Move ssh_gssapi_support_oids() to correct position in file to avoid diff.

[gssapi-openssh.git] / openssh / monitor.c

diff --git a/openssh/monitor.c b/openssh/monitor.c
index ce6a7f7471a80f84d05c055f7989f5e25153fd6f..92eeeb6a543c36ad675e950dac615bd670e14d1c 100644 (file)
--- a/openssh/monitor.c
+++ b/openssh/monitor.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.88 2006/08/12 20:46:46 miod Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.91 2007/05/17 20:52:13 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
  * Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
@@ -378,7 +378,7 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctxt, struct monitor *pmonitor)
        /* The first few requests do not require asynchronous access */
        while (!authenticated) {
                auth_method = "unknown";
-               authenticated = monitor_read(pmonitor, mon_dispatch, &ent);
+               authenticated = (monitor_read(pmonitor, mon_dispatch, &ent) == 1);
                if (authenticated) {
                        if (!(ent->flags & MON_AUTHDECIDE))
                                fatal("%s: unexpected authentication from %d",
@@ -437,6 +437,7 @@ monitor_child_postauth(struct monitor *pmonitor)
        monitor_set_child_handler(pmonitor->m_pid);
        signal(SIGHUP, &monitor_child_handler);
        signal(SIGTERM, &monitor_child_handler);
+       signal(SIGINT, &monitor_child_handler);
 
        if (compat20) {
                mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth20;
@@ -679,6 +680,9 @@ mm_answer_pwnamallow(int sock, Buffer *m)
 #endif
        buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_dir);
        buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_shell);
+       buffer_put_string(m, &options, sizeof(options));
+       if (options.banner != NULL)
+               buffer_put_cstring(m, options.banner);
 
  out:
        debug3("%s: sending MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM: %d", __func__, allowed);
@@ -1254,7 +1258,7 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(int sock, Buffer *m)
 
        verified = key_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen);
        debug3("%s: key %p signature %s",
-           __func__, key, verified ? "verified" : "unverified");
+           __func__, key, (verified == 1) ? "verified" : "unverified");
 
        key_free(key);
        xfree(blob);
@@ -1269,7 +1273,7 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(int sock, Buffer *m)
        buffer_put_int(m, verified);
        mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_KEYVERIFY, m);
 
-       return (verified);
+       return (verified == 1);
 }
 
 static void
@@ -1696,11 +1700,12 @@ mm_get_kex(Buffer *m)
        kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
        kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
        kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server;
+       kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server;
 #ifdef GSSAPI
        kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
+       kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
        kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
 #endif
-       kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server;
        kex->server = 1;
        kex->hostkey_type = buffer_get_int(m);
        kex->kex_type = buffer_get_int(m);
@@ -2095,5 +2100,4 @@ mm_answer_gss_localname(int socket, Buffer *m) {
 
         return(0);
 }
-
 #endif /* GSSAPI */