+/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.171 2009/03/05 07:18:19 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2008 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.105 2002/06/23 03:30:17 deraadt Exp $");
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#if defined(HAVE_STRNVIS) && defined(HAVE_VIS_H)
+#include <vis.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
-#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "buffer.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "compat.h"
-#include "bufaux.h"
#include "cipher.h"
+#include "key.h"
#include "kex.h"
#include "myproposal.h"
#include "sshconnect.h"
#include "authfd.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "readconf.h"
-#include "readpass.h"
+#include "misc.h"
#include "match.h"
#include "dispatch.h"
#include "canohost.h"
#include "msg.h"
#include "pathnames.h"
+#include "uidswap.h"
+#include "schnorr.h"
+#include "jpake.h"
+
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#endif
/* import */
extern char *client_version_string;
extern char *server_version_string;
extern Options options;
+extern Kex *xxx_kex;
+
+/* tty_flag is set in ssh.c. use this in ssh_userauth2 */
+/* if it is set then prevent the switch to the null cipher */
+
+extern int tty_flag;
+
+/* tty_flag is set in ssh.c. use this in ssh_userauth2 */
+/* if it is set then prevent the switch to the null cipher */
+
+extern int tty_flag;
+
+/* tty_flag is set in ssh.c. use this in ssh_userauth2 */
+/* if it is set then prevent the switch to the null cipher */
+
+extern int tty_flag;
/*
* SSH2 key exchange
*/
u_char *session_id2 = NULL;
-int session_id2_len = 0;
+u_int session_id2_len = 0;
char *xxx_host;
struct sockaddr *xxx_hostaddr;
{
Kex *kex;
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+ char *orig = NULL, *gss = NULL;
+ char *gss_host = NULL;
+#endif
+
xxx_host = host;
xxx_hostaddr = hostaddr;
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+ if (options.gss_keyex) {
+ /* Add the GSSAPI mechanisms currently supported on this
+ * client to the key exchange algorithm proposal */
+ orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
+
+ if (options.gss_trust_dns)
+ gss_host = (char *)get_canonical_hostname(1);
+ else
+ gss_host = host;
+
+ gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host, options.gss_client_identity);
+ if (gss) {
+ debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss);
+ xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS],
+ "%s,%s", gss, orig);
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
if (options.ciphers == (char *)-1) {
- log("No valid ciphers for protocol version 2 given, using defaults.");
+ logit("No valid ciphers for protocol version 2 given, using defaults.");
options.ciphers = NULL;
}
if (options.ciphers != NULL) {
compat_cipher_proposal(myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC]);
if (options.compression) {
myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS] =
- myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] = "zlib";
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] = "zlib@openssh.com,zlib,none";
} else {
myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS] =
- myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] = "none";
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] = "none,zlib@openssh.com,zlib";
}
if (options.macs != NULL) {
myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] =
myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] =
options.hostkeyalgorithms;
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+ /* If we've got GSSAPI algorithms, then we also support the
+ * 'null' hostkey, as a last resort */
+ if (options.gss_keyex && gss) {
+ orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS];
+ xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS],
+ "%s,null", orig);
+ xfree(gss);
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if (options.rekey_limit)
+ packet_set_rekey_limit((u_int32_t)options.rekey_limit);
+
/* start key exchange */
kex = kex_setup(myproposal);
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_client;
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_client;
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_client;
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_client;
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+ if (options.gss_keyex) {
+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_client;
+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_client;
+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_client;
+ }
+#endif
kex->client_version_string=client_version_string;
kex->server_version_string=server_version_string;
kex->verify_host_key=&verify_host_key_callback;
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+ if (options.gss_keyex) {
+ kex->gss_deleg_creds = options.gss_deleg_creds;
+ kex->gss_trust_dns = options.gss_trust_dns;
+ kex->gss_client = options.gss_client_identity;
+ kex->gss_host = gss_host;
+ }
+#endif
+
xxx_kex = kex;
dispatch_run(DISPATCH_BLOCK, &kex->done, kex);
packet_send();
packet_write_wait();
#endif
- debug("done: ssh_kex2.");
}
/*
typedef struct Authctxt Authctxt;
typedef struct Authmethod Authmethod;
-
-typedef int sign_cb_fn(
- Authctxt *authctxt, Key *key,
- u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp, u_char *data, u_int datalen);
+typedef struct identity Identity;
+typedef struct idlist Idlist;
+
+struct identity {
+ TAILQ_ENTRY(identity) next;
+ AuthenticationConnection *ac; /* set if agent supports key */
+ Key *key; /* public/private key */
+ char *filename; /* comment for agent-only keys */
+ int tried;
+ int isprivate; /* key points to the private key */
+};
+TAILQ_HEAD(idlist, identity);
struct Authctxt {
const char *server_user;
int success;
char *authlist;
/* pubkey */
- Key *last_key;
- sign_cb_fn *last_key_sign;
- int last_key_hint;
+ Idlist keys;
AuthenticationConnection *agent;
/* hostbased */
Sensitive *sensitive;
/* kbd-interactive */
int info_req_seen;
+ /* generic */
+ void *methoddata;
};
struct Authmethod {
char *name; /* string to compare against server's list */
int (*userauth)(Authctxt *authctxt);
+ void (*cleanup)(Authctxt *authctxt);
int *enabled; /* flag in option struct that enables method */
int *batch_flag; /* flag in option struct that disables method */
};
void input_userauth_info_req(int, u_int32_t, void *);
void input_userauth_pk_ok(int, u_int32_t, void *);
void input_userauth_passwd_changereq(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+void input_userauth_jpake_server_step1(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+void input_userauth_jpake_server_step2(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+void input_userauth_jpake_server_confirm(int, u_int32_t, void *);
int userauth_none(Authctxt *);
int userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *);
int userauth_passwd(Authctxt *);
int userauth_kbdint(Authctxt *);
int userauth_hostbased(Authctxt *);
+int userauth_jpake(Authctxt *);
+
+void userauth_jpake_cleanup(Authctxt *);
+
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+int userauth_external(Authctxt *authctxt);
+int userauth_gssapi(Authctxt *authctxt);
+int userauth_gssapi_with_mic(Authctxt *authctxt);
+int userauth_gssapi_without_mic(Authctxt *authctxt);
+void input_gssapi_response(int type, u_int32_t, void *);
+void input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t, void *);
+void input_gssapi_hash(int type, u_int32_t, void *);
+void input_gssapi_error(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+void input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+int userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt);
+#endif
void userauth(Authctxt *, char *);
-static int sign_and_send_pubkey(Authctxt *, Key *, sign_cb_fn *);
-static void clear_auth_state(Authctxt *);
+static int sign_and_send_pubkey(Authctxt *, Identity *);
+static void pubkey_prepare(Authctxt *);
+static void pubkey_cleanup(Authctxt *);
+static Key *load_identity_file(char *);
static Authmethod *authmethod_get(char *authlist);
static Authmethod *authmethod_lookup(const char *name);
static char *authmethods_get(void);
Authmethod authmethods[] = {
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+ {"gssapi-keyex",
+ userauth_gsskeyex,
+ NULL,
+ &options.gss_authentication,
+ NULL},
+ {"external-keyx",
+ userauth_external,
+ NULL,
+ &options.gss_authentication,
+ NULL},
+ {"gssapi-with-mic",
+ userauth_gssapi,
+ NULL,
+ &options.gss_authentication,
+ NULL},
+ {"gssapi",
+ userauth_gssapi,
+ NULL,
+ &options.gss_authentication,
+ NULL},
+#endif
{"hostbased",
userauth_hostbased,
+ NULL,
&options.hostbased_authentication,
NULL},
{"publickey",
userauth_pubkey,
+ NULL,
&options.pubkey_authentication,
NULL},
+#ifdef JPAKE
+ {"jpake-01@openssh.com",
+ userauth_jpake,
+ userauth_jpake_cleanup,
+ &options.zero_knowledge_password_authentication,
+ &options.batch_mode},
+#endif
{"keyboard-interactive",
userauth_kbdint,
+ NULL,
&options.kbd_interactive_authentication,
&options.batch_mode},
{"password",
userauth_passwd,
+ NULL,
&options.password_authentication,
&options.batch_mode},
{"none",
userauth_none,
NULL,
+ NULL,
NULL},
- {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}
+ {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}
};
void
if (options.challenge_response_authentication)
options.kbd_interactive_authentication = 1;
- debug("send SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST");
packet_start(SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST);
packet_put_cstring("ssh-userauth");
packet_send();
+ debug("SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST sent");
packet_write_wait();
type = packet_read();
- if (type != SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT) {
- fatal("denied SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT: %d", type);
- }
+ if (type != SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT)
+ fatal("Server denied authentication request: %d", type);
if (packet_remaining() > 0) {
char *reply = packet_get_string(NULL);
- debug("service_accept: %s", reply);
+ debug2("service_accept: %s", reply);
xfree(reply);
} else {
- debug("buggy server: service_accept w/o service");
+ debug2("buggy server: service_accept w/o service");
}
packet_check_eom();
- debug("got SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT");
+ debug("SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT received");
if (options.preferred_authentications == NULL)
options.preferred_authentications = authmethods_get();
/* setup authentication context */
memset(&authctxt, 0, sizeof(authctxt));
- authctxt.agent = ssh_get_authentication_connection();
+ pubkey_prepare(&authctxt);
authctxt.server_user = server_user;
authctxt.local_user = local_user;
authctxt.host = host;
authctxt.success = 0;
authctxt.method = authmethod_lookup("none");
authctxt.authlist = NULL;
+ authctxt.methoddata = NULL;
authctxt.sensitive = sensitive;
authctxt.info_req_seen = 0;
if (authctxt.method == NULL)
dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER, &input_userauth_banner);
dispatch_run(DISPATCH_BLOCK, &authctxt.success, &authctxt); /* loop until success */
- if (authctxt.agent != NULL)
- ssh_close_authentication_connection(authctxt.agent);
-
- debug("ssh-userauth2 successful: method %s", authctxt.method->name);
+ pubkey_cleanup(&authctxt);
+ dispatch_range(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_MIN, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_MAX, NULL);
+
+ /* if the user wants to use the none cipher do it */
+ /* post authentication and only if the right conditions are met */
+ /* both of the NONE commands must be true and there must be no */
+ /* tty allocated */
+ if ((options.none_switch == 1) && (options.none_enabled == 1))
+ {
+ if (!tty_flag) /* no null on tty sessions */
+ {
+ debug("Requesting none rekeying...");
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = "none";
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] = "none";
+ kex_prop2buf(&xxx_kex->my,myproposal);
+ packet_request_rekeying();
+ fprintf(stderr, "WARNING: ENABLED NONE CIPHER\n");
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /* requested NONE cipher when in a tty */
+ debug("Cannot switch to NONE cipher with tty allocated");
+ fprintf(stderr, "NONE cipher switch disabled when a TTY is allocated\n");
+ }
+ }
+ debug("Authentication succeeded (%s).", authctxt.method->name);
}
+
void
userauth(Authctxt *authctxt, char *authlist)
{
+ if (authctxt->method != NULL && authctxt->method->cleanup != NULL)
+ authctxt->method->cleanup(authctxt);
+
+ if (authctxt->methoddata) {
+ xfree(authctxt->methoddata);
+ authctxt->methoddata = NULL;
+ }
if (authlist == NULL) {
authlist = authctxt->authlist;
} else {
if (method == NULL)
fatal("Permission denied (%s).", authlist);
authctxt->method = method;
+
+ /* reset the per method handler */
+ dispatch_range(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PER_METHOD_MIN,
+ SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PER_METHOD_MAX, NULL);
+
+ /* and try new method */
if (method->userauth(authctxt) != 0) {
debug2("we sent a %s packet, wait for reply", method->name);
break;
}
}
+/* ARGSUSED */
void
input_userauth_error(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
{
fatal("input_userauth_error: bad message during authentication: "
- "type %d", type);
+ "type %d", type);
}
+/* ARGSUSED */
void
input_userauth_banner(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
{
- char *msg, *lang;
+ char *msg, *raw, *lang;
+ u_int len;
+
debug3("input_userauth_banner");
- msg = packet_get_string(NULL);
+ raw = packet_get_string(&len);
lang = packet_get_string(NULL);
- fprintf(stderr, "%s", msg);
- xfree(msg);
+ if (len > 0 && options.log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO) {
+ if (len > 65536)
+ len = 65536;
+ msg = xmalloc(len * 4 + 1); /* max expansion from strnvis() */
+ strnvis(msg, raw, len * 4 + 1, VIS_SAFE|VIS_OCTAL);
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s", msg);
+ xfree(msg);
+ }
+ xfree(raw);
xfree(lang);
}
+/* ARGSUSED */
void
input_userauth_success(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
if (authctxt == NULL)
fatal("input_userauth_success: no authentication context");
- if (authctxt->authlist)
+ if (authctxt->authlist) {
xfree(authctxt->authlist);
- clear_auth_state(authctxt);
+ authctxt->authlist = NULL;
+ }
+ if (authctxt->methoddata) {
+ xfree(authctxt->methoddata);
+ authctxt->methoddata = NULL;
+ }
authctxt->success = 1; /* break out */
}
+/* ARGSUSED */
void
input_userauth_failure(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
{
packet_check_eom();
if (partial != 0)
- log("Authenticated with partial success.");
- debug("authentications that can continue: %s", authlist);
+ logit("Authenticated with partial success.");
+ debug("Authentications that can continue: %s", authlist);
- clear_auth_state(authctxt);
userauth(authctxt, authlist);
}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
void
input_userauth_pk_ok(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
Key *key = NULL;
+ Identity *id = NULL;
Buffer b;
int pktype, sent = 0;
u_int alen, blen;
}
packet_check_eom();
- debug("input_userauth_pk_ok: pkalg %s blen %u lastkey %p hint %d",
- pkalg, blen, authctxt->last_key, authctxt->last_key_hint);
+ debug("Server accepts key: pkalg %s blen %u", pkalg, blen);
- do {
- if (authctxt->last_key == NULL ||
- authctxt->last_key_sign == NULL) {
- debug("no last key or no sign cb");
- break;
- }
- if ((pktype = key_type_from_name(pkalg)) == KEY_UNSPEC) {
- debug("unknown pkalg %s", pkalg);
- break;
- }
- if ((key = key_from_blob(pkblob, blen)) == NULL) {
- debug("no key from blob. pkalg %s", pkalg);
- break;
- }
- if (key->type != pktype) {
- error("input_userauth_pk_ok: type mismatch "
- "for decoded key (received %d, expected %d)",
- key->type, pktype);
- break;
- }
- fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
- debug2("input_userauth_pk_ok: fp %s", fp);
- xfree(fp);
- if (!key_equal(key, authctxt->last_key)) {
- debug("key != last_key");
+ if ((pktype = key_type_from_name(pkalg)) == KEY_UNSPEC) {
+ debug("unknown pkalg %s", pkalg);
+ goto done;
+ }
+ if ((key = key_from_blob(pkblob, blen)) == NULL) {
+ debug("no key from blob. pkalg %s", pkalg);
+ goto done;
+ }
+ if (key->type != pktype) {
+ error("input_userauth_pk_ok: type mismatch "
+ "for decoded key (received %d, expected %d)",
+ key->type, pktype);
+ goto done;
+ }
+ fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
+ debug2("input_userauth_pk_ok: fp %s", fp);
+ xfree(fp);
+
+ /*
+ * search keys in the reverse order, because last candidate has been
+ * moved to the end of the queue. this also avoids confusion by
+ * duplicate keys
+ */
+ TAILQ_FOREACH_REVERSE(id, &authctxt->keys, idlist, next) {
+ if (key_equal(key, id->key)) {
+ sent = sign_and_send_pubkey(authctxt, id);
break;
}
- sent = sign_and_send_pubkey(authctxt, key,
- authctxt->last_key_sign);
- } while (0);
-
+ }
+done:
if (key != NULL)
key_free(key);
xfree(pkalg);
xfree(pkblob);
- /* unregister */
- clear_auth_state(authctxt);
- dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK, NULL);
-
- /* try another method if we did not send a packet*/
+ /* try another method if we did not send a packet */
if (sent == 0)
userauth(authctxt, NULL);
+}
+
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+int
+userauth_gssapi(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+ Gssctxt *gssctxt = NULL;
+ static gss_OID_set gss_supported = NULL;
+ static u_int mech = 0;
+ OM_uint32 min;
+ int ok = 0;
+ char *gss_host = NULL;
+
+ if (!options.gss_authentication) {
+ verbose("GSSAPI authentication disabled.");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (options.gss_trust_dns)
+ gss_host = (char *)get_canonical_hostname(1);
+ else
+ gss_host = (char *)authctxt->host;
+
+ /* Try one GSSAPI method at a time, rather than sending them all at
+ * once. */
+
+ if (gss_supported == NULL)
+ if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min, &gss_supported))) {
+ gss_supported = NULL;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Check to see if the mechanism is usable before we offer it */
+ while (mech < gss_supported->count && !ok) {
+ /* My DER encoding requires length<128 */
+ if (gss_supported->elements[mech].length < 128 &&
+ ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(&gssctxt,
+ &gss_supported->elements[mech], gss_host,
+ options.gss_client_identity)) {
+ ok = 1; /* Mechanism works */
+ } else {
+ mech++;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!ok)
+ return 0;
+
+ authctxt->methoddata=(void *)gssctxt;
+
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
+ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->server_user);
+ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->service);
+ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name);
+
+ packet_put_int(1);
+
+ packet_put_int((gss_supported->elements[mech].length) + 2);
+ packet_put_char(SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE);
+ packet_put_char(gss_supported->elements[mech].length);
+ packet_put_raw(gss_supported->elements[mech].elements,
+ gss_supported->elements[mech].length);
+
+ packet_send();
+
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_RESPONSE, &input_gssapi_response);
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, &input_gssapi_token);
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERROR, &input_gssapi_error);
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK, &input_gssapi_errtok);
+
+ mech++; /* Move along to next candidate */
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static OM_uint32
+process_gssapi_token(void *ctxt, gss_buffer_t recv_tok)
+{
+ Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
+ Gssctxt *gssctxt = authctxt->methoddata;
+ gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+ gss_buffer_desc mic = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+ gss_buffer_desc gssbuf;
+ OM_uint32 status, ms, flags;
+ Buffer b;
+
+ status = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(gssctxt, options.gss_deleg_creds,
+ recv_tok, &send_tok, &flags);
+
+ if (send_tok.length > 0) {
+ if (GSS_ERROR(status))
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK);
+ else
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN);
+
+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
+ packet_send();
+ gss_release_buffer(&ms, &send_tok);
+ }
+
+ if (status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
+ /* send either complete or MIC, depending on mechanism */
+ if (strcmp(authctxt->method->name,"gssapi")==0 ||
+ (!(flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))) {
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE);
+ packet_send();
+ } else {
+ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, authctxt->server_user,
+ authctxt->service, "gssapi-with-mic");
+
+ gssbuf.value = buffer_ptr(&b);
+ gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b);
+
+ status = ssh_gssapi_sign(gssctxt, &gssbuf, &mic);
+
+ if (!GSS_ERROR(status)) {
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC);
+ packet_put_string(mic.value, mic.length);
+
+ packet_send();
+ }
+
+ buffer_free(&b);
+ gss_release_buffer(&ms, &mic);
+ }
+ }
+
+ return status;
+}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+void
+input_gssapi_response(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
+{
+ Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
+ Gssctxt *gssctxt;
+ u_int oidlen;
+ u_char *oidv;
+
+ if (authctxt == NULL)
+ fatal("input_gssapi_response: no authentication context");
+ gssctxt = authctxt->methoddata;
+
+ /* Setup our OID */
+ oidv = packet_get_string(&oidlen);
+
+ if (oidlen <= 2 ||
+ oidv[0] != SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE ||
+ oidv[1] != oidlen - 2) {
+ xfree(oidv);
+ debug("Badly encoded mechanism OID received");
+ userauth(authctxt, NULL);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (!ssh_gssapi_check_oid(gssctxt, oidv + 2, oidlen - 2))
+ fatal("Server returned different OID than expected");
+ packet_check_eom();
+
+ xfree(oidv);
+
+ if (GSS_ERROR(process_gssapi_token(ctxt, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER))) {
+ /* Start again with next method on list */
+ debug("Trying to start again");
+ userauth(authctxt, NULL);
+ return;
+ }
+}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+void
+input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
+{
+ Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
+ gss_buffer_desc recv_tok;
+ OM_uint32 status;
+ u_int slen;
+
+ if (authctxt == NULL)
+ fatal("input_gssapi_response: no authentication context");
+
+ recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&slen);
+ recv_tok.length = slen; /* safe typecast */
+
+ packet_check_eom();
+
+ status = process_gssapi_token(ctxt, &recv_tok);
+
+ xfree(recv_tok.value);
+
+ if (GSS_ERROR(status)) {
+ /* Start again with the next method in the list */
+ userauth(authctxt, NULL);
+ return;
+ }
}
+/* ARGSUSED */
+void
+input_gssapi_errtok(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
+{
+ Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
+ Gssctxt *gssctxt;
+ gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+ gss_buffer_desc recv_tok;
+ OM_uint32 status, ms;
+ u_int len;
+
+ if (authctxt == NULL)
+ fatal("input_gssapi_response: no authentication context");
+ gssctxt = authctxt->methoddata;
+
+ recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&len);
+ recv_tok.length = len;
+
+ packet_check_eom();
+
+ /* Stick it into GSSAPI and see what it says */
+ status = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(gssctxt, options.gss_deleg_creds,
+ &recv_tok, &send_tok, NULL);
+
+ xfree(recv_tok.value);
+ gss_release_buffer(&ms, &send_tok);
+
+ /* Server will be returning a failed packet after this one */
+}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+void
+input_gssapi_error(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
+{
+ OM_uint32 maj, min;
+ char *msg;
+ char *lang;
+
+ maj=packet_get_int();
+ min=packet_get_int();
+ msg=packet_get_string(NULL);
+ lang=packet_get_string(NULL);
+
+ packet_check_eom();
+
+ debug("Server GSSAPI Error:\n%s", msg);
+ xfree(msg);
+ xfree(lang);
+}
+
+#ifdef GSI
+extern
+const gss_OID_desc * const gss_mech_globus_gssapi_openssl;
+#define is_gsi_oid(oid) \
+ (oid->length == gss_mech_globus_gssapi_openssl->length && \
+ (memcmp(oid->elements, gss_mech_globus_gssapi_openssl->elements, \
+ oid->length) == 0))
+#endif
+
+int
+userauth_external(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+ static int attempt = 0;
+
+ if (attempt++ >= 1)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* The client MUST NOT try this method if initial key exchange
+ was not performed using a GSSAPI-based key exchange
+ method. */
+ if (gss_kex_context == NULL) {
+ debug2("gsskex not performed, skipping external-keyx");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ debug2("userauth_external");
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
+#ifdef GSI
+ if (options.implicit && is_gsi_oid(gss_kex_context->oid)) {
+ packet_put_cstring("");
+ } else {
+#endif
+ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->server_user);
+#ifdef GSI
+ }
+#endif
+ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->service);
+ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name);
+ packet_send();
+ packet_write_wait();
+ return 1;
+}
+int
+userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+ Buffer b;
+ gss_buffer_desc gssbuf;
+ gss_buffer_desc mic = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+ OM_uint32 ms;
+
+ static int attempt = 0;
+ if (attempt++ >= 1)
+ return (0);
+
+ if (gss_kex_context == NULL) {
+ debug("No valid Key exchange context");
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+#ifdef GSI
+ if (options.implicit && is_gsi_oid(gss_kex_context->oid)) {
+ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, "", authctxt->service, "gssapi-keyex");
+ } else {
+#endif
+ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, authctxt->server_user, authctxt->service,
+ "gssapi-keyex");
+#ifdef GSI
+ }
+#endif
+
+ gssbuf.value = buffer_ptr(&b);
+ gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b);
+
+ if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_sign(gss_kex_context, &gssbuf, &mic))) {
+ buffer_free(&b);
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
+#ifdef GSI
+ if (options.implicit && is_gsi_oid(gss_kex_context->oid)) {
+ packet_put_cstring("");
+ } else {
+#endif
+ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->server_user);
+#ifdef GSI
+ }
+#endif
+ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->service);
+ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name);
+ packet_put_string(mic.value, mic.length);
+ packet_send();
+
+ buffer_free(&b);
+ gss_release_buffer(&ms, &mic);
+
+ return (1);
+}
+
+#endif /* GSSAPI */
+
int
userauth_none(Authctxt *authctxt)
{
return 1;
}
+
/*
* parse PASSWD_CHANGEREQ, prompt user and send SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST
*/
+/* ARGSUSED */
void
input_userauth_passwd_changereq(int type, u_int32_t seqnr, void *ctxt)
{
info = packet_get_string(NULL);
lang = packet_get_string(NULL);
if (strlen(info) > 0)
- log("%s", info);
+ logit("%s", info);
xfree(info);
xfree(lang);
packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
if (strcmp(password, retype) != 0) {
memset(password, 0, strlen(password));
xfree(password);
- log("Mismatch; try again, EOF to quit.");
+ logit("Mismatch; try again, EOF to quit.");
password = NULL;
}
memset(retype, 0, strlen(retype));
&input_userauth_passwd_changereq);
}
-static void
-clear_auth_state(Authctxt *authctxt)
+#ifdef JPAKE
+static char *
+pw_encrypt(const char *password, const char *crypt_scheme, const char *salt)
{
- /* XXX clear authentication state */
- dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ, NULL);
+ /* OpenBSD crypt(3) handles all of these */
+ if (strcmp(crypt_scheme, "crypt") == 0 ||
+ strcmp(crypt_scheme, "bcrypt") == 0 ||
+ strcmp(crypt_scheme, "md5crypt") == 0 ||
+ strcmp(crypt_scheme, "crypt-extended") == 0)
+ return xstrdup(crypt(password, salt));
+ error("%s: unsupported password encryption scheme \"%.100s\"",
+ __func__, crypt_scheme);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static BIGNUM *
+jpake_password_to_secret(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *crypt_scheme,
+ const char *salt)
+{
+ char prompt[256], *password, *crypted;
+ u_char *secret;
+ u_int secret_len;
+ BIGNUM *ret;
- if (authctxt->last_key != NULL && authctxt->last_key_hint == -1) {
- debug3("clear_auth_state: key_free %p", authctxt->last_key);
- key_free(authctxt->last_key);
+ snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), "%.30s@%.128s's password (JPAKE): ",
+ authctxt->server_user, authctxt->host);
+ password = read_passphrase(prompt, 0);
+
+ if ((crypted = pw_encrypt(password, crypt_scheme, salt)) == NULL) {
+ logit("Disabling %s authentication", authctxt->method->name);
+ authctxt->method->enabled = NULL;
+ /* Continue with an empty password to fail gracefully */
+ crypted = xstrdup("");
}
- authctxt->last_key = NULL;
- authctxt->last_key_hint = -2;
- authctxt->last_key_sign = NULL;
+
+#ifdef JPAKE_DEBUG
+ debug3("%s: salt = %s", __func__, salt);
+ debug3("%s: scheme = %s", __func__, crypt_scheme);
+ debug3("%s: crypted = %s", __func__, crypted);
+#endif
+
+ if (hash_buffer(crypted, strlen(crypted), EVP_sha256(),
+ &secret, &secret_len) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: hash_buffer", __func__);
+
+ bzero(password, strlen(password));
+ bzero(crypted, strlen(crypted));
+ xfree(password);
+ xfree(crypted);
+
+ if ((ret = BN_bin2bn(secret, secret_len, NULL)) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: BN_bin2bn (secret)", __func__);
+ bzero(secret, secret_len);
+ xfree(secret);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+void
+input_userauth_jpake_server_step1(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+ Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
+ struct jpake_ctx *pctx = authctxt->methoddata;
+ u_char *x3_proof, *x4_proof, *x2_s_proof;
+ u_int x3_proof_len, x4_proof_len, x2_s_proof_len;
+ char *crypt_scheme, *salt;
+
+ /* Disable this message */
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_SERVER_STEP1, NULL);
+
+ if ((pctx->g_x3 = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+ (pctx->g_x4 = BN_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
+
+ /* Fetch step 1 values */
+ crypt_scheme = packet_get_string(NULL);
+ salt = packet_get_string(NULL);
+ pctx->server_id = packet_get_string(&pctx->server_id_len);
+ packet_get_bignum2(pctx->g_x3);
+ packet_get_bignum2(pctx->g_x4);
+ x3_proof = packet_get_string(&x3_proof_len);
+ x4_proof = packet_get_string(&x4_proof_len);
+ packet_check_eom();
+
+ JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "step 1 received in %s", __func__));
+
+ /* Obtain password and derive secret */
+ pctx->s = jpake_password_to_secret(authctxt, crypt_scheme, salt);
+ bzero(crypt_scheme, strlen(crypt_scheme));
+ bzero(salt, strlen(salt));
+ xfree(crypt_scheme);
+ xfree(salt);
+ JPAKE_DEBUG_BN((pctx->s, "%s: s = ", __func__));
+
+ /* Calculate step 2 values */
+ jpake_step2(pctx->grp, pctx->s, pctx->g_x1,
+ pctx->g_x3, pctx->g_x4, pctx->x2,
+ pctx->server_id, pctx->server_id_len,
+ pctx->client_id, pctx->client_id_len,
+ x3_proof, x3_proof_len,
+ x4_proof, x4_proof_len,
+ &pctx->a,
+ &x2_s_proof, &x2_s_proof_len);
+
+ bzero(x3_proof, x3_proof_len);
+ bzero(x4_proof, x4_proof_len);
+ xfree(x3_proof);
+ xfree(x4_proof);
+
+ JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "step 2 sending in %s", __func__));
+
+ /* Send values for step 2 */
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_CLIENT_STEP2);
+ packet_put_bignum2(pctx->a);
+ packet_put_string(x2_s_proof, x2_s_proof_len);
+ packet_send();
+
+ bzero(x2_s_proof, x2_s_proof_len);
+ xfree(x2_s_proof);
+
+ /* Expect step 2 packet from peer */
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_SERVER_STEP2,
+ input_userauth_jpake_server_step2);
}
+/* ARGSUSED */
+void
+input_userauth_jpake_server_step2(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+ Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
+ struct jpake_ctx *pctx = authctxt->methoddata;
+ u_char *x4_s_proof;
+ u_int x4_s_proof_len;
+
+ /* Disable this message */
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_SERVER_STEP2, NULL);
+
+ if ((pctx->b = BN_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
+
+ /* Fetch step 2 values */
+ packet_get_bignum2(pctx->b);
+ x4_s_proof = packet_get_string(&x4_s_proof_len);
+ packet_check_eom();
+
+ JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "step 2 received in %s", __func__));
+
+ /* Derive shared key and calculate confirmation hash */
+ jpake_key_confirm(pctx->grp, pctx->s, pctx->b,
+ pctx->x2, pctx->g_x1, pctx->g_x2, pctx->g_x3, pctx->g_x4,
+ pctx->client_id, pctx->client_id_len,
+ pctx->server_id, pctx->server_id_len,
+ session_id2, session_id2_len,
+ x4_s_proof, x4_s_proof_len,
+ &pctx->k,
+ &pctx->h_k_cid_sessid, &pctx->h_k_cid_sessid_len);
+
+ bzero(x4_s_proof, x4_s_proof_len);
+ xfree(x4_s_proof);
+
+ JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "confirm sending in %s", __func__));
+
+ /* Send key confirmation proof */
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_CLIENT_CONFIRM);
+ packet_put_string(pctx->h_k_cid_sessid, pctx->h_k_cid_sessid_len);
+ packet_send();
+
+ /* Expect confirmation from peer */
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_SERVER_CONFIRM,
+ input_userauth_jpake_server_confirm);
+}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+void
+input_userauth_jpake_server_confirm(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+ Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
+ struct jpake_ctx *pctx = authctxt->methoddata;
+
+ /* Disable this message */
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_SERVER_CONFIRM, NULL);
+
+ pctx->h_k_sid_sessid = packet_get_string(&pctx->h_k_sid_sessid_len);
+ packet_check_eom();
+
+ JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "confirm received in %s", __func__));
+
+ /* Verify expected confirmation hash */
+ if (jpake_check_confirm(pctx->k,
+ pctx->server_id, pctx->server_id_len,
+ session_id2, session_id2_len,
+ pctx->h_k_sid_sessid, pctx->h_k_sid_sessid_len) == 1)
+ debug("%s: %s success", __func__, authctxt->method->name);
+ else {
+ debug("%s: confirmation mismatch", __func__);
+ /* XXX stash this so if auth succeeds then we can warn/kill */
+ }
+
+ userauth_jpake_cleanup(authctxt);
+}
+#endif /* JPAKE */
+
static int
-sign_and_send_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt, Key *k, sign_cb_fn *sign_callback)
+identity_sign(Identity *id, u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp,
+ u_char *data, u_int datalen)
+{
+ Key *prv;
+ int ret;
+
+ /* the agent supports this key */
+ if (id->ac)
+ return (ssh_agent_sign(id->ac, id->key, sigp, lenp,
+ data, datalen));
+ /*
+ * we have already loaded the private key or
+ * the private key is stored in external hardware
+ */
+ if (id->isprivate || (id->key->flags & KEY_FLAG_EXT))
+ return (key_sign(id->key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen));
+ /* load the private key from the file */
+ if ((prv = load_identity_file(id->filename)) == NULL)
+ return (-1);
+ ret = key_sign(prv, sigp, lenp, data, datalen);
+ key_free(prv);
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+static int
+sign_and_send_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt, Identity *id)
{
Buffer b;
u_char *blob, *signature;
u_int bloblen, slen;
- int skip = 0;
+ u_int skip = 0;
int ret = -1;
int have_sig = 1;
debug3("sign_and_send_pubkey");
- if (key_to_blob(k, &blob, &bloblen) == 0) {
+ if (key_to_blob(id->key, &blob, &bloblen) == 0) {
/* we cannot handle this key */
debug3("sign_and_send_pubkey: cannot handle key");
return 0;
} else {
buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->method->name);
buffer_put_char(&b, have_sig);
- buffer_put_cstring(&b, key_ssh_name(k));
+ buffer_put_cstring(&b, key_ssh_name(id->key));
}
buffer_put_string(&b, blob, bloblen);
/* generate signature */
- ret = (*sign_callback)(authctxt, k, &signature, &slen,
+ ret = identity_sign(id, &signature, &slen,
buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b));
if (ret == -1) {
xfree(blob);
buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->method->name);
buffer_put_char(&b, have_sig);
if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH))
- buffer_put_cstring(&b, key_ssh_name(k));
+ buffer_put_cstring(&b, key_ssh_name(id->key));
buffer_put_string(&b, blob, bloblen);
}
xfree(blob);
}
static int
-send_pubkey_test(Authctxt *authctxt, Key *k, sign_cb_fn *sign_callback,
- int hint)
+send_pubkey_test(Authctxt *authctxt, Identity *id)
{
u_char *blob;
u_int bloblen, have_sig = 0;
debug3("send_pubkey_test");
- if (key_to_blob(k, &blob, &bloblen) == 0) {
+ if (key_to_blob(id->key, &blob, &bloblen) == 0) {
/* we cannot handle this key */
debug3("send_pubkey_test: cannot handle key");
return 0;
}
/* register callback for USERAUTH_PK_OK message */
- authctxt->last_key_sign = sign_callback;
- authctxt->last_key_hint = hint;
- authctxt->last_key = k;
dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK, &input_userauth_pk_ok);
packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name);
packet_put_char(have_sig);
if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH))
- packet_put_cstring(key_ssh_name(k));
+ packet_put_cstring(key_ssh_name(id->key));
packet_put_string(blob, bloblen);
xfree(blob);
packet_send();
{
Key *private;
char prompt[300], *passphrase;
- int quit, i;
+ int perm_ok, quit, i;
struct stat st;
if (stat(filename, &st) < 0) {
debug3("no such identity: %s", filename);
return NULL;
}
- private = key_load_private_type(KEY_UNSPEC, filename, "", NULL);
+ private = key_load_private_type(KEY_UNSPEC, filename, "", NULL, &perm_ok);
+ if (!perm_ok)
+ return NULL;
if (private == NULL) {
if (options.batch_mode)
return NULL;
for (i = 0; i < options.number_of_password_prompts; i++) {
passphrase = read_passphrase(prompt, 0);
if (strcmp(passphrase, "") != 0) {
- private = key_load_private_type(KEY_UNSPEC, filename,
- passphrase, NULL);
+ private = key_load_private_type(KEY_UNSPEC,
+ filename, passphrase, NULL, NULL);
quit = 0;
} else {
debug2("no passphrase given, try next key");
return private;
}
-static int
-identity_sign_cb(Authctxt *authctxt, Key *key, u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp,
- u_char *data, u_int datalen)
-{
- Key *private;
- int idx, ret;
-
- idx = authctxt->last_key_hint;
- if (idx < 0)
- return -1;
-
- /* private key is stored in external hardware */
- if (options.identity_keys[idx]->flags & KEY_FLAG_EXT)
- return key_sign(options.identity_keys[idx], sigp, lenp, data, datalen);
-
- private = load_identity_file(options.identity_files[idx]);
- if (private == NULL)
- return -1;
- ret = key_sign(private, sigp, lenp, data, datalen);
- key_free(private);
- return ret;
-}
-
-static int
-agent_sign_cb(Authctxt *authctxt, Key *key, u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp,
- u_char *data, u_int datalen)
-{
- return ssh_agent_sign(authctxt->agent, key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen);
-}
-
-static int
-key_sign_cb(Authctxt *authctxt, Key *key, u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp,
- u_char *data, u_int datalen)
+/*
+ * try keys in the following order:
+ * 1. agent keys that are found in the config file
+ * 2. other agent keys
+ * 3. keys that are only listed in the config file
+ */
+static void
+pubkey_prepare(Authctxt *authctxt)
{
- return key_sign(key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen);
+ Identity *id;
+ Idlist agent, files, *preferred;
+ Key *key;
+ AuthenticationConnection *ac;
+ char *comment;
+ int i, found;
+
+ TAILQ_INIT(&agent); /* keys from the agent */
+ TAILQ_INIT(&files); /* keys from the config file */
+ preferred = &authctxt->keys;
+ TAILQ_INIT(preferred); /* preferred order of keys */
+
+ /* list of keys stored in the filesystem */
+ for (i = 0; i < options.num_identity_files; i++) {
+ key = options.identity_keys[i];
+ if (key && key->type == KEY_RSA1)
+ continue;
+ options.identity_keys[i] = NULL;
+ id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*id));
+ id->key = key;
+ id->filename = xstrdup(options.identity_files[i]);
+ TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&files, id, next);
+ }
+ /* list of keys supported by the agent */
+ if ((ac = ssh_get_authentication_connection())) {
+ for (key = ssh_get_first_identity(ac, &comment, 2);
+ key != NULL;
+ key = ssh_get_next_identity(ac, &comment, 2)) {
+ found = 0;
+ TAILQ_FOREACH(id, &files, next) {
+ /* agent keys from the config file are preferred */
+ if (key_equal(key, id->key)) {
+ key_free(key);
+ xfree(comment);
+ TAILQ_REMOVE(&files, id, next);
+ TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(preferred, id, next);
+ id->ac = ac;
+ found = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!found && !options.identities_only) {
+ id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*id));
+ id->key = key;
+ id->filename = comment;
+ id->ac = ac;
+ TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&agent, id, next);
+ }
+ }
+ /* append remaining agent keys */
+ for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&agent); id; id = TAILQ_FIRST(&agent)) {
+ TAILQ_REMOVE(&agent, id, next);
+ TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(preferred, id, next);
+ }
+ authctxt->agent = ac;
+ }
+ /* append remaining keys from the config file */
+ for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&files); id; id = TAILQ_FIRST(&files)) {
+ TAILQ_REMOVE(&files, id, next);
+ TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(preferred, id, next);
+ }
+ TAILQ_FOREACH(id, preferred, next) {
+ debug2("key: %s (%p)", id->filename, id->key);
+ }
}
-static int
-userauth_pubkey_agent(Authctxt *authctxt)
+static void
+pubkey_cleanup(Authctxt *authctxt)
{
- static int called = 0;
- int ret = 0;
- char *comment;
- Key *k;
-
- if (called == 0) {
- if (ssh_get_num_identities(authctxt->agent, 2) == 0)
- debug2("userauth_pubkey_agent: no keys at all");
- called = 1;
+ Identity *id;
+
+ if (authctxt->agent != NULL)
+ ssh_close_authentication_connection(authctxt->agent);
+ for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&authctxt->keys); id;
+ id = TAILQ_FIRST(&authctxt->keys)) {
+ TAILQ_REMOVE(&authctxt->keys, id, next);
+ if (id->key)
+ key_free(id->key);
+ if (id->filename)
+ xfree(id->filename);
+ xfree(id);
}
- k = ssh_get_next_identity(authctxt->agent, &comment, 2);
- if (k == NULL) {
- debug2("userauth_pubkey_agent: no more keys");
- } else {
- debug("userauth_pubkey_agent: testing agent key %s", comment);
- xfree(comment);
- ret = send_pubkey_test(authctxt, k, agent_sign_cb, -1);
- if (ret == 0)
- key_free(k);
- }
- if (ret == 0)
- debug2("userauth_pubkey_agent: no message sent");
- return ret;
}
int
userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt)
{
- static int idx = 0;
+ Identity *id;
int sent = 0;
- Key *key;
- char *filename;
-
- if (authctxt->agent != NULL) {
- do {
- sent = userauth_pubkey_agent(authctxt);
- } while (!sent && authctxt->agent->howmany > 0);
- }
- while (!sent && idx < options.num_identity_files) {
- key = options.identity_keys[idx];
- filename = options.identity_files[idx];
- if (key == NULL) {
- debug("try privkey: %s", filename);
- key = load_identity_file(filename);
- if (key != NULL) {
- sent = sign_and_send_pubkey(authctxt, key,
- key_sign_cb);
- key_free(key);
+
+ while ((id = TAILQ_FIRST(&authctxt->keys))) {
+ if (id->tried++)
+ return (0);
+ /* move key to the end of the queue */
+ TAILQ_REMOVE(&authctxt->keys, id, next);
+ TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&authctxt->keys, id, next);
+ /*
+ * send a test message if we have the public key. for
+ * encrypted keys we cannot do this and have to load the
+ * private key instead
+ */
+ if (id->key && id->key->type != KEY_RSA1) {
+ debug("Offering public key: %s", id->filename);
+ sent = send_pubkey_test(authctxt, id);
+ } else if (id->key == NULL) {
+ debug("Trying private key: %s", id->filename);
+ id->key = load_identity_file(id->filename);
+ if (id->key != NULL) {
+ id->isprivate = 1;
+ sent = sign_and_send_pubkey(authctxt, id);
+ key_free(id->key);
+ id->key = NULL;
}
- } else if (key->type != KEY_RSA1) {
- debug("try pubkey: %s", filename);
- sent = send_pubkey_test(authctxt, key,
- identity_sign_cb, idx);
}
- idx++;
+ if (sent)
+ return (sent);
}
- return sent;
+ return (0);
}
/*
inst = packet_get_string(NULL);
lang = packet_get_string(NULL);
if (strlen(name) > 0)
- log("%s", name);
+ logit("%s", name);
if (strlen(inst) > 0)
- log("%s", inst);
+ logit("%s", inst);
xfree(name);
xfree(inst);
xfree(lang);
pid_t pid;
int to[2], from[2], status, version = 2;
- debug("ssh_keysign called");
+ debug2("ssh_keysign called");
if (stat(_PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN, &st) < 0) {
error("ssh_keysign: no installed: %s", strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
if (pid == 0) {
- seteuid(getuid());
- setuid(getuid());
+ permanently_drop_suid(getuid());
close(from[0]);
if (dup2(from[1], STDOUT_FILENO) < 0)
fatal("ssh_keysign: dup2: %s", strerror(errno));
buffer_init(&b);
buffer_put_int(&b, packet_get_connection_in()); /* send # of socket */
buffer_put_string(&b, data, datalen);
- msg_send(to[1], version, &b);
+ if (ssh_msg_send(to[1], version, &b) == -1)
+ fatal("ssh_keysign: couldn't send request");
- if (msg_recv(from[0], &b) < 0) {
+ if (ssh_msg_recv(from[0], &b) < 0) {
error("ssh_keysign: no reply");
- buffer_clear(&b);
+ buffer_free(&b);
return -1;
}
close(from[0]);
if (buffer_get_char(&b) != version) {
error("ssh_keysign: bad version");
- buffer_clear(&b);
+ buffer_free(&b);
return -1;
}
*sigp = buffer_get_string(&b, lenp);
- buffer_clear(&b);
+ buffer_free(&b);
return 0;
}
Sensitive *sensitive = authctxt->sensitive;
Buffer b;
u_char *signature, *blob;
- char *chost, *pkalg, *p;
+ char *chost, *pkalg, *p, myname[NI_MAXHOST];
const char *service;
u_int blen, slen;
int ok, i, len, found = 0;
}
}
if (!found) {
- debug("userauth_hostbased: no more client hostkeys");
+ debug("No more client hostkeys for hostbased authentication.");
return 0;
}
if (key_to_blob(private, &blob, &blen) == 0) {
return 0;
}
/* figure out a name for the client host */
- p = get_local_name(packet_get_connection_in());
+ p = NULL;
+ if (packet_connection_is_on_socket())
+ p = get_local_name(packet_get_connection_in());
+ if (p == NULL) {
+ if (gethostname(myname, sizeof(myname)) == -1) {
+ verbose("userauth_hostbased: gethostname: %s",
+ strerror(errno));
+ } else
+ p = xstrdup(myname);
+ }
if (p == NULL) {
error("userauth_hostbased: cannot get local ipaddr/name");
key_free(private);
+ xfree(blob);
return 0;
}
len = strlen(p) + 2;
- chost = xmalloc(len);
- strlcpy(chost, p, len);
- strlcat(chost, ".", len);
+ xasprintf(&chost, "%s.", p);
debug2("userauth_hostbased: chost %s", chost);
+ xfree(p);
service = datafellows & SSH_BUG_HBSERVICE ? "ssh-userauth" :
authctxt->service;
error("key_sign failed");
xfree(chost);
xfree(pkalg);
+ xfree(blob);
return 0;
}
packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
xfree(signature);
xfree(chost);
xfree(pkalg);
+ xfree(blob);
packet_send();
return 1;
}
+#ifdef JPAKE
+int
+userauth_jpake(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+ struct jpake_ctx *pctx;
+ u_char *x1_proof, *x2_proof;
+ u_int x1_proof_len, x2_proof_len;
+ static int attempt = 0; /* XXX share with userauth_password's? */
+
+ if (attempt++ >= options.number_of_password_prompts)
+ return 0;
+ if (attempt != 1)
+ error("Permission denied, please try again.");
+
+ if (authctxt->methoddata != NULL)
+ fatal("%s: authctxt->methoddata already set (%p)",
+ __func__, authctxt->methoddata);
+
+ authctxt->methoddata = pctx = jpake_new();
+
+ /*
+ * Send request immediately, to get the protocol going while
+ * we do the initial computations.
+ */
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
+ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->server_user);
+ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->service);
+ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name);
+ packet_send();
+ packet_write_wait();
+
+ jpake_step1(pctx->grp,
+ &pctx->client_id, &pctx->client_id_len,
+ &pctx->x1, &pctx->x2, &pctx->g_x1, &pctx->g_x2,
+ &x1_proof, &x1_proof_len,
+ &x2_proof, &x2_proof_len);
+
+ JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "step 1 sending in %s", __func__));
+
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_CLIENT_STEP1);
+ packet_put_string(pctx->client_id, pctx->client_id_len);
+ packet_put_bignum2(pctx->g_x1);
+ packet_put_bignum2(pctx->g_x2);
+ packet_put_string(x1_proof, x1_proof_len);
+ packet_put_string(x2_proof, x2_proof_len);
+ packet_send();
+
+ bzero(x1_proof, x1_proof_len);
+ bzero(x2_proof, x2_proof_len);
+ xfree(x1_proof);
+ xfree(x2_proof);
+
+ /* Expect step 1 packet from peer */
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_SERVER_STEP1,
+ input_userauth_jpake_server_step1);
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+void
+userauth_jpake_cleanup(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+ debug3("%s: clean up", __func__);
+ if (authctxt->methoddata != NULL) {
+ jpake_free(authctxt->methoddata);
+ authctxt->methoddata = NULL;
+ }
+}
+#endif /* JPAKE */
+
/* find auth method */
/*
static Authmethod *
authmethod_get(char *authlist)
{
-
char *name = NULL;
u_int next;
for (;;) {
if ((name = match_list(preferred, supported, &next)) == NULL) {
- debug("no more auth methods to try");
+ debug("No more authentication methods to try.");
current = NULL;
return NULL;
}
if ((current = authmethod_lookup(name)) != NULL &&
authmethod_is_enabled(current)) {
debug3("authmethod_is_enabled %s", name);
- debug("next auth method to try is %s", name);
+ debug("Next authentication method: %s", name);
return current;
}
}
buffer_free(&b);
return list;
}
+