--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
+ * Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.11 2002/05/15 15:47:49 mouring Exp $");
+
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+
+#ifdef SKEY
+#include <skey.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "dh.h"
+#include "zlib.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "auth-options.h"
+#include "sshpty.h"
+#include "channels.h"
+#include "session.h"
+#include "sshlogin.h"
+#include "canohost.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+#include "monitor.h"
+#include "monitor_mm.h"
+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
+#include "monitor_fdpass.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "bufaux.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "mpaux.h"
+
+/* Imports */
+extern ServerOptions options;
+extern u_int utmp_len;
+extern Newkeys *current_keys[];
+extern z_stream incoming_stream;
+extern z_stream outgoing_stream;
+extern u_char session_id[];
+extern Buffer input, output;
+extern Buffer auth_debug;
+extern int auth_debug_init;
+
+/* State exported from the child */
+
+struct {
+ z_stream incoming;
+ z_stream outgoing;
+ u_char *keyin;
+ u_int keyinlen;
+ u_char *keyout;
+ u_int keyoutlen;
+ u_char *ivin;
+ u_int ivinlen;
+ u_char *ivout;
+ u_int ivoutlen;
+ int ssh1cipher;
+ int ssh1protoflags;
+ u_char *input;
+ u_int ilen;
+ u_char *output;
+ u_int olen;
+} child_state;
+
+/* Functions on the montior that answer unprivileged requests */
+
+int mm_answer_moduli(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_sign(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_pwnamallow(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_authserv(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_authpassword(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_bsdauthquery(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_skeyquery(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_skeyrespond(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_keyallowed(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_keyverify(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_pty(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_pty_cleanup(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_term(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_rsa_challenge(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_rsa_response(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_sesskey(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_sessid(int, Buffer *);
+
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+int mm_answer_pam_start(int, Buffer *);
+#endif
+
+static Authctxt *authctxt;
+static BIGNUM *ssh1_challenge = NULL; /* used for ssh1 rsa auth */
+
+/* local state for key verify */
+static u_char *key_blob = NULL;
+static u_int key_bloblen = 0;
+static int key_blobtype = MM_NOKEY;
+static u_char *hostbased_cuser = NULL;
+static u_char *hostbased_chost = NULL;
+static char *auth_method = "unknown";
+
+struct mon_table {
+ enum monitor_reqtype type;
+ int flags;
+ int (*f)(int, Buffer *);
+};
+
+#define MON_ISAUTH 0x0004 /* Required for Authentication */
+#define MON_AUTHDECIDE 0x0008 /* Decides Authentication */
+#define MON_ONCE 0x0010 /* Disable after calling */
+
+#define MON_AUTH (MON_ISAUTH|MON_AUTHDECIDE)
+
+#define MON_PERMIT 0x1000 /* Request is permitted */
+
+struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] = {
+ {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_moduli},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sign},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authserv},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_auth2_read_banner},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword},
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+ {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pam_start},
+#endif
+#ifdef BSD_AUTH
+ {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, MON_AUTH,mm_answer_bsdauthrespond},
+#endif
+#ifdef SKEY
+ {MONITOR_REQ_SKEYQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_skeyquery},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_SKEYRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_skeyrespond},
+#endif
+ {MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_keyallowed},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_KEYVERIFY, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_keyverify},
+ {0, 0, NULL}
+};
+
+struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20[] = {
+ {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 0, mm_answer_moduli},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 0, mm_answer_sign},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 0, mm_answer_pty},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, 0, mm_answer_pty_cleanup},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 0, mm_answer_term},
+ {0, 0, NULL}
+};
+
+struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto15[] = {
+ {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sesskey},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_SESSID, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sessid},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_RSAKEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_keyallowed},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_rsa_challenge},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_rsa_response},
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+ {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pam_start},
+#endif
+#ifdef BSD_AUTH
+ {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, MON_AUTH,mm_answer_bsdauthrespond},
+#endif
+#ifdef SKEY
+ {MONITOR_REQ_SKEYQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_skeyquery},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_SKEYRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_skeyrespond},
+#endif
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+ {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pam_start},
+#endif
+ {0, 0, NULL}
+};
+
+struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth15[] = {
+ {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pty},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pty_cleanup},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 0, mm_answer_term},
+ {0, 0, NULL}
+};
+
+struct mon_table *mon_dispatch;
+
+/* Specifies if a certain message is allowed at the moment */
+
+static void
+monitor_permit(struct mon_table *ent, enum monitor_reqtype type, int permit)
+{
+ while (ent->f != NULL) {
+ if (ent->type == type) {
+ ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT;
+ ent->flags |= permit ? MON_PERMIT : 0;
+ return;
+ }
+ ent++;
+ }
+}
+
+static void
+monitor_permit_authentications(int permit)
+{
+ struct mon_table *ent = mon_dispatch;
+
+ while (ent->f != NULL) {
+ if (ent->flags & MON_AUTH) {
+ ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT;
+ ent->flags |= permit ? MON_PERMIT : 0;
+ }
+ ent++;
+ }
+}
+
+Authctxt *
+monitor_child_preauth(struct monitor *pmonitor)
+{
+ struct mon_table *ent;
+ int authenticated = 0;
+
+ debug3("preauth child monitor started");
+
+ if (compat20) {
+ mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto20;
+
+ /* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
+ } else {
+ mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto15;
+
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, 1);
+ }
+
+ authctxt = authctxt_new();
+
+ /* The first few requests do not require asynchronous access */
+ while (!authenticated) {
+ authenticated = monitor_read(pmonitor, mon_dispatch, &ent);
+ if (authenticated) {
+ if (!(ent->flags & MON_AUTHDECIDE))
+ fatal("%s: unexpected authentication from %d",
+ __FUNCTION__, ent->type);
+ if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
+ !auth_root_allowed(auth_method))
+ authenticated = 0;
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+ if (!do_pam_account(authctxt->pw->pw_name, NULL))
+ authenticated = 0;
+#endif
+ }
+
+ if (ent->flags & MON_AUTHDECIDE) {
+ auth_log(authctxt, authenticated, auth_method,
+ compat20 ? " ssh2" : "");
+ if (!authenticated)
+ authctxt->failures++;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!authctxt->valid)
+ fatal("%s: authenticated invalid user", __FUNCTION__);
+
+ debug("%s: %s has been authenticated by privileged process",
+ __FUNCTION__, authctxt->user);
+
+ mm_get_keystate(pmonitor);
+
+ return (authctxt);
+}
+
+void
+monitor_child_postauth(struct monitor *pmonitor)
+{
+ if (compat20) {
+ mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth20;
+
+ /* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
+
+ } else {
+ mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth15;
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
+ }
+ if (!no_pty_flag) {
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 1);
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, 1);
+ }
+
+ for (;;)
+ monitor_read(pmonitor, mon_dispatch, NULL);
+}
+
+void
+monitor_sync(struct monitor *pmonitor)
+{
+ /* The member allocation is not visible, so sync it */
+ mm_share_sync(&pmonitor->m_zlib, &pmonitor->m_zback);
+}
+
+int
+monitor_read(struct monitor *pmonitor, struct mon_table *ent,
+ struct mon_table **pent)
+{
+ Buffer m;
+ int ret;
+ u_char type;
+
+ buffer_init(&m);
+
+ mm_request_receive(pmonitor->m_sendfd, &m);
+ type = buffer_get_char(&m);
+
+ debug3("%s: checking request %d", __FUNCTION__, type);
+
+ while (ent->f != NULL) {
+ if (ent->type == type)
+ break;
+ ent++;
+ }
+
+ if (ent->f != NULL) {
+ if (!(ent->flags & MON_PERMIT))
+ fatal("%s: unpermitted request %d", __FUNCTION__,
+ type);
+ ret = (*ent->f)(pmonitor->m_sendfd, &m);
+ buffer_free(&m);
+
+ /* The child may use this request only once, disable it */
+ if (ent->flags & MON_ONCE) {
+ debug2("%s: %d used once, disabling now", __FUNCTION__,
+ type);
+ ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT;
+ }
+
+ if (pent != NULL)
+ *pent = ent;
+
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ fatal("%s: unsupported request: %d", __FUNCTION__, type);
+
+ /* NOTREACHED */
+ return (-1);
+}
+
+/* allowed key state */
+static int
+monitor_allowed_key(u_char *blob, u_int bloblen)
+{
+ /* make sure key is allowed */
+ if (key_blob == NULL || key_bloblen != bloblen ||
+ memcmp(key_blob, blob, key_bloblen))
+ return (0);
+ return (1);
+}
+
+static void
+monitor_reset_key_state(void)
+{
+ /* reset state */
+ if (key_blob != NULL)
+ xfree(key_blob);
+ if (hostbased_cuser != NULL)
+ xfree(hostbased_cuser);
+ if (hostbased_chost != NULL)
+ xfree(hostbased_chost);
+ key_blob = NULL;
+ key_bloblen = 0;
+ key_blobtype = MM_NOKEY;
+ hostbased_cuser = NULL;
+ hostbased_chost = NULL;
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_moduli(int socket, Buffer *m)
+{
+ DH *dh;
+ int min, want, max;
+
+ min = buffer_get_int(m);
+ want = buffer_get_int(m);
+ max = buffer_get_int(m);
+
+ debug3("%s: got parameters: %d %d %d",
+ __FUNCTION__, min, want, max);
+ /* We need to check here, too, in case the child got corrupted */
+ if (max < min || want < min || max < want)
+ fatal("%s: bad parameters: %d %d %d",
+ __FUNCTION__, min, want, max);
+
+ buffer_clear(m);
+
+ dh = choose_dh(min, want, max);
+ if (dh == NULL) {
+ buffer_put_char(m, 0);
+ return (0);
+ } else {
+ /* Send first bignum */
+ buffer_put_char(m, 1);
+ buffer_put_bignum2(m, dh->p);
+ buffer_put_bignum2(m, dh->g);
+
+ DH_free(dh);
+ }
+ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_MODULI, m);
+ return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_sign(int socket, Buffer *m)
+{
+ Key *key;
+ u_char *p;
+ u_char *signature;
+ u_int siglen, datlen;
+ int keyid;
+
+ debug3("%s", __FUNCTION__);
+
+ keyid = buffer_get_int(m);
+ p = buffer_get_string(m, &datlen);
+
+ if (datlen != 20)
+ fatal("%s: data length incorrect: %d", __FUNCTION__, datlen);
+
+ if ((key = get_hostkey_by_index(keyid)) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: no hostkey from index %d", __FUNCTION__, keyid);
+ if (key_sign(key, &signature, &siglen, p, datlen) < 0)
+ fatal("%s: key_sign failed", __FUNCTION__);
+
+ debug3("%s: signature %p(%d)", __FUNCTION__, signature, siglen);
+
+ buffer_clear(m);
+ buffer_put_string(m, signature, siglen);
+
+ xfree(p);
+ xfree(signature);
+
+ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_SIGN, m);
+
+ /* Turn on permissions for getpwnam */
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1);
+
+ return (0);
+}
+
+/* Retrieves the password entry and also checks if the user is permitted */
+
+int
+mm_answer_pwnamallow(int socket, Buffer *m)
+{
+ char *login;
+ struct passwd *pwent;
+ int allowed = 0;
+
+ debug3("%s", __FUNCTION__);
+
+ if (authctxt->attempt++ != 0)
+ fatal("%s: multiple attempts for getpwnam", __FUNCTION__);
+
+ login = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
+
+ pwent = getpwnamallow(login);
+
+ authctxt->user = xstrdup(login);
+ setproctitle("%s [priv]", pwent ? login : "unknown");
+ xfree(login);
+
+ buffer_clear(m);
+
+ if (pwent == NULL) {
+ buffer_put_char(m, 0);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ allowed = 1;
+ authctxt->pw = pwent;
+ authctxt->valid = 1;
+
+ buffer_put_char(m, 1);
+ buffer_put_string(m, pwent, sizeof(struct passwd));
+ buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_name);
+ buffer_put_cstring(m, "*");
+ buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_gecos);
+#ifdef HAVE_PW_CLASS_IN_PASSWD
+ buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_class);
+#endif
+ buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_dir);
+ buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_shell);
+
+ out:
+ debug3("%s: sending MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM: %d", __FUNCTION__, allowed);
+ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM, m);
+
+ /* For SSHv1 allow authentication now */
+ if (!compat20)
+ monitor_permit_authentications(1);
+ else {
+ /* Allow service/style information on the auth context */
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, 1);
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, 1);
+ }
+
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START, 1);
+#endif
+
+ return (0);
+}
+
+int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(int socket, Buffer *m)
+{
+ char *banner;
+
+ buffer_clear(m);
+ banner = auth2_read_banner();
+ buffer_put_cstring(m, banner != NULL ? banner : "");
+ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, m);
+
+ if (banner != NULL)
+ free(banner);
+
+ return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_authserv(int socket, Buffer *m)
+{
+ monitor_permit_authentications(1);
+
+ authctxt->service = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
+ authctxt->style = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
+ debug3("%s: service=%s, style=%s",
+ __FUNCTION__, authctxt->service, authctxt->style);
+
+ if (strlen(authctxt->style) == 0) {
+ xfree(authctxt->style);
+ authctxt->style = NULL;
+ }
+
+ return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_authpassword(int socket, Buffer *m)
+{
+ static int call_count;
+ char *passwd;
+ int authenticated, plen;
+
+ passwd = buffer_get_string(m, &plen);
+ /* Only authenticate if the context is valid */
+ authenticated = authctxt->valid && auth_password(authctxt, passwd);
+ memset(passwd, 0, strlen(passwd));
+ xfree(passwd);
+
+ buffer_clear(m);
+ buffer_put_int(m, authenticated);
+
+ debug3("%s: sending result %d", __FUNCTION__, authenticated);
+ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_AUTHPASSWORD, m);
+
+ call_count++;
+ if (plen == 0 && call_count == 1)
+ auth_method = "none";
+ else
+ auth_method = "password";
+
+ /* Causes monitor loop to terminate if authenticated */
+ return (authenticated);
+}
+
+#ifdef BSD_AUTH
+int
+mm_answer_bsdauthquery(int socket, Buffer *m)
+{
+ char *name, *infotxt;
+ u_int numprompts;
+ u_int *echo_on;
+ char **prompts;
+ int res;
+
+ res = bsdauth_query(authctxt, &name, &infotxt, &numprompts,
+ &prompts, &echo_on);
+
+ buffer_clear(m);
+ buffer_put_int(m, res);
+ if (res != -1)
+ buffer_put_cstring(m, prompts[0]);
+
+ debug3("%s: sending challenge res: %d", __FUNCTION__, res);
+ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHQUERY, m);
+
+ if (res != -1) {
+ xfree(name);
+ xfree(infotxt);
+ xfree(prompts);
+ xfree(echo_on);
+ }
+
+ return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(int socket, Buffer *m)
+{
+ char *response;
+ int authok;
+
+ if (authctxt->as == 0)
+ fatal("%s: no bsd auth session", __FUNCTION__);
+
+ response = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
+ authok = auth_userresponse(authctxt->as, response, 0);
+ authctxt->as = NULL;
+ debug3("%s: <%s> = <%d>", __FUNCTION__, response, authok);
+ xfree(response);
+
+ buffer_clear(m);
+ buffer_put_int(m, authok);
+
+ debug3("%s: sending authenticated: %d", __FUNCTION__, authok);
+ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHRESPOND, m);
+
+ auth_method = "bsdauth";
+
+ return (authok != 0);
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifdef SKEY
+int
+mm_answer_skeyquery(int socket, Buffer *m)
+{
+ struct skey skey;
+ char challenge[1024];
+ int res;
+
+ res = skeychallenge(&skey, authctxt->user, challenge);
+
+ buffer_clear(m);
+ buffer_put_int(m, res);
+ if (res != -1)
+ buffer_put_cstring(m, challenge);
+
+ debug3("%s: sending challenge res: %d", __FUNCTION__, res);
+ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_SKEYQUERY, m);
+
+ return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_skeyrespond(int socket, Buffer *m)
+{
+ char *response;
+ int authok;
+
+ response = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
+
+ authok = (authctxt->valid &&
+ skey_haskey(authctxt->pw->pw_name) == 0 &&
+ skey_passcheck(authctxt->pw->pw_name, response) != -1);
+
+ xfree(response);
+
+ buffer_clear(m);
+ buffer_put_int(m, authok);
+
+ debug3("%s: sending authenticated: %d", __FUNCTION__, authok);
+ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_SKEYRESPOND, m);
+
+ auth_method = "skey";
+
+ return (authok != 0);
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+int
+mm_answer_pam_start(int socket, Buffer *m)
+{
+ char *user;
+
+ user = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
+
+ start_pam(user);
+
+ xfree(user);
+
+ return (0);
+}
+#endif
+
+static void
+mm_append_debug(Buffer *m)
+{
+ if (auth_debug_init && buffer_len(&auth_debug)) {
+ debug3("%s: Appending debug messages for child", __FUNCTION__);
+ buffer_append(m, buffer_ptr(&auth_debug),
+ buffer_len(&auth_debug));
+ buffer_clear(&auth_debug);
+ }
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_keyallowed(int socket, Buffer *m)
+{
+ Key *key;
+ u_char *cuser, *chost, *blob;
+ u_int bloblen;
+ enum mm_keytype type = 0;
+ int allowed = 0;
+
+ debug3("%s entering", __FUNCTION__);
+
+ type = buffer_get_int(m);
+ cuser = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
+ chost = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
+ blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen);
+
+ key = key_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
+
+ if ((compat20 && type == MM_RSAHOSTKEY) ||
+ (!compat20 && type != MM_RSAHOSTKEY))
+ fatal("%s: key type and protocol mismatch", __FUNCTION__);
+
+ debug3("%s: key_from_blob: %p", __FUNCTION__, key);
+
+ if (key != NULL && authctxt->pw != NULL) {
+ switch(type) {
+ case MM_USERKEY:
+ allowed = user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key);
+ break;
+ case MM_HOSTKEY:
+ allowed = hostbased_key_allowed(authctxt->pw,
+ cuser, chost, key);
+ break;
+ case MM_RSAHOSTKEY:
+ key->type = KEY_RSA1; /* XXX */
+ allowed = auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(authctxt->pw,
+ cuser, chost, key);
+ break;
+ default:
+ fatal("%s: unknown key type %d", __FUNCTION__, type);
+ break;
+ }
+ key_free(key);
+ }
+
+ /* clear temporarily storage (used by verify) */
+ monitor_reset_key_state();
+
+ if (allowed) {
+ /* Save temporarily for comparison in verify */
+ key_blob = blob;
+ key_bloblen = bloblen;
+ key_blobtype = type;
+ hostbased_cuser = cuser;
+ hostbased_chost = chost;
+ }
+
+ debug3("%s: key %p is %s",
+ __FUNCTION__, key, allowed ? "allowed" : "disallowed");
+
+ buffer_clear(m);
+ buffer_put_int(m, allowed);
+
+ mm_append_debug(m);
+
+ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_KEYALLOWED, m);
+
+ if (type == MM_RSAHOSTKEY)
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, allowed);
+
+ return (0);
+}
+
+static int
+monitor_valid_userblob(u_char *data, u_int datalen)
+{
+ Buffer b;
+ u_char *p;
+ u_int len;
+ int fail = 0;
+ int session_id2_len = 20 /*XXX should get from [net] */;
+
+ buffer_init(&b);
+ buffer_append(&b, data, datalen);
+
+ if (datafellows & SSH_OLD_SESSIONID) {
+ buffer_consume(&b, session_id2_len);
+ } else {
+ xfree(buffer_get_string(&b, &len));
+ if (len != session_id2_len)
+ fail++;
+ }
+ if (buffer_get_char(&b) != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)
+ fail++;
+ p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
+ if (strcmp(authctxt->user, p) != 0) {
+ log("wrong user name passed to monitor: expected %s != %.100s",
+ authctxt->user, p);
+ fail++;
+ }
+ xfree(p);
+ buffer_skip_string(&b);
+ if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH) {
+ if (!buffer_get_char(&b))
+ fail++;
+ } else {
+ p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
+ if (strcmp("publickey", p) != 0)
+ fail++;
+ xfree(p);
+ if (!buffer_get_char(&b))
+ fail++;
+ buffer_skip_string(&b);
+ }
+ buffer_skip_string(&b);
+ if (buffer_len(&b) != 0)
+ fail++;
+ buffer_free(&b);
+ return (fail == 0);
+}
+
+static int
+monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(u_char *data, u_int datalen, u_char *cuser,
+ u_char *chost)
+{
+ Buffer b;
+ u_char *p;
+ u_int len;
+ int fail = 0;
+ int session_id2_len = 20 /*XXX should get from [net] */;
+
+ buffer_init(&b);
+ buffer_append(&b, data, datalen);
+
+ xfree(buffer_get_string(&b, &len));
+ if (len != session_id2_len)
+ fail++;
+ if (buffer_get_char(&b) != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)
+ fail++;
+ p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
+ if (strcmp(authctxt->user, p) != 0) {
+ log("wrong user name passed to monitor: expected %s != %.100s",
+ authctxt->user, p);
+ fail++;
+ }
+ xfree(p);
+ buffer_skip_string(&b); /* service */
+ p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
+ if (strcmp(p, "hostbased") != 0)
+ fail++;
+ xfree(p);
+ buffer_skip_string(&b); /* pkalg */
+ buffer_skip_string(&b); /* pkblob */
+
+ /* verify client host, strip trailing dot if necessary */
+ p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
+ if (((len = strlen(p)) > 0) && p[len - 1] == '.')
+ p[len - 1] = '\0';
+ if (strcmp(p, chost) != 0)
+ fail++;
+ xfree(p);
+
+ /* verify client user */
+ p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
+ if (strcmp(p, cuser) != 0)
+ fail++;
+ xfree(p);
+
+ if (buffer_len(&b) != 0)
+ fail++;
+ buffer_free(&b);
+ return (fail == 0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_keyverify(int socket, Buffer *m)
+{
+ Key *key;
+ u_char *signature, *data, *blob;
+ u_int signaturelen, datalen, bloblen;
+ int verified = 0;
+ int valid_data = 0;
+
+ blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen);
+ signature = buffer_get_string(m, &signaturelen);
+ data = buffer_get_string(m, &datalen);
+
+ if (hostbased_cuser == NULL || hostbased_chost == NULL ||
+ !monitor_allowed_key(blob, bloblen))
+ fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __FUNCTION__);
+
+ key = key_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
+ if (key == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: bad public key blob", __FUNCTION__);
+
+ switch (key_blobtype) {
+ case MM_USERKEY:
+ valid_data = monitor_valid_userblob(data, datalen);
+ break;
+ case MM_HOSTKEY:
+ valid_data = monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(data, datalen,
+ hostbased_cuser, hostbased_chost);
+ break;
+ default:
+ valid_data = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (!valid_data)
+ fatal("%s: bad signature data blob", __FUNCTION__);
+
+ verified = key_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen);
+ debug3("%s: key %p signature %s",
+ __FUNCTION__, key, verified ? "verified" : "unverified");
+
+ key_free(key);
+ xfree(blob);
+ xfree(signature);
+ xfree(data);
+
+ monitor_reset_key_state();
+
+ buffer_clear(m);
+ buffer_put_int(m, verified);
+ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_KEYVERIFY, m);
+
+ auth_method = "publickey";
+
+ return (verified);
+}
+
+static void
+mm_record_login(Session *s, struct passwd *pw)
+{
+ socklen_t fromlen;
+ struct sockaddr_storage from;
+
+ /*
+ * Get IP address of client. If the connection is not a socket, let
+ * the address be 0.0.0.0.
+ */
+ memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
+ if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) {
+ fromlen = sizeof(from);
+ if (getpeername(packet_get_connection_in(),
+ (struct sockaddr *) & from, &fromlen) < 0) {
+ debug("getpeername: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ fatal_cleanup();
+ }
+ }
+ /* Record that there was a login on that tty from the remote host. */
+ record_login(s->pid, s->tty, pw->pw_name, pw->pw_uid,
+ get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.verify_reverse_mapping),
+ (struct sockaddr *)&from);
+}
+
+static void
+mm_session_close(Session *s)
+{
+ debug3("%s: session %d pid %d", __FUNCTION__, s->self, s->pid);
+ if (s->ttyfd != -1) {
+ debug3("%s: tty %s ptyfd %d", __FUNCTION__, s->tty, s->ptyfd);
+ fatal_remove_cleanup(session_pty_cleanup2, (void *)s);
+ session_pty_cleanup2(s);
+ }
+ s->used = 0;
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_pty(int socket, Buffer *m)
+{
+ extern struct monitor *pmonitor;
+ Session *s;
+ int res, fd0;
+
+ debug3("%s entering", __FUNCTION__);
+
+ buffer_clear(m);
+ s = session_new();
+ if (s == NULL)
+ goto error;
+ s->authctxt = authctxt;
+ s->pw = authctxt->pw;
+ s->pid = pmonitor->m_pid;
+ res = pty_allocate(&s->ptyfd, &s->ttyfd, s->tty, sizeof(s->tty));
+ if (res == 0)
+ goto error;
+ fatal_add_cleanup(session_pty_cleanup2, (void *)s);
+ pty_setowner(authctxt->pw, s->tty);
+
+ buffer_put_int(m, 1);
+ buffer_put_cstring(m, s->tty);
+ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, m);
+
+ mm_send_fd(socket, s->ptyfd);
+ mm_send_fd(socket, s->ttyfd);
+
+ /* We need to trick ttyslot */
+ if (dup2(s->ttyfd, 0) == -1)
+ fatal("%s: dup2", __FUNCTION__);
+
+ mm_record_login(s, authctxt->pw);
+
+ /* Now we can close the file descriptor again */
+ close(0);
+
+ /* make sure nothing uses fd 0 */
+ if ((fd0 = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDONLY)) < 0)
+ fatal("%s: open(/dev/null): %s", __FUNCTION__, strerror(errno));
+ if (fd0 != 0)
+ error("%s: fd0 %d != 0", __FUNCTION__, fd0);
+
+ /* slave is not needed */
+ close(s->ttyfd);
+ s->ttyfd = s->ptyfd;
+ /* no need to dup() because nobody closes ptyfd */
+ s->ptymaster = s->ptyfd;
+
+ debug3("%s: tty %s ptyfd %d", __FUNCTION__, s->tty, s->ttyfd);
+
+ return (0);
+
+ error:
+ if (s != NULL)
+ mm_session_close(s);
+ buffer_put_int(m, 0);
+ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, m);
+ return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_pty_cleanup(int socket, Buffer *m)
+{
+ Session *s;
+ char *tty;
+
+ debug3("%s entering", __FUNCTION__);
+
+ tty = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
+ if ((s = session_by_tty(tty)) != NULL)
+ mm_session_close(s);
+ buffer_clear(m);
+ xfree(tty);
+ return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_sesskey(int socket, Buffer *m)
+{
+ BIGNUM *p;
+ int rsafail;
+
+ /* Turn off permissions */
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, 1);
+
+ if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: BN_new", __FUNCTION__);
+
+ buffer_get_bignum2(m, p);
+
+ rsafail = ssh1_session_key(p);
+
+ buffer_clear(m);
+ buffer_put_int(m, rsafail);
+ buffer_put_bignum2(m, p);
+
+ BN_clear_free(p);
+
+ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_SESSKEY, m);
+
+ /* Turn on permissions for sessid passing */
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SESSID, 1);
+
+ return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_sessid(int socket, Buffer *m)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ debug3("%s entering", __FUNCTION__);
+
+ if (buffer_len(m) != 16)
+ fatal("%s: bad ssh1 session id", __FUNCTION__);
+ for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
+ session_id[i] = buffer_get_char(m);
+
+ /* Turn on permissions for getpwnam */
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1);
+
+ return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed(int socket, Buffer *m)
+{
+ BIGNUM *client_n;
+ Key *key = NULL;
+ u_char *blob = NULL;
+ u_int blen = 0;
+ int allowed = 0;
+
+ debug3("%s entering", __FUNCTION__);
+
+ if (authctxt->valid) {
+ if ((client_n = BN_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: BN_new", __FUNCTION__);
+ buffer_get_bignum2(m, client_n);
+ allowed = auth_rsa_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, client_n, &key);
+ BN_clear_free(client_n);
+ }
+ buffer_clear(m);
+ buffer_put_int(m, allowed);
+
+ /* clear temporarily storage (used by generate challenge) */
+ monitor_reset_key_state();
+
+ if (allowed && key != NULL) {
+ key->type = KEY_RSA; /* cheat for key_to_blob */
+ if (key_to_blob(key, &blob, &blen) == 0)
+ fatal("%s: key_to_blob failed", __FUNCTION__);
+ buffer_put_string(m, blob, blen);
+
+ /* Save temporarily for comparison in verify */
+ key_blob = blob;
+ key_bloblen = blen;
+ key_blobtype = MM_RSAUSERKEY;
+ key_free(key);
+ }
+
+ mm_append_debug(m);
+
+ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_RSAKEYALLOWED, m);
+
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, allowed);
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, 0);
+ return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_rsa_challenge(int socket, Buffer *m)
+{
+ Key *key = NULL;
+ u_char *blob;
+ u_int blen;
+
+ debug3("%s entering", __FUNCTION__);
+
+ if (!authctxt->valid)
+ fatal("%s: authctxt not valid", __FUNCTION__);
+ blob = buffer_get_string(m, &blen);
+ if (!monitor_allowed_key(blob, blen))
+ fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __FUNCTION__);
+ if (key_blobtype != MM_RSAUSERKEY && key_blobtype != MM_RSAHOSTKEY)
+ fatal("%s: key type mismatch", __FUNCTION__);
+ if ((key = key_from_blob(blob, blen)) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: received bad key", __FUNCTION__);
+
+ if (ssh1_challenge)
+ BN_clear_free(ssh1_challenge);
+ ssh1_challenge = auth_rsa_generate_challenge(key);
+
+ buffer_clear(m);
+ buffer_put_bignum2(m, ssh1_challenge);
+
+ debug3("%s sending reply", __FUNCTION__);
+ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_RSACHALLENGE, m);
+
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, 1);
+ return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_rsa_response(int socket, Buffer *m)
+{
+ Key *key = NULL;
+ u_char *blob, *response;
+ u_int blen, len;
+ int success;
+
+ debug3("%s entering", __FUNCTION__);
+
+ if (!authctxt->valid)
+ fatal("%s: authctxt not valid", __FUNCTION__);
+ if (ssh1_challenge == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: no ssh1_challenge", __FUNCTION__);
+
+ blob = buffer_get_string(m, &blen);
+ if (!monitor_allowed_key(blob, blen))
+ fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __FUNCTION__);
+ if (key_blobtype != MM_RSAUSERKEY && key_blobtype != MM_RSAHOSTKEY)
+ fatal("%s: key type mismatch: %d", __FUNCTION__, key_blobtype);
+ if ((key = key_from_blob(blob, blen)) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: received bad key", __FUNCTION__);
+ response = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
+ if (len != 16)
+ fatal("%s: received bad response to challenge", __FUNCTION__);
+ success = auth_rsa_verify_response(key, ssh1_challenge, response);
+
+ key_free(key);
+ xfree(response);
+
+ auth_method = key_blobtype == MM_RSAUSERKEY ? "rsa" : "rhosts-rsa";
+
+ /* reset state */
+ BN_clear_free(ssh1_challenge);
+ ssh1_challenge = NULL;
+ monitor_reset_key_state();
+
+ buffer_clear(m);
+ buffer_put_int(m, success);
+ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_RSARESPONSE, m);
+
+ return (success);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_term(int socket, Buffer *req)
+{
+ extern struct monitor *pmonitor;
+ int res, status;
+
+ debug3("%s: tearing down sessions", __FUNCTION__);
+
+ /* The child is terminating */
+ session_destroy_all(&mm_session_close);
+
+ while (waitpid(pmonitor->m_pid, &status, 0) == -1)
+ if (errno != EINTR)
+ exit(1);
+
+ res = WIFEXITED(status) ? WEXITSTATUS(status) : 1;
+
+ /* Terminate process */
+ exit (res);
+}
+
+void
+monitor_apply_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor)
+{
+ if (compat20) {
+ set_newkeys(MODE_IN);
+ set_newkeys(MODE_OUT);
+ } else {
+ u_char key[SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH];
+
+ memset(key, 'a', sizeof(key));
+ packet_set_protocol_flags(child_state.ssh1protoflags);
+ packet_set_encryption_key(key, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH,
+ child_state.ssh1cipher);
+ }
+
+ packet_set_keycontext(MODE_OUT, child_state.keyout);
+ xfree(child_state.keyout);
+ packet_set_keycontext(MODE_IN, child_state.keyin);
+ xfree(child_state.keyin);
+
+ if (!compat20) {
+ packet_set_iv(MODE_OUT, child_state.ivout);
+ xfree(child_state.ivout);
+ packet_set_iv(MODE_IN, child_state.ivin);
+ xfree(child_state.ivin);
+ }
+
+ memcpy(&incoming_stream, &child_state.incoming,
+ sizeof(incoming_stream));
+ memcpy(&outgoing_stream, &child_state.outgoing,
+ sizeof(outgoing_stream));
+
+ /* Update with new address */
+ mm_init_compression(pmonitor->m_zlib);
+
+ /* Network I/O buffers */
+ /* XXX inefficient for large buffers, need: buffer_init_from_string */
+ buffer_clear(&input);
+ buffer_append(&input, child_state.input, child_state.ilen);
+ memset(child_state.input, 0, child_state.ilen);
+ xfree(child_state.input);
+
+ buffer_clear(&output);
+ buffer_append(&output, child_state.output, child_state.olen);
+ memset(child_state.output, 0, child_state.olen);
+ xfree(child_state.output);
+}
+
+static Kex *
+mm_get_kex(Buffer *m)
+{
+ Kex *kex;
+ void *blob;
+ u_int bloblen;
+
+ kex = xmalloc(sizeof(*kex));
+ memset(kex, 0, sizeof(*kex));
+ kex->session_id = buffer_get_string(m, &kex->session_id_len);
+ kex->we_need = buffer_get_int(m);
+ kex->server = 1;
+ kex->hostkey_type = buffer_get_int(m);
+ kex->kex_type = buffer_get_int(m);
+ blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen);
+ buffer_init(&kex->my);
+ buffer_append(&kex->my, blob, bloblen);
+ xfree(blob);
+ blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen);
+ buffer_init(&kex->peer);
+ buffer_append(&kex->peer, blob, bloblen);
+ xfree(blob);
+ kex->done = 1;
+ kex->flags = buffer_get_int(m);
+ kex->client_version_string = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
+ kex->server_version_string = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
+ kex->load_host_key=&get_hostkey_by_type;
+ kex->host_key_index=&get_hostkey_index;
+
+ return (kex);
+}
+
+/* This function requries careful sanity checking */
+
+void
+mm_get_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor)
+{
+ Buffer m;
+ u_char *blob, *p;
+ u_int bloblen, plen;
+
+ debug3("%s: Waiting for new keys", __FUNCTION__);
+
+ buffer_init(&m);
+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_sendfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYEXPORT, &m);
+ if (!compat20) {
+ child_state.ssh1protoflags = buffer_get_int(&m);
+ child_state.ssh1cipher = buffer_get_int(&m);
+ child_state.ivout = buffer_get_string(&m,
+ &child_state.ivoutlen);
+ child_state.ivin = buffer_get_string(&m, &child_state.ivinlen);
+ goto skip;
+ } else {
+ /* Get the Kex for rekeying */
+ *pmonitor->m_pkex = mm_get_kex(&m);
+ }
+
+ blob = buffer_get_string(&m, &bloblen);
+ current_keys[MODE_OUT] = mm_newkeys_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
+ xfree(blob);
+
+ debug3("%s: Waiting for second key", __FUNCTION__);
+ blob = buffer_get_string(&m, &bloblen);
+ current_keys[MODE_IN] = mm_newkeys_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
+ xfree(blob);
+
+ /* Now get sequence numbers for the packets */
+ packet_set_seqnr(MODE_OUT, buffer_get_int(&m));
+ packet_set_seqnr(MODE_IN, buffer_get_int(&m));
+
+ skip:
+ /* Get the key context */
+ child_state.keyout = buffer_get_string(&m, &child_state.keyoutlen);
+ child_state.keyin = buffer_get_string(&m, &child_state.keyinlen);
+
+ debug3("%s: Getting compression state", __FUNCTION__);
+ /* Get compression state */
+ p = buffer_get_string(&m, &plen);
+ if (plen != sizeof(child_state.outgoing))
+ fatal("%s: bad request size", __FUNCTION__);
+ memcpy(&child_state.outgoing, p, sizeof(child_state.outgoing));
+ xfree(p);
+
+ p = buffer_get_string(&m, &plen);
+ if (plen != sizeof(child_state.incoming))
+ fatal("%s: bad request size", __FUNCTION__);
+ memcpy(&child_state.incoming, p, sizeof(child_state.incoming));
+ xfree(p);
+
+ /* Network I/O buffers */
+ debug3("%s: Getting Network I/O buffers", __FUNCTION__);
+ child_state.input = buffer_get_string(&m, &child_state.ilen);
+ child_state.output = buffer_get_string(&m, &child_state.olen);
+
+ buffer_free(&m);
+}
+
+
+/* Allocation functions for zlib */
+void *
+mm_zalloc(struct mm_master *mm, u_int ncount, u_int size)
+{
+ void *address;
+
+ address = mm_malloc(mm, size * ncount);
+
+ return (address);
+}
+
+void
+mm_zfree(struct mm_master *mm, void *address)
+{
+ mm_free(mm, address);
+}
+
+void
+mm_init_compression(struct mm_master *mm)
+{
+ outgoing_stream.zalloc = (alloc_func)mm_zalloc;
+ outgoing_stream.zfree = (free_func)mm_zfree;
+ outgoing_stream.opaque = mm;
+
+ incoming_stream.zalloc = (alloc_func)mm_zalloc;
+ incoming_stream.zfree = (free_func)mm_zfree;
+ incoming_stream.opaque = mm;
+}
+
+/* XXX */
+
+#define FD_CLOSEONEXEC(x) do { \
+ if (fcntl(x, F_SETFD, 1) == -1) \
+ fatal("fcntl(%d, F_SETFD)", x); \
+} while (0)
+
+static void
+monitor_socketpair(int *pair)
+{
+#ifdef HAVE_SOCKETPAIR
+ if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, pair) == -1)
+ fatal("%s: socketpair", __FUNCTION__);
+#else
+ fatal("%s: UsePrivilegeSeparation=yes not supported",
+ __FUNCTION__);
+#endif
+ FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[0]);
+ FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[1]);
+}
+
+#define MM_MEMSIZE 65536
+
+struct monitor *
+monitor_init(void)
+{
+ struct monitor *mon;
+ int pair[2];
+
+ mon = xmalloc(sizeof(*mon));
+
+ monitor_socketpair(pair);
+
+ mon->m_recvfd = pair[0];
+ mon->m_sendfd = pair[1];
+
+ /* Used to share zlib space across processes */
+ mon->m_zback = mm_create(NULL, MM_MEMSIZE);
+ mon->m_zlib = mm_create(mon->m_zback, 20 * MM_MEMSIZE);
+
+ /* Compression needs to share state across borders */
+ mm_init_compression(mon->m_zlib);
+
+ return mon;
+}
+
+void
+monitor_reinit(struct monitor *mon)
+{
+ int pair[2];
+
+ monitor_socketpair(pair);
+
+ mon->m_recvfd = pair[0];
+ mon->m_sendfd = pair[1];
+}
andersk / gssapi-openssh.git / blobdiff