       return(0);
+#endif /* _HAVE_CLOCK */
+}
+
+double
+stir_rusage(int who, double entropy_estimate)
+{
+#ifdef HAVE_GETRUSAGE
+       struct rusage ru;
+
+       if (getrusage(who, &ru) == -1)
+               return(0);
+
+       RAND_add(&ru, sizeof(ru), entropy_estimate);
+
+       return(entropy_estimate);
+#else /* _HAVE_GETRUSAGE */
+       return(0);
+#endif /* _HAVE_GETRUSAGE */
+}
+
+
+static int
+_get_timeval_msec_difference(struct timeval *t1, struct timeval *t2) {
+       int secdiff, usecdiff;
+
+       secdiff = t2->tv_sec - t1->tv_sec;
+       usecdiff = (secdiff*1000000) + (t2->tv_usec - t1->tv_usec);
+       return (int)(usecdiff / 1000);
+}
+
+double
+hash_output_from_command(entropy_source_t *src, char *hash)
+{
+       static int devnull = -1;
        int p[2];
+       fd_set rdset;
+       int cmd_eof = 0, error_abort = 0;
+       struct timeval tv_start, tv_current;
+       int msec_elapsed = 0;
        pid_t pid;
-       int ret;
-       unsigned char buf[RANDOM_SEED_SIZE];
-       mysig_t old_sigchld;
+       int status;
+       char buf[16384];
+       int bytes_read;
+       int total_bytes_read;
+       SHA_CTX sha;
 
-       if (RAND_status() == 1) {
-               debug3("RNG is ready, skipping seeding");
-               return;
-       }
+       debug3("Reading output from \'%s\'", src->cmdstring);
 
-       debug3("Seeding PRNG from %s", SSH_RAND_HELPER);
+       if (devnull == -1) {
+               devnull = open("/dev/null", O_RDWR);
+               if (devnull == -1)
+                       fatal("Couldn't open /dev/null: %s", strerror(errno));
+       }
 
-       if ((devnull = open("/dev/null", O_RDWR)) == -1)
-               fatal("Couldn't open /dev/null: %s", strerror(errno));
        if (pipe(p) == -1)
-               fatal("pipe: %s", strerror(errno));
-
-       old_sigchld = mysignal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
-       if ((pid = fork()) == -1)
-               fatal("Couldn't fork: %s", strerror(errno));
-       if (pid == 0) {
-               dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO);
-               dup2(p[1], STDOUT_FILENO);
-               /* Keep stderr open for errors */
-               close(p[0]);
-               close(p[1]);
-               close(devnull);
-
-               if (original_uid != original_euid && 
-                   ( seteuid(getuid()) == -1 || 
-                     setuid(original_uid) == -1) ) {
-                       fprintf(stderr, "(rand child) setuid(%d): %s\n", 
-                           original_uid, strerror(errno));
-                       _exit(1);
-               }
-               
-               execl(SSH_RAND_HELPER, "ssh-rand-helper", NULL);
-               fprintf(stderr, "(rand child) Couldn't exec '%s': %s\n", 
-                   SSH_RAND_HELPER, strerror(errno));
-               _exit(1);
+               fatal("Couldn't open pipe: %s", strerror(errno));
+
+       (void)gettimeofday(&tv_start, NULL); /* record start time */
+
+       switch (pid = fork()) {
+               case -1: /* Error */
+                       close(p[0]);
+                       close(p[1]);
+                       fatal("Couldn't fork: %s", strerror(errno));
+                       /* NOTREACHED */
+               case 0: /* Child */
+                       dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO);
+                       dup2(p[1], STDOUT_FILENO);
+                       dup2(p[1], STDERR_FILENO);
+                       close(p[0]);
+                       close(p[1]);
+                       close(devnull);
+
+                       setuid(original_uid);
+                       execv(src->path, (char**)(src->args));
+                       debug("(child) Couldn't exec '%s': %s", src->cmdstring,
+                             strerror(errno));
+                       _exit(-1);
+               default: /* Parent */
+                       break;
        }
 
-       close(devnull);
+       RAND_add(&pid, sizeof(&pid), 0.0);
+
        close(p[1]);
 
-       memset(buf, '\0', sizeof(buf));
-       ret = atomicio(read, p[0], buf, sizeof(buf));
-       if (ret == -1)
-               fatal("Couldn't read from ssh-rand-helper: %s",
-                   strerror(errno));
-       if (ret != sizeof(buf))
-               fatal("ssh-rand-helper child produced insufficient data");
+       /* Hash output from child */
+       SHA1_Init(&sha);
+       total_bytes_read = 0;
+
+       while (!error_abort && !cmd_eof) {
+               int ret;
+               struct timeval tv;
+               int msec_remaining;
+
+               (void) gettimeofday(&tv_current, 0);
+               msec_elapsed = _get_timeval_msec_difference(&tv_start, &tv_current);
+               if (msec_elapsed >= entropy_timeout_current) {
+                       error_abort=1;
+                       continue;
+               }
+               msec_remaining = entropy_timeout_current - msec_elapsed;
+
+               FD_ZERO(&rdset);
+               FD_SET(p[0], &rdset);
+               tv.tv_sec =  msec_remaining / 1000;
+               tv.tv_usec = (msec_remaining % 1000) * 1000;
+
+               ret = select(p[0]+1, &rdset, NULL, NULL, &tv);
+
+               RAND_add(&tv, sizeof(tv), 0.0);
+
+               switch (ret) {
+               case 0:
+                       /* timer expired */
+                       error_abort = 1;
+                       break;
+               case 1:
+                       /* command input */
+                       do {
+                               bytes_read = read(p[0], buf, sizeof(buf));
+                       } while (bytes_read == -1 && errno == EINTR);
+                       RAND_add(&bytes_read, sizeof(&bytes_read), 0.0);
+                       if (bytes_read == -1) {
+                               error_abort = 1;
+                               break;
+                       } else if (bytes_read) {
+                               SHA1_Update(&sha, buf, bytes_read);
+                               total_bytes_read += bytes_read;
+                       } else {
+                               cmd_eof = 1;
+                       }
+                       break;
+               case -1:
+               default:
+                       /* error */
+                       debug("Command '%s': select() failed: %s", src->cmdstring,
+                             strerror(errno));
+                       error_abort = 1;
+                       break;
+               }
+       }
+
+       SHA1_Final(hash, &sha);
 
        close(p[0]);
 
-       if (waitpid(pid, &ret, 0) == -1)
-              fatal("Couldn't wait for ssh-rand-helper completion: %s", 
-                  strerror(errno));
-       mysignal(SIGCHLD, old_sigchld);
+       debug3("Time elapsed: %d msec", msec_elapsed);
 
-       /* We don't mind if the child exits upon a SIGPIPE */
-       if (!WIFEXITED(ret) && 
-           (!WIFSIGNALED(ret) || WTERMSIG(ret) != SIGPIPE))
-               fatal("ssh-rand-helper terminated abnormally");
-       if (WEXITSTATUS(ret) != 0)
-               fatal("ssh-rand-helper exit with exit status %d", ret);
+       if (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) {
+              error("Couldn't wait for child '%s' completion: %s", src->cmdstring,
+                    strerror(errno));
+               return(0.0);
+       }
 
-       RAND_add(buf, sizeof(buf), sizeof(buf));
-       memset(buf, '\0', sizeof(buf));
+       RAND_add(&status, sizeof(&status), 0.0);
+
+       if (error_abort) {
+               /* closing p[0] on timeout causes the entropy command to
+                * SIGPIPE. Take whatever output we got, and mark this command
+                * as slow */
+               debug2("Command '%s' timed out", src->cmdstring);
+               src->sticky_badness *= 2;
+               src->badness = src->sticky_badness;
+               return(total_bytes_read);
+       }
+
+       if (WIFEXITED(status)) {
+               if (WEXITSTATUS(status)==0) {
+                       return(total_bytes_read);
+               } else {
+                       debug2("Command '%s' exit status was %d", src->cmdstring,
+                               WEXITSTATUS(status));
+                       src->badness = src->sticky_badness = 128;
+                       return (0.0);
+               }
+       } else if (WIFSIGNALED(status)) {
+               debug2("Command '%s' returned on uncaught signal %d !", src->cmdstring,
+                       status);
+               src->badness = src->sticky_badness = 128;
+               return(0.0);
+       } else
+               return(0.0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * prng seedfile functions
+ */
+int
+prng_check_seedfile(char *filename) {
+
+       struct stat st;
+
+       /* FIXME raceable: eg replace seed between this stat and subsequent open */
+       /* Not such a problem because we don't trust the seed file anyway */
+       if (lstat(filename, &st) == -1) {
+               /* Give up on hard errors */
+               if (errno != ENOENT)
+                       debug("WARNING: Couldn't stat random seed file \"%s\": %s",
+                          filename, strerror(errno));
+
+               return(0);
+       }
+
+       /* regular file? */
+       if (!S_ISREG(st.st_mode))
+               fatal("PRNG seedfile %.100s is not a regular file", filename);
+
+       /* mode 0600, owned by root or the current user? */
+       if (((st.st_mode & 0177) != 0) || !(st.st_uid == original_uid)) {
+               debug("WARNING: PRNG seedfile %.100s must be mode 0600, owned by uid %d",
+                        filename, getuid());
+               return(0);
+       }
 
-#endif /* OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY */
-       if (RAND_status() != 1)
-               fatal("PRNG is not seeded");
+       return(1);
 }
 
 void
-init_rng(void) 
+prng_write_seedfile(void) {
+       int fd;
+       char seed[1024];
+       char filename[1024];
+       struct passwd *pw;
+
+       /* Don't bother if we have already saved a seed */
+       if (prng_seed_saved)
+               return;
+
+       setuid(original_uid);
+
+       prng_seed_saved = 1;
+
+       pw = getpwuid(original_uid);
+       if (pw == NULL)
+               fatal("Couldn't get password entry for current user (%i): %s",
+                       original_uid, strerror(errno));
+
+       /* Try to ensure that the parent directory is there */
+       snprintf(filename, sizeof(filename), "%.512s/%s", pw->pw_dir,
+               _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR);
+       mkdir(filename, 0700);
+
+       snprintf(filename, sizeof(filename), "%.512s/%s", pw->pw_dir,
+               SSH_PRNG_SEED_FILE);
+
+       debug("writing PRNG seed to file %.100s", filename);
+
+       RAND_bytes(seed, sizeof(seed));
+
+       /* Don't care if the seed doesn't exist */
+       prng_check_seedfile(filename);
+
+       if ((fd = open(filename, O_WRONLY|O_TRUNC|O_CREAT, 0600)) == -1) {
+               debug("WARNING: couldn't access PRNG seedfile %.100s (%.100s)",
+                  filename, strerror(errno));
+       } else {
+               if (atomicio(write, fd, &seed, sizeof(seed)) != sizeof(seed))
+                       fatal("problem writing PRNG seedfile %.100s (%.100s)", filename,
+                                strerror(errno));
+
+               close(fd);
+       }
+}
+
+void
+prng_read_seedfile(void) {
+       int fd;
+       char seed[1024];
+       char filename[1024];
+       struct passwd *pw;
+
+       pw = getpwuid(original_uid);
+       if (pw == NULL)
+               fatal("Couldn't get password entry for current user (%i): %s",
+                       original_uid, strerror(errno));
+
+       snprintf(filename, sizeof(filename), "%.512s/%s", pw->pw_dir,
+               SSH_PRNG_SEED_FILE);
+
+       debug("loading PRNG seed from file %.100s", filename);
+
+       if (!prng_check_seedfile(filename)) {
+               verbose("Random seed file not found or not valid, ignoring.");
+               return;
+       }
+
+       /* open the file and read in the seed */
+       fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY);
+       if (fd == -1)
+               fatal("could not open PRNG seedfile %.100s (%.100s)", filename,
+                       strerror(errno));
+
+       if (atomicio(read, fd, &seed, sizeof(seed)) != sizeof(seed)) {
+               verbose("invalid or short read from PRNG seedfile %.100s - ignoring",
+                       filename);
+               memset(seed, '\0', sizeof(seed));
+       }
+       close(fd);
+
+       /* stir in the seed, with estimated entropy zero */
+       RAND_add(&seed, sizeof(seed), 0.0);
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * entropy command initialisation functions
+ */
+int
+prng_read_commands(char *cmdfilename)
+{
+       FILE *f;
+       char *cp;
+       char line[1024];
+       char cmd[1024];
+       char path[256];
+       int linenum;
+       int num_cmds = 64;
+       int cur_cmd = 0;
+       double est;
+       entropy_source_t *entcmd;
+
+       f = fopen(cmdfilename, "r");
+       if (!f) {
+               fatal("couldn't read entropy commands file %.100s: %.100s",
+                   cmdfilename, strerror(errno));
+       }
+
+       entcmd = (entropy_source_t *)xmalloc(num_cmds * sizeof(entropy_source_t));
+       memset(entcmd, '\0', num_cmds * sizeof(entropy_source_t));
+
+       /* Read in file */
+       linenum = 0;
+       while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), f)) {
+               int arg;
+               char *argv;
+
+               linenum++;
+
+               /* skip leading whitespace, test for blank line or comment */
+               cp = line + strspn(line, WHITESPACE);
+               if ((*cp == 0) || (*cp == '#'))
+                       continue; /* done with this line */
+
+               /* First non-whitespace char should be double quote delimiting */
+               /* commandline */
+               if (*cp != '"') {
+                       error("bad entropy command, %.100s line %d", cmdfilename,
+                            linenum);
+                       continue;
+               }
+
+               /* first token, command args (incl. argv[0]) in double quotes */
+               cp = strtok(cp, "\"");
+               if (cp == NULL) {
+                       error("missing or bad command string, %.100s line %d -- ignored",
+                             cmdfilename, linenum);
+                       continue;
+               }
+               strlcpy(cmd, cp, sizeof(cmd));
+
+               /* second token, full command path */
+               if ((cp = strtok(NULL, WHITESPACE)) == NULL) {
+                       error("missing command path, %.100s line %d -- ignored",
+                             cmdfilename, linenum);
+                       continue;
+               }
+
+               /* did configure mark this as dead? */
+               if (strncmp("undef", cp, 5) == 0)
+                       continue;
+
+               strlcpy(path, cp, sizeof(path));
+
+               /* third token, entropy rate estimate for this command */
+               if ((cp = strtok(NULL, WHITESPACE)) == NULL) {
+                       error("missing entropy estimate, %.100s line %d -- ignored",
+                             cmdfilename, linenum);
+                       continue;
+               }
+               est = strtod(cp, &argv);
+
+               /* end of line */
+               if ((cp = strtok(NULL, WHITESPACE)) != NULL) {
+                       error("garbage at end of line %d in %.100s -- ignored", linenum,
+                               cmdfilename);
+                       continue;
+               }
+
+               /* save the command for debug messages */
+               entcmd[cur_cmd].cmdstring = xstrdup(cmd);
+
+               /* split the command args */
+               cp = strtok(cmd, WHITESPACE);
+               arg = 0;
+               argv = NULL;
+               do {
+                       char *s = (char*)xmalloc(strlen(cp) + 1);
+                       strncpy(s, cp, strlen(cp) + 1);
+                       entcmd[cur_cmd].args[arg] = s;
+                       arg++;
+               } while ((arg < 5) && (cp = strtok(NULL, WHITESPACE)));
+
+               if (strtok(NULL, WHITESPACE))
+                       error("ignored extra command elements (max 5), %.100s line %d",
+                             cmdfilename, linenum);
+
+               /* Copy the command path and rate estimate */
+               entcmd[cur_cmd].path = xstrdup(path);
+               entcmd[cur_cmd].rate = est;
+
+               /* Initialise other values */
+               entcmd[cur_cmd].sticky_badness = 1;
+
+               cur_cmd++;
+
+               /* If we've filled the array, reallocate it twice the size */
+               /* Do this now because even if this we're on the last command,
+                  we need another slot to mark the last entry */
+               if (cur_cmd == num_cmds) {
+                       num_cmds *= 2;
+                       entcmd = xrealloc(entcmd, num_cmds * sizeof(entropy_source_t));
+               }
+       }
+
+       /* zero the last entry */
+       memset(&entcmd[cur_cmd], '\0', sizeof(entropy_source_t));
+
+       /* trim to size */
+       entropy_sources = xrealloc(entcmd, (cur_cmd+1) * sizeof(entropy_source_t));
+
+       debug("Loaded %d entropy commands from %.100s", cur_cmd, cmdfilename);
+
+       return (cur_cmd >= MIN_ENTROPY_SOURCES);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Write a keyfile at exit
+ */
+void
+prng_seed_cleanup(void *junk)
 {
+       prng_write_seedfile();
+}
+
+/*
+ * Conditionally Seed OpenSSL's random number pool from
+ * syscalls and program output
+ */
+void
+seed_rng(void)
+{
+       mysig_t old_sigchld_handler;
+
+       if (!prng_initialised)
+               fatal("RNG not initialised");
+
+       /* Make sure some other sigchld handler doesn't reap our entropy */
+       /* commands */
+       old_sigchld_handler = mysignal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
+
+       debug("Seeded RNG with %i bytes from programs", 
+           (int)stir_from_programs());
+       debug("Seeded RNG with %i bytes from system calls", 
+           (int)stir_from_system());
+
+       if (!RAND_status())
+               fatal("Not enough entropy in RNG");
+
+       mysignal(SIGCHLD, old_sigchld_handler);
+
+       if (!RAND_status())
+               fatal("Couldn't initialise builtin random number generator -- exiting.");
+}
+
+void
+init_rng(void)
+{
+       int original_euid;
+
+       check_openssl_version();
+
+       original_uid = getuid();
+       original_euid = geteuid();
+
+       /* Read in collection commands */
+       if (!prng_read_commands(SSH_PRNG_COMMAND_FILE))
+               fatal("PRNG initialisation failed -- exiting.");
+
+       /* Set ourselves up to save a seed upon exit */
+       prng_seed_saved = 0;
+
+       /* Give up privs while reading seed file */
+#ifdef SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID
+       if ((original_uid != original_euid) && (seteuid(original_uid) == -1))
+               fatal("Couldn't give up privileges");
+#else /* SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID */
        /*
-        * OpenSSL version numbers: MNNFFPPS: major minor fix patch status
-        * We match major, minor, fix and status (not patch)
+        * Propagate the privileged uid to all of our uids.
+        * Set the effective uid to the given (unprivileged) uid. 
         */
-       if ((SSLeay() ^ OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER) & ~0xff0L)
-               fatal("OpenSSL version mismatch. Built against %lx, you "
-                   "have %lx", OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER, SSLeay());
+       if (original_uid != original_euid && (setuid(original_euid) == -1 || 
+           seteuid(original_uid) == -1))
+               fatal("Couldn't give up privileges");
+#endif /* SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID */
 
-#ifndef OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY
-       if ((original_uid = getuid()) == -1)
-               fatal("getuid: %s", strerror(errno));
-       if ((original_euid = geteuid()) == -1)
-               fatal("geteuid: %s", strerror(errno));
-#endif
+       prng_read_seedfile();
+
+#ifdef SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID
+       if ((original_uid != original_euid) && (seteuid(original_euid) == -1))
+               fatal("Couldn't restore privileges");
+#else /* SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID */
+       /*
+        * We are unable to restore the real uid to its unprivileged value.
+        * Propagate the real uid (usually more privileged) to effective uid
+        * as well.
+        */
+       if (original_uid != original_euid && (seteuid(original_euid) == -1 || 
+           setuid(original_uid) == -1))
+               fatal("Couldn't restore privileges");
+#endif /* SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID */
+
+       fatal_add_cleanup(prng_seed_cleanup, NULL);
+       atexit(prng_write_seedfile);
+
+       prng_initialised = 1;
 }
 
+#endif /* defined(USE_PRNGD) || defined(RANDOM_POOL) */
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