*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth1.c,v 1.47 2003/02/06 21:22:42 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth1.c,v 1.52 2003/08/28 12:54:34 markus Exp $");
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "rsa.h"
case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS:
case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE:
return "challenge-response";
-#if defined(KRB4) || defined(KRB5)
- case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_KERBEROS:
- return "kerberos";
-#endif
}
snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "bad-auth-msg-%d", type);
return buf;
char info[1024];
u_int dlen;
u_int ulen;
- int type = 0;
+ int prev, type = 0;
struct passwd *pw = authctxt->pw;
debug("Attempting authentication for %s%.100s.",
/* If the user has no password, accept authentication immediately. */
if (options.password_authentication &&
-#if defined(KRB4) || defined(KRB5)
+#ifdef KRB5
(!options.kerberos_authentication || options.kerberos_or_local_passwd) &&
#endif
PRIVSEP(auth_password(authctxt, ""))) {
info[0] = '\0';
/* Get a packet from the client. */
+ prev = type;
type = packet_read();
+ /*
+ * If we started challenge-response authentication but the
+ * next packet is not a response to our challenge, release
+ * the resources allocated by get_challenge() (which would
+ * normally have been released by verify_response() had we
+ * received such a response)
+ */
+ if (prev == SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS &&
+ type != SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE)
+ abandon_challenge_response(authctxt);
+
/* Process the packet. */
switch (type) {
-
-#if defined(KRB4) || defined(KRB5)
- case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_KERBEROS:
- if (!options.kerberos_authentication) {
- verbose("Kerberos authentication disabled.");
- } else {
- char *kdata = packet_get_string(&dlen);
- packet_check_eom();
-
- if (kdata[0] == 4) { /* KRB_PROT_VERSION */
-#ifdef KRB4
- KTEXT_ST tkt, reply;
- tkt.length = dlen;
- if (tkt.length < MAX_KTXT_LEN)
- memcpy(tkt.dat, kdata, tkt.length);
-
- if (PRIVSEP(auth_krb4(authctxt, &tkt,
- &client_user, &reply))) {
- authenticated = 1;
- snprintf(info, sizeof(info),
- " tktuser %.100s",
- client_user);
-
- packet_start(
- SSH_SMSG_AUTH_KERBEROS_RESPONSE);
- packet_put_string((char *)
- reply.dat, reply.length);
- packet_send();
- packet_write_wait();
- }
-#endif /* KRB4 */
- } else {
-#ifdef KRB5
- krb5_data tkt, reply;
- tkt.length = dlen;
- tkt.data = kdata;
-
- if (PRIVSEP(auth_krb5(authctxt, &tkt,
- &client_user, &reply))) {
- authenticated = 1;
- snprintf(info, sizeof(info),
- " tktuser %.100s",
- client_user);
-
- /* Send response to client */
- packet_start(
- SSH_SMSG_AUTH_KERBEROS_RESPONSE);
- packet_put_string((char *)
- reply.data, reply.length);
- packet_send();
- packet_write_wait();
-
- if (reply.length)
- xfree(reply.data);
- }
-#endif /* KRB5 */
- }
- xfree(kdata);
- }
- break;
-#endif /* KRB4 || KRB5 */
-
-#if defined(AFS) || defined(KRB5)
- /* XXX - punt on backward compatibility here. */
- case SSH_CMSG_HAVE_KERBEROS_TGT:
- packet_send_debug("Kerberos TGT passing disabled before authentication.");
- break;
-#ifdef AFS
- case SSH_CMSG_HAVE_AFS_TOKEN:
- packet_send_debug("AFS token passing disabled before authentication.");
- break;
-#endif /* AFS */
-#endif /* AFS || KRB5 */
-
- case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS:
- if (!options.rhosts_authentication) {
- verbose("Rhosts authentication disabled.");
- break;
- }
- /*
- * Get client user name. Note that we just have to
- * trust the client; this is one reason why rhosts
- * authentication is insecure. (Another is
- * IP-spoofing on a local network.)
- */
- client_user = packet_get_string(&ulen);
- packet_check_eom();
-
- /* Try to authenticate using /etc/hosts.equiv and .rhosts. */
- authenticated = auth_rhosts(pw, client_user);
-
- snprintf(info, sizeof info, " ruser %.100s", client_user);
- break;
-
case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA:
if (!options.rhosts_rsa_authentication) {
verbose("Rhosts with RSA authentication disabled.");
* Any unknown messages will be ignored (and failure
* returned) during authentication.
*/
- log("Unknown message during authentication: type %d", type);
+ logit("Unknown message during authentication: type %d", type);
break;
}
#ifdef BSD_AUTH
authctxt->user);
#ifdef _UNICOS
- if (type == SSH_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD && !authenticated)
- cray_login_failure(authctxt->user, IA_UDBERR);
if (authenticated && cray_access_denied(authctxt->user)) {
authenticated = 0;
fatal("Access denied for user %s.",authctxt->user);
!auth_root_allowed(get_authname(type)))
authenticated = 0;
#endif
+
#ifdef USE_PAM
- if (!use_privsep && authenticated &&
- !do_pam_account(pw->pw_name, client_user))
+ if (options.use_pam && authenticated &&
+ !PRIVSEP(do_pam_account()))
authenticated = 0;
#endif
if (authenticated)
return;
- if (authctxt->failures++ > AUTH_FAIL_MAX) {
+ if (authctxt->failures++ > AUTH_FAIL_MAX)
packet_disconnect(AUTH_FAIL_MSG, authctxt->user);
- }
packet_start(SSH_SMSG_FAILURE);
packet_send();
if ((style = strchr(user, ':')) != NULL)
*style++ = '\0';
-#ifdef KRB5
- /* XXX - SSH.com Kerberos v5 braindeath. */
- if ((datafellows & SSH_BUG_K5USER) &&
- options.kerberos_authentication) {
- char *p;
- if ((p = strchr(user, '@')) != NULL)
- *p = '\0';
- }
-#endif
-
authctxt = authctxt_new();
authctxt->user = user;
authctxt->style = style;
/* Verify that the user is a valid user. */
if ((authctxt->pw = PRIVSEP(getpwnamallow(user))) != NULL)
authctxt->valid = 1;
- else
+ else {
debug("do_authentication: illegal user %s", user);
+ authctxt->pw = fakepw();
+ }
setproctitle("%s%s", authctxt->pw ? user : "unknown",
use_privsep ? " [net]" : "");
#ifdef USE_PAM
- PRIVSEP(start_pam(authctxt->pw == NULL ? "NOUSER" : user));
+ if (options.use_pam)
+ PRIVSEP(start_pam(user));
#endif
/*
andersk / gssapi-openssh.git / blobdiff