* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
*
* SSH2 implementation:
+ * Privilege Separation:
*
- * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001, 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2002 Niels Provos. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.209 2001/11/10 13:19:45 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.318 2005/12/24 02:27:41 djm Exp $");
#include <openssl/dh.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
-#include <openssl/hmac.h>
+#include <openssl/md5.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SECUREWARE
+#include <sys/security.h>
+#include <prot.h>
+#endif
#include "ssh.h"
#include "ssh1.h"
#include "rsa.h"
#include "sshpty.h"
#include "packet.h"
-#include "mpaux.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "servconf.h"
#include "uidswap.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "buffer.h"
+#include "bufaux.h"
#include "cipher.h"
#include "kex.h"
#include "key.h"
#include "canohost.h"
#include "auth.h"
#include "misc.h"
+#include "msg.h"
#include "dispatch.h"
#include "channels.h"
-
-#ifdef GSSAPI
-#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#include "session.h"
+#include "monitor_mm.h"
+#include "monitor.h"
+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
+#include "monitor_fdpass.h"
+
+#ifdef USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API
+#include <Security/AuthSession.h>
#endif
-/*modified by binhe*/
-#ifdef GSSAPI
-#include <openssl/md5.h>
-#include "bufaux.h"
-#endif /* GSSAPI */
-/*end of modification*/
-
#ifdef LIBWRAP
#include <tcpd.h>
#include <syslog.h>
#define O_NOCTTY 0
#endif
-#ifdef HAVE___PROGNAME
+/* Re-exec fds */
+#define REEXEC_DEVCRYPTO_RESERVED_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 1)
+#define REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 2)
+#define REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 3)
+#define REEXEC_MIN_FREE_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 4)
+
extern char *__progname;
-#else
-char *__progname;
-#endif
/* Server configuration options. */
ServerOptions options;
/* Name of the server configuration file. */
char *config_file_name = _PATH_SERVER_CONFIG_FILE;
-/*
- * Flag indicating whether IPv4 or IPv6. This can be set on the command line.
- * Default value is AF_UNSPEC means both IPv4 and IPv6.
- */
-#ifdef IPV4_DEFAULT
-int IPv4or6 = AF_INET;
-#else
-int IPv4or6 = AF_UNSPEC;
-#endif
-
/*
* Debug mode flag. This can be set on the command line. If debug
* mode is enabled, extra debugging output will be sent to the system
char **saved_argv;
int saved_argc;
+/* re-exec */
+int rexeced_flag = 0;
+int rexec_flag = 1;
+int rexec_argc = 0;
+char **rexec_argv;
+
/*
* The sockets that the server is listening; this is used in the SIGHUP
* signal handler.
* Flag indicating whether the RSA server key needs to be regenerated.
* Is set in the SIGALRM handler and cleared when the key is regenerated.
*/
-int key_do_regen = 0;
+static volatile sig_atomic_t key_do_regen = 0;
/* This is set to true when a signal is received. */
-int received_sighup = 0;
-int received_sigterm = 0;
+static volatile sig_atomic_t received_sighup = 0;
+static volatile sig_atomic_t received_sigterm = 0;
/* session identifier, used by RSA-auth */
u_char session_id[16];
/* same for ssh2 */
u_char *session_id2 = NULL;
-int session_id2_len = 0;
+u_int session_id2_len = 0;
/* record remote hostname or ip */
u_int utmp_len = MAXHOSTNAMELEN;
+/* options.max_startup sized array of fd ints */
+int *startup_pipes = NULL;
+int startup_pipe; /* in child */
+
+/* variables used for privilege separation */
+int use_privsep;
+struct monitor *pmonitor = NULL;
+
+/* global authentication context */
+Authctxt *the_authctxt = NULL;
+
+/* message to be displayed after login */
+Buffer loginmsg;
+
/* Prototypes for various functions defined later in this file. */
void destroy_sensitive_data(void);
+void demote_sensitive_data(void);
static void do_ssh1_kex(void);
static void do_ssh2_kex(void);
close_listen_socks(void)
{
int i;
+
for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++)
close(listen_socks[i]);
num_listen_socks = -1;
}
+static void
+close_startup_pipes(void)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ if (startup_pipes)
+ for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++)
+ if (startup_pipes[i] != -1)
+ close(startup_pipes[i]);
+}
+
/*
* Signal handler for SIGHUP. Sshd execs itself when it receives SIGHUP;
* the effect is to reread the configuration file (and to regenerate
static void
sighup_handler(int sig)
{
+ int save_errno = errno;
+
received_sighup = 1;
signal(SIGHUP, sighup_handler);
+ errno = save_errno;
}
/*
static void
sighup_restart(void)
{
- log("Received SIGHUP; restarting.");
+ logit("Received SIGHUP; restarting.");
close_listen_socks();
+ close_startup_pipes();
execv(saved_argv[0], saved_argv);
- log("RESTART FAILED: av[0]='%.100s', error: %.100s.", saved_argv[0], strerror(errno));
+ logit("RESTART FAILED: av[0]='%.100s', error: %.100s.", saved_argv[0],
+ strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
main_sigchld_handler(int sig)
{
int save_errno = errno;
+ pid_t pid;
int status;
- while (waitpid(-1, &status, WNOHANG) > 0)
+ while ((pid = waitpid(-1, &status, WNOHANG)) > 0 ||
+ (pid < 0 && errno == EINTR))
;
signal(SIGCHLD, main_sigchld_handler);
{
/* XXX no idea how fix this signal handler */
- /* Close the connection. */
- packet_close();
+ if (use_privsep && pmonitor != NULL && pmonitor->m_pid > 0)
+ kill(pmonitor->m_pid, SIGALRM);
/* Log error and exit. */
- fatal("Timeout before authentication for %s.", get_remote_ipaddr());
+ fatal("Timeout before authentication for %s", get_remote_ipaddr());
}
/*
static void
generate_ephemeral_server_key(void)
{
- u_int32_t rand = 0;
+ u_int32_t rnd = 0;
int i;
verbose("Generating %s%d bit RSA key.",
for (i = 0; i < SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH; i++) {
if (i % 4 == 0)
- rand = arc4random();
- sensitive_data.ssh1_cookie[i] = rand & 0xff;
- rand >>= 8;
+ rnd = arc4random();
+ sensitive_data.ssh1_cookie[i] = rnd & 0xff;
+ rnd >>= 8;
}
arc4random_stir();
}
key_regeneration_alarm(int sig)
{
int save_errno = errno;
+
signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL);
errno = save_errno;
key_do_regen = 1;
static void
sshd_exchange_identification(int sock_in, int sock_out)
{
- int i, mismatch;
+ u_int i;
+ int mismatch;
int remote_major, remote_minor;
int major, minor;
char *s;
major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1;
minor = PROTOCOL_MINOR_1;
}
- snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s\n", major, minor, SSH_VERSION);
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s\n", major, minor, SSH_RELEASE);
server_version_string = xstrdup(buf);
- if (client_version_string == NULL) {
- /* Send our protocol version identification. */
- if (atomicio(write, sock_out, server_version_string, strlen(server_version_string))
- != strlen(server_version_string)) {
- log("Could not write ident string to %s", get_remote_ipaddr());
- fatal_cleanup();
- }
+ /* Send our protocol version identification. */
+ if (atomicio(vwrite, sock_out, server_version_string,
+ strlen(server_version_string))
+ != strlen(server_version_string)) {
+ logit("Could not write ident string to %s", get_remote_ipaddr());
+ cleanup_exit(255);
+ }
- /* Read other side's version identification. */
- memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
- for (i = 0; i < sizeof(buf) - 1; i++) {
- if (atomicio(read, sock_in, &buf[i], 1) != 1) {
- log("Did not receive identification string from %s",
- get_remote_ipaddr());
- fatal_cleanup();
- }
- if (buf[i] == '\r') {
- buf[i] = 0;
- /* Kludge for F-Secure Macintosh < 1.0.2 */
- if (i == 12 &&
- strncmp(buf, "SSH-1.5-W1.0", 12) == 0)
- break;
- continue;
- }
- if (buf[i] == '\n') {
- buf[i] = 0;
+ /* Read other sides version identification. */
+ memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
+ for (i = 0; i < sizeof(buf) - 1; i++) {
+ if (atomicio(read, sock_in, &buf[i], 1) != 1) {
+ logit("Did not receive identification string from %s",
+ get_remote_ipaddr());
+ cleanup_exit(255);
+ }
+ if (buf[i] == '\r') {
+ buf[i] = 0;
+ /* Kludge for F-Secure Macintosh < 1.0.2 */
+ if (i == 12 &&
+ strncmp(buf, "SSH-1.5-W1.0", 12) == 0)
break;
- }
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (buf[i] == '\n') {
+ buf[i] = 0;
+ break;
}
- buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = 0;
- client_version_string = xstrdup(buf);
}
+ buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = 0;
+ client_version_string = xstrdup(buf);
/*
* Check that the versions match. In future this might accept
if (sscanf(client_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%[^\n]\n",
&remote_major, &remote_minor, remote_version) != 3) {
s = "Protocol mismatch.\n";
- (void) atomicio(write, sock_out, s, strlen(s));
+ (void) atomicio(vwrite, sock_out, s, strlen(s));
close(sock_in);
close(sock_out);
- log("Bad protocol version identification '%.100s' from %s",
+ logit("Bad protocol version identification '%.100s' from %s",
client_version_string, get_remote_ipaddr());
- fatal_cleanup();
+ cleanup_exit(255);
}
debug("Client protocol version %d.%d; client software version %.100s",
- remote_major, remote_minor, remote_version);
+ remote_major, remote_minor, remote_version);
compat_datafellows(remote_version);
+ if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PROBE) {
+ logit("probed from %s with %s. Don't panic.",
+ get_remote_ipaddr(), client_version_string);
+ cleanup_exit(255);
+ }
+
if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_SCANNER) {
- log("scanned from %s with %s. Don't panic.",
+ logit("scanned from %s with %s. Don't panic.",
get_remote_ipaddr(), client_version_string);
- fatal_cleanup();
+ cleanup_exit(255);
}
mismatch = 0;
- switch(remote_major) {
+ switch (remote_major) {
case 1:
if (remote_minor == 99) {
if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2)
if (mismatch) {
s = "Protocol major versions differ.\n";
- (void) atomicio(write, sock_out, s, strlen(s));
+ (void) atomicio(vwrite, sock_out, s, strlen(s));
close(sock_in);
close(sock_out);
- log("Protocol major versions differ for %s: %.200s vs. %.200s",
+ logit("Protocol major versions differ for %s: %.200s vs. %.200s",
get_remote_ipaddr(),
server_version_string, client_version_string);
- fatal_cleanup();
+ cleanup_exit(255);
}
}
-
/* Destroy the host and server keys. They will no longer be needed. */
void
destroy_sensitive_data(void)
key_free(sensitive_data.server_key);
sensitive_data.server_key = NULL;
}
- for(i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
+ for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) {
key_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]);
sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL;
memset(sensitive_data.ssh1_cookie, 0, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH);
}
+/* Demote private to public keys for network child */
+void
+demote_sensitive_data(void)
+{
+ Key *tmp;
+ int i;
+
+ if (sensitive_data.server_key) {
+ tmp = key_demote(sensitive_data.server_key);
+ key_free(sensitive_data.server_key);
+ sensitive_data.server_key = tmp;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
+ if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) {
+ tmp = key_demote(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]);
+ key_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]);
+ sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = tmp;
+ if (tmp->type == KEY_RSA1)
+ sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = tmp;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* We do not clear ssh1_host key and cookie. XXX - Okay Niels? */
+}
+
+static void
+privsep_preauth_child(void)
+{
+ u_int32_t rnd[256];
+ gid_t gidset[1];
+ struct passwd *pw;
+ int i;
+
+ /* Enable challenge-response authentication for privilege separation */
+ privsep_challenge_enable();
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 256; i++)
+ rnd[i] = arc4random();
+ RAND_seed(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
+
+ /* Demote the private keys to public keys. */
+ demote_sensitive_data();
+
+ if ((pw = getpwnam(SSH_PRIVSEP_USER)) == NULL)
+ fatal("Privilege separation user %s does not exist",
+ SSH_PRIVSEP_USER);
+ memset(pw->pw_passwd, 0, strlen(pw->pw_passwd));
+ endpwent();
+
+ /* Change our root directory */
+ if (chroot(_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR) == -1)
+ fatal("chroot(\"%s\"): %s", _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR,
+ strerror(errno));
+ if (chdir("/") == -1)
+ fatal("chdir(\"/\"): %s", strerror(errno));
+
+ /* Drop our privileges */
+ debug3("privsep user:group %u:%u", (u_int)pw->pw_uid,
+ (u_int)pw->pw_gid);
+#if 0
+ /* XXX not ready, too heavy after chroot */
+ do_setusercontext(pw);
+#else
+ gidset[0] = pw->pw_gid;
+ if (setgroups(1, gidset) < 0)
+ fatal("setgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ permanently_set_uid(pw);
+#endif
+}
+
+static int
+privsep_preauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+ int status;
+ pid_t pid;
+
+ /* Set up unprivileged child process to deal with network data */
+ pmonitor = monitor_init();
+ /* Store a pointer to the kex for later rekeying */
+ pmonitor->m_pkex = &xxx_kex;
+
+ pid = fork();
+ if (pid == -1) {
+ fatal("fork of unprivileged child failed");
+ } else if (pid != 0) {
+ debug2("Network child is on pid %ld", (long)pid);
+
+ close(pmonitor->m_recvfd);
+ pmonitor->m_pid = pid;
+ monitor_child_preauth(authctxt, pmonitor);
+ close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
+
+ /* Sync memory */
+ monitor_sync(pmonitor);
+
+ /* Wait for the child's exit status */
+ while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) < 0)
+ if (errno != EINTR)
+ break;
+ return (1);
+ } else {
+ /* child */
+
+ close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
+
+ /* Demote the child */
+ if (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0)
+ privsep_preauth_child();
+ setproctitle("%s", "[net]");
+ }
+ return (0);
+}
+
+static void
+privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+#ifdef DISABLE_FD_PASSING
+ if (1) {
+#else
+ if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 || options.use_login) {
+#endif
+ /* File descriptor passing is broken or root login */
+ use_privsep = 0;
+ goto skip;
+ }
+
+ /* New socket pair */
+ monitor_reinit(pmonitor);
+
+ pmonitor->m_pid = fork();
+ if (pmonitor->m_pid == -1)
+ fatal("fork of unprivileged child failed");
+ else if (pmonitor->m_pid != 0) {
+ debug2("User child is on pid %ld", (long)pmonitor->m_pid);
+ close(pmonitor->m_recvfd);
+ buffer_clear(&loginmsg);
+ monitor_child_postauth(pmonitor);
+
+ /* NEVERREACHED */
+ exit(0);
+ }
+
+ close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
+
+ /* Demote the private keys to public keys. */
+ demote_sensitive_data();
+
+ /* Drop privileges */
+ do_setusercontext(authctxt->pw);
+
+ skip:
+ /* It is safe now to apply the key state */
+ monitor_apply_keystate(pmonitor);
+
+ /*
+ * Tell the packet layer that authentication was successful, since
+ * this information is not part of the key state.
+ */
+ packet_set_authenticated();
+}
+
static char *
list_hostkey_types(void)
{
- static char buf[1024];
+ Buffer b;
+ const char *p;
+ char *ret;
int i;
- buf[0] = '\0';
- for(i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
+
+ buffer_init(&b);
+ for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
Key *key = sensitive_data.host_keys[i];
if (key == NULL)
continue;
- switch(key->type) {
+ switch (key->type) {
case KEY_RSA:
case KEY_DSA:
- strlcat(buf, key_ssh_name(key), sizeof buf);
- strlcat(buf, ",", sizeof buf);
+ if (buffer_len(&b) > 0)
+ buffer_append(&b, ",", 1);
+ p = key_ssh_name(key);
+ buffer_append(&b, p, strlen(p));
break;
}
}
- i = strlen(buf);
- if (i > 0 && buf[i-1] == ',')
- buf[i-1] = '\0';
- debug("list_hostkey_types: %s", buf);
- return buf;
+ buffer_append(&b, "\0", 1);
+ ret = xstrdup(buffer_ptr(&b));
+ buffer_free(&b);
+ debug("list_hostkey_types: %s", ret);
+ return ret;
}
-static Key *
+Key *
get_hostkey_by_type(int type)
{
int i;
- for(i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
+
+ for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
Key *key = sensitive_data.host_keys[i];
if (key != NULL && key->type == type)
return key;
return NULL;
}
+Key *
+get_hostkey_by_index(int ind)
+{
+ if (ind < 0 || ind >= options.num_host_key_files)
+ return (NULL);
+ return (sensitive_data.host_keys[ind]);
+}
+
+int
+get_hostkey_index(Key *key)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
+ if (key == sensitive_data.host_keys[i])
+ return (i);
+ }
+ return (-1);
+}
+
/*
* returns 1 if connection should be dropped, 0 otherwise.
* dropping starts at connection #max_startups_begin with a probability
static int
drop_connection(int startups)
{
- double p, r;
+ int p, r;
if (startups < options.max_startups_begin)
return 0;
p = 100 - options.max_startups_rate;
p *= startups - options.max_startups_begin;
- p /= (double) (options.max_startups - options.max_startups_begin);
+ p /= options.max_startups - options.max_startups_begin;
p += options.max_startups_rate;
- p /= 100.0;
- r = arc4random() / (double) UINT_MAX;
+ r = arc4random() % 100;
- debug("drop_connection: p %g, r %g", p, r);
+ debug("drop_connection: p %d, r %d", p, r);
return (r < p) ? 1 : 0;
}
-int *startup_pipes = NULL; /* options.max_startup sized array of fd ints */
-int startup_pipe; /* in child */
+static void
+usage(void)
+{
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s, %s\n",
+ SSH_RELEASE, SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION));
+ fprintf(stderr,
+"usage: sshd [-46Ddeiqt] [-b bits] [-f config_file] [-g login_grace_time]\n"
+" [-h host_key_file] [-k key_gen_time] [-o option] [-p port] [-u len]\n"
+ );
+ exit(1);
+}
+
+static void
+send_rexec_state(int fd, Buffer *conf)
+{
+ Buffer m;
+
+ debug3("%s: entering fd = %d config len %d", __func__, fd,
+ buffer_len(conf));
+
+ /*
+ * Protocol from reexec master to child:
+ * string configuration
+ * u_int ephemeral_key_follows
+ * bignum e (only if ephemeral_key_follows == 1)
+ * bignum n "
+ * bignum d "
+ * bignum iqmp "
+ * bignum p "
+ * bignum q "
+ * string rngseed (only if OpenSSL is not self-seeded)
+ */
+ buffer_init(&m);
+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, buffer_ptr(conf));
+
+ if (sensitive_data.server_key != NULL &&
+ sensitive_data.server_key->type == KEY_RSA1) {
+ buffer_put_int(&m, 1);
+ buffer_put_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->e);
+ buffer_put_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n);
+ buffer_put_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->d);
+ buffer_put_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->iqmp);
+ buffer_put_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->p);
+ buffer_put_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->q);
+ } else
+ buffer_put_int(&m, 0);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY
+ rexec_send_rng_seed(&m);
+#endif
+
+ if (ssh_msg_send(fd, 0, &m) == -1)
+ fatal("%s: ssh_msg_send failed", __func__);
+
+ buffer_free(&m);
+
+ debug3("%s: done", __func__);
+}
+
+static void
+recv_rexec_state(int fd, Buffer *conf)
+{
+ Buffer m;
+ char *cp;
+ u_int len;
+
+ debug3("%s: entering fd = %d", __func__, fd);
+
+ buffer_init(&m);
+
+ if (ssh_msg_recv(fd, &m) == -1)
+ fatal("%s: ssh_msg_recv failed", __func__);
+ if (buffer_get_char(&m) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: rexec version mismatch", __func__);
+
+ cp = buffer_get_string(&m, &len);
+ if (conf != NULL)
+ buffer_append(conf, cp, len + 1);
+ xfree(cp);
+
+ if (buffer_get_int(&m)) {
+ if (sensitive_data.server_key != NULL)
+ key_free(sensitive_data.server_key);
+ sensitive_data.server_key = key_new_private(KEY_RSA1);
+ buffer_get_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->e);
+ buffer_get_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n);
+ buffer_get_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->d);
+ buffer_get_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->iqmp);
+ buffer_get_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->p);
+ buffer_get_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->q);
+ rsa_generate_additional_parameters(
+ sensitive_data.server_key->rsa);
+ }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY
+ rexec_recv_rng_seed(&m);
+#endif
+
+ buffer_free(&m);
+
+ debug3("%s: done", __func__);
+}
/*
* Main program for the daemon.
{
extern char *optarg;
extern int optind;
- int opt, sock_in = 0, sock_out = 0, newsock, j, i, fdsetsz, on = 1;
+ int opt, j, i, fdsetsz, on = 1;
+ int sock_in = -1, sock_out = -1, newsock = -1;
pid_t pid;
socklen_t fromlen;
fd_set *fdset;
const char *remote_ip;
int remote_port;
FILE *f;
- struct linger linger;
struct addrinfo *ai;
char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV];
+ char *line;
int listen_sock, maxfd;
- int startup_p[2];
+ int startup_p[2] = { -1 , -1 }, config_s[2] = { -1 , -1 };
int startups = 0;
Key *key;
+ Authctxt *authctxt;
int ret, key_used = 0;
+ Buffer cfg;
- __progname = get_progname(av[0]);
+#ifdef HAVE_SECUREWARE
+ (void)set_auth_parameters(ac, av);
+#endif
+ __progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]);
init_rng();
- /* Save argv. */
+ /* Save argv. Duplicate so setproctitle emulation doesn't clobber it */
saved_argc = ac;
- saved_argv = av;
+ rexec_argc = ac;
+ saved_argv = xmalloc(sizeof(*saved_argv) * (ac + 1));
+ for (i = 0; i < ac; i++)
+ saved_argv[i] = xstrdup(av[i]);
+ saved_argv[i] = NULL;
+
+#ifndef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE
+ /* Prepare for later setproctitle emulation */
+ compat_init_setproctitle(ac, av);
+ av = saved_argv;
+#endif
+
+ if (geteuid() == 0 && setgroups(0, NULL) == -1)
+ debug("setgroups(): %.200s", strerror(errno));
+
+ /* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */
+ sanitise_stdfd();
/* Initialize configuration options to their default values. */
initialize_server_options(&options);
/* Parse command-line arguments. */
- while ((opt = getopt(ac, av, "f:p:b:k:h:g:V:u:dDeiqtQ46")) != -1) {
+ while ((opt = getopt(ac, av, "f:p:b:k:h:g:u:o:dDeiqrtQR46")) != -1) {
switch (opt) {
case '4':
- IPv4or6 = AF_INET;
+ options.address_family = AF_INET;
break;
case '6':
- IPv4or6 = AF_INET6;
+ options.address_family = AF_INET6;
break;
case 'f':
config_file_name = optarg;
break;
case 'd':
- if (0 == debug_flag) {
+ if (debug_flag == 0) {
debug_flag = 1;
options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1;
- } else if (options.log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3) {
+ } else if (options.log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3)
options.log_level++;
- } else {
- fprintf(stderr, "Too high debugging level.\n");
- exit(1);
- }
break;
case 'D':
no_daemon_flag = 1;
case 'i':
inetd_flag = 1;
break;
+ case 'r':
+ rexec_flag = 0;
+ break;
+ case 'R':
+ rexeced_flag = 1;
+ inetd_flag = 1;
+ break;
case 'Q':
/* ignored */
break;
}
options.host_key_files[options.num_host_key_files++] = optarg;
break;
- case 'V':
- client_version_string = optarg;
- /* only makes sense with inetd_flag, i.e. no listen() */
- inetd_flag = 1;
- break;
case 't':
test_flag = 1;
break;
case 'u':
utmp_len = atoi(optarg);
+ if (utmp_len > MAXHOSTNAMELEN) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Invalid utmp length.\n");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ break;
+ case 'o':
+ line = xstrdup(optarg);
+ if (process_server_config_line(&options, line,
+ "command-line", 0) != 0)
+ exit(1);
+ xfree(line);
break;
case '?':
default:
- fprintf(stderr, "sshd version %s\n", SSH_VERSION);
- fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s [options]\n", __progname);
- fprintf(stderr, "Options:\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -f file Configuration file (default %s)\n", _PATH_SERVER_CONFIG_FILE);
- fprintf(stderr, " -d Debugging mode (multiple -d means more debugging)\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -i Started from inetd\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -D Do not fork into daemon mode\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -t Only test configuration file and keys\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -q Quiet (no logging)\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -p port Listen on the specified port (default: 22)\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -k seconds Regenerate server key every this many seconds (default: 3600)\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -g seconds Grace period for authentication (default: 600)\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -b bits Size of server RSA key (default: 768 bits)\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -h file File from which to read host key (default: %s)\n",
- _PATH_HOST_KEY_FILE);
- fprintf(stderr, " -u len Maximum hostname length for utmp recording\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -4 Use IPv4 only\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -6 Use IPv6 only\n");
- exit(1);
+ usage();
+ break;
}
}
+ if (rexeced_flag || inetd_flag)
+ rexec_flag = 0;
+ if (rexec_flag && (av[0] == NULL || *av[0] != '/'))
+ fatal("sshd re-exec requires execution with an absolute path");
+ if (rexeced_flag)
+ closefrom(REEXEC_MIN_FREE_FD);
+ else
+ closefrom(REEXEC_DEVCRYPTO_RESERVED_FD);
+
SSLeay_add_all_algorithms();
- channel_set_af(IPv4or6);
/*
* Force logging to stderr until we have loaded the private host
* key (unless started from inetd)
*/
log_init(__progname,
- options.log_level == -1 ? SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : options.log_level,
- options.log_facility == -1 ? SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH : options.log_facility,
- !inetd_flag);
+ options.log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET ?
+ SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : options.log_level,
+ options.log_facility == SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET ?
+ SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH : options.log_facility,
+ log_stderr || !inetd_flag);
+
+ /*
+ * Unset KRB5CCNAME, otherwise the user's session may inherit it from
+ * root's environment
+ */
+ if (getenv("KRB5CCNAME") != NULL)
+ unsetenv("KRB5CCNAME");
-#ifdef _CRAY
- /* Cray can define user privs drop all prives now!
+#ifdef _UNICOS
+ /* Cray can define user privs drop all privs now!
* Not needed on PRIV_SU systems!
*/
drop_cray_privs();
#endif
- seed_rng();
+ sensitive_data.server_key = NULL;
+ sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = NULL;
+ sensitive_data.have_ssh1_key = 0;
+ sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key = 0;
- /* Read server configuration options from the configuration file. */
- read_server_config(&options, config_file_name);
+ /* Fetch our configuration */
+ buffer_init(&cfg);
+ if (rexeced_flag)
+ recv_rexec_state(REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD, &cfg);
+ else
+ load_server_config(config_file_name, &cfg);
+
+ parse_server_config(&options,
+ rexeced_flag ? "rexec" : config_file_name, &cfg);
+
+ if (!rexec_flag)
+ buffer_free(&cfg);
+
+ seed_rng();
/* Fill in default values for those options not explicitly set. */
fill_default_server_options(&options);
+ /* set default channel AF */
+ channel_set_af(options.address_family);
+
/* Check that there are no remaining arguments. */
if (optind < ac) {
fprintf(stderr, "Extra argument %s.\n", av[optind]);
exit(1);
}
- debug("sshd version %.100s", SSH_VERSION);
+ debug("sshd version %.100s", SSH_RELEASE);
/* load private host keys */
- sensitive_data.host_keys = xmalloc(options.num_host_key_files*sizeof(Key*));
- for(i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++)
+ sensitive_data.host_keys = xmalloc(options.num_host_key_files *
+ sizeof(Key *));
+ for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++)
sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL;
- sensitive_data.server_key = NULL;
- sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = NULL;
- sensitive_data.have_ssh1_key = 0;
- sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key = 0;
- for(i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
+ for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
key = key_load_private(options.host_key_files[i], "", NULL);
sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = key;
if (key == NULL) {
sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL;
continue;
}
- switch(key->type){
+ switch (key->type) {
case KEY_RSA1:
sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = key;
sensitive_data.have_ssh1_key = 1;
key_type(key));
}
if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) && !sensitive_data.have_ssh1_key) {
- log("Disabling protocol version 1. Could not load host key");
+ logit("Disabling protocol version 1. Could not load host key");
options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_1;
}
#ifndef GSSAPI
/* The GSSAPI key exchange can run without a host key */
if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) && !sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key) {
- log("Disabling protocol version 2. Could not load host key");
+ logit("Disabling protocol version 2. Could not load host key");
options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_2;
}
#endif
if (!(options.protocol & (SSH_PROTO_1|SSH_PROTO_2))) {
- log("sshd: no hostkeys available -- exiting.");
+ logit("sshd: no hostkeys available -- exiting.");
exit(1);
}
* hate software patents. I dont know if this can go? Niels
*/
if (options.server_key_bits >
- BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) - SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED &&
- options.server_key_bits <
- BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) {
+ BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) -
+ SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED && options.server_key_bits <
+ BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) +
+ SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) {
options.server_key_bits =
- BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED;
+ BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) +
+ SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED;
debug("Forcing server key to %d bits to make it differ from host key.",
options.server_key_bits);
}
}
+ if (use_privsep) {
+ struct passwd *pw;
+ struct stat st;
+
+ if ((pw = getpwnam(SSH_PRIVSEP_USER)) == NULL)
+ fatal("Privilege separation user %s does not exist",
+ SSH_PRIVSEP_USER);
+ if ((stat(_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR, &st) == -1) ||
+ (S_ISDIR(st.st_mode) == 0))
+ fatal("Missing privilege separation directory: %s",
+ _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR);
+
+#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
+ if (check_ntsec(_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR) &&
+ (st.st_uid != getuid () ||
+ (st.st_mode & (S_IWGRP|S_IWOTH)) != 0))
+#else
+ if (st.st_uid != 0 || (st.st_mode & (S_IWGRP|S_IWOTH)) != 0)
+#endif
+ fatal("%s must be owned by root and not group or "
+ "world-writable.", _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR);
+ }
+
/* Configuration looks good, so exit if in test mode. */
if (test_flag)
exit(0);
-/*modified by binhe*/
-#ifdef GSSAPI
- gssapi_clean_env();
-#endif /* GSSAPI */
-/*end of modification*/
-
-#ifdef HAVE_SCO_PROTECTED_PW
- (void) set_auth_parameters(ac, av);
-#endif
+ /*
+ * Clear out any supplemental groups we may have inherited. This
+ * prevents inadvertent creation of files with bad modes (in the
+ * portable version at least, it's certainly possible for PAM
+ * to create a file, and we can't control the code in every
+ * module which might be used).
+ */
+ if (setgroups(0, NULL) < 0)
+ debug("setgroups() failed: %.200s", strerror(errno));
+
+ if (rexec_flag) {
+ rexec_argv = xmalloc(sizeof(char *) * (rexec_argc + 2));
+ for (i = 0; i < rexec_argc; i++) {
+ debug("rexec_argv[%d]='%s'", i, saved_argv[i]);
+ rexec_argv[i] = saved_argv[i];
+ }
+ rexec_argv[rexec_argc] = "-R";
+ rexec_argv[rexec_argc + 1] = NULL;
+ }
/* Initialize the log (it is reinitialized below in case we forked). */
- if (debug_flag && !inetd_flag)
+ if (debug_flag && (!inetd_flag || rexeced_flag))
log_stderr = 1;
log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr);
/* Chdir to the root directory so that the current disk can be
unmounted if desired. */
chdir("/");
-
+
/* ignore SIGPIPE */
signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
/* Start listening for a socket, unless started from inetd. */
if (inetd_flag) {
- int s1;
- s1 = dup(0); /* Make sure descriptors 0, 1, and 2 are in use. */
- dup(s1);
- sock_in = dup(0);
- sock_out = dup(1);
+ int fd;
+
startup_pipe = -1;
+ if (rexeced_flag) {
+ close(REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD);
+ sock_in = sock_out = dup(STDIN_FILENO);
+ if (!debug_flag) {
+ startup_pipe = dup(REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD);
+ close(REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD);
+ }
+ } else {
+ sock_in = dup(STDIN_FILENO);
+ sock_out = dup(STDOUT_FILENO);
+ }
/*
* We intentionally do not close the descriptors 0, 1, and 2
- * as our code for setting the descriptors won\'t work if
+ * as our code for setting the descriptors won't work if
* ttyfd happens to be one of those.
*/
+ if ((fd = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR, 0)) != -1) {
+ dup2(fd, STDIN_FILENO);
+ dup2(fd, STDOUT_FILENO);
+ if (fd > STDOUT_FILENO)
+ close(fd);
+ }
debug("inetd sockets after dupping: %d, %d", sock_in, sock_out);
- if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1)
+ if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) &&
+ sensitive_data.server_key == NULL)
generate_ephemeral_server_key();
} else {
for (ai = options.listen_addrs; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
if (num_listen_socks >= MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS)
fatal("Too many listen sockets. "
"Enlarge MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS");
- if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen,
+ if ((ret = getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen,
ntop, sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport),
- NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV) != 0) {
- error("getnameinfo failed");
+ NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV)) != 0) {
+ error("getnameinfo failed: %.100s",
+ (ret != EAI_SYSTEM) ? gai_strerror(ret) :
+ strerror(errno));
continue;
}
/* Create socket for listening. */
- listen_sock = socket(ai->ai_family, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
+ listen_sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype,
+ ai->ai_protocol);
if (listen_sock < 0) {
/* kernel may not support ipv6 */
verbose("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
continue;
}
- if (fcntl(listen_sock, F_SETFL, O_NONBLOCK) < 0) {
- error("listen_sock O_NONBLOCK: %s", strerror(errno));
+ if (set_nonblock(listen_sock) == -1) {
close(listen_sock);
continue;
}
/*
- * Set socket options. We try to make the port
- * reusable and have it close as fast as possible
- * without waiting in unnecessary wait states on
- * close.
+ * Set socket options.
+ * Allow local port reuse in TIME_WAIT.
*/
- setsockopt(listen_sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR,
- (void *) &on, sizeof(on));
- linger.l_onoff = 1;
- linger.l_linger = 5;
- setsockopt(listen_sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_LINGER,
- (void *) &linger, sizeof(linger));
+ if (setsockopt(listen_sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR,
+ &on, sizeof(on)) == -1)
+ error("setsockopt SO_REUSEADDR: %s", strerror(errno));
debug("Bind to port %s on %s.", strport, ntop);
num_listen_socks++;
/* Start listening on the port. */
- log("Server listening on %s port %s.", ntop, strport);
- if (listen(listen_sock, 5) < 0)
+ logit("Server listening on %s port %s.", ntop, strport);
+ if (listen(listen_sock, SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG) < 0)
fatal("listen: %.100s", strerror(errno));
}
* overwrite any old pid in the file.
*/
f = fopen(options.pid_file, "wb");
- if (f) {
- fprintf(f, "%u\n", (u_int) getpid());
+ if (f == NULL) {
+ error("Couldn't create pid file \"%s\": %s",
+ options.pid_file, strerror(errno));
+ } else {
+ fprintf(f, "%ld\n", (long) getpid());
fclose(f);
}
}
if (ret < 0 && errno != EINTR)
error("select: %.100s", strerror(errno));
if (received_sigterm) {
- log("Received signal %d; terminating.",
- received_sigterm);
+ logit("Received signal %d; terminating.",
+ (int) received_sigterm);
close_listen_socks();
unlink(options.pid_file);
exit(255);
error("accept: %.100s", strerror(errno));
continue;
}
- if (fcntl(newsock, F_SETFL, 0) < 0) {
- error("newsock del O_NONBLOCK: %s", strerror(errno));
+ if (unset_nonblock(newsock) == -1) {
+ close(newsock);
continue;
}
if (drop_connection(startups) == 1) {
continue;
}
+ if (rexec_flag && socketpair(AF_UNIX,
+ SOCK_STREAM, 0, config_s) == -1) {
+ error("reexec socketpair: %s",
+ strerror(errno));
+ close(newsock);
+ close(startup_p[0]);
+ close(startup_p[1]);
+ continue;
+ }
+
for (j = 0; j < options.max_startups; j++)
if (startup_pipes[j] == -1) {
startup_pipes[j] = startup_p[0];
close_listen_socks();
sock_in = newsock;
sock_out = newsock;
+ close(startup_p[0]);
+ close(startup_p[1]);
startup_pipe = -1;
pid = getpid();
+ if (rexec_flag) {
+ send_rexec_state(config_s[0],
+ &cfg);
+ close(config_s[0]);
+ }
break;
} else {
/*
* the connection.
*/
startup_pipe = startup_p[1];
- for (j = 0; j < options.max_startups; j++)
- if (startup_pipes[j] != -1)
- close(startup_pipes[j]);
+ close_startup_pipes();
close_listen_socks();
sock_in = newsock;
sock_out = newsock;
log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr);
+ if (rexec_flag)
+ close(config_s[0]);
break;
}
}
if (pid < 0)
error("fork: %.100s", strerror(errno));
else
- debug("Forked child %d.", pid);
+ debug("Forked child %ld.", (long)pid);
close(startup_p[1]);
+ if (rexec_flag) {
+ send_rexec_state(config_s[0], &cfg);
+ close(config_s[0]);
+ close(config_s[1]);
+ }
+
/* Mark that the key has been used (it was "given" to the child). */
if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) &&
key_used == 0) {
}
/* This is the child processing a new connection. */
+ setproctitle("%s", "[accepted]");
+
+ /*
+ * Create a new session and process group since the 4.4BSD
+ * setlogin() affects the entire process group. We don't
+ * want the child to be able to affect the parent.
+ */
+#if !defined(SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY)
+ /*
+ * If setsid is called, on some platforms sshd will later acquire a
+ * controlling terminal which will result in "could not set
+ * controlling tty" errors.
+ */
+ if (!debug_flag && !inetd_flag && setsid() < 0)
+ error("setsid: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+#endif
+
+ if (rexec_flag) {
+ int fd;
+
+ debug("rexec start in %d out %d newsock %d pipe %d sock %d",
+ sock_in, sock_out, newsock, startup_pipe, config_s[0]);
+ dup2(newsock, STDIN_FILENO);
+ dup2(STDIN_FILENO, STDOUT_FILENO);
+ if (startup_pipe == -1)
+ close(REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD);
+ else
+ dup2(startup_pipe, REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD);
+
+ dup2(config_s[1], REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD);
+ close(config_s[1]);
+ if (startup_pipe != -1)
+ close(startup_pipe);
+
+ execv(rexec_argv[0], rexec_argv);
+
+ /* Reexec has failed, fall back and continue */
+ error("rexec of %s failed: %s", rexec_argv[0], strerror(errno));
+ recv_rexec_state(REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD, NULL);
+ log_init(__progname, options.log_level,
+ options.log_facility, log_stderr);
+
+ /* Clean up fds */
+ startup_pipe = REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD;
+ close(config_s[1]);
+ close(REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD);
+ newsock = sock_out = sock_in = dup(STDIN_FILENO);
+ if ((fd = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR, 0)) != -1) {
+ dup2(fd, STDIN_FILENO);
+ dup2(fd, STDOUT_FILENO);
+ if (fd > STDERR_FILENO)
+ close(fd);
+ }
+ debug("rexec cleanup in %d out %d newsock %d pipe %d sock %d",
+ sock_in, sock_out, newsock, startup_pipe, config_s[0]);
+ }
/*
* Disable the key regeneration alarm. We will not regenerate the
signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
signal(SIGINT, SIG_DFL);
- /*
- * Set socket options for the connection. We want the socket to
- * close as fast as possible without waiting for anything. If the
- * connection is not a socket, these will do nothing.
- */
- /* setsockopt(sock_in, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, (void *)&on, sizeof(on)); */
- linger.l_onoff = 1;
- linger.l_linger = 5;
- setsockopt(sock_in, SOL_SOCKET, SO_LINGER, (void *) &linger, sizeof(linger));
-
- /* Set keepalives if requested. */
- if (options.keepalives &&
- setsockopt(sock_in, SOL_SOCKET, SO_KEEPALIVE, (void *)&on,
- sizeof(on)) < 0)
- error("setsockopt SO_KEEPALIVE: %.100s", strerror(errno));
-
/*
* Register our connection. This turns encryption off because we do
* not have a key.
*/
packet_set_connection(sock_in, sock_out);
+ packet_set_server();
- remote_port = get_remote_port();
- remote_ip = get_remote_ipaddr();
+ /* Set SO_KEEPALIVE if requested. */
+ if (options.tcp_keep_alive && packet_connection_is_on_socket() &&
+ setsockopt(sock_in, SOL_SOCKET, SO_KEEPALIVE, &on, sizeof(on)) < 0)
+ error("setsockopt SO_KEEPALIVE: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+
+ if ((remote_port = get_remote_port()) < 0) {
+ debug("get_remote_port failed");
+ cleanup_exit(255);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We use get_canonical_hostname with usedns = 0 instead of
+ * get_remote_ipaddr here so IP options will be checked.
+ */
+ remote_ip = get_canonical_hostname(0);
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ audit_connection_from(remote_ip, remote_port);
+#endif
#ifdef LIBWRAP
/* Check whether logins are denied from this host. */
- {
+ if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) {
struct request_info req;
request_init(&req, RQ_DAEMON, __progname, RQ_FILE, sock_in, 0);
/* Log the connection. */
verbose("Connection from %.500s port %d", remote_ip, remote_port);
+#ifdef USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API
/*
- * We don\'t want to listen forever unless the other side
+ * Create a new security session for use by the new user login if
+ * the current session is the root session or we are not launched
+ * by inetd (eg: debugging mode or server mode). We do not
+ * necessarily need to create a session if we are launched from
+ * inetd because Panther xinetd will create a session for us.
+ *
+ * The only case where this logic will fail is if there is an
+ * inetd running in a non-root session which is not creating
+ * new sessions for us. Then all the users will end up in the
+ * same session (bad).
+ *
+ * When the client exits, the session will be destroyed for us
+ * automatically.
+ *
+ * We must create the session before any credentials are stored
+ * (including AFS pags, which happens a few lines below).
+ */
+ {
+ OSStatus err = 0;
+ SecuritySessionId sid = 0;
+ SessionAttributeBits sattrs = 0;
+
+ err = SessionGetInfo(callerSecuritySession, &sid, &sattrs);
+ if (err)
+ error("SessionGetInfo() failed with error %.8X",
+ (unsigned) err);
+ else
+ debug("Current Session ID is %.8X / Session Attributes are %.8X",
+ (unsigned) sid, (unsigned) sattrs);
+
+ if (inetd_flag && !(sattrs & sessionIsRoot))
+ debug("Running in inetd mode in a non-root session... "
+ "assuming inetd created the session for us.");
+ else {
+ debug("Creating new security session...");
+ err = SessionCreate(0, sessionHasTTY | sessionIsRemote);
+ if (err)
+ error("SessionCreate() failed with error %.8X",
+ (unsigned) err);
+
+ err = SessionGetInfo(callerSecuritySession, &sid,
+ &sattrs);
+ if (err)
+ error("SessionGetInfo() failed with error %.8X",
+ (unsigned) err);
+ else
+ debug("New Session ID is %.8X / Session Attributes are %.8X",
+ (unsigned) sid, (unsigned) sattrs);
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * We don't want to listen forever unless the other side
* successfully authenticates itself. So we set up an alarm which is
* cleared after successful authentication. A limit of zero
- * indicates no limit. Note that we don\'t set the alarm in debugging
+ * indicates no limit. Note that we don't set the alarm in debugging
* mode; it is just annoying to have the server exit just when you
* are about to discover the bug.
*/
alarm(options.login_grace_time);
sshd_exchange_identification(sock_in, sock_out);
- /*
- * Check that the connection comes from a privileged port.
- * Rhosts-Authentication only makes sense from priviledged
- * programs. Of course, if the intruder has root access on his local
- * machine, he can connect from any port. So do not use these
- * authentication methods from machines that you do not trust.
- */
- if (remote_port >= IPPORT_RESERVED ||
- remote_port < IPPORT_RESERVED / 2) {
- debug("Rhosts Authentication disabled, "
- "originating port %d not trusted.", remote_port);
- options.rhosts_authentication = 0;
- }
-#if defined(KRB4) && !defined(KRB5)
- if (!packet_connection_is_ipv4() &&
- options.kerberos_authentication) {
- debug("Kerberos Authentication disabled, only available for IPv4.");
- options.kerberos_authentication = 0;
- }
-#endif /* KRB4 && !KRB5 */
-#ifdef AFS
+#if defined(AFS_KRB5)
/* If machine has AFS, set process authentication group. */
if (k_hasafs()) {
k_setpag();
k_unlog();
}
-#endif /* AFS */
+#endif /* AFS || AFS_KRB5 */
packet_set_nonblocking();
+ /* allocate authentication context */
+ authctxt = xmalloc(sizeof(*authctxt));
+ memset(authctxt, 0, sizeof(*authctxt));
+
+ authctxt->loginmsg = &loginmsg;
+
+ /* XXX global for cleanup, access from other modules */
+ the_authctxt = authctxt;
+
+ /* prepare buffer to collect messages to display to user after login */
+ buffer_init(&loginmsg);
+
+ if (use_privsep)
+ if (privsep_preauth(authctxt) == 1)
+ goto authenticated;
+
/* perform the key exchange */
/* authenticate user and start session */
if (compat20) {
do_ssh2_kex();
- do_authentication2();
+ do_authentication2(authctxt);
} else {
do_ssh1_kex();
- do_authentication();
+ do_authentication(authctxt);
+ }
+ /*
+ * If we use privilege separation, the unprivileged child transfers
+ * the current keystate and exits
+ */
+ if (use_privsep) {
+ mm_send_keystate(pmonitor);
+ exit(0);
+ }
+
+ authenticated:
+ /*
+ * Cancel the alarm we set to limit the time taken for
+ * authentication.
+ */
+ alarm(0);
+ signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL);
+ if (startup_pipe != -1) {
+ close(startup_pipe);
+ startup_pipe = -1;
}
+
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ audit_event(SSH_AUTH_SUCCESS);
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * In privilege separation, we fork another child and prepare
+ * file descriptor passing.
+ */
+ if (use_privsep) {
+ privsep_postauth(authctxt);
+ /* the monitor process [priv] will not return */
+ if (!compat20)
+ destroy_sensitive_data();
+ }
+
+ /* Start session. */
+ do_authenticated(authctxt);
+
/* The connection has been terminated. */
verbose("Closing connection to %.100s", remote_ip);
#ifdef USE_PAM
- finish_pam();
+ if (options.use_pam)
+ finish_pam();
#endif /* USE_PAM */
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ PRIVSEP(audit_event(SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE));
+#endif
+
packet_close();
+
+ if (use_privsep)
+ mm_terminate();
+
exit(0);
}
+/*
+ * Decrypt session_key_int using our private server key and private host key
+ * (key with larger modulus first).
+ */
+int
+ssh1_session_key(BIGNUM *session_key_int)
+{
+ int rsafail = 0;
+
+ if (BN_cmp(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n, sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) > 0) {
+ /* Server key has bigger modulus. */
+ if (BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n) <
+ BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) {
+ fatal("do_connection: %s: server_key %d < host_key %d + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED %d",
+ get_remote_ipaddr(),
+ BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n),
+ BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n),
+ SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED);
+ }
+ if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int,
+ sensitive_data.server_key->rsa) <= 0)
+ rsafail++;
+ if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int,
+ sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa) <= 0)
+ rsafail++;
+ } else {
+ /* Host key has bigger modulus (or they are equal). */
+ if (BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) <
+ BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) {
+ fatal("do_connection: %s: host_key %d < server_key %d + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED %d",
+ get_remote_ipaddr(),
+ BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n),
+ BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n),
+ SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED);
+ }
+ if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int,
+ sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa) < 0)
+ rsafail++;
+ if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int,
+ sensitive_data.server_key->rsa) < 0)
+ rsafail++;
+ }
+ return (rsafail);
+}
/*
* SSH1 key exchange
*/
do_ssh1_kex(void)
{
int i, len;
- int plen, slen;
int rsafail = 0;
BIGNUM *session_key_int;
u_char session_key[SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH];
u_char cookie[8];
u_int cipher_type, auth_mask, protocol_flags;
- u_int32_t rand = 0;
+ u_int32_t rnd = 0;
/*
* Generate check bytes that the client must send back in the user
*/
for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
if (i % 4 == 0)
- rand = arc4random();
- cookie[i] = rand & 0xff;
- rand >>= 8;
+ rnd = arc4random();
+ cookie[i] = rnd & 0xff;
+ rnd >>= 8;
}
/*
/* Declare supported authentication types. */
auth_mask = 0;
- if (options.rhosts_authentication)
- auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_RHOSTS;
if (options.rhosts_rsa_authentication)
auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA;
if (options.rsa_authentication)
auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_RSA;
-#if defined(KRB4) || defined(KRB5)
- if (options.kerberos_authentication)
- auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_KERBEROS;
-#endif
-#if defined(AFS) || defined(KRB5)
- if (options.kerberos_tgt_passing)
- auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_PASS_KERBEROS_TGT;
-#endif
-#ifdef AFS
- if (options.afs_token_passing)
- auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_PASS_AFS_TOKEN;
-#endif
if (options.challenge_response_authentication == 1)
auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_TIS;
-
-/*modified by binhe*/
-#ifdef GSSAPI
- if (options.gss_authentication)
- auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_GSSAPI;
-#endif
-/*end of modification*/
-
if (options.password_authentication)
auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_PASSWORD;
packet_put_int(auth_mask);
BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n));
/* Read clients reply (cipher type and session key). */
- packet_read_expect(&plen, SSH_CMSG_SESSION_KEY);
+ packet_read_expect(SSH_CMSG_SESSION_KEY);
/* Get cipher type and check whether we accept this. */
cipher_type = packet_get_char();
debug("Encryption type: %.200s", cipher_name(cipher_type));
/* Get the encrypted integer. */
- session_key_int = BN_new();
- packet_get_bignum(session_key_int, &slen);
+ if ((session_key_int = BN_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("do_ssh1_kex: BN_new failed");
+ packet_get_bignum(session_key_int);
protocol_flags = packet_get_int();
packet_set_protocol_flags(protocol_flags);
+ packet_check_eom();
- packet_integrity_check(plen, 1 + 8 + slen + 4, SSH_CMSG_SESSION_KEY);
+ /* Decrypt session_key_int using host/server keys */
+ rsafail = PRIVSEP(ssh1_session_key(session_key_int));
- /*
- * Decrypt it using our private server key and private host key (key
- * with larger modulus first).
- */
- if (BN_cmp(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n, sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) > 0) {
- /* Server key has bigger modulus. */
- if (BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n) <
- BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) {
- fatal("do_connection: %s: server_key %d < host_key %d + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED %d",
- get_remote_ipaddr(),
- BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n),
- BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n),
- SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED);
- }
- if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int,
- sensitive_data.server_key->rsa) <= 0)
- rsafail++;
- if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int,
- sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa) <= 0)
- rsafail++;
- } else {
- /* Host key has bigger modulus (or they are equal). */
- if (BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) <
- BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) {
- fatal("do_connection: %s: host_key %d < server_key %d + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED %d",
- get_remote_ipaddr(),
- BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n),
- BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n),
- SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED);
- }
- if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int,
- sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa) < 0)
- rsafail++;
- if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int,
- sensitive_data.server_key->rsa) < 0)
- rsafail++;
- }
/*
* Extract session key from the decrypted integer. The key is in the
* least significant 256 bits of the integer; the first byte of the
if (!rsafail) {
BN_mask_bits(session_key_int, sizeof(session_key) * 8);
len = BN_num_bytes(session_key_int);
- if (len < 0 || len > sizeof(session_key)) {
+ if (len < 0 || (u_int)len > sizeof(session_key)) {
error("do_connection: bad session key len from %s: "
"session_key_int %d > sizeof(session_key) %lu",
get_remote_ipaddr(), len, (u_long)sizeof(session_key));
BN_bn2bin(session_key_int,
session_key + sizeof(session_key) - len);
- compute_session_id(session_id, cookie,
+ derive_ssh1_session_id(
sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n,
- sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n);
+ sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n,
+ cookie, session_id);
/*
* Xor the first 16 bytes of the session key with the
* session id.
}
if (rsafail) {
int bytes = BN_num_bytes(session_key_int);
- char *buf = xmalloc(bytes);
+ u_char *buf = xmalloc(bytes);
MD5_CTX md;
- log("do_connection: generating a fake encryption key");
+ logit("do_connection: generating a fake encryption key");
BN_bn2bin(session_key_int, buf);
MD5_Init(&md);
MD5_Update(&md, buf, bytes);
for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
session_id[i] = session_key[i] ^ session_key[i + 16];
}
-
-/*modified by binhe*/
-#ifdef GSSAPI
- /*
- * Before we destroy the host and server keys, hash them so we can
- * send the hash over to the client via a secure channel so that it
- * can verify them.
- */
- {
- MD5_CTX md5context;
- Buffer buf;
- unsigned char *data;
- unsigned int data_len;
- extern unsigned char ssh_key_digest[]; /* in auth_gssapi.c */
-
-
- debug("Calculating MD5 hash of server and host keys...");
-
- /* Write all the keys to a temporary buffer */
- buffer_init(&buf);
-
- /* Server key */
- buffer_put_bignum(&buf, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->e);
- buffer_put_bignum(&buf, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n);
-
- /* Host key */
- buffer_put_bignum(&buf, sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->e);
- buffer_put_bignum(&buf, sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n);
-
- /* Get the resulting data */
- data = (unsigned char *) buffer_ptr(&buf);
- data_len = buffer_len(&buf);
-
- /* And hash it */
- MD5_Init(&md5context);
- MD5_Update(&md5context, data, data_len);
- MD5_Final(ssh_key_digest, &md5context);
-
- /* Clean up */
- buffer_clear(&buf);
- buffer_free(&buf);
- }
-#endif /* GSSAPI */
-/*end of modification*/
-
- /* Destroy the private and public keys. They will no longer be needed. */
+ /* Destroy the private and public keys. No longer. */
destroy_sensitive_data();
+ if (use_privsep)
+ mm_ssh1_session_id(session_id);
+
/* Destroy the decrypted integer. It is no longer needed. */
BN_clear_free(session_key_int);
debug("Received session key; encryption turned on.");
- /* Send an acknowledgement packet. Note that this packet is sent encrypted. */
+ /* Send an acknowledgment packet. Note that this packet is sent encrypted. */
packet_start(SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS);
packet_send();
packet_write_wait();
if (options.ciphers != NULL) {
myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = options.ciphers;
+ } else if (options.none_enabled == 1) {
+ debug ("WARNING: None cipher enabled");
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = KEX_ENCRYPT_INCLUDE_NONE;
}
myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
compat_cipher_proposal(myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS]);
myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] =
myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = options.macs;
}
+ if (options.compression == COMP_NONE) {
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS] =
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] = "none";
+ } else if (options.compression == COMP_DELAYED) {
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS] =
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] = "none,zlib@openssh.com";
+ }
+
myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = list_hostkey_types();
+ /* start key exchange */
+
#ifdef GSSAPI
- {
+ {
char *orig;
char *gss = NULL;
char *newstr = NULL;
- orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
-
- /* If we don't have a host key, then all of the algorithms
- * currently in myproposal are useless */
- if (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS])==0)
- orig= NULL;
-
- if (options.gss_keyex)
- gss = ssh_gssapi_mechanisms(1,NULL);
- else
- gss = NULL;
-
+ orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
+
+ /*
+ * If we don't have a host key, then there's no point advertising
+ * the other key exchange algorithms
+ */
+
+ if (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]) == 0)
+ orig = NULL;
+
+ if (options.gss_keyex)
+ gss = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms();
+ else
+ gss = NULL;
+
if (gss && orig) {
- int len = strlen(orig) + strlen(gss) +2;
- newstr=xmalloc(len);
- snprintf(newstr,len,"%s,%s",gss,orig);
+ int len = strlen(orig) + strlen(gss) + 2;
+ newstr = xmalloc(len);
+ snprintf(newstr, len, "%s,%s", gss, orig);
} else if (gss) {
- newstr=gss;
+ newstr = gss;
} else if (orig) {
- newstr=orig;
- }
- /* If we've got GSSAPI mechanisms, then we've also got the 'null'
- host key algorithm, but we're not allowed to advertise it, unless
- its the only host key algorithm we're supporting */
- if (gss && (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS])) == 0) {
- myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]="null";
+ newstr = orig;
}
+ /*
+ * If we've got GSSAPI mechanisms, then we've got the 'null' host
+ * key alg, but we can't tell people about it unless its the only
+ * host key algorithm we support
+ */
+ if (gss && (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS])) == 0)
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = "null";
+
if (newstr)
- myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]=newstr;
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = newstr;
else
fatal("No supported key exchange algorithms");
- }
+ }
#endif
- /* start key exchange */
- kex = kex_setup(myproposal);
- kex->server = 1;
- kex->client_version_string=client_version_string;
- kex->server_version_string=server_version_string;
+ /* start key exchange */
+ kex = kex_setup(myproposal);
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server;
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
+#endif
+ kex->server = 1;
+ kex->client_version_string=client_version_string;
+ kex->server_version_string=server_version_string;
kex->load_host_key=&get_hostkey_by_type;
+ kex->host_key_index=&get_hostkey_index;
xxx_kex = kex;
#endif
debug("KEX done");
}
+
+/* server specific fatal cleanup */
+void
+cleanup_exit(int i)
+{
+ if (the_authctxt)
+ do_cleanup(the_authctxt);
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ /* done after do_cleanup so it can cancel the PAM auth 'thread' */
+ if (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor())
+ audit_event(SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON);
+#endif
+ _exit(i);
+}